



ARTICLE

Tendencies of Translation Manipulation Strategies in Anglophone Mass Media: The Case of the “Collective West”

Alyona V. Dymova

Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia

Natalya N. Koptyaeva

Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg, Russia

Thomas A. Beavitt

Institute for Philosophy and Law, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Yekaterinburg, Russia

ABSTRACT

Especially at times of conflict, questions concerning the accuracy of texts published as translations are of interest in fields including sociology and international relations due to their role in facilitating—or forestalling—the possibility of resolving such conflicts. In order to examine why texts asserted as translations are not always accurate, we analyze tendencies in mistranslation. To this end, we sampled texts containing the key term “collective West” from Russian news sources and their translations in Anglophone mass media. Using a comparative interpretation method within contextual and discursive theory, we noticed numerous discrepancies and distortions, which allowed us to identify key tendencies in mistranslation. Five main tendencies identified from the analysis are: (a) subtle tampering in direct quotation; (b) deliberate omission of chunks; (c) imprecise indirect quotation; (d) tampering with the cornerstones of direct quotation; (e) defacing the source of quotation. The results of our research reveal the manipulative character of such mistranslations.

Received 4 July 2024

Accepted 23 November 2024

Published online 28 December 2024

© 2024 Alyona V. Dymova, Natalya N. Koptyaeva,

Thomas A. Beavitt

dym.alyona@yandex.ru, nkoptyaeva@inbox.ru,

tommy@globalvillagebard.org

KEYWORDS

collective West, translation distortion, news translation, ideologeme, mistranslation, linguistic manipulation, international relations, Anglophone media, misquotation

Introduction and Literature Review

Especially at times of geopolitical turmoil, languages undergo shifts, which become embedded in particular semantic meanings that are subsequently attached to certain words and phrases. Depending on the position of a given protagonist in an unfolding conflict, as well as the eventual outcomes of such conflicts, a particular term may acquire a positive or negative connotation. This in turn depends not only on one's opponent's interpretation of the semantic meaning of this term, but also on one's own perceptions of the opponent's interpretation. Since, in addition to involving opposing perspectives, media coverage of geopolitical developments takes place in multiple languages, involving the near-simultaneous translation of the news media of the other participants in the conflict, it becomes necessary for translation and social discourse theories to take such rapidly evolving and potentially diverse meanings into account.

While many linguists proceed according to the assumption that "language is a natural growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes," this position has been criticized as leading to the "abuse of language" (Orwell, 2013). Such abuses are especially likely when occurring in political contexts, memorably characterized by George Orwell, and discussed in a previously published paper, as "a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia" (Beavitt, 2021). In other previous research, the unique position of the English language in global communication was considered both in terms of its serving as an interlingua to conduct international scientific communication, and concerning whether such a role may involve elements of linguistic imperialism (Popova & Beavitt, 2017). Given these identified tendencies, it becomes relevant to examine the extent to which linguistic shifts result in the context of international conflicts due to hostile manipulations, as well as to consider whether the English language itself is inherently prone to such manipulations.

Perceived hostile linguistic manipulations are not always limited to countries defined as "unfriendly," but, as a result of the rapid dissemination of media content by international news agencies, can also appear in the media of ostensibly neutral or even "friendly" countries. For example, in a rebuttal issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India's English-language media are alleged in their coverage of the present Ukrainian crisis to "blindly reprint articles on foreign policy events from biased foreign news agencies, such as AP¹, AFP², Bloomberg³ and Reuters⁴, which present news in the anti-Russia spirit and often publish bare-faced disinformation and

¹ <https://apnews.com>

² <https://www.afp.com/en/news-hub>

³ <https://www.bloomberg.com/europe>

⁴ <https://www.reuters.com>

fake news” (Unreliable publications, 2023). While such rebuttals cannot themselves always be taken at face value, the example serves to highlight the global nature of manipulation, disinformation, and fake news creation techniques in mass media, especially when carried out in the English language.

The present work sets out to evaluate the means by which linguistic distortions creep into media discourses by examining a sample of content that features the concept of the “collective West.” To inform our comparison of the uses of this term in English language media with those appearing in equivalent Russian texts, we will take an interdisciplinary approach that blends linguistic and translation studies techniques with discourse analysis and sociolinguistic approaches.

Since the translation of political media texts serves not only as a means of communication but also as a tool for manipulation and ideological framing, the intersection of linguistics, political science, and media studies has attracted significant scholarly attention. While Norman Fairclough (2013) and Teun A. van Dijk (2013) describe how discourse and ideology interact in political media texts, Mona Baker (2018), Jeremy Munday (2007), and Anthony Pym (2023) explore the theories and practices of translation in terms of its impact on political communication and public perception.

According to Ali Darwish, “by submitting news to translation it undergoes a reframing process entailing a reconstruction of a constructed reality already subjected to professional, institutional or contextual influences” (Darwish, 2010, p. 52). Darwish observes that Western journalists first gather and package foreign news for use as source material, which is then subjected to reframing as a means of adapting news reports to conform to their editorial policy. While some framing and reframing may occur within translation processes themselves, the directed work of sub editors can often play a more significant role in the context of news reporting. However, for the purposes of our analysis, “translator” and “translation” will refer not only to the linguistic activity of professional translators, but also to the editors whose work shapes how such “translations” appear in the form of published texts.

According to Rima Malkawi (2012), translation processes are affected by an *ideological stamp*:

It can be argued that in news media the ideological stamp is not only selective and manipulative of the translation in news media of political discourse, but it also affects the accuracy in the translation process and causes mistranslation. Such mistranslation must be distinguished from mistranslation caused by the level of incompetence of the translator and/or the limitation of the process itself. (p. 38)

Mistranslation may also occur as the result of deliberate manipulation. In contrast to the ostensible primary purpose of translation, which is to accurately render the *meaning* of the source text into the target text, *manipulative translation* has the opposite aim. Lada Kolomiyets (2020) points out that this involves “the idea of conceptual deformation of the source text and, as a result, the objective of subversion of the source-text message(s)” and can be referred to as “propagandistic translation” (p. 368). Zulfira Chanysheva (2017) argues that making deliberate mistakes has non-

linguistic or ideological motivation to manipulate mass consciousness, which may be considered as an act of ideological sabotage to establish control over the informational space of the audience (p. 65). Among potentially manipulative techniques used in political translation and described in the literature are additions and omissions (Khanmohammad & Aminzad, 2015), combination of reframing and translation, manifestation of conflicts in political ideologies (Kaplunen et al., 2020), evaluation in naming (Munday, 2007), and many others.

In the present work, we consider this set of problems on the example of the phrase the “collective West,” or “коллективный Запад” [kollektivnyi Zapad] in Russian, currently used by both main protagonists in the geopolitical proxy conflict currently centred on Ukraine, but sometimes to connote quite varying (self-)conceptualized entities. In a recent work, we demonstrated that the ideologeme “kollektivnyi Zapad”—along with its English version the “collective West”—carries a negative connotation, comprising the components *confrontation*, *aggression*, *hegemony*, *decline*, *hypocrisy*, etc. (Dymova & Koptyaeva, 2024). We noticed that, when translating Russian statements including the term the “collective West,” Anglophone media apply various techniques of linguistic manipulation (depersonalization, personification, distortion in translation). For this reason, it was necessary to carry out further research to reveal the tendencies of mistranslation. To this end, a bilingual sample of different uses of this term, obtained from a representative number of Russian and Anglophone news sources, is analyzed. From the analysis, five main tendencies are identified. These form a basis for a consideration of the nature of the manipulation techniques themselves, as well as a discussion of what they may be trying to achieve.

Along with being relevant to professional and theoretical linguists, a deepened understanding of such differences and changes in the meanings of terms associated with conflicts and changing international contexts, including those that involve both intentional and unintentional manipulation (Akopova, 2013), may be of interest to government policymakers, as well as decision makers working for companies involved in international trade, NGOs, etc.

