Changing Societies & Personalities

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Aims and scope

«Changing Societies & Personalities» is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal,
published in English by the Ural Federal University. CS&P examines how rapid societal-
level changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values — and how
these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality
traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection
of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an
interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the
contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious
beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of
perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern
society. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- Value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and
  personal self-identity;
- Changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- Moral reasoning and behavior;
- Variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or
  religious identity;
- The moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- Social exclusion and inclusion;
- Post-secular religious individualism;
- Tolerance and merely 'tolerating': their meanings, varieties and fundamental
  bases;
- Ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and
  social change;
- Educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- Social and existential security.
- The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review
  articles and book reviews.

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"You cannot step into the same river twice", – what does it mean for us today?

Elena Stepanova

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The world in which we live is undergoing rapid transformations across all societal systems, affecting such spheres as economy, technology, politics and culture. Undeniably, these processes in turn reshape human values, morals and religious beliefs. Individual and collective identities cannot be static; rather, they are subject to various evolutionary influences. Among the factors that pertain to identity change are global and regional pressures, post-industrial technological developments, migration issues, political challenges, as well as the changing role played by religion in post-secular societies. Indeed, societies and individuals are varying constantly; therefore, identification of the forces driving these changes becomes one of the main concerns of modern intellectual history. Theories and methodologies aimed at understanding the direction and mechanisms behind social change have differed dramatically since the emergence of the social sciences. A teleological approach towards history – and the notion of progress as the continuous improvement of society – was embedded in the Judeo-Christian tradition, whose concept strongly influenced social and political philosophy during the Enlightenment period and inspired the writings of influential 19th and early 20th century social thinkers, from August Comte to Émile Durkheim. In the classical period of the development of the social sciences, social dynamics was understood in terms of either evolution or revolution and seen as a predictable and irreversible process, along which societies moved from a primitive to a complex developmental stage.

The major intellectual insight of the first part of the 20th century concerned the essence, structure and functions of modern society.

Theories of modernization, which treated the latter as being an inevitable stage through which all societies should pass in the progress of humankind, declared the "Western" way of social development to be an authentic pattern for the rest of the world to follow. Nevertheless, towards the end of the 20th century, such historical events as the explosion of the new Asian economies, the decolonization of most African nations, the collapse of socialist ideologies, the rise of Islamism and other concepts alternative to western liberal democracy revealed the limits of existing social theories and methodologies as derived from the Western experience of modernization. This theory of modernization was challenged by the contrary idea that there are in fact multiple models for development which modern societies may follow and that their choice is determined by a particular cultural-historical context; as a result, conventional social research dichotomies between "modern and traditional", "highly-developed, less-developed and under-developed", "civilized and uncivilized", "Eastern and Western", "the South and the North" have lost their distinctiveness and validity.

Today, the linear view of historical progress is giving way to non-linearity and contingency and the teleology of the development of a society starting from a lower stage and progressing to a higher one has been largely discarded. As Zygmunt Bauman, the author of the famous metaphor depicting modernity as a "liquid", underlines, the main feature of the contemporary phase in the history of humankind is the "non-directedness of changes". Such changes seem to become more and more random and unpredictable; therefore, the futurological utopian genre has lost all of its credibility. According to Bauman, we now find ourselves in the period of an "interregnum": one in which the old ways no longer work, but for which the new ways have not yet been established. It may seem that it is not just that one cannot step twice into the same river, as the ancient Greek sophist Cratylus said in his going beyond Heraclitus, but instead it is that one cannot step into the same river even once. According to this logic, it is not possible to elaborate a solid definition of the manifestations of liquid sociality;

likewise, it is not possible to distinguish between true and false social theories because all social change is eternal and any theory will soon be superseded by another even before the first has been verbalized.

Fortunately, the vast majority of researchers consider such extremist relativism as counter-productive. We are bound to continue in our endeavours to reveal the internal logic of social reality and to determine its causes and effects. At the same time, changing societies and transmuting personalities require us to employ flexible theories and methodologies when studying highly diverse historical experiences, social patterns, political institutions and cultures. Changing societies and personalities are in need of new approaches both in the humanities and social sciences; these should include an analysis of both macro-social and micro-social forces operating in particular socio-cultural contexts, as well as a study of the interconnection between global and local communities, and the mutual influence of national societies and individual identities.

Today, the main concern of the social sciences is not so much in elaborating new concepts, but rather in describing the state of things as they are, and reflecting upon their essence and meaning. Social scientists should not strive to be the "bearers of truth", but rather should seek to act as observers, who occupy meta-positions above the fray. Such a position neither presupposes the researcher to be completely independent of his or her own context, nor does it exclude his or her intellectual priorities; at the same time, it does not imply adopting a post-modernist point of view, according to which every person is imprisoned inside his or her subjective world. At the same time, an observer should not, when carrying out a study, pretend to be wholly impersonal and objective. On the contrary, the researcher should freely describe his or her own propensities, preferences, understandings and attitudes towards historical, cultural and political problems, while at the same time being self-reflective and aware of such propensities. This means that the researcher will free him- or herself from any particular concept or school of thought; as a result the research will remain diverse, new and fresh. The only limitation the observer should obey concerns the very subject of research in its dynamics. The flexibility, broadness and malleability of the social sciences and humanities are defined by the

overall aim of the research – which is to elaborate new ways of living together in order to reconcile the needs of people belonging to different cultural, racial, ethnical, ethical and religious backgrounds.

On behalf of the Editorial Board, it is my honour to introduce the first issue of "Changing Societies & Personalities" (CS&P) – an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University, Ekaterinburg, Russia. This journal strives to become a forum for discussion and reflection informed by the results of relevant research into societal and personal transformations in different spheres. The journal will promote networking between researchers, enabling them to share their ideas, insights, methodologies and concerns about the past, present and future of societies and personalities. The aim of this journal is two-fold: firstly, to study social and individual transformations and their interconnection in history and in the present day; secondly, to reflect upon the approaches, theories, ideas and methods of the social sciences and humanities in studying changing societies and personalities.

The journal wishes to stimulate a creative and mutually beneficial exchange of ideas between scholars from different countries and cultural backgrounds, taking into account national specificities in terms of the theoretical and methodological approaches applied. We welcome interdisciplinary approaches to academic research and writing, since social changes and personal transformations cannot be fully understood from the perspective of any single social science or humanities discipline; nor can it be comprehended within the bounds of a single academic discipline. Culture, morality, religion, ethnicity, class, age and gender are among those points of scientific interest influencing choices of which research projects to pursue, as well as which methods and theoretical frameworks to apply. However, the interdisciplinary approach does not imply an erosion of academic requirements; the interdisciplinary approach to research should be grounded in a thorough knowledge of specific trends, theories and methodologies in the social sciences and humanities.

CS&P examines how rapid societal-level changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The journal welcomes

theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity in postmodern societies. The themes of the journal include but are not limited to: value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity; changes in value orientations; materialist and post-materialist values; moral reasoning and behaviour; variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity; the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination; social exclusion and inclusion; post-secular religious individualism; meanings, varieties and fundaments of tolerance or merely 'tolerating'; ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change; educational strategies as training for specific social competences; social and existential security. The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, interviews, conference proceedings, review articles and book reviews.

The papers included into the current issue are linked to the general theme of continuity and alteration of value systems.

In the interview entitled "There is a crucial need for competent social scientists…", Ronald Inglehart stresses the importance of the social sciences in analysing the main controversies of the contemporary world such as growing income inequality and the replacement of industrial society by the knowledge society. Speaking about ethnic, religious, racial conflicts, and xenophobia, Inglehart argues that the reasons for conflicts decline systematically as people become more secure. Consequently, over time, people living in advanced industrial societies have become more tolerant towards diversity and less violent towards others. Underlying the validity of religion as a source of the meaning of life, as well as pointing out the failure of the theory of secularization, Inglehart determines religion as an expression of the basic human need for predictability and a distinction between right and wrong.

In the paper "Beyond the Freakonomics of Religious Liberty", Ivan Strenski describes his experience with religious freedom in Armenia and points out the difference between the Western and Eastern approaches: if in the West the values governing religious freedom are analogous to the values governing economic markets, in the East

this may not be the case due to a different socio-cultural atmosphere. Strenski argues that it might be better to think about religious liberty using models embodying other kinds of values than those dominating the thinking of citizens of Western societies. He refers to Western values in terms of a "market" model, which presupposes a free choice of beliefs, ideas and values, of association and companionship, as well as implying a market place for spiritual goods and services in which no one is permitted an advantage over any other buyer or seller. Consequently, all religions ought to expect to compete equally and fairly for adherents.

Strenski distinguishes two possible reasons why the leading religious confession in Armenia – the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church (HAAC) – is so determined to resist the Western model of the freedom of religion: firstly, after 70 years of the Soviet system hostility towards religion, the HAAC is not ready for a free religious market in the country; and secondly, it feels it should remain in a privileged position because of its historical role in preserving both Armenian nationality and local Christianity throughout the Soviet period of active persecution of religion. On the other hand, new Protestant churches in Armenia see HAAC as the representation of a traditionalist religious monopoly that seeks to maintain its hegemony and restrict the religious choices of Armenians. Using the Armenian context, Strenski raises the question of whether it is always in the best interests of people to assert their right to religious liberty and whether the Western understanding of a free religious market has its natural limits when applied to former Soviet countries with their traditional religions, as well as to Greece and Turkey. The paper invites discussion on the possibility and potential necessity of an alternative model to the religious liberty market model, taking into account the unique socio-historical peculiarities and contemporary context of the given country, and so raises a question as to the optimal relation between religions in post-Soviet states.

The main topic of Tim Jensen's paper "Religious Education: Meeting and Countering Changes, – Changing and Standing Still" is the challenges that religious education (RE) faces in public schools in European countries due to increased religious pluralism and

individualism. Jensen stresses the importance of RE since it is this education that is supposed to play a key role in paving the way for tolerance, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, human rights and freedom of religion. In addition, RE is expected to function as an antidote to what is seen as a growing fragmentation, as well as a lack of spiritual and moral orientation. Jensen underlines the advantages and shortcomings of the confessional and non-confessional types of RE in the light of transnational EU recommendations and academic discussions being held on the issue.

Using the Scandinavian example, Jensen reveals the ambiguity of the "religious dimension" of culture, which he acknowledges as the "crypto-confessional" approach in RE. As a result, in most European countries, other religions besides Christianity are still seen only from the point of view of the established "confession" or religion. Jensen also observes the "citizenship education" as an alternative/substitute for RE. The paper seeks answers to basic questions of RE: whether RE is the study of beliefs and values of oneself and others or a way to develop pupils' basic beliefs, values and identities; whether RE is merely a way to provide pupils with information about religions or a way to inspire religious faith in those pupils.

Nikolay Skvortsov's paper "The Formation of National Identity in Contemporary Russia" explores the complex issue of the search for national identity in post-Soviet Russia. He raises questions as to why problems of nation and national identity are arising now, stressing the fact that their topicality is connected both with internal and external challenges faced by contemporary Russia, as well as concerning the need to strengthen the multi-ethnic Russian state in order to mitigate negative developments in the sphere of international relations and prevent ethnic conflicts. Referring to the definitions of the nation referred to in Soviet social science, Skvortsov underlines that the Soviet model of the nation is based on ethnic nationalism as opposed to an understanding of the nation as a discrete political and territorial entity. Thus, the author warns against possible dangers arising out of the tradition of interpreting the nation only in ethnic terms. He concludes that the integrated, multi-level structure of the Russian national identity determines the complexity of

its formation in people's minds. In solving this task, it is necessary for various social institutions to be involved – the family, the government, the educational system, mass media and others.

In the current issue of the journal, two book reviews are published. Andrey Menshikov offers the reader a commentary on Carlo Invernizzi Accetti's Relativism and Religion: Why Democratic Societies Do Not Need Moral Absolutes (Columbia University Press, 2015). In this review, Menshikov highlights two interrelated topics of the book: the first being a historical analysis of how the concept of relativism has become so prominent in Catholic political theory; the second being an analytical study of the contradictions inherent in the idea that democratic regimes need to be complemented by a set of absolute moral or political truths in order to avoid degenerating into a form of totalitarianism. The analysis of relativism and religion, as described by Menshikov, is based on a comparison of the secular relativist concept of freedom and the Catholic Church's notion of freedom, which relies on an acceptance of man's creation in the image of God.

Elena Trubina offers the reader a review of The Unhappy Divorce of Sociology and Psychoanalysis: Diverse Perspectives on the Psychosocial (Lynn Chancer, John Andrews, eds., Springer, 2014). In her review, the author underlines the increased alienation between the disciplines of sociology and psychology in the 20th century and highlights the important work done by scholars of the 21st century in a book in which the failure of two disciplines to engage in a productive dialogue is exhaustively analysed. From Trubina's standpoint, the reviewed work demonstrates examples of a disconnect between the two disciplines of sociology and psychology, while leaving open a possibility for their reconciliation.

We welcome thoughts from readers and prospective authors, and invite them to send us their reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

Interview

"There is a crucial need for competent social scientists"…

Ronald Inglehart

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

We decided to conduct our journal's first interview with **Ronald F. Inglehart** – Lowenstein Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan (USA), Academic Supervisor of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research at National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia) and Founding President of the World Values Survey Association. We asked him about challenges to contemporary social sciences and trends in their development. Professor **Inglehart** is interviewed by **Olga Iakimova**, the executive editor of CS&P.

O. I. Professor, what do you think are the main challenges contemporary societies will face in the near future? How can social sciences help and do they have or can provide relevant tools to cope with these challenges?

R. I. Those are big questions. I think that the two biggest problems facing the world are (1) conflict between countries and (2) poverty and rising inequality within countries.

War between countries has been occurring throughout history, but things have changed in one really important way. Once upon a time, war between countries made sense. Once upon a time, when land was the only basis of income, the only way to get rich was by seizing somebody's land and enslaving or decimating the population. Since the development of industrial society, this is no longer true. Already before World War I, the noted social scientist Norman Angell argued that

war is obsolete: it had become irrational and was no longer profitable, because industrialization had made it possible to get rich in much safer and more productive ways without war. This theory seemed to have been disastrously disproven by World War I and then by World War II. Actually, social scientists have done a large amount of research on this topic, and it confirms the basic idea that war is irrational: in terms of cost-benefit analysis it *is* a heavily losing proposition – in any war between two highly developed countries, the costs tend to heavily outweigh the gains. The problem is that political actors do not always act rationally – in fact, quite often they do not. For example, World War I was a catastrophe for all sides – the losses far outweighed the gains. And again, in World War II Hitler went to war thinking that seizing the land of the Soviet Union, depopulating the Slavic population, and replacing them with German peasants was the best way to make Germany prosperous and strong. It was a disastrous mistake – disastrous for Russia, disastrous for Germany, disastrous for everyone involved.

Ironically, stripped of its empire and stripped of almost half of its territory after World War II, West Germany became far more prosperous than it had ever been before, through industrial production. This illustrates the simple but crucial point that political leaders do not always make rational decisions – in fact, quite often they make irrational ones. Social scientists can help with this. Social scientists often serve as advisors to political leaders, providing feedback on public opinion, and providing analyses of potential conflicts. This particular field, "the cost-benefit ratio of war," is something that political leaders need to absorb. A large body of research points to the conclusion that war between developed countries no longer makes sense: for advanced industrial societies, the costs of war far outweigh the gains – and this becomes increasingly true as the technology of war advances. In so far social scientists are able to convey this message to political decision-makers and to the publics of these societies, it will be enormously beneficial. Everything invested in social science throughout history will be more than repaid if it results in avoiding just one significant war.

Another big problem is that of poverty and growing income inequality. Poverty is rapidly diminishing. The world as a whole is

experiencing the most rapid economic growth in history. Almost half of the world's population, living in China, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Thailand, has been escaping subsistence-level poverty during the past 30 years.

But at the same time, practically all high-income societies are facing problems of growing income inequality. For most of the 20th century, the rise of organized labor and working-class-based political parties, elected governments that redistributed income and installed welfare-state policies. As a result, the dominant trend for most of the 20th century was a move from very high levels of inequality around 1900, toward much lower levels of inequality. This is true for the US, Great Britain, Russia, China, and most other industrialized societies. But since about 1970, this trend has reversed itself. The structure of the work forces has changed. There are no longer large numbers of industrial workers – in fact, in the US the industrial work force has fallen to less than 9 percent of the population. It is no longer the base of a winning coalition. The coalition that once pushed successfully for economic redistribution, for policies that benefited the entire population, no longer exists. This change in the structure of the work force is one factor.

Another factor is that these countries have become knowledge societies – which inherently tend to have winner-takes-all economies. In an industrial society, there are many niches. They produce very cheap automobiles, slightly more expensive ones, mid-sized vehicles, more expensive ones and luxury automobiles and they compete on cost. The market has room for scores of different products. In the knowledge society there is a huge change. The cost of reproduction becomes almost zero. In the knowledge society, it may take a big investment to produce something – Microsoft software, for example. But once you have developed it, it costs almost nothing to make and distribute additional copies, so, there is no need to buy anything but the top product and one product tends to dominate the world. If you invent Microsoft, you can be a billionaire before you reach the age of 40, like Bill Gates. If you invent Facebook, you can be a billionaire before you are 30, as did Mark Zuckerberg. Enormous rewards go to the very top. But since the top product tends to dominate the market, the rewards

go almost entirely to those at the top. This is an inherent feature of the knowledge society that only government can offset.

This problem is not yet well understood, it needs to be analyzed and explained by social scientists. Today the key basis of political polarization is between the top 1 percent and the remaining 99 percent. For the past few four decades, most people's incomes and job security have been diminishing, and this is becoming an increasingly serious problem.

Political leaders and political movements need to emerge that represent the needs of the electorate as a whole. In democracies, the masses can elect governments that represent their interests. The problem is that, so far, there is no political coalition representing the new basis of political conflict. For the past thirty years, there has been a lot of economic growth, but the rewards have gone almost entirely to the top 10 percent, mostly to the top 1 percent. As Bernie Sanders argued in his surprisingly strong electoral campaign in the 2016 US Presidential elections, the key struggle is no longer between the working class and the middle class, but between the vast majority of the work force and a tiny minority of extremely rich people at the very top. This is something that social science can aid in understanding. It reflects a structural problem inherent in the nature of knowledge societies. It would not go away if we rely on market forces, which are strongly pushing toward rising inequality. The only actor that can offset this force is government. In democracies, if the 99 percent or even a large part of the 99 percent form a coalition, it can win power and install governments that reallocate resources. The problem today is not a lack of resources – they are abundant. The problem is that they are badly allocated, going overwhelmingly to a narrow stratum at the very top. This could be reallocated in ways that could be immensely beneficial for society.

