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Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. *CS&P* examines how rapid societallevel changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- moral reasoning and behavior;
- variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- social exclusion and inclusion;
- post-secular religious individualism;
- tolerance and merely "tolerating": their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.

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EDITORIAL

Nationalisms in Times of Change, Changes in Nationalism: Editorial Introduction

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The comeback of nationalism observed over the last several years apparently reached its pinnacle in 2020. Until the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the phenomenon termed the revival of nationalism mostly amounted to the growth in popularity of the political actors, whether parties or individuals, that are variously called extreme right wing, right-wing nationalist, or, perhaps the most frequently, national populists. The consolidation of power by Viktor Orban in Hungary, the rise of the AfD (*Alternative fur Deutschland)* party in Germany, the growth in popularity of the Front National in France, the referendum on Brexit followed by Boris Johnson becoming the prime minister of the UK, Jair Bolsonaro becoming the president of Brazil, and, most tellingly, Donald Trump wining the 2016 presidential elections in the US – this series of events made it obvious that nationalism, far from being gradually made obsolete by globalization, was back. This triumphal comeback, however, could be reasonably argued to belong exclusively to the public political sphere and not necessarily express the mass attitudes affecting everyday life. The growing electoral support granted to national populists could represent a proxy for something not directly related to nationalism. A widespread argument suggested that granting support to national populist at least partly constituted a kind of protest voting – a way to send a painful and not-to-be-ignored signal to the allegedly cosmopolitan ruling

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elites who would not otherwise listen to what the protest voters might believe was "the voice of the people". If this explanation were accurate and sufficient, the new comeback of nationalism could be well contained within the political sphere narrowly defined (as opposed to "everything is political") and, having served its purpose as a proxy and a tactical tool, gradually dissolved.

The COVID-19 pandemic undermined these expectations by showing the ongoing revival of nationalism to represent much more than an easily available form for expressing a substantively more general set of opinions. With what came as a surprise to many experts and informed observers, governments in various countries reacted to the by definition biological rather than social problem of the pandemic by closing national borders and pursuing their own independent and more often than not uncoordinated and vastly diverse policies, even within the EU. This reliance of the older, more familiar structures of the nation-state, until recently deemed outdated, rather than more up-to-date institutions aimed at promoting international cooperation, goes far beyond the narrower definition of nationalism as a political ideology and instead resembles "banal nationalism". This term coined in by Michael Billig in mid-1990s just as globalization was supposed to eradicate all things national, stands for the multiple ways the belief in nations and nationalities as objective and natural shapes the everyday perceptions, primarily via certain language structures and conventions of speech. "Banal nationalism", unlike its more familiar political counterpart, is not usually recognized as representing a certain ideologically charged belief, and, moreover, not easily recognized as conveying any message at all. This omnipresence of nationalism in its covert form further manifested itself at the later stage of the pandemic as what quickly got known as the "vaccine nationalism" – the geopolitical considerations as well as internal demand for new grounds of national pride amidst uncertainty and collective self-doubt, affecting the Mertonian "republic of science" in its quest for the much needed solution of the universal problem.

Taken together, the events of the last years demonstrated the currently prevalent inclination to rely on habitual nationalism-inspired discursive and institutional structures in both all-too-settled times of the consolidated mainstream political elites and the "unsettled times" of the pandemic. Contrary to the expectations once prominent in nations and nationalism studies, nationalism not only did not become wholly obsolete due to globalization, as was suggested in the 1990s, but also was not transformed into more pluralist, individually creative, and transient hybrid identities compatible with cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. What has made a comeback is clearly not any kind of "enlightened", hybridized, or otherwise more sophisticated postnationalism, but an easily recognizable prototypical nationalism based on the uncritical belief in nations as natural driving forces of history. This belief is to some extent shared by some of the nationalism researchers in the academia, where until recently essentialist notions of the nation were espoused only by a small minority, mostly those belonging to the sociobiological or evolutionary psychological schools of thought in social sciences. This year, however, the *Nations and Nationalism* journal, one of the major trendsetters in nationalism studies, features a paper suggesting that opponents of nationalist populism would do well to embrace nationalism of their

own and attempt to combine it with their own liberal views to make the latter more attractive to the majority of the population. This attitude towards nationalism is profoundly ambivalent. On the one hand, it implies an instrumental use of nationalism as a dressing for the advancement of a different ideology. Yet, on the other hand, the very need for making use of such an instrument rests on the assumption that nationalism is not merely something that people incidentally happen to want at the moment, and accordingly could be dissuaded from if necessary, but an important part of the current social reality that, at least in the foreseeable future, is here to stay. This view closely resembles the unambiguous and much more straightforward idea of the nation as a necessary precondition of any guided and predictable social change at the macrolevel. Along this line of reasoning, the coverage of the protests following the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus abounded in the literal, uncritical use of the apparently long deconstructed notions such as the "birth of the nation" and "national awakening" (echoing the view of the nation as a "sleeping beauty" exposed by Ernest Gellner). This profound shift in the academic stance on nationalism as a reaction to the newly revealed durability of nationalism itself marks a yet another unusual twist in the history of the year 2020. Whether it represents the optimal, let alone the only possible reaction to the unpredicted comeback of nationalism, is another matter.

The present special issue relies upon the belief that the range of replies posed by the new reality of nationalism to the nations and nationalism studies does not necessarily have to be confined to a binary choice between deconstruction vs. acceptance of all or some things national(ist). Its emphasis on changes in nationalism suggests viewing the comeback of the prototypical nationalism amidst the social conditions profoundly different from those where it was conceived as a yet another transformation, which reflects its protean flexibility and requires a corresponding plurality of research perspectives. The authors of the articles comprised in this special issue represent this rich plurality of approaches as applied to some of the most pertinent issues in the contemporary nations and nationalism studies.

The issue consists of four articles presenting research on various manifestations of nationalism and Elena Stepanova's review of a recently published book on Russian nationalism by Marlene Laruelle. In addition to these materials dedicated to nationalism, the issue also contains two contributions focused on other representations of cultural identity – an article on the dynamics of the Soviet morality by Victor Martianov and Leonid Fishman, and Ekaterina Purgina's review of of two books covering the experience of their authors (Sarah Wheeler and Rachel Polonsky) getting acquainted with Russian history and culture.

National Populism: What We Need to Know and How We (Might) Get to Know It

National populism, already mentioned here as one of the key topics in the ongoing discussions on the contemporary nationalism, is also one of the subject of one of the papers in the present special issue. The importance of returning to this already much debated phenomenon stems from the fact that, so far, the existing academic research as well as semi-academic expert analysis have not been instrumental in coming up

with a single exhaustive answer. Instead, researchers have come up with a variety of versions that at present do not form a cohesive pattern.

Apart from the protest voting suggestion, several other explanations of the causes of national populism state it to be not a mere instrument of signaling and voicing general dissatisfaction, but a genuine expression of the attitudes shared by considerable sections of the population. Thus, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in their most recent book "Cultural Backlash and the Rise of Populism: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism" (2019), which, which has some of the national populist political leaders displayed on its cover, treat the revival of nationalism as a part of a more general traditionalist attitudinal, normative, and value set. According to this theory, the modernization of values, inevitable in the long run, does not necessarily run smoothly in a straightforward linear motion. Any society at any given time point in its history is heterogeneous, and relatively more rapid social transformations are likely to increase this heterogeneity by way of necessitating everybody's positioning *vis-à-vis* the ongoing social change. This differentiation of positions, in turn, may lead to the consolidation of those not ready to accept so much change at such a fast pace. Moreover, traditionalists would arguably feel a greater need for collective mobilization due to their self-perception as caught by the tide of history not being in their favor, and therefore as underprivileged and underrepresented (hence the anti-mainstream appeal). National pride, as proved by the empirical data of the World Values Survey, constitutes an integral part of the traditional value set and for this reason features prominently in the more general cultural backlash.

Yet another kind of explanation presents national populism in connection with the gap between the expectations of the liberal democratic "end of history" and the less than perfect reality fraught with difficulties unevenly distributed across countries. The global North vs. South divide as well as the East vs. West controversies with the united Europe highlight the tensions unlikely to be significantly alleviated in the near future and reflect deep-settled institutional controversies and dead ends that are all to easily perceived via the us vs. them nationalist frame. Within this line of reasoning, national identities provide a readily available explanation and justification in multiple ways ranging from very straightforward to rather subtle. Taken together, these lay theories of nationality show that a comprehensive theory of nationalist populism is unlikely to emerge otherwise than by means of empirical research.

In this issue, Olga Novoselova's article represents such an attempt of making an empirically grounded and at the same time theory driven generalization upon some of the most widely debated cases of the contemporary national populism. Her research is a comprehensive metaanalysis of a range of empirical studies on the online communication tools and techniques employed by national populist politicians and accounting for at least some of their popular appeal. In line with the theoretical frame of discussion outlined here, the majority of empirical research findings show the body of these online communications to go well beyond a mere expression of disapproval. Nor even do they merely pander to nationalist aspirations by legitimizing this discourse and bringing it back to the public political sphere. Instead, the messages transmitted to the public by the politicians in question gradually create

a comprehensive vision of as nation with its ascribed values, defining features and criteria of belonging solidified as the rules of inclusion/exclusion. Many of the findings covered in the article echo the recent discussion whether nationalism and populism constitute to separate dimension that temporarily came together due to some contingent causes, or belong together for certain intrinsic reasons of their inner logic. Novoselova's conclusions apparently point towards the latter position by showing the repeating rhetorical tool of defining nation not as a country's whole population but as "we, the people" as opposed to the national elites reframed as "others" on a part with foreigners from beyond the country. Another dimension of Novoselova's article highlighting the importance of its contribution is the focus on online communication pertinent for the examination of the ways self-defined proponents of traditional values make effective use of modern technologies. Same as in the case of (post)nationalism, the initial optimistic aspirations regarding digital technologies have gradually given way first to the recognition of their ambivalence as a double-edged sword and then, to focusing of their danger of posing potential threats to individual freedoms and established social institutes. In both these research directions, Novoselova's article provides a set of valuable conclusions and prompts future research.

(Trans)Nationalism and Attitudes towards Migrants: Relevant or Interrelated?

Another article in this special issue raises a set of issues that have shaped much of the public debate on nationalism for at least as long as national populism, and of late in close relation. Attitudes towards foreigners in general and towards migrants in particular, and especially negative attitudes such as xenophobia and migrantophobia, constitute a separate area of studies substantively different from nations and nationalism studies. The reasons for this differentiation are twofold. First, the ascribed others viewed and treated as foreigners are often defined along ethnic and racial lines rather than based on nationality proper. Second, although nationality is defined via establishing external borders of belonging, attitudes towards foreigners, especially towards foreigners within a country, often play a less prominent role than foreigners' attitudes ranging from international recognition to soft power affecting internal perceptions of a nation and displayed in the feelings of national pride, shame and national superiority. Accordingly, nationalism is not necessarily xenophobic, and xenophobia does not necessarily have anything to do with the substantive side of national identity.

Nevertheless, the two phenomena recently came to be treated as a whole. This is partly due to the powerful impact of migration in challenging the essentialist motion of nationality as immutable or at least subject to at best a slow, painful and potentially traumatic transformation. Successful integration of migrants into host societies contradicts the nationalist narrative of a search for national identity as a dramatic personal quest and an attempt at changing national self-identification, as an existential crisis. A curious twist in the nationalist worldview, strangely different from its more conventional versions yet internally coherent according to its own premises, is the so-called nativism based on the claim that each national culture is of equal worth in its own right – insofar as different cultures and their representative do not mix. Thus,

a nativist maintains a positive attitude towards foreigners, but only while they remain foreigners. Migrants pose the most obvious threat to this notion of the ideal world order as comprised of mutually detached nations. Interestingly, migrants who keep the culture of their countries of origin tend to be accused of cultural expansionism and erasing the national identity of their host countries, while migrants willing to leave their old lives behind frequently face the accusation of being unable and/or unwilling to grasp the uniqueness of their host country and instead treating it as a mere commodity with no regard to its deeper meaning. Thus, while not inherently interrelated, nationalism and attitudes towards migrants inevitably get intertwined when migration becomes a mass phenomenon redefining national identity.

The article coauthored by Natalia Tregubova and Maxim Nee makes one step further in the research on attitudes towards migrants by focusing on the ways migrant themselves consider these attitudes in making sense of their positions in relation to various social groups and categories. Their study on migrants' identity construction in the social media shows that migrants are fully aware of the ways they are perceived by the non-migrant (or, more accurately, not recently migrant) parts of the population in the host country and have to consider these views among other external circumstances shaping the migrants' social situation. The research findings show that migrants themselves do not see these consideration solely as adaptation to the differences between the country of origins and the host country, nor simply to the migrant status as such, nor is the attitudes towards migrants are estimated by migrants themselves solely on the xenophobic vs. tolerant dimension. Instead, migrants navigate the space of the available options, tools, and restriction for their identity construction. The authors found the most frequent kind of migrants' self-identification to be that of "low-skilled migrants from Central Asia" – a hybrid formulation that is illuminating in two ways. First, this identification is a hybrid one but not in the postnationalist and multiculturalist way of mixing various nationalities and ethnicities. Instead, it put a regional identity on a part with education, professional qualifications, occupation, and, less directly, a position in the socioeconomic hierarchy, as well as the migrant status as such. Second, the underlying factor that holds these substantively different dimensions of identification together is the mirroring of the external gaze of the majority of the population in the host country. The notion of the Central Asia as an undifferentiated place of origins clearly reflect the position of an outsider to whom "all Central Asians look the same", while to the insiders, national and local differences within the region are known and matter. This mirrored self-identification is not, however, uncritically adopted by the migrants covered by the study, nor accepted as an immutable social fact, but are treated as a subject of discussion and a starting point for developing a variety of coping strategies. The focal point of this discussion, and arguably one of the most interesting findings of the study, is the issue of visibility. The public perception of migrants by the majority of the population is heavily yet far from obviously affected by the varying chances for different kinds of migrants of being recognized as such. Those comprised in the category of "low-skilled migrants from Central Asia" are more different due to their frequently poorer Russian language skills and disproportional representation in certain kinds of usually lowly paid and not prestigious jobs than

better qualified migrants, who are often relatively easily able to share the same life style as the non-migrants and for this reason do not fall into a specific category and do not contribute to the cognitive prototype of what a typical migrant is like. Further research on the factors and implications of migrants' visibility are likely to lead to new discoveries on the vaieties on migrants national identities.

(How) Can Nationalists Joke?

Nationalism and humor seem unlikely to appear within the same analytical framework, let alone a specific empirical study. In the first place, the prototypical rhetoric of nationalism rests on pathos and thrives upon high emotional tension and strong moral stance. Nationalism is supposed to be all about soul-searching, rallying round the flag, and various degrees and modes of self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation. Whether mainstream or counter-mainstream, the language of nationalism seeks to establish a coherent master narrative and place its adherents within a comprehensive and allegedly self-evident vision of the world. Nationalists aspiring to enlist new recruits for their cause are more likely to use emotionally inflated and normatively charged speech, while maintenance of already firmly established national identities requires an unprepossessing sober style of unquestioning tacit agreement.

Humor contradicts each of these two options. It is difficult to find a place for jokes either in the pathos of the "hot", fighting nationalism or in the implicit ethos of its "cold", "banal" counterpart. Rather than a tool of mobilization or stabilization, humor acts as an instrument of subversion. A joke functions at the intersection of cognitive processes of information processing and emotional experience of releasing tension. This feeling of release and liberation appears due to a clash of previously disconnected although familiar notions that allows seeing them in a new and unexpected way. A punch line in a joke shows that the world is not as it seems, but not in a grim way of conspiracy theories. The unexpected, as uncovered by means of humor, reveals new opportunities and mutability of old restraints and thus crates a vision of individual freedom.

When and under what conditions would nationalists require a tool for unleashing individual freedom? The first and most obvious option appears to be that of presenting a positive role model of a typical representative of a nation, a "national hero" with an ability to joke in the face of danger as an essential part of its heroism. The characters of Till Eulenspiegel or the Good Soldier Schweik owe their ability to attract and elicit sympathy precisely due to their extensive and constant vision of virtually anything and everybody, beginning with themselves, in a humorous way. This kind of defiant humor works well in shaping a national identity based on a dream of a peaceful and independent future against the background of horror and oppression, such as the fate of a smaller nation caught in a world war. In retrospect, this kind of humor ranging from mild self-deprecation to borderline cruel practical jokes brings back the bittersweet memories of forging the nation and helps to appreciate the achievements of peace.

It is far less obvious whether nationalism can find its expression in more cerebral kinds of humor, such as sarcasm, satire and especially irony. Irony, as a particularly intellectualized kind of humor, undermines the seeming immutability not just of internal

meanings and interconnections but of borders between the serious and the playful, the real and the imaginary, the grounds for decision-making and the inconsequential experimentation and exploration.

The article by Anastasia Mitrofanova in this issue provides a valuable empirical insight into the uses of irony by nationalists in various genres of communication. Her study shows that nationalists who use irony are neither the classical fighters for the correspondence between political and cultural borders as famously defined by Gellner, nor are they marginal nonentities able to transcend the rules of navigating the serious and the humorous simply because nobody really cares whether they abide by the rules or not. Instead, these ironic nationalists navigate the new, more complicated world of transient borders densely populated with marginalities of all sorts. The irony, the punch line effect of the unexpected here lies in the nationalists' ability of speaking the languages of the various alternative ideology. By making use of this ability, they demonstrate the artificiality of any language and any ideology, transitivity of their borders, and groundlessness of their pretensions at granting there adherents with the ultimate truth. The ironic nationalist reject the traditional way an ideology gains power – by showcasing its attractive traits that make it appear distinct and favorably different from its alternatives. By way of mastering and ironically twisting languages of other ideologies, rather than developing and promoting the language of their own, the protagonists of Mitrofanova's study assert their power over their competitors. The lack of the language of their own makes these nationalists not merely immune to a similar attack and simultaneously show their urbane, superior understanding of the world of ideas and the rules of their construction. Within this logic, the step beyond marks in the eyes of its proponents a step forward.

How and to what extent this perception helps to attract followers, is another question. The study clearly shows that its protagonists aim not so much as gaining popular support measured in numbers as at establishing themselves among the loosely defined intellectuals and being accepted as intellectual trendsetters. These aspirations display a curious – one is tempted to call it "ironic" – contrast with Miroslav Hroch's classical three stages of national identity formation moving beyond the narrow circle of its intellectual inventors into the broad anonymous majority of its followers, who for the most part may know next to nothing about the original creators. The use of intellectual irony brings nationalism back from the popular and homely notion back into the glittering realm where intellectual novelties are forged and appreciated by connoisseurs. Thus, the research on the quixotic tribe of ironic nationalists echoes the other articles of this special issue over the major topics of the internal logic and popular appeal of nationalism granting its mutability and endurance.

