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Aims and Scope:

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. *CS&P* examines how rapid societallevel changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- moral reasoning and behavior;
- variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- social exclusion and inclusion;
- post-secular religious individualism;
- tolerance and merely "tolerating": their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.

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EDITORIAL

Editor's Note

The current issue of *Changing Societies & Personalities* continues discussion on values in various contexts, in particular, on the values of freedom, power, and national identity. Ivan Strenski in the article *What Do Religious Corporations Owe for Burdening Individual Civil Rights* compares two terms: individual "religious freedom" and corporate "freedom of religion"; he argues that they are often confused with one another. Strenski examines the relationship between corporate religious bodies and the state and stresses the craven collapse in religious resistance to Leviathan, which is a very regrettable circumstance in modern political and religious history. In addition, religion is not always really seeking freedom from the state control. Strenski emphasizes that in the West it has become commonplace to identify religious freedom with the right to believe whatever one chooses; however, the two concepts under consideration in the article are quite different from each other. The true measure of the depth of this difference can be assessed by the frequency, with which the rights of individual religious freedom conflict with the rights of corporate religious institutions. To reinforce his conclusions, Strenski cites relevant historical and contemporary examples.

In the article *Weber's Nationalism vs. Weberian Methodological Individualism: Implications for Contemporary Social Theory,* Marharyta Fabrykant notes that "there is no comprehensive theory of nationalism unlike other key concepts, such as democracy, political culture, or even society itself, but a multitude of theoretical approaches dedicated to specific aspects of the issue, primarily to the origins of nations and nationalism". Considering Max Weber's understanding of nationalism is especially important in the light of continuing debates on the nature of his concept. Fabrykant analyzes the scholarly discussion on the topic whether Weber himself was a nationalist, and underlines that there is a considerable variety of opinions about Weber's nationalism and its historical context. She compares the ideas of sociological classics – Simmel, Durkheim, and Sombart – with Weber's ideas and concludes that he "does not attempt to tie the emergence of nations to a specific

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historical period with its specific macrolevel context. Instead he relies upon what he believes to be universals of human nature – the tendency to produce personal and emotionally charged meanings for the initially purely pragmatic events, as long as the latter are not universally shared". At the same time, Fabrykant argues that there is a significant difference between Weber's views on nationalism in his earlier and mature texts.

Nelly A. Romanovich in the article *Dichotomy of the Basic Aspects of the Image of Power in Russia: Traditional and Modern Models* writes that there is the system of perceptions about power within a given society, which includes both basic (concept, functions, form, duties, etc.), and contextual (expectation of specific socio-political actions from a particular government) aspects. She argues that the historical developmental paths of Eastern and Western cultures have led to differences in the system of power relations. These differences were manifested in the political cultures of Western countries and Russia, and affected the people's attitude towards the concept of power. As a result, the image of power has obtained its own sociocultural specifics in each society. Romanovich compares traditional and modern models of power and argues that characteristics of the former are based on a special loyalty of people to their sovereigns; this model is traditional for Russia since it originated and was formed along with the birth and foundation of the country where "power" is something, to which one needs to serve and should serve. In Russia, people did not endow the autocrat with authority, but rather recognized his/her authority. In its turn, the modern model of the image of power suggests the opposite direction of serving: "The highest representative elected by the people serves the people, and never vice versa. Therefore, the attitude towards the authorities and its supreme representative is calm, without any admixture of mysticism". Romanovich considers personification, which includes a set of logical consequences such as autocracy, centralization and hierarchy, as the main characteristic of the Russian model of the image of power. She concludes that the modern model of the image of power conflicts with the original Russian model, and notes that in spite of proclaiming the modern model in the current Russian Constitution, the traditional model still dominates public opinion.

In the ESSAY section, Olga Potap's *Power of Memory (In Commemoration of Elie Wiesel, 1928–2016)* is published. The essay is dedicated to Elie Wiesel's ninety-year-old birthday anniversary, and since this publication coincides with the third anniversary of his death, the article aims to commemorate him. Olga Potap had a privilege to be a student of Elie Wiesel from 2003–2005; she describes his teaching carrier at different universities of the USA, outlines the themes of Wiesel's lectures and seminars, and depicts the method of his teaching.

The current issue of CS&P includes two book reviews. The first one is on Michael Ignatieff's *The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World* (Harvard University Press, 2017). In the review, I've focused on the analysis of ordinary virtues against moral universalism. The second review is on Michael Goodhart's *Injustice: Political Theory for the Real World* (Oxford University Press, 2018) written by Daniil Kokin. The reviewer notes that the book "raises a serious problem of contemporary

political theory by showing its one-sided character and inability to address the real-world political issues".

Discussions on the topics raised in the current issue will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal, and new themes will be introduced. We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections, book reviews and other formats from readers and prospective authors, and invite them to send us their reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

Elena A. Stepanova,
Editor-in-Chief

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Essay

Power of Memory (In Commemoration of Elie Wiesel, 1928–2016)

Olga Potap
Boston University, Boston (MA), USA

ABSTRACT
This essay portrays famous writer and human rights activist, Nobel Prize winner, Elie Wiesel (1928–2016) in the role of teacher. Wiesel valued this role more than his other achievements. The author's personal memoir and the archival documents make a core of this writing. The essay is dedicated to Wiesel ninety-year-old birthday anniversary.

KEYWORDS
Wiesel, Elie (1928–2016), commemoration, biography, teaching method, "a Socratic Method", Holocaust education, appeal to humanity, memory

Introduction

This essay is dedicated to Elie Wiesel's ninety-year-old birthday anniversary, and since this publication coincides with the third anniversary of his death, the essay aims to commemorate him. The author had the privilege to be a student of Elie Wiesel from 2003–2005. This essay is just a quiet tune in a multi-voiced chorus of commemorative speeches, reports, and publications bestowed to the great humanist, writer, and teacher. A word "commemoration" is coined from two Latin roots "com", meaning "altogether "and "memorate" meanings "to remind". Elie Wiesel believes in the mystical power of memory and emphasized it in his Nobel Prize lecture entitled, "Hope, Despair and Memory", saying that "without memory, our existence would be barred and opaque" (Wiesel & Aarvik, 1986). To remember a teacher is to hear the voices of his students. Altogether, we remember, that is, commemorate him.

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Elie Wiesel Biography

Elie Wiesel, Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Philosophy and Religion

Elie Wiesel (September 30, 1928 – July 2, 2016) was a well-known writer, journalist, political activist, philosopher, a Jewish scholar, intellectual and a great teacher.

He was a Holocaust survivor. As a teenage boy, he passed through the hell of a ghetto and the concentration camps. He lost his father, mother and younger sister there. Wiesel depicted his journey through Auschwitz and Buchenwald in his first novel *Night* published in 1958. Since the first publication, the book has been translated into 30 languages. Besides *Night*, Wiesel is the author of 57 books.

Elie Wiesel was honored with many awards, including the Commander in the French Legion of Honor (1984), the Nobel Peace Prize (1986) and U.S. Congressional Gold Medal (1984).

A significant public figure, "a messenger to mankind[1]", "the arbiter of morality in the twenties century" (Abramowitz, 1994), Wiesel had a passion for learning and teaching. This work outlines both aspects of his love. The first part of the essay describes sources of Wiesel's religious and secular education and portrays his great teachers – Shoushani and professor and rabbi Saul Liberman. The second part of this essay is dedicated to his teaching career at different universities of the USA. The essay outlines the themes of Wiesel's lectures and seminars and depicts the method of his teaching. Special attention is given to Wiesel's relationship with his students. The conclusion attempts to sum up the meaning of his lessons of memory in the contest of its humanistic approach.

Schooling

Honorable professor of many famous universities, he saw himself as an apprentice, "a yeshivah bucher from Sighet". Being a professor, he remained a student who never stopped learning, even in Auschwitz. Wiesel says that his daily study of Jewish texts was essential for him. He says, "I love to study. It gives you a good sense of proportion. After all, what Rambam says maybe is more important than the article I write for the New York Times" (Abramowitz, 1994). In his yeshiva in Sighet, a little town in Transylvania, he "learned to examine the text from all angles, to penetrate beneath all appearances, to the substance, to the original meaning, but not straight away. The superimposed structures, too, had to be learned. Above all, we learned to question the text, and that attitude has remained with me" (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 343). "What we learned then was to give timelessness to the timely subject in the Torah. All the events of the Torah were alive; they were a part of my life, and of the

[1] Egil Aarvick, chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee, called him as "a messenger to mankind – not with a message of hate and revenge but with one of brotherhood and atonement".

existence we celebrated. But that, of course, in Judaism: to celebrate every event as though it involves us personally" (Wiesel & Rothschild, 1995, p. 131).

In 1947, Wiesel became a student of Shushani, "the mysterious Talmudic scholar" (Wiesel & Rothschild, 1995, p. 131).

"No one knew his real name, his origin, or his age. …Where did he learn all of those ancient and modern languages?... He knew the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmud by heart; also Maimonides, Nahmanides, and Gresas, not to mention Yehuda Halevi, the poems of Ibn Gabirol, and the Greek and Latin classics as well" (Wiesel & Rothschild, 1995, p. 124).

> During the Occupation Shushani was arrested by an officer of the Gestapo. In perfect German, he declared that he was Alsatian, Aryan, and university professor to boot. The officer guffawed at the sigh of thus vagabond.
>
> "You, a professor?"
>
> "Yes, me."
>
> "And what do you teach?"
>
> "Higher mathematics."
>
> "No luck. It just so happens that I myself am a professor of higher mathematics in civilian life."
>
> Shushani was unfazed, "Well", he replied, "you can, of course, test my knowledge if you like. But I have a better idea. Let me pose a problem to you. If you can solve it, shoot me. If not, let me go". Released, Shushani slipped into Switzerland, where the chief rabbi became one of his most devoted admirers (Wiesel & Rothschild, 1995, p. 127).

Wiesel recollects: "For two or three years he taught me unforgettable lessons about the limit of language and reason, about the behavior of sages and madmen, about the obscure paths of thought as it wends its way across countries and cultures" (Wiesel & Rothschild, 1995, p. 121). "Shushani was probably the decisive teacher in my postwar year. He taught me Talmud again, and he taught me philosophy. He taught me secular sciences and prepared me for the Sorbonne. Whatever I knew I got from him" (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 21).

At age twenty, Wiesel was enrolled at the Sorbonne, where he studied literature, philosophy, and psychology.

From 1968 until 1983, Wiesel was a student of "the greatest Jewish scholar in many generations" (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 43), a professor and Rabbi Saul Liberman, who was also known under the name of Gaon Rabbeinu Shaul. The death of Liberman in 1983 in an airplane heading to the Holy Land had stopped their study. Wiesel (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 43) wrote about his teacher:

> Professor Saul Liberman, or Rabbi Saul Lieberman, was the master of Talmud. For the last fifteen years, I was his student and friend. Twice a week I would come to study with him – alone. Each session would last three hours, and it is thanks to him that I can share with others whatever I know now.

> He was an extraordinary man. His knowledge was all encompassing. It was both secular and religious. There was no word in the Talmud which he could not locate. There was no commentary which he could not quote by heart. The Greek influence, the Latin influence on the Talmud: he gave us the keys to open gates to the enchanted universe of ideas, stories, laws, dreams, and memories.

For Elie Wiesel, the daily study of Jewish texts was a ritual. Never-ending learning was the style of his life. For more than three decades as a Professor of Boston University, he was accustomed to the daily routine of studying Talmud with his friend, Rabbi Polak, a director of Hillel House at Boston University. "During the several decades we spent together at Boston University, we fell into the practice of devoting several hours every day delving deeply into a page of Talmud, into the ancient debates between the Sages, teasing out, as well, their meaning for today" (Polak, 2014, p. 9).

A chapter "On Learning and Teaching" in Elie Wiesel's book *And the Sea is Never Full* opens with the statement: "To quote a Talmudic sage (Rabbi Hanina, according to the Tractate of Taanin, or Rabbi Yehuda Ha-Nasi, according to the Tractate of Malkot): 'I have learned a great deal from my masters, but I have learned much more from my colleagues, and above all I have learned from my pupils'. This statement reflects my own feeling about teaching".

In Wiesel's case, his desire to learn embodies to desire to teach and vice versa. In his life, there is no straight transformation from a student to a teacher. On the contrary, he was always a student and teacher at the same time.

Teaching

Elie Wiesel wrote: "As an adolescent, I dreamed of becoming a writer and a teacher. Today, I am both" (Wiesel, 1999, p. 101).

Teaching at the Yale University

Elie Wiesel's academic career began in the mid-'60s. He was invited to teach at one of the most prestigious Ivy League's universities, Yale. The Yale offer sounded very attractive to him: "two courses per semester – one on literature, one on Hasidic thoughts" (Wiesel, 1999, p. 101). Elie Wiesel took his responsibilities very seriously – "every hour of lecturing takes four hours of preparations. Never had I studied so much" (Wiesel, 1999, p. 102). His attitude toward the students was exceptional – "I am very close to all my students; my door is always open to them. I try to make them my friends even though at first they intimidate me, as I probably intimidate them" (Wiesel, 1999, p. 102). However, very soon, Elie Wiesel realized his unique role in the relationship with his students. In the mid-1960s, almost all of these students were children of survivors. Wiesel recollects: "It takes me awhile to understand that for them I am a substitute for their fathers. Since their fathers were unable or unwilling to share their past with them, they turn to me and take an interest in mine… I thus become a human bridge between two worlds" (Wiesel, 1999, p. 102).

Wiesel had to find a tune, a word, a language to communicate with his students "about those years of darkness without shifting the burden to them" (Wiesel, 1999). He had to find a way "to convince them that in spite of everything, mankind deserves our faith" (Wiesel, 1999). It was a tough task for Wiesel and his students. Boys and girls came to his office privately, and almost every visitor started and ended their conversation with Elie Wiesel by sobbing or crying. One boy came crying about his father and mother, Auschwitz survivors, who lost their husband and wife and their children in the concentrations camps. They met and remarried after the liberation. They have one son from this marriage. He is Wiesel's student. This boy expressed a sad feeling about his parents' attitude toward him. Whenever they looked at their son or talked to him, they didn't see him at all. His parents still saw their dead children. Another girl came to Wiesel to express her anger toward her mother: "How come, my mother, who survived a ghetto and the concentration camp, she, who knew and experiences all of the horrors. How dare she let me born and live in this horrible world?" (Wiesel, 1999).

Wiesel recollects that sometimes the discussion in the class was too intense and emotional that his students were not able to leave his classroom. They "remain seated, heads buried in their hands" (Wiesel, 1999). Wiesel told his students: "What are we about to learn here? To read, to weep, to dream the end of the dream. And later, to fall down, but also to rise again, to take one step and then another" (Wiesel, 1999).

Elie Wiesel decided never to teach the history and literature of the Holocaust after his first Yale experience. He explained his choice: "I too feel the weight and destructive force of the theme, I sleep poorly. Even though I know how to share, there are limits. I feel that I cannot and should not be completely open. In speaking of the victims, how

Elie Wiesel among his friends and students, circa 1989.
Photo from the private archive of professor Hillel Levine

can I prevent a student from identifying me with them?" (Wiesel, 1999). Wiesel broke his promise do not teach history and literature of the Holocaust at the university only once when Boston University cannot find another professor to teach this subject.

Although he stopped teaching Holocaust studies at the universities, Wiesel never stopped talking about oppressors, victims, observers, and survivors relevant to the Holocaust or other forms of genocide. He taught his students to appeal to humanity. He pleaded to humanism through the literature and memory; more precisely through Literature of Memory. That was the primary subject of his classes at Boston University. Elie Wiesel believed in "the mystical power of memory". In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized: "…it is a memory that will save humanity. For me, hope without memory is like memory without hope" (Wiesel & Aarvik, 1986).

Teaching at Boston University

Since 1976 until 2013, Elie Wiesel was appointed as a University professor of the Humanities at Boston University. He was a faculty member of the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Religion. During his tenure at Boston University, for three and a half decades, Elie Wiesel taught two courses per semester, both with the same title: "Literature of Memory". One of these courses was always dedicated to a topic of religion, while the second one was concentrated on the subject of comparative literature. Even though the title of his courses never changed, the subtitles, as well as the topics of the study, were changed every semester.

What did Elie Wiesel teach at Boston University? Here are a few examples of his courses[2].