The government could develop programs to create jobs, having human beings doing useful things in early childhood education, in healthcare, environmental protection, infrastructure, research, development and in the arts and humanities. Instead of blindly following market forces, governments could be installed that would use the tremendous resources of advanced industrial society to benefit the population as a whole, to raise quality of life for the entire population.

This is a new problem. War has been around throughout history and social scientists have been trying to analyze its causes and consequences for quite a long time. This fact that income inequality has been rising sharply throughout developed industrialized societies has only recently has been recognized and we are still in the early stages of designing effective ways for the government to reallocate abundant resources for the benefit society as a whole, and not just for the one percent. There is a crucial need for competent social scientists to develop programs to do this efficiently. It seems clear that the solution is not a state-run economy. That option was tried for many decades and mountains of empirical evidence indicate that it does not work.

One major alternative would be to have governments provide grants to programs that would create jobs for humans doing valuable things. In the US, the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health have been effective in providing peer-reviewed grants for large programs that have been successful in developing the Internet, eradicating disease, furthering environmental protection and supporting basic research in many other fields. This is an agenda for future research. We need people to develop good programs that will create useful jobs that will benefit society.

O. I. How do you see the role of artificial intelligence in society – in your point of view, is it rather a threat or advantage?
R. I. It is both. Artificial intelligence is a tremendously valuable tool. I am immensely impressed by its potential. It can do wonderful things. Artificial intelligence can improve people's quality of life, can solve health problems, can make people much more efficient.
It also presents an underestimated danger. For the past thirty years, the working class of developed countries has experienced stagnant or declining real income because automation and outsourcing has displaced unskilled labour. This has been true for decades.
More recently, artificial intelligence is being used to perform the jobs of highly educated people – lawyers, doctors, educators, scientists, engineers, journalists. Their fields are being taken over by artificial intelligence. So, artificial intelligence present both a threat and a

potential. It means that we have the power to do things we could not do before. But if we continue to blindly follow market forces the income and job security of the entire work force will be squeezed. The vast majority of the population – not just the less educated – are losing their bargaining power, leaving them at the mercy of a thin stratum who control large corporations.

This is a pervasive process that has been going on for the last few decades in all industrial societies. For example, young lawyers are being replaced by computers that can read and interpret and classify the information from millions of pages of documents much more quickly than people. So, there is now considerable unemployment in the legal profession – which used to be a relatively secure and lucrative field. This is invading all fields – education, medicine, and journalism are being taken over by artificial intelligence.

There is a huge positive potential – for artificial intelligence offers huge resources. The question is, do we blindly follow market forces in which the people at the very top squeeze the work force, making enormous profits for those at the top, or do we use these resources for the benefit of society as a whole?

The political system can cope with this, but it needs intelligent and well-informed guidance. The government needs to play an active role in reallocating resources. Donald Trump has been elected President of the US with the goal of reducing taxes on the very rich, stripping back regulation of the economy and cutting government expenditures on health, education, welfare, research and development in order to increase military spending. This is exact opposite of what is needed. We need to reallocate resources for the benefit of society as a whole, and this cannot be done blindly. It will require social scientists (among others) to analyze the problems, and propose appropriate programs to solve. Some of the programs will probably work well, while others will not – but social science can help evaluate and improve the programs.

O. I. In the case when government and state play an active role in reallocating resources – how they will interact with market? What socio-economic model of society it will be?

R. I. We need a combination of government and market forces. I think market forces should guide the economy, but since the 1970s – particularly in the US and Great Britain under Reagan and Thatcher – we have had reduced government regulation, reduced reallocation, and greatly reduced tax rates on the top incomes, in the belief that this will provide prosperity for all. It has not. In fact, the real income of the working class has had declining, and in the US, it has even had declining life expectancy. The belief that maximizing the income of those at the very top would lead to strong economic growth and jobs for all did not work. We need an economy based on market forces but tempered with appropriate state regulation and reallocation.

Politics has always has been a balancing act. It is possible to get too much government – it is quite clear. The totalitarian systems of Hitler and Stalin were disasters. One can get too much government, but one can also get too little government.

We are now in a phase of having too little government. This was true earlier. In the 19th century, we had too little regulation, with extreme exploitation of workers, dangerous working conditions, low wages, low benefits. One of the big advances of the 20th century was the development of working class movements, including communist movements and social democratic or labour-oriented political parties in the West that reallocated resources for the benefit of the society as a whole.

You clearly can get too little government. A basic problem is that advantages tend to be cumulative. Those who happen to be born into prosperous families usually get better pre-natal care, better nutrition, more intellectual stimulation and medical care as children, and better education and more influential social contacts as young adults – and subsequently tend to make higher incomes. Those born into poorer families tend to fall behind on all of these measures.

Without countervailing government policies, the more privileged tend to accumulate wealth and political power, which they use to further their own interests in a snowballing process. Unless the government plays a balancing role, wealth tends to accumulate while the mass of the population is exploited.

This may sound like a Marxist analysis. Obviously, Marx was wrong on many points, but the notion that there is a need for reallocation of resources strikes me as perfectly true. This is not a purely Marxist concept, of course – all societies have always had cultural norms or government policies to reallocate resources to some extant – for example, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism all emphasize charity and the duty to give alms, and tribal societies emphasize sharing, in recognition of the fact that resources tend to be cumulative – a tendency that needs to be offset for the sake of solidarity.

O. I. Let us get back to artificial intelligence. In your opinion, how and to what extent it will participate in human's life in future?
R. I. You are thinking far ahead but it is a very important question. In the long run – but probably sooner than we think – artificial intelligence will transform society profoundly. It is developing rapidly, and it is already playing a very important role. When I want to know anything – anything in the world – I do a Google search, and it scans millions of documents and within a few seconds tells me what I want to know. When my students and I are discussing something in class, if a question comes up, someone pulls out a smartphone or an I-Pad and in a second we have the answer instead of going to the library and spending an afternoon looking through the shelves until we find the answer.

We have wonderful, almost unlimited access to information. We are smarter, we know more, and we can do more. This has many advantages – in terms of healthcare for example. Our ability to analyze and solve problems is increasing immensely. Our ability to cope with diseases is increasing. Artificial intelligence combined with nano-technology is capable producing nanobots – tiny robots, invisible to the eye that can be injected into the blood stream. They can go to the cancer site and specifically attack only the cancer cells. They can do operations that once were complex and dangerous. They can improve the quality of life and increase life expectancy. Artificial intelligence can provide huge resources! Used intelligently, it can make us powerful, healthy and wise.

But artificial intelligence already is getting smart enough to replace lawyers and doctors, and university professors. Will humans be able stay in control? Artificial intelligence could conceivably rise to the top of the food chain. Would it treat humans any better than we now treat the other animals on this planet? Artificial intelligence is growing in power at a geometric rate, much faster than humans are developing. Artificial intelligence has, for some time, been able to beat the best human chess-players. In the not too distant future, they will be beating us in many far more complex fields than chess. Unless we take precautions, artificial intelligence could wind up ruling the world. If we are lucky, artificial intelligence may treat us as kindly as we treat cute little puppies and kittens, but I cannot guarantee it. In any case, human intelligence will be greatly surpassed. This is a serious problem. Human intelligence is capable solving it but it should not be neglected and we need to begin acting now. Your question has major long-term implications.

O. I. Reasoning about trends in social sciences, could you emphasize a particular area that will be highly significant in the near future?
R. I. Using artificial intelligence to develop models of society that enable us to experiment with social change to develop and test alternative ways of doing things could be immensely valuable. Mistakes in social and political can be enormously expensive in terms of money and human lives, as World War II and the failure of China's Great Leap Forward demonstrated.

Developing models of society that are so realistic that the models themselves can be tested and used to experiment with social change, with policies that provide a specific treatment to the society and to examine their implications, could be extremely valuable. So, I am a big fan of artificial intelligence – but at the same time I view it as something that could conceivably take over and replace humanity.

O. I. Nowadays, there is variety of conflicts in societies which is, unfortunately, only increasing. In this context, what can be the basis for social cohesion and solidarity? What will be this basis in the future?

R. I. It would be ridiculous to claim that there is a simple solution. But social science can give some general guidance. Ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, racial conflicts, and xenophobia are huge problems. A large body of research indicates that the amount of xenophobia – and the amount of conflict between peoples – varies systematically. Xenophobia tends to be highest under conditions of extreme insecurity. For example, under conditions where just enough land to support one tribe, and another tribe comes along, it may literally be a question of one tribe or the other surviving. Under these conditions, xenophobia is realistic.

But evidence from countries containing most of the world's population, indicates that xenophobia declines systematically as people become more secure. With rising levels of security, people become less xenophobic, and they become more tolerant of people with other values, other religions, other races. Consequently, over time, the people of advanced industrial societies have become more tolerant of diversity and less violent toward others. The higher level of security, the less realistic xenophobia becomes.

With high levels of economic and physical security, people actually value cultural diversity, they go out their way to eat exotic food, travel to foreign countries, and experience what life is like there. It is interesting and stimulating. So, at the high end of spectrum diversity is actually valued and respected. In general, as more the world gets more secure, the lower the level of conflict and xenophobia is likely to be. Thus, the fact that China and India are currently experiencing 6 to 7 percent economic growth per year is a huge plus. Some observers view it as threatening that China is becoming the world's largest economic power, but it has some highly positive implications. The fact that China and India, with 40 percent of the world's population are rapidly escaping subsistence-level poverty tends to make the world a safer, more tolerant place in a long run. Nothing is inevitable, but this seems to be a strong tendency: secure people are less defensive, less xenophobic, less hostile than insecure people.

O. I. Contemporary societies have been shaped, in general, by two waves of global transformations: one is the global flow of capital,

information and risks, another – the implementation of a pluralistic paradigm of structural and value systems. But why are the trajectories of societies' development so different? What are the forces that lead the transformations and what values do populations share? Is it possible to predict some potential outcomes of current social transformations?

R. I. Globalization has brought major economic changes that are transforming the world's value systems. Large amounts of capital and technology have moved from Western countries to Asian countries, making them increasingly the world's center of manufacturing. This has brought a decline of manufacturing in Western countries and a huge boom in India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh and other Asian countries containing half of the world's population. This is transforming their value system but they are currently moving from agrarian values to industrial values. India and China are going through the phase of rising materialism, and emphasis on economic development is the top goal. This has made Beijing and Shanghai some of the world's most polluted cities. Theoretically, in the long run, China, India and the other rapidly developing countries will begin to move on the trajectory toward rising emphasis on post materialist values that occurred in Western countries and Japan in the post-World War II era, but for now they are experiencing rising materialism.

Different regions of the world have been moving in different ways in recent decades. There has been a huge growth and rising prosperity for the populations of India, China, Bangladesh, etc. along with a stagnation and even a decline in real income for a large share of the population of high-income countries. These countries are not becoming poor – the US, and Germany, and France, and Sweden are still experiencing economic growth. But for last few decades almost all of the economic gains have gone to the top 10 percent, mainly the top 1 percent, which means that there has been cultural regression in these advanced industrial societies. They continue to move ahead in rising gender equality, rising tolerance of gays, rising emphasis on environmental protection but also with rising xenophobia.

 This phenomenon is wide spread. It manifests itself in British exit from the EU and in election of Donald Trump as president in the US, and

the rise of the National Front in France. A large share of population in the US and other Western countries has experienced declining real income, and in the US even declining life expectancy. This segment of the population is angry, they do not trust their leaders, they feel that they have been going nowhere in recent decades, and they are angry.

One standard response to insecurity is to blame the problems on foreigners. Insecurity triggers a tendency to rally behind a strong leader, seeking strong in-group solidarity, and closing ranks against dangerous outsiders. This tendency is deeply rooted in the human psyche.

Today there is more than enough food to go around. But the gains in recent decades have gone almost entirely to the top. Most of the population has gone nowhere in terms of security, even in terms of health and life expectancy. They are angry and blaming it on outsiders, in a classic reaction.

In the US, we see quite an alarming trend in this direction. Though Clinton won 2.8 million more votes than Trump, Trump won the elections through a fluke of the US Electoral College. He has taken office on a platform that emphasizes xenophobia, blaming the country's troubles on immigrants and foreigners. He plans to build a huge and expensive wall to keep out Mexican criminals and rapists. He claims that if the Chinese do not shape up and accept his terms, they are going to be in big trouble. I think he will find the Chinese much more difficult to push around than he expects. This rising xenophobia in much of the world is an alarming phenomenon. It resembles the rise of fascism in the 1930s; abut fortunately the insecurity driving it now is much less severe than that of the Great Depression.

Which is another reason why I think that the rising prosperity of China, India and much of the world is a very good thing. In the long run, it makes the world a safer place. Insecure people tend to be hostile, xenophobic, and ready to fight. Secure people are more tolerant of others, they behave generally better. Trump's proposals are false solutions – building a wall to keep all Mexicans out (unless they are clever enough to get ladders or dig tunnels), viewing them all as criminals, banning Muslims from the US only fans support among unsecure people. It does not really solve the problem. Turning power over to a billionaire who pays no income taxes

is not the solution to their problem. What is needed a government that taxes billionaires who now pay far less than their share, and redistributes resources to create jobs.

O. I. Modern societies are marked by the fact that religious beliefs – both historical and new ones – as well as atheism, agnosticism and non-religious lifestyles are equally viable options. This raises the question of how two main principles of secularism – equal respect to all beliefs, and freedom of conscience – and its two operative modes – separation of religious institutions and state, and state neutrality towards religions – are challenged by post-secularism?

R. I. I think religion is very important. I have to confess that when I was a graduate student, I paid no attention to religion, because my mentors and I thought that religion was disappearing and that it would drop dead within a few decades.

This assumption was profoundly wrong. It reflects the 19th century version of secularization theory, proposed by some very brilliant social theorists, which held that the spread of scientific knowledge would show religion to be an outdated myth, one that would disappear with the spread of knowledge. It did not happen. My mentors and I were wrong.

One major function of religion has been to give a sense of predictability and security in a face of an uncertain and frightening, dangerous universe. Religion played a crucial role in agrarian society where people were just above the starvation level. They lived in uncertainty whether they and their children might starve next year. Religion did two things – it insisted on a curtain degree of reallocation in the form of charity, alms, and public feasts sponsored by the rich, which helped ward off starvation. But even bigger function of religion was that it provided a sense of assurance that although we do not know what the future holds, it is in the hands of higher power who will provide for us. Things will work out for the best. So, instead of giving up in despair people, did their best to cope with their situation. This is tremendously positive function of religion in uncertain societies.

Economic development and the emergence of advanced social welfare networks in the decades after World War II greatly increased the existential security of the people of highly developed societies, and secularization has taken place in rich secure societies. As societies become more developed, the need for the reassurance in the face of existential uncertainty that religion provided, has diminished. Evidence from the World Value Survey demonstrates that during last forty years the role of religion has shrunk markedly. With one big exception: in ex-communist societies religion has been growing rapidly, to fill the ideological vacuum left by the disappearance of a Marxist belief system that once gave a sense of meaning and purpose to millions of people. For reassurance in the face of insecurity is not religion's only function. People need something to believe in. They need a sense of what is right, what is wrong, of where are we going and where should we go, and religion has provided this function. Marxism for quite a long time provided an alternative sense of meaning; a sense that we are building a good society, that communism is the wave of the future. For a long time, communism had true believers who believed that they were building a good and meaningful society, that they were improving the lot of people. Communism actually did improve education, healthcare, and provided jobs for almost everyone (though some of them were jobs as slave laborers). But in the long run, state-run economies societies do not work well. The people who were the party elite became a new self-serving ruling class by the 1970s and by the1980s, belief in communism was rapidly eroding. By the 1990s, hardly anyone believed any longer in the communist myth. This opened intellectual vacuum, which is being filled now by religion, and by nationalism.

For the past three decades, the top eight countries in which religion is growing most rapidly are all former communist countries – including Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus, other ex-communist countries. They started with very low levels of religiosity but it is growing rapidly. In China, religion has started from an almost non-existent base but is expanding rapidly. Russia also had low levels of religiosity during the Soviet era but today, Russia is a more religious country than France.

Religion did not disappear, contrary to what many enlightened people used to think. For people need a belief system. Many kinds of ideology can serve this purpose but religion is the most widespread institution that provides a sense of predictability, of right and wrong, a sense that universe is orderly.

This seems to be a basic human need. Humans evolved searching for patterns, looking for purpose, trying to predict what would happen, and those who could make a connection between a snapping twig or the fluttering of birds and the presence of predator were more likely to survive. The search for meaning is part of human make up. We need an explanation and if we do not have one people tend to be insecure and function poorly. Religion is not the only thing that can serve that function – Marxism once did so and ideologies based on ecology, gender equality, human rights are wide spread in the West. But people have a deep-rooted tendency to seek some belief system to explain what is good and what is bad and what is just and what is unjust.

The role of religion has declined dramatically in highly developed societies. It once declined almost to extinction in the Soviet Union but now is coming back. As people become more secure they have less need for an absolute believe system that lays down rules that claim to be infallible and eternally unchanging. They become open to more flexible belief systems that accept new idea like gender equality and tolerance of gays and lesbians.

Note from the interviewer:

The views presented in this interview are discussed in detail, along with supporting evidence, in Inglehart's forthcoming book *Cultural Evolution: How Human Motivations are Changing, and How this is Changing the World.* A Russian translation of this book, with a preface by Evgeny Yasin, is forthcoming from the Higher School of Economics, Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Article

Beyond the Freakonomics of Religious Liberty

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ABSTRACT

The paper critiques the prevailing liberal market economy models of religious liberty and religious encounter. In place of market models, this paper argues that values inscribed in gift exchange, hospitality, guest/host relations, in many cases, and to varying degrees, provide better alternative values to govern religious interaction than those of the market model. Instead of conceiving religion as commodity for "sale" – adoption, conversion – and instead of conceiving missionaries as salespeople for their religions, I propose that the encounter of religions could be better conceived in terms of guest/host, gift giver/gift receiver relations. "Freakonomics", therefore, – whether in free market or monopoly form – does not, therefore, write the last page in the story of religious liberty.

KEYWORDS

Armenia, Freakonomics, guest/host, Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, liberty, market values, missionaries, religion.