Nations, Empires, and Colonies: Coming Together Again

The only theoretical article in this thematic special issue juxtaposes the nation with its closest historical counterparts. While at the individual level, nationality is most closely substantively related to race and ethnicity, nations at the macrolevel are usually defined via their comparison with empires and colonies. Nation-states are

usually conceptualized as the universal form of a modern statehood as opposed on the one hand to the more archaic empires and, on the other hand, to the still largely hypothetical supranational and postnational forms of late modern statehood. Unlike a nation, an empire does not need a shared identity or a shared culture. For this reason, paradoxically, an empire, while demanding strict subordination in the overt, literal, institutionalized way, does not usually require cultural homogeneity and symbolic power characteristic of a modern nation, such as the one described in Eugene Weber's seminal work "Peasants Into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914" (1976). An empire relies on military and bureaucratic rather than symbolic power and does not attempt cultural unification within its entire realm. On the contrary, the division of power within an empire presupposes a marked distinction between its center and peripheries (for example, Alexander Motyl in his book "Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires" (2001) defines an empire as a state where peripheries are not allowed communicate with each other directly without the mediation and control of the center), and the visibility of this distinction is more easily ensured by preserving cultural differences. Empires rest on keeping intact a variety of local peculiarities much as they were first found during the original conquer. Nations reject this acceptance verging on indifference and replace it with a profound significance ascribed to cultural diversity as grounds for identities and justification for political sovereignty. Second, nations strive to normalize this diversity by means of porserving the differences between independent nation-states and simultaneously striving to eradicate diversity within national borders. Third, the modern world of nation-states is incompatible with the explicit imperial hierarchies of cultures and has the parity and equality of all nations as an essential principle of its makeup.

Despite these obvious differences, one has only to place the outline of the ideal type of the world of nation-states against the realities of the contemporary geopolitics to see the multiple covert survivals of the premodern imperial past. Many nation-states, despite the shared high culture omnipresent in the media and centrally transmitted via education still struggle with making sense of their internal cultural diversity an integrating it into the higher-order pan-national framework. The hierarchies of national cultures has become more covert and negotiable, yet this constant chance at renegotiation makes the exercise in nation-branding and soft power all the more tempting, and the quest for rising in national rankings, all the more pertinent. Moreover, the late modern increase in the mobility of people and information across national borders made the two imperial remnants intertwined by reproducing the overlapping contested places in the covert hierarchies of cross-national comparison both within and between nation-states.

The article by Maxim Khomyakov shed some new light on the similarities, differences and interrelations between nations and empires. His focus is not on establishing a new general pattern, but on historical varieties of imperial and postimperial trajectories and ways of coping with various relations to a nation's colonial past. The author builds upon the notion of internal colonization as applied to Russia to make a statement that Russian imperial and, accordingly, postimperial

experience is in a number of important ways substantively different from the heir of the former Western European empires and, most tellingly, the U.S. For this reason, he argues, the majority of the Russian population does not share the contemporary Western discourse of racial justice and retribution of imperial grievances. The article demonstrates how the language of the Western debate on racial issues leaves Russia indifferent and how this indifference is represented using the language of liberty and pluralism.

Same as all the other articles of this special issue, Khomyakov's contribution explores the languages of the contemporary nationalism, counter-nationalism and the initially multivoiced debate on nationalism-related themes. The languages of nationalism might constitute an area of renewed importance, especially as, notwithstanding the abundance of specific case studies, there have not been major theoretical breakthroughs in this direction since Michael Billig's "Banal Nationalism", and so much has changed since then, particularly due to digitalization. Obviously, nationalism and digital technology constitutes another promising subtopic in nations and nationalism studies. The researchers in this domain, however, still need to clarify their research question. It goes without saying that nationalists are able, ready, and willing to make use of the many opportunities offered by digital technologies. What we still do not know is how exactly digital manifestations of nationalism are different from digital transmission of other ideologies and worldviews. Nor is it clear how the new medium of nationalism transforms the message itself and, in particular, to what extent and by way of which mechanisms digitalization contributes to nationalists' attempts to adapt to the new trends of social change or, alternatively, preserve and revive the prototypical forms of nationalism generated under considerably different conditions of the early modernity. Another recurrent motif in all the contributions to this special issue is the role of borders. Be they the borders between ideologies (Novoselova, life courses and resulting experiences (Tregubova and Nee), gravity and irony (Mitrofanova), or natural borders between societies demarcating varieties of historical paths (Khomyakov), the ability of nationalism to produce, reproduce, maintain and rearrange borders might be one of the secrets of its attraction and longevity. At any rate, now is the right time to study nations and nationalism, and more interesting insights are likely to come.

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ARTICLE

Nationalism and Colonialism: Oceans, Civilizations, Races

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ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the analysis of the complex interrelations between the imaginaries of nation and colony, and, by the same token, between nationalism and colonialism. The author argues that modern nationalism has always contained colonialism as its integral part and parcel. Colonies are interpreted as "mirrors" for the nation-building; while oceans, civilizations and races are the factors which keep distance between what is considered to be national and what is to be interpreted as colonial. In their turn, movement of the population, education and modernization were important tools for bridging the gaps between nations and their colonies. Russian national, imperial and colonial experience in this context is rather anomalous, because, according to the author, it constantly blurs the existing boundaries and mix up differences. One of the interesting results of this historical experience is current insensitivity of Russian society to such pressing issues of the today's European and American politics as the war against symbolic representations of the racist nationalism.

KEYWORDS
colonialism, nationalism, imperialism, nation-building, modernity, modern history of Russia, social imaginaries, racism, civilizations, ethnic identities, frontier, orientalism

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Introduction

Nations and nationalism as we today know them are modern phenomena. The very idea that communities of human beings whose sense of belonging is based upon certain historically constructed common features (ranging from language to racial characteristics or myths of common origin) are to politically and economically organize their life together on certain territory, is closely connected with the modern condition (see, however, Smith, 1986, and Armstrong, 1982 for the accounts of ancient ethnic origin of the national identities). Even if, as some authors claim, nationalism has medieval sources (Adrian Hastings, for example, traces these sources back to the obscure times of Bede the Venerable, see Hastings, 1997, p. 38) today's nationalism is distinctively modern.

In its turn, modernity, according to Cornelius Castoriadis' characterization, "is best defined by the conflict, but also the mutual contamination and entanglement, of two imaginary significations: autonomy on the one hand, unlimited expansion of 'rational mastery', on the other. They ambiguously coexisted under the common roof of 'reason'" (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 37–38). Arguably, both autonomy and rational mastery in their turn are enabled by a certain type of collectivity, which provides the ground for the collective decision-making and shared responsibility for the future. Such collectivity is seen as the last source of sovereignty (Anderson, 2006, p. 7; Miller, 1995, p. 30), and, thus, as the "final" autonomous being. Being the last sovereign, this collectivity is entitled to produce the laws, through obeying which it also exercises its autonomy.

As such this collectivity represents moral community (Miller, 1995, pp. 49–80; Moore, 2001, pp. 25–35), providing basis for solidarity, mobilization, political obligations, collective responsibility, feelings of belonging and common destiny, etc. In short, these communities took the holy place previously occupied by the Church and God Himself, the position of the source of all sovereignty and all power (Anderson, 2006, pp. 9–38). Worshipped under the name of the nations, these communities became the main object of the modern religion of nationalism.

Both autonomy and rational mastery are "imaginary significations", that is "multiform complexes of meaning that give rise to more determinate patterns and at the same time remain open to other interpretations" (Arnason, 1989, p. 34). Modern people are interpreting them as the members of nations, which, by the same token, are indeed "imagined communities" (Anderson, 2006). It is imagination that connects nations with autonomy and mastery: through imaginations nations understand themselves as autonomous (free) and rational (powerful); and it is through autonomous and creative imagination that large anonymous communities form the sense of belonging and obtain the moral obligations needed for them to become modern nations.

Since imagination is a phenomenon of human creativity, nationalism essentially is a creative reconstruction (through experience and interpretation) of the human world. Although in various nationalistic myths the nations are often represented as primordial entities, as something rooted in the "blood and soil" (Barry, 1999, pp. 17–20), they are, however, constantly imagined and constructed. It can be said, then, that there are no

nations, but only various national building processes, or, by the same token, various nationalisms. Nationalism, therefore, can be described as a creative imagination of the national building process. It is not surprising, then, that many authors trace sources of nation-building to the spread of the vernacular literary traditions (Anderson, 2006, pp. 37–46; Hastings, 1997, pp. 21–25). National literature, it seems, created not only the Russians (Lotman, 1987, p. 196, p. 320); its imaginative role was crucial in formation of all modern nations. According to Yu. Lotman, when the world of the medieval cultural values and moral principles was substituted with the modern culture, it is the literature – and this is especially obvious in Russia – which took the role of the spiritual and moral guide of the social life (see: Lotman, 1987, p. 320).

Imagination (including literary one) is crucial for both *interpretation* and *experience* of the reality. It is through the lens of imagination that autonomous human beings are making sense of their world, experience it and interpret this experience. That is why, according to Peter Wagner, modernity itself is *experience and interpretation* of the modern conditions (Wagner, 2008). The reality to be interpreted and experienced is rephrased by Wagner as *problématiques*, to which any society needs to give an answer. Namely, "the question about the rules for life in common constitutes the *political problématique* […]; the one about satisfaction of needs, the *economic problématique* […]; and the one about valid knowledge, the *epistemic problématique*" (Wagner, 2008, p. 4). Literature, science, music, theater, political institutions, economic arrangements etc. all are somehow answering the questions on how the community should govern its life together, by which means it will satisfy its material needs, and how the valid knowledge is produced.

Wagner's characterization is rather persuasive. However, it would also make sense to ask the question on what "the society", which needs to give an answer to the *problématiques* is? Wagner's description seems to suggest that this society is a kind of linguistic, historical and cultural community (since it requires common experience [history and culture] as well as shared interpretations [culture and language]), united by common political, economic and epistemic life. In short, the society in question is modern nation.

It is nation, then, which seeks to autonomously answer modern questions. At the same time, however, the opposite is also true: the nations are formed in the process of answering these questions. Nations are shaped by their answers and in this way obtain their national histories. This answering, in its turn, is not happened in isolation: nations in their nation-building face other realities, in which they are reflected like in (sometimes very distorting) mirrors. These mirrors include other nations and ethnic groups, as well as nature and geography of the national territory and so on. Nation-building, thus, is both limited and enabled by these externalities.

Now, this article is devoted to the analysis of the imaginary of the nation and nationalism in terms of its interrelations with another important modern imaginary: one of colony and colonialism. It will briefly demonstrate how interplay of the concepts of nation and colony produces modern understanding of the community. Since, as the text will show, it is the concept of the colony, which provides both the image of "the other", and the mirror needed for the effective nation-building, the colony is imagined

as what is distant geographically, different civilizationally and alien racially. The distance, however, is both postulated and bridged: postulated by oceans and bridged by resettlement, postulated by civilizational gap and bridged by education, and, finally, postulated by race, and bridged by citizenship.

The main question, which the article seeks to answer, then, is a question on the nature of this dialectic of distancing and approximation in the interplay of the ideas of colonialism and nationalism. Another important task relates to the analysis of the peculiarities of Russian colonial-and-national imaginary to the "model" European one. In many instances, as we will see, Russia is an anomaly, but it is exactly this anomality, which makes its case especially useful for the conceptual analysis.

Modern Mirrors

It is not at all accidental that the formation of modern European nations coincided with the development of the worldwide colonial system. Colonies seemed to provide Europe with the finest possible mirrors, helping European nations to find answers to the modern questions. On the one hand, colonies gave to the Europeans contrasting examples of the "backward" peoples, thus, justifying civilizational mission and "white man's burden", but, on the other hand, represented something like testing areas for the institutional arrangements to be used domestically afterwards. In India, for example, the British colonists tried the first joint-stock company (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006, p. 44), the first government-run schools, trigonometrical survey, separate cemetery, competitive examination for the civil service etc.: "The institutions of the modern state took shape in the colony, which can be seen as something of a laboratory of administrative practice, before making their way back to England" (ibid., p. 83).

Being a laboratory, the colony, however, at the same time must remain separate, different, alien, since only in such way it can perform its function of the mirror. It is just very natural, then, that various colonial rebellions strengthened metropolitan nationalism. Until very recently this cultural alienation very often took racial forms. Sepoy mutiny, for example, intensified British racism and resulted in creation of the separately demarcated spaces in Indian cities. "These spaces communicated racial difference. […] They represented, moreover, as part of lived experience, an association of British culture with the 'modern' in contrast to the older sections of the city seen as 'medieval' or 'traditional' – always the necessary foil to modernity. The 'colonial city' was predicated on such duality" (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006, p. 108).

Duality of metropolitan and colonial, modern and traditional created world of the simple binary oppositions, which survived up to the twenty-first century. The discourse of the binary oppositions, where "we" are described as mastering "our culture", autonomous, civilized and mature, while "they" are heteronomous, barbaric, childish, and are dominated by their culture, can be found both in Imperial British description of India and in recent George W. Bush's "war against terror". Wendy Brown comments:

> "We" have culture while culture has "them", or we have culture while they are a culture. Or, we are a democracy while they are a culture. This asymmetry turns

> on an imagined opposition between culture and individual moral autonomy, in which the former vanquishes the latter unless culture is itself subordinated by liberalism. The logic derived from this opposition between nonliberalized culture and moral autonomy then articulates a further set of oppositions between nonliberalized culture and freedom and between nonliberalized culture and equality (Brown, 2006, p. 151).

Theoretically, however, nationalism is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is nurtured by the differentiation, colonialism, and alienation; on the other hand, it also contains an important emancipatory trend: in theory, all nations are equally entitled to the national state. Thus, in the universalistic nationalism as well as in the very universality of the *Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* there has always been a seed of the elimination of the very same colonial dependency, which so actively participated in the formation of this nationalism.

Thus, the Great French Revolution, which intended to establish *liberty, equality* and *fraternity* for the citizens of the metropole, led to the demand of the equal rights among the colonized population as well as to the abolition of the slavery in some of the French colonies. Maintaining colonial system after the Revolution, in its turn, required complex theoretical argumentation on the unpreparedness of the colonies to the full autonomy, and, by the same token, radical displacement of the full exercise of the autonomy to the future. Thus, for example, in the French Caribbean the administrators confronted

> the dilemmas of a Republican imperialism in which colonial exploitation had to be institutionalized and justified within an ideological system based on the principle of universal rights. The solutions these administrators crafted were a foundation for the forms of governance employed by the French "imperial nation-state" of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this empire, as in the revolutionary French Caribbean, the colonized sometimes used claims to universal rights in demands for representation. But even as the colonial state presented itself as the bearer of the liberatory possibilities of democracy, administrators argued that the majority of the colonized did not have the cultural and intellectual capacities necessary to responsibly exercise political rights. The promise of access to rights was extended by the colonial administration but was constantly deferred to some unspecified moment in the future (Dubois, 2004, pp. 3–4).

In the beginning the rights were understood in the nationalist framework of thought as applicable to the co-citizens only, as a part of the nation-building process. Their very universality, however, gradually made them an instrument, applicable to much larger realm of international relations. As Samuel Moyn explains it,

> *droits de l'homme et du citoyen* meant something different from today's "human rights". For most of modern history, rights have been part and parcel of battles over the meanings and entitlements of citizenship, and therefore have been

> dependent on national borders for their pursuit, achievement and protection. In the beginning, they were typically invoked by a people to found a nation-state of their own, not to police someone else's. They were a justification for state sovereignty, not a source of appeal to some authority– like international law– outside and above it (Moyn, 2014, p. 58).

The very history of the idea of human rights, thus, clearly demonstrates historical dialectics of the national and colonial: being applicable first to the national realm only, the rights became a tool of overcoming the very gap between the national and colonial.

These introductory remarks seem to be enough to firmly support our claim that nation and colony, as well as the ideologies of nationalism and colonialism, are closely connected, entangled concepts. They are engaged in complex dialectical interrelations with each other. Nationalism of the metropole is reinforced by the reflection in the mirror of the colony; in its very reflection, however, it contributes to the production of the colony's nationalism, which, in its turn, destabilizes colonial system. If this is so, we have at least two rather different nationalisms: of the metropole and of the colony. The first starts with the idea of the civilizational (cultural, racial) superiority and combines domestic nation-building with civilizational mission abroad; the second is consolidated in the liberation struggle and had to define its tasks in negative terms. In the absence of the positive programme the anti-colonial nationalism is often weakened immediately after the liberation and tend to re-produce neo-colonial conditions.

The difference between these two types of the nationalism was well-known to revolutionary Soviet politicians, who supported anti-colonial (e.g. anti-Russian) nationalism of the "backward people", and by all means suppressed Russian nationalism, in which they saw chauvinism of the former metropole. As Lenin dictated in 1922,

> A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation. [...] Thus, internationalism on the part of oppressor or so-called "great" nation [...] must consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations, but even in an inequality, of the oppressor nation, the great nation, that must make up for the inequality which obtains in actual practice" (Lenin, 1970, pp. 358–359).

In Russia of the 1920s, this approach led to the creation of what Terry Martin called *affirmative action empire* (Martin, 2001).

For us, however, this distinction is important because it demonstrates intricate complex dialectics of the national and colonial. The rest of this article is essentially an attempt to analyze some aspects of this dialectics: we start from identifying the main characteristics of colonialism and proceed with the analysis of their interrelations with different types of the nationalism. It is impossible, of course, to provide here a fully comprehensive all-embracing picture; that is why we focus upon just *some* features, which, however, seem to be among the most crucial characterizations of modern colonialism and nationalism.

Plantation

Modern colonialism is part and parcel of modernity. Arguably, it is colonialism that represented the first historical form of both globalization and modernization. It is through its colonies that Europe tried to modernize (or to civilize, according to the dominant terminology of this time) the world, and thus to make European modernity truly global (see for example, Ferro, 1997, p. 86). On the one hand, colonies provided Europe with an image of "the Other," thus contributing to the consolidation of the idea of Europe itself. It was colonialism, undoubtedly, that introduced a "new accumulation regime," and thus "drew Europe into a global economy" (Stråth & Wagner, 2017, p. 92) contributing also to the unification of Europe (ibid., pp. 48–52). On the other hand, colonial experience linked modernity with oppression, or rather, "modernity itself [...] inaugurated a history of oppression" (ibid., p. 12). In short, we cannot hope to understand modernity without the history of colonization, which was at the same time a history of modernization, and a history of oppression and imperial domination. What, however, do we have in mind, when we talk of colonial experience?

It seems that today "colonialism" and "colonial" sometimes mean many different things. The authors are talking about colonization of the land and colonization of the people, colonization as external domination and colonization as modernization, colonization of the foreign peoples and domestic colonization of the peasants (see e.g. Etkind, 2003, p. 111). But does not it essentially blur all borders and differences between various types of domination? After all, domination always is alienation, a production of the cultural distance, that is, for some authors, a colonization.

Now, to define intricate relations between the national and the colonial it would seem to make much more sense to start with more traditional concept of colonization. First of all, one early modern meaning of colonization was "plantation" – and not only of exotic plants such as sugar cane or Pará rubber trees, as we would probably expect, but of people. Such was, at least, Francis Bacon's understanding in his essay 33 "On plantations" (Bacon, 1625/2001). Colonies, then, presuppose transfer of people from their motherland to elsewhere, their "plantation" on the other soil. This, in its turn also means more or less clear distinction between internal, national, and external, colonial. That is why it was always easier to talk about the colonies in the context of ocean empires, where internal and external were separated by masses of water than in relation to the continental empires, where, like in Russia, the boundaries between national and colonial have always been rather blurred. In any case, we talk of the colonies only when some trans-plantation of people takes place. That is why we talk about ancient Greek colonies or German colonies in the Volga region of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century Russia.