- *Literature of Memory: Hidden Literature and Banned books* – "this course explored writing that were hidden in times of oppression as well as writing that was banned due to controversy. This course investigated themes such as the limits of language, the obligation to witnesses, the persecution of words and the value of recording".
- *Literature of Memory: Hasidic Portraits: Rebbe Nachman of Bratslav* – "this course dedicated to Inspiring master, unique storyteller and enigmatic wanderer, the 18th century. Hasidic teacher Rebbe Nachman of Bratslav is the guide in a journey through madness and laughter, imagination and interpretation. Through biographical reading and tales, we will seek to approach this elusive personality and the secrets he spent his life hiding and revealing".
- *Literature of Memory: Literary perspectives: From first novel to masterpiece* – "this course will explore the evolution of the novelist's world view, literature technique, and imagination within the parameters of the author's first published novel and acclaimed masterpiece. This type of literature comparison invokes and illuminates issue of continuity and perspective as well as the development of other human concerns in the *oeuvre* of the novelist. Reading will include works by Ernest Hemingway, Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, F.M. Dostoevsky and others".
- *Literature of Memory: The World of the Shtetl* – "Jewish life and literature carry within then an image of the shtetl, that lost world of the small Jewish town, where

[2] Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center at Boston University, box 81, folder 19.

society, religion, myth, and spirituality were intertwined in all aspects of life. This course will try to open the doors of memory to recapture the enchantment, depth, fear and beauty of that lost world, through writings created from within the shtetl, or from within longing for time and place are gone. Authors will include: Sholom Aleichem, Y. L. Peretz, Singer Brothers and others".

- *Literature of Memory: Reconciliation: Promise, Challenge, Utopia?* – "Moment of crisis, injustice, and enigma disclose the historical events regarding us to consider the question of reconciliation. This course will explore the dimensions of reconciliation encountered in literature addressing times of discord or crisis including the Spanish Inquisition, McCarthyism, the Vietnam conflict and more. Reading will include works by Karl Jaspers, Franz Werfel and others".

The followings are the titles of a few other courses that professor Wiesel taught at Boston University. Every title is provocative, intriguing, and controversial:

– Literature in respond of oppression;
– The Literature of Madness and Hope;
– Faith and Revelation in Literature;
– Suicide and Literature;
– Hassidic renaissance.

Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center at Boston University preserves a significant part of Elie Wiesel's archives. A syllabus of the course *Literature of Memory: Philosophy and Literature of Friendship* is a part of the collection of Wiesel's papers. The text of the curriculum gives an idea of Professor Wiesel's requirements for his class and his expectation from his students.

Syllabus[3]

This course is an examination of friendship in philosophical, literature and religious texts of the ancient, classical, and medieval worlds and its subsequent understanding and representation in selected periods of Western Culture. The focus will be given to friendship that might variously be called ideal, philosophical, spiritual, and even romantic.

1. What is friendship? What is the nature of Friendship? What is the necessary and sufficient condition for friendship?

2. What are different kinds of friendship there? In what ways are they different? Are these differences significant and distinct, or ambiguous and irrelevant?

3. What type of love is friendship? Is it preferential love only, and therefore partly unjust? Is it strictly Philla? How does it relate to Eros and to agape?

4. Is there a tradition of friendship? Is there one tradition that applies to different times and culture, or are there several distinct traditions? What significance did friendship have for the various societies in which it existed? What relevance does it have for contemporary society?

5. Is there etic of friendship? Are there principles that constitute the making and maintaining of a friendship? Is there a logical or necessary relationship between

[3] Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center at Boston University, box 81, folder 22.

friendship and virtue? What is the role of friendship in creating and developing character?

The followed is an example of the text selection for the course *Literature of Memory: Philosophy and Literature of Friendship.*

1. Homer's "Iliad".
2. Euripides "Iphigenia in Tauris".
3. Plato "Symposium".
4. The Tanakh.
5. Al-Ghazali "On the duty of Brotherhood".
6. Jalal al-Din Rumi's Mystical poems.
7. W. Shakespeare Sonnets.
8. Alfred. Lord Tennyson "In memoriam".
9. Walt Whitman "Leaves of Grass".
10. D.H. Lawrence "Women in Love".
11. Kant "Lecture of friendship".
12. The Tanakh "David and Jonathan story".
13. Plutarch "Parallel Lives".
14. Cicero "On friendship".
15. Seneca "Epistles IX and LXIII".
16. The Gospel of John 13, 15, 19.

The diversity of the selected texts approaches to examine the topic of friendship from literature, religion, and philosophical perspectives.

"Socratic Method" of Teaching

A former student of Elie Wiesel, Rabbi Dan Ehrenkrantz called Wiesel's approach of teaching "a Socratic Method". Brilliant speechmaker and storyteller, in his classroom Wiesel preferred to listen to his students, asking them open-ended questions and initiated the discussions. He never stood up on a podium giving his lectures. There was no podium in his classroom.

As for lectures, Wiesel delegated this duty to his students. At the beginning of every class, a student-volunteer made an eight minutes presentation on a particular topic. Although these presentations were not evenly excellent and well-thought-out, Wiesel listened to them with remarkable attention and addressed questions to the speaker with a healthy respect. His teaching manner was a freestyle conversation. He taught his students the art of listening and the art of asking questions. Both skills are crucial for mastering the art of critical thinking. As a Jewish scholar, Wiesel valued questions much more than the answers. Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel said: "We are closer to God when we are asking questions than when we think we have the answers". Wiesel echoed: "In Hebrew, the word for

Classroom of Elie Wiesel located at 147 Bay State Rd., Boston, MA



Tribute to Elie Wiesel at Boston University, sculptor Mark Melon

'question' is she'elah, and the alef lamen of God's name are part of the fabric of that word. Therefore God is in the question" (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 3, p. 297).

> Wiesel wrote: "In the beginning my students do not understand the arrogance of answers. The professor is supposed to have answers. After a while they realize there is beauty in questions, more than in answers. There is truth in questions. Questions never provoked a war" (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 3, p. 297).

Questions and Answers

It was Wiesel's tradition to dedicate the last class of a semester to question-answer dialogue. Students can ask Wiesel any questions they wanted, and he responded. What did they ask?

- **Student**: What is your greatest achieving in the life?
- **Wiesel**: My son.
- **Student**: What is your favorite book?
- **Wiesel**: *Life and Fate* by Vasily Grossman is one of my favorite books[4].
- **Student**: Why has so much persecution been directed against the Jews? When I read Jewish history, almost every chapter is about the Jews as victims. My question is: Why us?
- **Wiesel**: We are a strange people… We are everywhere. We defy all systems, so we defy all people. We are not understood, so we are good scapegoats. To cosmopolitans, we are a provincial people. To provincial people, we are cosmopolitans. To the Communists, we are the capitalists. To the capitalists, we are the Communists. To the nationalists, we are internationalists. To the internationalists, we are nationalists. To the religious, we are heretics. To the heretics, we are religious. No one understands us, so they hate us. Do

[4] These two questions and answers were recorded by the author of this essay in 2003.

> you think people understood Abraham? Here was a man who lived in a world where idols were worshiped. One day he began talking about one God, an invisible God. Abraham was a troublemaker. Or Moses. Do you think people understood Moses? His people were slaves, and Moses wanted them to be free. People lived by stealing, and he said that you should not steal. Why us? The easiest thing is to kill what you do not understand (Wiesel & Abrahamson, 1985, Vol. 3, p. 297).

Fifteen minutes audience

Another of Wiesel's traditions was a meeting with every student individually. Professor Wiesel wanted to know each of them, and he scheduled a time to sit down privately with his students and talk with them about their concerns. An audience with Elie Wiesel lasted no longer than 15 minutes. What can people tell each other in 15 minutes? Was it a long or short appointment? In my case, it was not long or short. A different category, non-time classification, should be applied. After I briefly introduced myself and answered to the standard questions, such as: where did I come from; where do I work; where do I live, Wiesel asked me an unexpected question: "Olga, are you happy?" I replied without hesitation: "Yes" and immediately reflected, why I so confidently answered "yes". The answer suddenly came by itself, and I confirmed, responding no longer to Elie Wiesel, but myself: "Yes, I am happy because my mom is still alive".

Later, I read Wiesel's interview with Golda Meir ("Golda at 75"). Among other questions, all of a sudden, he asked her: "Madame Prime Minister, are you happy?" So she replied: "Of course". (for a different reason than mine, indeed). At the end of our meeting, I asked Wiesel to sign his book for my friend. He asked my friend's name and wrote: "To Olga's friend, G. N. Elie Wiesel". It was Wiesel's style – to show respect to his students in a gentle manner. He just put my name at the same level as his name.

Students

Who were Wiesel's students? Wiesel's courses were a free elective for the undergraduate seniors with different majors of study, graduated students, as well as Ph.D. candidates. However, not only Boston University affiliates attended his classes. I remember a government lawyer who came from Washington, D.C. to Boston every week just for Wiesel's classes. I recollect a professor at Boston University's Dental School, a surgeon-periodontist, who adjusted his clinical schedule to participate in Wiesel's classes. There was an old lady who attended Wiesel's courses for a few years. She introduced herself as an "Auschwitz graduate". If at the beginning of Wiesel's teaching career at the Yale University, the majority of his students were children of the Holocaust survivors, then at the end of his tenure, he had many students from Germany. They were grandchildren of the enemies. So they come to Wiesel seeking for truth and remedy.

Birthday Anniversary

Although he never celebrated his birthdays saying that he had the more important dates in his life, one of his anniversaries I will always remember. It was September 30, 2003. He turned 75 years old. We had a morning class that started at 9:00 AM. The students brought some juice and cookies. When he appeared at the door, they shouted, "Happy Birthday." Wiesel thanked everybody, drank some orange juice and joked that according to Hassidic tradition he had to start this day with a shot of vodka… That class he told us about the fate of Simon Dubnov, a Jewish historian, killed in Riga ghetto on December 8, 1941. He said as he had witnessed the last days of Dubnov. He told about his former student from the University of Heidelberg, Johann Siebert, who killed Dubnov. He reproduced the conversation of Siebert with Dubnov, if he, and not Dubnov, answered questions of the murderer.

Siebert: Professor, you have spent a long time talking to your students about the triumph of humanism in 20th century. Do you still believe in your ideas of the victory of humanism?

Dubnow: Yes, I do.

Siebert: Yesterday, according to my order, 480 Jews were killed in Bikernieki forest.

Dubnow: How many, did you said? 480? Thank you for the information. It is essential for my chronicles.

Wiesel told that Dubnov appealed to the Jews of Riga's ghetto until the moment of his death, demanding: "Yidden, shreibt un fersheibt" (Jews, write it all down).

Wiesel told that Dubnov and his primary opponent in the religious disputes, Rabbi Zak, were shot by Siebert; and the blood of these irreconcilable antagonists mingled saturating the snow. Having finished his story, Wiesel paused and then said: "I know that Dubnov wrote a chronicle. And this chronicle is not found yet". Then, the eyes of 75 years old man sparkled like a young man's eyes, and he stated: "I will find his records!"

Elie Wiesel died three years ago, and he did not find Dubnov's chronicles. However, he gave a hint to his students to learn his lessons of memory.

To be a Student of Elie Wiesel

In his letter addressed to Elie Wiesel, one of his students wrote that he would never forged Wiesel's words that he felt the responsibility of each of his students. Then, the student said that he feels a great responsibility to Wiesel as his teacher as well. Then, he concluded: "One of the most vivid feelings I feel toward you is gratitude. As a teacher, you gave me much more than notes and assignments. You gave me a part of yourself[5]".

Ariel Burger, the former student and teaching assistant of Elie Wiesel, answers to the question, what does it mean to be a student of Elie Wiesel, saying, "It means always learning, thinking higher and feeling deeper, always challenging yourself to

[5] Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center at Boston University, box 81, folder 19.

dive into the great text, stories, and ideas in search of wisdom… Most of all, it means remembering the past and understanding the link between past and future. It means choosing to care about other's lives, their suffering and their joy" (Burger, 2018, p. 254).

Hillel Levine, the well-known rabbi, scholar, and activist says that Wiesel's direct dialog with his pupils so dignified them with his high expectations of them much as evoking the great teachers and universalists, like Maimonides was his way of bringing the spirit of the Yeshiva, its non-hierarchical environment to the highest platforms of academies and polities to which he was invited. Levine's friendship with Wiesel began in the 60s. Levine was nineteen years old when he first met Wiesel. Following Wiesel's lecture that Levine heard that left him shaking with inspiration, Hillel had the fearlessness to ask Wiesel if he could walk him home. They walked out into the night. Levine says that that walk will continue throughout his life. In 1967, Elie told him that after breaking the silence on the suffering of Soviet Jews publishing a book the Jews of Silence, it would be dangerous for Wiesel to revisit USSR. However, he expected Hillel, his friend and pupil, to go and that he would help make the arrangements. Levine still wonders about the great lessons that this brought to his "pupil".

Conclusion

What subjects did Elie Wiesel teach during his long tenure in academic institutions? Was it literature, philosophy, or theology? How to classify his lessons of memory according to the academic standards? It seems to be an open question the same like his lessons, which never ended with the answer but started with another query. The teacher, he remains a scholar who never ends the search for truth and remedy and struggling with his quests. An open question is a bridge between him and his students. An open question is a bridge between past and future.

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ARTICLE

What Do Religious Corporations Owe for Burdening Individual Civil Rights

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ABSTRACT
In the name of religious liberty, recent legislative initiatives by Christian nationalists seek broad legal exemptions from general law. This reflects an abiding antipathy to and a fear of the power of the state, the ultimate aim of which may be sovereignty for religious institutions. But, the claims of Christian nationalists are vulnerable to a series of critical objections. First, the rhetoric of religious liberty used by Christian nationalists plays on confusion between two senses of religious liberty – that of institutional religious freedom and that of individual freedom of religious conscience. These two senses need to be distinguished, since they are sometimes in fundamental conflict with one another, arguably to the extent of institutional religious freedom burdening individual religious conscience. Further, legal exemptions to general law that benefit particular religious institutions should also be recognized as gifts. They are not fundamental or inalienable rights. Therefore, granting such accommodations requires that religious communities benefitting from them should somehow reciprocate for their being exempted from common obligations under general law.

KEYWORDS
exit rights, accommodation, Mauss, gift, individual rights, compensation

The Sovereignty Blitz

In the United States, a consistent complaint argued on the part of self-appointed defenders of so-called "freedom of religion" and/or "religious freedom" is the vulnerability of religions over against an essentially Erastian state. For them,

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what is, in effect, the predatory image of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, casts a shadow of an all-powerful nation-state holding an absolute monopoly on the use of power across its entire territory, including the territory of religion. It is against such an imagined threat to their presumed liberty that corporate religious bodies are featured in a front-page story in *The New York Times* reported on May 27, 2018 "A Christian Nationalist Blitz" (Stewart, 2018). This "blitz" of nationwide "Christian nationalist" legislative initiatives aims to promote "religious freedom", that *The NY Times* report identifies as "the latest attempt by religious extremists to use the coercive power of government to secure a privileged position in society for their version of Christianity" (Stewart, 2018). When exposed to light of day, the Christian nationalist Blitz seeks, in truth, to limit the exercise of civil liberty in the public domain by leveraging the power of religious forces. In seeking exemptions from civic responsibility, I shall argue first that corporate religious bodies seek nothing less than the liberty that only sovereignty can insure.

The Power of Religion

In this light, it is worth recalling the nature of a kind of historical *demarche* between corporate religious bodies and the state. The existence of sovereign corporate religion threatens Leviathan in ways that other members of civil society do not, or perhaps cannot. Religious institutions speak with an authority (*auctoritas*) that can compete with, if not transcend, that of the State's. One might even argue that all religions need in order to become polities themselves is territory and a capacity to exercise power (*potestas*) – those "divisions" that Stalin reminded Pope Pius XII he lacked. Thus, the need to control, manage, suppress, or even eliminate religion and so on may weigh more heavily upon Leviathan than the need to keep the rest of Leviathan's domain in order. Leviathan's determined and effective control over religious bodies speaks volumes about Leviathan's conviction that the religions will never acquire those "divisions", the lack of which Stalin chided the Roman pontiff (Sarkissian, 2016).

For certain religious devotees, the craven collapse of religious resistance to Leviathan is one of the least edifying spectacles of modern political and religious history. The domestication of the eastern churches, the established Lutheran churches of Scandinavia, the Church of England, or the Protestant and Jewish communities of France, or until recently, at least, the Islam of Turkey, for example, serve as exemplary contemporary examples of religious bodies effectively neutered by their respective governments. All may be well-fed, but they are likewise firmly leashed.

But, by the same token, it would be reasonable to be suspicious about the ultimate intentions of the religions regarding their own liberty from state control. Some may seek to build upon incremental gains in legal "accommodation", to seek fuller freedom in a sovereignty, not unlike those enjoyed by the Native American nations. In this, the churches would, in effect, seek to become laws unto themselves, states-within-states, thus presenting, as it were, the prospect of pockets of theocracy. Symptoms of this seizure of sovereignty from the nation-state, can be found in governments like those hostage to the Roman Catholic Church, such as today's Poland, or those submitting to the Guardian Council in Iran, or like Israel's, governments that typically defer to

broadly unpopular decisions about Jewish identity, conversion and marriage made by the Orthodox Chief Rabbinate of the state. But, in principle, Leviathan still holds the hammer. The modern state monopolizes the use of force and as such, compels the religions to behave as it wishes. In this vein, it is worth observing that most, if not all, recent insurgent or revolutionary attempts to replace the Westphalian system, where Leviathan rules, have been made in behalf of religious social formations. Al Qaeda, ISIL, the Islamic Republic of Iran or Christian Identity nationalists come readily to mind.