"Religious Liberty" as Commodity

In May of 2013, I was invited to lecture in Armenia on religious liberty. Instead of teaching, I was "taken to school" about how West and East clashed over religious liberty. For Western governmental, religious and humanitarian groups, the values governing religious liberty or freedom were analogous to the values governing economic markets. The religious "marketplace" should be free and open to all competitors. Religious people should be free to make a "rational choice" of a religion. They should not be regulated in

making their fundamental religious decisions. Individual conscience should be their guide. For the East – the Holy Armenia Apostolic Church (HAAC, hereafter), economic values likewise governed the way it should be with religion. In their case, however, the religious "marketplace" should be tightly regulated, indeed made subject to their monopoly. What mattered most were the historic collective values of national identity and history. Such values put the HAAC firmly in control of religious transactions in the religious marketplace in Armenia. I want first of all to point out that both West and East assume a market model of religion. They differ only as to the degree of freedom in that market. Both, in effect, would agree that the dominant values of the religious realm conform to what Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner have written in their book, *Freakonomics.* (Levitt & Dubner 2009). The discourse on international religious liberty is, thus, thought to play (and ought to play) by Levitt and Dubner's "hidden" rules of economic exchange.

But, should it? I shall argue that the standard "Freakonomic" model may encounter intractable obstacles to successful application. The market model need not govern religious encounter and exchange any more than it needs to encompass all our other kinds of exchange. All the more applies with equal force to monopolists, like the HAAC. The values inherent in what we call "the economy," the market, whether free or regulated, is a relatively late, though doubtless often overwhelming. Religious folk should, for instance, choose the "best" religion – one that rationally maximized their religious "profit," such as their opportunity for salvation. But, if we follow Karl Polanyi's powerful sweeping arguments in his *The Great Transformation*, then we would recognize that profit-maximizing rationality was not always the dominant value in systems of human exchange. (Polanyi 1944) Without reciting Polanyi's entire arguments, we can glean from him the notion of the historicity of our values about exchange. While it is natural for us, who are dominated by the values of economic society, to regard our world with the market foremost in mind, other peoples, past and present, need not do so as well, or at least in as thoroughgoing a fashion as we do.

With Polanyi in mind, I want to argue, instead, that it might be better to think about religious liberty on models embodying other kinds

of values than those dominating our thinking as citizens of economic society. I suggest that the values inscribed in gift exchange, of hospitality – of guest/host, not economic exchange – provide alternative values governing religious interaction to those of the market model. "Freakonomics" – whether in free market or monopoly form – does not write the last page in the story of religious liberty.

The Market Values of the Venice Commission Report in Armenia

To set my thesis in a concrete context, I would point out how prominent official agencies in the West, such as the European Union's Venice Commission conceive the engagement of religions in the public square. For them, not surprisingly, a dominant liberal, rational choice – indeed, "Freakonomic" – model rules. Market values inform official thinking about how religions should get on in a liberal democratic nation-state. Religions thus "sell" their wares (proselytize), "buy into" or "buy out" of a condition of membership (are converted or depart), "win over customers" (gain converts), satisfy their "consumers" (believers, adherents), and so on. In its report of 14-15 October 2011, the Venice Commission concluded its review of proposed revisions to the Armenian constitution and the role of the HAAC. These revisions granted to the HAAC a "list of exclusive missions" (in Freakonomic terms, "franchises") such as 'freely preaching and disseminating its religion'; 'building new churches'; contributing to the spiritual education of the Armenian people" and so on. Critically, in Paragraph 96, the Venice Commission report noted, "that other religious associations will not be allowed to engage in such activities" (in Freakonomic terms, establish a cartel or monopoly). In effect, the HAAC sought to monopolize the field of religious choice in Armenia, to "corner the market," so to speak. "Such a restriction," the report goes on, "would violate international standards on freedom of religion or belief and on the prohibition of non-discrimination" (Flanagan, et al. 2011)[1] – because it violated the value of the autonomy of the "market."

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[1] Much the same principles have been enunciated in the US Congress' "International Religious Freedom Act of 1998" (H. R. 2431), which, in turn, cites a list of international accords on religious freedom as its precedents – among them, prominently the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.*

For convenience sake, I shall call this a "market" model, because major Western institutions, like the EU or the US government, like to say, or think, that religions are, or ought to be, "free," in, at least, an analogous sense to that in which liberal economists imagine the market for goods and services is, or should be, "free." But, as we may be learning, religious institutions, like all the institutions of civil society, are neither absolutely, autonomous, free or sovereign – even though they try mightily so to be. Religious institutions depend as much upon political and economic institutions as another. Few churches get built, and thus does the liberty to build them get exercised, as well, across Aleppo-like war-torn landscapes. Even under the normal conditions of life in a nation-state, as long as the state maintains its designated hold on the monopoly of the use of force in a society, it can always coerce any institution to submit to state influence, if not control. Recent radical movements for will-o'-the-wisp church sovereignty in the United States seem to have taken this to heart, in dramatic ways. When Liberty Baptist University opened an on-campus shooting range, it attracted national media attention (Shapiro 2016). So, as well, did the increased activity of an influential Roman Catholic group "ChurchMilitant" (http://www.churchmilitant.com/). But, at the moment, the Eurasian state maintains "sovereignty," not the churches. But even here, as far as the state is concerned, if one means by "state," the "nation-state," we might want to reserve final judgment about the real extent of the sovereignty of today's nation-states until we can better calculate how far globalized interdependence and multi-national corporations compromise their "freedom" or "sovereignty."

Until quite recently, Armenia, with its ancient established church, the Holy Apostolic Armenian Church, (HAAC) was facing the demands of the EU Venice Commission's reforms of its public policy and practice in the area of "religious liberty," so called. Things changed in early September 2013, however, when further negotiations for full association of Armenia with the EU were suspended, in favor of far weaker plans for relations. At that point, the Armenian government may have, perhaps, realized just what the costs of actual association with the EU would be, as spelt out by the Venice Commission, especially in

light of what could be seen as geopolitically more natural association with Russia's EurAsEC Customs Union. After all, large numbers of otherwise un- or under-employed Armenians worked in Russia. The EurAs EC Customs Union made no demands similar to those required by the Venice Commission's rigorous "religious liberty" requirements. But, although the particular drama of Armenia's approach to the EU may be suspended, the lessons learned in the process of negotiation still apply. To wit, although pluralistic tolerance and "religious liberty" were affirmed in the constitution of the Republic of Armenia, the Venice Commission's report found their official adherence to the letter and spirit of the constitution at odds with its noble aspirations. The Commission claimed that minority churches suffered a range of restrictions, and sometimes even outright harassment. These range from the non-HAAC churches publically being declared "cults" to limitations being placed upon their ability to proselytize, mobilize, or even advertise their existence. Some of the minority churches even complained of incidents threatening their physical well-being. Against this background of intimidation and hostility, the government seemed to favor the HAAC in ways that exceeded its undisputed and well-earned recognition in the formation and preservation of Armenian national identity (Flanagan, et al. 2011). Without my fully being aware of it at the time, Armenia was shaping up as a remarkable case where the battle lines had been drawn – as perplexing as this may sound – between the opposed forces of religious freedom against those of freedom of religion. But, there was more. It also highlighted certain confusing and contrary things about the international religious liberty agenda's campaign for "religious liberty," (whatever that means?) itself.

Nowhere more thoroughly does the Council of Europe reveal what values animate it than the Venice Commission report. This document, and indeed the policies of the Council of Europe as a whole, regarding religious liberty, make liberal values of free choice primary. These values permeate, and are officially inscribed into, Western society in all, if not most, of its domains – including everything from free choice of beliefs, ideas and values to those of association and companionship, as well as to the market place for goods and services. To cite but one

of many examples that might be mentions, the Venice Commission report states in Paragraph 93, while reiterating the judgments of earlier documents, that "individuals and groups should be free to practice their religion without registration if they so desire – regardless of how small or large their group may be"(Flanagan, et al. 2011). The Venice Commission even singles out the cardinal value of being free to "proselytize" – in effect, to publicize, in effect, offer for sale, adopt or acquire – particular religious association.[2] In Paragraph 44, the report states that the government

> must take into account that any limitation on proselytism or the man-
> ifestation of religion, which is a fundamental right, requires careful
> assessment. There is a thin line between the right to manifest one's
> religion and change one's beliefs and the right to religious expres-
> sion, the right to impart and receive even offensive ideas that shock
> and disturb – yet these are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and
> broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society."

Another way to look at this assertion of liberal values in regards to religion is to see them Freakonomically – as the same as the values of the free market. The Venice Commission thus imagines a world shaped by the values of the market, free and rational choice, a venue in which made up of willing buyers and willing sellers. Paragraph 56 accordingly states that "most democratic legal systems do not regulate proselytism *per se*… Special laws targeting religious persuasion are likely to lead to discrimination and may result in unjust curtailment of legitimate manifestations of religion…" The Council of Europe has, in effect, declared – or at the very least assumes – a world in which there ideally exists what is, in effect, an open, free "market" in religious beliefs.

In such a construction of the values governing religious social reality, they, likewise, assume neutrality among religious beliefs. No religion deserves being privileged save by its ability to attract adherents. And, not even those religions, such as the national churches of the East or the established churches of the West, that may actually be privileged (monopolies) should feel entitled to their privileges. Again, the values

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[2] See especially paragraphs 42–59.

of there being willing buyers and willing sellers, so to speak, should prevail, not the controlled "market" preferred by the national churches of the East. In Western liberal eyes, to revert again to an economic metaphor, no one is permitted to "have their thumbs on the scale," so to speak, to gain or deserve an advantage over any other buyer or seller. In the eyes of the Venice Commission, all religions ought to expect to compete equally and "fairly" (sic) for adherents. Ideally, the market will not favor any participant, and thus each enters the market as an equal. In the same way candidates for office appeal for votes or, say, automobile, appliance, dry-cleaning, baguette, or computer sales-folk appeal for potential buyers of their goods and services, so also do the religions compete for "consumers." The religions offer their potential "consumers" a commodity – here, religious belief – and the religious marketplace decides how to value it. The Venice Commission thus affirms values common to those of the liberal economic market as those that will govern interaction among religions. Not so, as we will see, in the monopoly-minded East.

When a Free Market of Religions is Not Really Free

It is not hard to understand why the HAAC seems determined to resist the Venice Commission's open market model of religious relations. Any free market of religions would presume an equally endowed array of willing sellers and willing buyers. But, the HAAC does not believe present-day Armenia fits the model of being an equal player. It has been greatly disadvantaged by the vicissitudes of modern history. Markets need those willing sellers and willing buyers, of which I have already spoken. Even if it did want to compete in a free market, seventy years of systematic Soviet efforts to destroy the HAAC, and all remnants of religion in Armenia have depleted the Apostolic Church's resources of a mature clergy and healthy institutional basis. The Apostolic Church feels that it deserves some consideration for preserving both Armenian nationality and local Christianity through the Soviet period of active oppression of religion. That consideration may well be a permanent monopoly of the religious marketplace for the HAAC. Witness, perhaps to the insensitivity of the arrogant West in appreciating the HAAC's

weakened condition, she is being asked to compete in a "market" rigged against her – a market that is not really "free." Instead of equally endowed willing buyers and willing sellers, the HAAC faces well-funded and energized religious competitors from abroad.

On the side of the new Protestant missionizing churches, the view differs considerably. These small, sometime struggling communities, such as the Jehovah Witnesses, for instance, see themselves disadvantaged in comparison to the larger and historically more deeply rooted HAAC. To them, it represents a stifling, traditionalist monopoly religion that wants to maintain its hegemony, and restrict the religious choices of Armenians. The Apostolic Church thereby seeks to deny Armenians their religious freedom, their inalienable human right to religious liberty, and thus to free exercise of their religions. It is the past, and they represent the future. From documents like the USA's International RFRA or the EU's Venice Commission report, the West is seen as agreeing with the new missionizing churches.

One example that illustrates what sparked such anxiety for the HAAC in the post-Soviet world was the power of such outside groups like the Church of the Latter-Day Saints (LDS, hereafter). Notable here were the innocent-seeming, indeed generous, philanthropic activities of Jon Huntsman, Sr., father of the GOP presidential candidate, Jon Huntsman, Jr. After the 1988 earthquake in northern Armenia, he capped a 25-year effort of philanthropy in Armenia by funding massive rebuilding projects, founding schools and health care facilities, providing for scholarships for Armenian students to study at Utah State University, and so on. Up against one of the world's richest persons, and a conspicuous adherent to the LDS, it is small wonder that the relatively threadbare HAAC felt outclassed! Reasonable or not, the Apostolic Church sees itself and its position in Armenia threatened by well-meaning, international forces.[3] The HAAC sees the power of a

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[3] We need not slight the genuine good Huntsman's resources have done for Armenia. Nor, do we need to slip into an easy cynicism about the ulterior religious motives in Huntsman's gifts. Of course, Huntsman's gift is not "free." As a long-time student of Marcel Mauss, I accept that obligation rules the world of gift giving. All gifts are given under obligation – I must give gifts are also accepted under obligation – I must accept the gift. And, what is more, they are repaid with a force of obligation – I must repay the gift. But, facing the reality

globalized network of religions, mostly based in the US, and funded by American congregations, such as the LDS, as threats to the HAAC's historical monopoly in the religious world of Armenian homeland. And, make no mistake, the term "monopoly" fits the Armenian situation well, even as the HAAC's perfection of that sort of regime has never been complete and has lately been slipping.

Learning from Armenia about Religious Liberty, or Lack of it?

Assuming liberal or market values when it comes to religion might seem like an obvious and unremarkable place to begin thinking about the engagement of religions in the public square. But, for liberal advocates of religious liberty, Armenia and other nations with state churches, deal out unexpected lessons. Here, polarization rules. Combatants on either side are as entrenched as First World War armies facing each other across the front lines. As far as my visit to Armenia went, doors had been slammed shut even before I had tried to walk in. Unlike the world of a liberal market of religions, presumed by the Venice Commission (and in theory, the Armenian constitution, at least as the EU wished it to become), Armenia represents an entirely different, and hostile territory. It is one thing to think about such matters, but really another one to live through them. What was remarkable was the pre-emptive nature of the collision with those who saw me an opponent from my very first day there. The audiences I was scheduled to address showed promise – students at a teachers' college or the American University of Armenia, seminarians of the HAAC, representatives of local NGOs and leaders from local Protestant communities, such as evangelicals, and US affiliated Protestant missionary congregations, such as the LDS – even a national TV audience in prime time. But, no matter how varied these venues, the same entrenched positions stifled serious questioning of any kind from the get-go. These considerations might then be thought a tad theoretical, since the very structure of opposition worked to make

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of gift giving as interested doesn't condemn us to cynicism. It only forces us to face reality of living in a world of relationships. And, that reality – even Huntsman – can be good, however, motivated, or however not "optimal" from a given point of view.

it even impossible to explore, much less entertain, value options, much less to promote a certain values.

Besides the "schooling" Armenia's polarized religious situation gave me, recent criticisms of the international religious liberty agenda by the likes of Elizabeth Shakman Hurd have also given many of us reason to rethink the entire issue (Hurd 2008; Hurd 2014). Is it always in the best interests of people to assert their right to religious liberty? Are other interests, such as maintaining the social peace of a *convivium* with other peoples of different religions, more desirable? Would the assertion by one religious group of their religious liberty only provoke endless destructive conflict, and so on? Would not human welfare, Hurd, in effect suggests, be better served by letting thing be – even if this meant inequality, and even monopolies on the religious scene? Armenia provides us with a concrete context in which to consider these and other criticisms of the international religious freedom agenda.

On the one side, how could one not respect the heroic situation of the HAAC, just emerging from Stalinist oppression – a fact to which the Venice Commission report gave scant recognition (Paragraph 43). (And, what form would that take, short of complying with the will of the HAAC in all things religious in Armenia?) And, given the massive majority of those who identified with the HAAC in the country, wasn't it a bit artificial, in effect, to consider it just one of another set of competing religions, all equal in the sight of God and the global market of religions? (But, how could religious liberty for the missionaries be assured short of that?) On the other side, the whole range of (mostly) Protestant evangelicals and the LDS, with their ample funding from abroad, their powerful mass media, their competitive insurgent's energy, were not to be denied. (But, whose country were they seeing operate?) The Protestant missionaries also brought a modern sense openness coupled with a winning desire to do good for Armenia. How and why should this be resisted?

But, maybe, these dilemmas, naturally provoked by the market model, signaled the limit to that model's utility? What is more, this conclusion would be not only apply to Armenia, but to all the nations of the former USSR, including Greece and Turkey – wherever either,

officially or not, a national religion was in place. In some quarters, the idea of markets in religions may seem uncontroversial, even morally imperative. But, being "on the ground" in Armenia confronts one with the fact of the actual feasibility of the market model. Hegemony, monopoly, or whatever one wants to call them, are real. The Armenian market in religions seemed hopelessly fixed from every angle, certainly from the viewpoint of the HAAC and its local hegemony. But, also it was fixed, or at least unbalanced, from the perspective of the missionary religions, with the material advantages they brought to the market.

While it may be easier to understand the advantages accruing to missionary competitiveness, the ways the HAAC's local position gave it market power are far less obvious. An unwelcome opportunity to discover the subtleties of market manipulation by the HAAC came with visit to the teachers' college at Gyumri. I share it at this point to flesh out the idea of how markets can be manipulated, here, worse than that, how markets can be undermined even before they have had a chance to set up shop. The point is, of course, not to let a potential competitor set up shop at all. That is, in effect, what happened at the state teacher's college in Gyumri.

Subverting the Marketplace of Ideas about Religious Liberty at the Gyumri

Anyone who wishes to understand the myriad ways states repress religions, and thus restrict religious liberty should consult Ani Sarkissian's, *The Varieties of Religious Repression* (Sarkissian 2016). She gives us the first relentlessly thorough account of the devices, policies, techniques, strategies and such used by modern nation-states to manipulate religion within their borders. In fact, Sarkissian details so many, that it would be impossible to begin doing her itemization justice. Here, nevertheless are some examples. States may begin by preventing individuals from participating in religious services, or restricting certain groups from participating in religious services, then move on to restricting the location of, or architecture of, places of worship. Not enough, limiting the hours that religious gathering places may be open to the public helps repressive policies, as does coercing conversion, restricting proselytizing directly, or the

formation of religious communities through discriminatory registration or monitoring requirements. Then, there is always the control over clerical appointments, restricting religious speech, banning religious political parties, and so on and so on (Sarkissian 2016:27ff).