When, however, we refer to modern colonies as sources of wealth for the metropole or as the tools for "modernization" or a primitive form of modern "globalization", we always think of them as maintaining tight connections with the country of origin or as being externally dominated by the mother country. The colonies were able to become the tools of modernization, thus, because "history of the colonies is surely the history of the ways in which the power, prestige and profits

of some countries were enhanced [...] by external dependencies of migrant settlers" (Finley, 1976, p. 174). That is why the USA of the nineteenth century can be referred to as a British ex-colony, but communities of German Mennonites in Russia of the eighteenth century have never really been true colonies of the German principalities. It is in this context of the tight connections with the metropole, that Bacon thinks that the new plantations must be taken care of before they can produce handsome profit: "Planting of countries is like planting of woods; for you must make account to lose almost twenty years' profit, and expect your recompense in the end" (Bacon, 1625/2001, p. 123).

In addition to these three main elements – trans-plantation, external territory and formal (state) dependency – the very notion of soil seems to be of paramount importance. The main object of colonization seems to be exactly the soil, the land and not just a group of people. The external land, the territory, is where the trans-plantation happens. In the ideal case, the land should be free, empty or belong to nobody. The discourse of nobody's land or *terra nullius* is, thus, very important for the justification of colonization. This discourse equally applies to the vast Siberian territory in Russia or the lands of the present-day KwaZulu-Natal and Highveld after the turmoil of Mfecane and Difaqane, which led to the depopulation of these territories, subsequently occupied by white settlers (Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007, pp. 124–138; Nattrass, 2017, pp. 57–58). As Bacon put it, "I like a plantation in a pure soil; that is, where people are not displanted to the end to plant in others. For else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation" (Bacon, 1625/2001, p. 123).

Now, all three traditional elements of the colonial situation – transplantation, external territory and formal dependency – reproduce sharp difference and distance between national and colonial, between the land, that plants and the soil, in which the colony is planted. Kept in this way on a distance, colony becomes a good mirror for the nation. Colonial is understood as external, while national in the contrast is defined as internal and domestic. In this understanding colonial distance is defined geographically, while bridged politically (through dependency) and demographically (via transplantation of the population). The clearest case, then, is presented by the ocean Empires, where the colony and the nation were divided by the water. In these Empires the notion of colony (of what belong to us "there") seems to be very important for the definition of the nation (of who we are "here").

Russian case, on the other hand, seems to be much less evident. Being the country, which is colonizing itself (see: Klyuchevsky, 1904/1908, p. 24), it was constantly transforming the frontier into national territory, thus, changing would be colonies into what gradually came to be defined as the core of the nation. Consider for example, that in the period of the sixteenth – eighteenth centuries Russia had proper borders only in its western part. As Michael Khodarkovsky explains,

> borders required that neighboring peoples define and agree upon common lines of partition. […] A frontier is a region that forms a margin of a settled or developed territory, a politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit. […] In the west, where Russia confronted other sovereign states,

> the territorial limits of the states were demarcated by the borders. In the south and east, where Russia's colonization efforts encountered disparate peoples not organized onto states and with no boundaries between them, the zone of separation between Russia and its neighbors was a frontier (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 47).

This partly explains the fact why it was always difficult for the Russian Empire to clearly distinguish between the national and the colonial.

Another differentiation seems to be relevant here for better understanding the nuances of the interdependency of the colonial and the national. It is differentiation between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, between soil-based and blood-based nationalisms, which Rogers Brubaker finds in French and German nationalisms respectively. Stating that "the modern nation-state is […] inherently nationalistic" and that "its legitimacy depends on its furthering […] the interests of a particular, bounded citizenry", he observes: "French understandings of nationhood have been state-centered and assimilationist, German understandings ethnocultural and 'differentialist'" (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 10–11).

These two nationalisms treat the distance between the colonies and the nation differently. If for the French *jus soli* people from colonies can become members of the French nation, the community of descent of the *jus sanguinis* is rather exclusivist and perceive the gap with the other peoples as unbridgeable. Even if it seems too much to say that "[…] *jus sanguinis* leads logically to ethnic cleansing, *jus soli* to ethnic integration" (Hastings, 1997, p. 34), the differentiation between these two types of nationalism helps us to understand different variants of the relations between colonialism and nationalism.

Thus, France, for example, has finally come to treat its colonies as certain extension of the French nation. That is why French citizenship (that is membership in the French nation) has been given at birth to any child, at least one parent of whom was also born in France (including Algeria or other colonial territories before independence). This late French understanding of the colonies as extensions of the metropole nation is, of course, very different from, for example, British almost apartheid concept of the Indian sub-continent. Interestingly, in his famous study of 1902 J. A. Hobson located the cause of this different understanding of the national and colonial in the influence of imperialistic attitudes.

For Hobson colonialism is not only very different from imperialism, but, in its original spirit, is contradictory to imperial domination. Genuine colonialism is, for Hobson, "migration of part of a nation to vacant or sparsely peopled foreign lands, the emigrants carrying with them full rights of citizenship in the mother country, or else establishing local self-government with her institutions and under her final control, may be considered a genuine expansion of nationality" (Hobson, 1902, p. 6).

Imperialism, however, is a domination over foreign territories, which does not always imply migration of people. Some colonies, according to Hobson, choose self-governance in the spirit of genuine colonialism (South Africa, for example), while others (such as India) are exploited in the spirit of imperialism. Colonial imperialism,

thus, for Hobson, is a perversion of colonialism, when colonies are not considered anymore as extensions of nationality but are imperialistically exploited.

France and Germany for him are equally imperialistic, and the French and German territories in Africa and Asia are not real colonies, since they "were in no real sense plantations of French and German national life beyond the seas; nowhere, not even in Algeria, did they represent true European civilization; their political and economic structure of society is wholly alien from that of the mother country" (Hobson, 1902, p. 7). Anyway, it is pronounced difference between the colonial and the national, which for Hobson was the main evidence of the imperialistic (and therefore quasi-colonial) domination. Colonialism, thus, is always located somewhere in between nationalism, on the one hand, and imperialism, on the other.

Civilization

Terra nullius, however, is rarely "pure" in Bacon's terminology, since it is often occupied by different indigenous peoples. Existence of indigenous population certainly complicates the issue and requires an elaborated theory of what is *terra nullius* if it is already occupied, and whether new-coming settlers can really wage just wars against local people who are defending the land upon which they have lived for millennia. It is here that the notions of civilization and barbarism enter the complex colonial discourse. Bacon already used the notion of superiority of civilization over barbarism as a reason for colonial domination, and the notion of modern moral education of the "savages" as a justification for the land expropriation:

> If you plant where savages are, do not only entertain them with trifles and gingles, but use them justly and graciously, with sufficient guard nevertheless; and do not win their favor by helping them to invade their enemies, but for their defense it is not amiss; and send of them over to the country that plants, that they may see a better condition than their own, and commend it when they return (Bacon, 1625/2001, pp. 125–126).

The discourse of colonization is thus connected with the discourse of civilization on the one hand, and education, on the other. How, then, is civilization conceptualized, and why does this conceptualization help to justify expropriation of the land from "uncivilized" people or rather to understand this land as a proper *terra nullius*? First of all, there is a Christian theological background in early modern thinking about land ownership. As David Boucher noted: "The basic premise among jurists and philosophers in the early modern period regarding property rights was that God gave the whole world in common to mankind, and those portions that remained unoccupied or uncultivated, which did not necessarily mean upon which no people resided, were available for legitimate occupation" (Boucher, 2016, p. 71). Moreover, since God gave the land to humankind to make the most of it through its cultivation by labor, only those who cultivate the land (and not simply occupy it) can claim the property right. Property comes with labor and not with occupation. Thus, uncultivated land is conceptualized

as *terra nullius* even if it is occupied by "savage" hunters and gatherers: "Vitoria, Ayala, Suarez, Gentile, Locke, Wolff and Vattel, for example, contend that people have an obligation to cultivate the land, and if they do not, they have no right to prevent those who would" (Boucher, 2016, p. 71).

Thus, colonialism, originally at least, is more about the land and the property, than about the "colonized" people. Legitimation of the expropriations, however, was a starting point for the civilization discourse, which drew sharp boundaries between modern European nations and the "savage" indigenous populations of the colonies. Colonization, then, came also with a special "white man's burden": to serve, in Kipling's words, "your new-caught sullen peoples, half devil and half child" (Kipling, 1899). We have seen that already Bacon recommended to send the "savages" to "the country that plants", so that they would see for themselves the advantages of the European ways of life and would commend them after returning home. The "white man's burden" then is conceptualized as the education for modernization. This educational dimension of colonial imperialism seems to be a unique feature of modernity. If Rome, according to Vergil, must only govern the peoples (Vergil, n.d., 851–853), modern Europe had to educate them.

John Stuart Mill, for example, has famously made moral education in colonies an important element of his concept of liberty. For him,

> Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion (Mill, 1991, p. 31).

"Barbarians", "savages", are "half children", and since nobody grants to children (who can harm themselves and others) the full liberty of adult people, it cannot be granted to the "barbarians" either. If, in thinking of the "savages", John Locke focused upon rational mastery of the world (effective use of the land), Mill pays attention to the individual autonomy (capacity to be improved by free discussion). Both elements define "civilization" in contrast to "barbarism". Although Mill himself referred to the subjects of Charlemagne as "the barbarians" of these passages (Mill, 1991, p. 31), one cannot help thinking that for him, at some point a high officer of the East India Company, this notion covered also the population of the Indian sub-continent.

Civilization discourse is really ambiguous in so far as it concerns relations between the nation and its colonies. On the one hand, it compares "barbarians" to the children, and thus, being a discourse of moral education, is aimed at the equality, at eliminating domination, at moral maturity of the "savages". Children are growing up, and so do the barbarians. On the other hand, the discourse tends to displace the maturity and autonomy of the colonial population to more or less distant future. One of the mechanisms of this displacement is a myth of the slow "sleepy" nature of the "oriental" civilizations. They all are too slow in reaching moral maturity of the readiness to the exercise of autonomy. Thus, they will have to remain colonies for a long period.

This displacement, in its turn, contributed to the establishing of the persistent cultural distance between the colony and the metropole. This cultural distancing in addition to the geographical one became another key instrument for the differentiation between the national and the colonial.

Russia, again, had some important peculiarities. On the one hand, a world mission of Russian Empire has been interpreted in terms of civilizing Asian people. Even those authors, who as Engels were skeptical about a "Russian world", have semi-reluctantly recognized this mission. Thus, Engels wrote in 1851 to Marx: "Russia, on the other hand, is truly progressive by comparison with the East. Russian rule, for all its infamy, all its Slavic filth, is civilizing for the Black and Caspian Seas and Central Asia, for the Bashkirs and Tatars" (Engels, 1913/2010, p. 363). This arrogant phrase is closely echoed by the nationalistic Fyodor Dostoyevsky: In Europe we were dependents and slaves; we will come to Asia as the masters. In Europe, we were Tatars; in Asia, we are Europeans. Our mission, our civilizing mission in Asia will attract our spirit. Just build two railroads, one to Siberia, another to Central Asia (see: Dostoyevsky, 1881/1984, pp. 36–37; see however Danilevskiy, 1869/2016, p. 98).

On the other hand, being a strong European Empire in the mirror of its Asian possessions, Russia itself was an "Asian" "backward" country in the mirror of the "enlightened Europe". This self-orientalization narrowed the gap between the Russians and "Asian tribes" on the borders of the Empire. Taken together with the lack of the clear physical borders, it significantly blurred the difference between the nation and colony. Thus, if for the much of the nineteenth century, Siberia was perceived as a colony (see, for example, Yadrintsev, 1882), and its Russian population – almost as a separate proto-nation, in the twentieth century it became an integral (and central) part of the Russian national territory.

That is why, in spite of the constant calls to treat newly acquired Russian lands according to the European colonial model (see: Khomyakov, 2020, p. 239), the officials of the Empire have always insisted that these lands are not really the colonies, but extensions of the Russian national territory (for a discussion see Sunderland, 2010). "Colonization" in Russia has always meant "resettlement" or "development of the territories", so that in 1920s there existed a State Research Institute of Colonization (Goskolonit). This absence of the strict differentiation between the colonial and the national, has certainly influenced upon the very imaginary of Russian nation (see, for example, Khomyakov, 2020, p. 240). Therefore, for the Imperial ex- prime minister Sergei Witte, the Russian Empire represents agglomeration of different nationalities, therefore, essentially, there is no Russia, there is only the Russian Empire (see: Witte, 1923/1960, p. 129).

Races

The discourse of civilization was, on the one hand, supported by various modern racial theories, but, on the other hand, was also in radical contradiction to them. Races are different, and according to the racial theories, these differences can be ordered hierarchically. This explains why the "lower races" are so slow in their

development, and, thus, legitimizes civilizational mission of the "higher races". On the other hand, races are primordial and, thus, *insuperably different*. What insuperability justifies, however, is rather apartheid, separation of the races in the society, and not so much education, civilization or modernization of the "lower races". Insuperability of the differences makes civilizational efforts futile. Racism, thus, produces perfect separation of the nation and its colonies, even if they exist, as in South Africa, in the framework of the single society.

We have already mentioned masses of water, which endowed ocean empires with clear boundaries between national and colonial territories. Now we see that the most powerful discourse, which rendered population of those territories different, was, in reality, the discourse of the race (or, in some cases, of ethnos). Existence of obvious physical differences made race an effective instrument for separating external and internal. Races and oceans, thus, played similar roles in modern colonialism (there is a rich literature on these issues. See, for example, Betts, 1982, demonstrating how the French Empire was constantly re-producing differences between white colon and black or yellow *indigènes*). Oceans, however, can be sailed and, thus, bridged, while racial differences are imagined as perennial.

More liberal forms of racism, however, did not deny possibilities of education. Even if the "lower" races are slower, they are still able to imitate the ways of the higher civilizing nation. Some Russian liberals of the nineteenth century were professing this kind of the racism. A brilliant historian of Siberia, Afanasy Shchapov (1831–1876) wrote in 1864: Let us be humane and scientifically attentive to our lower brothers, the alien tribes. They are also waiting for facilitation of their struggle with the climate, hunger, with the violence of the higher tribe, waiting for the enlightenment and for their conflation with the higher, more developed Slavic Russian tribe (see: Shchapov, 1865/1906, p. 366). See similar considerations in works of the Shchapov's follower, Nikolay Yadrintsev (Yadrintsev, 1891, p. 189; Yadrintsev, 1882, p. 123). Lower races are slower in their development, but nothing really precludes them from getting to the level of the "higher races", whose task is to help their "brothers" in this difficult process.

In general, however, racism helped to substitute what Hobson called "colonial spirit" with purely imperialistic exploitation, and to abandon the very thought of the possibility of considering "colonial" as an extension of the "national". Later Leninist literature would tightly connect colonialism to imperialism and to the development of transnational monopolies. In this interpretation colonialism is essentially a fight between imperialistic nations for the new markets and exploitation of some nations by the others (Lenin, 1917/1964).

As for the racial issues, although, as we have seen above, Russian intellectuals had not escaped the racist theories, these theories in general, it seems, were not as widespread and popular as they were elsewhere. Racist considerations, at the same time, were substituted in Russia with equally primordial ethnic ones. Ethnicity played in Russia almost the same role, which in the ocean Empires has been played by the race. Interestingly, "ethnic" characterizations in Russia were generally used in description of the "undeveloped" or "backward" people, while population of the

"central" and "western" (predominantly Christian) regions of the Empire was described as "nations". Later primordial ethnicity has often been described as "nationality", while "nation" required certain level of the modernization and development.

In general, however, the terminology has never been stable in the country, which stubbornly denied its colonial nature even after conquering Caucasus and Central Asia. Michael Khodarkovsky describes it in the following way:

> It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that the collective terms for Russia's non-Christian subjects emerged in the official Russian language. The non-Christians were now more systematically referred to as *inovertsy* (of a different faith), and by the early nineteenth century as *inorodtsy* (of a different origin, descent, and later race). The two terms conflated notions of people and faith, emphasizing unmistakably that the non-Christians were different from the Russians in both religion and race. Religion also marked the boundaries in the usage of the term "nation" (*natsiia*), which by the late eighteenth century was largely for the Christian peoples […] within Russian Empire, while the non-Christians were referred to as a people (narod or ludi) (Khodarkovsky, 2002, pp. 188–189).

What was religion in the eighteenth century became modernization or westernization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:

> If all societies are classified relative to their degree of "westernization" – and they have been so classified in Russia […] then a truly "meaningful" change has to result in the West being "outwested", that is, in certain economic, social, and cultural expectations being fulfilled. […] The Estonians, for example, who in nineteenth-century Russia tended to be portrayed as "sullen Finns" and inarticulate rural barbarians […] came to represent the epitome of Western development and sophistication after their reincorporation into the empire in 1940 (Slezkine, 1994, pp. 390–391).

This absence of the clear racial classifications is yet another evidence of the blurred boundary between national and colonial in Russian Empire. In Russia, thus, we have a very peculiar imperial arrangement, where nation and colony are not separated by any clear border in the form of the oceanic water, are not interpreted in terms of racial differences, and where the mother nation imagined itself a backward colony of the Enlightened Europe. Being a civilized nation with clear "white man's mission" in the East, the Russians thought of themselves as of barbaric people in relation to Europe. Although Soviet modernization changed the picture rather radically, one still can really describe Soviet Union neither as a colonial empire nor as a national state (see: Khomyakov, 2020, pp. 225-263; Slezkine, 2004, p. 275). The blurred boundaries and unclear borders between different nations and numerous ethnic groups, thus, seem to represent one of the defining features of Russian modernity.

Conclusion

In conclusion let us to recapitulate. The national is separated from the colonial by physical boundaries, distance between civilization and barbarism, racial or ethnic differences. In classical European colonialism, these differences were sharp and clear. They started to disappear only with a radical development of the emancipatory logic of nationalism and with the technological innovations of the jet plane, which made distant places easily accessible for the mass tourists. Ideology and technology, thus, equally contributed to the world's emancipation.

In Russia, on the contrary, the borders were constantly erased, the frontier cultivated, the differences mixed up. Racial issues have never been so acute here as in Europe or the New World and civilizing other tribes very often turned out to be self-civilization. Russia has always been both orientalizing and orientalized, imperial and colonial, Eastern and Western, civilized and barbaric, European and Asian, in short, nation and colony. Russian nation-building has been accompanied by the intertwined processes of colonization and self-decolonization and has always been influenced by the imagination of the borders and frontiers.

The triptych of alienation/bridging of oceans/navigation, civilization/education and racism/modernization has not really worked in Russia in the way it worked for the European ocean Empires. In result, Russian self-image in the colonial mirrors was very often too distorted and unclear to significantly help in nation-building; much clearer image has been provided by the mirror of the Enlightened Europe, in which one of the largest Empires appeared to be a backward barbaric semi-colony.

These peculiarities seem to persist until today. Current rise of anti-colonial and anti-racist protests after killing of George Floyd is undoubtedly connected with the history of exclusive interpretation of nation and with colonialism built into nationalism and processes of nation-building. *Black Lives Matter* movement's war against symbols and monuments is essentially a radical re-interpretation of the founding events of the American and European nations. Discourses are being reconsidered everywhere: started in the ex-colonial America, it went as far as Imperial Spain and Portugal. The discussion of the racist elements in European nationalism is gradually rising almost everywhere. Thus, for example, a recent publication on Portuguese national identity asks: "With the growth of anti-racist movement in Portugal, our entire national narrative is being challenged, confronting us with the possibility of racism as a structural reality in Portugal. Are we a racist country?" (Braga, 2020).