About such possible threats to the sovereignty of the state, recently deceased Supreme Court Judge Antonin Scalia lined up smartly on the side of Leviathan. So committed was Scalia to the modern secular order he felt that if religious accommodations were not reined in, chaos would ensue. Writing in 1990 for the majority in the so-called peyote religion case – Oregon Employment Division v Smith (Employment Div., 1990) – Scalia dismissed the claim by members of the Native American Church for religious exemption from Oregon's controlled substances laws for using peyote in a sacramental setting. Then, citing the landmark Supreme Court decision on the Mormon practice of polygamy, Reynolds v. United States (1879), Scalia quoted Reynolds to the effect that "To permit this" (polygamy) "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself" (Reynolds v. Untied States, 1879). Scholars have pointed out that Scalia is far from consistent in resisting the expansion of religious accommodations. But, this does not weaken the force of his decision as an example of significant judicial fears about the risks of the chaos caused by creeping sovereignty issuing from unrestricted religious accommodations (Stolzenberg, 2016).

How Freedom of Religion May Burden Religious Freedom

Thus far, I have not distinguished between two senses of religious liberty that Christian nationalists of the so-called "Christian Blitz" use interchangeably, perhaps for strategic purposes. These terms, "religious freedom" and "freedom of religion", when confused with one another, play havoc with our ability to think clearly about issues provoked by Christian nationalists and others of their ilk who seek greater corporate religious liberty. "Religious freedom" refers to freedom of belief, freedom of the individual conscience. "Freedom of religion" denotes quite another thing. It refers to the relative state of the sovereignty or autonomy of corporate religion or religious institutions – what the recent literature refers to as "corporate religious liberty" or "religious sovereignty" (Schwartzman, Flanders & Robinson, 2016). On the side of individual "religious freedom", Roger Williams exemplifies the iconic alternative, while Thomas à Becket models corporate sovereignty or "freedom of religion". No matter how much our modern media culture – T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral" included – has cast Becket, in effect, as a Roger Williams of his day, the two men stand for two different notions of religious liberty. The difference? Williams conscientiously dissented from the orthodoxy of the church institution of his New England coreligionists, and was thus forced to leave Massachusetts Bay Colony in order enjoy his own personal religious freedom – to believe as he chose.

By contrast, as formal agent of the corporate Church, Thomas à Becket asserted the freedom of the Church of Rome against the kingly authority of Henry II in 1170. Becket was no model of the free conscience, but rather stood in for the authority of the Roman magisterium. Becket, in effect, asserted the autonomy of Papal corporate ecclesiastical authority against the competing institution of the political authority of the English Crown. Four decades later, in 1215, one will seek in vain in the *Magna Carta* for any charter for individual freedom of religious conscience. Instead, the *Magna Carta* finds a duly chastened King John affirming that very same corporate religious freedom for which Becket died in the following words: "First, that we have granted to God, and by this present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired". So exemplary was this conception of the "freedom of religion" – corporate freedom of the Church – that, the justices cited this exact clause from the *Magna Carta* in the Hosanna-Tabor decision (Green, 2017).

> Controversy between church and state over religious offices is hardly new. In 1215, the issue was addressed in the very first clause of *Magna Carta*. There, King John agreed that "the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired". The King in particular accepted the "freedom of elections", a right "thought to be of the greatest necessity and importance to the English Church" ("Hosanna-Tabor", 2012).

In the Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC (2012) ruling, SCOTUS, therefore, forbade the government from applying equal opportunity employment law to the case of an individual worker fired from her job with the church. The worker, Cheryl Perich, had fallen ill, and after recovering, wanted to reclaim her *non-ministerial* job to which she was arguably entitled by her civil rights to fair treatment under the law. But, the firing was upheld, and the sovereignty of the church – its freedom of religion – to do so was accommodated at the expense of the civil rights of the employee on the basis of the "ministerial exception". In effect, the Court granted the Hosanna-Tabor Church an "exit right" from having to abide by certain civil rights on the basis of the "ministerial exemption" – even though Cheryl Perich had not been employed within the ministry.

On the face of it, supporting the Church's right to exit its civic obligations to a non-ministerial employee, based as it was on the "ministerial exception", seems an egregious misapplication of legal principle. While one might maintain in this way that the state should not presume to rule on ecclesiastical matters, church employee sickness and subsequent absence from work are hardly issues in which theological considerations apply. The state was not, for instance, asked to reinstate an employee who had advocated allegedly heretical views during the course of her employment. Surely a person's health is a matter lying well outside the realm of the "ministerial", and squarely within that of general welfare. Recent literature on the Hosanna-Tabor decision, in particular, Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, raises some similar issues as I have raised here. Yet, even they overlook the obvious fact that theological issues or religious judgments do not apply in the Hosanna-Tabor case. Nor, are "ministerial"

functions relevant to the case of Perich's termination. She had no sacerdotal functions (Lupu & Tuttle, 2017). Cheryl Perich's failing was one of common health. Her illness had simply made it impossible for her to fulfill her duties as an employee.

Critically, neither the *Magna Carta* itself nor the Hosanna-Tabor case affirm individual freedom of conscience, or what I have called "religious freedom". From the Alito-Kagan decision ("Hosanna-Tabor", 2012), it should be clear about what (or whose) freedom is being affirmed, both by the *Magna Carta* and SCOTUS. Plainly, it is corporate or institutional sovereignty, not personal liberty that both documents affirm. It is not, therefore, the right to believe according to the dictates of conscience against the authority of one's religious community. It is, rather, the freedom (or sovereignty) of religious corporations that is advanced – indeed, often to rein in individual believers merely for exercising constitutionally protected religious and other freedoms.

The different genealogies of these two notions – (corporate) freedom of religion and religious freedom (of individual conscience) – have been noted by historians of the early 20th century, like John Neville Figgis (1997), extending even into our own day by Harold Berman (1983), Martha Nussbaum (2008) and others. Pope Gregory VII's so-called 12th century "Papal Revolution" asserts the freedom of the Church, of religion, while the value of religious freedom (of conscience) arises in the liberality of the 17th century Dutch Republic and the colonial experiments of Roger Williams. It has become commonplace, however in the West, to regard the religious liberty as identified exclusively with sacrality of conscience, the right to believe whatever one chooses. Historically speaking, this conception of religious liberty ignores that sense of religious liberty understood as the freedom of an institution, people, nation and such, recently recognized in the Hosanna-Tabor decision. Worst of all, such confused usages falsely collapse the notions of corporate freedom and freedom of belief or conscience into each other. This eventuates, as I have observed, in the irony of Becket being held up as a paragon of *individual* religious freedom or independent conscience when, in fact, he was serving as a corporate, institutional factotum of the Roman Church against the English state of Henry II!

These two notions of religious liberty, then, differ deeply from one another. A fair measure of the profundity of this difference can better be appreciated by the frequency with which the rights of individual religious conscience are asserted against the authority or freedom of corporate religious institutions, rather than in their behalf. I submit that while corporate freedom of religion may indeed "protect the individual" from a predatory State, it may also disadvantage the individual with respect to their general civil rights, all in order to affirm the corporate institutional freedom of the church. In the Hosanna-Tabor case, the State's siding with the church over against the rights of an individual demonstrates just such conflict within the notion of religious liberty. Sometimes freedom of religion, freedom of a church, for instance, demands compromising of the freedom – religious or otherwise – an individual's freedom or well-being. For instance, any number of critical Roman Catholic theologians, trying to assert theological *Lehrfreiheit* at Catholic institutions, as well as Roger Williams, William Robertson Smith, Galileo Galilei, Ridley and Latimer, Michael Servetus, Thomas Moore, Hans Küng, or the Network's "Nuns on the Bus" might complain of

being oppressed by the ambitions of their churches to assert corporate sovereignty. In these cases, the State has stood by, exposing individuals and their sacred consciences to the predations of their corporate religious bodies. In such cases, I think we can fairly say that freedom of religion (FR) militates against religious freedoms (RF).

Burdening Civil Rights in the Name of Religion's Rights

Distinctly worrying are the increasing number of cases where the freedom of religion – that is corporate freedom of religion – disadvantages the individual enjoyment of civil goods. Two recent and quite different cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) and compounded case of Zubic v. Burwell (2016) exemplify rulings in which judicial exemptions granted to religious corporations disadvantage individual enjoyment of legitimate civic goods. In order to appreciate the harm done to civil rights, one can entertain the view that the federal mandate to offer contraceptive support to women employees of Hobby Lobby, the Little Sisters of the Poor, and so on, put these organizations into moral straits. Indeed, governmental officials tried to accommodate the scruples of the religious plaintiffs by providing their women with contraceptive services from non-religious, public sources. Still, despite such attempts of honor the claims of all concerned, the women entitled to contraceptive services were, in fact, "burdened" by being kept waiting through periods of uncertainty and deprivation of their legitimate civic goods, while this matter was being litigated. Guarantees to them under general law paid little actual heed to their civil rights.

While these are not cases where the interests of (corporate) freedom of religion conflict directly with religious freedom (of conscience), they are cases where (corporate) freedom of religion does "burden" the enjoyment of legitimate civic goods. Here, it is not freedom of conscience that suffers, but simply the enjoyment of common civic goods ensured by general law. An individual citizen's legitimate enjoyment of civic goods has, thus, been "burdened" by the claim of a religious institution to have been "burdened", in turn, by general law. I should immediately note, however, that the courts have commonly tried to balance these burdens upon the general citizenry over against those of religious plaintiffs. In the Little Sisters of the Poor case, for instance, the Federal government provided the contraceptive services from which the nuns sought exemption. The "burdening" of the general citizenry seems to be the social cost of freeing religious institutions from "burdens". In light of such asymmetrical outcomes, I suggest that the equity of such civic burdening might be given further scrutiny.

Legal "Accommodation", a Prelude to Sovereignty?

The history of legal exemption or accommodation for the purpose of insuring free exercise of religion is long. But, long as it is, it is equally well understood that the history of freedom of conscience is equally long as well. Martha Nussbaum locates the American origins of such an individual, interior sense of religious freedom in the struggles of Roger Williams, who held that "the capability of conscience requires

protection of the widest possible space that is compatible with the safety and survival of the state." Only the extremes of ultimate "safety and survival, could possibly justify any diminution of the space within which conscience exercises itself" (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 44). Nussbaum argues that it was Williams' spirit of the freedom of individual conscience that most deeply touched the Founders.

But, what if accommodations principally result in empowering religious institutions, at the expense of individuals, and even individual religious freedom? What if corporate accommodations turn out to be more consequential, especially in terms of influencing the outcomes of political contestation? What, as well, if corporate accommodations weaken conceptions fundamental to the values of national integrity, such as the value of the individual conscience? While individual accommodations may threaten conformity, or at best, induce pluralism into the body politic, corporate exemptions that seek exceptions from general law, in fact, challenge the integrity of the polity at large. At what point do these institutions exemptions or accommodations begin enabling the establishment of a state within a state? At what point, do these exceptions to the rule accumulate enough substance to become the foundations of a new rule, that is to say, the grounds of sovereignty, that is to say, virtual secession?

While skeptics of that congeries of notions passing under the label, "religious liberty", sometimes focus upon possible violations of the establishment clause of the constitution, I am not doing so. Rather, a warning might instead be issued for the use of the free exercise clause to enable movements of religious sovereignty or secession. Should this be true, the accommodations sought on behalf of the freedom of religious institutions pose arguably greater threats to national public order because they tend to secession from, at least, the support of civil rights. In so far as they constitute efforts to opt out of acknowledging certain civil rights, legal accommodations made to institutions, such as in Hosanna-Tabor may constitute the first steps on a journey, whose final destination may itself be sovereignty. In Smith, Justice Scalia feared that permitting the kind of individual liberty from prevailing law that the plaintiffs sought would "permit every citizen to become a law unto himself" (Reynolds v. United States, 1879). By extension, I am saying that legal accommodations to religious institutions may be hastening their achievement of being such "laws unto themselves".

If we take seriously Scalia's fears in Smith of the potential anarchy should "every citizen" become a "law unto themselves", how much greater the risk to the nation and to the individual conscience, posed by the gradually expanding accommodations made to religious bodies? Professor B. Jessie Hill of Case-Western Reserve Law School, reminds us that "religious sovereignty is a claim to the same people and the same geographical space that the political sovereign controls" (Hill, 2017, p. 1196). She further argues that there are, *in principle*, no limits to the increase expansion of religious claims to sovereignty (Hill, 2017, p. 1196). Indeed, Hill argues that the movement pushing for these exemptions is "problematic because it has no logical stopping point, and that the lack of limitation is inherent to sovereignty claims" (Hill, 2017, p. 1179). To boot, Hill claims that these corporate religious "claims of entitlement [are] not just to deference, but to almost complete non-interference with certain aspects of institutional life" (Hill, 2017, p. 1191).

Legal "Accommodations" to the Religions Are Gifts Rather than Inalienable Rights

I raise this prospect of the potentially limitless expansion of claims to corporate freedom of religion because I believe it forces us to take a more critical look at freedom of religious corporations. This is true whether or not religious institutions actually do seek the sovereignty their critics, like Hill, believe they seek. I am arguing that even if Hill and her ilk overstate the self-seeking of religious institutions, there is, nonetheless, reason to re-examine the relation of religious institutions and the State.

Consider the case where religious institutions, despite their pursuit of accommodations to, and exemptions from, general law, desire to remain good citizens of the commonwealth, contributing appropriately to the general welfare. What might be appropriate reactions to these grants of exit rights from general law? Further, what, indeed, could one argue, should their response be to the granting of such exemptions and accommodations? Assuming that accommodations for individual conscience have not been seen as enabling secession or separation, to what extent do plaintiffs recognize that granting accommodations puts them in debt to society at large?

While accommodations to general laws in behalf of religious institutions may be relatively common, we are not justified in regarding such exemptions as "natural" or as marking "fundamental human rights." They are instead derived from or extrapolated out of more fundamental rights. Accommodations or exemptions are, therefore, concessions "granted". And, like all *grants*, they are *gifts*. Like all gifts, they may be accepted, circulated, reciprocated, rejected, returned, and so on. Cheryl Perich, the unfortunate church employee dismissed because of the accommodation – "gift" – to do so *granted* to Hosanna-Tabor church could be "given" back her job should that ruling be reversed at a later date. Similarly, the decision makes it clear that *granting* such an exemption is not fundamental in the sense of being "required", or constitutionally demanded, and, significantly not "recognized" (Employment Div., 1990). It is further important to distinguish exemptions and accommodations from so called "natural" or "God-given" rights in other ways. Thus, while it is true that statutory or judicial accommodations may be recognized as flowing from or inhering in such pre-contractual rights, their determination depends upon legislative or judicial action. As the precise logic of "granting" implies, these accommodations or exemptions are, instead, gifts, grants, awards, bestowals, concessions, and so on. Again, while "inalienable" or "natural" rights may be seen as "God-given", as having divine origins, accommodations to general law depend upon specific human agency by courts or legislatures. If we, thus, pay heed to the language of a recent Supreme Court ruling involving religious liberty, such as Employment Division v. Smith, the notorious peyote religion case, "accommodation" is always modified by language like "allow", "permit", "provide", "confer", "grant". The court speaks always of "granting" an exemption or not. This is the language of *gift*, not of "inalienable" right. There is no "right," strictly speaking, for members of the Native American Church to ingest a legally proscribed drug – peyote – in the sacramental setting of their devising. No such status is "recognized"; it is, rather, either "granted" or not. Were the court of allow such a practice, it would, in effect, be granting – giving – the Church an exemption from the general rule against

the use of a controlled substance, such as peyote. Thus, because the language of accommodation and exemption is so important to many recent cases of legislation or judicial determination, it is even more important to take stock of the logic of gift or social exchange. This logic is freighted with the language of obligation.

Honoring the Gift of Accommodation by Paying It Forward

One of the better-known obligations recognized by those granted gifts is the obligation to repay the gift. Following the logic of gift and obligation, in the case of exemptions from general laws *granted* to religious corporations, there comes an obligation to repay the gift of accommodation. One way such an obligation could be fulfilled might be with some sort of good will public or patriotic service. Individual citizens, for example, granted conscientious objector's exemption from military service commonly perform public service either in civilian life or in non-combatant roles in the military. Religious institutions granted ministerial exception to military service of their clergy typically provide chaplains to the military in implicit recognition, typically uncoerced, of their obligation to the nation, and in recognition of the gift nature of accommodations.

At the same time, such recognition of the obligation to repay counts as a pledge of patriotism. Such a gesture, such a gift to the whole, would create a virtuous symmetry with respect to the State for granting its special accommodations to the religions. For example, Hobby Lobby might make a noble patriotic gesture of gratitude for its exemption from offering birth control benefits to its employees with a program to provide free day care to employees. Or, the Little Sisters of the Poor might reciprocate the grant of being exempted from providing birth control coverage for their employees by, say, funding adoptions of children otherwise hard to place. One can trust the creativity of our public sector and NGOs to come up with similarly healing ways to acknowledge the gift of religious accommodations and the concomitant great social debt owing to the society that makes such accommodations possible at all.