Methods and Materials

For the sample, we collected 103 original Russian language fragments, which date from 2022 to 2024, from Russian and Belorussian news sources containing the key phrase “коллективный Запад” [kollektivnyi Zapad]⁵. All of the fragments are thematically united by their focus on the nature of political and economic interactions between Russia and the West as representing a major field in which the term “коллективный Запад” (phonetically “kollektivnyi Zapad”, meaning “collective West”) is applied. These were then compared with 143 translations appearing in British or

⁵ The original Russian statements were taken from: [TASS](https://tass.ru), [RIA Novosti](https://ria.ru), [Rossiyskaya Gazeta](https://rosstat.gov.ru), [Izvestiia](https://izvestia.ru), [RBC.ru](https://rbc.ru), [Interfax](https://interfax.ru), [Lenta.ru](https://lenta.ru), [Vedomosti](https://vedomosti.ru), [Gazeta.ru](https://gazeta.ru), [Regnum](https://regnum.ru), [BFM.ru](https://bfm.ru), [Radio Sputnik](https://radio.sputnik.ru), [MIR24](https://mir24.ru), [Voennoe Obozrenie](https://voennoe-obozrenie.ru), [Vechnyaya Moskva](https://vechernyaya-moskva.ru), [Argumenty i Fakty](https://argumenty-i-fakty.ru), [Komsomolskaya Pravda](https://komsomolskaya-pravda.ru), [Parlamentskaya Gazeta](https://parlament.gazeta.ru), <https://government.ru>, <https://mid.ru>, <https://kremlin.ru>, https://t.me/medvedev_telegram, <https://t.me/tikandelaki>, <https://soyuz.by>, <https://www.belta.by>.

American news publications and featuring the term the “collective West” (or its several variants)⁶. The samples were then analyzed using a comparative interpretation approach according to contextual and discourse theory. From this larger sample, representative fragments were selected to inform the analysis and discussion.

In this research, following the widely accepted definitions of “discourse” by Nina D. Arutiunova (1990), Fairclough & Wodak (1997), van Dijk (2008), etc., we analyzed the sampled material with an emphasis on the social, interactive, and contextual nature of discourse as essential to understanding linguistic facts. In this respect, the discourse theory of Laclau & Mouffe (2001) was of particular importance due to its establishment of a framework for investigating how discursive practices shape politics and how the concept of “hegemony” influences dominant narratives. Consequently, it is by means of discursive analysis that we were able to obtain an insight into the application of the term the “collective West” across different discourses, focusing on the covert translation manipulations and their ideological implications.

Likewise, contextual theory, closely connected to discourse theory and extensively discussed by Michael Halliday (1992), allowed us to evaluate equivalence of translation in the sample, that is to say, whether equivalence of meaning as equivalence of function is established in each particular context. In other words, when analysing the sample, we took into consideration that each item from the original statement has a variety of equivalents in the translated version, but that each is “contextually conditioned,” thus contributing differently to a particular discourse.

Integrating both contextual and discursive theories, the following 5-step methodological approach was formulated to ensure an in-depth examination of the sample: (a) selection of the sample; (b) categorisation into five tendencies; (c) contextual analysis of equivalence; (d) discursive analysis of translation manipulations; (e) synthesis of the data from the previous steps.

Textual Analysis

The phrase “коллективный Запад” (phonetically “kollektivnyi Zapad”) typically translated into English as “collective West,” almost universally preceded with “the,” became prominent in the post-Soviet era as a means to describe the perceived unified stance of Western nations—primarily the States and European countries—on geopolitical issues that involve Russia and its actions on the global stage. According to Giogio Comai (2023), this term was preceded by the expression “our Western partners,” which is “supposedly neutral, but in context often deprived of positive connotations” (p. 2).

In the political texts considered in this study, various stylistic devices are identified as playing a role in the (mis)representation of the term the “collective West.” For example, enclosing the phrase in quotation marks may indicate the author’s disagreement with the term, their ironic attitude towards it, or the limited circle of

⁶ BrE: [Reuters](#), [The Guardian](#), [Sky News](#), [The Independent](#), [The Mirror](#), [Daily Mail](#), [The Sun](#). AmE: [AP News](#), [The New York Times](#), [POLITICO](#), [Fox News](#), [NBC News](#), [CNN](#), [U.S. News & World Report](#), [CNBC](#), [HuffPost](#), [Bloomberg](#), [Newsweek](#), [The Daily Beast](#), [Foreign Policy](#), [USA Today](#), [Los Angeles Times](#), [The Washington Post](#).

people who are understood to use it. Additionally, as demonstrated in some of the examples used in this paper, quotation marks may be used when the term is paired with markers like “the term” or “the concept.” The term can be written with capital letters in both words (“Collective West”) or lowercase: “The *collective west* wants to divide our society” (Guilbert, 2022). Significantly, there can also be different versions of translation of the same Russian statement “Коллективный Запад пытается расколоть наше общество” (Stenogramma vystupleniia, 2022), e.g., “*The West, collectively*, is trying to fracture our society” (Ruiz, 2022).

In disavowing the term the “collective West” altogether, English-language media may employ various other designations to refer to what appears to be the same entity (i.e., as opposed to the Global South, Eurasia, the Muslim world, the East, etc.): “the Western world,” “the western countries,” “the West,” or, more euphemistically, “the international community.” Even the simple first-person plural pronoun “we” can frequently be used to carry this semantic burden, especially when typically coupled with modal verbs like “can” and “should.”

In some cases, Anglophone media attempt to explain the term the “collective West” to their readers from Russia’s assumed perspective:

The stakes are rising as Russia seeks to paint its war in Ukraine as a battle against the liberal democracies of what it calls the “collective West.” (Belton & Rauhala, 2023)

They use that term in describing their conflict against the collective West, which in their mind is the United States and all of the so-called “vassal states” that in their mind we control. (Transcript: World Stage, 2023)

Tendency 1. Subtle Tampering in Direct Quotation

One of the manipulative tendencies associated with direct quotation is misquotation. This occurs when some statement is represented as if it were a *precise* translation of the original in quotation marks, when in fact some details have been changed in it. Due to their probable lack of knowledge of the source language, target readers are unlikely to notice that something has been altered, since, more often than not, such changes are *subtle* and not immediately apparent.

Various devices used in the course of subtle tampering with the meaning of the original quotation may include omitting words (Quotes 1–3, 5, 8), lexical substitution (Quotes 3, 4, 6, 9), reordering/changing a theme–rheme pattern and eliminating an emotional component (Quote 7); transposition with a change in meaning, e.g., when the active voice is unjustifiably replaced with the passive voice (Quote 9).

We notice the omission of words in Quotes 1 and 2. The original statement in Quote 1 meant to imply that the absence of readiness on the part of the collective West is temporary, while the translation elides this meaning. Furthermore, Quote 1 is an authentic TASS⁷ translation which has been used in a modified way by NBC News⁸. In the following Quote 2, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov refers to a brief “romantic”

⁷ <https://tass.com>

⁸ <https://www.nbcnews.com>

period of hope for peaceful cooperation between the reformed Soviet Union and the world, the collective West here being added as an additional or third side. However, the meaning of the quote has been changed in translation with the elision of “world” to leave only two sides of this relationship, namely the Soviet Union and the collective West.

Quote 1. “Поэтому пока со стороны коллективного Запада никакой готовности или открытости к мирным инициативам нет”,—констатировал представитель Кремля. (Lystseva, 2023)

“There is no readiness or openness to peaceful initiatives on the part of the collective West,” Peskov was quoted. (Sackur, 2023)

Quote 2. “Горбачев дал импульс [окончанию] холодной войны, и он искренне хотел верить в то, что она закончится и наступит вечный романтический период между новым Советским Союзом и миром, и коллективным Западом.” (Kak v Rossii otreagirovali, 2022)

“Gorbachev gave an impulse for ending the Cold War and he sincerely wanted to believe that it would be over and an eternal romance would start between the renewed Soviet Union and the collective West,” Peskov said. (Isachenkov, 2022)

In the following quotes (3–5) the translators use words with subtle implications (“unstoppable” instead of “relentless”, “bellicose” instead of “aggressive”) instead of the more widely-used terms, possibly to downplay the accusations of aggressiveness on the part of the collective West:

Quote 3. “Ход истории неумолим, и попытки этого коллективного Запада навязать свой миропорядок обречены на неудачу”,—подчеркнул он. (Putin zaiavil, chto voynu na Ukraine razviazal kollektivnyi Zapad, 2022)

“The course of history is *unstoppable* and attempts by the collective West to enforce its version of the global order are doomed to fail.” (Ukraine war, 2022)

Quote 4. “Мы также видим, что коллективный Запад стремится распространить на Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион блоковую систему по аналогии с НАТО в Европе. С этой целью формируются агрессивные военно-политические союзы”. (Putin zaiavil, chto Zapad, 2022)

“We also see that the collective West is seeking to extend its bloc system to the Asia-Pacific region *similarly* to NATO in Europe. For this purpose, *bellicose* military-political alliances are being formed, such as AUKUS and the others,” Putin claimed. (Ellyatt, 2022a)

The metaphor “blank wall” (or, literally, “wall of deafness”) in Quote 5 turns into just “wall,” thus losing the implied meaning of a deliberate deafness (or refusal to negotiate) on the part of the collective West:

Quote 5. “Но, несмотря на это, господину Гутерришу, к сожалению, не удалось пробить глухую стену коллективного Запада. Условия, которые согласовывались как неотъемлемая интегральная часть сделки, выполнены не были.” (V Kremlе nazvali zhestom dobroj voli, 2023)

“But, despite this, unfortunately, Mr. (Antonio) Guterres has failed to break through the collective West’s wall. The conditions that were agreed upon as an integral part of the deal have not been fulfilled.” (Russia says it shows “goodwill,” 2023)

The opposite tendency may also be observed, when the authors of the translation use lexical transformations for the purposes of exaggeration. Instead of “civil confrontation,” they use “civil rebellion,” which has a stronger and more specific meaning: “violent action organized by a group of people who are trying to change the political system in their country” (University of Cambridge, n.d.). While a rebellion in Russia might be desirable for some political elites in the collective West, the original claim merely referred to provoking a civil confrontation.