Less noticed by Sarkissian, however, are how attempts to defeat, repress, subvert, or undermine a free market of ideas aid the efforts to undermine a free market in religious liberty. In Gyumri, I discovered that it did so by blocking the application of the methods of modern religious studies – by preventing religion itself from becoming an object of academic or scientific study. At its most elementary, these efforts are aimed at stifling any talk about religion in the public square that purports to be neutral, or disinterested with respect to the doctrinal or other positions under discussion. In effect, this attack upon open discourse is part and parcel of the way repressive states seek to control civil society, in all its diversity. By "neutral," I do not mean some absolute objectivity, disinterestedness, or neutrality, with respect to any and all values, but only a "relative" neutrality – one with respect to dogmatic positions in the contested religious field of inquiry. In a field represented by Catholics and Protestants, an investigator committed to Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Jewish or Muslim values might be deemed interested with respect to those values. However, they could claim such *prima facie* "relative neutrality" with respect to the Protestants and Catholics contestants.

But, in the case I want to illuminate, agents of market manipulation, here, friendly to the HAAC, sought to defeat, undermine, subvert, stifle, and so on, neutral inquiry. They sought to discredit the values of open and disinterested inquiry – here, involving the scientific study of, religion, itself. I have discovered that such a strategy of the repression of inquiry may involve at least three elements. I would be surprised if my list of three broad kinds of techniques of undermining open, disinterested discussion is exhaustive, so readers may want to contribute their own to those I have spelt out here.

The occasion in question was a talk held before a group of about 40 youthful, future teachers at the Gyumri Teachers' College. I prepared for the seminar, ready with a brief, 15-minute PowerPoint presentation –

really, no more than "fish food" to encourage discussion about religious liberty. I really did not offer my own thinking about how to solve the various conundrums connected to this subject – frankly, because I had no solution to these thorny problems! Instead, I would have been pleased just to listen to and learn about the concerns and opinions of what looked to be a keen group of about 40 young students. As people started taking their seats, I noticed a group of older men, curiously situating themselves, as if by assignment, about the room. When question time began, I soon learned why. Before a single student could speak, however, instead of some light-hearted give and take, those strategically seated older men began peppering me with questions, so much so that they, in effect, monopolized questioning. In Gyumri, they not only turned up in force, arrayed strategically around the room, but they echoed and reinforced each other. Who were they? I thought, perhaps, they were teachers, or mature students, returning for further credentialing. I never really learned who they were, but they succeeded in their purpose. I thought nothing of it at the time, but in retrospect, now I realize what had happened. In effect, I got caught in a carefully concocted ambush conducted that attempted to undermine discussion with provocations, attempts to bait or distract me as a primary discussant, by tempting me to pursue tangential issues. It was obvious that my tormenters were practiced in the art of undermining open discourse by a combination of monopolizing discussion or diverting it.

Second, silencing discussion. The antics of these older men succeeded in effectively silencing other members of the assembly from effectively speaking. Students seemed to recognize them for what they were, and feared them. Their mere presence effectively intimidated the others in the assembly into silence. In Gyumri, the students took note. They knew who they were, even though I did not. They had seen this movie before, and kept their heads down.

Third, entrapment. Finally, and subtlest of all, these agents of repression might try to trap a speaker into veering from neutrality. They might do this by challenging a speaker to declare their "where they stand," typically by challenging the candor of a speaker for withholding their own commitments. But, were one to surrender and accept being

the bearer of a "message," a speaker would lose their credentials as an honest broker, as neutral, in a given discussion. In Armenia, for instance, I truly wanted to orient myself to the local situation by scrupulously seeking to listen to all sides in the dispute over religious liberty. At one point, apparently exasperated by my passive stance, I was asked by one of the agents of repression, "But what is your message?" I was briefly stunned, since delivery a message was really far from my mind. If I had a hidden agenda, which I ironically did not have, it would have been that I had no agenda, no message! But, despite lacking a message, when asked such a question, I do admit having felt tempted to retort with a reply as requested. Yet, had I done so, rather than stammer, as I did, something about not having a message, I would have trapped myself into being seen as just another dogmatist, just another messenger. I would have been tricked into defeating my own purposes of seeking open, disinterested, neutral discussion. In Armenia, agents of repression were ready with an ample armory of weapons ready to defeat serious engagement in questions about religious liberty by first undercutting the possibility of discussing religion at all in neutral, or non-dogmatic, ways. I was truly thus caught in a verbal "ambush." But, though I may have been left for dead, I was far from it.

If Not Markets, What?

In Gyumri, then, I experienced, first-hand, how a marketplace of religious can be frustrated from forming at all. A symptom of Armenia's religious polarization, it, nonetheless, did offer food for thought. One way I had thought to tease out some views was in fact, objectively and frankly, to present an alternative model to the religious liberty market model. For starters, one might try to recognize the concerns of the HAAC, and argue that we should query the idea of a truly free-for-all, open market, where religions duked it out against one another. This was nothing but an attempt to provoke a discussion of how we could we better conceive the relationship between the HAAC and both the new Protestant missionary churches? The same goes as well for the local, resident Protestant (also some Roman Catholic and Orthodox) churches of relative longstanding?

What model would enshrine the values that would best prescribe how these communities should look on each other?

First, just to shake up things a bit, a little thought adventure. When situations seem so dire, we tend to focus more and more on the details of our immediate slice of history, here, in Armenia in the 21st century. But, why not reset our perspective first and assume a grander purview? Imagine a vantage point 50,000 feet above Armenia and 50,00 years into the past. From there, Armenia, much like Israel/Palestine, sits squarely on a land bridge between larger continental masses. Human migrations out of Africa had traipsed across this "Armenia" for tens of thousands of years. Contrary to the way, Armenians may feel in Fortress Armenia, the space occupied by today's Armenia has always swarmed with peoples on the move. Understandably, both the trauma of the genocide and its newly acquired independence has made Armenians more conscious of their vulnerability, finitude and isolation. But, especially when we add the stunning reality of the Armenian diaspora to my imaginative reflection on Armenia's place in the prehistoric movement of peoples, the present fixation upon the present-day Republic of Armenia might begin to seem disproportionate. If the ancient history of Armenia challenges beliefs about Armenian uniqueness and insulation from the flows of history, what does it mean to Armenian self-consciousness that three times the number of Armenians live in the diaspora than in the Republic – 10 million there, and only 3.5 million in Armenia, proper.

Let me suggest that these historic and demographic facts might offer reasons to reconsider the stalemate endgame that the market vs. monopoly model of religious relationship in Armenia has produced? I find it hard to believe that the only way to think about religions in relation is either as competing commodities in an ideal-type market or as alienated subjects of a religious monopoly. This is not to say that another model, such as I shall now suggest, will be flawless, or indeed that any model for thinking about this matter will be. But, what harm can come from entertaining different ways of conceiving situation – especially those that seem at loggerheads?

The Values of Being Good Hosts and Guests

Accordingly, to challenge the ubiquitous model of market vs. monopoly values, one might consider another possible alternative model of values regulating religious interaction – the values of being good hosts/guests. In particular, as I shall now elaborate, one might regard the non-HAAC churches seeking access to Armenia as potential "guests." If such a substitution sounds softheaded or sentimental, or both, I would strongly object. Indeed, the guest/host model has particularly apt application to Armenia. Consider the particularity of Armenia's well-known and often celebrated diaspora communities. Armenians have been welcome "guests" the whole world over, however, familiar, even if painfully so, this may be. Were I an Armenian, I would be distinctly proud that Armenian "guests" (i.e., migrants) have a history of being so welcomed in so many different parts of the world. (I, of course, exclude the Genocide.) Today Armenians are, in effect, one of the world's more prominent and successfully integrated "guest" communities. Indeed, the vitality, growth, deployment and success of the international Armenian migrant diaspora ought to be recognized as a great success story of international social integration. But, the very success of the diaspora, the very warmth of the welcome accorded Armenians in diaspora, puts Armenia in debt to the world. Is not something owed in return? Thus, far from being soft and sentimental, proposing this guest/host model recognizes the reciprocal debt Armenia has incurred to be a host nation itself.

In Armenia, complaints of suppression by Protestant missionary groups have, in effect, made religious liberty an issue in Armenia. They feel aggrieved by feeling frozen out of the Armenian marketplace of religions by the monopoly power of the HAAC. They claim that the HAAC or its agents have sought to restrict their ability to "sell" their version of religion in the Armenian marketplace. Put in the alternative mode that I am proposing, why would not we say as well that the HAAC does not wish to "host" the Protestant missionaries, it does not want to extend to them the honor of being "guests" in Armenia. (I need to say immediately, however, that several of the non-HAAC churches

are well-established in Armenia, and not "new" in the sense that the post-1989 mission churches are, and hence do not exactly qualify a "guests." The Armenian Evangelical Church, for example, dates from 1846 in Armenia. Small numbers of Roman Catholics and Russian Orthodox, but notably evangelicals (1%) balance to over 92% who claim allegiance to the AAC) Might, then, this alternative perspective of religious contact as conforming more to the host/guest model than the liberal market model, at least, make us stop and think, even if we rushed back to our old positions thereafter?

I have no solution for this puzzle, but cannot help but perhaps elaborating it according to the guest/host model may induce some fresh thinking. I have already said why it might be argued that Armenians find themselves in an awkward position with respect to others, wishing to come to Armenia, since their own kind have been so welcomed abroad. How would one counter the argument that the very existence of such a large diaspora – about 4 times the population of Armenia proper – may place a moral burden upon Armenians to be good "hosts" of these new stranger religions? Next, of course, a lack of hospitality towards the new missionary groups could be said to offend longstanding cultural norms. A glance at Armenia's location on the Caucasian land bridge between the Middle East and northeastern Europe and central Asia, and its 50,000 year history as a conduit for migrant human populations for bespeak a people who have learned how to engage the stranger. Despite its present-day look of isolation, Armenia has always been a crossroads of world's populations. Does any of this suggest new policies towards the new "visitors"?

Up to this point, I have been showing how the values expressed in the guest/host model of relations suggest other modes of behavior that the HAAC "hosts" might have otherwise not considered. But thinking about the relation of say, the new missionaries and the HAAC, cuts both ways. Replacing the market model with the host/guest model has value implications the new Protestant missionaries. A "guest" is not the same as a "consumer" or "salesperson." If the Protestant missionaries think of themselves more as guests than as salespeople do, I believe they would have to entertain different sorts of values in regulating their

behavior. A "guest" in Armenia, say, should conceive of themselves, first, as having been given the gift of, at least, provisional acceptance. Guests, unlike, salespeople or consumers, are not free of the logic of gift and obligation. The entire point of replacing gift with commodity is precisely to eliminate moral considerations. Caveat emptor. As a guest, however, one would be expected to behave as if one were welcomed into the Armenian "house," so to speak. As such, guests are expected to restrain themselves in certain ways, even as they enjoy corresponding privileges. The best silverware is put out for the guest, but correspondingly, the guest is trusted not to run off with the silverware, as it were! Or, guests are expected to educate themselves about their hosts, so that they can, again, behave accordingly. For instance, it would seem to be both seemly good manners and decent historical awareness that the new missionary religions in Armenia recognize what the HAAC is and has been. One might, also, frankly admit the oddity of Christians seeking to missionize the first officially Christian nation! Why would not that be a little like a case of "bringing coals to Newcastle"? Further, putting such encounters into a broader and deeper historical context, we might all be reminded of the ignorant disrespect Latin Christians have meted out to Eastern Christians over a very long history, whether in Protestant or Roman Catholic form.

For these reasons alone, more systematic acknowledgment, respect and admiration on the part of Latin Christians for their poorer Eastern cousins might be in order. I am not sure what form that should take, or what will, should or could happen once it did. Perhaps host/guest reciprocity could if those foreign, American, say, missionary groups took the lead in receiving Armenian immigrants into their new homes in the Diaspora? Are the foreign Christian missionaries being good 'Christians' at home by offering real hospitality to Armenian migrants to the United States? Doing so might start a "virtuous cycle" of guest/host reciprocity, perhaps even educating would-be Protestant Christian missionary churches about the place of HAAC in the history of Christianity? But, until the sometimes-perceived zeal of the new foreign missionaries is tempered by some humility for the historic communities of Eastern Christianity, the new missionaries risk being

seen as barbarians who offend all the ancient and sacred rules of hospitality. Without the realization of a theology of mutual respect and recognition, both sides will continue to be estranged from each other. That is work for theologians on all sides of this issue.

The challenge remains great for those who want to foster open discussions of central values about the optimal relation of religions in post-Soviet states, like Armenia, with its historic national churches. Perhaps, too much is invested in the outcomes of such discussions for principal participants? As a result, really open conversation about key values becomes difficult, whether by nature or by deliberate resistance. I can say this with some authority, because not only my Gyumri conference and talk systematically subverted, but also immediately thereafter the HAAC authorities canceled my much-anticipated meeting with their seminarians. Whether this was in anticipation of my merely trotting out the familiar position of the US religious liberty agenda or not, I shall never know. But, if the HAAC seminary authorities felt every visitor was going to "sing" from the RFRA (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), IRFA (International Religious Freedom Act) and the Venice Commission report's "hymnals," they could easily have justified the cancelation to themselves. "Who are these people to preach to, the HAAC, about religion in our own country?!" What need Armenia for a new batch of Christian missionaries, when it was already a nation of Christians, indeed an officially Christian nation – the first – since 303 CE? But, other visitors might have loved to have had a chance to listen and learn from them about their perspective on the entire religious liberty question.

Ironically, the authorities often do not realize that even visiting American academics could have deep sympathies for their doubts about the Western, neo-liberal, market model of religions proposed for Armenia by the EU and the US. For instance, the often-triumphal arrogance of today's reformed Latin Christians rehearses the historic disrespect for Coptic and Orthodox Christianity that Saba Mahmood so well explored recently. (Danchin, et al. 2015) Such deep-seated or deeply designed suspicions, alas, can successfully prevent reaching some level of mutual recognition and respect. So, leaders of the

historic Eastern churches might want at least to listen to what the next roving academic has to say. Some of us academics value openness. We seek to learn from others by listening by virtue of the very vocation we have chosen to pursue. Some Western academics do respect the historic churches of the East, as much as they feel sympathy for the sometimes struggling, sometimes well-financed missionaries from the West. I have tried to argue here that both sides might better exploit the situation of contact and exchange by seeing each other as hosts and guests, rather than as buyer and sellers of religion.

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Article

Religious Education: Meeting and Countering Changes, – Changing and Standing Still*

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ABSTRACT

I shall venture to map and discuss how (certain) states in the Western part of Europe have responded to the challenges of increased religious pluralism and individualism, in particular, new Muslim presence and new Islamophobia. The main focus will be on the changes as regards the RE offered and supported by the state in public school. The conclusion reached by my analysis is that there have been some changes to RE as a reflection of and response to the changes taking place in society and in the world at large as regards religion, but some of the responses and changes to RE seem to be changes and responses meant to counter, if not stop, the changes that have to do with religion, the role of religion in society at large and the meaning (or not) of religion for individuals. One can witness a strange mixture of responses: on the one hand, an opening up of the contents and approaches of the RE to the increasingly multi-religious society, and, on the other hand, an effort to use RE to protect and boost the national religio-cultural situation of the past, e.g. by way of promoting the traditional majority religion of the state, and by, inter alia, insisting on its key role for the (unchanging) national identity. The core aims, thus, of the RE often remain unchanged even if certain terms and aims do reflect that times have changed.

Introduction

French sociologist of religion, J.-P. Willaime, former Director of the (French) *Institute européen en sciences des religions* (IESR), an institute set up by the French government in order to stimulate and strengthen teaching about religion as a dimension within other school subjects (e.g. by way of producing qualified textbooks as well as offering in-service teacher-training) in an overview of RE in Europe wrote (Willaime 2007, 57 f) that all kinds of religious education (RE) in Europe were facing the same kind of challenges caused by the same kind of change, namely, an increased religious pluralism and individualism.

Though I would add and stress that 'religious pluralism and individualism' include an increase in many countries of so-called *nones* as well as of outright atheists, and though, as regards challenges, I find it unavoidable to emphasize the importance – for all kinds of thinking about RE, religion and religious pluralism – of the new Muslim presence and (not least) the various kinds of old and new Islamophobia. I cannot but agree with Willaime.[1] Also today, in 2016.

In what follows, I shall venture to map and discuss how and to what a degree (certain) states in the Western part of Europe have actually responded to the mentioned challenges and changes as regards the RE offered and supported by the state in public school. Though many countries have highly developed private- school system and though allowing supporting, funding and establishing (and controlling, inspecting and sometimes closing) e.g. Muslim private schools, and though developments within the private religious schools system can

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[1] For discussions on definitions of 'Islamophobia' as well as references, see inter alia Otterbeck, J. and P. Bevelander 2006. I use the term to refer to hostile and fearful (at times also dicriminatory and neo-racist) attitudes, actions, and discourses on Islam and Muslims based primarily on prejudice, generalisations and stereotypes. For an Islamophobia in Denmark, see Jensen 2012.

also be seen as a response (also a state response) to change and the religious pluralisation, I have not included this in the following.

Amongst the conclusions reached by my description and analysis mention may be made of a few overall ones: there *have* been some changes to RE as a reflection of and response to the changes taking place in society and in the world at large as regards religion, but, as it will be clear, some of the responses and changes to RE seem to be changes and responses meant to *counter*, if not stop, the changes that have to do with religion, the role of religion in society at large and the meaning (or not) of religion for individuals.

Likewise, one can witness a strange mixture of responses: on the one hand, an opening up, in various ways, of the contents and approaches of the RE in question to the increasingly multi-religious society, and, on the other hand, and, at the same time, an effort to use RE to protect and boost the national religio-cultural situation of the past, e.g. by way of promoting the traditional majority religion of the state, and by, *inter alia*, insisting on its key role for the (unchanging) national identity. The core aims, thus, of the RE in question, quite often remain unchanged even if certain terms and aims *do* reflect that times have changed. Even as regards the introduction of an alternative subject to the traditional confessional RE offered, it often turns out that the alternative is no 'real' alternative but rather a substitute for a (confessional) RE, a confessional RE traditionally thought to be a provider of not least the moral supposed to be the foundation of the good society.

Mapping out RE – and Changes to RE Reflecting Societal and Religious Changes

Mapping out and ever so briefly discussing responses to changes necessitates mapping out the various kinds and modalities of RE. "Religious education" (RE) is a (highly) generic term that can (and actually does) include all kinds and often very different kinds of teaching religion. RE, and here I only look at religious education in public schools, comes in many shapes, and each shape, besides, comes in many shades.