But, if legal accommodations are gifts, are there other implications? In his classic anthropological treatise, *The Gift* Marcel Mauss (1967) argued that there was no such thing as a so-called "free" gift. Instead, "obligation" ruled: gifts are given out of a sense of obligation; we are similarly obliged to accept the gift, and finally obliged to repay it in some manner (Mauss, 1967). A common misunderstanding of what the obligation to repay the gift means is "reciprocation" in one-for-one correspondence from the receiver of the gift to the original giver of the gift. While reciprocation, in the sense of a one-for-one correspondent return of the gift, is one-way repayment can be understood, Mauss and later exchange theorists did not feel that a proper response to the gift was limited to strict reciprocity. The gift maybe repaid by "paying it forward", as we commonly say. If I give you the gift of a dollar, this may mean that you, in return, reciprocate by giving me a dollar at a later date. On the other hand, you may instead "pay my gift forward" by collecting my mail while I am out of town, or do some other service to yet another party because of my initial gift. The labor of school teachers, for instance, can be understood in this way as an act of "paying forward" to their students

the devoted service their own teachers gave them. In acknowledgment of an original act of generosity, the receiver of the gift might be moved to acts of charity to others, rather than to direct repayment. This is the familiar pattern set up in the Gospels of responding to divine acts of generosity by going forth and being generous to fellow creatures, for instance.

On this view, legal accommodation to religious corporations might, therefore, to be seen as a gift that creates obligations laid upon religious bodies to "repay" or "pay forward" the very gift of such legal accommodation. Since these accommodations consist in gifts to particular ecclesiastical communities an appropriate repayment for such specialized gifts might preferably be something that enhances civic virtue. Put otherwise, since these accommodations benefit the self-interest of *particular* members of the overall American community, an appropriate repayment of this exemption from common rules would be something that itself would celebrate the blessings of *common civic life*, chief among them our civic virtues.

Within the confines of this space, I cannot hope to tell the whole story of the all-too-common Christian nationalist assumption of the unrelieved malevolence of the state. Their sadly, too familiar, vision of the state as predatory Leviathan only excites them to greater efforts to execute what Robin West has called the "rights to exit" from, or "opt out of", general civil rights typical of the Christian nationalist drive for corporate religious liberty, that is to say, sovereignty (West, 2016, p. 404). West further notes that these "exit rights" do not enhance individual liberty – religious or not – by enabling citizens more deeply to participate in civil society, but rather they aim to enable an exit from "our society's legally constructed social contract. In each case in which an exit right is recognized, the individual or corporate entity is given a right to refuse to participate, rather than rights to participate, in some legally constructed and shared project of civil society" (West, 2016, p. 405).

Civic virtues are the values that enhance our common life together, that increase the general good. These should not be confused with the goods desired by particular communities. Roger Williams had the occasion to address his Massachusetts Bay Colony opponents on this subject. They insisted that the chief criterion for choosing a political leader was that person's Christian convictions. Williams, however, declared that what was relevant to political office was, indeed, a particular set of moral virtues, but that these virtues are separable from religious convictions. "Good moral principles are routinely found", he says, "in people who have a religion that one may take to be in error". Our politics should be conducted within that shared moral space, "making sure that it does not get hijacked by any particular doctrine, in such a way as to jeopardize both liberty and equality" (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 44).

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ARTICLE

Weber's Nationalism vs. Weberian Methodological Individualism: Implications for Contemporary Social Theory

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ABSTRACT

Most contemporary sociologists' aversion towards nationalism contrasts with the alleged nationalist views of one of the key classics of sociology, Max Weber. The considerable accumulated scholarship on the issue presents a unified belief that Weber was indeed a nationalist yet varies considerably in the significance attributed to the issue. Most authors entrench Weber's nationalism within biographical studies of Weber's political views as an individual beyond Weberian sociological theorizing. A different approach suggests that the notions of nationality in Weber's works do have certain theoretical value as potentially capable of enriching the current understanding of the nation. The present article aims to bring together the notions of nationality dispersed within Weber's various writings with the Weberian methodological individualism. The main argument of the article is that individualism and nationalism in Weber's thought are not a contradiction despite the collectivism associated with the essentialist view of the nation. Instead, they represent a reflection of the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of the micro-macro link definitive for the modern social theory. Analyzing the internal logic of this change provides new insights into the currently debated issue of retraditionalization, especially in relation to the ongoing renaissance of nationalism.

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Introduction

The current upsurge in nationalism in the public political discourse and, according to certain indicators, in public opinion brings to mind B. Anderson's insightful observation about the contradiction in the fate of nationalism. According to Anderson, although we live in the world of nations and thus should recognize nationalism as the most successful of the competing ideologies generated in the nineteenth century, it is also the only ideology unrelated to an input of a major thinker of the period. It is also true that there is no comprehensive theory of nationalism unlike other key concepts, such as democracy, political culture, or even society itself, but a multitude of theoretical approaches dedicated to specific aspects of the issue, primarily to the origins of nations and nationalism. It is this emphasis on the past and, more importantly, these twin lacunas that might bear at least some responsibility for the present rebirth of nationalism remains not only unpredicted but also mostly unexplained. The quest for explanation poses anew Anderson's unanswered question why there are no big theory and no big theorists of nationalism (Anderson, 2012). Did they underestimate the significance of nationalism? Or might they avoid the issue because of too acute personal involvement with nationalist belief pervasive in the Zeitgeist for a critical distance sufficient for an value-free academic scrutiny?

These considerations put a not so small and remarkably diverse body of research on Max Weber's nationalism into a much wider perspective than a minor issue in a major classic's biography. While any insight into life and views of a figure of Weber's caliber is arguably important for its own sake, in the case of nationalism something more might be at stake. What matters most in this regard is the intention to separate Weber as one of the three founders of sociology and his theoretical legacy from the unsavory underpinnings of what is generally qualified as nationalist views of Weber as an individual. This task is especially salient considering the brand of nationalism prevalent in the later nineteenth – and early twentieth century Germany. On the other hand, if notions of nations and nationality dispersed in Weber's writings might contain something more than a mere reproduction of the doxa of the period and instead offer certain new insight and inspirations to nations and nationalism studies.

Against this background, this article adopts a more universalist perspective by daring to explore the relation of Weber's nationalism to a key Weberian concept.

Moreover, the concept in question is not one from Webers' many contributions to political sociology and political theory, apparently more obviously relevant to the nationalism issue, but the very core of Weberianism – its methodological individualism. Following in Anderson's footsteps, I consider that since nation-state is a prevalent and prototypical form of the modern society, the study of nationalism is not merely about politics but about society in general – what it ultimately is and how it should be studied.

The key question this study seeks to answer is, to what extent was Weber's nationalism Weberian? In other words, to what extent, if any, were Weber's nationalist political inclinations merely reflective of the prevailing opinions in the society in general, in the academia, or in the nascent sociology – and to what extent were they relevant to his original contributions to social theory? The conclusion that Weberian nationalism does constitute a part of his theoretical legacy, and not merely a biographical detail can be made if at least two conditions are observed. First, Weber's notion of nationalism and approach to the issue must be substantively different from those characteristics of his contemporaries, academics, and especially other classical sociological theorists. Second, this originality must provide sufficient grounds to be defined not only negatively as dissimilarity from others, but also positively as corresponding to at least some of the key concepts and principles of Weberianism. The crux of the matter is how did Weber address the apparent contradiction between the collectivist essence of nationalism and the principle of methodological individualism? Not surprisingly, this question echoes the contemporary tensions between individual national vs. other kinds of identities and between an individual's national self-identification and the external institutional and normative restrictions. During the ongoing new upsurge of nationalism, unpredicted by social scientists, it is particularly interesting to reexamine the place of nationalism studies in the "big" social theory by focusing of one of its founders.

The article is structured as follows. The first section contains a review of the existing scholarship on the evidence and meaning of Weber's nationalism. The second section puts these findings against a broader background by comparing them to the period-specific notions of nations and national identities, especially among Weber's fellow academics. The third section zooms in and focuses on the views on nationalism espoused by Weber's three contemporaries and, in retrospect, fellow sociological classics – Simmel, Durkheim, and Sombart – as compared to the Weber's own position. Based on the results of this comparison, the fourth section of the article elaborates on the implications of the identified manifestations of Weber's nationalism with various degrees of originality for methodological individualism. The concluding section discusses the output of the study that the juxtaposition of methodological individualism and nationalism in Weber's thought reflects the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of the micro-macro link definitive for the modern social theory.

Weber's Nationalism: What Does It Mean and Why Should It Matter?

Most studies specifically dedicated to the essence and impact of Weber's nationalist views start with the assumption that Weber indeed was a nationalist and then proceed

to question the meaning of this notion, implications, and scope of significance, but not the notion itself. The reason for this apparent consensus is that Weber's nationalist views have by now not only been well documented (Mommsen, 1974) but also strongly advocated by such authoritative scholars as R. Dahrendorf (1992) and P. Anderson (1992). Momsen's book was the first and still remains the most comprehensive exposure of Weber's nationalist views expressed in various sources. When the book first appeared, it posed a major challenge to an image of Weber as an advocate of liberalism and rationality that had been created by American sociologists, most notably Parsons. Instead, it drew on multiple sources to portray Weber as an ardent champion of German imperialism and power politics in general. Since then, the image of Weber regarding his politics has been split and never devoid of sinister undertones. Some contemporary scholarship even goes so far as to claim that Weber's nationalism was not only ethically unacceptable in itself, but also exercised bad influence on Naumann, an initially non-nationalist thinker (Kedar, 2010) and provided not entirely justified yet plausible source of legitimization for a much more compromised political theorist C. Schmitt (Engelbrekt, 2009). And yet most publications on Weber's nationalism of the last decades attempt what is essentially a kind of apologetics aimed at rehabilitating Weber's scholarship, liberal political views, or both. The three line of this apologetics run as follows.

The first and also undoubtedly quite Weberian way of limiting the significance of Weber's nationalism is drawing a sharp division line between Weber as an individual and Weber as a scholar. Roth goes so far as to make this distinction chronological by claiming that Weber as a politician in the 1890s entered the public sphere as a politician using nationalist rhetoric for populist reasons and only later, after a personal crisis, reemerged as a scholar interested in pure theory as opposed to practical politics (Roth, 1993). Yet this view fails to account for the evidence that manifestations of Weber's nationalism, let alone Weber's political concerns and involvement, are dispersed throughout his writings. According to Bellamy, Weber did not abandon his interest in the national issue but rather modified it significantly by becoming more critical of nationalism, especially as Germany entered the First World war with the claims of which Weber rather disapproved (Bellamy, 1992). The central point of this line of apology is not the chronological limits, but the implied notion that nationalist views expressed by Weber should not be qualified as a product of his original thinking, unlike his theoretical heritage, which thus remains untainted, but merely reflect the prevailing beliefs of the society where he belonged (see also Ay, 2004).

The second line of apology confronts this statement by regarding Weber's nationalism as occupying a significant place in his views on social and political dynamics yet playing a secondary role as derivatives from issues of primary concern. Some of this scholarship advocates the need to abandon anachronistic imposition of the contemporary view on liberalism and nationalism as mutually exclusive and antagonistic ideologies onto the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. Nationalism thus appears a logical, albeit not the only possible consequence, first, of Weber's belief, decidedly ethnocentric by contemporary standards, in the ultimate value of what he saw as the Western civilization embodying the ideals of liberalism

and rationalism, and second, by a social Darwinist view on the mode of promoting the interests of the West, which in contemporary terms amounts to the belief in the zero sum game. The central point of in this relation between nationalism and liberalism is not an essentialist belief in the spirit of the nation, but a struggle over limited and therefore contested economic resources, especially as Weber famously referred to himself as an "economic nationalist" (Kim, 2002). A different argument derives Weber's nationalism not from his alleged ultra-rationalism and Machiavellianism but, on the contrary, from placing too much trust in the necessity and potential beneficence of the irrational. Thus, Pfaff portrays Weber not as a *Realpolitisch* technocrat, but as a proponent of a nationalist charismatic leadership as a path towards popular support of liberal democracy, lacking of the multiple illustrations from the twentieth-century of how this assumption may prove disastrously wrong (Pfaff, 2002). The contemporary relevance of technocratic geopolitics in relation to internal political liberalism and the use of nationalism to make democratization appealing to the majority is transparent. It can be argued that both these positions owe its relevance to the contrast between their rejection by most, even though not all, academic scholars and these notions' continuing appeal to many political actors – very much as nationalism itself. Unlike in the first line of apologetics, this kind of reasoning places Weber's nationalism among his theoretical heritage yet, unlike its major part, points its out as secondary, derivative, and essentially wrong.

The third line of apology regards Weber's views on nations and national identities as having an intrinsic theoretical value. Its representatives are concerned not so much with morality or veracity of Weber's nationalism but with its heuristic potential for the contemporary understanding of nationality. Palonen regards the issue from the views of the history of concepts and attributes the apparent inconsistency between Weber's views on nationalism by an in complete deconstruction. According to Palonen, Weber, especially in his post-WWI writings, demonstrates a critical self-distancing from nationalism understood as chauvinism, and nevertheless remains a nationalist in the broadest definition of the term widespread in the contemporary nations and nationalism studies – as a believer in the objective and necessary existence of nations (Palonen, 2001). Thus, Weber's case is regarded as instrumental in broadening the current views on the relations between the concepts of nation and nationalism. Norkus, on the contrary, emphasizes the constructivist as well as essentialist views on the nation found in Weber's writings and their relevance to the contemporary theory – first, by countering the prevalence of new nation states over old ex-empires in the modernist approaches to the origins of nations, and second, by applying the notion of rent-seeking to international relations (Norkus, 2004). In this logic, Weber's nationalism is relativized largely because of its conceptual inconsistency. A decided nationalism would espouse a single and relatively simple definition of the nation and adhere to it without further theoretical alterations.

Taken together, these three views reflect a considerable variety of opinions in the scholarship on Weber's nationalism and even to its historical context. Apparently, all the interpretations of Weber's views on the nation, instrumentalist as well as genuine, objectivist as well as chauvinist, civic as well as ethnic, and

even constructivist as well as primordialist, can be and are in some way traced back to some part of the conceptual imagery in the Wilhelmine Germany. It is therefore necessary to transcend the information on the issue found in the relevant part of Weber studies and take a direct and closer look at the understanding of nations and national identities existing in the period.

Notions of Nations and Nationalism in Weber's Germany

The nineteenth century is generally regarded as the age of nationalism. The "long nineteenth century" started with the event most theorist agree manifested the birth of the idea of the nation in its modern sense, the French Revolution, continued with Romantics' turn to turn to "national roots" and a number of national liberation uprisings in various parts of Europe including the famous Spring of Nations in 1848, and ended with the new nation-states emerging in the centers as well as peripheries of the old empires and the principle of national self-determination acquiring the normative status in the Treaty of Versailles. According to the author of the term "long nineteenth century", sometime in the middle of this period the idea of nationalism drastically and apparently for good changed its political belonging. The early nineteenth century, according to Hobsbawm, was liberal and revolutionary and was perceived as such by its champions and opponents alike. Later, however, as the old aristocratic and religious grounds of the dynastic power starting to lose credibility, the ruling dynasties saw nationalism as a new source of their legitimization and adopted it accordingly (Hobsbawm, 2012). It is mainly to this conservative turn that Hobsbawm mainly attributes the diffusion of the then new nationalism with the old interethnic hatred that surpassed the idea of the national liberation struggle "for your freedom and ours" and ultimately brought Europe to the WWI.