Quote 6. Коллективный Запад пытается расколоть наше общество, спекулируя на боевых потерях, на социально-экономических последствиях санкций, спровоцировать *гражданское противостояние* в России и, используя свою “пятую колонну,” стремится к достижению своей цели. (Stenogramma vystupleniia, 2022)

“The collective west is trying to divide our society,” Vladimir Putin said in a speech late last week. “Speculating on military losses, the socio-economic consequences of sanctions, to provoke *a civil rebellion* in Russia. And is using its fifth column in order to achieve this goal ... the destruction of Russia. (Roth, 2022)

In some cases, changes in theme–rheme patterns are observed (Khlabutina, 2011), which include not only re-arranging the word order, but also involve subtle meanings connoted by the English article system, which is absent in Russian (Beavitt & Popova, 2020). The version (Quote 7) chosen by the translator has a slight difference in meaning, and pointing out to the collective West as new information, and hence emphasising it, is missing here. Besides, they also avoided a more obvious word choice that would manifest itself in inversion such as “and so does the collective West.”

Quote 7. “Мы понимаем, что Киев продолжает испытывать проблемы, и проблемы также испытывает и коллективный Запад.” (Peskov zaiavil chto SShA, 2024)

“We understand that Kyiv continues to experience problems, *and the collective West is also experiencing problems.*” (Faulconbridge, 2024)

As well as omitting the pejorative phrase “образовалась эта компашка” [obrazovalas’ eta kompashka], the translation of the next quote (8) includes lexical replacement: instead of “became a participant” the translator used “became involved.” The latter sounds softer and implies less responsibility due to the conceptual shift from being represented as an actor to someone merely drawn in.

Quote 8. “Да, это начиналось как специальная военная операция, но, как только там образовалась эта компашка, когда коллективный Запад стал

участником этого на стороне Украины, для нас это уже стало войной. Я в этом убежден”,—сказал представитель Кремля. (Peskov zaiavil, chto Rossiia, 2024)

“It started as a special military operation,” the Kremlin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said. “But as soon as ... the collective west *became involved* in this on the side of Ukraine, it became a war for us.” (Sauer, 2024)

A decision to use the English passive voice in Quote 9 to translate the Russian reflexive verb construction “-сь” (meaning “self”) serves to reduce Ukraine’s implied responsibility for allowing itself to be used as a tool in the hands of the collective West. Additionally, it can be noted that “to put more pressure on” is nowhere near as violent as “*додавить*” (phonetically “*dodavit*”), since it does not express the original idea of destroying Russia.

Quote 9. “Украина превратилась в инструмент в руках коллективного Запада, с помощью которого они намерены, как им кажется, *додавить* Россию, сдерживать Россию, оставить ее на задворках развития во всех смыслах.” (Peskov nazval Ukrainu, 2024)

Because Ukraine *has been turned* into an instrument in the hands of the collective west with whose help it intends, so it seems to them, *to put more pressure on* Russia, restrain Russia and abandon it to the fringes of development. (Lowe & Bayer, 2024)

Thus, we see that tendency of misquotation and mistranslation serves ideological purposes, allowing anglophone mass media to impute negative interpretations of Russia’s policy and representatives, as well as to signal virtue and innocence on the part of the West.

Tendency 2. Deliberate Omission of Chunks

Deliberate omission of chunks of text is frequently practised when facts that can weaken the position of the translator’s own country are elided. Unlike the occasional and isolated exclusion of words and phrases that occur as part of the previous tendency, here clauses (Quotes 10–13, 15) and even whole sentences (Quotes 14, 16) that formed an integral part of the meaning of the original are simply removed. Hence, the original mention of “Maidan-style coups” (trans. by Alyona Dymova, Natalya Koptyaeva, & Thomas Beavitt—A. D., N. K., & T. B.), or color revolutions, whose Russian formulation here takes the genitive plural form to connote a series of events of the same basic type (sometimes translated in the singular by Western journalists as “Maidan Revolution” or “Revolution of Dignity”) was omitted in the translation together with the participle clause in the next example:

Quote 10. “Очевидны попытки коллективного Запада раскатать ситуацию в стране, *используя техники ‘майданных переворотов.’*” (MID Rossii otreagiroval, 2023)

“The attempts of the collective West to destabilise the situation in the country are obvious,” the foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told the state-run news agency RIA Novosti. (Otte & Lowe, 2023)

In Quote 11, the translation oversimplifies the claim about the world order being “based on the priority of international law, the indivisibility of security, respect for the sovereignty and national interests of states,” here ignoring another participle clause. By itself, “just world order” can be interpreted in a variety of ways and without further elaboration remains vague.

Quote 11. “... противостоять политике коллективного Запада, препятствующего установлению подлинно многополярного, справедливого миропорядка, основанного на приоритете международного права, неделимости безопасности, уважении суверенитета и национальных интересов государств.” (Putin otsenil podderzhku, 2023)

Putin wrote, according to Russian state Ria news agency: “Strong support from the DPRK for the special military operation in Ukraine, (and) solidarity with Russia on key international issues further emphasise our common interest and determination to oppose the policy of the collective West, which prevents the establishment of a truly multipolar, just world order.” (Chao-Fong et al., 2023)

Another inconvenient fact omitted in Quote 12 is the deliberate stonewalling of the Minsk agreements, as subsequently admitted by Angela Merkel. As a result, the first-time clause is reflected in the translation, whereas the second one is elided.

Quote 12. С нами воюет коллективный Запад во главе с ядерной державой—США. Эта война была нам объявлена достаточно давно—после того, как состоялся госпереворот на Украине, оркестрированный США и, по сути дела, поддержанный Евросоюзом, и после того, как Минские договоренности, как теперь уже окончательно выясняется, никто не собирался выполнять, госпожа Меркель вновь это подтвердила. (Mettsel', 2022)

“The collective West, which is headed by a nuclear power—the United States—is at war with us,” Lavrov told Channel One, as reported by the state-run Tass news agency. “This war was declared on us quite a long time ago, after the coup d’etat in Ukraine that was orchestrated by the United States and, in fact, backed by the European Union,” Lavrov said. (Brennan, 2022)

The economic growth of Russia mentioned by Peskov is omitted in the next example (Quote 13). Interestingly enough, while several news agencies such as CNBC and USA Today literally quoted TASS’s translation, they opted to delete “We have started to develop,” thus, focusing primarily on the challenges that Russia is currently experiencing.

Quote 13. В экономическом плане мы живем неплохо, мы начали развиваться, у нас, безусловно, есть трудности, есть проблемы, мы не можем не ощущать эти проблемы на себе, учитывая ту недружественную атмосферу, в которой мы находимся, я имею в виду то, что пытаются с

нами делать страны коллективного Запада. Но, несмотря на это, мы все-таки демонстрируем очень хорошие показатели. (Peskov zaiavil, chto rossiiane, 2023)

“In economic terms we are doing quite well,” Peskov said. “We certainly have difficulties. We have problems. We can’t help but feel these problems on ourselves, given the unfriendly atmosphere around us. I mean what the countries of the collective West have been trying to do to us. But despite this, we still demonstrate very good parameters.” (Bacon & Ortiz, 2023)

In Quote 14 we can note a manipulative omission of Russian journalist and TV producer Tina Kandelaki’s words about the benefits the collective West extracted from Russian oligarchs in terms of their spending on luxury goods:

Quote 14. Коллективный Запад всегда нас ненавидел. Когда принимал наши деньги, когда обслуживал нас в дорогих ресторанах, когда продавал дома всем этим олигархам без рода и племени. В глубине души он испытывал к нам презрение, ненависть, граничащую с желанием смерти. (Kandelaki, 2024)

“Deep down the collective West always despised us and felt a hatred bordering on a death wish,” prominent TV personality Tina Kandelaki wrote. (Hartog, 2024)

In statement (Quote 15), Maria Zakharova provides a definition of what Russians mean by “the collective West.” While she mentions the capitals of some Western countries (Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris) and other NATO member states, the translator avoids including this list in the translated version. Likewise, they fail to mention the point that all these capitals seemed to be aware of the planned terrorist attack. CNN⁹, The New York Times¹⁰, and other names of Anglophone mass media were also omitted. Moreover, the repetition of the name “ISIS”¹¹, put forward by the collective West as the alleged organiser of the terrorist act and contained in the original statement, disappears in translation.