Maps and models are supposed to be less complex than the empirical complexities they try to map, overview, reduce and handle. But RE, in its various shapes and shades, is mapped and classified in so many ways—and the classifications are based on such a variety of criteria – that readers who are not well read in the relevant literature are likely to get lost. Here follows my classification and overview, – and I can only hope that the reader does not get lost *and* refer her to some of the many other overviews.[2]

Confessional RE

RE in public state-run (otherwise) secular education and public schools, be it elementary or upper-secondary school, may be a time-tabled *Confessional RE*, state supported (in various ways) and (as in Germany) taught by teachers educated, not in the normal state institutions for teacher training, but in institutions run by the 'confession' (majority or minority religion, denomination etc.) in question.

Though confessional RE comes in various shapes and shades (Finland for example having its own special kind, maybe more correctly termed 'separative' rather than 'confessional' RE),[3] it normally takes as its starting point the religious teachings of the religion/confession/denomination in question, and it has, one way or the other, the aim of making those religious teachings religiously and morally relevant to the pupils. Pupils, who are normally, though not exclusively, children of parents who 'adhere' or 'belong' to the religion/confession in question.

Confessional RE is always a kind of *learning religion or learning from religion*, especially or exclusively learning from 'one's own' religion, and it aims at making the pupils *religiously competent*, as it is sometimes expressed. It is teaching *into* the religion or denomination in question. 'Religious instruction', 'Religious upbringing' or 'religious

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[2] Many of the books and articles on RE listed in the references to this article have some kind of account of the various terms and kinds of RE. However, from my study-of-religions perspective specific mention may be made of: Alberts 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009; Jensen 2005; Willaime 2007. Byrne 2014 also has useful overviews and discussions. For more recent overviews and discussions from other perspectives that a study-of-religions perspective, cf. e.g. Jackson 2014, and Schreiner 2015.

[3] For inland, see Sakaranaho 2013.

nurture' are terms that may therefore at times be applied too, despite the fact that these terms may also be used for religious education taking place within the religious institution itself (or in the home) rather than in the public school.

One may also speak more broadly about 'religious' RE as well as of 'interreligious' RE, – over against 'non-religious' or 'secular' RE, – a terminology that may be preferred in order to e.g. avoid that 'confessional RE' is used only when the kind of RE in question is identical to a kind of catechism and exclusively based upon and aimed at a formulated 'confession' or creed.

As a consequence of an increase in certain kinds of religious pluralization and/or pluralism(s), e.g. an increased presence, in a nation or region, of parents and pupils with various kinds of religious or denominational backgrounds, systems of confessional RE, e.g. in various 'Länder' in Germany, tend to become systems of multi-confessional RE, with each religion or denomination (Islamic, Jewish, Apostolic etc) establishing and running, with the support of the state, its own confessional RE in the public school.[4]

Apart from the development into a system of multi-confessionalism in places with confessional RE mention must, of course, also be made of the necessity to have an opt-out possibility and to offer an alternative subject, non-confessional, to confessional RE. The human rights 'regime' is evidently in place most places and it has necessitated changes also as regards RE in school, and the increase in religious pluralisation implies an increase in non-religion, also amongst parents and pupils formally belonging to one religion or denomination. The opt-out option sometimes also exists even if the RE in question is, in accordance with the laws of the land, in principle non-confessional. This is, for example, the case in elementary school in Denmark as well as in Norway, and in both countries this is to make sure that the state is not taken to court by some stakeholders (e.g. minority religions or denominations, humanist associations, and parents) who think (correctly or not) that that the RE in question does not qualify as 'objective, critical, and pluralistic',

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[4] See e.g. with regard to Bavaria in Germany Jensen & Kjeldsen 2014d.

the criteria staked out for a compulsory RE by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as well with as by US Supreme Court.[5]

Likewise, most confessional RE nowadays includes some teaching of and about 'other' religions.[6] A critical look at the inclusion of other religions in the curriculum in confessional RE, however, reveals that quite often this teaching does not comply with basic study-of-religions standards for a series of reasons:

Though the teachers teaching about other religions within the framework of confessional RE may have had some kind of education qualifying them for this, most confessional RE-teachers have not been educated at something comparable to study-of-religions departments and thus have not acquired the cross-cultural, critical, comparative and historical knowledge and competences, knowledge and competences necessary also in order to minimize the risk that teaching about the other religion(s) takes place on the basis of and from the viewpoint of the teacher's own religion and insider-notion of religion.

Linked to the inclusion of teaching about (other) religions in confessional RE is a widespread ecumenical aim, or, as it is more often called, interreligious or interfaith inspiration and aspiration. Teaching of one's own religion and the religion(s) of others (also sometimes the others sitting in the classroom) aims at providing the pupils with not just religious but interreligious competence. The so-called Hamburg way of doing things, with protestant theologian Wolfram Weisse as a

[5] See Jensen 2005 for a discussion with reference to human rights norms, and Andreassen 2013 on the problems for Norwegian RE to meet the human rights standards. The Norwegian case, in an exemplary way, indicates how hard it is for an, in principle, non-confessional RE to comply with not just human rights but also with study-of-religions standards. It may be added that the opt-out possibility is only *partial* in Norway: the pupils can only be exempted from those parts of the RE teaching (and those parts, actually, of all teaching in school, which they (or their parents) deem to be religious or religious-like practice. In Denmark, they can be totally exempted, but only from RE. In both countries there is no alternative offered, but in Denmark the parents are supposed to educate their child in their own religion. There is, in both countries, no opt-out possibility in upper-secondary school, no doubt because the RE in question is more (or totally) study-of-religions based.

[6] Examples may be found in the so-called baseline studies on RE in Spain, Italy and Germany produced by Jensen & Kjeldsen 2014bcd.

leading figure, is a good example of this combination of confessional and interreligious (or: 'inter-faith' or 'inter-confessional') RE.[7]

Interreligious (or Intercultural or Multicultural) RE

Though there are instances of confessional RE that turns into some kind of inter-confessional or interreligious RE, one might also argue that this kind of RE or more 'full-blown' kinds explicitly interreligious RE must be mapped as a special kind of response to the changes in or towards new kinds of religious pluralism. In what follows I shall therefore take a brief look at this class of RE.

'Intercultural education' (ICE), 'multicultural education' (MCE), 'interreligious education' (IRE) (not to be mistaken for IRE = 'Islamic religious education'), 'interfaith education', and 'intercultural religious education' are all terms flourishing on the 'market'. And, like RE, they are all far from self-explanatory.

What they *are* or what they *intend* to be can only be determined from case to case following an elucidation and analysis of the relevant source material. They may also be taught in schools in various ways: as im- or explicit dimensions of other specific time tabled school subjects (e.g. history or a timetabled RE), as im- or explicit dimensions and practices of the school and education system as a whole, or as specific time tabled school subjects in their own right so to say.

Both intercultural and multicultural education often imply a kind of education, teaching and learning that is aimed at supporting and strengthening identities, (equal) rights and social/cultural inclusion of various cultural and religious groups and the individuals pertaining to those groups. A support and an inclusion seen as essential to the well-being of the groups and individuals in question and to the larger multicultural society and world.

It is therefore quite often an im- or explicit part also of what is called 'citizenship education', and it is thus also often linked to education

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[7] For one of many brief introductions to the "Hamburger Weg", see Doedens & Weisse 2007. For a brief critical overview with references to further study-of-religions based critical analysis, inter alia by Christoph Bochinger, of this kind of confessional-interreligious RE, see Frank 2010, 27-29. Linked to this kind of confessional RE in Hamburg is the so-called Akademie der Weltreligionen at the University of Hamburg. See http://www.awr.uni-hamburg.de (last accessed February 20, 2016).

aimed at promoting democracy and human rights. Only a case -by-case study, however, may reveal to what a degree the stipulated or factual education or teaching does not only recognize, respect and tolerate diversity, especially cultural or religious diversity, but does also 'celebrate' it and move beyond recognition to dialogical (inter-)action with a possibility of promoting and generating shared cross-cultural or cross-religious notions and practices.

In most cases, it is learning about others in the presence of each other, and in some cases it is learning *from* the others in the presence of each other. The last mentioned possibility often is implied in the term 'dialogue' as well as in what is sometimes called 'interreligious education'. Since religion is often (considered) an important element in culture and identity (construction), intercultural as well as multicultural education is not rarely paying attention to religion, and it thus also often linked to interreligious or interfaith education.

Transnational (Recommendations) for RE

Recommendations from the much advertised and influential REDCo (*Religion in Education. A Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict in Transforming Societies of European Countries*)[8] project, as well as the aims and policy of the equally influential ENRECA network (*The European Network for Religious Education through Contextual Approaches*),[9] in various ways show clear signs of the characteristics

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[8] The project, financed for three years, 2006-2009, by the research department of the European Commission, included projects linked to eight countries. The project has resulted in several books published by Waxman, Münster, and in even more articles. The US journal *Religion & Education* devoted a special issue (Vol. 37, Number 3, 2010) to the project. With an introduction by W. Weisse, *ibid*. 187-202, and "responses" from invited scholars, including my own critical one (Jensen 2010).

[9] The policy statement of ENRECA, written by Siebren Miedema, Peter Schreiner, Geir Skeie, and Robert Jackson may be downloaded from several URLs. One is the Comenius platform at http://www.comenius.de/pdfs/themen/Europa-enreca.pdf (last accessed Februay 20,2016). The Comenius-Institut, by the way, represented by its former director as well as by its present director (Peter Schreiner) has been prominent and very influential in the field of European RE for decennia, an indication of a characteristic mixture of scholarly as well as religious interests and affiliations to be found on the European RE scene. Schreiner, has, it must be emphasized, time and again produced solid and helpful research based overviews of RE in Europe.

of interreligious education: religions are seen as spiritual and moral resources for the pupils and for society, teaching *about* is combined with teaching from the insider's perspectives, learning about is also learning *from*, and RE is seen as having much more to accomplish than providing knowledge and analytical skills.

If not there to save the world, it (RE) is there to, at the least, play a key role in paving the way for tolerance, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, human rights, and freedom of religion, and it is supposed to function as an anti-dote to what is seen as a growing fragmentation, lack of spiritual and moral orientation, and gross materialism. In brief: important cultural and societal changes, conceived of states and certain stakeholders to influence societies and individual in negative ways.

The RE in question, recommended or 'for real', is thus aiming at contributing to the formation of what has been called 'the whole child', as well as of what is thought to be a 'wholesome' society. With reference to the famous UK based 'gift to the child'-project and-pedagogy (cf. *inter alia* Alberts 2007, 120-130 for an overview and references) one can say that this kind of interreligious RE sees itself as a gift to the child as well to society at large, the cohesion of which it contributes to while functioning also to develop interpersonal (moral) values and interreligious competences.

Several other of the transnational recommendations and projects, projects which have received at least some publicity beyond the ranks of RE-linked scholars and policy makers, at a first glance seem to recommend a study-of-religions approach, teaching *about* religion. Yet, quite a few, e.g. the Council of Europe's project(s) on intercultural

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Nevertheless, it must also be noticed that (cf. the Comenius-Institut website) this key RE-player is at the same time director of the Comenius-Institut (Muenster, Germany), a Protestant Centre for Research and Development in Education. Consequently, it must be noted that a key player like Schreiner who has also been central in the EFTRE, the European Forum for RE-teachers, and who is moderator of the Coordinating Group for Religious Education in Europe (CoGREE), at the same time is also president of the Inter-European Commission on Church and School (ICCS), a non-governmental organization with participatory status at the Council of Europe and an associated member organization of the Conference of European Churches.

education, actually *stress* that learning *about* is not enough.[10] This is true also for the recent 2014 publication edited by Robert Jackson (Jackson 2014), beyond a doubt the most influential contemporary RE-scholar and policy maker. The publication (Chapter 2) *inter alia* stresses that religion cannot be reduced to a cultural fact, that understanding must include the understanding of the insider's perspective, and that it takes imagination and empathy to understand religion. This, as well as the explicit recommendation of e.g. a dialogical approach, is not in line with a study-of-religions approach, even if the publication at various places speaks of the kind of RE recommended for schools in terms of 'study of religions' ('studying religions') in school.

The same can be said about another response, *The Toledo Guiding Principles* issued by the OSCE, to the changes and 'challenges', especially religion-related changes and challenges conceived of as a threat to the security of the OSCE member states. *The Toledo Guiding Principles* is a thorough recommendation to member states to implement a non-confessional kind of RE in public schools, and time and again, the *The Toledo Guiding Principles* refers to the study of religions as the academic basis for RE (and the educational background of RE-teachers), and time and again it stresses that it is teaching *about* that is recommended. Yet, at the same time it displays, as pointed out by the present writer (Jensen 2008, 132-133), several clear examples of an approach to religion and RE not specifically characteristic of an academic study of religion.

Nevertheless, some responses, e.g. the *Toledo Guiding Principles*, to changes and challenges, do, I think, also constitute a step in the direction of a study-of-religions non-confessional RE, another response to the challenges of course, and a response looked at closer ahead. It does so even if it does so in a 'flawed' way. The same, of course, goes for the many conferences and discussions, not least in French-speaking and Catholic countries, also those that have looked for inspiration in Canadian Quebec and its recent introduction of the so-called *Ethics and Religious Culture* (ERC) program.

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[10] See the critical overview with references in Jensen & Kjeldsen 2014a.

Though I cannot go into details, the ERC, however, just like e.g. the abovementioned *Toledo Guiding Principles* at a closer look is evidently not fully emancipated from a confessional approach. It is not a regular study-of-religions based RE, neither as regards its explicit intercultural and interreligious dialogue aims nor as regards its contents. Scholars of religion and RE-specialists Bengt-Ove Andreassen (Norway) and Satoko Fujiwara (Japan) in their critical contributions to a special issue of *Religion Education* (Andreassen 2011; Fujiwara 2011) both agree that 'deconfessionalisation' has not been fully completed with the ERC.

Alternatives to Confessional RE: Ethics, Ethics and Values, Philosophy, et al

As indicated above: religious pluralism(s), including non-religion and atheism, individualism, secularisation and the human rights regime all have made it necessary for states having and supporting a confessional RE-system to include into the system an opt-out possibility, a possibility at times limited or supplemented by the offering of a voluntary or compulsory alternative to confessional RE. Though this might be – and in Spain at a time has been – a non-confessional study-of-religions based RE – the general picture shows that states in general prefer to offer an alternative which, at least in its name, does not signal any teaching about religion. The many alternative subjects offered to pupils opting-out of a confessional RE have many names (Ethics, Philosophy or a combination), and a few actually do offer some teaching about religion.

It is impossible to go into any kind of detailed overview of these responses to societal changes and religious pluralisms but a closer look at one particular case may illustrate that the alternative offered at least at times are not real alternatives but rather substitutes to confesssional RE. My case is *Werte und Normen* in Lower Saxony, Germany:

According to the 2009 "Kerncurriculum" (p. 7) issued by the "Kultusministerium", *Werte und Normen* is said to be the school subject which *in particular* (my emphasis) contributes to the general aims for the public school, namely to support the development of "die Persönlichkeit der Schülerinnen und Schüler auf der Grundlage des

Christentums, des Europäischen Humanismus und der Ideen der liberalen, demokratischen und sozialen Freiheitsbewegungen"(§2).

Though the wording of § 2 tends to indicate that the values and norms linked to or implied in Christianity, Humanism, and the mentioned "Freiheitsbewegungen", are, if not *eternal*, then at least sufficiently stabile to constitute a foundation ('Grundlage'), the text, nevertheless, at the same time addresses the dynamic changes and plurality of values and norms (supposedly also those implied in the abovementioned 'Grundlage'), as well as what is considered a result thereof, namely 'Orientierungsprobleme' – for the modern human being and not least for the pupils.

Kant's (normative) question "Was soll Ich tun?"is considered key to the identity of the school subject, something that becomes evident also from the listing (p. 11) of the contents related areas of competence ('inhaltsbezogene Kompetenzbereiche'): 'Fragen nach dem Ich', 'Fragen nach der Zukunft', 'Fragen nach Moral und Ethik', 'Fragen nach der Wirklichkeit', and 'Fragen nach Religionen und Weltanschaungen'. Being able to reflect on one's own as well as other's positions, values and norms, and thus by way of such (self-)reflection developing the 'Persönlichkeit' of the pupils, includes a stipulated capability to be able to enter into a dialogue and discuss with each other in the classroom and in society at large, – on a basis of nuanced knowledge and in a reasoned and qualified manner. The developed 'Persönlichkeit', thus, is not an isolated individual moral being but also a competent social being, a 'mündig' citizen.

As regards religion(s): the core curriculum expresses a notion of religion as essentially 'about' so-called existential questions, i.e. questions postulated to be posed by all human beings, questions about life and death, meaning, identity, etc. Teaching about and learning about religion(s) thus also becomes learning *from* religion(s).

On this background, it is difficult not to see *Werte und Normen* as a school subject in which the teaching is not just *about* morals (from, say, a philosophical or sociological point of view). Aims and contents reveal that this subject also aims at *providing* morals, or as said above, *Werte und Normen* seems to be more of a *substitute* for than a real alternative

to confessional RE. It is the school subject particularly tailored to taking care of that moral and societal upbringing that used to be the business of confessional RE. *Werte und Normen*, thus, may very well be compared to and seen as an example of (Frank) 'life world-related RE', maybe also as a (Jensen & Kjeldsen) kind of 'small-c confessional RE'. Kinds of RE that may be found within formally non-confessional RE, – to which we turn in the next section.

Before doing so, however, it must be mentioned, that, *Werte und Normen*, just like e.g. *Toledo Guiding Principles*, arguably may also be said to, after all, constitute a step in the direction of non-confessional RE, and there is clear evidence of efforts to strike a balance between the normative and informative when the text explicitly mentions that teaching *Werte und Normen*, in contrast to confessional RE (Religionsunterricht), must be neutral in regard to religion and worldviews. Normative ('binding') 'answers' to the fact of a plurality of truths and the fundamental moral questions can be given, it is furthermore stated, only with reference to the [German] Constitution and the educational aims in general, not with reference to religious or 'weltanschaulicher' premises (p. 8, note 1). Moreover, the academic basis of the subject is clearly demarcated from a theological and confessional religious base, since the three "Bezugswissenschaften" are (applied) Philosophy, The Study of Religions ("Religionswssenschaft"), and (various) social sciences (p. 9). *Werte und Normen* – teachers, moreover, are educated accordingly.