In a way, this development undermines very foundations of the liberal nationalism, which, as we have seen, had been developing in close connection with colonialism. In this sense, elimination of the remnants of the colonial system might well turn out to be a start of the dusk of nationalism, which many experts were expecting for a long time. Eric Hobsbaum, for example, saw in the rise of the literature of nationalism an indicator of its near demise: "[…] The very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggest that, as so often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings

wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 192).

Russia seems to be excluded from this process. Because of its peculiar history and unique relations between the imaginary of the Russian nation and the idea of colonial Empire, it lacks European and American sensitivity to the issues of race. One of the current radical examples of this insensitiveness is a politically motivated and culturally conditioned paper of otherwise prominent scholar, Alexander V. Lukin. Interestingly, among other things, he argues that "the West (the U.S. and Europe) are no longer free societies", while "Universities in Russia are […] much freer than in the U.S. and Western Europe where they have turned into places where lecturers and students are forced to repent and get expelled for inadvertent remarks" (Lukin, 2020).

Russia and the post-colonial world of the European Empires and their more or less distant ex-colonies speak today very different languages. What seems of paramount importance in the West sounds ridiculous in Russia, which in result suddenly started to feel more emancipated than liberal Europe itself? Probably, however, it is historically determined insensitivity mistakenly taken for the freedom.

Russia has, of course, its own foundational historical myths, fundamental for the current imaginary of the Russian nation. And it is as difficult for the Russians to speak of them freely, as it is currently is difficult for the Americans to express their disagreement with the anti-racist war with the symbols. Most influential among these Russian myths are history of the WWII, the role of Russian language as well as some remnants of the colonial past (see, for example, discussions around the monuments to the conqueror of Caucasus, General Ermolov). Race, however, is not included in these themes. Surely, it does not make Russia much freer than Europe and the US as far as the freedom of speech is concerned; it does render it different, however.

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ARTICLE

Irony as a Political Demarcation Tool of the New Russian Nationalists

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ABSTRACT
The article discusses how and why the new nationalists, who call for political self-determination of Russians but share some ideological concepts with liberals, use *stiob* – form of ironic parody based on overidentification and decontextualisation, resulting in destruction of the authoritative discourse. Their entertaining, or educational-cum-entertaining projects located in the gray area between politics and counterculture strive to undermine domineering political discourses (liberal, neo-Soviet, leftist, official patriotic and old nationalist) and to go beyond the left-right dichotomy. The author concludes that the main function of *stiob* and other forms of irony for the new nationalists is negative identification. Ambivalence of the language of *stiob* simultaneously attracts the target audience of nationalists ("those in the know") and does not prevent solidarizing with any political platform when needed. The article is based on qualitative analysis of narratives produced by nationalist social media influencers, including fiction, essays, talks, lectures, interviews, live broadcasts, posts in blogs, social networks and messengers.

KEYWORDS
new nationalists, irony, *stiob*, parody, digitalization of politics

Introduction

In this article, I will speak about nationalists who envision the Russian Federation as a state dominated by ethnic minorities and call for political self-determination of Russians (Mitrofanova, 2006; 2016), although most of them understand Russianness in terms of culture, not biology. Their political ideal is known as the Russian nation-state (*Russkoe natsionalnoe gosudarstvo*),

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commonly abbreviated as *RNG*. I focus on a stream that shares some ideological concepts with Western-style liberalism, known as National Democrats (the *Natsdem*), liberal conservatives, right-wing liberals, or simply as the new nationalists (Laruelle, 2018, pp. 174–180; Mitrofanova, 2012)[1]. They antagonize the old right, or the old nationalists and sometimes solidarize with liberal political figures, such as Mikhail Svetov, Valerii Solovei, or Alexei Navalny. In many aspects they resemble the American alt-right (see: Naked Pravda, 2020b) and the European right-wing populists. The new nationalists renounce the style of the old ones and self-identify ironically as "beardless". Besides, they became notorious for their use of satire as a political instrument. The new nationalists in Russia utilize such concepts of the Western far right as "cultural Marxism", but the question of mutual influence remains so far open; some interactions exist, but they hardly have serious impact on both sides.

The article discusses how and why the new nationalists use a specific form of ironic parody known as *stiob*[2]. It is based on qualitative analysis of narratives produced by social media influencers, including fiction, essays, talks, lectures, interviews, live broadcasts, posts in blogs, social networks and messengers. Visual content, such as memes, demotivators, cartoons, etc. remains outside the framework of this publication (see: Babikova & Voroshilova, 2017; Kalkina, 2020; Sanina, 2015). I relied mostly on individual online platforms such as personal or friendly YouTube[3] channels; profiles on Yandex[4] Zen and Facebook[5]; Discord[6] and Telegram[7] channels; personal websites. Of collective projects, I used Telegram-channels *The Right News* [Правые новости] and *Memes for Russians* [Мемы для русских], *Vespa.media – Journal of the National Revenge* (website, Facebook and Telegram). To be confident that the narratives are not parodies, I chose resources created by eminent nationalists, or, at least, by people whose belonging to the milieu had been confirmed by well-known influencers. Key personalities are Konstantin Krylov (1967–2020), Vladimir Lorchenkov (b. 1977), Dometii Zavolskii (b. 1980), Egor Prosvirnin (b. 1986), Aleksandr Bosykh (b. 1978), and Nikolai Rosov (b. 1995). Data collection took place in 2018–2020, although sporadically I refer to older digital content, retrieved with the help of keywords. The research was based exclusively on observation and was limited to profiles and posts open to the public. No quantitative methods were applied.

Themes brought up in the publication have been partly discussed by linguists studying irony as a narrative technique in the Russian language in general (Guseinov, 2005; Kornilov, 2015; Panchenko, 2016; Ruzhentseva, 2014; Tomson, 2009; Vokuev,

[1] I prefer calling them «new nationalists», because this definition seems to be acceptable for the majority of the milieu.

[2] *Stiob* – a form of parody, an ironic aesthetic that "required such a degree of overidentification with the object, person, or idea [...] that it was often impossible to tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a peculiar mixture of the two". According to Alexei Yurchak, it was the fundamental feature of late Soviet and early post-Soviet culture (Yurchak, 2005, p. 250).

[3] YouTube™ is a trademark of Google Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

[4] Yandex™ is a trademark of Yandex Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

[5] Facebook™ is a trademark of Facebook Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

[6] Discord ™ is a trademark of Discord Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

[7] Telegram™ is a trademark of Telegram Messenger LLP.

2011), or with a focus on political discourse (Babikova & Voroshilova, 2015; Fenina, 2015; Gornostaeva, 2018; Shilikhina, 2011). *Stiob* and related forms of irony have been extensively studied by anthropologists and sociologists of Soviet and early post-Soviet counterculture (Boym, 2006; Dubin, 2001; Gudkov & Dubin, 1994; Ioffe, 2016; Klebanov, 2013; Stodolsky, 2011; Yoffe, 2013; Yurchak, 2005, 2011) and mass culture (Dunn, 2004; Hutchings, 2017, 2020; Noordenbos, 2011; Yoffe, 2005).

The Aesthetics of *Stiob*: Between Politics and Counter-Culture

Digitalization definitely provides for further blurring of the border between politics and fun (for a review of contemporary literature on humour in politics, see: Petrovic, 2018). Political discourse as a whole becomes more entertainment-oriented. In last years, gamification became a visible characteristic of social media broadcasting (see: Woodcock & Johnson, 2019). Apart from being an important part of contemporary leisure culture, videogames are also communication platforms for networks of like-minded people. It is reported that American far right use in-game chat rooms to recruit new supporters (Kamenetz, 2018). In Russia currently there is no such evidence; nevertheless, the new nationalists extensively use streaming of videogames – live or pre-recorded – to convey their message. Communication often takes place in chat rooms created on platforms, like Discord, designed for videogamers. Some nationalist authors consider street-level political activism outdated and suggest that one clip dedicated to Fallout and published on Youtube does more for advancing the right-wing ideas that hundreds of demos (see: Maksimov, 2018).

To be watched, nationalist streams need to provide some interesting information, mostly not related to the ideology. Most of social media influencers create educational-cum-entertaining ("edutaining") content, such as popular lectures about science, or talks with Internet celebrities (Figure 1). History is the most popular topic, because in Russia it is commonly discussed as a substitute to politics.



Figure 1. Anthropologist Drobyshevskii, a Youtube celebrity, as a guest of Nikolai Rosov's stream; pre-recorded game Ancestors in the background reflects the profession of the invitee (Groza, 2020a)

The easiest ways to attract more viewers are satirical parody and irony, especially their most harsh forms, such as *stiob*, conceptualised by Alexei Yurchak (Yurchak, 2005). Mark Yoffe who invented a bunch of words to discuss the phenomenon (stiobbing, stiobber, stiobbee, stiobby, to out-stiob[8]) understands *stiob* as interaction between "those 'in the know' who presume that their utterances, aside from signifying the obvious, also signify something else, often the opposite of what is being stated straightforwardly" (Yoffe, 2013, p. 209). Successful *stiob* is ambivalent and indistinguishable from the original discourse (Klebanov, 2013, p. 232; Yoffe, 2013, p. 222; Yurchak, 2011, p. 319). Sometimes the degree of overidentification becomes so surprise that *stiob* is often described as a blatant, cruel and merciless form of communication.

Yurchak suggests that overidentification is necessarily accompanied by decontextualization, when the object of stiobbing is placed in a context that is unintended and unexpected for it (Yurchak, 2005, p. 252). Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin also define *stiob* as a public deflation of symbols by their demonstrative use in the context of parody (Gudkov & Dubin 1994, p. 166). A. Kugaevskii (2006) suggests that there are two kinds of *stiob*: direct defamation of the object (another words, its decontextualization) or exaggerating the object's qualities and reducing them to an absurdity (i.e., overidentification). Both kinds aim at deconstruction, or even total destruction of a discourse.

Scholarly attention to *stiob* resulted from the studies in the second Russian avant-garde. Some directions in art of that period based on overidentification with the domineering discourse: for example, conceptualist performances could hardly be differentiated from the normal Soviet life (a *stiobby* visit of conceptualists Vadim Zakharov and Igor Luts to the Lenin's Museum in 1979 did not differ from any other visit). *Stiob* works well in the situation of a hypernormalized authoritative discursive regime, where reproduction of formulaic structures becomes more important than solidarity with their initial meanings (Yurchak, 2005, p. 284). This kind of irony is commonly associated with political languages of (post)socialist countries; however, it is not uncommon to apply the concept of *stiob* to Western societies. Yoffe traces it in Black American culture and in the work of Tarantino (Yoffe, 2013, pp. 216–217); Boyer and Yurchak discuss the emerging genre of American *stiob* in the sphere of news media (2010). Similar kind of irony is utilized by the alt-right in the U.S. (see: Woods & Hahner, 2019) and by the European populist right, wearing pig masks or carnival Muslim costumes during their demos (Pilkington, 2016, pp. 192–193).

Yoffe suggests that *stiob*, at least, in Russia, "is a more powerful tool in the hands of right-wing nationalists" (Yoffe, 2013, p. 210). In fact, the second avant-garde was politically ambivalent: commonly associated with leftism, it was, nevertheless, "right-wing oriented" (Ioffe, 2016). This ambivalence was equally characteristical of the first avant-garde and of the post-Soviet counterculture exemplified by a conceptualist artist Sergei Kurekhin (Boyer & Yurchak, 2010; Klebanov, 2013; Yurchak, 2011) who eventually became a promoter of ultraconservative political agenda. *Stiob* shaped many activities of the National Bolshevik Party; both Aleksandr Dugin and Eduard Limonov, once its leaders, could not be precisely categorized in accordance with left-

[8] Boyer and Yurchak offer also "stiobesque".

right scale. Kurekhin, Limonov and Dugin are transitional figures providing a bridge between the artistic world and the domain of politics.

The new nationalists are not necessarily artists, but following the suggestion of Fabrizio Fenghi (2017, p. 184) that the aesthetics of the National Bolsheviks should be seen as an adaptation of the style and posture of the historical avant-gardes, I locate them in the grey zone between art and politics. Maria Engström states with regard to politicized Orthodox groups that some radical discourses are so marginalized that they have to ally themselves with counter-cultural forces (Engström, 2015, p. 71). The same assumption is correct about the new nationalist milieu, where writers and other art-makers play an important part.

New Nationalist Literary Parodies

Boris Dubin rightly mentions that *stiob* is tied to literature (Dubin, 2001, p. 174); therefore, I would like to begin with literary parodies produced by three new nationalist writers: the late Konstantin Krylov, head of the National Democratic Party that existed mostly on paper (also known as a sci-fi writer Mikhail Kharitonov), Vladimir Lorchenkov and Dometii Zavolskii. From many Russian literary canons listed by Alexei Yudin (2017, pp. 346–347), nationalist writers have selected the genres of mass literature (detective stories, adventures, sci-fi, etc.) and juvenile literature, often blending them. Books belonging to these literary canons are unmistakably recognizable and easily comprehensible; they are also conveniently structured to perform political tasks: both genres admit no undertones and are built on clear antagonism between good and evil, us and them (Nosova & Chernyak, 2016, p. 34). Writers of parodies use fixed discursive units or "precedent phenomena" (Babikova & Voroshilova, 2017) loaned from the original text to invert its meaning and to switch between good and evil. Inversion is then presented as revealing the true nature of things, which the original text conceals. Politicized parodies, of course, target not the original texts as such; bit a social context to which these texts belong (Yudin, 2017, p. 339).

Konstantin Krylov's relatively popular novella *Rubidium* [Рубидий] travesties a famous novel "Monday begins on Saturday" [Понедельник начинается в субботу] by the Strugatsky brothers. The parody is complex and includes a scrupulous stylization of the original text, but I will like to limit my analysis to the types of ethnic Russians shown in *Rubidium*.

The first type – a Soviet Russian – is the protagonist, Privalov. Following the original text, Krylov pictures him as a naïve person, unaware of what actually happens in his social environment, which miraculously acquires an ability to see the true essences of people. Then three other types of Russians are revealed. One is Korneev, who was a talented young scholar in the original novel, whose only problem was "rude" speech (in Krylov's parody, he endlessly spews *mat* and obscenities). Magic reveals Korneev's true nature as of a "red", i.e. Soviet, man who is not Russian any more. Professor Vybegallo, poorly educated and mean in the original novel, turns out to be an enchanted pre-revolutionary Russian *intelligent* Filipp Filippovich Preobrazhenskii (a personage from Mikhail Bulgakov's story *Heart of a Dog*). He explains that Privalov

is under control of numerous spells, which do no harm to his non-Russian colleagues because they have nationality, and it blocks such things (see: Kharitonov, 2016). The fourth Russian is Sasha Drozd, a loafer from the original text, who eventually degrades to the position of the local analogy to house elves, but after disenchantment reincarnates into a talented photographer.

While *Rubidium* is based mostly on decontextualization, some other parodies by Krylov imply high degree of overidentification. He wrote a blog on behalf of a Jewish poet Yudik Sherman [Юдик Шерман]. Travesty nature of this mask is mostly evident, but there are some exceptions, such as "a genuinely Jewish verse in the style of the Jerusalem Poetry Almanac" written on behalf of a Jew who gets outraged because of a phone bill for a conversation with Jerusalem. He laments about Jews who had to pay "for the right to exist" and declares that some indefinite "them" should pay: For our Bible, for our Einstein, for our women, for our genius, and for our pain (see: Sherman, 2009). The verse is totally ambivalent and can be mistaken for serious poetry, although several suspicious lines are still present. Obviously, Krylov hints here to Jewish greed, but this layer of parody is superficial. Krylov considered anti-Semitism a "marginalizing ideology" aiming at provoking a feeling of complete helplessness and inability to do anything (see: Krylov, 2009). Krylov's *stiob* targets the "old right" sharing this ideology and envisioning Jews as all-mighty people whom Russians will never be able to overcome.

Vladimir Lorchenkov, who lives in Canada and spells his name as Lorcenkov, is not politically active; more than once he claimed not being a Russian nationalist. Nevertheless, his essays demonstrate that he supports the idea of a Russian nation-state, although evaluates its perspectives pessimistically. Lorchenkov's works, as well as those by Krylov, are full of *stiob* and other types of irony, as well as of *mat*, violence and physiological details. A short story *The City of the Sun* [Город Солнца] refers to a modern fairy tale by an Italian Communist writer Gianni Rodari, *The Adventures of the Little Onion [Cipollino]*, belonging to the Soviet canon of juvenile literature. The original text is about a proletarian revolution in the kingdom of vegetables and fruits, but Lorchenkov decontextualizes it, describing a country torn by civil war, where a revolutionary squad of vegetables perpetrates monstrous violence (Lorchenkov, 2012). The author parodies the style not of Gianni Rodari, but of Isaac Babel's collection of short stories about civil war *Konarmiya* [*Конармия*]. He mentions a combatant named Garlic ([Чесночок], a hint at Jewishness) who wants to become a writer and takes Babel as a pen name (this personage also resembles Eduard Bagritskii and other early Soviet authors). Lorchenkov's target is left-wing ideology in general; that is why he choses an Italian children's story with a clear reference to an utopian book by another Italian author, Tommaso Campanella. Lorchenkov also authors a cycle of fake translations from writers and poets representing Soviet nationalities. These personages are given stiobby names and texts: for example, a verse by "Petro Zakolbyuzhnyi, a Ukrainian poet" consists of one phrase – "Glory to Ukraine"; in every line, syllables and letters mingle until the text gradually becomes a mess (TsarGori, 2018). "Translations" target not some concrete authors, but the concept of national literature as such, both Soviet and post-Soviet.

Dometii (Dmitrii) Zavolskii is much less known than Krylov and Lorchenkov; besides, unlike them, he avoids *mat*, aggression, obscenities and physiological

details. His cycle of short stories “Mishka and I, and all the secrets of the USSR” [Мы с Мишкой и все тайны СССР] refers to books from the Soviet juvenile canon, such as Nikolai Nosov’s short stories about two friends, one of whom is called Mishka, and short stories by Viktor Dragunskii about Deniska and Mishka (Zavolskii provides no name for the narrator). Both authors were known to each Soviet child and are available in bookstores even now. Zavolskii also refers to the mass literature canon, namely, to Soviet sci-fi and adventure fiction.

Short stories about Mishka are overloaded with details: the discourse there is so thick that leaves a grotesque impression (Zavolskii, 2014). Zavolskii uses some discursive units recursively until this condensation of discourse results in its full destruction. Konstantin Krylov commented on extremely high concentration of specific personages untypical of the real Soviet literature: spies [шпионы], chekists [чекисты], and even Masons (Kharitonov 2015). The target of Zavolskii’s parody is so-called Soviet nostalgia (see: Zavolskii 2019). By condensing the Soviet discourse, he wants to demonstrate that contemporary “Sovietophiles” intentionally distort the image of the Soviet Union and edit out most of its negative characteristics.

Stiob as a Narrative Technique in the New Nationalist Social Media

Most of stiobby texts, written or visual, heavily rely on using specific languages, the most prevalent of which are Padonkoffsky jargon, *Lurkoyaz* – the language of a parodic Lurkmore encyclopedia [Луркоморье], and the language associated with a fake web personage Lev Sharansky.