The nineteenth century Germany appears the most obvious case of this conservative turn. Already in 1808 in his famous "Addresses to the German nation" J. Fichte developed not merely an advocacy of German rather than French superiority but a comprehensive system of beliefs containing all the key components of what later became known as ethnic nationalism (Fichte, 1978). Most notably, these components include orientation towards the past, long history as the source of legitimacy, the value of authenticity understood as lack of exposure to foreign influence, and the central role of the national language. Later, F. Meinecke named this type of nation, where culture tales precedence over statehood not only in time but also in priority a *Kulturnation* with Germany as its prototypical case opposed to *Staatsnation* primarily represented with France (Meinecke, 2015). By the end of the century, the ethnic kind of nationalism apparently became mainstream in Germany no longer as a self-definition but as a general understanding of any nation (Bärenbrinker & Jakubowski, 1995). That is how this understanding is elaborated in the entry "Nation" of *Meyers Konsersations-Lexicon*, an authoritative encyclopedic dictionary (*Meyers Konversations-Lexikon*, 1888, pp. 2–3):

> ***Nation*** (lat., Völkerschaft), ein nach Abstammung und Geburt, nach Sitte und Sprache zusammengehöriger Teil der Menschheit; Nationalität, die

> Zugehörigkeit zu diesem. Nach heutigem deutschen Sprachgebrauch decken sich die Begriffe N. und Volk keineswegs, man versteht vielmehr unter "Volk" die unter einer gemeinsamen Regierung vereinigten Angehörigen eines bestimmten Staats. Wie sich aber die Bevölkerung eines solchen aus verschiedenen Nationalitäten zusammensetzen kann, so können auch umgekehrt aus einer und derselben N. verschiedene Staatswesen gebildet werden. Denn manche Nationen, und so namentlich die deutsche, sind kräftig genug, um für mehrere Staatskörper Material zu liefern. Das Wort N. bezeichnet, wie Bluntschli sagt, einen Kulturbegriff, das Wort "Volk" einen Staatsbegriff. Man kann also z. B. sehr wohl von einem österreichischen Volk, nicht aber von einer österreichischen N. sprechen. Zu beachten ist ferner, daß nach englischem und französischem Sprachgebrauch der Ausdruck N. gerade umgekehrt das Staatsvolk (die sogen. politische Nationalität) bezeichnet, während für die N. im deutschen Sinn des Wortes, für das Naturvolk (die sogen. natürliche Nationalität), die Worte Peuple (franz.) und People (engl.) gebräuchlich sind[1].

This extended definition reveals the self-conscious rather than naïve upholding of the ethnic view of the nation, the awareness of an alternative, and the word other than nation reserved for this alternative. Moreover, this distinction is attributed to the language rather than to a country-specific tradition of thought, thus implying the highest degree of consensus. The four criteria of a nation all constitute an ascribed rather than achieved identity. Later in the entry, there is no reference to self-determination in the sense of Renan's everyday plebiscite (Renan, 2002). The subjective side of nationality is restricted to emotions such as the national feeling (*Nationalgefühl*) understood as national affinity or national pride (*Nationalehre*) and the national character (*Nationalcharakter*). The latter and even to some extent the former reflects an important point – the understanding of the nation as a personalized entity. It echoes the initial definition of the nation as "a part of humanity" where "a group of people" would seem more natural to a contemporary reader. This view of nation as a meganthropos was typical for the early nineteenth century German Romanticism (Hübner, 1991), and the cited source gives evidence of the prevalence of this view in the popular discourse in Weber's formative years.

The uncritically assumed single unity of the nation is scrutinized and challenged by one of the most prominent philosophers of the Wilhelmine Germany, Hermann Cohen. According to Cohen, the nation constitutes a plurality (*Mehrheit*) as opposed

[1] *Nation* (lat. *Peoplehood*), a part of humanity united by shared ancestry and birth, custom and language; nationality, belonging to a nation. In the contemporary German usage, the notions of the nation and the people do not overlap; the people signify the members of a given state united under the same government. The population of the people can consist of multiple nationalities, and, the other way around, the multiple peoples may come from the same nation, because some nations, and notably Germans, are strong enough to lend material for many state entities. The word nation means, as Bluntschi says, a cultural concept, and the word the people, a state concept. For example, it is possible to speak of the Austrian people but not the Austrian nation. It is further important to notice that in English and French usage, the word nation, quite on the contrary, refers to the people of the state (the so-called political nationality) while for the nation in the German sense, the natural people (the so-called natural nationality) the words people (in French) and people (in English) are used (translated by the author of the article).

to unity, "allness" (*Allheit*). Yet, again contrary to what a contemporary reader might expect, Cohen does not refer to the plurality of individuals. Instead, he understands nation as a plurality of nationalities defined as religious entities forming a political union under the auspices of a shared state. A model nation for Cohen, unlike for the authors of the entry cited earlier, therefore was not Germany but Austria. Another important point is the deliberate rather than "natural" character of the union (Wiedebach, 2012). Thus, with the internal plurality of the nation and the constitutive role of self-determination, the only element missing from the present-day idea of the nation is its individual members.

This important omission interestingly resonates with the central principle of the Weberian approach to sociology – its methodological individualism, especially as it is closely related to the interpretative sociology (*verstehende Soziologie*), which Weber developed under the influence of Neo-Kantianism, albeit primarily its Southwestern school, not the Marburg school to which Cohen belonged. More generally, nationalism as such presupposing a certain collectivism, especially in Weber's time as seen in the afore cited definition, appears distinctly at odds with methodological, as well and probably even more consistently so than political individualism. Yet this contradiction is not discussed even by L. Greenfeld who starts her programmatic book on the varieties of nationalism by defining herself as a Weberian precisely regarding methodological individualism. The next section presents an attempt of such a discussion based on Weber's key texts dedicated to nations and nationalism – lecture "The Nation State and Economic Policy" and the part 2 of "Economy and Society".

National Issue in Simmel, Durkheim, and Sombart

A theoretical concept from Weber's times that can be considered the most influential or at least the most frequently present in the contemporary literature on nationalism is George Simmel's notion of a stranger. According to Simmel's famous essay, the figure of a stranger is characteristic for modernity and thus represents yet another breakup from tradition – in this case, from the unequivocal overlap between spatial and substantive proximity (Simmel, 1999). The stranger is defined as a permanent other who is there to stay and nevertheless would not become more similar to the main body of the society he lives in no matter how long he stays. This dialectics of proximity and distance appears disturbing to a premodern or antimodern mind, and that it what sound a familiar note in the ongoing debate on migration and xenophobia, especially with the emphasis on the implication that the stranger is constructed as such by the society. Therefore, despite the logical sequence unfolding at the microlevel, the story centers primarily not on the stranger himself, but on the society as a whole dealing with the challenge of a permanent ambiguous otherness. This challenge is not considered as an abstract possibility, but has its obvious historical prototype in the so-called Jewish issue, also, and somewhat similarly, addressed by Simmel with regard to the economic modernity (Simmel, 2004). It could be argued that at that period, the national issue, if not the nation itself, was conceived as modern when related to the Jewish issue, as seen in the works of two other Weber's contemporaries.

Another case of the individual vs. the nation controversy, but addressed and resolved in a very different way, is found in Emile Durkheim's work dealing with the anti-Dreyfussards (Durkheim, 1970). According to Durkheim, their view on individualism as posing a threat to the nation' s unity is valid insofar as the question mark remains. Unlike Simmel, however, Durkheim does not see this controversy as inherent and dialectic. Instead, he proposes to resolve it by recognizing that the kind of individualism anti-Dreyfussards were attacking was essentially a straw man – not the only, not the proper, and not even the most popular one. While recognizing the economic egotism as potentially disruptive to society but also obsolete, Durkheim not only approves of a more "spiritual" idea of individualism but also considers its power of uniting society as well as any socially shared idea can and even proposes it as what can be somewhat anachronistically called the national idea of France. Thus, even more obviously than the "strangeness", individualism is a collective attribute, a social fact.

Another way of defining the "national idea", much more extreme and also much more significant in its use as a general explanatory tool, can be found in the works of Werner Sombart. His theoretical constructions on the alleged peculiarly Jewish rationalism as a driving force behind the emergence of the modern capitalism bear obvious resemblance to Weber's protestant ethic, except the different relations between nationality and religion (Sombart, 2001). Sombart was writing his work at the times when the new racial theory led to redefinition of the Jewish identity from religious to racial – hence the "Jewish issue" could no longer be resolved by religious conversion and assimilation. On the contrary the assimilated yet "racially different" Jew was turned into an ominous figure, a disguised "stranger" among "us", as demonstrated in the Dreyfus case. Later, the propaganda used by all sides during the WWI, showed that the racialized notion of nationality originally applied to an ethnic minority came to define major European nations. In a work by Sombart published in 1915 with a self-explanatory title "Traders and Heroes", the military clash between, respectively, the English and Germans was presented as a conflict between two essentially opposing "national characters" (Sombart, 1915).

This essentialist idea of the national automatically extrapolated on all its members as micromodels was by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as seen in the previously quoted definitions, already anachronistic. Yet what unites this seeming relapse to premodern unproblematic collective identities with the challenges of modernity conceptualized by Simmel and Durkheim is the implication that nationality originally exists at the collective level and is reflected in the individuals only insofar as they either represent or become socialized into a collective entity. Let us now see whether this notion was also shared by Weber.

Is Weber's Nationalism Individualist?

One of Weber's works most frequently analyzed in detail when discussing his nationalist views is the inaugural lecture "The Nation State and Economic Policy" ("Die Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik") delivered and published in 1895 – during the period that supposedly marks the pinnacle of Weber's nationalism

(Weber, 1921–1994). It is unsurprising considering that the single empirical case the lecture build on is the economic situation in the borderline region of the West Prussia framed by Weber as a struggle for power between the two nationalities – Germans and Poles – understood exactly in the same way the nation is defined in the entry on the nation cited earlier and, in relation nationality to religion, similar to Cohen. Moreover, Weber refers to the two nationalities as either collective entities – *Polentum* and *Deutschtum* (Polish and German populations respectively) – or even as abstract principles or uncountable substances, such as "the polish element".

This archaic way of description contrasts with quite modern-looking mode of introducing the issues unrelated to nationalism, such as social stratification and demographic dynamics. The question Weber asks is why the Polish nationality seems to him to be winning the power in the region even though "high level of economic sophistication *(Kultur)* and a relatively high standard of living are identical with the *German people and character (Deutschtum)* in West Prussia" (Weber, 1994, p. 5). Weber poses the question in the following way: "Yet the two nationalities have competed for centuries on the same soil and with essentially the same chances. What is it, then, that distinguishes them?" (Weber, 1994, p. 5). The suggested answer is this: "One is immediately tempted to believe that psychological and physical racial characteristics make the two nationalities differ in their *ability to adapt* to the varying economic and social conditions of existence. This is indeed the explanation and the proof of it is to be found in the trend made apparent by a *shift* in the population and its nationalist structure. This tendency also makes clear just how fateful that difference in adaptability has proved to be for the German race in the east" (Weber, 1994, p. 5). In a nutshell, according to Weber, the German population of the region was emigrating and the Polish population, multiplying despite Poles primarily belonging to a lower social stratum with lower living standards because Poles have lower expectations that there and then was able to deliver higher level of life satisfaction than Germans' superior ability to improve their living standards. Weber argues that "the two races seem to have had this difference in adaptability from the very outset, as a fixed element in their make-up. It could perhaps shift again as a result of further generations of breeding of the kind which may have produced the difference in the first place) but at present it simply has to be taken account of as a fixed given for the purposes of analysis" (Weber, 1994, p. 10).

The contradiction between the seemingly archaic and modern rhetoric reflects Weber's attempt to explain a sociological phenomenon – a close relation between national belonging and social stratification – from the outside, by means of psychological rather than sociological phenomena. The understanding of nationalities as distinct entities with shared psychological traits belongs to the psychology of the peoples (*Völkerpsychologie*) established several decades earlier (the journal dedicated to advancing this field – *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* – appeared in 1859), not to the emerging sociology. It looks almost as if Weber struggled with the internal plurality and flexibility of society as captured in the notion of social stratification and has to get this new *explanandum* firmly rooted in the familiar *explanans* of essentialist nationalities and national

characters. The ultimate reasons are attributed to agency, not structure, yet this agency resides not in individuals but in collective entities endowed with distinct personalities.

Another Weber's text focused on nations and nationalism is the chapter five of the part two of "Economy and Society" (Weber, 1922–1978). Already its title "Ethnic groups" suggests a different approach to the one found in "The Nation State and Economic Policy" because the ethnicity is no longer presented as a single entity but as a group of individuals. This expectation is confirmed throughout the text. That is how Weber defines an ethnic group: "The belief in group affinity, regardless of whether it has any objective foundation, can have important consequences especially for the formation of a political community. We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter" (Weber, 1978, p. 389). As Norkus (2004) justly remarked, this definition captures nearly all the key part of Anderson's theory of nations as "imagined communities" – and also obviously echo the so-called Thomas's theorem about objective consequences of subjective beliefs regardless of their initial objective grounds. What concerns the key point of this study is not so much the emphasis on subjectivity and the formative role of imagery in the emergence of an ethnic group but the shift of agency from the ethnicity to an individual, who provide the creative subjectivity and essentially doing the imagery. The question as to how the apparently uncoordinated yet similar "presumed identities" of multiple individuals merge into a single shared structure is given rather less attention. Instead, the issue of coordination between the social actors participating in the process of the ethnic identity construction is described from the individual perspective via the basic mechanisms of attraction and imitation.

This gap in dealing with the issue of coordination gets a paradoxical solution: ethnic identities are positioned not as socially shared but as emerging from the social actions that are not widely shared. "This artificial origin of the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern […] of rational association, turning into personal relationships. If rationally regulated action is not widespread, almost any association, even the most rational one, creates an overarching communal consciousness; this takes the form of a brotherhood on the basis of the belief in common ethnicity" (Weber, 1978, p. 389). Unlike in "The Nation State and Economic Policy", ethnicity is no longer a primary irrational cause for more modern and rational social phenomena, but a secondary subjective consequence of at least partly rational and even purely pragmatic decisions. The multitude of these origins capable of turning into potential subjectively ascribed grounds for a shared identity is so large and chaotic that Weber concludes that ethnicity is too much of an umbrella term to be of much academic use: "It is

certain that in this process the collective term 'ethnic' would be abandoned, for it is unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis. […] The concept of the 'ethnic' group, which dissolves if we define our terns exactly, corresponds in this regard to one of the most vexing, since emotionally charged concepts: the nation, as soon as we attempt a sociological definition" (Weber, 1978, p. 395).

Attempting to define the nation, Weber decisively departs with what it refers to as a "vague connotation" (Weber, 1978, p. 395) of various kind of common ground preceding the nation itself. Having considered and rejected each of these grounds, such as religion, language, customs and so on, Weber concludes that the concept "nation" directs us to political power/Hence, the concept seems to refer – if it refers at all to a uniform phenomenon – to a specific kind of pathos which is linked to the idea of a powerful political community of people who share a common language, or religion, or common customs, or political memories; such a state may already exist or it may be desired (Weber, 1978, p. 398).

It could be argued that here again, the nation is explained by means of psychological phenomena – the need for emotional stimulation as captured in the notion of pathos, the quest for positive self-esteem, which Weber refers to as "pathetic pride" (Weber, 1978, p. 395), and the striving for power. Unlike the proponents of the view of nations as subjective and socially constructed, Weber does not attempt to tie the emergence of nations to a specific historical period with its specific macrolevel context. Instead he relies upon what he believes to be universals of human nature – the tendency to produce personal and emotionally charged meanings for the initially purely pragmatic events as long as the latter are not universally shared. Yet, unlike in the earlier definition, the psychological part is no longer played by static traits ascribed to collective agencies, but to dynamic mechanisms repeatedly occurring in the behavior of individuals engaged in the social action.

Discussion

Weber's nationalism is amenable to a number of meaningful interpretations – as a minor yet curious biographical idiosyncrasy, as a prompt for critical reconsideration of a major social scientist as a role model, as an insight into the history of concepts, or as a source as inspiration for the contemporary nations and nationalism studies. The approach presented in this article suggest yet another interpretation of Weber's nationalism – as a frontier issue testing the limits and possibly also the limitations of Weberian sociology.

In the introductory section of this paper, the main question whether there exists a Weberian view on nationality Weber's nationalism was broken into two parts – first, on the originality of the ides of the nation in Weber's writings and second, on its relevance to major themes in Weberianism, in particular the apparent contradiction with the principle of methodological individualism. Based on the present study, several important differences between Weber's approach and that of his contemporaries become clear. First, unlike Simmel, Durkheim, and especially Sombart, in his later works Weber focuses not on the ways the national entity reproduces itself via

individuals but on the individuals developing national identities in response to their basic social needs. Second, unlike these three classics, Weber changed his views on nationality so much that while the earlier texts seem both old-fashioned and unoriginal, the subsequent ones, on the contrary, could have almost been written by somebody working not earlier than in the 1980s.

In Weber's earlier works, his views on nationality appear a kind of a blind spot borrowed from more archaic schools of thought, not sociological and due to its direct contradiction to the principle of methodological individualism, emphatically not Weberian. His mature views on nations, however, appear not only consistent with his approach to other social groups, but also very close to the currently mainstream academic understanding of nationality developed more than half a century later and not nationalist or even to some extent, due to its emphasis on the social construction of nations, anti-nationalist. To simplify the matter, it could be said that Weber's views cease to be nationalist according to the contemporary understanding of nationalism as soon as they become Weberian.

This analysis thus yields the main conclusion that individualism and nationalism in Weber's thought are not a contradiction despite the apparent association of collectivism with the essentialist view of the nation. On the contrary, Weber's work on integrating nationalism into his general theory of the social sphere reflects of the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of the micro-macro link definitive for the modern social theory. Analyzing the internal logic of this change provides new insights into the currently debated issue of the alleged retraditionalization of the late modernity, especially in relation to the ongoing renaissance of nationalism. It demonstrates the possible necessity to bring the agency back into the picture currently dominated with the clash between proponents of structural and cultural explanations of social phenomena including nations and nationalism. The transformation of Weber's works on nationalism suggests that explicitly defining the agency (in general terms, not reduced to the images of populist politicians abusing nationalist rhetoric for their own rather transparent ends) is crucial for understanding and deliberately choosing the implied mechanisms used for explaining social dynamics.