Quote 15. Для того, чтобы отвести подозрения от “коллективного Запада,” от Вашингтона, Лондона, Берлина (который буквально прямым текстом обсуждал, как уже сказала, возможность совершения террористических актов на территории нашей страны), Парижа и других натовских стран, им нужно было срочно найти хоть что-то, хоть какое-то объяснение. Прибегли к ИГИЛ. Так сказать, вынули этот “козырь” из рукава. Буквально спустя несколько часов после теракта англосаксонские мейнстримовые медиа

⁹ <https://edition.cnn.com>

¹⁰ <https://www.nytimes.com>

¹¹ ISIS has been designated a terrorist organisation and is banned from all activities by the United Nations, United States, European Union, Russia, and many others. We condemn all forms of terrorism, particularly this organisation’s activities. ИГИЛ была признана террористической организацией; любая деятельность ИГИЛ запрещена в России, США, Европейском Союзе и многих других странах. Мы осуждаем любые формы терроризма, в том числе деятельность этой организации.

(“Си-Эн-Эн”, “Нью-Йорк Таймс” и многие другие) начали распространять именно эти версии, *главный смысл которых сводился к одному—во всём виновато “Исламское государство”*. (Brifing ofitsial'nogo predstavitelia MID Rossii, 2024)

“In order to ward off suspicions from the collective West, they urgently needed to come up with something, so they resorted to ISIS, pulled an ace out of their sleeve, and literally a few hours after the terrorist attack, the Anglo-Saxon media began disseminating precisely these versions,” she said. (Russia says it is hard to believe, 2024)

While the English translation of Quote 16 mentions terrorist attacks in the Baltic Sea, it fails to convey the original message about the alleged direct beneficiary of the pipeline explosions, namely the United States:

Quote 16. *Нелишним было бы задуматься о причинах упрямого нежелания коллективного Запада дать ход транспарентному и объективному международному расследованию под эгидой Совета Безопасности ООН террористических атак в Балтийском море. Равно как и прояснить роль США в подрывах трубопроводов, в том числе как прямого выгодоприобретателя перекрыжки европейского энергорынка.* (Embassy of Russia in the USA / Posol'stvo Rossii v SShA, 2023)

“It would be useful to think about the reasons for the stubborn unwillingness of the collective West to launch a transparent and objective international investigation under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council in the terrorist attacks in the Baltic Sea,” Ledenev was quoted as saying in a post on the embassy’s Telegram messaging channel. (Russia urges “transparent” investigation, 2023)

To sum up the described cases of deliberate omission of chunks, we can conclude that the Anglophone mass media tend to omit inconvenient facts about the collective West (the Maidan coup, the pipeline explosions, benefits from Russian oligarchs) and statements implying a positive view of Russia (its economic growth, the priority given to international law etc.). At the same time, the remainder of the quoted statements tend to stick closely to the original, sometimes even using the official TASS translation.

Tendency 3. Imprecise Indirect Quotation

In contrast to the tendencies described above, the contexts grouped under this heading show translation manipulations by means of indirect quotation with occasional inclusions of a word or a phrase given in quotation marks. As is seen from the examples below, those words that in any way compliment the translator’s country are quoted in the indirect speech. One reason for this arrangement might be to demonstrate that such compliments are not figments of translators’ imaginations, but are precisely produced by the opposing side. The fact that the rest of the words framing these tiny quotes quite often tamper with the original statement is unlikely to be obvious to the target reader. Among the means employed, we may include generalisation

(Quote 17), concretisation (Quote 23), lexical substitution (Quote 18), changing the meaning (Quotes 19–21), omission of the author’s explanation (Quote 22).

One such case of mistranslation is unjustified generalisation. In Quote 17 instead of “Kiev’s puppet regime” the translator opted to use “Ukraine” in general. However, according to the original statement, the collective West is alleged to support Zelensky’s cabinet rather in the sense that a puppet is “supported” by the puppeteer’s strings, i.e., implying that it is being controlled by a foreign power to advance that power’s ends.

Quote 17. “Коллективный Запад ведет против России опосредованную войну, оказывая беспрецедентную поддержку *марионеточному киевскому режиму*.” (Kollektivnyi Zapad vedet protiv Rossii, 2023)

“The collective West is waging a proxy war against Russia,” he said, according to his ministry, pointing to its “unprecedented support” for *Ukraine*. (Russia to build up forces, 2023)

Imprecise quotation can be made in the form of lexical substitution, a means widely used in Tendency 1. For example, in Quote 18, the translator uses “to strengthen” instead of “to preserve.” Furthermore, “to strengthen” is indeed a word borrowed from the original statement—“укреплять” [ukrepliat’],—although there it is applied to an opposing idea that “strengthening global security is not the collective West’s goal”.

Quote 18. Что касается “коллективного Запада” во главе с США, то эти страны стремятся затормозить и повернуть данные процессы вспять. Их цель—не *укреплять* всеобщую безопасность и не заниматься совместным развитием, а *сохранить* свою гегемонию в мировых делах и далее реализовывать неокOLONIALную повестку. (Interv’iu Ministra inostrannykh del, 2023)

The goal of the “US-led collective West” is *to strengthen* its global hegemony, Lavrov told the Kompas newspaper. (Russia’s Lavrov, 2023)

Another case of mistranslation involves a change in the meaning, e.g., when predicted energy shortages and price rises in European countries are attributed to Russia. The problems with energy supply are listed along with Ukraine’s loss of state independence. Thus, according to the translation, it is Russia and Ukraine that would suffer from the consequences of the war. This shift in the meaning appears to be aimed at reassuring an average European reader that everything is under control:

Quote 19. “Их грехи. (В чём Россия не виновата) ... 2. В том, что обычные европейцы будут люто мёрзнуть в своих домах этой зимой. 3. В том, что в Европе и США самая высокая продуктовая инфляция за последние десятилетия. 9. В том, что после переворота 2014 года Украина потеряла государственную независимость и перешла под прямое управление коллективного Запада, а также поверила в то, что НАТО будет обеспечивать её безопасность”. (Medvedev, 2022)

“After the 2014 coup, Ukraine lost its state independence and fell under direct control of the collective West as well as began to believe that NATO would guarantee its security,” he noted as he blamed the West for the fallout from the Ukrainian war, *such as energy shortages and high food prices*. (Ellyatt, 2022b)

An illustrative example of imprecise indirect quoting is given in Quote 20. In the original text, Peskov asserts that the *special military operation* was initially aimed at Ukraine, but then it subsequently turned into a form of *war* against the collective West. However, in the English translation with extended comments, while it turns out that the “special military operation” *has indeed become* a “war against the collective West,” all the intermediate explanations are omitted.

Quote 20. “Специальная военная операция начиналась против Украины. Со временем она приняла форму войны против коллективного Запада”. (Peskov zaiavil, chto spetsoperatsiia, 2024)

President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman informed Russians this week that the “special military operation” that Putin launched in Ukraine in February 2022 was set to go on much longer because *it is now “a war against the collective West.”* (Nemtsova, 2024)

In some indirect quotes the translator can replace the second conditional used for a hypothetical situation, e.g., If “we imagine that the offensive of the Ukrobanderites with the support of NATO was successful and they seized part of our land, then we would have to, by virtue of the rules of the decree of the President of Russia dated June 2, 2020, resort to the use of nuclear weapons” (Medvedev, 2023; Trans. by A. D., N. K., & T. B.) with the first conditional used for real situations (threatens to unleash nuclear war if Russia is defeated). This leads to exaggeration and misrepresentation, especially since the conditions and the purposes for this hypothetical action are ignored in the translation, as can be seen in Quote 21. Moreover, the words about preventing a global conflict are intentionally left out to make the Russian armed forces look aggressive and dangerous.