Gasan Guseinov associates Padonkoffsky jargon with the historical Russian avant-gardes (Guseinov, 2005); it implies deliberate distortion of words, which then become fixed as the new norm (e.g., *afftar* instead of *avtor*). *Lurkoyaz* is notorious for using *mat* and other obscene words, as well as unique neologisms and memes (see: Dementiev, 2015; Ivannikov, 2019; Shulgin, 2010). The new nationalists have also borrowed such characteristics of *Lurkoyaz* as English transliterations, Ukrainian memes, and caricature «Jewish accent» (*oy vey* and the like). Lev Sharansky is a *stiob* parody of a former Soviet dissident, now a liberal blogger, living in America but commenting on Russia. His avatar image is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (it is not clear who actually authors the meme). Sharansky was extremely popular in 2011–13, although the blog is still operating. Memes, such as “freedom is better than non-freedom because of the presence of freedom”, are known as “sharanisms”.

Sharansky’s personality is based on perceiving the language of the Russian liberals as hypernormalized and consisting of “esoteric” formulaic structures (similar phenomenon in the U.S. is described in Boyer & Yurchak, 2010, p. 182). While Padonkoffsky and *Lurkoyaz* are totally ambivalent and give an opportunity of mutual stiobbing for all ideological platforms, including liberals (see: Dementiev, 2013, p. 39; Guseinov, 2005), the language of Sharansky targets a specific group of pro-Western liberals. It distorts, misuses, or excessively concentrates their discursive units to providing a stiobbing effect. Ambivalence of shcharanisms is that they can be utilized by all non-liberals, either left- or right-wing. An example of this newspeak is: The fall of

the regime is inevitable. The days of the Putin's dictatorship are counted. Vlad Putin, a bloodstained tyrant, from the Kremlin wall gloomily looks through binocular at the creative class that drinks smoothies at Jean-Jacques Café (see: Sharansky, 2015). And this is how a nationalist shows overidentification with liberal discourse using Shcharanisms: While you are celebrating here, the Bloodstained KGB [Кровавая Гэбня] exposes the opposition to pshychotrope warfare! Everyone, urgently follow the example of the handshakable parliamentarians and make protective equipment! (see: Bosykh, 2012).

Similar techniques of stiobbing are used when nationalists borrow stereotypic formulations directly from the antagonistic discourses:

- Liberal discourse: As a Russian I am deeply ashamed of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, thanks to which Hitler, without any effort, was able to access the magnificent industrial base of Czechoslovakia. Forgive us, the Czechs! (see: Prosvirnin, 2019). Here the speaker refers to a meme "Forgive me (us)", associated with a 2014 Echo of Moscow [Эхо Москвы] broadcast (see: "Liya Akhedzhakova", 2014).
- Soviet discourse, a dialog between right-wing broadcasters Nikolai Rosov and Vatoadmin (a stiobby nick): in Rosov, words, in a Soviet country store it was always fully packed by people, sort of "comrade, I am now going to eat your ear", this was how closely to one another they stand. Vatoadmin asks: Were there situations that they ate ears? Rosov responds: Well, no, I am kidding. Sorry (see: KoVerArab, 2020). This dialog exemplifies an attempt to utilize condensed Soviet discourse; besides, it is exactly what Yoffe means speaking about "the mutually mocking conversation of two stiobbers trying to out-stiob each other" (Yoffe, 2013, p. 223).
- Official patriotic discourse: Egor Prosvirnin and his guest Artemii Sych declare that "a German spy [Putin] has banned the Victory Day" (because of lockdown); by saying this they seemingly solidarize with those who celebrate the holiday in spite of the ban, but immediately proceed to stiobbing Communists who went to the city center armed with the Victory Banner and butthurt [English transliteration] and were detained (CzarStream, 2020)[9].

Target Groups: Noviops and Uncool Boomers

Targets of nationalist *stiob* fall into three complex categories: (1) Pseudo-liberals, because the new nationalists envision themselves as the true liberals/non-Russians as oppressors of ethnic Russians; (2) "Sovietophyles"/leftists/loyal citizens of the Russian Federation; (3) the "old" nationalists, or the old right, i.e., Orthodox monarchists. The first two categories can be further generalized under the umbrella of the *noviop* (for "new historical community of the Soviet people" [новая историческая общность]). This stiobby abbreviation referring to a Soviet formulation was invented by philosopher and writer Dmitii Galkovskii. It stresses genetic and spiritual kinship between the two

[9] Prosvirnin confirmed many times that for him the Great Patriotic War was "a war of Kolyma with Buchenwald" (CzarStream, 2019); this adds more layers to the nature of stiobbing in this broadcast.

groups, because liberals are seen as main beneficiaries of the Soviet and post-Soviet "friendship of peoples".

The new nationalists declare that liberals pretend to descend from groups persecuted in the USSR (the nobility, dissidents, ethnic minorities, etc.) but have no right to claim this heritage, because they and/or their grandparents belonged to the anti-Russian Soviet elite and were responsible for the 1917 revolution and subsequent political repression. Vladmir Lorchenkov, in accordance with his own formula "scratch a *noviop* – you'll find a hangman" (TsarGori, 2019), provides a fake biography for above-mentioned "Zakolbiuzhnyi", informing that the poet was born in a family of a party functionary and a Komsomol activist, and that he became an active member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to destroy the regime from within (see: TsarGori, 2018). Sovietophiles, leftists, and liberals appear in the nationalist ironic discourse as dogmatists, unable to think independently and following guidelines: the sheep of Navalny do not even need arguments – they are just driven like an unconscious herd (see: Bosykh, 2020); biorobots, loaded with software worked out by Western cultural Marxists (see: Bennen, 2017). They are also portrayed as people alien to Russia and hating it; mostly as having non-Russian origins: Some Shenderovich[10], clever head, has read in his life one book about 120 recipes of *vorschmack* (see: CzarStream, 2020).

Nationalists often speak on behalf of a younger generation, which never experienced life in the USSR, and contrast it to people of forty or fifty, "uncool boomers" (CzarStream, 2019). Nikolai Rosov describes Vladimir Putin ironically as an obsolete Soviet pensioner: If you ask him what sort of dream he has in life, it will be something like Soviet slippers and the fish that bites (see: Andrey_Funt, 2020). A creator of "Memes for Russians" describes the generations born in the USSR in the absurdist manner as those who fixate too much on some emotions from their childhood or youth, when there were seltzer, ice-cream; two-roubles sausage sits in sour-cream, when comrade Lenin's head rises two times per night, etc. (see: CzarStream, 2019).

Nationalists equally despise people loyal to the Russian Federation, and particularly its public officials: one of the figures most stiobbed by them is Margarita Simonyan, an ethnic Armenian and editor-in-chief of *Russia Today*. Hypernormalized official political language of the Russian Federation (see: Brock, 2018, p. 285) became for the new nationalists a source of meaningless formulations (traditional values, spirituality, the Great Victory, etc.), which they use as building blocks for stiobbing.

From the very start of the new nationalist movement in the mid-2000, its participants jeer at the "old right" (Orthodox nationalist monarchists). One of the first *Natsdem*, Aleksandr Belov, stated that nationalists should look respectable and wearing not beards and huge boots, but suits and ties (see: Kozenko & Krasovskaya, 2008). This stiobby attitude to the style of the old right remains prevalent. Krylov described the old nationalists as lunatic lads of undefined age, often in some rags and with sunken eyes (see: Krylov, 2009); others offer descriptions like "our bald-bearded-fat alt-right [English transliteration]" (Maksimov, 2018).

While the above-said might be designated as detractive *stiob*, overidentification examples are also abundant. Marina Urusova, Egor Prosvirnin's fiancée, has issued

[10] Victor Shenderovich is a liberal journalist.

a 30-minutes feature video "The Foundations of Orthodox Culture (real)", where she appears as someone scrupulously observing everyday Orthodox rites: lighting candles, kissing icons, putting sign of the cross on everything, fasting, confessing; she even rinses throat with holy water and prays instead of medication (CzarTalks, 2020). The video looks like a serious message except that Orthodox discourse there is overly condensed; there are also some subtle clues, for example, cheerful music that decontextualizes the scenes of strict fasting. The heroine prays at the icon of The Holy Tsar Nicholas II, obviously hinting at Orthodox monarchists; after kissing this icon she fells seriously ill.

Making this short but semi-professional film obviously required a significant amount of time and money; it signifies that demarcation with the obsolete version of nationalism is extremely important for the new generation. The latter make effort to destroy the image of Russian nationalism as something overly-serious, asserting instead that it can be fashionable; it can be youthful; it can be funny (see: CzarStream, 2019), or even that nationalism should be "cute [няшный]" (Groza, 2020c).

Breaking the Taboos: Sex, Violence and Fascism

Focus on violence and sexuality have been characteristical of the historical avant-gardes, asserting themselves through direct or indirect calls to violence, symbolic violent acts, such as burning books, obscene words (including *mat*), rough speech, criminal jargon, uncensored descriptions of sex. At the same time, Dennis Ioffe theorizes that these grotesque violence and sexuality were purely symbolic, unserious, and that the surrealistic terror of the brutal stiob was needed to blow up the established social practices, either Soviet or bourgeois (see: Ioffe, 2016). National Bolsheviks were notorious for their aggressive and sexualized style in the aesthetics and ideology (Fenghi, 2017, p. 195). Stiobby aggressiveness of this sort was not rare with some of the old nationalists; for example, the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers [Союз православных хоругвеносцев] practiced burning books and photographs of its antagonists (Engström, 2017).

Some linguists are convinced that the language of politics is naturally "agonal" (deathly) and destructive (see: Gornostaeva, 2018, pp. 58–59). It is no surprise that the new nationalists extensively exploit violence and sexuality. Answering a reader, Konstantin Krylov explained that he could not refrain from "*stiob* and obscenities", because poesy was a dialog with the world, and the world was so nasty that any other communication with it seemed impossible (Krylov, 2015). Sometimes nationalist broadcasters use aggressive nicks like *Pogrom*, or Thunderstorm [Гроза]; most of them publicly use *mat* and other obscene words, or trivialize violence through calls to "shoot", "hang", or "execute" their antagonists. Egor Prosvirnin-Pogrom ironically suggests shooting down all the obstetricians as a method of raising birth rate (CzarStream, 2019); Nikolai Rosov joyfully proposes using a nuclear strike to destroy ugly Soviet buildings (Andrey_Funt, 2020); Pogrom and Artemii Sych make jokes about hanging Margarita Simonyan (CzarStream, 2020). Some nationalists go into detailed descriptions of violence under the pretext that they need it to expose the state's repressive system (Groza, 2020b).

Unlike the old right, seriously concerned about the emerging threats to morality, the new nationalists see sex more as a fun than a danger. They portray nationalism as something "sexually attractive", and their invitation-only forum is called Russians. sexy. At the same time, their broadcasts and visual memes are full of rude jokes about sex, including rape, homosexuality and other sensitive topics. This dialog between Prosvirnin and an imagined interlocutor from an Orthodox monarchist TV-channel *Tsargrad* shows that he envisions moral wars of the old right as irrelevant: *Tsargrad* channel, what can they say about the protests in Khabarovsk? Well, they can say: in America, you know, there are [...] transsexuals there. Ok, what about Khabarovsk? In Khabarovsk we need no [...] transsexuals; one should pray, fast and put the sign of a cross (see: Sergei Zadumov, 2020).

As well as their Western like minds, the new nationalists in Russia target the highly formalized language of political correctness, which became, as Boyer and Yurchak correctly state, a new authoritative discourse (2010). Apart from using *mat* and other obscene words, they publicly demonstrate socially unapproved habits, such as smoking (Figure 2). The calling card of the new nationalists is using fascism as a material for stiobbing. Contrary to neo-Nazi groups seriously associating themselves with fascist ideology, they mostly speak about it using stiobby words, such as *svaston* [свастон] instead of swastika. Nevertheless, such evident despise of fascist symbols does not prevent them from borrowing fascist aesthetics and ideology. I suggest that, as well as in the case of National Bolsheviks, this fact "should not be interpreted literally, but as part of a new performative mode of political dissent" (Fenghi, 2017, p. 193). The same way of appropriating fascist symbols can be found in Russian counterculture, especially in rock-music (Gabowitsch, 2009; Kasakow, 20096).



Figure 2. Egor Pogrom and Artemii Sych smoke during a live broadcast. The plaque reads: Russian Occupation Government[1] (CzarStream, 2020)

[1] Alert: Smoking seriously damages your health and those around you.

The new nationalist discourse of fascism is mostly ambivalent and does not betray the "true" position of a speaker. For example, Nikolai Rosov produced a videostream "Smiling Fascism", where he describes the British fascists as a women rights-oriented and "cute" movement, while jeering at both the USSR and Nazi Germany (Groza, 2020c).

Racism in 2020 became another popular topic for stiobbing. The new nationalists overidentify with the discourses of oppressed groups: as Vladimir Lorchenkov says, for a Frenchman, [...] means you, or me (Chuzhbina podcast, 2020); Egor Prosvirnin refers to Russian as "victims of the Holocaust" (CzarStream, 2019). In June 2020 a libertarian broadcaster Mikhail Svetov initiated a hash tag #RussianLivesMatter against police brutality in Russia, which was immediately caught by nationalists. It is unclear whether Svetov's initiative was stiobby; my personal opinion is yes, because he demonstrated obvious overidentification with civil rights activism in the U.S. (Naked Pravda, 2020a). Whatever his intentions might have been, the use of the hash tag by the nationalists is an example of decontextualization.

Conclusions

Negative identification is the main function of *stiob* and other forms of irony for the new nationalists. They make use of hypernormalization of the available political discourses (liberal, neo-Soviet, leftist, official patriotic and old nationalist) and undermine them from within leaning on their own formulaic units. All these political platforms, in the eyes of the new nationalists, are interwoven and constitute one domineering discourse, evaluated as obsolete and irrelevant, regardless of ideology. Nationalists go beyond the left-right dichotomy, rejecting, instead, the discourse as a whole.

Applying *stiob* as a specific technique of narration lets the new nationalist influencers express their opinions with such degree of ambiguity that these opinions sound totally obscure and not comprehensible. This ambivalence provides a successful decision for two tasks. Firstly, it helps to map out the peripheries of the milieu, or, as Alexei Yurchak formulates, to reach the public of *svoi*, or "normal people" (Yurchak, 2005, pp. 287–288). This public consists of those who get the point even in case of multi-layer *stiobbing*; mostly it becomes possible thanks to the fact of belonging, of knowing (in real life, or – more often – on the web) the right people. Those who miss the point and take *stiob* at face value reveal their alienness and get expelled from communication. Second, *stiob* enables the new nationalists at any moment to take back what has been said and solidarize with any political platform when needed. They, for example, experienced no difficulties in supporting the people's republics in Donbass together with pro-Soviet and leftist groups, or with supporting a libertarian initiative #RussianLivesMatter. Besides, irony provides escape clause to avoid moderation of social networks and other public platforms.

Extensive usage of *stiob* and parody reveals that the new nationalists remain minoritarians in Russian politics. It is symptomatic that other ideological groups never practice similar ironic overidentification with them. At the moment, the new nationalists constitute a highly marginalized group and more a counter-cultural than political

phenomenon. Most of their propaganda is currently done via live Internet-broadcasts having a lot in common with staged performances; nationalist web resources mostly provide entertaining or educational-cum-entertaining content often barely related to any ideology. Those of them, who reach relative political success, for example, through winning elections at municipal level, avoid using *stiob*; instead, they promote local "apolitical" agenda (environmental and urban issues, and the like). Both options let the new nationalists to preserve ambivalence and to be simultaneously "in" the domineering discourse and "out" of it.

I can conclude that the new nationalism in Russia repeats worldwide developmental trends of socio-political movements known as the right-wing populists, the new far right, or as the neo-nationalists. These movements increasingly become less ideology-driven and less interested in the traditional conservative agenda; instead they produce either handy or entertaining (or both) content to attract as many people of diverse ideological orientations as possible. For researchers this means turning from party platforms and political manifestos to seemingly non-political (i.e., non-electoral) phenomena, often in the field of web culture. There is, nevertheless, an important distinction between similar right-wing movements in Russia and in the Western countries: the new nationalism in Russia became entirely digitalized. In the period from early 2010s to the mid-decade, their legally operating organizations were outlawed and their leaders arrested; informal groupings, involved into street-level violence, were dispersed by the law-enforcement bodies. At the moment, activists who still show interest in the electoral process do not disclosure their affiliation with nationalism; radical street politics is currently non-existent for all ideological platforms. As a result, researchers of Russian politics intending to figure out what goes on in the nationalist milieu need to focus on seemingly non-political spheres, such as videogames, digital comedy shows, popular science lectures and other phenomena of digital culture.

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ARTICLE

Beyond Nations and Nationalities: Discussing the Variety of Migrants' Identifications in Russian Social Media

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ABSTRACT

This article examines how transnational labor migrants to Russia from the five former Soviet Union countries – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – identify themselves in social media. The authors combine Rogers Brubaker's theory of identifications with Randall Collins' interaction ritual theory to study migrants' online interactions in the largest Russian social media (VK.com). They observed online interactions in 23 groups. The article illuminates how normative and policy contexts affect the Russian Federation's migration processes through a detailed discussion of migrants' everyday online interactions. Results reveal common and country-specific identifications of migrants in their online interactions. Migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan employ identifications connected to diasporic connections. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in their identifications refer to low-skilled labor migration to Russia as a fact, a subject for assessment, and as a unifying category. For these countries, the present and the future of the nation is discussed in the framework of evaluation of mass immigration to Russia.

KEYWORDS

migration to Russia, transnational migrants, labor migrants, ethnic and national identifications, interaction rituals, online interactions, social media

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Introduction

Setting the Problem

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the appearance of new states and state borders. Russia has become a recipient country for many migrants, mostly from the former Soviet Union (fSU) countries. Today Russia is the largest recipient country in the region and one of the largest in the world. According to the United Nations International Migration report, Russia was a number four country among places of destination for international migrants in 2017 (United Nations, 2017). In the 1990s, those who moved to Russia were predominantly ethnic Russians and Russophone citizens who wanted to resettle in Russia (Brubaker, 1995). However, since the end of the 1990s, migration to Russia is primarily labor migration of those who return or plan to return to their homelands (Malakhov, 2014; Sadovskaya, 2013).

Post-Soviet migration is a path-dependent process and, to a certain extent, it reproduces the Soviet trends. The post-Soviet region continues to be quite self-centered in terms of migration despite of new migration flows (Stepanov, 2018). Massive labor migration to Russia from Central Asian and Caucasian states succeeds migration from "the Soviet South"/"southern republics" to Moscow and Leningrad (Sahadeo, 2019). Old territorial divisions and classifications of "nationalities" (Martin, 2001) remain significant for developing state policies dealing with migration, as well as for everyday life of migrants. Ethnic classifications (nationalities), the ideology of "the friendship of the peoples", and Russian language as the language of intercultural communication constitute common frames for everyday interactions between migrants in Russia (Libman & Obydenkova, 2019; Sanders, 2017). Soviet administrative policies shaped the territorial and national boundaries in such a way that today the distinction between internal and international migrants is blurred. In Russia, migrants from the national republics of North Caucasus and international migrants from South Caucasus and Central Asia are often perceived by local Russian residents as "visible migrants", or just "migrants" (Mukomel, 2016).

At the same time, other kinds of identities, such as religion and orientations towards socio-cultural and historical specifics that formed the reality of nation-building before the Soviet period, acquire their significance in post-Soviet states (Aitamurto, 2019; Sullivan, 1995). These identities are important for migrants, because through them, migrants categorize themselves, but also are categorized by the local residents or by the state officials as Muslims, Asians, non-Westerners, Turks, etc. Islam has a particular significance for migrants from Central Asia and Caucuses as it provides both a way of integration into the Russian society, and a way to dissociate from the "Russian mainstream" (Di Puppo & Schmoller, 2018).