Citizenship Education

Mention must also be made, and more explicitly than done above, of another 'response' to the common challenges mentioned, namely the introduction or development of so-called 'citizenship education.' In recent citizenship education in France, according to sociologist of religion, Valentine Zuber (Zuber 2016), the "moral code taught is [...] more of a tool that provides an upbringing than one for education." While French citizenship education may have a special tenor to it due to the French notion of *laïcite*, citizenship, and nation, including a claim that the 'morale *laïque*' is a universal moral code, a tenor also

reflecting shades of a notion of the sacredness of the Republic 'as such', other kinds of citizenship education more or less explicitly refer to the importance of the Christian 'roots' and tradition for the present (postulated) democratic and civic values. Citizenship education (and RE) for that reason enters into several kinds of 'alliances' or combinations, some of which include the teaching about a growing number of other religions than Christianity in order to pave the way for tolerance, societal harmony, and sometimes, of course, interreligious or intercultural understanding and competences. A combination of, on the one hand, a neo-nationalist promotion and knowledge of 'our' values and the good citizen as humanist *and* Christian, and, on the other, of a more cosmopolitan citizen and multi-cultural or religious plural world and society can also be found. An example maybe of what has been termed 'glocalization'.

Two paragraphs of the 2007 curriculum deserve particular attention

The neo-nationalist, pro-Christian aspect and agenda most certainly played a significant role when citizenship education in 2007 was linked in a most conspicuous manner to an existing compulsory RE subject (to be read by all future teachers in the Danish elementary school, not just those teaching RE). The then new compulsory subject was called by the somewhat hybrid name KLM (Kristendomskundskab, Livsoplysning, Medborgerskab = *Knowledge of Christianity/Enlightenment of Life/ Citizenship*). The equally hybrid subject, to be taught not by social scientists but by teachers a large part of whom were educated as theologians, consisted of three knowledge areas: Religion and Culture, the History of Philosophy, and Democracy and Citizenship. Besides Christianity, Islam and Judaism as minority religions in Europe were obligatory.

Two paragraphs of the 2007 curriculum deserve particular attention (and they were also publicly discussed). One of them deals with the general objectives, saying that the students should gain competences in order to "[...] relate to the impact of Christianity and other world-views ('livsanskuelser') on the foundational values in a European and Danish cultural context" (Undervisningsministeriet 2007, 2.2). The other one was listed as contents under "Religion and Culture". It read: "The impact ('betydning') of Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity on democracy, the

welfare state and the school in Denmark" (Undervisningsministeriet 2007,2.3.1).

A report made after the first year of implementation found that many students seemed to have acquired a highly simplified 'understanding' of democracy, the welfare state and human rights as a direct heritage of Christianity – something they, moreover, had learnt to see as being in opposition to Islam not least. The students, according to the report, also expressed a "secularized culture-Christian" perspective, with no critical look at all at the historical impact of Christianity and on the church as a powerful and dominating institution (Brandt & Böwadt 2009).

A 2012 research project by Karna Kjeldsen, analyzing *inter alia* local syllabi, reached a less critical conclusion as regarded the actual implementation of the national curriculum. However, it also documented that a majority of classes had primarily read literature with a positive version of Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity and its impact on Danish culture, the welfare state and democratic values (Kjeldsen 2012). Furthermore, it must be added that in a recent (2013) revised version of the national curriculum for KLM the neo-nationalist (cultural-Christian discourse has been played-down, and the paragraphs on the direct impact of Christianity (Evangelical-Lutheran especially) on European and Danish democracy and values have been totally deleted (Ministeriet for Forskning, Innovation og Videregående Uddannelse 2013).

Non-Confessional RE

Another kind of reaction to the development towards more (or: other kinds of) religious plurality as well as to developments like secularization and individualization, are of course efforts, mostly in vain, e.g. in Spain and Italy (cf. Jensen & Kjeldsen 2015 with references), as well as in Germany and Belgium (cf. Alberts 2007 and Franken 2016) towards the establishment of (some kind of) non-religious or *non-confessional RE*. And, in places where (at least in principle) non-religious, non-confessional RE has been in place for years or even decades, (then) coming into being of such non-religious RE may, of course, be seen as a response to changes and challenges mentioned: secularization, (another kind of) religious pluralism, individualism etc.

Non-confessional RE, however, may be a lot of 'things'. It is, in principle at least, a kind of RE that, legally as well in practice, and contrary to confessional RE, is *not*, legally and formally, based upon or intimately linked to the (explicit) teachings of one specific religion. And non-confessional RE teachers are, normally, not educated by religious institutions but at normal teacher-training institutions, including, in some countries, universities and university departments e.g. departments for the scientific, historical and comparative study of religions. In non-confessional RE, in principle, the religions taught *about* are to be approached on equal terms; theories and methods applied are, in principle, the same no matter what religion is taught. It is teaching and learning *about* religion(s), and it is not rarely explicitly claimed that it is so in ways in line with the academic study-of-religions perspectives. It could be added that it is often thought to be, in principle, this kind of RE that can comply with the above mentioned criteria put forward by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as well with as by US Supreme Court for a compulsory RE, an RE that does not violate the rights of the parents as regards (religious) education, because it is 'objective, critical, and pluralistic', and it is not infrequently said to be this kind of RE that may be found in England and Scotland, as well as in the Scandinavian countries.

Before a more critical look at certain kinds of this kind of RE, it may be useful to introduce a few more analytical categories developed by study-of-religions scholars:

The first useful typology has been developed by Katharina Frank on the basis of research on RE in Switzerland. Based on various empirical (re-)sources, classroom observation included, Frank distinguishes between (a) 'religiöse' and (b) 'kulturkundliche' *framings* of religion in RE. The two kind of framings are then subdivided into, on the one hand, (a) narrative RE, dogma-related RE, and life world-related RE, and, on the other hand (b) historical RE, sociological RE, and systematic-comparative RE.[11] With reference to Frank's analysis and classification of 'life-world-related RE' as a kind of *religious* RE, a closer look at non-confessional RE from the point of view of a study-of-religions scholar

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[11] See, *inter alia*, Frank 2010, and 2015; Frank & Bochinger 2008.

clearly shows that many a so-called non-confessional kind of RE actually is 'life-world-related' and thus religious, or religiously framed, RE.

Another classification and category, 'developed' by this author together with Karna Kjeldsen, is based upon the one proposed by Donald Wiebe (Wiebe 1984) for theology and theology-like (or religious) studies of religion. With reference to Wiebe, we proposed to operate with, respectively, 'Capital-C Confessional RE' and 'small-c confessional RE'.

While the latter is formally and maybe also *in realiter* dissociated from a specific religious confession (or a specific religious tradition), it continues to be based on a religious understanding of religion, and to have the ex- or implicit aim of promoting (some kind of) religion, religiosity, or religion-based values in general. Wiebe wrote:

All uncritical thinking about Gods or the gods that rests on revelation and authority or on the "presumption of theism", and that therefore refuses to countenance the possible non-existence of God or the gods, is "confessional theology". Such theology constitutes a species of what I prefer to think of as "religious thought" which operates entirely within the framework of general religious assumptions, or within a particular religious tradition, and is, therefore, incompatible with what will be referred to below as the basic minimum presuppositions for the academic study of religion (Wiebe1984, 405).

Analyses of many kinds of so-called non-confessional and non-religious RE reveal many traces of such 'religious thinking', whether it operates within the framework of general religious assumptions or a particular religious tradition, and I consider such cases to be a kind of 'small-c confessional' RE, sharing many characteristics with Frank's 'life world related RE'.

Turning more directly to established educational systems with a declared non-confessional RE, a look at the situation in e.g. England taken by Wanda Alberts in her 2006 dissertation (Alberts 2007, 86 ff, and (a brief exposé) Alberts 2010, 277f) shows with crystal clarity that a lot of RE in England cannot even with the best will be seen as in line with an study-of-religions approach. There is a lot of RE that may described as much more in line with e.g. the already mentioned

'a gift for the child' approach,[12] and thus not just multi-faith but rather interfaith RE.

A more recent report (by the UK Religious Education Council) of the purpose, aims and content of RE in the United Kingdom, summarized by the editor to the *British Journal of Religious Education*, speaks its own clear and honest language as regards the messy situation:

> Is religious education an academic study of the beliefs and values of others, or more a form of personal development in which pupils work out their own important beliefs, values and identity? [...] Is it a non-confessional activity or is there a place for faith development? What is the place of philosophy and ethics? Can religious education contribute to social and political goals such as community cohesion, global citizenship or saving the planet, or is this ridiculously over-ambitious and distracting from the core purpose? (Editorial, *British Journal of Religious Education*, vol. 35, no 3, 2013)

Moving from England and the UK to Scandinavia, not rarely considered a stronghold of non-confessional RE, with Sweden and Norway introducing it as early as in 1969, and Denmark, (elementary school) 1975, the situation, especially as regards RE in elementary school, is also somewhat ambiguous.

As scholars of religion, Jenny Berglund (2013), Bengt-Ove Andreassen (2013) and Tim Jensen & Karna Kjeldsen (2013), have demonstrated, RE, not least in elementary school in each of these three countries, may be said, as indicated in the title of the 2013 article by Berglund, to be 'marinated in' Lutheran-Protestant Christianity. In each of the three countries RE is linked to a (neo-) nationalist culturalist agenda of inculcating (a notion of) so-called Christian values and Christian (cultural) heritage in the pupils and future citizens via RE.

In Denmark, furthermore, such a (neo-)nationalist agenda as regards RE and the promotion of Christianity as foundational for the past and present Danish society and culture, is coupled with a pro-religious agenda promoting some postulated 'religious dimension' (clearly some sort of Tillich-inspired theological notion) said to constitute a universal

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[12] For the "gift to the child" approach and project with references, see Alberts 2007, 120–130.

human and ontological fact that, strangely enough, is totally in line with Danish theological-existentialist life-philosophy.

Despite some recent attention to providing more solid knowledge, this RE primarily aims at having children realize that the postulated religious dimension is important, to them and everybody, since every religion at its basis has this 'religious dimension' and a quest for 'meaning'. At a closer look, the 'religious dimension' as well as the key thematic and pedagogical unit, the philosophy-of-life, is, as first formulated by Pia Rose Böwadt, nothing but 'Christianity in new clothes'. The teaching supposed to be teaching about is in fact 'preaching the gospel of this 'religious dimension' and of Danish culture as Christian culture (cf. Jensen & Kjeldsen 2013, 195 ff).

Unfortunately, this crypto-confessional or 'small-c confessional RE' can be seen elsewhere too, for instance in Switzerland, as shown by e.g. Andrea Rota (Rota 2013). Also on the basis of research on RE in Switzerland, religion scholar Katharina Frank (at times with Christoph Bochinger) has, as mentioned above, developed another highly useful classification of RE. The discussion of the category 'life world related RE' and the demonstration, with reference to the analysis of the relevant empirical material, why this pertains to the larger class of religious RE, is particularly useful: In 'life world-related RE' the aim is to link the objects of the teaching, i.e., religious figures, narratives, dogmas, rituals etc. to the life world and experience of the pupils and thus to make the pupils *familiar* with what is considered universal human themes and experiences: the aim is to develop the personality, spirituality, and 'humanity' of the pupils.

When pupils in many a RE classroom are imagined to develop respect and understanding for other religions and for those (other) pupils and persons who 'adhere' to these religions, the 'otherness' of the other religion(s) may be stressed.[13] It may, however, also be

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[13] In Denmark, for instance, by way of seeing 'our" (way of having) religion as compatible with a secular democratic state, with secularization, human rights, and gender equality, at the same time as it is seen as a challenge to the other religions (Islam not least, of course). Another 'strategy' is to describe and see the religions of the others as 'religion' while our religion is primarily 'morals' and 'faith' or 'culture' or 'cultural heritage'. Furthermore, the religions of the others are religions with e.g. divine

evaded or belied: the majority religion ('our' religion) and the other('s) religions all translate into universal existential themes and general human experiences. We and they can thus meet (in the RE classroom and in the hoped for better world) as humans, and 'we' can all see all religions as valuable resources for human development, mutual understanding etc. Religion, though specially the Christian one, or if religion 'in general', religion seen through some kind of Christian-theological lens, is seen as a resource for positive values, including positive moral values. A kind of RE that cannot properly be classified as study-of religions based but the kind that has taken over in many a place when confessional RE had to go.

Concluding Remarks

Many, if not most, European states seem to prefer, no matter some growing interest in some kind of teaching about more religions than the majority religion, to continue to have and to prefer to have confessional RE, with opt-out options and a so-called alternative subject like e.g. *Werte und Normen*.

An increased religious pluralism, an increased focus on the role of religion in local and global politics, the role of religion in regard to so-called clash of cultures, social conflicts and terrorism, show in various ways: religions or denominations differing from the majority religion are included in the RE-teaching and a system of multi-confessionalism developed. It is still, though, 'Capital C Confessional RE', and the other religions are still seen in comparison to and from the point of view of the 'confession' or religion in power.

Added to the aims of religious and moral upbringing in line with the dominant religion in question, we now find aims linked to the needs for social cohesion in a world and society considered prone for conflict linked to a plurality of religions and cultures and to the new Muslim presence not least. RE-teaching now is therefore not just religious but interreligious 'preaching', with religions, not least the local kind of

commandments, rituals, and outmoded rules regarding childish notions of e.g. pure and impure. Cf. Jensen & Kjeldsen 2013, 195–197, and Andreassen 2014.

Christianity, as a resource which, rightly understood, of course, at the same time matches and adds to human rights and humanist values.

An evident, though at times thinly veiled, aim, of course, is to use the new kind of more interreligious confessional RE to save the world from conflict, save the children from postulated evils of materialism or neo-liberalism, *and* to save the religion (and religions) taught from a possible future in a feared for total oblivion. Secularization understood as less religion on the societal and individual level is countered by RE. Most states with a (in principle) non-confessional RE seem to prefer to make sure that this RE not only accommodates the changes and challenges but also counter and oppose them, by way of using RE to inculcate postulated cultural-religious (Christian) values linked to the postulated cultural and (Christian) religious heritage and identity of the nation state in question.

Moreover: even when looking at fairly well-established non-confessional kinds of RE, e.g. in the UK, and in Scandinavia, it is crystal clear that these subjects also have aims and contents that are more in line with a religious kind of RE, thus making it plausible to classify them as examples of 'small-c confessional RE' and/or 'life world-related RE' rather than SR-based RE.

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Article

The Formation of National Identity in Contemporary Russia*

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the relationship between ethnicity and nationality in forming the national identity of the Russian people, emphasizing the danger of relying on the "ethnic" model of the nation developed in Soviet social science. Analyzing the fundamental documents of the Soviet State from the 1917 Declaration of the Rights of Peoples of Russia to the last Soviet Constitution of 1977, the author points out: (1) the significant contradiction between the proclaimed right of nations to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity and, (2) evidence that a national policy based on the ethnic nationalist model created a peculiar "hierarchy of peoples" (so-called "titular" and "not-titular" nationalities). The challenges to the Soviet Union's national policy that took place during the 1990th and its consequences – the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world map and subsequent movements toward breaking apart the Russian Federation (the sovereignty claims of Chechnya and some of the Volga republics) – indicate that the tasks of a multi-ethnic state, such as solving national problems and harmonizing interethnic relations, require rejecting the ideology of ethnic nationalism, and moving toward the "de-ethnicisation" of nationality and the formation of a unified civil nation. Understanding that the transition to the paradigm of Russian national identity derived from civic nationhood is a complex and lengthy process, the author develops a multi-level model of the formation of Russian national identity comprised of (1) the basic level of cultural diversity, (2) the middle level of solidarity in the overcoming of cultural differences on the basis

of an awareness of "shared values," and (3) the highest level of civic consciousness – the awareness of being a citizen of Russia and an understanding of the civic responsibilities this entails. Finally, the author translation of the article. outlines the role the social sciences play in the process of the formation of the national identity, pointing out the need to establish the theoretical basics of national policy, and to develop models for its implementation.

KEYWORDS
Nation, right of nations to self-determination, ethnic nationalism, civic model of nation, national identity.

This article primarily concerns those aspects of the problem of national identity that are linked to the relationship between ethnicity and nationality in the context of an analysis of Russian national identity. A wider and more multifaceted approach to the study of the phenomenon of national identity can be found in a number of works of Russian authors (Kortunov, 2008–2009).

Discussion around the topic of "nation-building" in contemporary Russia, along with the related issue of national identity, seems almost paradoxical: we are not discussing the 19th century (referred to as "the century of nationalism", i.e. the period of the formation of nations and nation-states), but the 21st. Furthermore, let us recall that the former Soviet Union, as was repeated more than once, comprised "more than 100 nations and nationalities", and that the so-called "national question" was proclaimed as "solved once and for all".

Then why do the problems of nation and national identity arise now? Why does the President often talk about it; why is it the topic of heated discussions between so many politicians, experts and scientists? Evidently, it is connected with the internal and external challenges faced by contemporary Russia, as well as the need to strengthen the multi-ethnic Russian state, mitigate negative developments in the sphere of international relations and prevent ethnic conflicts. In order to more clearly understand the situation, we should remember the model of the nation that was developed as part of Soviet social science and on the basis of which the theory, ideology and practice of nation-building was developed. At its foundation was the well-known definition of I.V. Stalin,

set out in his work Marxism and the National Question (1913): "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Stalin, 1946, p. 296).

This definition of the nation formed the theoretical basis for the researches of Soviet social scientists involved in national and ethnic studies. One of the most influential figures in these studies was the Soviet academician Yulian Bromley, whose "theory of ethnos" was one of the key approaches to the national question. Bromley proceeds from the assumption that humanity, as a single entity in the biological sense, developed general social laws; meanwhile, many distinct historical communities were formed, among which a special place is occupied by the community, referred to as "ethnos". According to Bromley, ethnicity is a form of human group integration with special characteristics, representing a "stable set of people who historically developed in a particular area having in common relatively stable features in terms of language, culture and mentality, as well as consciousness of its unity and differences from other similar entities (self-awareness), attached to an endonym (ethnonym)" (Bromley, 1987, p.14).

Ethnicity evolves historically. According to the "theory of ethnos", the stages of development of an ethnic group are: family, tribe (tribal union), nationality and nation (capitalist and subsequently also socialist). In the context of the USSR, the crown of this ethnic chain – "the Soviet people" – was hailed as a new supra-ethnic and supra-national historical community. Thus, the domestic tradition is based on the understanding of the nation as a form or stage of development of an ethnic group or ethnic community. The nation, then, is ethnicity at the highest stage of its development.

From this point of view, the Soviet model of the nation on which the theory of nation building is based consists in ethnic nationalism, i.e., the conception of a nation as the natural development of the ethnic communities that historically constitute it. According to this scenario, a nation is constructed on existing ethnic relationships and patterns.