Quote 21. Наши Вооружённые силы, отражая контрнаступление коллективного врага, защищают граждан России и нашу землю. Это очевидно всем приличным людям. Но помимо этого они предотвращают мировой конфликт. Ведь если представить себе, что наступление укробандеровцев при поддержке НАТО удалось и они отторгли часть нашей земли, то нам пришлось бы в силу правил указа Президента России от 02.06.2020 пойти на использование ядерного оружия. (Medvedev, 2023)

Earlier this year, he also *threatened to unleash nuclear war on the collective West* if Russia is *defeated* in Ukraine. (Cleave, 2023)

Indirect quotation implies paraphrasing and summarising, but in many cases of political mistranslation we observe exaggeration, one-sided interpretation, or omission of the author’s explanation. For instance, in Quote 22 the translator summarises

Putin's explanation in just a few words, whereas the arguments the Russian president advances provide necessary context for the political decision they defend and should therefore be taken into consideration. Noteworthy, the original statement does not contain the term the "collective West," instead naming its leaders Washington, London, and Brussels, which makes its insertion a peculiar word choice. Here, we again observe a change in meaning since in the original statement it is Russia that is said to be threatened—"при угрозе" [pri ugroze],—whereas in this particular mistranslation Russia is blamed for threatening someone else.

Quote 22. "Тем, кто позволяет себе такие заявления в отношении России, хочу напомнить, наша страна также располагает различными средствами поражения, а по отдельным компонентам и более современными, чем у стран НАТО и при угрозе территориальной целостности нашей страны, для защиты России и нашего народа. Мы, безусловно, используем все имеющиеся в нашем распоряжении средства. Это не блеф",—заявил Путин. (Obrashchenie Prezidenta, 2022)

Russia is fighting not only Ukraine but *the entire "collective West" that wants to destroy it*, Putin said in a speech explaining the decision on national television. He again *threatened to use all available means including nuclear weapons* to defend territory. "This is not a bluff," he said. (Putin ups the ante, 2022)

Another case of manipulative summarising can be seen in Quote 23. Concretisation and generalisation can be applied as means of paraphrasing, but in this context inappropriate concretisation changes the meaning of the statement:

Quote 23. "Любая провокация, любой внутренний конфликт в военных и политических кругах, в информационном поле и гражданском обществе— подарок коллективному Западу",—отмечается в сообщении. (V Belorussii zaivili, 2023)

Belarus, a close ally of Russia throughout the invasion of Ukraine, called *the internal dispute* "a gift to the collective West." (Aitken, 2023)

Tendency 4. Tampering With the Cornerstones of Direct Quotation

As with Tendency 1, this tendency represents contexts using direct quotation. However, these more fundamental changes involve more blatantly manipulative intrusions in the direct quotations. When contrasted with the original, such mistranslations are straightforwardly obvious, since they turn the entire argument upside down under the guise of reporting someone's direct speech. This tendency includes the shift from the Passive Voice to Active (Quotes 24, 29), lexical substitution (Quotes 25, 26), omission (Quotes 27, 28).

When speaking about hypothetical threats and possible outcomes, Putin used the phrase "вынуждена будет реагировать" [vynuzhdena budet reagirovat'] (Quote 24), which means "will be forced to react." This meaning, which could also have been translated as "will have to react" or "it will be necessary to react," was completely changed.

The purpose of this mistranslation was to shift the responsibility for using nuclear weapons onto the Russian government, but ignoring the context and background.

Quote 24. “Хотел бы в этой связи отметить, что если все это будет происходить, *то соответствующим образом Россия вынуждена будет реагировать*, имея в виду, что коллективный Запад начинает применять уже оружие с ядерным компонентом”,—сказал Путин. (Abramov, 2023)

“If that happens, *Russia will respond* accordingly, given that the collective West is starting to use weapons with a nuclear component,” he said, without elaborating. (Ritter, 2023)

In the following quote (25) by the Belarusian President Lukashenko, the mention of allies and other integration unions was omitted, “counteraction” or “pushback” was replaced with “front,” and the post-Soviet space is mentioned in connection with pressure rather than unified resistance. All that creates a more heightened effect of militarisation of the countries supporting Russia.

Quote 25. “И не нужно думать, что это кого-то обойдет стороной. Сейчас абсолютно очевидно, что, не встретив *единого противодействия* со стороны союзников по организации и других интеграционных объединений на постсоветском пространстве, коллективный Запад будет наращивать свой прессинг”. (Vystuplenie Prezidenta Belarusi, 2022)

“*Without a united front*, the collective West will build up pressure on the post-Soviet space,” Mr. Lukashenko said in televised opening remarks. (Putin warns Russia will respond, 2022)

As a lexical transformation to soften the statement, the word “вина” [vina] (blame) regarding the collective West was translated as “responsibility” in Quote 26. The initially used lexeme implies doing something wrong, whereas “responsibility” is more strongly associated with someone correctly performing their duties.

Quote 26. Поэтому *вину* за продолжающееся кровопролитие в Украине в полной мере должен нести коллективный Запад. (Makei s vysokoi tribuny OON, 2022)

“Therefore,” he claimed, “it is the collective West that should fully bear the *responsibility* for the ongoing bloodshed in Ukraine.” (Sarkar, 2022)

The chunk “*standing together against the collective West*” was omitted in Quote 27 despite being introduced as a direct quote. The suggestion of Russia being supported by other countries seems redundant to the translator.

Quote 27. “Сегодня мы вместе противостояим коллективному Западу, который ведет против наших стран, по сути, необъявленную войну”,— указал министр. (Shoigu zaiavil o vedenii, 2023)

“The collective West is essentially waging an undeclared war against our countries,” Mr Shoigu claimed. (Stevenson, 2023)

The point about the United States subjugating the entire collective West was omitted in Quote 28. Instead of attempting to translate the metaphorical expression “*поставить под ружье*” [postavit’ pod ruzh’e], meaning “put under arms,” the translator simply opts to repeat “mobilized.”

Quote 28. “Сегодня США подчинили себе практически весь коллективный Запад, мобилизовав его на превращение Украины в инструмент войны с Россией, так же как в свое время Гитлер поставил под ружье большинство стран Европы для нападения на Советский Союз.” (Lavrov: SShA deistvovali, 2022)

“The U.S. has *mobilized* practically all of the collective West to turn Ukraine into an instrument of war against Russia, just as Hitler *mobilized* military resources of most European nations to attack the Soviet Union,” Lavrov said. (Live Updates: Russia–Ukraine War, 2022)

One of the most egregious distortions appearing in this group can be observed in Quote 29. Here, instead of the collective West appearing as the actor of the verb “противодействовать” [protivodeistvovat’], which means “act against” or “antagonise”, the translation reverses the verb structure to portray Russia and its armed forces in this role:

Quote 29. “Нашей стране и ее вооруженным силам сегодня противодействует практически весь коллективный Запад”,—заявил Герасимов. (Gerasimov zaivil, 2023)

“Our country and its armed forces are today acting against the entire collective West,” Gerasimov said. (Kelly, 2023)

As formulated by Anderson and Itule (1984), in journalistic contexts, while “misquoting is a cardinal sin,” this does not imply that quotes “cannot be altered slightly to clean up grammar or to take out profanities; it means that quote marks around a sentence are somewhat sacred. They mean the words are exactly—or nearly exactly—what the person said” (Anderson & Itule, 1984, p. 65).

Tendency 5. Defacing the Source of Quoting

In order to form a biased judgement in the reader when reading a quotation, Anglophone mass media use derogatory and ironic comments, evaluative language, labels, and negative epithets: “In one *bizarre* remark during his speech, Putin claimed...”; “the *tyrant droned* on for nearly an hour...”; “*The more than 11,000-word document* approved by Putin”; “She *went into great lengths*” [about Maria Zakharova]; “*pro-Kremlin newspaper*.” The reader’s opinion is also shaped by the characterisation of information sources as pro-government (*state-run, pro-Kremlin*), which imply a bias and one-sidedness on the part of the quoted source.