The intensity of migration flows exerts a substantial influence on the nation-building processes in the fSU countries (Fabrykant, 2017; Laruelle, 2009). Issues of nationalism and ethnicity in the fSU countries are linked to religion, race, and racialization in a complex and ambiguous way, particularly in the case of Islam (Abashin, 2016; Aitamurto, 2019; Zakharov, 2015). Russian nationalism is simultaneously characterized by modernization and nostalgia, striving for geopolitical influence and

xenophobia, promoting the nation-state and empire; these contradictions coexist with a "concentric logic" of "Russianness" with ethnic Russians at the core (Laruelle, 2009). In Central Asian and South Caucasian states, interactions between language (dialect), intra-state region, urban-rural division, nationality, religion and locality/kinship constitute complex patterns of differences in nation-building (Brubaker, 2011; Faranda & Nolle, 2011; Pinchuk & Minyazhev, 2017; Reeves, 2019a; Utyasheva, 2018).

In this article, we address the following puzzle. In the situation of mass labor migration to Russia from the fSU countries, various categories could be used for the purposes of migrants' identification – by themselves and by others. Some of these categories, such as nationality, are inherited from the Soviet past. Other categories, such as religion, belong both to the pre- and post-Soviet periods. Which of these categories are relevant for migrants in their everyday interactions?

The research question we address is twofold. First, our focus is on migrants' identifications[1] in online interactions. In Russia, as well as in other parts of the world, staying online is an integral part of migrants' lives (Reeves, 2016). Nowadays much of migrants' everyday interactions happen online, which in turn shapes the reality of their identifications. Social media provide migrants with tools to stay connected with relatives and friends in their homeland as well as to solve everyday life problems in the host society (Andersson, 2019). Online technologies support various migrants' activities and social formations, from family transactions to diasporic organizations (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Madianou & Miller, 2012). Therefore, it is relevant to ask how migrants identify themselves online.

Second, we explore the identifications of migrants from five post-Soviet states: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They have important similarities and differences as countries of origin of migration to Russia.

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are among seven leading countries of origin for migration flows to Russia (the other two are China and Ukraine). In 2019, more than 19.5 million international migrants entered Russia, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (2020). More than 4.8 million migrants were citizens of Uzbekistan, about 2.8 million were from Tajikistan, and more than a million from Kyrgyzstan. About 0.7 million migrants were citizens of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The goals of migration, as indicated by migrants themselves in official documents, are partly similar and partly different for the countries under consideration. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are predominantly labor migrants, while for migrants from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan work is one of the main aims of migration. The most popular reason to emigrate for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is "work". For migrants from Azerbaijan, the two main goals are "private affairs"[2] and "work". For migrants from Kazakhstan, the most popular goal is "private affairs", followed by "work", and "education".

[1] We use the terms "identification" in accordance with Rogers Brubaker's theory of ethnicity (2004). The theoretical framework of the paper is discussed below in details.

[2] We believe this goal embraces different kinds of migration, including informal labor migration.

These five countries share two important characteristics as the countries of origin. First, they are countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Second, migrants from these countries are predominantly "visible" migrants. Religion is one of the key characteristics used for the identification of migrants in post-Soviet Russia (Sokolov, 2017; Turaeva, 2019). Visibility is highly significant for migrants' perception by the Russian officials and the public in general (Chandler, 2011; Sokolov, 2017).

At the same time, citizens from these countries experience different official regulations and migration policies in Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), so their citizens enjoy a privileged access to Russia's labor market in comparison with migrants from Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, Kazakhstan is both a sending and a recipient country. It is a place of destination for many labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Laruelle, 2013). Finally, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan present regional diversity at both inter-state level (Central Asia and Caucasus) and sub-state levels (Fergana and Pamir regions, among others).

Literature Overview

Research materials that have already been published characterize a variety of ways of how migrants identify themselves and how they are identified by others in the fSU countries. Identification could be based on nationality (ethnicity), religion, citizenship, the region inside the state, the larger region (Central Asia, Caucasus), type of work, etc. Some of these characteristics are directly inherited from the Soviet time, or even in the earlier periods, some became relevant only after the USSR's breakdown. Different actors in different post-Soviet states have used different combinations of these characteristics in their claims to construct their identity.

In Russia, labor migrants identify themselves in various ways that extend beyond nationality and citizenship. Sometimes their identifications are related to labor: migrants identify themselves as "hard workers" (Ni & Lisitsyn, 2017). Another identification is religion intersected with nation and region in various ways, for example as "Central Asia Muslims" (Turaeva, 2019) or "Tajiks are the strongest believers" (Roshe, 2018). A person from a local village/mahalla might also be a kind of identification (Urinboyev, 2017). Migrants' identifications are influenced by the local residents' attitudes towards migrants' connections to ethnic hierarchies intertwined with job hierarchies, visibility, Russian language proficiency, affiliation to a broader ethnicity (such as being Slavs), and the region of origin. Kyrgyz migrants perceive their ethnic status as low but superior to Tajik and Uzbek migrants and associate their superiority with proficiency in Russian language (Gerber & Zavisca, 2020), while some Tajik migrants compensate their low status by positioning themselves as pious Muslims (Roshe, 2018).

Migration research generally addresses three main topics: movement, control, and settlement (Kivisto & Faist, 2010). Movement refers to the aims and patterns of migration. Migration to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is primarily labor migration, as we have already noticed. Labor migrants in Russia are oriented towards paychecks. They commonly face de-qualification, informal employment, and poor labor conditions, while wages received

by the Russian and migrant workers are comparable (Mukomel, 2017). However, migrants' aims may eventually be transformed: migrants return to their homelands and then move back to Russia, labor migration entails family migration and so on (Brednikova, 2017). Migration policies developed in the Russian Federation are strict and asymmetric: even a minor break of the legal rules means that a migrant has little chance to be legalized again (Kubal, 2016). Moreover, migrants often do not have a clear understanding of the Russian legislation (Varshaver, Rocheva, & Ivanova, 2017). A gap between formal and informal institutions leads to corruption and proliferation of migration-related businesses (Malakhov, 2014). Struggles for getting the proper documents are an important part of migrants' everyday practices and interactions (Reeves, 2019b). These problems, however, are less significant for migrants from the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. For them, the regulations and requirements to stay and work in Russia are more relaxed (Mukomel, 2017).

The issues of settlement concern migrants' incorporation into host societies. Migrants from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are partly transnational migrants. Transnational social formations "consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two nation states" (Faist, 2013, p. 450). Transnational ties are typical for migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Abashin, 2017; Brednikova, 2017; Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014) and occasionally occur for migrants from Azerbaijan (Braux, 2013; Pinchuk & Minyazhev, 2017) and Kazakhstan (Ryazantsev, 2016; Safonova, 2008). Migrants to Russia engage in transnational social formations by staying in touch with their relatives at home and with compatriots abroad, sending remittances, visiting home, presenting gifts to their friends in their country of origin and in Russia, and so on. Interactions with the country of origin and with compatriots in Russia are highly important for starting the migration process as well as for the settlement in a new environment (Abashin, 2017; Lisitsyn & Stepanov, 2019; Pinchuk & Minyazhev, 2017).

Thus, research findings on movement, control and settlement of migrants to Russia reveal three crucial sources for identification. They are class (labor status), citizenship and nation, respectively.

Interactions via social media constitute one of the most important sources of information and emotional support for migrants living in Russia. Social media are characterized by "scalable sociality": "Social media [colonize] the space between traditional broadcast and private dyadic communication, providing people with a scale of group size and degrees of privacy that we have termed scalable sociality" (Miller et al., 2016, p. 9). Migrants to Russia use social media to stay in touch with relatives and friends in their homeland and in Russia (Ruget & Usmanalieva, 2019; Schröder, 2018; Urinboyev, 2017), as well as to exchange information and goods with strangers (Timoshkin, 2019). This scalability, together with the ubiquity of online connections make interactions on the social media of particular interest for studying migrants' identifications. They also present the kind of data that is underappreciated in the studies of migrants' everyday lives in Russia, so far dominated by interviews and observation.

Theoretical Framework and Research Questions

This article looks at how inherited social categories and related symbols constitute resources for migrants' identifications in online interactions. To analyze how ethnic, national, and other categories are used in online interactions of migrants, we combine several conceptual and theoretical sources.

One source is the theory of ethnic and national identifications proposed by Rogers Brubaker (2004): "As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, 'identification' […] invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying" (p. 41). For Brubaker, to study ethnic, national and other identifications means to answer the following questions: How do people identify themselves? How do other people identify them? In what types of situations do ethnic, national and other social categories become resources for identifications? Answering these questions demands knowledge of historical and cultural contexts as well as details of everyday social encounters. Brubaker provides two key distinctions: (a) between self-identification and identification by other actors, and (b) between relational and categorical modes of identification. Relational identifications refer to the participation in a web of social relations; categorical identifications refer to the "membership in a class of persons sharing some categorical attribute (such as race, ethnicity, language, nationality, citizenship, gender, sexual orientation, etc.)" (Brubaker, 2004, p. 42). Our research focuses on migrants' self-identifications and external identifications of the categorical mode.

We base our argument also on the concept of "everyday nationalism" proposed by Paul Goode and David Stroup (2015). We focus on the "quotidian practices by which ethnic and national identities are elaborated, confirmed, reproduced, or challenged" (Goode & Stroup, 2015, p. 718) in contrast to institutional and discursive identifications in official documents, political texts, mass media, etc. Everyday/"private" aspects of nationalism in contemporary Russia seem to be quite distinct from the institutional ones and thus constitute a subject of special interest (Goode, 2017). However, our unit of analysis is not everyday practice as such, but the situation of interaction in the social media. Thus, the paper has a micro-sociological focus in contrast to the anthropological approach taken by Goode.

To study migrants' interactions, we rely on the interaction ritual theory (IRT) by Randall Collins (2004). The IRT provides guiding principles for studying how cultural symbols gain relevance in interaction. The concept of the interaction ritual embraces a whole spectrum of interactions, from everyday talks to ceremonies. Interaction rituals, according to Collins, have four ingredients and four outcomes connected by a specific situational mechanism (Collins, 2004, pp. 47–49). Ritual ingredients are the group assembly, the group boundary to outsiders, the mutual focus of attention, and the shared mood. "As the persons become more tightly focused on their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and more aware of each other's awareness, they experience their shared emotion more intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness" (Collins, 2004, p. 48). Persons engage in common rhythms; rhythmic entrainment produces intersubjectivity and, for successful rituals, evolves into collective effervescence (Emile Durkheim's term). Ritual outcomes are group solidarity, the emergence of group symbols, the

standards of morality towards the group and its symbols, and emotional energy in individuals. The latter is a feeling of enthusiasm about the interaction that pushes individuals to participate in similar interactions in the future. The importance of symbols for individuals tends to fade away gradually; hence, symbols need to be recharged in new interactions. Thus, according to Collins, interactions tend to form patterns in time, interaction ritual chains.

Additionally, we apply the concept of attention space also developed by Collins (1998; 2004). Attention space characterizes symbols and ideas that are relevant for a community and are used in its interactions and discourses. There are two important observations about attention space: it is limited, and it is structured. First, several symbols are at the center of attention while others are employed marginally, in an episodic way. Second, symbols and ideas are interrelated: some are in opposition, some are in affinity. The concept of attention space helps to combine Collins's and Brubaker's theoretical perspectives. Who and what situational mechanisms make limited attention in interaction focused on the ethnic, national, religious or other social categories? This question combines Collins's interactional analysis with Brubaker's interest to mechanisms of group formation.

To analyze online interactions of migrants as interaction rituals we rely on conceptual and methodological adaptations of the IRT for studying online interactions provided by Paul DiMaggio and his colleagues (DiMaggio, Bernier, Heckscher, & Mimno, 2019). The authors combine Collins's ideas with a theory of speech genres developed by Mikhail Bakhtin in order to explore how mutual focus of attention, shared mood, and rhythmic entrainment exist in posts, comments, and threads. In particular, we consider national, ethnic and other social categories as potential group symbols.

Research materials that have already been published in combination with the formulated theoretical framework allow us to formulate five research questions for this study:

1) What social categories do migrants to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan employ in their attempts to identify themselves and to be identified by others in online interactions?
2) How are these categories related to each other? Are they used individually, or are there elective affinities between social categories exercised for the purposes of identifications?
3) Do identifications differ for migrants from different countries?
4) Do they differ for self-identifications and external identifications?
5) What are the typical situations when the usage of "migrant" category is relevant?

Data and Methods

The source of empirical data are interactions in a sample of online groups found on the social media. Specifically, we study migrants' interactions in VK.com (VK is short for its original name Vkontakte), Russia'a most popular social network and one of the most popular in the fSU countries (Timoshkin, 2019). The group is a specific form

of interaction that enables users to communicate with a wide range of people, from friends to strangers. Our sampling of groups was organized in two steps.

First, in January-February 2020, we searched for groups that contain the morphemes migrant*/migrat*, azer*, kazakh*, kyrgyz*, tajik*, uzbek* in their titles. To embrace regional and ethnic diversity of sending countries, we also included such morphemes as badakshan*, dungan*, fergan*, karalakalpak*, pamir*, talysh*, and uyghur*. The search was conducted in the Russian language for all morphemes and then additionally in the national languages for morphemes migrant*/migrat* and the name of the nation[3]. We looked through all the groups displayed in VK's search output and selected groups of three types: (1) groups related to migrant activities; (2) 20 largest groups that provide information about the country of origin for each nation (both for Russian and for the national language); (3) groups that discuss Islam for each nation. More than 2000 groups were selected at this stage.

Second, in March 2020, we applied network analysis for further sampling[4]. We considered common members of two groups as a link between them. Network analysis was conducted for the groups with different morphemes in titles, as well as for all groups together. Based on the results of the network analysis, we selected 23 groups based on (a) centrality; (b) relevance for migration issues; (c) intensity of interactions in a group; (d) diversity of groups (including clusterizations)[5].

The online groups that were included in our study can be divided into four types. The first type is a community of migrants from one country that settled in a specific Russian city. Three Kyrgyz, one Tajik, and two Kazakh groups belong to this type[6]. Migrants' communities provide a space for casual interactions, mutual assistance, and information exchanges. The second type is an information group. It contains information on various topics about a country of origin, including migration issues. This type is represented by one Kyrgyz group; two Tajiks groups (one of which is focused on the history of Tajikistan); four Uzbeks groups (with different target audiences: Uzbek youth outside the country, immigrants who left the country in the 1990s, mixed audiences); one Kazakh group; and two Azerbaijani groups. The third type consists of the groups of national cultural organizations in Russian cities. It embraces one Azerbaijani and two Kazakh groups. The fourth type consists of groups devoted to legal assistance/mutual assistance for migrants to Russia from different countries.

[3] For kazakh* we specified Russia as a country due to larger amount of groups with this morpheme in title. For other morphemes a country was not specified.

[4] We would like to thank Anastasia Kitaeva for her assistance in conducting network analysis.

[5] We used the online service for social network communities analysis Popsters (https://popsters.com/) to review the groups' content and intensity of interactions and then to select the posts. The groups are: https://vk.com/podsluskakgz; https://vk.com/just_sss; https://vk.com/in_kyrgyzstan; https://vk.com/piterskiekyrgyzy; https://vk.com/typicaltashkent; https://vk.com/uzbeki_so_vsego_mira; https://vk.com/tashkent2x2; https://vk.com/uzbek.mahalla; https://vk.com/vatantj; https://vk.com/history_of_tajikistan01; https://vk.com/tadjiki1; https://vk.com/kazahi_omska; https://vk.com/club45832163; https://vk.com/murager_moscow; https://vk.com/znewskz; https://vk.com/kazakh_in_moscow; https://vk.com/amor.official; https://vk.com/azerbaycan_tradition; https://vk.com/azerbaycan; https://vk.com/rossiyavsem; https://vk.com/migroland; https://vk.com/vestimigranta; https://vk.com/migrant_russia

[6] One of the Kazakh groups is a group for Russophones in Kazakhstan who plan to resettle in Russia.

This type includes four groups selected on the basis of the morpheme migrant*/migrat*. These groups are of different sizes and orientations, from pragmatic issues to defense of migrants' rights. Interactions in the former three types of groups combine, in different parts, the Russian language and the national languages[7]. Interactions in the fourth type are entirely in Russian.

The main research method of this study was online observation. We investigated online interactions in these groups in April 2020. Specifically, we observed interactions that took place during the period from January 2019 to April 2020[8]. In the study, we adopted the methodology developed by DiMaggio et al. (2019). The unit of observation is a post along with its thread of comments. We focused on the posts that triggered discussions among users: for small and medium groups, we analyzed the posts with 10 or more comments; for large groups, we analyzed the posts with 20 or more comments. Moreover, our observation was focused only on the interactions that comprise migrants' identifications. In total, 578 posts were analyzed, along with their threads.

During the observation, we identified the symbolic focus of the original post, symbolic foci of the thread, as well as self-identifications and external identifications applied by the users. Then prevalent and auxiliary types of identifications were revealed, as well as typical situations of interaction. Our analysis is qualitative, highly dependent on the context of interactions in a particular group. Thus, in the presentation of our results we provide and discuss observations of interactions exemplary for all groups or for a specific type of groups.

Results

Common Prevalent Identifications: Between Market, State and Nation

Five common prevalent identifications characterize migrants' interactions in online groups. These identifications are common as they occur in all types of groups. They are prevalent as they occur regularly and were a topic for focused discussions. Two identifications deal with a migrant as a person who moves from one country to another. Three more identifications cover a migrant's settlement in Russia. For the latter self-identifications are tightly intertwined with external identifications.

The first prevalent identification is "migration as economic necessity". It relates labor migration to economic or political situation in the country of origin, and image of the nation depends on how migration to Russia is evaluated. This identification could be further specified in two matters. First, the definition of a migrant can be either derogatory (abusive) or neutral/moderately positive, and this issue is debatable by migrants themselves. The illustration is the following interaction from an Uzbek information group:

[7] We used Google Translate (https://translate.google.com) to comprehend the statements that are in the national languages.

[8] For two groups the period of observation was January 2017 – April 2017; we extended the period to embrace more activities in the groups.

Observation 1[9]

> **Post**: And here is the whole truth about the totalitarian regime ☺ Mirziev called Karimov's rule "an era of fear" [...]
>
> **Comment**: It is necessary to twist the economic balance so that the Uzbeks would live better, and they would not call us *gastarbeiters*!!!!
>
> **Reply to comment**: Those who call us *gastarbeiters* have megalomania. The Russians who go to work to the North, abroad, are also treated like slaves. Russians and other nationalities have been working with us for more than 70 years, but no one has ever treated them like slaves and they have never been called *gastarbeiters*. I mean, here, in Uzbekistan. So, I think any nation and any work deserves respect.