To sum up, the question raised in this paper can be answered in the affirmative. Weber apparently started off burdened with nationalist views characteristic of his milieu and developed views on nationality that seem closer to the contemporary nations and nationalism studies than to his own epoch. This trajectory makes Weber stand out from other classics in social theory, and it is too tempting to conclude that in his later writings on nationality, Weber was "ahead of his own times". Yet I would argue that the similarity is at best superficial in one important respect: the research subject outlined by Weber does not truly match the focus of the contemporary empirical research. We know a lot about the ways collective identities of various nations are constructed, quite a lot on how individuals react to the challenges posed by the external request for national self-identification and reenact socially shared meanings. We still know little on how individuals act in ways that eventually affect the world of nations. The main takeaway from the study on the notions on

nationality in Weber's writings appear to be not theoretical, since his later views have already albeit much letter been reproduced, but methodological: the shift towards methodological individualism in the nations and nationalism studies would make the area much more balanced and its subject slightly more predictable to the contemporary social scientists.

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ARTICLE

Dichotomy of the Basic Aspects of the Image of Power in Russia: Traditional and Modern Models

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ABSTRACT
Social and cultural characteristics of any country form a certain image of power in the minds of its representatives. The image of power is treated in this work as a set of perceptions about power, which is determined by the sociocultural specifics of a particular political culture. In this article, I discuss contradictions between the traditional model of the image of power inherent in the Russian political culture and the modern democratic model. A conclusion is made that today's Russia is characterised by the reproduction of the traditional model of the image of power.

KEYWORDS
image of power, traditional model, modern model, source of power, personification, autocracy, centralization

Image of Power as a Sociocultural Phenomenon

Citizens' perceptions with regard to what power is, what duties and functions it performs, of which structural elements it consists, what actions it undertakes in various situations – inclusively combine into a certain image of power. This image is characterized by a number of culture-specific features.

The concept of the image of power was developed in my previous work (Romanovich, 2009). In a nutshell, it is the system of perceptions about power within a given society, which includes both basic (concept, functions, form,

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duties, etc.), and contextual (expectation of specific socio-political actions from a particular government) aspects. While the former are more connected with semantic interpretations, the latter are in essence the reflection of objective reality. In this work, I focus on basic aspects, since "political perception is mainly aimed at semantic and evaluative interpretations of political objects, rather than reflection of objective reality" (Palitaĭ, 2018, p. 152). It is the basic aspects of the image of power that are formed as a sociocultural phenomenon of a particular society depending on the historical context of its development.

The historical developmental paths of Eastern and Western cultures have led to differences in the system of power relations. These differences were manifested in the political cultures of Western countries and Russia and affected the populations' attitude towards the concept of power. As a result, the image of power has obtained its own sociocultural specifics in each society. Thus, the Russian image of power is based on such characteristics as personification, autocracy, centralization and hierarchy (Romanovich, 2009, p. 272). According to political scientists, "unlike perception as such, political perception is determined by political and historical contexts, the socio-cultural peculiarities of historical processes" (Palitaĭ, 2018, p. 154). Therefore, different political cultures will indispensably have different basic characteristics of the image of power. In this work, I set out to consider the basic characteristics of the image of power in Russia, as well as key differences in the perception of power in Russian and Western political cultures.

Traditional and Modern Models

The perception of power in Russia is significantly different from that typical of the population of Western countries. These differences have been repeatedly noted by philosophers, publicists and ordinary people. In particular, over 100 years ago, Sciarchimandrite Varsonofy (Plikhankov) claimed in his "Cell Notes" (1892–1896):

> The devotion of Russian Orthodox people to their tsars cannot be compared to the loyalty of Western people to their sovereigns. According to modern Western concepts, the sovereign is nothing more than a representative of his people. Western nations love their representatives and willingly obey provided the sovereign faithfully fulfils his/her duties. In the West, people love only themselves in their sovereigns. In the case when the king, due to his/her personal traits, is not capable of fulfilling the people's aspirations, ideas and passions, then his/her will be limited by means of the Constitution. If the king does not give in to these efforts and is unable to succumb to the taste and character of his subjects, then he loses not only people's love, but also the throne, as was the case both with Charles X, Louis Philippe and the Sardinian king Albert. In Russia, the situation is completely different: our tsar is the representative of the will of God, rather than that of the people. His will is sacred to us, as the will of the anointed of God; we love him because we love God (Plikhankov, 1991).

Let us refer to this model of the image of power, the characteristics of which are based on a special loyalty of people to their sovereigns as the *traditional* or Russian model, since it originated and was formed along with the birth and foundation of Russia.

The image of power includes reference, structural, functional, evaluation, and other characteristics that are logically interrelated. In particular, the image of power comprises such a feature as the idea of *serving*. In the traditional Russian model, it is interpreted as follows: "power" is something, to which you need and should serve. Soldiers in the tsar army greeted the tsar with the words: "I serve the tsar and the fatherland". In the eyes of the people, the tsar was the representative of God on the Earth, the immediate spokesman of the divine will. Therefore, to serve the tsar and to serve God was almost an equal virtue. In the traditional Russian model, a charismatic attitude towards the supreme ruler prevailed over a rational assessment of his/her personal qualities.

Unlike the traditional Russian model, for example, the American model of relations between the people and the authorities suggests the opposite direction of *serving*. The highest representative elected by the people serves the people, and never vice versa. Therefore, the attitude towards the authorities and its supreme representative is calm, without any admixture of mysticism, to some extent resembling the attitude towards maintenance staff. This attitude towards the ruler is characteristic of the democratic idea and represents its logical consequence. Such a characteristic is immanent to *the modern model* of the image of power. It should be noted that the contradiction between the *traditional* and *modern* models is considered in this work in the framework of a classical approach, as the opposition Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft formulated by F. Tennis. This opposition is considered without taking into account an extended socio-philosophical interpretation, but rather as localized within the framework of power relations.

According to formal indicators, the modern model of power relations is dominant today in developed countries. That is how the model acquired its name.

The democratic concept of development has brought the *modern* model of the image of power to Russia, where it contradicts the *traditional* Russian model. For Russia, following this new model means using Western models of power relations and setting a task of catching up with the West (or the US) in the cultural and civilizational perspectives. The modern model of the image of power conflicts with the original Russian model of the image of power. In fact, these contradictions are not contradictions between the past and the present, as it may seem from the dichotomy of the concepts of traditionalism and modernity; rather, these contradictions are those between the East and the West, which have existed along the entire observable Russian history.

It might seem that, if some institutions of power in different political cultures are identical in name or arrangement, then they are identical in content. However, for example, the monarchy in pre-revolutionary Russia had inconspicuous, at a first glance, but rather significant differences from the monarchy of Western countries. According to modern political scientists, some elements of today's democratic institutions were borrowed from the monarchist ideology. Thus, the political scientist M. V. Il'in argues that the concept of "*predstavitelstvo*" (i.e. representation of the people in Duma and

other institutions through elections) was not invented by democrats; rather, it appeared as a medieval institution of the monarchical and aristocratic rule. According to him, "*predstavitelstvo*" was fundamentally opposite to direct participation in decision-making, i.e. democracy itself, being its logical antithesis. "Indeed, authoritarianism in its logic is a consistent implementation of the principle of representation, delegation of authority to authority, that is, its alienation from the majority and its transmission to few or even to one person. In the limit, it is autocracy implying the deprivation of each and every subjectivity in favour of a single autocrat" (Il'in, 2003, p. 158). This conclusion may be true for the monarchies of the Western type. However, autocracy in the Russian version is not at all a kind of representation, nor the delegation of power from the people to the tsar. Instead, it is something completely opposite. In Russia, the people did not endow the autocrat with authority, but rather recognized his/her authority. The tsar was recognized, because God himself was believed to have given authority to the monarch. In Russia, the tsar reigned not on behalf of the people, but on behalf of God. In the Russian case, the vector of delegation of power is directed from the top to the bottom: from God to the tsar, and further to the people. In the context of representation ("*predstavitelstvo*"), power is distributed from the bottom to the top, i.e. from the subjects to the monarch. It then follows that, although the forms of governing were equally called monarchy both in the West and in Russia, they had significant ideological differences, which predetermined further ways of their transformation. It is not surprising that representation, which sprouted from the monarchy of the Western type, has eventually turned into its "logical antithesis", as Il'in called democracy. Having a visible logical contradiction, these two concepts have an invisible essential similarity, i.e. the same direction of the vector of power, which is one of the basic characteristics of the image of power.

Presented in the form of a geometric figure, power relations in Russia are a pointed pyramid, with the top and the bottom being respectively the ruler and the people. This pyramidal form is adequate to the monarchical idea. The higher the pyramid layer is, the more concentrated the power becomes. The democratic idea can be represented in the form of an inverted pyramid, where the people are the top, thus symbolising that it is the people who are the main actor of power. The ruler then is at the bottom, to whom the people descend their orders. These characteristics of the two models of the image of power demonstrate convex and almost visible ideological differences between the Russian monarchy and Western democracy, thus predetermining a system of state institutions appropriate for each model.

V.I. Rossman, a philosopher currently residing in the US, also refers to these differences between Russia and the West (Rossman, 2005, pp. 31–38). He believes that the ideological confrontation between two ancient philosophers – Plato and Aristotle – has not yet been completed. Both of them tried to create their own concept of the state. According to Rossman, Plato's concept of the state and his main ideas had been absorbed by Russia. Since then, they have been constantly resurrected in various elements of the state structure in this or that exotic form. And "Plato's pyramid of power," he argues, "is an inverted pyramid of the power of Western society" (Rossman, 2005, p. 199). In Plato' "State", the leading role belongs to philosopher-kings armed with the correct ideology and absolute knowledge; they are followed

by warriors' guards intended to ensure the safety of citizens; but only after them go artisans and merchants. In the Western "capitalist" society, merchants (CEO of major corporations) are located at the top of the pyramid, followed by artisans (including engineers and programmers, mechanics and accountants) and the military, with the underlay of society belonging to philosophers and other scholars. Rossman notes that "in contrast to the Western pyramid of power, even the post-Soviet Russian hierarchy retains some loyalty to the Platonic idea of ideocracy and reproduces the Platonic pyramid in bizarre modifications" (Rossman, 2005, p. 40). Some strange modifications are also characteristic of democracy: in the Russian version, it transforms into "managed democracy", "sovereign democracy", etc.

Thus, it can be seen that the characteristics of the image of power, such as the source of power, vector orientation and the so-called power pyramid, confront each other in the two models of the image of power – traditional and modern. This confrontation is reflected in the contradictions between the views of the population on power and the content of official documents. Formally, Russia has adopted a modern model of power relations, which is formulated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is curious that the current Constitution proclaims the modern model of the image of power, while the traditional model dominates public opinion. Thus, for example, according to a survey by VCIOM,

> the *main source* of power and the carrier of sovereignty in our country is not the people, as it is written in the Constitution, but the President [...] 55% of the population are convinced that the head of the state and the sovereignty are one and the same. Formally, only 23% of the participants in the all-Russian survey believe in Russian democracy and believe that power in our country belongs to [...] the people (VCIOM, 2014).

The power in Russia is therefore personified with the head of the state, since it is he, in the opinion of the people, who is *the source of power*.

Sergiy Bulgakov, in his philosophical essay *Svet Nevechernii* ("Unfading Light"), trying to determine the religious and mystical nature of power, argues:

> Obviously, power has to do with the very essence of the human spirit, and we must, first of all, reject the rationalistic inventions of "enlightenment" that claims that power and law were invented by someone, occurred as a result of "social contract" or "free agreement" [...] Power radiates involuntarily and arises organically and specifically as historical power [...] It is inherent in all humans and is comprised of the ability to command and to obey, of authority and loyalty, which are only two poles of power [...] True power belongs to God alone, earthly power is a symbol of God's omnipotence (Bulgakov, 1917).

In the traditional Russian model of the image of power, the source of power has a sacred nature; therefore, power is personified with the name of the supreme ruler of the state as the carrier of this sacred power.

Personification

The original Russian model of the image of power includes such an underlying characteristic as *personification*. Personification of power implies the perception of power not as a political institution, but as a specific person, in whom this power is embodied. The personal qualities of a representative of power are given a greater importance than law-making actions.

The perception of power imprinted in centuries-old socio-cultural Russian traditions is not simply different from the modern democratic model of the image of power, but logically opposes it. And one of such battles is the confrontation between the concepts of personification and de-personification of power.

Debates on the role of the person in history have long been continuing. There is a belief that the personality of a representative of power should not affect the functioning of the society. Otherwise, the stability of such a society can be undermined. The democratic concept reflected in the modern image of power promotes the idea of the de-personification of power. A person invested with power seems to be something like a necessary detail in a well-established mechanism. This detail should be changed, say, every four to five or six years. The control scheme is constructed in such a way that the system works regardless of who occupies particular positions. The modern model of the image of power is aimed at solving the following problem: to minimize the influence of an individual on history, to unify the management system, securing it from any unexpected situations resulting from the individual traits of people. Within the framework of such an approach, the key thing is the law that determines the control system and specifies its functions.

However, the role of the person in power has been traditionally given key importance in the Russian mentality. For Russian thinkers, the personality is the cornerstone of state-building. Thus, Il'in insisted,

> it is the best people of the country that should rule the state; however, people often choose not the best, but flatterers that please them and unscrupulous demagogues that excite them", and threatened: "Democracy, which cannot distinguish the best, does not justify itself: it destroys the people and the state, therefore, it must fall (Il'in, 1993, p. 246).

The concept of personality is the starting point of N. A. Berdiaev's philosophy. Personality, according to Berdiaev, "is an ontological reality, it is included in the hierarchy of ontological realities. Personality assumes the reality of other personalities and the reality of which is higher and deeper than it. In nominalistic individualism, the personality decays and disintegrates" (Berdiaev, 1990, p. 199). Berdiaev discerned the internal contradiction between the personal and democratic principles:

> Democracy is not favourable for the appearance of strong, bright and creative individuals. Democracy creates a levelling social environment that seeks to completely absorb the personality and subjugate it. Your democratic opinion is

> the most terrible of all tyrannies, it depresses the human spirit, undermines its wings (Berdiaev, 1990, p. 199).

Many modern researchers agree that power in Russia is perceived as personified by the population. This has become commonplace. For example, Iu. S. Pivovarov states this fact in an axiomatic form: "Russian power implies a personification mode" (Pivovarov, 2006). In connection with the personification regime, "the Russian political tradition presupposes the presence of a clearly designated leader" (Malinova, 2006, p. 122). When a new person comes to power, the people expect changes: "A new violin plays in a new way". In other words, there is a kind of legalization of the fact that the specifics of governing, and sometimes its form, can be determined by the character and personal traits of a particular representative of authority. During elections, it is not so important for the population to carefully study the programmes of the candidates: it is much more important to see the face of the person they choose. Russian voters are much more interested in the character traits and particular actions of the future government representative than the concept of development that he/she proposes. The logic of the population is rather simple: judging by appearance and actions, people try to "guess" what actions can be expected from the candidate, how good he/she is, what ideals he/she adheres – since all these things may cardinally differ from those declared.

Russian people do not think of power as a collective phenomenon, the image of power is always directly connected with a certain actor. According to A. I. Solov'ev, the political space in Russia is marked by "a mutually conventional attitude towards parliament as an "unreal, secondary, ostentatious power" on the part of both elite and non-elite social layers (Solov'ev, 2006). Therefore, the population considers the elections of the President to be the only "real elections" or elections of the real power, unlike elections to the State Duma or local legislative bodies. The latter institutions are recognized by the Russian society as secondary, and of little significance. Thus, Russian citizens have frequently ignored legislative elections (especially at the local level) as opposed to their more or less massive participation in the elections of the President and governors.

Moreover, Russian people increasingly believe that the State Duma and the Federation Council are simply superfluous, unnecessary organs:

> The number of Russians who believe that the country can do without the State Duma and the Federation Council has been recently growing very significantly: from 29% in 1997 to 40% in 2016. At the same time, the number of those believing that Russia does not need a multiparty system slightly exceeds 50%. Only 12–13% of the respondents are convinced that these institutions are 'extremely important' and that the country's political system could not function effectively without them (Petukhov, 2016).

This data raises an important question concerning the problem of law-making in Russia. Who will develop laws if the State Duma were abolished? Do Russians consider law-making to be a sort of luxury? Attitude to laws in Russia is

not unambiguous. It is not that Russians do not respect the rule of law. However, a Russian person is annoyed by the very case when “extreme law” turns into “extreme injustice”. This gives grounds for Il’in to render the verdict: “Formal, literary, pedantic application of law is not law, but its caricature” (Il’in, 1993, p. 199). Rejection of purely formal legitimacy transforms formalized structures as well. “The spirit of Christian love has also penetrated, in Il’in’s opinion, into Russian jurisprudence with its search for justice” (Il’in, 1993, p. 317).