Quote 30. “The attempts of the collective West to destabilise the situation in the country are obvious,” the foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told the *state-run* news agency RIA Novosti. (Otte & Lowe, 2023)

Quote 31. The crowds looked glum and appeared to clap on cue as the *tyrant droned* on for nearly an hour before the separatist leaders signed the decrees, joined hands and chanted “Russia!” In one *bizarre* remark during his speech, Putin claimed the “collective West is afraid of our philosophy and that’s why they try to assassinate our philosophers”. (Braddick, 2022)

Quote 32. “We are in a state of war. Yes, it started as a special military operation, but as soon as this bunch was formed there, when the collective West became a participant on Ukraine’s side, for us it already became a war,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in an interview to a *pro-Kremlin newspaper* published on Friday. (Averre, 2024)

Quote 33. *The more than 11,000-word document* approved by Putin on Friday describes Washington as “main inspirer, organizer and executor of the aggressive anti-Russian policy of the collective West.” (McFall, 2023)

An additional means to discredit Russia in translation is victimisation: thus, in some contexts, translated material is used to portray Russia as a victim, a weak side that complains. In the world of power in which states try to project strength and reassurance, this image is considered to be shameful. However, the original translated statements typically do not imply this meaning. In order to achieve this effect, the lexeme “victim” is widely used in the description of the quote source in the examples below together with a range of actions pertaining to a victim (e.g., *a complaint, to lament*).

Quote 34. *In Putin’s world*, the West is the aggressor and *Russia the victim*: “I want to underscore again that their insatiability and determination to preserve their unfettered dominance are the real causes of the hybrid war that the collective West is waging against Russia.” (Gioe, 2023)

Quote 35. In a wide-ranging interview with Russia’s Channel One, broadcast on Wednesday, Lavrov claimed *Russia is a victim* of long-term Western aggression. (Brennan, 2022)

Quote 36. Lavrov’s trips are partly a Russian effort to foster support for *Moscow’s complaint* that “the collective west” is trying to break up Russia. (Lowe et al., 2023)

Quote 37. *Former Putin adviser Sergei Glazyev lamented in public* that Russia does not have a clear end objective, a sound ideology or the resources to win the war against the collective West. (McFaul, 2023)

Research into the linguistic construction of the “victim” image has shown, for instance, that such a label is perceived more negatively than the “survivor” image (Papendick & Bohner, 2017, p. 1). In politics, however, this stance is believed, when artificially constructed by mass media, to discredit the image of the “hero–victim” and turn it into the image of the “enemy–victim” (Kozyrev, 2009, pp. 20–21).

Discussion of the Results of Textual Analysis

In order to study intercultural and ideological differences revealed in translation, we sampled texts featuring the term the “collective West.” Since this term is ideologically charged and its usage limited by political contexts, we expected to reveal some discrepancies in the translations. However, along with more subtle changes, the overwhelming evidence of wholesale tampering with direct quotation, omission of significant chunks, and defacing of quotation sources is hard to explain other than in terms of intentional manipulation and distortion. While it may be tempting to blame translators themselves for what would generally be considered in most contexts as malpractice, it is likely that many of the observed distortions in the translated texts, which reveal cultural and ideological differences, personal disagreements with the statements, as well as bias and manipulative intentions, are the result of subsequent editorial distortions applied to texts that had already been translated into English. In any case, unless the translation source is acknowledged, the inherent opaqueness of such textual manipulation processes prevents a precise attribution of blame. Nevertheless, the identified misquotation and mistranslation tendencies clearly serve ideological purposes in terms of their use in Anglophone mass media to invite negative assessments of Russia’s policies and political leaders, along with corresponding positive (or less negative) attitudes towards Western policies and leadership.

It would be hard to construct a rigorous linguistic argument supporting the contention that the English language is inherently susceptible to such manipulations. In principle, similar accusations could probably be made against translators and editors working in other globally important languages, such as Russian, Arabic, Spanish, or Chinese. However, as revealed by the body of research, English does seem to represent a particular case in point. This may be due to its present global status and role—not least in terms of upholding the interests of those euphemised in the term the “collective West.”

One of the points frequently raised by Russian leaders in the analyzed material concerns an intentional “wall of deafness”, i.e., a refusal to listen on the part of the “collective West.” Unfortunately, until such a wall of deafness is surmounted, it appears likely that a basis for negotiation will also be lacking, thus prolonging the present conflict. Nevertheless, all wars fought so far have ended in negotiations; moreover, despite the circumstances, these negotiations were necessarily conducted in language that permitted no such distortions as have been identified in the present work.

Conclusion

Our analysis of translation distortions and linguistic manipulations on the example of the “collective West” confirms tendencies previously identified in the academic literature on translation distortion and linguistic manipulation. While English tends to play a central role in such investigations, this seems likely to be a result of the present status of the language in international discourse, which, in turn, is connected with the identity of the “collective West.” Future studies may consider the extent to which translation distortion and linguistic manipulation occurs in languages other than English and whether such a comparison could be carried out on a rigorous basis.

References

- Abramov, N. (2023, March 21). *Putin prokomentiroval plany postavki Ukraine oruzhiia s iadernym komponentom* [Putin commented on plans to supply Ukraine with weapons with a nuclear component]. Lenta.ru. <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/03/21/yaderny/>
- Aitken, P. (2023, June 24). *Biden admin, foreign officials react as Wagner Group makes ‘march for justice’ toward Moscow*. Fox News. <https://www.foxnews.com/world/biden-admin-foreign-officials-react-wagner-group-makes-march-justice-moscow>
- Akopova, A. (2013). Linguistic manipulation: Definition and types. *International Journal of Cognitive Research in Science, Engineering and Education*, 1(2), 78–82.
- Anderson, D. A., & Itule, B. D. (1984). *Contemporary news reporting*. Random House.
- Arutiunova, N. D. (1990). Diskurs [Discourse]. In V. N. Iartseva (Ed.), *Lingvisticheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* [Linguistic encyclopedic dictionary] (pp. 136–137). Sovetskaia entsiklopediia.
- Averre, D. (2024, March 22). *Russia finally admits it is “at war” despite jailing people for using the term instead of “special military operation” when describing Putin’s invasion of Ukraine*. MailOnline. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13227483/Russia-finally-admits-war-despite-jailing-people-using-term-instead-special-military-operation-describing-Putins-invasion-Ukraine>
- Bacon, J., & Ortiz, J. L. (2023, September 11). *\$2M bounty for Russian MiG just “legend.” But one chopper drew \$500K from Ukraine: Updates*. USA Today. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2023/09/11/ukraine-russia-war-live-updates/70820731007/>
- Baker, M. (2018). *Translation and conflict: A narrative account*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429438240>
- Beavitt, T. (2021). Orwellian Doublespeak: Dialogicality and the English Language. *Changing Societies & Personalities*, 5(4), 690–694. <https://doi.org/10.15826/csp.2021.5.4.158>

Beavitt, T. A., & Popova, N. G. (2020). The role of the English article system in developing dialogical context: A view from Russian science. *Journal of Language and Education*, 6(3), 52–68. <https://doi.org/10.17323/jle.2020.10360>

Belton, C., & Rauhala, E. (2023, May 19). Europe's military industrial capabilities fall short of Ukraine's needs. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/18/europe-weapons-military-industrial-base/>

Braddick, I. (2022, September 30). Vlad's Z Day. Putin vows to use "any means" to defend annexed Ukraine regions in new nuke threat after biggest land grab since WW2. *The Sun*. <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/19965603/putin-officially-declares-ukrainian-regions-are-russian/>

Brennan, D. (2022, December 30). Russia already at war with U.S., "collective West": Lavrov. *Newsweek*. <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-already-war-us-collective-west-lavrov-1770102>

Brifing ofitsial'nogo predstavitelia MID Rossii M. V. Zakharovoi, Moskva, 27 marta 2024 goda [Briefing by M.V. Zakharova, Official Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, March 27, 2024]. (2024, March 27). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/video/posledniye_dobavleniye/1941293/

Chanyшева, Z. Z. (2017). Perevod kak instrument ideologicheskoi diversii v mezhkul'turnoi politicheskoi kommunikatsii [Translation as a tool of ideological sabotage in intercultural political communication]. *Political Linguistics*, 5, 60–65.

Chao-Fong, L., Gecsoyler, S., Belam, M., & Sullivan, H. (2023, July 27). Russia-Ukraine war: Ukrainian forces say they have recaptured frontline village after Putin says attacks have intensified—as it happened. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/jul/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-kim-jong-un-north-korea-russian-defence-minister-sergei-shoigu-moldova-moscow-diplomats>

Cleave, I. (2023, October 2). Putin on the blitz. Putin's top ally Dmitry Medvedev warns of World War 3 if UK troops are sent to Ukraine & says they'd be "destroyed". *The Sun*. <https://www.the-sun.com/news/9223083/putins-ally-world-war-3-uk-troops/>

Comai, G. (2023). *Who said it first? 'The collective West' in Russia's nationalist media and official statements*. Zenodo. <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.7739077>

Darwish, A. (2010). *Elements of translation: A practical guide for translators* (2nd ed.). Writescop.