Second, being a migrant could be associated with returning to homeland or with staying in Russia, and it is not obvious what place and what decision is better. Consider an observation from a Kyrgyz migrant community:

Observation 2

> **Post**: I'll leave it here for myself [...] Kyrgyzstan will not develop [...]. In the Kyrgyz Republic, every family has someone who left country as a migrant. In some families two or three persons work abroad. The people are coping somehow [...]. The people are trying to get along [...]. But our "Elite" have hands that grow out of their ass and slime instead of brains [...].
>
> **Comment**: I fully agree with the author; I have not lived in the Kyrgyz Republic for 6–7 years. And nothing has changed during this time here. I also had a desire to fly back from the airport. I won't say that in Russia or in other countries we feel good. But how good it would be if you worked in your hometown and your close relatives were nearby [...].
>
> **Comment**: I partially agree, but in Kyrgyzstan people also work to buy apartments, and other things too. If we were taught from childhood that Kyrgyzstan is the best place in the world, this is our Motherland and we must find our place here, then everyone would remain there. We all think that Russia is better, and we are accustomed to the local situation [in Russia], we forget and not fulfil our traditions, we think that "we live freely without obligations", how bitterly we are mistaken. If we came home and worked hardly like in Russia, it would be different, but we are not able to do this [...].

[9] Examples of observations (posts and comments) are presented in fragments. Translation into English preserves the meaning of the statements. However, we did not attempt to hold the slang or specific mistakes of the original comments and posts.

> **Comment**: No one chose where he was born, it became easier for us to complain about one's own life and to look for those who are guilty than to fight and to move, to find solutions to problems!!! As long as you have health and brains in place, you can work and earn money not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in Africa, for this you need only confidence and aspiration!

The second prevalent identification is "a migrant subject to state regulations". This identification is typically discussed in connection with the EEU and with requirements for obtaining Russian citizenship. Moreover, citizenship is spontaneously associated with ethnicity, in a variety of migrants' interactions, both in national groups and in legal assistance groups. The logic of nationality and the logic of citizenship mismatch. This is articulated in claims to simplify requirements for Russian citizenship for "Russians", in accusations of discrimination against non-Slavs, as well as in assertions that nationality actually does not matter for migration regulations. To illustrate this incongruity let us refer to two posts with opposite logics, both are from groups of legal assistance:

Observation 3

> **Post**: The Federation Council of the Russian Federation called on the Ministry of Internal Affairs to deal with companies that extort money from migrants [...]. On March 11, the Federation Council approved a law that abolishes the obligation to pass the Russian language exam for residents of Belarus and Ukraine who are native speakers [...].
>
> **Comment**: And to other migrants from Central Asia? If you abolish it, do it for all. They again divide people into Slavs and non-Russian, yeah.

Observation 4[10]

> **Post**: A letter was sent to me by mail. "[…] May be, we will try to write a collective appeal to Putin and to ask him to supplement the second law, on obtaining a Russian passport in a simplified way by amendments about Ukrainian citizens living in the Russian Federation with a [legal] status (temporary asylum, temporary residence permit, residence permit), but with *propiska* in Donetsk and Lugansk region? […]" Electronic signatures will not work. But, as far as I remember, is there some kind of official/semi-official website for petitions? Do you believe in success of this idea, in general?
>
> **Comment**: You want to give citizenship to Ukrainians but what about [ethnic] Russians? How is it for them? In common order? Justice is off the hook.

[10] This observation comes from a group of legal assistance for migrants from different countries. That is why issues of people from Donetsk and Lugansk region are discussed below together with migration from Central Asia.

Reply to comment: This is not the point. The fact is that the Donetsk region was divided in into parts, into us and them.

Reply to comment: Ukrainians have their homeland Ukraine, we have Russia [...]; why to solve everything at the expense of us? Where is the simplification for us? We didn't ride on the Maidan [...], we were denigrated and kicked off [...] now give citizenship to all Ukrainians [...]. And what about us? Or should we suffer for years? And to stand in the queues with Uzbeks and Tajiks on a common basis?

The third prevalent identification is "a migrant representing the nation". In national information groups it is presented in the news about migrant heroes and migrant criminals. It constitutes the basis for solidarity or splits in online discussions where self-identifications and external identifications are intertwined (see Observations 7 and 8 below). In migrants' communities, there are typically discussions and criticism (or, less often, praise) of migrants' behavior (i.e. everyday practices) and demands to behave properly. The argument is that the behavior of one Kyrgyz in Russia is a ground for judgment about all Kyrgyz (the same for Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.). This identification is combined sometimes with characterization of migrants as hillbilly insufficiently imbued with urban culture. Consider, as an example, how this kind of self-identification arises in response to external identification in the Kyrgyz migrant community:

Observation 5

Post: This is to a post about the attitude of [ethnic] Russians towards us! It's our own fault that they treat us like that. Firstly, our country, to put it mildly, is weak. Secondly, our people in Moscow and other Russian cities behave very indecently. They are very arrogant and immediately begin to swear from a scratch [...].

Comment: In principle, there are people who behave just wildly, but again, not all.

Comment: Ahahw author is a moron! I will provide arguments about the post in private message. Nothing personal, your worldview is just so funny, I can't call you anything else.

Comment: As for arrogance, I agree, I talked with a colleague, she thought that I was from Kazakhstan and said that the Kyrgyz are arrogant and very poor-educated [...], that many Kyrgyz do not know the Russian language [...]; the author of the post really got the point. I think this is because most of the migrants are from villages [...].

The fourth prevalent identification is "a migrant as a native speaker". There are claims on VK groups that migrants should use their native language. These claims are often related to fear of their own culture and language (see Observations 9 and 12 below).

The fifth prevalent identification is "a migrant as inferior to local people". It relates to the following topics: difficulties in employment, racial profiling, biased media, and to a general belief that Russians consider migrants as second-rate people. This self-identification is supported by two kinds of external identifications. The first one is provocations against migrants in online groups that do or do not result in further discussions. The second one is the accusation of migrants in hostility to Russians that may turn into a squabble fueled by mutual diminishment of nationalities. Counterarguments against radical nationalism in such discussions often arise from the Soviet notion of "the friendship of the peoples". The most vivid example that is characteristic for Uzbek and Tajik groups are claims that these nations expelled the Russians in 1990s. Here is a typical interaction from a Tajik information group:

Observation 6

> **Post**: January 1, 2020, the procedure for obtaining quotas [for labor migrants] [...].
>
> **Comment**: Stop going to Russia and acting like filth. Live at your own home.
>
> **Reply to comment**: Why so rude? I think you are not to decide for someone where to live and where to go. It is a choice for any citizen [...].
>
> **Reply to comment**: I know you hypocrites. I have a girlfriend from Uzbekistan. She told how they terrified the Russians back in the 90s. After they stabbed her uncle, they had to leave. And before that they had always said, they said "Russians go home". So get out of here, goddamn Nazis.
>
> **Reply to comment**: How old are you? Probably, you've heard that then everyone had troubles. The Union was disintegrating. There were clashes between people everywhere. According to the stories of elderly people, relatives, Uzbekistan, in particular, Tashkent City was built by the whole country, they sent professionals from all the national republics to rebuilt the City that was destroyed by the earthquake. So, it has become multinational. People lived well, friendly, nobody distinguished who is of what nationality, they learned the Russian language, and Russians learned the Uzbek language. You need to understand, there is no bad nations, all are good, it is just bad persons in every nation […].

Country-Specific Prevalent Identifications: Internal Differentiation

Prevalent country-specific identifications in migrants' online interactions split the countries into two groups. One includes Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the other embraces Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

The key category for the split is "low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia". "Central Asia" typically refers to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This category is employed for self-identifications as well as for external identifications and constitutes a basis for internal differentiation. For migrants from Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, it acts both as a unifying identification (occasionally in combination with identification as a Muslim) and as an object of detachment. The illustrations are the following interactions from the information groups of Uzbeks and Tajiks, respectively:

Observation 7

> **Post**: The heroism of the Uzbeks and Tajiks is not revealed! April 8 nursing home burned down! Tajiks and Uzbeks came running to the rescue from a neighboring dormitory for labor migrants, they risked their lives and saved 30 people, but there's no word about them on [Russian] TV! Many thanks them and their parents!
>
> **Comment**: And who said that they will show Muslims on TV? This is media, they can show only when they do bad things, and they call them terrorists, and when their own people do it, they call it hooliganism, or a crazy person. I live in Russia for a long time and I have never seen a TV program that depict Muslims in a good way! [...]
>
> **Comment**: Our peoples have always been solid, Uzbeks, Tajiks, all of Central Asia. We should have joined a long time ago, we need to create a union.

Observation 8

> **Post**: About hatred of Tajiks [...]. How long will Tajiks be accused of all black deeds occurring in Russia?! When anything goes wrong, just blame a Tajik [...]. The janitor beat up the teenager, and they called him Tajik for almost the entire TV program, which he is not, then at the end it turns out that it was Uzbek [...] and the Uzbek diaspora "bought out" their janitor for 50 000 rubles. Is it fine? Why to blame Tajiks? [...]
>
> **Comment**: Tajiks and Uzbeks are not just two different nations; they are two different races. Russians, you are so stupid that you don't distinguish races, and there are only four of them on Earth.

For migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, "low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia" is an external identification. Consider two examples from the Kazakh and Azerbaijani groups, respectively:

Observation 9

> **Post**: A great film about how to be a Kazakh, no matter where you live! We advise to watch it, especially for those who do not know for what and why they need to know the language, to honor the traditions and what to pass on to children.

Comment: Russian Kazakhs are the most non-patriotic Kazakhs (Russified).

Reply to comment: I do not agree with you! Today, my brother told me – the guy from Kazakhstan works with him at the factory, my brother spoke Kazakh with him, and he said – I don't understand, no one speaks Kazakh in our family. And it's kind of weird.

Reply to comment: There is no *gastarbeiters* among Kazakhs, this Kazakh is am improper Kazakh.

Observation 10

Post: The influx of migrants to Russia has fallen to a minimum for the entire post-Soviet period […].

Comment: It's just that all these migrants have already bought citizenship of the Russian Federation, now every second Tajik has citizenship.

Comment: I don't know where they decreased in numbers, today I was driving past the migration service, and it was crowded. Five hundred people stood. And all were Uzbeks or Kyrgyz. This is in April, and soon there will be warmer and there will be more of them. It seems to me that though the cost of a patent has been raised and laws are constantly changing against them, those who are in need go here, they are trying their best, work for a penny to somehow feed their family at home. I feel pity for those people.

"A member of the diaspora" is a crucial self-identification for migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This identification shapes a group border that separates "members of the diaspora" from "low-qualified labor migrants", or "*gastarbeiters*". For Azerbaijani diasporic identification is not specified further. For Kazakhs the division within the diaspora between Russian Kazakhs and Kazakhstan Kazakhs turns out to be salient (see Observation 9).

These two identifications, "low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia" and "members of the diaspora", imply different uses of ethnic categorizations. On the one hand, discussions of everyday problems of labor migrants amalgamate symbols of class, social status, religion and ethnicity. Strong ethnic categorizations arise here mainly in response to violation of moral boundaries: for example, when someone generalizes one's own negative experience of interaction with "Kyrgyzs", "Tajiks" or "Uzbeks" to the entire nation. On the other hand, ethnic categorizations strengthen transnational diasporic networks. Being "Azerbaijani" or "Kazakh" means learning native language and culture, as well as being aware of what is going on in the Homeland. Such categorizations are constructed through symbols that refer to the imagined community, from national culture to political debates.

Changing Identifications

Several discussions in VK groups were about migrants who change their identifications when they move to Russia. These discussions are of special interest because they reveal significant characteristics of migrants' condition in Russia. Some of them are related to collective emotions, while others are just pragmatic.

First, consider two observations from a Tajik information group.

Observation 11

Post: Pamir [a photo of a couple in national costumes].

Commentary: This is a group for Tajiks, they [Pamiris] don't consider themselves as Tajiks when they arrive to Russia or other countries [...].

Reply to comment: Yes, we are not Tajiks, we are Pamiris. With a capital letter. We have a different civilization, tradition, language, and everything else, and do not discuss us, ok. Tajikistan is a state for us, not a home, our home is in the mountains, and your city will be destroyed. The mountains will remain, the Pamir is the Roof of the world, the world will be destroyed and the Roof will remain.

Reply to comment: I know what culture you have in the Pamirs, all men and women sleep in one place, this is a fact [...]. Look at what you are, Tajikistan gives you a passport, you still don't consider yourself a Tajik only in Russia or in other countries, well, try it in Dushanbe, you are cowards.

Reply to comment: why do you need a Tajik passport if you do not consider yourself to be Tajiks.

Observation 12

Post: [...] We endure humiliation from all and everywhere [in Russia]. But we are not averse to pretend to be Caucasians, wearing hats, dancing Lezginka, posing as Dagestani and Chechens. Our young people are not averse to showing strength to their fellow countrymen, arranging showdowns and humiliating their own blood brothers. [...] Find in yourself at least a little courage not to pretend to be someone you don't know but to learn to support each other [...]. We are used to blame everything on our government. Maybe we just cannot admit our cowardice and helplessness?!

Comment: The author of the post, the majority here supports you, but this is the case here, we have always depended on the Russian Federation… and government of Tajikistan, as you can see, is inactive, so first you need to be independent from the Russian Federation.

Comment: "Not to pretend to be someone you don't know?" Why such a neglect for Caucasians. After all, it is clear whom and why they [Tajik migrants in Russia] are pretending to be.

Comment: You yourself say that the guys are pretending to be Caucasians, but you yourself write in Russian. So, you are pretending to be a Russian?

Both observations refer to change in self-identification related to external identifications in Russian society. However, these changes have different directions. Pamiri migrants in Russia are claimed to reveal their identity, whereas Tajik migrants are claimed to hide it. Observation 11 reveals a conflict between concepts of Tajik nation and Tajik citizenship for Pamiris. Migration to Russia seems to be liberating for them, as, it is argued, it allows for national self-identification that is possible in Tajikistan only in opposition to Tajik majority. Post in Observation 12, in contrast, accuses Tajiks in faking their identity to be more prestigious (Caucasians). Tajiks are considered here as having an inferior position in ethnic hierarchies, and Caucasians better as they have reputation of tough guys and are Russian citizens (Dagestani and Chechens are mentioned). At the same time, Caucasians are migrants from what was called the "Soviet South", as Tajiks are, and here citizenship becomes less important than visibility and ethno-territorial divisions inherited from the Soviet past.

Juxtaposition of these two observations supports the statement about internal differentiation of migrants. Both transformations of identifications help to avoid being classified as "low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia" that is associated with weakness and low position in Russian society. It is obvious in switch from "a Tajik" to "a Caucasian", while "a Pamiri" seems to be exotic/less-accountable identification in Russia that is not strongly associated with labor migration. These observations also demonstrate that clash between national pride and "migrant" categorization is painful and fuels collective emotions from humiliation to rage.

At the same time, a change of identification could have pragmatic purposes connected with labor migration. Consider an observation from a Kyrgyz migrant community:

Observation 13

Post: Hello, a passport has found more than a week ago. If anyone knows anything about the owner, please contact me [...] [Photo of Kyrgyz passport].

Comment: Who is this Uzbek with a Kyrgyz passport?

Reply to comment: Kyrgyz Uzbek.

Reply to comment: I've heard that Uzbeks and Tajiks make fake [Kyrgyz] passports so as not to pay for a patent and work permit.

Reply to comment: Yes, it is true! And this is the state who allows it.

Here the identification changes only in institutional contexts (for the police, the migration service, etc.) as citizens of Kyrgyzstan are subjects to much simple migration regulations. Thus, the citizenship has been changed, not ethnicity. Note, however, that the change of identification lies within the category "low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia". Probably, that is why it does not arouse emotional responses connected with ethnic hierarchies: neither "an Uzbek" nor "a Kyrgyz" seems to be better identification in Russian society.

Auxiliary Identifications

In addition to the identifications characterized above, we observed migrants' identifications that are auxiliary: they did not occur regularly, or often, or are not a topic for focused discussions.

There are several auxiliary self-identifications in migrants' online interactions. They are:

- "Muslim migrants". This identification is primarily connected to discussion of everyday religious practices. For Tajik and Uzbek groups, it is also concerns a discussion that Islam is easier to practice in Russia than in the country of origin due to strict regulation of Muslim practices by the state (especially in Tajikistan).
- "A person from a specific place" – city, town, village, or region (see Observation 11). This self-identification could also be combined with the emphasis on nation, such that "we are all Tajiks".
- "Nostalgic migrants" identification arises in various situations, and it is of special relevance for Russophone immigrants from Uzbekistan to Russia who left the country in 1990s.
- A type of migration: educational or labor.
- "Too many migrants from my country".
- Negative and positive auto-stereotypes. They are: "Your own people cannot be trusted" (observed in Kyrgyz and Kazakh online groups); "Tajiks are passive"; "Azerbaijanis are entrepreneurial, decent and solidary"; "there exists 'warm' Central Asian mentality" (observed in Uzbek groups); "Uzbeks are generous".

Auxiliary external identifications are:

- Imputation of ethnicity to the opponent (observed for Russian, Armenian and Uzbek nationalities).
- "We-migrants are better than you-migrants". This identification applies to migrants from Central Asia, and the arguments are: "Because we are Russian"/"we know the language"/"our behavior is proper" (see Observation 4 above). This identification occurs spontaneously or in response to provocations, "migrants are not welcomed in Russia".
- "A migrant obliged to Russian laws". This identification appears in two forms: as a moral obligation to obey laws and as a righteous anger to unjust laws.
- "A hostage of the situation" due to the actions of the authorities or economic policies of Russia and/or the country of origin. It is simultaneously a self-identification and an external identification employed by advocated of migrants' rights.

Contexts of Identifications

Three more remarks about varying contexts of identifications in online interactions.

First, discrimination against migrants does not universally function as a collective symbol in migrants' interactions. A significant part of interactions that we observed are pragmatic. Some interactions involve emotions that original posts do not intent to produce. Let us consider a post focused on the insult of a Kyrgyz migrant by a popular Russian talk-show host. Comments to this post do not demonstrate collective offence against Russia: commentators blame the person, discuss his actions in a pragmatic manner, or address their negative emotions to Kyrgyz authorities:

Observation 14

> **Post**: Andrey Malakhov reacted to angry comments of the Kyrgyz people addressed to him. Russian TV-presenter Andrey Malakhov made a statement after the scandal with the comment about the Kyrgyz people […].
>
> **Comment**: Well, he is partially right. Salary of doctors and teachers in Kyrgyzstan is tiny. Our elections: for 1000 soms[11] you can buy a voice. Maybe those who are offended do not know how people live outside Bishkek.
>
> **Reply to comment**: I did not hear him speaking. But what I've read – it did not offend me at all. I am more offended by the theft of the state budget, the venality of the authorities and Nazism.
>
> **Comment**: Malakh, you are an oligarch whore.
>
> **Comment**: What do you want from a person who "washed" other people's lingerie and digs into it during all his professional life. Those who remember his program "Big wash" will understand what I mean and how it relates to this person.

Second, the Soviet type of identification – "the friendship of the peoples" policy in combination with "nationalities" classification – regularly arises in observed interactions. It is often presented in a truncated form, as a widespread judgment: "There are no bad nations, there are bad people". However, some users directly refer to "the friendship of the peoples" and its implementation in Soviet history, as Observation 6 above reveals.

Finally, the dynamics and the focal topics of interactions also depend on the characteristics of a particular online group: its size, audience, language, who can post, who can comment, and so on. Observations 3 and 4 (see above) are a good illustration. The observations are from two groups, both are legal assistance groups with active moderators. The first group is small. It is characterized by human rights rhetoric applied to low-qualified labor migrants in Russia. Interactions in this group often occur in broken Russian. The second group is large. It focuses on obtaining

[11] The *som* is the national currency of Kyrgyzstan.