It is common knowledge that the ideal of the Western image of governing is the power of law, rather than the power of any subject of power. In Russia, law traditionally gives way to the head of the state. That is why the personal characteristics of the representative of higher authorities are so crucial for Russia. Such a state of affairs in Russia is being predictably criticised in the West. In an attempt to defend the to self-determination and the regime of power personification, Russian researchers also criticize Western societies for being “impersonified” by the liberal democratic idea. For example, according to A. N. Fatenkov, “the fundamental flaw of liberalism lies in the desire of one impersonal structure (anatomically interpreted as individual) to restrict another, even more impersonal, structure. As a result, the liberal project appears in the figurative expression of V. F. Odoyevsky as ‘a city without a name’” (Fatenkov, 2005, p. 165).

Personification of power includes a set of logical consequences, which are presented in the form of the structural characteristics of the image of power: *autocracy, centralization* and *hierarchy.* The defining characteristics of the image of power form its structure. In a nutshell, using the patristic saying: “The spirit makes forms for itself”.

Autocracy

Autocracy implies the transfer of all power in the state into the hands of one person. This has been the historical tradition of Russia for many centuries. Even when a general secretary or a president replaced an autocratic tsar, it was only the name of the position that changed, not the very essence of power.

The concept of autocracy is not only opposite to democracy; rather, the former destroys the latter. The fundamental idea of democracy is the restriction of autocracy by separating powers. It is assumed that the ruler, no matter how good he/she is, must be controlled. The democratic system of checks and balances was created to destroy autocracy. For democratic consciousness, the highest sedition is the idea of transferring power to one person.

In modern Russia, the results of sociological surveys have proven the inclusion of the concept of *autocracy* in the Russian image of power. According to a study undertaken by the Institute of Public Opinion *Qualitas* (as part of a public opinion monitoring being carried out by the Institute from 1998 to the present, which every year covers from 600 to 1,000 inhabitants of the city of Voronezh using the method of personal interview), the majority of the population do not have anything against the prospect of transferring all power in the state to one person. In January 2018, when answering the question: *“Which of the two opposing judgments do you agree with:*

we should not allow the power in Russia to be given into the hands of one person or there must be a host in the country – our people need a strong hand?", most of the respondents (63%) supported the latter statement about "a strong hand". Only 26% of the respondents expressed concerns with this regard (Romanovich, 2018). Moreover, every tenth respondent had no their own opinion on this matter. At the same time, the immutable laws of democracy impose a "taboo" on the concentration of power in the hands of one person. This "taboo" is supported by the system of separation of powers, the limitation of the term of the government and other institutions. However, it seems that Russian people's idea concerning what kind of power it should be radically diverges from fundamental democratic principles. The survey was conducted three times for Voronezh residents: in 2001, 2008 and 2018. Changes in the perception of power over this period are shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. *Which of the two judgments do you agree with: "We must not allow the power in Russia to be concentrated in the hands of one person" or "We need a host in the country, our people need a "strong hand"?*

In 2001, at the beginning of V. Putin's presidency, after the democratic experiment of B. Yeltsin, the people's longing for a strong and authoritative power was particularly great. At that time, 70% of the respondents wanted to see the true "host" as the head of the state. In 2008, the people's thirst for a strong government was somewhat satisfied by the personality of V. Putin. As a result, the number of those who wished a "strong hand" decreased to 56%. However, the need for stability and the fear of losing it raised the number of autocracy supporters to 63% in 2018. It should be noted that Voronezh is not an exception; the preponderance of judgments in favour of autocracy has an all-Russian scale. According to FOM polls, about 50% of Russians would like power to be transferred into the hands of one person, with only 38% being against it (Kertman, 2006, p. 122).

The mentality of people determines the actions of the authorities. It was not by chance that power began to be concentrated in the hands of the President of the Russian Federation: "The principle of a presidential republic was entrenched in the new Constitution, and the president was vested with enormous rights, comparable only to the power of an autocrat" (Pantin, 2007). Researchers argue that the form of the current state system in Russia resembles a constitutional monarchy by formal indicators. A comparative analysis of the main state laws issued April 23, 1906 and the 1993 Constitution conducted by the Russian historian V. Startsev (2002) showed that the powers of the constitutional monarch and the president differ only in three positions: unlike the monarch, the president of the Russian Federation has no right to

pass his/her position by inheritance, mint his/her own portraits on coins and dispose of the "property of the court" by his/her own will (Startsev, 2002, p. 6).

The autocracy is inscribed in the ideological schemes of Russian citizens. By being a characteristic feature of the image of power, autocracy sets regulatory parameters that cause transformation of power structures in accordance with the expectations of the population. The *traditional* image of power inherent in popular beliefs transforms the imposed stencil of the *modern* model. The basic aspects of the original Russian model of the image of power are reborn as a phoenix from the ashes. It is interesting to note that a book by a modern Russian researcher of the system of government, the philosopher V. D. Popov, was entitled "The Flight of the Phoenix Bird [...]" (Popov, 2007). The Phoenix bird, in Popov's interpretation, is the nature of the Russian government, which is reviving again and again, despite reforms, revolutions, wars and other social cataclysms.

Autocracy as a basic aspect of the image of power implies the existence of another its aspect – *centralization* of power.

Centralization

Centralization of power as a basic aspect of the image of power implies a system that is controlled from a single centre and is typically personified with the name of the head of the state.

The *modern* model, which has not so far been able to overcome the *traditional* Russian model of the image of power, has begun to transform itself into something else adapted to the Russian realities. Many Russian analysts and public politicians claim that today's Russia is characterised by the regime of managed democracy. V. Surkov coined the term "sovereign democracy" for this concept. The vector of power directed from the top to the bottom logically corresponds to the idea of power centralization. Being deeply rooted in the Russian mentality but not necessarily declared or clearly manifested, this idea should be treated as a fundamental structural characteristic forming the image of power as a whole.

The modern image of power, which is embodied in the democratic idea, immanently implies the *de*centralization of power. One of the fundamental principles of democracy – the principle of separation of powers – is directed against power centralization. At the same time, "power centralization is underway, and it is not yet clear who can stop it" (Chirikova, 2008, p. 109). Such a conclusion is drawn by the sociologist A. E. Chirikova, who conducted a survey devoted to studying the opinions of both representatives of the Russian elite and ordinary citizens. According to her analysis, "the forms of federalism in Russia are determined not only and not so much by the actions of the centre, but rather by the behaviour of the population [...]" (Chirikova, 2008, p. 110). In other words, the centralization of power is the answer of the authorities to the expectations of the population. Thus, centralization is not so much the will of the centre, but rather the will of the Russian population. Some Russian researchers argue that the social environment in Russian favours the reproduction (on a national and regional scale) of centripetal, and even authoritarian, tendencies (Mironiuk, 2003, p. 105).

The hierarchical centralized model of governance in Russia has developed historically due to its efficiency and social demand. In the course of the *knyaz* (prince) power evolution across the Russian territories, a hierarchically built monocentric governance model was gradually forming during the 12th – 14th centuries. This model, according to researchers, allowed such a vast country as Russia to be protected from enemy attacks and destruction (Fëdorov, 2006, p. 4). Thus, A. Iu. Fëdorov sees reasons behind the collapse of the USSR in *the destruction of the traditional (for Russia) model of interaction between the central and regional leadership* (Fëdorov, 2006, p. 15). Centralization is inscribed in *the traditional model* of the image of Russian power as a structural characteristic. Decentralization *belongs to the modern model* of the Western-type power.

In the West, the view is dominated that decentralization leads to more efficient public administration. However, is that so? The real situation never repeats the forecasts of scientific theories. According to Russian political scientists, decentralization has not created any prerequisites for improving the efficiency of the public sector. If governmental levels begin to compete with each other for economic resources, power and popularity in the eyes of voters, the result of decentralization can only be a decrease in the efficiency of the public sector. "In this case, we actually enter a game with a zero or even negative sum, where the only source of gain is the loss of the competitor" (Nechaev, 2005, p. 199). According to V. D. Nechaev, a similar picture was observed in many developing countries that had embarked on the path of modernization. Attempts to install models of local self-government based on Western models, as a rule, led to a decline in governance efficiency, conflicts between new and traditional institutions, and the spread of corruption (Nechaev, 2005, p. 199).

In the most recent Russian history, one can also find many examples of this kind. The struggle between the governors and the mayors of capital cities and regional centres in the 1990s is quite indicative in this respect. For example, in an attempt to remove a regional mayor from office by demonstrating his inefficiency in solving economic problems, a regional government resorted to a targeted limitation of the budget of a regional capital. At the same time, according to V. D. Nechaev, it is important to remember that the municipal reform of the second half of the 19th century led to similar consequences. As V. Bezobrazov brilliantly demonstrates in this essay "Zemstvo Institutions and Self-Government", the removal of Zemstvo institutions from the state power system had indeed turned into a decline in the effectiveness of public administration, which was manifested in the weak coordination of efforts of the state bureaucracy and Zemstvos, in their mutual distrust and competition, resulting in an increase in the tax burden (as cited in Nechaev, 2005, p. 199). A natural conclusion would be that the reasons for the emergence of zero-sum games in relations between autonomous levels of government are not personal, but systemic, institutional, political and economic in their nature.

"Power-centredness", according to Yu. S. Pivovarov, is a key characteristic of Russian political culture. "Power-centredness" implies building a "vertical" of power. The process of centralization of power began under the first President of the Russian Federation. "The centralization of power in the hands of the president," I. K. Pantin

notes, “was not the expression of Yeltsin’s ambitions and his entourage, although they had enough ambitions [...] It was not the mistakes and the evil will of the rulers that pushed for the centralization of power” (Pantin, 2007, p. 121). The general trend of the social attitude latently, but inevitably, was transforming power structures. The abolition of direct governor elections in 2004 was predetermined by a combination of social, political and economic reasons, as well as by such a characteristic of the image of power in Russia as *centralization*.

It should be noted, however, that the current postmodern space cannot be characterized by a centre in its original sense. Trying to comprehend the system of power relations in a conceptual manner, Michel Foucault concludes that, in a modern society, power no longer has a single centre, being spilled across the whole. According to the German sociologist N. Luhmann, contemporary people live in a society without a peak and without a centre. As a result of functional differentiation and centrifugal social processes, it is no longer possible to conceive unity within society.

However, people still have a strong psychological need for the centre and the spatial-social hierarchy. The vitality of this concept, according to philosophers, is associated with a deeply rooted psychological need – a kind of the instinct of centre and the instinct of the sacred. The mechanism of centring a person appears as an opportunity to save him/her from everyday alienation and loneliness. “In traditional civilizations, the centre opened the road to heaven, i.e. a vertical of life. In modern civilizations, the heaven is so distant that the understanding of the very concept of the centre of the world requires considerable effort from contemporary people. After all, where there is polycentrism, there is no more rotation along single orbits and no sense of sacredness. Modern culture is not a culture around, but a culture about” (Rossman, 2008, p. 57). The postmodern space is structured a-centrically, and non-hierarchically. Nevertheless, rumours about the “death of the centre” are greatly exaggerated.

According to the results obtained by A. E. Chirikova, centralization will increase in the future, “because there are many supporters of this idea both among elites and among the population” (Chirikova, 2008, p. 199). The process of centralization, in her opinion, “opens up possibilities for administrative control, replacing political communication channels with hierarchical ones” (Chirikova, 2008, p. 109). A consequence of any centralization process is hierarchy.

Hierarchy

The hierarchy of power is “a system of consistent subordination of the structural units of social power from the lower to the higher level” (Kravchenko, 2004, p. 131). A number of historical documents are extremely curious in this respect. In particular, the conversation that took place on December 12, 1927 between Metropolitan Sergius and a delegation of four diocese representatives – Bishop Gdovsky Dimitry (Beloved), Professor Archpriest Vasily Veryuzhsky, Archpriest Viktorina Dobronravov and the layman Alekseev representing the believers – was remarkable. The delegates brought a letter to the Metropolitan, which, among other requests and suggestions, contained an insistence: “Cancel the order [...] on giving prayers for civil authority”.

The delegates justified this requirement as follows:

– From the religious point of view, our rulers are not power.
– How so, not power? – Metropolitan Sergius was amazed.
– Power is hierarchy: when not only someone is subordinate to me, but I myself am subordinate to someone standing above me, and so on, and it all goes up to God, as the source of any power.
– Well, this is a subtle philosophy, – Metropolitan Sergius observed with irony.
– The pure in heart simply feel it. Since the question is new, deep and complex, we should formulate it subtly, as a subject of conciliar discussion (Tsypin, 1999, p. 150).

The refusal of the representatives of the Orthodox people to call the Soviet government "power", since it did not constitute a hierarchy, is very symptomatic. This reflects the very ideological background of the "source of any power". However, despite the fact that the ideological background in the minds of Russian people has begun to erode, the principles of hierarchy in power structures have stood the test of time as immanent to the concept of power in Russia.

Communist ideology, rejecting the priesthood as a class, could not, however, abandon the idea of hierarchy in power relations. Moreover, the communist ideology fostered this idea as something immutable and sacred. Some researchers have drawn attention to the rigid hierarchy within the ruling Communist party. In particular, A. Brown, an honorary professor of political science at the University of Oxford, writes: "Ideology was given such importance (especially as justifying the rigidly hierarchical internal structure of the communist party and its monopoly on power) that any changes in theory entailed deep political consequences" (Brown, 2007, p. 72). The Russian professor B. I. Kashnikov notes that a hierarchical society is usually called upon to serve a great idea (Kashnikov, 2004). The millennial idea of "holy Russia" demanded a hierarchical structure of earthly power, in accordance with the power of heaven. The great idea of building communism, that is, the "kingdom of God on the Earth", also reproduced the hierarchical structure of power. Despite the fact that the place of God in the USSR became vacant, the perceptions about power among the population remained the same, which contributed to the revival of the traditional hierarchical principle in power structures. The Soviet society, according to B. I. Kashnikov, should be understood as a hierarchical society, a variation on the theme of the perverted ideal of Holy Russia. Moreover, "the modern Russian society", the philosophers conclude, "is still a hierarchical society" (Kashnikov, 2004, pp. 40–43).

Although the current post-Soviet society, despite repeated attempts, has not been able to spawn any great idea, the traditional hierarchical structure is being reproduced in power again. Why is that? Because it is precisely such a structure that is present in the Russian image of power, the structure has survived its ideological background. *Hierarchy* is a structural characteristic *of the original Russian model* of the image of power.

Hierarchy as a structural characteristic *of the traditional* Russian model of the image of power contradicts the *modern* democratic model, which is aimed at destroying any hierarchy. The re-election of the President of the Russian Federation after the period established by law implies that any representative of the nation can become the President. Consequently, although the hierarchy exists, it exists exclusively as a convention. A frequent change of the President "helps" to destroy the hierarchical ladder again and again, as soon as it begins to form.

The democratic concept has set the positions of the President and the governor on one level, thus equalizing them by means of nation-wide elections. Since governors in Russia (up to a certain time) had been elected by the people, they were also on the same level as the President in the hierarchy. The absence of a hierarchical ladder, as a rule, excludes the mode of subordination. Therefore, Vladimir Putin had a reason to carry out a reform aimed at strengthening the "vertical of power" in order to increase the effectiveness of governance in the country.

The principle of separation of powers into *executive*, *legislative* and *judicial* in a democratic scheme does not imply any hierarchy between them. All three branches of government are on the same level, none of them is any higher or any lower than the others, they have an equal degree of power, although in different spheres. However, the results of sociological surveys show that there is no equilibrium between these three branches of power in the minds of Russians, with "the executive branch being perceived as the only true power" (Shestopal, 2005, p. 40).

Sociologists note that building hierarchical relations at the level "federal centre – regions" contributes to the extinction of conflicts: "Our comparison of the opinions of the elites in 2004 and 2006 clearly showed that the relationship between the centre and the regions over time loses its sharpness, turning into a relationship of hierarchical subordination" (Chirikova, 2008, p. 111). According to the results of regional public opinion polls of the Institute of Public Opinion *Qualitas*, the population builds a hierarchy from the President to the governor and then to the mayor, believing that a strict subordination regime takes place in the relations between these levels. Moreover, the legislative power is included in the unified hierarchy of power. Therefore, *the power structure is conceived by Russian citizens exclusively as a hierarchical structure.*

Russian authorities are reproducing the hierarchical structure, despite the proclaimed principle of separation of powers, not because they are full of authoritarian ambitions, but rather because hierarchical schemes are intertwined with the Russian image of power. It goes without saying, any professional politician feels obliged to make use of national schemes; otherwise he/she will lose the trust of the people. That is why Russian democracy acquires the features of manageability and hierarchy.