Dymova, A. V., & Koptyaeva, N. N. (2024). Ideologema "kollektivnyi Zapad": Russkoiazychnye vs. angloiazychnye SMI [Ideologeme "collective West": Russian-language vs. English-language media]. *Discourse-P*, 21(2), 150–170.

Ellyatt, H. (2022a, July 21). *Ukraine could "disappear from the world map," top Russian official says*. CNBC.com. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/21/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html>

Ellyatt, H. (2022b, August 16). *Putin slams U.S., claims it wants to drag out war in Ukraine and provoke China*. CNBC.com. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/16/putin-claims-us-wants-to-drag-out-war-in-ukraine.html>

Embassy of Russia in the USA / Posol'stvo Rossii v SShA. (2023, June 14). *Otvét sovetnika-poslannika Posol'stva Rossii v SShA A. A. Ledeneva na vopros SMI* [Response of A.A. Ledenev, Minister Counselor of the Russian Embassy in the USA, to a media question]. Telegram. <https://t.me/EmbUSA/3674>

Fairclough, N. (2013). *Language and power*. Routledge.

Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. van Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse as social interaction* (pp. 258–284). SAGE.

Faulconbridge, G. (2024, February 1). *War with Russia? Kremlin says the West is trying to demonise Russia*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/war-with-russia-kremlin-says-west-is-trying-to-demonise-russia-2024-02-01/>

Gerasimov zaiavil, chto armii RF v khode SVO protivodeistvuet pochti ves' kollektivnyi Zapad [Gerasimov said that the Russian army is countered by almost the entire collective West during the SMO]. (2023, January 23). Interfax. <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/881908>

Gioe, D. (2023, March 14). Putin is trapped in the sunk-cost fallacy of war. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/14/putin-ukraine-war-sunk-cost-fallacy/>

Guilbert, K. (2022, March 17). Putin accuses west of seeking to destroy Russia and issues warning to “traitors”. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-west-destroy-russia-traitors-b2037410.html>

Halliday, M. A. K. (1992). Language theory and translation practice. *Rivista Internazionale di tecnica della traduzione*, 15–25.

Hartog, E. (2024, March 30). *Putin the autocrat comes of age*. POLITICO. <https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-autocrat-election-terrorism/>

Interv'iu Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii S. V. Lavrova indoneziiskoi gazete “Kompas”, 11 iulia 2023 goda [Interview by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, to the Indonesian newspaper Kompas, July 11, 2023]. (2023, July 11). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/1896460/

Isachenkov, V. (2022, September 1). *Kremlin offers mixed view of Gorbachev's historic role*. The Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-mikhail-gorbachev-moscow-soviet-union-439663274edc712d7c974a88e084d6a1>

Kak v Rossii otreagirovali na smert' Gorbacheva [How Russia reacted to Gorbachev's death]. (2022, August 31). RBC.ru. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/31/08/2022/630ef6029a79472c6f86cc97>

Kandelaki, T. (2024, March 23). *Kollektivnyi Zapad vseгда nas nenavidel* [The collective West has always hated us]. Telegram. <https://t.me/tikandelaki/17720>

Kaplunenko, A. M., Tyurneva, T. V., Vedernikova, T. I., & Shchurik, N. V. (2020). On manipulative techniques in translating political discourse. *Functional aspects of Intercultural Communication. Translation and Interpreting Issues*, 7, 111–118.

Kelly, L. (2023, January 24). *Russia's military reforms respond to NATO's expansion, Ukraine—chief of general staff*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-military-reforms-respond-natos-expansion-ukraine-chief-general-staff-2023-01-24/>

Khlabutina, L. (2011). Neopredelennyi artikl' kak sredstvo aktualizatsii remy v nauchnom diskurse [Indefinite article as rheme actualization means in scientific discourse]. *Philology. Theory & Practice*, 2, 182–186.

Khanmohammad, H., & Aminzad, A. (2015). A study of additions and omissions in English translations of Persian-based social, cultural and political news headlines: A case study of ISNA news agency in Arab Spring. *T&I Review*, 5, 7–27. <https://doi.org/10.22962/tnirvw.2015.5..001>

Kollektivnyi Zapad vedet protiv Rossii oposredovannuiu voynu, zaiavil Shoigu [The collective West is waging an indirect war against Russia, Shoigu said]. (2023, August 9). RIA Novosti. <https://ria.ru/20230809/shoygu-1889039221.html>

Kolomiyets, L. (2020). Manipulative mistranslations in official documents and media discourses on contemporary Ukraine. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 37(3/4), 367–405.

Kozyrev, G. I. (2009). Sotsial'noe konstruirovanie obraza zhertvy v sotsial'nopoliticheskikh otnosheniakh i v konflikte [Social construction of the image of the victim in socio-political relations and in conflict]. *RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies*, 2, 11–27.

Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics*. Verso.

Lavrov: SShA deistvovali, kak Gitler protiv SSSR, prevrashchaia Ukrainu v sredstvo voiny s RF [Lavrov: US acted like Hitler against the USSR, turning Ukraine into a means of war with Russia]. (2022, October 3). TASS. <https://tass.ru/politika/15940653>

Live updates: Russia–Ukraine war. (2022, October 3). The Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-donetsk-6c6e3be1a1f461adcbf7158e78f9a318>

Lowe, Y., & Bayer, L. (2024, March 26). Russia–Ukraine war: 200,000 without power in Ukraine since Friday; Nato could 'shoot down Russian missiles near borders'—as it happened. *The Guardian*. www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/mar/26/russia-ukraine-war-live-ukraine-strikes-warship-that-russia-captured-in-2014

Lowe, Y., Moloney, C., Hall, R., & Murray, W. (2023, October 23). Russia–Ukraine war live: Zelenskyy says he will keep up military pressure on Russian-occupied

Crimea—as it happened. *The Guardian*. www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/oct/24/russia-ukraine-war-live-sabotage-attack-launched-on-sevastopol-says-occupation-governor

Lystseva, M. (2023, February 19). *Kreml' ne vidit so storony Zapada gotovnosti k mirnym initsiativam* [The Kremlin sees no willingness on the part of the West for peace initiatives]. TASS. <https://tass.ru/politika/17087877>

Makei s vysokoi tribuny OON predlozhit chestno otvetit' na dva voprosa. I oba o konflikte v Ukraine [Makei from the high UN rostrum offered to answer two questions honestly. Both about the conflict in Ukraine]. (2022, September 24). Belta. <https://belta.by/politics/view/makei-s-vysokoj-tribuny-oon-predlozhit-chestno-otvetit-na-dva-voprosa-i-oba-o-konflikte-v-ukraine-525575-2022/>

Malkawi, R. (2012). *The ideological stamp: Translation of political discourse in news media*. Writescope.

McFall, C. (2023, April 3). *Putin names US a “major risk” to Russian security in latest foreign policy doctrine*. Fox News. <https://www.foxnews.com/world/putin-names-us-major-risk-russian-security-latest-foreign-policy-doctrine>

McFaul, M. (2023, January 24). Are we seeing the beginning of the end of Putinism? *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/24/putin-ukraine-war-legitimacy-support/>

Medvedev, D. (2022, July 21). *IKh GREKhl (v chem Rossiia ne vinovata)* [THEIR SINS (for which Russia is not to blame)]. Telegram. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/146

Medvedev, D. (2023, July 30). *Nashi Vooruzhennye sily, otrazhaia kontrnastuplenie kollektivnogo vruga, zashchishchaiut grazhdan Rossii i nashu zemliu. Eto ochevidno vsem prilichnym liudiam* [Our Armed Forces, repelling the counter-offensive of the collective enemy, are defending the citizens of Russia and our land. This is obvious to all decent people]. Telegram. https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/362

Mettsel', M. (2022, December 28). *Lavrov zaiavil, chto kollektivnyi Zapad vo glave s SShA uzhe davno ob'javil Rossii voinu* [Lavrov said that the collective West, led by the United States, had long ago declared war on Russia]. TASS. <https://tass.ru/politika/16706003>

MID Rossii otreagiroval na besporiadki v Serbii [Russian Foreign Ministry reacts to unrest in Serbia]. (2023, December 25). RIA Novosti. <https://ria.ru/20231225/serbiya-1917858626.html>

Munday, J. (2007). Translation and ideology: A textual approach. *The Translator*, 13(2), 195–217. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13556509.2007.10799238>

Nemtsova, A. (2024, February 16). *Despair in Russia as Putin spirals out of control*. The Daily Beast. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/despair-in-russia-as-putin-spirals-out-of-control/>

Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Address by the President of the Russian Federation]. (2022, September 22). Official website of the President of Russia. <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390>

Orwell, G. (2013). *Politics and the English language*. Penguin Classic.