Meanwhile, it is well known that the ethnic model of the nation, i.e. ethnic nationalism, lies in contradistinction to an alternative understanding of the nation as a political, territorial-national entity

conceived in terms of civic education. In contrast to the ethnic interpretation of the nation focusing on a single history, customs, cultural elements, ethnic mobilisation and the like, the so-called "civic" model of the nation is based on the concepts of general laws, human rights and territorial citizenship. Historically, it was in the West that the first civic-territorial model of the nation predominated; in the East – in Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, most countries of South and East Asia – the ethnic model tended to prevail.

Here, ethnic nationalism has played a pivotal role in the creation of nations on the basis of pre-existing ethnic communities and groups. The word 'nation', according to Ernst Tugendhat, currently has two meanings: the first refers to ethnic groups [...], the second to the people of whom the state is comprised. The second concept of the nation [...] is essentially the first. It is also the first historically. In Article III of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) appears the following formulation: "The principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation." Here the word "nation" bears no relation to ethnicity, but simply refers to all people living in the territory that formerly pertained to the king (Tugendhat, 2001, p. 43).

In the Russian tradition, for a period of many decades, the nation was, of course, interpreted in ethnic terms. (The conflict between the ethnic and political grounds for the interpretation of the nature of the nation sometimes even led to misunderstandings in communication between Soviet scientists and their Western colleagues[1]). However,

[1] This situation is described by the well-known French-Swiss researcher Patrick Serio. In February 1984, the French communist newspaper "L'Humanité" published an open letter written by the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of France, Jacques Marchais, in which he addressed the Central Committee to express his "lively outrage" concerning the book by the famous Soviet ethnographer Solomon Brook entitled "World Population", published in 1983 in France and containing a description of the French nation from an "ethnodemographic" point of view.   The Secretary General, accusing the author of insulting French national identity and even racism, declared that "France is not a multi-national state, this is one country, one people, the fruit of a long history." However, in fact, the reason for such a dramatic perception of the work of Brook was simply to do with the difference in approaches to the understanding of the nature and essence of the nation, when one approaches it from the ethnic paradigm and the other from the civil-territorial (Seriot, 1995, pp. 51–52).

due to the multi-national, multi-ethnic composition of the population of the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union – and now the Russian Federation – the reliance on an ethnic understanding of the nation in nation-building discourses is fraught with a serious danger. The most significant of these is the contradiction between the proclaimed "right of nations to self-determination" and the principle of territorial integrity.

The idea of the right of nations (peoples) to self-determination, which permeated all the fundamental documents of the Soviet state in relation to nation-building, was drawn from the 1917 Declaration of the Rights of Peoples of Russia (Article 2: "The right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, including secession and the formation of a nation-state") to the last Soviet Constitution of 1977 (Article 72: "Each Union Republic shall retain the right to freely secede from the USSR"). At the same time as forming the basis for a national policy, the ethnic nationalist model has created a very peculiar "hierarchy of peoples", which impacts strongly upon national consciousness. So-called "titular" nationalities in the population of the Union Republics were conferred the status of nations, while others, including the "titular" nationalities of the autonomous Republics, were defined as "nations" or "peoples". If we remember that the nation was treated as the highest form of ethnic development, a confused picture emerges: for example, Estonians, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Moldovans appeared "more advanced" than, for example, Ossetians, Chechens, Karels, Mordvins etc. due to their higher level of ethnic classification.

This was acutely perceived in the national self-consciousness of the respective peoples considered not "ripened" to the status of nation. Incidentally, in trying to figure out how many of the peoples of the USSR had the status of a nation (a common cliché was that "in the Soviet Union there are more than one hundred nations and nationalities"), it becomes clear that the nations, excepting the abovementioned "titular" nationalities of the 15 Union Republics, also included the Tatars and Bashkirs – apparently due to their large numbers. In this connection, it stands to reason that nation status was something received by people

living in territories having external borders with other countries, who, in the case of exercising their right to self-determination (i.e. secession from the Soviet Union and the formation of their own state), would do less harm to the unitary state than people living in internal formations. Of course, the secession of a Republic from the "single and indivisible" Union was at the time envisaged solely in terms of an abstract possibility. However, this seemingly insignificant probability also had to take into account the necessity of maintaining the inviolability of the "right of nations to self-determination."

A great challenge to the national policy constructed on a model of ethnicity took place during the 1990s when the overall integrity of the Russian state came under serious threat. At its mature stage, when a multi-ethnic country with an extremely high level of ethnic and cultural diversity had been successfully developed, the Soviet approach to nation building resolved the national question according to the concept of "the Soviet people as a new historical, social and international community of people".

In the opinion of the creators of this ideological structure, the Soviet people as the "multinational group of workers of town and country, the community united under the socialist system [and] Marxist-Leninist ideology, the communist ideals of the working class and the principles of internationalism" (The Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1987), on the one hand, accumulated in all the diversity of cultures of nations and ethnic groups, and on the other, synthesised or "melted down"[2] nations and nationalities into the new quality. If it were not characteristic of Soviet social representation of the nation as the highest form of ethnic development and the absolute predominance of the "ethnic discourse", it would be possible to call this phenomenon the "Soviet nation" and describe the unified national residents of the country as the "Soviet people". (It is said that in the second half of the 70s in the USSR an attempt was even made to unify the column of "nationality" in the passports of Soviet citizens: instead of "Russian", "Tatar", "Georgian", "Estonian", etc. the record offered – "Soviet").

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[2] Some researchers have used the metaphor of the "melting pot" borrowed from the Chicago School of Sociology to describe the phenomenon of the "Soviet people".

The attempt to impose a Soviet identity was not accidental. Indeed, every nation in isolation has its own ethnic roots (territory, language, religion, culture, patterns of behaviour, etc.), on which basis a unique ethnic identity is formed. However, in a multi-ethnic state with the highest degree of ethnic and cultural diversity, as was the case with the Soviet Union, appeals to ethnicity in solving the national question carried a heavy freight of potential risks, including threatening the integrity of the state.

Despite the policy of suppression of national identity and its substitution with class, the approach to solving the "national question" in the Soviet Union was a form of ethnic nationalism. This became evident, in particular, in the principles of the national state apparatus of the Russian Federation. Along with those areas (initially, frontier provinces) posited on a territorial basis, were formed national-territorial entities, which, for the majority population living in them were based on ethnicity.

At the period from the end of the 80s to the beginning of the 90s, Russia was faced by the challenge of finding such forms of national government as would ensure the preservation of the multi-ethnic state. However, salvation from the threat of national disintegration was initially envisaged in a strange and contradictory model: a federal structure binding national republics that possessed unlimited sovereignty. Confirmation may be seen in the words of Boris Yeltsin, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and soon to become first president of Russia, which were pronounced in August 1990 just before the collapse of the USSR: "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow. I do not want… to be a hindrance in the development of the national consciousness of each republic." As a consequence of the "parade of sovereignties" that engulfed first the Soviet Union and then the autonomous republics within the Russian Federation, which was largely based on the "the right of nations to self-determination" being the slogan of the day, first the Soviet Union disappeared from the world map and then the Russian Federation started to literally break apart (here we recall Chechnya and the sovereignty claims on the part of the Volga republics, etc.).

The tasks of countering ethnic conflicts, solving national problems and harmonising interethnic relations require different approaches to

the understanding of the nation, national consciousness and national identity. In theoretical terms, this entails, first of all, a rejection of the traditional ethnic interpretation of the nation and of the ideology of ethnic nationalism.

The fate of the Soviet Union showed that a necessary condition for the long-term and sustainable existence of a multi-ethnic state is the formation of a unified civil nation. However, Russia is not France. The transition to the paradigm of Russian national identity derived from civic nationhood is a complex and lengthy process, one of the components of which is, so to speak, the "de-ethnicisation" of nationality. Nations do have actual ethnic origins, ethnic roots. However, the rejection of appeals to ethnicity in the practice of formation of the national identity of Russians is a necessary condition for the preservation and development of a multi-ethnic state.

The modern concept of the formation of Russian national identity, as articulated by Vladimir Putin, comes from the fact that "identity, i.e. the national idea, cannot be imposed from above, nor can it be built on the basis of an ideological monopoly." The President offers a view of national identity as a design with a very complex structure. "... Identity derived exclusively through ethnicity or religion in the largest state having a multi-ethnic population", was, he said, "certainly not possible." "The formation of a civic identity based precisely on common values, patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, complicity in the fate of the motherland without losing touch with their ethnic and religious roots is a necessary condition for preserving the unity of the country" (Putin, 2013).

Thus, national identity is a complex formation, taking place at multiple levels. The primary, basic level consists of ethnic characteristics: language, religion, behavioural stereotypes, etc. This is the level of cultural diversity. It is an expression of a rich cultural heritage resulting from the interaction and mutual influence of the different cultures of the peoples living on the territory of a unified state. But within it is also concealed a significant conflict potential associated with the religious, linguistic and behavioural differences; this is expressed in the form of the ethnic dichotomy of "us" and "them". The next level up is the

formation of unity and solidarity in the overcoming of such differences. This is the awareness of "shared values", of which the most important is patriotism or patriotic consciousness (the president has repeatedly referred to patriotism in terms of a "national idea"), i.e. complicity in the fate of the motherland. At this level, limitations in the ethnic nationalist worldview are overcome. In more philosophical terms, it consists in the necessity of dealing with the transition from ethnic particularism to civic national universalism.

Finally, the highest level in the structure of the national identity of Russians consists in the awareness of being a citizen of Russia and an understanding of the civic responsibilities thus entailed. "Russian citizens should feel themselves responsible masters of their country, their region, their hometown, their property, their possessions and their lives," (Putin, 2013). This is the level of freedom, responsibility, cooperation, professionalism, self-organisation and self-management. The integrated, multi-level structure of the Russian national identity determines the complexity of its formation in people's minds. In solving this task, it is necessary for various social institutions to be involved – family, government, educational, mass media and others. Here the social sciences play an important role in taking responsibility for the establishment of the theoretical foundations of contemporary national policy, as well as developing models and strategies for its implementation in practice.

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Book Review

Carlo Invernizzi Accetti (2015). Relativism and Religion: Why Democratic Societies Do Not Need Moral Absolutes. Columbia University Press.

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This study revolves around two interrelated topics, either of which would actually merit its own book. The first deals with the discourse of anti-relativism as it is present in official statements of the Catholic Church. It is often said that political philosophy, which Ian Shapiro called "narcissistic", has nowadays become encapsulated in its own canon and self-commentaries [Shapiro, Ian. Problems, *Methods, and Theories in the Study of Politics, Or What Is Wrong with Political Science and What to Do about It*. In *Political Theory 30:4 (August 2002)*, 596-619; 596]. The project that brings our attention to the body of texts criticizing liberal democracy from an intellectually elaborate point of view opens up our political philosophical discussion to the voices which are labeled "traditionalist" and thus are left unheeded. Historical analysis of how the concept of relativism has become so prominent in Catholic political theory is, however, only a foundation for the second part of the book, which is an analytical study of "the challenge represented for democratic theory by the idea that democratic regimes need to be complemented by the reference to a set of absolute moral or political truths in order to avoid degenerating into a form of tyranny or totalitarianism" (p. 6). The focus on the Catholic doctrine is explained by the facts that, on the one hand, it is in Catholic teaching that we find the most sophisticated formulations of anti-relativism

discourse, and, on the other hand, there emerged "a sort of inter-denominational division of labor whereby Catholic apologists provide the intellectual foundations, while Protestant organizations supply the grassroots support, for a set of essentially convergent positions. Thus, the Vatican's formulations of the discourse of anti-relativism can be considered exemplary of a much broader range of arguments raised from a variety of religious standpoints" (p. 8).

The first part of the book offers us penetrating insights into the historical dynamic of the notion of relativism. The original use of this concept is traced back to the encyclical letter *Humanum Genus* promulgated by Pope Leo XIII in 1884. Pope Leo XIII attacked freemasonry's "endeavor to obtain equality and community of all goods by the destruction of every distinction of rank and property" (p. 35). The dissolution of the Church's authority and actual separation of church and state, in his opinion, will inevitably result in moral decline and anarchy, culminating in tyranny. The standard criticism of democracy's susceptibility to tyranny, which dates back to Plato, is linked here with the views of the intransigentist reaction to the French revolution. Rejection of rank and authority in society, disregard for the transcendent in religion, and the elevation of human beings to being the sole measure of the true and the good are all subsumed under the introduced concept of relativism and detected in the political form of liberal democracy. Instead of the intransigentist "blanket rejection of modernity," however, "by focusing the Church's critical attention on a single term, ultimately traceable to an expression of the active impulse of the city of Man in human history, Leo XIII was able to implicitly carve out space for the recognition that there also exist other aspects of the modern world that are not tied to relativism or the freemasonry, with which the Church can come to terms. Hence, paradoxically, the focalization on the notion of relativism succeeded in opening up the conceptual space for the possibility of a compromise with the aspects of modernity that had been left out from this critique" (p. 39). During the next stage - between the First World War and the end of the Cold War - the main assault was directed at communism, later renamed totalitarianism, which "almost completely overshadowed the discourse of anti-relativism" (p. 43), and, in a way, allowed the Church first to come

to terms with fascist regimes and later to side with liberal democracies. "Hence the discourse of anti-relativism was effectively silenced throughout the duration of the Cold War in order to avoid any ambiguity over the side that the Church had chosen to endorse" (p. 47). The criticism of relativism, however, "began to be employed as a conceptual weapon for dealing with internal dissidence within the Catholic Church itself" (p. 49); first and foremost, "as a strategy for reasserting the principle of authority within the Catholic Church against the perceived destructive effects of the Second Vatican Council" (pp. 53–54).

After the collapse of the Soviet block, the threat of militant atheism disappeared and the discourse of anti-relativism re-emerges. Since the political form of liberal democracy stands now unchallenged by any alternative power, its criticism has been re-focused by the Church leaders – Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI – and is now emphatically limited to the domain of morality. The new targets are false freedom, tolerance and "knowledge through dialogue" (p. 66). The ancient argument against democracy, that cited its vulnerability to demagogues and hence to tyranny, is now rephrased by reference to new evils. In these documents it is now claimed that democracy without moral foundation in absolute truth will degenerate into totalitarianism. "One of the most important functions of the Catholic discourse of anti-relativism had historically been to mediate the Church's relation with the political form of democracy. Here, however, the link becomes explicit: the central claim is that, like freedom, democracy requires "guidance," because if it is grounded merely in a form of philosophical relativism, it is deprived of any sense of the necessary moral limits that must be imposed on the people's exercise of power over themselves and therefore runs the risk of converting into its opposite" (p. 62).

Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), in his debate with Habermas, stresses the necessity to subordinate the exercise of power to the requirements of the law and recognizes that now democracy is the sole form for legitimate political authority, yet, it is not capable of being the sole source of norms. Democracy has in itself no *a priori* limits to power and can be corrupted easily, unless its legislature is subject to external criterion, which, as Cardinal argues, is the notion

of human rights. The notion of human rights replaces the traditional category of natural law, because "the idea of natural law presupposed a conception of 'nature' in which nature and reason interlock. The victory of the theory of evolution has meant the end of this view of nature" (cited on p. 74). Therefore, we must look for those forces within nature, which represent rationality, that is human beings, and if rationality is the essence of humankind, their rights are the last rational foundation for just law and legitimate power. The fight against relativism is continued by Popes Benedict XVI and Francis I with the same vigor and targets 'unlimited freedom', 'hostile tolerance or distrust of truth'. In sum, we observe that criticism of relativism by the Catholic leaders entails criticism of democracy not founded on absolute moral truth, we, then, have to conclude that "religion is not incompatible with democracy but actually required by it" (p. 85).

The second chapter offers a conceptual analysis of the notions upon which the Church's discourse of anti-relativism hinges: relativism, absolute truth, authority, freedom, and totalitarianism. It is clear that relativism is often confused by its critics – whether intentionally or not – with nihilism or with indifferentism and it is presented as a dogmatic postulation of absolute relativity. Relativism may not imply an actual rejection of or indifference to all values; and it does not require the exclusion of the truth from our moral reasoning. "While not renouncing taking a stand and formulating moral judgments, therefore, the relativist is conscious that, from a second-order perspective, his stand and judgment remain relative to the specific cultural and discursive framework from which they emerge" (pp. 93-94).

The claim that without absolute moral truth political society will degenerate into tyranny or totalitarianism does not actually give us an answer to the questions whether the absolute moral truth exists, whether it can be known, and whether it can be grasped uniformly and unanimously. Moreover this argument implies that religion is, in fact, instrumental in maintaining political community regardless of its actual relation to truth, that is, as a civic religion. This implication may be offensive to true believers and seems rather Machiavellian. On the other hand, once we accept the fact that there are many believers who

claim knowledge of the absolute truth and are unlikely to compromise on it, the violent conflict between these 'truth communities' becomes inevitable.

The legitimate exercise of power presupposes the notion of authority. The interpretations of this notion stem from at least two separate but sometimes intermingling traditions. The first tradition, inherited from Platonism, derives all legitimacy of rule from the privileged access to truth, while whilst the second – a Roman juridical tradition – sees legitimacy as being grounded in contract relations, in which "two individuals can agree to sign a contract whereby one counts as the author of the actions of the other, and the latter can accordingly be said to act with authority of the former" (p. 106). Yet, social contract theories normally compound two elements: "*pactum unionis*, whereby isolated individuals reciprocally contract with one another to form a social unit" and "*pactum subiectionis* whereby an already constituted political entity agrees to submit to the authority of the government" (p. 108). For true democratic authority the "idea of pactum unionis constituted horizontally through reciprocal agreements among human beings is sustainable on its own and does not need to be tied to the idea of pactum subiectionis introducing the vertical dimension of the distinction between rulers and ruled" (p. 109). Thus, a certain similarity of presuppositions is present in Catholic discourse of anti-relativism and in many social contract theories. The presupposition that stability and order can be based only on subjection to higher authority is undermined if we rely on "a properly democratic conception of authority." No external pole to legitimate and to regulate the workings of democracy is conceptually needed, because social contract retains its internal dynamic, that is, "an iterated practice, constantly renewed through an ongoing process of negotiation among the members of a social order" (p. 112), and "does not work top-down but bottom-up" (p. 109).