Conclusion

In the process of social interaction, people form the image (perception) of power, which specifics is determined by value-normative attitudes inherent in this particular culture. Using Florenskiĭ's and Kireyevskiĭ's words, "the grain of a cultural idea" (Florenskiĭ, 1994, p. 357) germinates, having its own logic of development, and, being "an all-

defining cultural principle" (Kirievskiĭ, 1979, p. 256), sets parameters of the image of power for a given culture. The dynamics of the internal logic of the development of a cultural idea serves as a "motor" (Ionin, 2000, p. 8), whose work reproduces a certain image of power from generation to generation and manifests it in everyday practices of social interactions.

The *traditional* model of the image of power in Russia, which was formed in other sociocultural conditions, contradicts the *modern* model in terms of their basic aspects (the idea of service, the vector of power, the pyramid of power, personification, autocracy, centralization, hierarchy, etc.). The current invisible political landscape in Russia is characterized by a struggle between the two models – traditional and modern – of the image of power. The outcome of this struggle is the reproduction of the characteristics of the image of power belonging to the traditional Russian model. According to modern political scientists, "the complex process of value transformations in Russia has led to the differentiation of value orientations. However, 25 years later, a certain fundamental vector can be traced: the underlying values that are immanent to the political and cultural life of Russia are reproduced even in times, when the country goes through such drastic transformations as adoption of modernization values (Mchedlova, 2016, p. 181). The traditional image of power is the catalyst that allows the Phoenix bird to continue its flight over Russia.

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BOOK REVIEW

Michael Ignatieff (2017). The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World. Harvard University Press

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More than hundred years ago Andrew Carnegie established Church Peace Union aimed at fostering world peace by promoting dialogue among the world's faiths. Later, the Union was transformed into the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Michael Ignatieff's book *The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World* initially was conceived as part of the celebration of the centennial of Carnegie's project. The idea of the book was "to commemorate the illusions about moral progress that gave rise to Carnegie's bequest in 1914, as well as to investigate what moral globalization looks like in the twenty-first century"; and "to take ethics out of the seminar room and study how it shapes people's judgments and actions close to the ground where conflicts start" (p. 3). In June 2013, Ignatieff accompanied by a small research team started a journey of moral discovery that was to take it, over the next three years, to Bosnia and South Africa, Myanmar and Japan, USA and Brazil. Each place forms a separate chapter in the book and illuminates a specific aspect of ordinary virtues, ranging from corruption and public trust to reconciliation after periods of intense conflict. The team was commissioned by the Council to hold global ethical dialogues with experts, academics, jurists, and journalists on the questions: Is globalization drawing people together morally? In spite of all differences, what virtues, principles, and rules of conduct are humans sharing? How does moral reasoning manifest itself in real life?

The methodology of the project was to evaluate through dialogues on moral themes the idea that, as economies, lifestyles, technologies, and attitudes globalize, ethical reasoning also globalizes (p. 5). In other words, sharing the same goods, markets, lifestyles, and life chances, people might share similar patterns of moral reasoning. The belief in human rights, along with humanitarian law, environmentalism, and the religious languages of

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global solidarity, was presupposed to be a possible candidate for a new global ethic, but critical questions remain: How far and how deeply had this ethic spread? Had it really displaced or challenged local moral codes? How did the battle between the local and the universal, the contextual and the global, play out in the moral lives of ordinary people? (p. 5) And how people can create shared moral operating systems from hundreds of different origins, histories, and religions? These were the questions the research team had started with in conversations with people in different settings.

The first chapter summarizes conversations with community organizers, local politicians, police officers, urban theorists, and local passers – by in Queens (New-York) – the place of more different racial, ethnic, and religious groups living together than in any other county in the United States. People there are living side by side, as opposed to living together; and for them, tolerance is not a universal value, just a workaday social practice (p. 15). In the second chapter, the readers found themselves in Los Angeles where Whites and African Americans are now a declining percentage of the population, while Latinos and Asians make up more than a half. Altogether, there are people from 115 foreign countries speaking 224 different languages (p. 52). Therefore, the central ethical problem there is how to generate collaboration among strangers who do not share a common origin, religion, or ethnicity. As Michael Ignatieff notes, "in a diverse city everyone balances primary and secondary affiliations as a matter of course. They may live their most meaningful hours 'inside' their own communities of language, race, or origin, but they also live 'outside' because work leaves them no choice or because they like spending time with people different from themselves" (p. 60).

In the third chapter, the conversations in Rio de Janeiro favelas are analyzed with the aim to examine what rapid economic growth has done to the moral and political relations between enriched and empowered middle classes and poor people left behind. The fourth chapter is about today's Bosnia – the place of afterwar important exercise in "moral globalization where outsiders, trained in the moral disciplines of universalism and the techniques of reconciliation and forgiveness, trying to persuade battered insiders to adopt their moral codes" (p. 93). The fifth chapter brings the readers to the Buddhist monastery in Mandalay (Myanmar) where through the talks about ethnic and religious relations the conclusion was made that for the first time, Burmese society have to ask itself what a democratic country means and who it belongs to – the Buddhist majority or the hundreds of minorities, especially Muslim, who make it their home (p. 117).

The sixth chapter examines the attitudes of people in Japan after Fukushima explosion. For Ignatieff, they seek to do their best in impossible situations, and such a regard for the safety of others is firmly rooted in their "hope in the future of such a community", and "depends on some shared belief in a collective future worth fighting for" (p. 165). Finally, the seventh chapter describes the fragmentation of the initial alliance of actors after the battle against apartheid in South Africa was won. Ignatieff examines what he calls the "fantasy of the rainbow nation", and stresses that transition to a liberal democracy is not a redemption story, but "a tough struggle between elites

determined to use power for their own purposes and a populace struggling to get their hands on at least some of the fruits of democracy" (p. 190).

In each location, Ignatieff finds a common emphasis on what he describes as "ordinary virtues" – the collection of habits and intuitions such as trust, tolerance, forgiveness and reconciliation. These are not the result of abstract moral reasoning, but are rather "unreflexive and unthinking". In all locations, as Ignatieff underlines, the individuals they talked to never separated their own private dilemmas from the wider social context of conflict in which they lived: "Generalities about human obligation and moral reasoning [mean] little"; instead, "context was all" (pp. 26–27). While philosophers might think in terms of "the human race, some abstract standard, beyond the veil of ignorance" (p. 208), ordinary people think through moral situations in terms of concrete human relations with their family and friends. It means that instead of dialogues on values themselves, which risked becoming too abstract, the research group decided to focus on the common practical problems of people. The researchers wanted to find out whether people in different settings speak the same ethical language when they confront such issues as corruption and public trust, tolerance in multicultural cities, reconciliation after war and conflict, and resilience in times of uncertainty and danger. Ignatieff insists that "virtue was local", meaning that "we are always in a particular situation, a context, a moment […] and we are always with others, with people whose opinion shapes us and whose views we wish to shape" (p. 209). It is worth mentioning that the title of Ignatieff's book draws on Michel de Montaigne's essay "Of Cruelty" where five hundred years ago he described acts like "greed, lust, envy, and hatred" as "our ordinary vices," and spoke of vice and virtue as often coexisting and competing with one another.

The book shows that in view of the actions of individuals within a local community, the language of human rights is ambiguous. As Ignatieff argues, the human rights revolution has changed what many of us believe about the duty of states; but he doubts it has changed us (p. 216). At the same time, the spread of democracy and of the idea of human rights universalized the notion that citizens have a right to be heard. The research team wanted to understand how global norms like human rights work within everyday moral assumptions. For most of the people they talked to, human rights entered their moral perspective chiefly as an inchoate belief that all human beings, as individuals, are equal: by this, the interlocutors, often very poor people, meant equality of voice. So, Ignatieff writes, "we are in a new moral era in which the struggle for equality has produced a clamor, sometimes violent, for recognition and acknowledgment" (p. 28).

Ignatieff concludes that equality of voice and moral choice as an individual responsibility were the two new expectations observed everywhere. A further conclusion drawn from the conversations is that "the reaction against the forces of globalization is not a passing discontent, but an enduring element in ordinary people's defense of their identities" (p. 204). Thus, the most striking feature of the ordinary virtue perspective is how rarely any of the participants evoked universal principles of any kind – that is, ideas of general obligation to human beings as such – and how frequently they reasoned in terms of the local, the contingent, the here and now, what they owed

those near to them and what they owed themselves. Tolerance as an ordinary virtue is "a discipline of moral individualism, a decision formed by life experience, to suspend prior judgment, to take people as they come, to judge them on their merits, to bat away stereotypes and focus on the distinct reality of the person with whom you are dealing in a moral situation" (p. 212).

As James Traub points out in the *New-York Times,* one of the chief merits of Ignatieff's book is that he discovered in the course of his research that the question he had asked – "Is globalization drawing us together morally?", – was the wrong one. The right question is: "How can we hang on to decency in a world where old patterns, good and bad, have been disrupted?" In addressing that challenge, Ignatieff's book represents a triumph of execution over conception[1].

Ordinary virtues, Ignatieff repeats, do not generalize. They do not ignore difference, and are not interested in ethical consistency; they are anti-theoretical and anti-ideological. In the conflict situation, they are easily exploited for a politics of fear and exclusion. At the same time, they are also the key to healing, reconciliation, and solidarity on both a local and a global scale. The book is thus an analysis of virtues at work in an unjust, dangerous, and uncertain world, a study of how people reproduce virtue and moral order in complex circumstances.

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/books/review/ordinary-virtues-michael-ignatieff.html

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BOOK REVIEW

Michael Goodhart (2018). Injustice: Political Theory for the Real World. Oxford University Press

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It is ubiquitous today for political theorists and philosophers to challenge traditional and dominant methods of the discipline. The book written by Michael Goodhart, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, offers an original, radical and provocative approach to the problem of injustice. It has already received a review by Marcus Arvan, who indicated many problems there, although acknowledging its virtues. While considering the two problematic premises, which Goodhart purports to identify, as wrong, he supports what Goodhart calls three pathologies of ideal moral theory (the meaning of terms is to be explained below). However, Arvan criticizes Goodhart's alternative bifocal approach and accuses him of relativism. Eventually, Arvan does not pay due attention to the rest of the book, which "suffers as a result" (Arvan, 2019). I will try to show the general picture of the book without focusing only on a single part while keeping as impartial as possible.

The main problem the book deals with is that so called *Ideal Moral Theory* (IMT), the dominant approach to political theory that cannot adequately address the problem of injustice in the real world. Following from that, the primary aim of the book, as Goodhart puts it, "is to do better with respect to injustice – to do better in making sense of it and in bringing theory to bear on it in ways that might help to advance the work of people struggling against injustices of all kinds" (p. 8). The book comprises three parts and seven chapters, where each part can be thought as a stage of critical reflection process. First, there is an attempt to "unthink" IMT by showing that it does not help to understand what injustice is. The alternative called the bifocal approach is presented in the second part. Finally, it is shown how the new approach can be adopted to combat injustice.

The first part of the book (*Unthinking Ideal Moral Theory*) is aimed to show that IMT is mistaken in its assumptions and premises, which are the

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reason why it is unhelpful to address injustice. In the first chapter (*The Trouble with Justice*), Goodhart applies the procedure of estrangement or defamiliarization to look at IMT as at something less obvious or necessary. He explains that IMT is *ideal* for it depicts "justice in its pure or perfect form, uncontaminated by specific considerations of context and circumstance" (p. 25) and *moral* for it is "conceived as having categorical normative force – that is, as engendering or entailing binding duties and responsibilities" (pp. 25–26). He notes two troubling assumptions of IMT: "The first is that injustice can only be conceived as the absence or opposite of justice" (p. 27). To prove this position, Goodhart relies on Judith Shklar's ideas. The second assumption is that it is supposed "to provide 'ideal guidance', by which is meant something like using ideal moral principles of justice to criticize existing social arrangements, to evaluate (normatively and comparatively) the *status quo* and possible alternatives to it, and to recommend reforms (policies, institutional changes) intended to make society more just (more like the ideal)" (p. 29).

The three pathologies "can be traced back to the two troubling assumptions at the heart of IMT" (p. 31). The first is theoretical paralysis, the inability to go beyond the debates about "which conception of justice should be adopted" (p. 32). The second pathology is subordination of politics to morality. The final pathology is distortional thinking that reveals that justice might function ideologically.

The second chapter (*Barking Up the Wrong Trees*) uses questions "about selection of principles of justice, about the scope of justice, and about the effects of the global order on the poor" (p. 47) to show that claims about justice and injustice are subjected to the pathologies that make justice claims inevitably ideological. Goodhart criticizes constructivist approaches on global normative theory, taking Gillian Brock's initial choice situation (ICS) as an example. Then he analyzes various approaches justice, such as statist, cosmopolitan, hybrid and pluralist. Finally, he throws opposing views against each other regarding global poverty by taking accounts of Pogge and Risse.

In the second part (*Reconceptualizing the Problem*), Goodhart proposes the bifocal approach, a radical alternative to IMT for addressing injustice. The third chapter (*Getting Real?*) reflects alternative approaches to IMT elaborated within realist political theory, particularly Sen's realism-lite or nonideal realism (criticized for the similarity of the procedures he relies on with those of IMT), Williams' liberal realism (criticized for conservatism), and Geuss' critical realism. The approach Goodhart develops is realistic although not realist. He distances himself from realist political theory. In this sense, it seems closer to the approach David Miller applies in his book "Strangers in Our Midst" (Miller, 2016). Eventually, Goodhart criticizes realism for the wanting conception of normativity.

The fourth chapter (*The Bifocal Approach*) shows how realistic and normative frameworks can be combined into a single theoretical framework. The essence of the bifocal approach is the following: "it differentiates between but integrates two distinct tasks or functions of political theory: explanation and critique/ prescription" (p. 116). For this, Goodhart employs two lenses, namely, analytical and "partisan". Using these lenses, all justice claims are viewed as ideological claims. He insists

on the bifocal approach "because it accommodates normative and prescriptive theorizing from inside an ideological perspective without confusing that work with an exercise in ideal moral theory" (p. 117). As a result, we can see the two-dimensional politics of injustice, which requires a special account of normativity irreducible to morality. Goodhart considers Philippa Foot's conception of normativity as the valid one. He differentiates between the widespread categorical normativity and hypothetical normativity that is the basis of bifocal approach.

In the fifth chapter (*A Democratic Account on Injustice*), Goodhart applies the lenses of the bifocal approach to explain core democratic values and commitments (freedom and equality). He analyzes different types of power, democratic methods and knowledge, feminist epistemology, dialectical thinking and critical theory. Injustice is characterized as a "deformity in social relations where power creates or perpetuates subjection" (p. 154). Goodhart distinguishes three overlapping categories of injustice: domination, oppression, and exploitation. He also stands against a fixed definition of injustice in a diverse society because it can become a source of epistemic domination. After depicting his democratic account, the author differentiates himself from critical theorists.

The third part is focused on the practical differences bifocal approach makes, particularly on how political theorists can combat injustice and how we think of responsibility for injustice. In the sixth chapter (*Political Theory and the Politics of Injustice*), Goodhart holds that doing political theory is necessarily taking sides because "claims about justice and injustice are ideological claims" (p. 174). He holds that politics of injustice is a counterhegemonic politics, which means "struggles over injustice frequently require recontesting key elements of a hegemonic ideology, challenging the dominant meanings and interpretations that naturalize or normalize those injustices" (p. 180), and "politics that recognizes and acts on the realization that struggles over injustice are in large part struggles over values, ideas, and interpretations" (p. 181). Then Goodhart reflects upon collective political action, discursive politics, difference between articulation and justification and its relation to translation.

In the final chapter (*Taking Responsibility for Injustice*), Goodhart describes various ideas to consider the problem of systemic injustice "like hunger, poverty, and sweatshops – injustices originating in complex social systems, structures, and processes" (p. 206) and responsibility for it. By criticizing Iris Marion Young's idea of structural injustice, he aims to show that philosophical (or moral) understanding of responsibility is misleading. To combat injustice, we need to think of responsibility as a political problem, which is shown by the bifocal approach. The author is inclined to understand taking responsibility as "to assume responsibility when one has no obligation to do so", because "it provides us with a useful way to make sense of an important aspect of many people's engagement in struggles against systemic injustice" (p. 222). In other words, Goodhart understands responsibility for injustice as a political problem in virtue of the contingency of our judgements and constant ideological contestation.

To conclude, this book raises a serious problem of contemporary political theory by showing its one-sided character and inability to address the real-world political

issues. Goodhart's idea creates more problems than solves and generates more questions than it is supposed to. Eventually, it is up to the reader to consider it either as merit or weakness. If someone is interested in the problem of injustice, this book can be a great companion to delve deeper into the problem. The work will be useful for those interested in IMT generally as well because it allows to look at its downsides. However, the reader is supposed to be properly prepared, for both the criticism and the argument of the book are built on colliding rival views and approaches.

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	Miller, R. (Producer). (1989). The mind [Television series]. New York, NY: WNET.
Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. *Journal Title*, 8(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
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