Otte, J., & Lowe, Y. (2023, December 25). Russia–Ukraine war: Moscow “will be defeated”, Zelenskiy says as Ukraine marks Christmas Day on 25 December for first time—as it happened. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/25/russia-ukraine-war-live-moscow-russia-zelenskiy-christmas-day-on-25-december>

Papendick, M., & Bohner, G. (2017). “Passive victim—strong survivor”? Perceived meaning of labels applied to women who were raped. *PLOS ONE*, 12(5), Article e0177550. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177550>

Peskov nazval Ukrainu instrumentom Zapada dlia sderzhivaniia Rossii [Peskov called Ukraine a tool of the West to contain Russia]. (2024, March 26). *Izvestiia*. <https://iz.ru/1671716/2024-03-26/peskov-nazval-ukrainu-instrumentom-zapada-dlia-sderzhivaniia-rossii>

Peskov zaiavil, chto Rossiia nakhoditsia v sostoianii voiny [Peskov stated that Russia is in a state of war]. (2024, March 22). RBC.ru. <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/22/03/2024/65fd48a39a79479bd2b7138f>

Peskov zaiavil, chto rossiiane, uekhavshie za granitsu vo vremia SVO, budut vozvrashchat'sia [Peskov said that Russians who went abroad during the SMO will return]. (2023, September 11). TASS. <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/18713911>

Peskov zaiavil, chto spetsoperatsiia priniala formu voiny protiv Zapada [Peskov said the special operation took the form of a war against the West]. (2024, February 14). Regnum. <https://regnum.ru/news/3867386>

Peskov zaiavil, chto SShA budut pytat'sia perelozhit' finansovoe bremia podderzhki Kieva na ES [Peskov said the US will try to shift the financial burden of supporting Kiev to the EU]. (2024, February 1). TASS. <https://tass.ru/politika/19875071>

Popova, N. G., & Beavitt, T. A. (2017). English as a means of scientific communication: Linguistic imperialism or interlingua? *Integration of Education*, 21(1), 54–70. <https://doi.org/10.15507/1991-9468.086.021.201701.054-070>

Putin otsenil podderzhku spetsoperatsii so storony KNDR [Putin assessed the DPRK's support for the special operation]. (2023, July 27). RIA Novosti. <https://ria.ru/20230727/podderzhka-1886716289.html>

Putin ups the ante on a war that's going wrong. (2022, September 21). Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-09-21/putin-ups-the-ante-on-a-war-that-s-going-wrong>

Putin warns Russia will respond if NATO boosts Finland and Sweden's military strength. (2022, May 16). Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-putin-warns-russia-will-respond-if-nato-boosts-finland-and-swedens-military-strength-12614582>

Putin zaiavil, chto voinu na Ukraine razviazal kollektivnyi Zapad [Putin said the war in Ukraine was unleashed by the collective West]. (2022, July 7). TASS. <https://tass.ru/politika/15157853>

Putin zaiavil, chto Zapad stremitsia rasprostranit' na ATR blokovuiu sistemu [Putin said the West seeks to extend a block system to the Asia-Pacific region]. (2022, August 16). RIA Novosti. <https://ria.ru/20220816/atr-1809919336.html>

Pym, A. (2023). *Exploring translation theories* (3rd ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003383130>

Ritter, K. (2023, March 22). *Japan's PM offers Ukraine support as China's Xi backs Russia.* The Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/kishida-kyiv-xi-russia-putin-summit-575d4249f213f1ac0002344501c0239c>

Roth, A. (2022, March 22). How many Russian soldiers have died in the war in Ukraine? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/22/how-many-russian-soldiers-died-ukraine-losses>

Ruiz, M. (2022, March 18). *Putin sparks fears of new "Red Terror" in "Stalin-esque" speech on "fifth column" traitors in Russia.* Fox News. <https://www.foxnews.com/world/putins-stalin-esque-speech-fifth-column-traitors-russia>

Russia says it shows "goodwill" in extending grain deal. (2023, March 14). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-shows-goodwill-extending-grain-deal-2023-03-14/>

Russia urges "transparent" investigation into Nord Stream blasts. (2023, June 14). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-urges-transparent-investigation-into-nord-stream-blasts-2023-06-14/>

Russia says it is hard to believe Islamic State could have launched Moscow attack. (2024, March 28). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-hard-believe-islamic-state-could-have-launched-moscow-attack-2024-03-27/>

Russia to build up forces at western borders to counter NATO threat, defence minister Sergei Shoigu says. (2023, August 9). Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/russia-to-build-up-forces-at-western-borders-to-counter-nato-threat-defence-minister-sergei-shoigu-says-12936662>

Russia's Lavrov: Ukraine conflict will not end until West drops plans to defeat Moscow. (2023, July 12). Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-ukraine-conflict-will-not-end-until-west-drops-plans-defeat-2023-07-12/>

Sackur, L. (2023, February 19). *U.S. is the primary source of conflict, Putin's spokesman says after crimes against humanity accusation*. NBC News. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-us-international-conflict-vladimir-putin-spokesman-rcna71364>

Sarkar, P. (2022, September 25). *Belarus foreign minister blames NATO, West for Ukraine war*. The Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-general-assembly-russia-ukraine-nato-belarus-c39bf051b2fd8649c155f3e2ea4b8901>

Sauer, P. (2024, March 22). *Over 1m Ukrainians without power after major Russian assault on energy system*. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/22/over-1m-ukrainians-without-power-after-russias-largest-assault-on-energy-sector>

Shoigu zaiavil o vedenii Zapadom neob"iavlennoi voiny protiv RF i Belorussii [Shoigu says the West is waging an undeclared war against Russia and Belarus]. (2023, May 25). *Izvestiia*. <https://iz.ru/1518228/2023-05-25/shoigu-zaiavil-o-vedenii-zapadom-neobiavlennoi-voiny-protiv-rf-i-belorussii>

Stenogramma vystupleniia Vladimira Putina na soveshchanii o merakh podderzhki regionov [Transcript of Vladimir Putin's speech at the meeting on measures to support regions]. (2022, March 16). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. <https://rg.ru/2022/03/16/stenogramma-vystupleniia-vladimira-putina-na-soveshchanii-o-merakh-podderzhki-regionov.html>

Stevenson, C. (2023, May 25). *Russia has started deploying tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus, says Lukashenko*. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-putin-nuclear-weapons-belarus-ukraine-b2346020.html>

Transcript: World Stage: Russia with John Sullivan. (2023, July 7). *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live/2023/07/07/transcript-world-stage-russia-with-john-sullivan/>

Ukraine war: Vladimir Putin's warning that Russia has barely started its action. (2022, July 8). Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-vladimir-putins-warning-that-russia-has-barely-started-its-action-12647904>

University of Cambridge. (n.d.). *Rebellion*. In *Cambridge Dictionary*. Cambridge University Press. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/rebellion>

Unreliable publications in some Indian media outlets. (2023, July 30). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. https://mid.ru/en/press_service/articles_and_rebuttals/rebuttals/nedostovernie-publikacii/1898919/

V Belorussii zaiavili, chto Minsk byl i ostaetsia soiuznikom Moskvy [Belarus says Minsk has been and remains Moscow's ally]. (2023, June 24). RIA Novosti. <https://ria.ru/20230624/minsk-1880197687.html>

V Kremle nazvali zhestom dobroj voli so storony RF prodlenie “zernovoi sdelki” [The Kremlin called the extension of the “grain deal” a gesture of goodwill on the part of Russia]. (2023, March 14). Interfax. <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/890919>

van Dijk, T. A. (2008). *Discourse and context. A sociocognitive approach*. Cambridge University Press.

van Dijk, T. A. (2013). Ideology and discourse. In M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, & M. Stears (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of political ideologies* (pp. 175–196). Oxford University Press.

Vystuplenie Prezidenta Belarusi Aleksandra Lukashenko na vstreche liderov gosudarstv ODKB v Moskve [Address by President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at the CSTO Leaders’ Meeting in Moscow]. (2022, May 16). Information Analysis Portal of the Union State. <https://soyuz.by/obshchestvo/vystuplenie-prezidenta-belarusi-aleksandra-lukashenko-na-vstreche-liderov-gosudarstv-odkb-v-moskve>