While it is clear that the Church advocates the principle of authority and criticizes freedom, it should be taken into account that the Church operates on its own notion of freedom. Unlike 'relativist' freedom which has no content and, in fact, implies that human beings can do whatever they want, Christian notion of freedom relies on the acceptance of

man's creation in the image of God and, therefore, "when human beings obey the commandments of God they are not really submitting to an extraneous authority, but rather complying with the highest part of their own intrinsic nature" (p. 117). Obeying God thus means not being unfree, but being free in its true meaning, being properly autonomous. Invernizzi Acetti here claims that "while recognizing its astuteness, I nonetheless judge this argument to amount to a form of conceptual manipulation, because it effectively inverts the meaning traditionally ascribed to the concept of freedom" (p. 117) and "effectively deprives the enemies of the Catholic Church of the terms to formulate their own position" (p. 118).

The idea that freedom should be a part of the hierarchical system of values which alone can lend it substantive content is developed by Pope John Paul II in the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* and by Cardinal Ratzinger in his "*What is Truth? The Significance of Ethical and Religious Values in a Pluralist Society*", in which the latter defines the content of freedom as safeguarding human rights, that is, social peace and harmony. Here I believe the criticism of the Church's discourse is the weakest as Invernizzi Acetti argues that this conception of freedom does not stem from the internal logic of the principle of freedom, it does not have to be consistent with other values or even with itself. Consequently, "it is not freedom that requires a content, but the Church's project of inscribing it within its own hierarchical system of values, which introduces this necessity from outside. The paradox involved in the idea that the content of a free action can be determined logically a priori therefore proves to be not a consequence of the meaning traditionally ascribed to the concept of freedom itself, but rather the result of the Church's own contradictory goals with respect to it" (p. 120). Leaving aside the ulterior motives of the Church's argument alluded to by Invernizzi Acetti, it should be noted that freedom is never disentangled from other values. In liberal discourse, it is inseparable from the value of equality, these are twin values of modern polities, each supporting and limiting another, as the author recognizes in his own argument, and adds tolerance (pp. 176-177). If freedom is not a bare capacity to act without interference, which is merely the absence of

physical obstacles, then the notion of freedom implies acting in relation to and in communication with other human beings, it will necessarily be entwined with other values and often be subordinate to them.

In the third chapter, the interpretations of Rawls and Habermas, who provide us with an alternative to grounding democracy in absolute moral truths, demonstrate that both are inadequate for "developing a fully convincing response to Catholic discourse of anti-relativism". The cultural relativism is taken into account, but Invernizzi Acetti's aspiration is "to explore whether a theory of democracy can do away with the orientation to an idea of moral truth altogether" (p. 161).

The last chapter deals with an original defense of a relativist conception of democracy based on an interpretation and extrapolation of Hans Kelsen's connection between democracy and relativism. Generally, the argument can be summarized as follows: "the absence of any absolute ground for political justification can itself function as the ground for a specific conception of democracy. ... this absence implies that all exercises of coercive power and attempts at discrimination between different substantive conceptions of the good or the right must be considered illegitimate, unless they are consented to by the individuals to whom they apply. Since democracy can be understood as a political regime based on the principle of consent among equals, it follows that a form of philosophical relativism implying the unavailability of any absolute grounds for political justification constitutes a sufficient philosophical ground for justifying such a form of democracy" (pp. 212–213).

Moreover, Invernizzi Acetti claims "that it is not only possible but necessary to be a relativist about one's own relativism - which implies that positing such a form of relativism as the philosophical foundation for the legitimacy of democratic institutions amounts to a way of grounding their legitimacy not in a figure of the absolute, but in something that is inherently relative; that is, relativism itself" (p. 213). Now if we recollect the criticism of conceptual inversion and manipulation that Invernizzi Acetti directed at Catholic intellectuals for their interpretation of the notion of freedom, this summary seems to be doing the same. Are we to infer that to be a democrat one has to be a relativist? We claim that this conception of democracy is inclusive and safe from extremes

of both secularism, which excludes religion from public discourse, and post-secularism, which privileges religion, but this 'middle path' conception of democracy no less suppresses the aspiration of religions to be what they are –- belief in the absolute and in universally valid morality. On the last pages of his book, Invernizzi Acetti recognizes this objection, but brushes it away: "this objection misses the point of the overall conception of democracy I have sought to articulate and defend in this book. For the latter has never aimed to be absolutely 'neutral' between all possible religious views and opinions, but rather to give expression to a specific set of substantive values that are assumed to follow logically from the assumption of a form of philosophical relativism" (p. 219).

Finally, the actual response to the concern that democracy is amenable to tyranny is rather homely, but nevertheless strictly to the point: there are no risk-free polities. If democracy votes itself into another political form, it may be a tragedy to a committed democrat, but it in no way de-legitimizes democracy.

Book Review

The Unhappy Divorce of Sociology and Psychoanalysis: Diverse Perspectives on the Psychosocial. (2014). Eds. Lynn Chancer, John Andrews. Springer.

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Interdisciplinary Conflicts as a Way to Understanding Changing Societies and Personalities

Sociological conceptualization of the individual has often been marked by behaviorism and generalizations about the impact of society and social groups on individual identity and life strategies. However, psychoanalytical and, more broadly, psychological and psychiatric concepts and projects, have been employed in the past by some sociologists. This often involved critical reflection on of both disciplines. Erving Goffman, for example, was critical both of psychiatrists' understanding of mental illness and of sociologists' tendency to characterize mental illness as simply being a label that society attaches to certain individuals. This led to their conclusion that mental illness is merely a socially constructed notion rather than being a genuine medical condition.

Goffman wrote "Asylums and the Social Situation of Mental Patients" (1961) in an effort to counter the tendency of many sociologists to ignore the disturbing consequences of psychiatric illness on the individual and on society. Goffman's fieldwork on institutional psychiatry (he conducted a participant observational study in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.) resulted in thennovative use of the total institution model and the development

of the interesting concept of a "moral career" of the mental patient, looking both at the social situation and the individual. However, the prevailing understanding of the common use of the two disciplines' potential is marked by many biases. In fact, the classics of both psychoanalysis and sociology openly expressed these biases themselves. If, on the one hand, Freud believed that sociology 'cannot be anything but applied psychology', on the other hand, Parsons reduced psychoanalysis to an applied theory and concluded that Freud's most important result was the conception of "the human person as a psychological entity operating as a self-regulating system".

It is fair to say that the predominant trajectory of the two disciplines relations in the twentieth century has been one of increased alienation. Fortunately, twenty first century researchers have produced a book, in which they reflect on the failure of two disciplines to engage in a productive dialogue and express, in particular, concerns about the development of mainstream American sociology towards becoming a science that fails to see individual people and is reluctant to admit to what extent social behavior is connected to unconscious desires and irrational motives. The sociological concepts, whether these are 'nationalism" or "xenophobia", are employed to explain violence, murder and rape while the irrational, controversial motives of the individuals who commit these crimes are ignored as causative factors for their actions.

The authors of eighteen essays have compiled cases drawn from an impressive variety of social situations in an attempt to demonstrate the misfortune that, within American sociology from the 1940s through the present, the psychosocial and, in particular, psychoanalytic perspectives became relatively marginalized. Before their divorce, since the inception of two disciplines, their mutual engagement was gradually unfolding, and in the Foreword to the book, Craig Calhoun charts the remarkable similarities between the ways in which sociology and psychoanalysis have developed (both fields having benefited from the wealth of classical European intellectual traditions). He also points out a number of fruitful connections between the two fields, i.e. the psychosocial interest towards 'character" which resulted in a whole

new sub-discipline in sociology, namely, the studies of personality and socialization.

Jeffrey Alexander begins his Preface to the book by eulogizing Freud as "one of the most original and compelling social thinkers of the twentieth century" who "opened up the emotional dynamic and cultural strains of modern life as brilliantly as Max Weber, explored symbolism and solidarity as indigenously as Emile Durkheim and in his capacity for conceptual elaboration and theoretical complexity surpassed them" (p. xiii).

In the Introduction to the book, the editors Lynn Chancer and John Andrews delineate the reasons behind the on-going marginalization of these ideas. The first factor was, ironically, the growth of social movements of 1960s and 1970s, which made Freudian ideas increasingly unpopular. The second and third factors were the increasing positivist influence in the mainstream American sociology in 1980 and 1990s, as well as the growth of right-wing predilections among academics. The positivist influence resulted in part from the popularity of using quantitative methods in sociology and, since it was impossible to measure and observe things such as, say, defense mechanisms, many Freudian ideas were rejected.

The links between conservatism and institutional harassment are investigated by Catherine B. Silver in the chapter "Paranoid and Institutional Responses to Psychoanalysis among Early Sociologists". She comes up with the concept of positivistic "epistemological unconscious" in order to demonstrate that the paranoid thinking of a number of conservative early American sociologists, who attacked individuals and marginalized psychoanalysis, was connected to the establishment of sociology as a separate social science discipline and subsequent struggle for legitimacy and careers. The reorganization and consolidation of the American sociology was marked by "the marginalization of interpretive, introspective and other qualitative and essayist methods – all stylistic approaches that implicitly reference the personhood of the writer" (p. 75). In the first chapter of the book "Opening/Closing the Sociological Mind to Psychoanalysis", George Cavalletto and Catherine Silve, using statistical and thematic analysis of the articles published in major sociological journals in USA, demonstrate the central role of Department of Sociology at Columbia

University and Talkott Parsons in ensuring that psychological ideas were acknowledged and used in sociology in 1940s and 1950s.

Sociology's disengagement from psychoanalysis has closed off important pathways for understanding social life. The book seeks to understand the causes and tendencies of this disengagement and to further psychosocial perspectives.

The work is a collection of fine essays written by New York based academics who wished to discuss "the social/sociological and psychic/psychoanalytical dimensions of diverse topics" (p. xv).

The book is composed of four parts.

In part One of the book titled "The History of Sociology and Psychoanalysis in the United States: Diverse Perspective on a Longstanding Relationship" the contributors summarize the controversial historic links between the two disciplines which eventually led to what a prominent sociologist Jeffrey Alexander calls in the Preface "a grievous mistake" (p. xiii)

Part Two of the book "Are Psychosocial/Socioanalytic Syntheses Possible" includes great essays by Neil Smelser and Nancy Chodorow. If Smelser investigates the impact of the academe on his uneasy relationships to psychoanalysis, Chodorow describes the predicaments of combining sociological, psychoanalytic and feminist perspectives and the baffled reception of to her work in psychoanalytic circles. Chodorov claims that, although the psychoanalytic conceptualization of subjectivity can be very fruitful to sociology, a complex set of professional interests of sociologists have led to an unfortunate dismissal of psychoanalysis as being "a-sociological".

Part Three of the book "The Unfulfilled Promise of Psychoanalysis and Sociological Theory" is about the ways in which three renowned social theorists - Erich Fromm, C. Wright Mills and Pierre Bourdieu – use psychoanalytic concepts (or have avoid such use).

Part Four of the book "The Psychosocial (Analytic) in Research and Practice" contains essays that seek to show that psychoanalytic concepts can be productively utilized to interpret otherwise incomprehensible sociological phenomena. Arlene Stein's chapter stands out where she demonstrates how the notion of ''mutual recognition'' can be drawn on

to make sense of the extraordinary feelings of shame that survivors of the Holocaust have. She goes on to point out that since many survivors moved to the United States after the war, they were not able to find a group whose members would be willing to express sympathy with their suffering and were thus deprived of ''mutual recognition'' needed to overcome shame.

This book is an attempt to rectify the "contemporary sociological resistance" (p.10) to psychoanalytic approaches. It contains reflections on the reasons and consequences of the dominance of the particular paradigm of sociological research which favors massive surveys and the processing of statistics. The deficiencies in quantitative sociological methodologies are mentioned in the book while such concepts as the unconscious, anxiety and defense mechanism are repeatedly mentioned with expressions of regret that their potential was not fully realized in sociology. However, the benefits of the psychoanalytic paradigm are left for the reader to hold as a matter of mere belief. This book does a better job of explaining how the "divorce" between the two disciplines happened than explaining how exactly their "marriage" can now be achieved.

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        Description of the journal's article style
    2. Style guidelines
        Description of the journal's reference style
    3. Figures

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Three to five authors	At first mention: Smith, Jones, Khan, Patel, and Chen (2012) or (Smith, Jones, Khan, Patel, & Chen, 2012) At subsequent mentions: Smith et al. (2012) or (Smith et al., 2012) In cases where two or more references would shorten to the same form, retain all three names.
Six or more authors	Smith et al. (2012) (Smith et al., 2012)
Authors with same surname	G. Smith (2012) and F. Smith (2008) G. Smith (2012) and F. Smith (2012)
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Two authors	Author, A. A., & Author, B. B. (2012). This is a book title: And subtitle. Abingdon: Routledge
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Organization as author	American Psychological Association. (2003). Book title: And subtitle. Abingdon: Routledge.
No author	Merriam Webster's collegiate dictionary (10th ed.). (1993). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.

Chapter	Author, A. A. (2012). This is a chapter. In J. J. Editor (Ed.), Book title: And subtitle (pp. 300–316). Abingdon: Routledge.
	Author, A. A. (2012). This is a chapter. In J. J. Editor & B. B. Editor (Eds.), Book title: And subtitle (pp. 300–316). Abingdon: Routledge.
	Author, A. A. (2012). This is a chapter. In J. J. Editor, P. P. Editor, & B. B. Editor (Eds.), Book title: And subtitle (pp. 300–316). Abingdon: Routledge.
Edited	Editor, J. J. (Ed.). (2012). Book title: And subtitle. Abingdon: Routledge.
	Editor, J. J., Editor, A. A., & Editor, P. P. (Eds.). (2012). Book title: And subtitle. Abingdon: Routledge.
	Editor, J. J., & Editor, P. P. (Eds.). (2012). Edited online book: And subtitle. Retrieved from http://www.xxxxxx
Edition	Author, A. A. (2012). Book title: And subtitle (4th ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
Translated	Author, J. J. (2012). Book title: And subtitle. (L. Khan, Trans.). Abingdon: Routledge.
Not in English	Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1951). La genèse de l'idée de hasard chez l'enfant [The origin of the idea of chance in the child]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
	For transliteration of Cyrillic letters please use the links: ALA-LC Romanization Tables at the web-site of The Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/roman.html
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Multivolume works	

Multiple volumes from a multivolume work	Levison, D., & Ember, M. (Eds). (1996). Encyclopedia of cultural anthropology (Vols. 1-4). New York, NY: Henry Holt. Use Vol. for a single volume and Vols. for multiple volumes. In text, use (Levison & Ember, 1996).
A single volume from a multivolume work	Nash, M. (1993). Malay. In P. Hockings (Ed.), Encyclopedia of world cultures (Vol. 5, pp. 174-176). New York, NY: G.K. Hall. In text, use (Nash, 1993).
Journal	
One author	Author, A. A. (2011). Title of article. Title of Journal, 22, 123–231. doi:xx.xxxxxxxxxx Provide the issue number ONLY if each issue of the journal begins on page 1. In such cases it goes in parentheses: Journal, 8(1), pp–pp. Page numbers should always be provided. If there is no DOI and the reference was retrieved from an online database, give the database name and accession number or the database URL (no retrieval date is needed): Author, A. A. (2011). Title of article. Title of Journal, 22, 123–231. Retrieved from http://www.xxxxx If there is no DOI and the reference was retrieved from a journal homepage, give the full URL or site's homepage URL: Author, A. A. (2011). Title of article. Title of Journal, 22, 123–231. Retrieved from http://www.xxxxx
Two authors	Author, A. A., & Author, B. B. (2004). Title of article. Title of Journal, 22, 123–231. doi:xx.xxxxxxxxxx

Three authors	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (1987). Title of article. Title of Journal, 22, 123–231. doi:xx.xxxxxxxxxx
More authors	Include all names up to seven. If there are more than seven authors, list the first six with an ellipsis before the last. Author, M., Author, B., Author, E., Author, G., Author, D., Author, R., … Author, P. (2001).
Organization as author	American Psychological Association. (2003). Title of article: And subtitle. Title of Journal, 2, 12–23. doi:xx.xxxxxxxxxx
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Supplemental material	If you are citing supplemental material which is only available online, include a description of the contents in brackets following the title. [Audio podcast] [Letter to the editor]
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Paper	Presenter, A. A. (2012, February). Title of paper. Paper presented at the meeting of Organization Name, Location.
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Thesis	Author, A. A. (2012). Title of thesis (Unpublished doctoral dissertation or master's thesis). Name of Institution, Location.

Unpublished work	
Manuscript	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (2008). Title of manuscript. Unpublished manuscript. Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (2012). Title of manuscript. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Forthcoming article	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (in press). Title of article. Title of Journal. doi:xx. xxxxxxxxx
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Web page	If the format is out of the ordinary (e.g. lecture notes), add a description in brackets. Author, A. (2011). Title of document [Format description]. Retrieved from http://URL
Newspaper or magazine	Author, A. (2012, January 12). Title of article. The Sunday Times, p. 1. Author, A. (2012, January 12). Title of article. The Sunday Times. Retrieved from http://www.sundaytimes.com Title of article. (2012, January 12). The Sunday Times. Retrieved from http://www.sundaytimes.com/xxxx.html
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Personal communication	Personal communication includes letters, emails, memos, messages from discussion groups and electronic bulletin boards, personal interviews. Cite these only in the text. Include references for archived material only.
Other reference types	
Patent	Cho, S. T. (2005). U.S. Patent No. 6,980,855. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Map	London Mapping Co. (Cartographer). (1960). Street map. [Map]. Retrieved from http://www.londonmapping.co.uk/maps/ xxxxx.pdf

Act	Mental Health Systems Act, 41 U.S.C. § 9403 (1988).
Audio and visual media	Taupin, B. (1975). Someone saved my life tonight [Recorded by Elton John]. On Captain fantastic and the brown dirt cowboy [CD]. London: Big Pig Music Limited. Author, A. (Producer). (2009, December 2). Title of podcast [Audio podcast]. Retrieved from http://www.xxxxx.com Producer, P. P. (Producer), & Director, D. D. (Director). (Date of publication). Title of motion picture [Motion picture]. Country of origin: Studio or distributor. Smith, A. (Writer), & Miller, R. (Director). (1989). Title of episode [Television series episode]. In A. Green (Executive Producer), Series. New York, NY: WNET. Miller, R. (Producer). (1989). The mind [Television series]. New York, NY: WNET.
Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. Journal Title, 8(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
Dataset	Author. (2011). National Statistics Office monthly means and other derived variables [Data set]. Retrieved March 6, 2011, from http://www.xxxxx.com If the dataset is updated regularly, use the year of retrieval in the reference, and using the retrieval date is also recommended.

Computer program	Rightsholder, A. A. (2010). Title of program (Version number) [Description of form]. Location: Name of producer. Name of software (Version Number) [Computer software]. Location: Publisher. If the program can be downloaded or ordered from a website, give this information in place of the publication information.

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