Russian permanent residency and citizenship and involves empathy over migrants' troubles with these issues. It aims predominantly at migrants from the fSU countries, mainly at those for whom Russian is a native language. As Observations 3 and 4 demonstrate, in both groups there is a transition from the terms of citizenship to the terms of nationality. However, due to differences in initial goals and the target audience of the groups, this transition moves in the opposite directions: to accusations of discrimination against "non-Slavs", on the one hand, and to a call for privileges for "Russians", on the other hand.

Discussion and Conclusions

Let us begin this section with the answers to the original research questions of this paper.

What social categories do migrants employ in their attempts to identify themselves and to be identified by others in online interactions?

Migrants to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan employ a diverse set of social categories in their identifications. The prevalent categories are citizenship, nationality, language abilities, migrant-ness, as well as the category "low-skilled labor migrants from Central Asia" that amalgamates class, visibility and a broader region. Auxiliary social categories are religion, inter-state region, town/village/city of origin, urban/rural origin, tradition/modernity, broader ethnicity (such as Slavs) in connection with race and belonging to the Soviet culture. Minority status, the aim of migration and kinship are employed occasionally.

How are these categories related to each other? Are they used individually, or are there elective affinities between social categories exercised for the purposes of identifications?

There is an elective affinity that manifests itself in the category of "low-skilled labor migrants from Central Asia". It exists in the interactions in all types of groups and provides the basis for internal differentiation between migrants. "Low-skilled labor migrants from Central Asia" are opposed, on the one hand, to visible, but not (necessarily) low-skilled members of the Kazakh and Azerbaijani diasporas and, on the other hand, to non-visible ethnic Russian and Russophone migrants from Central Asia.

Do identifications differ for migrants from different countries?

There are substantial differences in identifications of migrants from different countries. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in their identifications refer to low-skilled labor migration to Russia as a fact, a subject for assessment, and on occasion as a unifying category. For these countries, the present and the future of the nation is discussed in the framework of evaluation of mass immigration to Russia. Migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan employ identifications connected to diasporic connections. Furthermore, in Kazakhstan there is a clear division between Russian and Kazakhstan Kazakhs.

Do identifications differ for self-identifications and external identifications?

External identifications and self-identifications are intertwined in typical discussions in VK groups. The perspective of Russian society on migrants is, as it were, built into the perception of migrants themselves.

What are the typical situations when the usage of "migrant" category is relevant?

There are three types of situations associated with the usage of the "migrant" category. They are connected with the market, state and nation, respectively. First, "migrant" is a synonym for "labor migrant" who moves to Russia due to economic necessity. Second, "migrant" is a citizen of the state subject to specific institutional regulations. Third, "migrant" is the Other, a representative of his/her nation in Russian society. The situation of the third type is primarily connected with three contexts: (a) discussions of migrants' behavior in Russia; (b) discussions of discrimination by police and employers; (c) provocations against migrants in social media. We should also add that migrants themselves sometimes perceive migrants from a different country as the Others.

The analysis of migrants' online interactions allows us to formulate the following conclusions:

1. "Low-qualified labor migration from the countries of Central Asia" (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) is a key categorization for national and other identifications of residents of these countries (both migrants and non-migrants). In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the fact of labor migration to Russia is highly relevant for the evaluation of the nation and its further developments.
2. Migration to Russia from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is fused with diasporic connections.
3. The issue of the language is highly significant for migrants' identifications. The national language is often regarded as an indicator of belonging to a nation. The role of Russian language is ambivalent. It is perceived as a valuable competence for a migrant in Russia, yet as a threat to national culture as well. We believe this ambivalence is rooted in the legacies of the Soviet national politics and policies.
4. Current migration flows to Russia are related with migration processes that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the countries of Central Asia (primarily, for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), the exodus of ethnic Russians in the 1990s is still important as a point of reference and evaluation of contemporary mass labor migration to Russia. At the same time, the Soviet type of identifications based on "nationalities" and "the friendship of the peoples" remains a reference point in discussions about migration.

How do these results supplement understanding of migration processes in post-Soviet region? Let us return to the similarities and differences between the Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that were formulated in the first part of this paper.

The five countries can be structured into two classes: (a) Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are characterized by huge labor migration to Russia, while (b)

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan provide less migrants coming with diversity of objectives. Our study shows that for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan migration to Russia is closely connected with diasporic ties. Both Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis detach themselves from "*gastarbeiters*" who came from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Visibility of migrants from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan turns out to be important for identifications in online interactions. However, visibility is not equal to race: it acts as a combination of phenotype, fluency in Russian language, and migrants' everyday practices. Visibility is also paired in online interactions to "invisibility" of ethnic Russian (Russophone) migrants from Central Asia.

Islam is present in observed online discourses to a varying degree and in different variations. Islam turns out to be more significant for image of a nation. In different cases it is related to a nation in different ways. Islam is a unifying category, however, for migrants it is typically an auxiliary identification. Two points are important here: (1) belief that Muslim migrants are not welcome in Russia; and (2) conception that Islam is easier to practice in Russia than at home (for migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).

Differences in the migration regulations among the post-Soviet countries are frequently discussed in social media. However, they are often connected to nationality: from the migrants' point of view, nationality is/should/should not be decisive for facilitation of migration legislation in Russia.

Regarding regional differences, we observe that "Central Asia" as an identification is widespread online while local identifications are not so important. Perhaps, this is due to the specifics of the studied groups that are primarily focused on nations.

Finally, transnationalism manifests itself in migrants' online interactions in two basic ways: as transnational labor migration and as diaspora. Besides, there are traces of transnational citizenship in discussions about dual citizenship and about politics in both Russia and the country of origin. This conclusion complements scholarly literature on transnational migration in Russia that pays attention to transnational practices of labor migrants from Central Asia and considers relations with relatives and friends, not political activities, as the main type of transnational practices.

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ARTICLE

Peculiarities of Modern Nationalist Messages in Online Political Communication: The Analyses of Donald Trump's and Jair Bolsonaro's Election Campaigns

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ABSTRACT
As digitalized election campaigns are a new phenomenon, there are almost no studies defining the peculiarities of modern nationalist messages in online political communication. This article seeks to identify some communication patterns and recent innovations in delivering online nationalist messages. These patterns are regarded in conflation with nationalist and populist approaches by political leaders during their digital election campaigns. The literature review approach is chosen to explore the articulation of nationalist and populist messages during Donald Trump's (The United States), and Jair Bolsonaro's (Brazil) election campaigns. Overall, the study boils down to an analysis of the populist and nationalist signifiers in social media posts, and the degree to which their structures of meaning revolve around the vertical down/up or the horizontal in/out axis. As a result, some common traits of modern nationalist messages in online political communication are identified and future areas of research are proposed.

KEYWORDS
online political communication, nationalism, populism, election campaign, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro

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Introduction

The victories of Donald Trump in 2016 (USA) and Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 (Brazil) were marked by several novelties from the point of view of mechanisms of online political communication. According to the data, Trump's campaign messages were three times more retweeted and five times more shared on Facebook than those from the opposite candidate (Persily, 2017). Based on a sample of 17 million tweets, Woolley and Guilbeault (2017) demonstrated how bots were able to occupy central positions in mediating information on Twitter during elections. Jair Bolsonaro, in the same vein, with just six seconds of TV daily, left other candidates behind; those candidates used traditional models of communication, such as mass media, debates and voter support (Piaia & Alves, 2019). The victory of the Brazilian political-fringe, divisive and intolerant political candidate (who joined the party only some months before the election, without a robust organizational structure in the states, and without a party alliance that guaranteed television time for electoral propaganda) had been seen as completely unlikely before the first round of the 2018 election. Nonetheless, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was the first case of building a candidacy mostly supported by digital channels in Brazil. These two examples show that the digital campaigns, once relegated by marketers to the background in the mass media, have gained relevance. These practices have been professionalizing and diversifying due to the technological innovations that appear during each cycle, such as websites, emails, blogs, Twitter[1], Facebook[2], Instagram[3], YouTube[4] and, more recently, WhatsApp[5] (Aggio, 2014).

These significant changes in the mediated political communication system have given rise to scientific research devoted to the investigation of messages, posts, retweets etc., for defining modern communication styles successfully used by politicians in social media. As a result, flamboyant speeches, extremist rhetoric, emotional appeals and other techniques were attributed to populism by most researchers (Fitzduff, 2017; Gonawela et al., 2018; Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019; Ituassu et al., 2018).

The nation-state remains the primary context for democratic political representation and public debate, making references to "the nation" unavoidable for most political discourses. Traditionally, operating within a national context, politicians, even populists that do not endorse a nationalist program, tend to speak in the name of a people defined at the national level. These connections between populism and nationalism have led to a conflation of populism and nationalism, which is traditionally reflected in political communication styles (de Cleen, 2017, p. 342).

Much valuable work has been done on how populism and nationalism come together in particular movements and parties (Canovan, 2005; Mény & Surel, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2005). However, explicit conceptual reflections on the relationship between populism and nationalism in the online communicational styles of politicians that could

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[4] YouTube™ is a trademark of Google Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

[5] WhatsApp™ is a trademark of WhatsApp Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

strengthen such empirical analyses have not received much systematic attention. I argue that, although the results of studies devoted to political communication styles in social media might show the rise of populist messages, there is still a combination of populist and nationalist messages in different kinds of populist communications.

This study explores how nationalism and populism is articulated in the communication styles of Donald Trump's and Jair Bolsonaros's election campaigns, and the peculiarities of expressing their messages in social media. With nationalism and populism as content, the study refers to the public communication of core components of ideologies with a characteristic set of key messages, or frames. With nationalism and populism as a style, it refers to the fact that these messages expressing ideology are often associated with the use of a characteristic set of presentational style elements. In this perspective, nationalism and populism are understood as features of political communication, rather than as characteristics of the actor sending the message in social media. Hence, the focus is on the unique contribution of the communication processes to "constructing" ideas, and on the communicative styles that systematically co-occur with this construction.

The study draws inspiration from research that has pointed to the articulation of nationalism and populism as distinctive discourses in different kinds of populist politics, where discourse theory studies are applied to produce a structure of meaning through the articulation of existing discursive elements (de Cleen, 2017). This study will contribute to previous research in several ways. Firstly, it will test a discourse-theoretical framework, which can further facilitate a rigorous study of the co-occurrence of populism and nationalism through the prism of articulation in the communication field (looking at the different ways in which populism and nationalism become intimately linked with each other in different empirical cases). Also, it will advance the empirical study of how populist and nationalist messages are combined in social media. Lastly, it will assist in expanding the context of political communication in social media. This article begins with a general explication of nationalism and populism approaches following by an overview of research devoted to populism and nationalism narratives used by politicians and further analysis of nationalist and populist messages in the election campaigns of Trump (The United States) and Bolsonaro (Brazil).

Literature Review

Many of the most prominent instances of populist politics have been nationalist, and nationalisms have often had a populist component. In Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu's seminal volume on populism, Angus Stewart (1969, p. 183) goes as far as to call populism "a kind of nationalism".

However, nationalism is best understood as a malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in the nation more than membership in other groups (i.e. based on gender, parties, or socio-economic status), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation, for the nation (Billig, 1995). The core concept of nationalism is the nation, which can be seen "as a limited and sovereign community that exists through time and is tied

to a certain space, and that is constructed through an in/out (member/nonmember) opposition between the nation and its outgroups" (de Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 308). This does not mean that nationalists exclusively use the word "nation". They also refer to "the people", as well as, "state", "land", "freedom", "democracy" and "culture", which acquire meaning in relation to the signifier 'nation' (Freeden, 1998, p. 750).

Conventionally, nationalism has been distinguished between an ethnic and a civic variant. Civic nationalism is based on citizenship and the ability of individuals to join the nation, whereas ethnic nationalism is based on the myth of common descent and is thus less inclusive (Kohn, 1944). According to Florian Bieber (2018), although nationalisms differ around the world, there are still some common patterns. The fear of immigrants, linked to the fear of a threat to the identity of the receiving country, is one of these patterns. The wish for homogeneity is an important element that fuels nationalism, and traditionally it has always been weaker in countries with a multifaceted identity and a high level of immigration that contributed to shaping this identity.

Even more polysemic and controversial than nationalism is the concept of populism, which refers to a wide range of empirical phenomena. It has been defined as a rhetorical style of political communication, a thin-centered ideology, a form of political behavior, and a strategy of consensus organization (Mudde, 2007).

Populism is a dichotomic discourse in which the people are juxtaposed to the elite along the lines of a down/up antagonism, in which the people are discursively constructed as a large, powerless group through opposition to the elite, who are conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populist politics claims to represent the people against elite that frustrates their legitimate demands, and presents these demands as expressions of the people's will (Laclau, 2005; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Thus, three elements can be considered as the common denominators of these successive historical and scholarly theoretical shapes of populism. Populism (1) always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; (2) is rooted in anti-elite feelings; (3) considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy.

If populists define the people in national terms (a tempting strategy in both nation-states and in multinational states) populism and nationalism merge; whereby, the corrupt elite can be either a minority accused of holding a disproportionate amount of political or economic power, or an elite accused of being beholden to foreign interests.

Conceiving nationalism and populism as ideologies that are articulated discursively by political actors and media actors bridges existing literature from political science and communication science (de Vreese et al., 2018). From a distinct political communication point of view, the focus now shifts from what constitutes the ideology of nationalism and populism to how it is communicated. In order not to overlook the vast research area of nationalism and populism studies, further understanding of, and approach to, nationalism and populism, thus, centers around communication and social media. Due to the fact that the advent of more sophisticated communication technologies, and the rise of social media, are seen to have created new opportunities and platforms for nationalists and populists to spread their messages, the main accent

in this study is paid to messages produced exactly in social media, skipping other mediums (Engesser et al., 2017; Gerbaudo, 2018).

There is now a growing body of literature on populism, and in the emerging field of populist political communication, which has mainly concentrated on media effects and mediated populism in Europe (Aalberg et al., 2016). Empirical examples in recent years have demonstrated this in Switzerland (Ernst et al., 2017), the Netherlands (Hameleers et al., 2016), Hungary and Italy (Moffitt, 2016). Hameleers et al. (2018) report on an unprecedented sixteen-country experiment testing the effects of populist communication on political engagement.

Some empirical tests for the presence of populism features in media content have been conducted (Bos & Brants, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014), and, based on the use of content characteristics and style features, one can distinguish different types of populism such as complete populism, excluding populism and empty populism (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Elena Bloch and Ralph Negrine (2017) provided a framework, which assesses the relevant features of specific populist actors' communicative styles, whereas Christian Fuchs (2020) defined the role of social media in the communication of nationalist ideology. Nationalist communication on social media seem to be predominant, and a great change after years in which liberal culture used social media in a more effective way (Adriani, 2019). L. Hagen et al. (2019) investigated the frames and meanings of emoji characters expressed by actors in defining their own identities involved in the white nationalist conversation in Twitter. Ki Deuk Hyun and Jinhee Kim (2015) in their study contend that online political expression facilitated by news consumption enhances support for the existing sociopolitical system, both directly and indirectly through nationalism.

Although researchers find the combination of populism and nationalism style a "powerful cocktail" (Sheranova, 2018, p. 2) as these features of communication style are defined to be used in online message building, only a few studies can be traced in the area of nationalism and populism conjunction as a communication phenomenon. Arzuu Sheranova (2018) considered the empirical case of the populist-nationalist leadership of Hungary, and demonstrated the interplay between populism and nationalism. Whereas, Robert Schertzer and Eric Woods (2020) found that ethno-nationalist and populist themes were, by far, the most important component of Trump's tweets, and these themes built upon long-standing myths and symbols of an ethnic conception of American identity.

However, this work tends to be quite limited. It often focuses on identifying discursive strategies that are broadly shared across movements and content, rather than on how nationalist populist communication is articulated between each other in the online messages of politicians. These studies are limited by the analysis of single country representatives, and doesn't express the wide peculiarities, which could be a framework for further research. As a result, they can miss what makes these ideologies meaningful and, therefore, why they resonate with voters.

This article adopts a literature review approach to analyzing how nationalism and populism are articulated in the two cases of online election campaigns, those from The United States and Brazil, in ways, which surface important processes of

sensemaking and message construction, and highlight issues of conflation. First, I provide a choice explanation of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro's election campaigns, and give an account of my qualitative methods of data collection and an interpretive mode of data analysis. Second, related shared generalizations centered on aspects of nationalist and populist conflation are elaborated. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings and methodological approach for understanding the processes of online political communication.

Methodology

The study aims to identify the peculiarities in online political communication, which are seen in conflation of nationalism and populism approaches, through comparative empirical investigation of the parameters, as well as the operative variables in order to verify if there are specificities and regularities.

For exploring the collective evidence in articulation of nationalist and populist messages in online communication, I selected the literature review approach (Bass & Wind, 1995) to make generalizations, rather than meta-analysis, because of the diverse design of the studies considered and the international scope (as it examines research by academician and practitioners in the United States and Brazil). The empirical generalizations are made by analyzing the interrelations among nationalist and populist messages that researchers have studied in defining the specific style and way messages were disseminated, which were popular among target audiences in Trump and Bolsonaro's election campaigns.

Studies eventually included were selected from an extensive database using investigations of the two presidential election campaigns at different angles of study. The study selection criteria were the following:

(1) Each study should focus on the online communication effects of election campaigns. Thus, studies pertaining to general political issues and communication effects after elections were excluded;
(2) The study should report empirical results or discuss empirical results of other studies;
(3) The study should be in English, Portuguese or Russian;
(4) The majority of studies were published in communication journals. Relevant books and conference proceedings were also included. The key consideration was whether the study contributed to the stock of knowledge of how the new type of message is being built in political communication on the social media.

In order to get a sample of research articles and case studies, the following snow-ball procedure was applied; I started with a well-known and widely cited set of research articles on Trump's and Bolsonaro's communications on social media, traced references in those articles, back-tracked the cited works in the references, and so on, until I was able to find no new relevant articles. This process resulted in a total of 54 research articles.

I make no claim that this selection is complete, and there are practitioners and academic papers I missed, but I believe these studies are enough to shed a light on

the peculiarities of nationalist messages in online communications in America and Brazil. Therefore, to trace commonalities in the diversity, the comparative method (Esser & Pfetsch, 2016) has been used, by which the election campaigns of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro are analyzed.

These two cases were chosen because there are clearly similarities between the phenomena of "Trumpism" and "Bolsonarism" that do not seem to be mere coincidence. Trump's and Bolsonaro's marketers have invested heavily in creating the image of a "new" politician.

In the last decade, the re-emergence of nationalist populism has sparked much research into possible reasons for its renewed attractiveness and its implications worldwide (van Hooft, 2016, p. 30). US President Donald Trump's rhetoric and policies are especially considered as signs of, and impetus to, a renationalization of global politics, in which national interests are prioritized and international challenges and partners subordinated (Kagan, 2018). Other leaders with nationalist messages all around the globe have been riding on the wave of nationalist messages that Trump has been spreading since his election campaign in 2016. One especially successful propagator of nationalist appeals is Jair Bolsonaro, who was elected Brazil's President in 2018. During his election campaign, he promised to fight globalism, and has been called the "Trump of the Tropics" based on their similarly nationalist rhetoric (Shear & Haberman, 2019). These phenomena pushed the scientific community to deeply study the peculiarities of these presidents' election campaigns and their populist messages in social media.

Thus, considering these similarities and the presence of numerous studies devoted to Trump's and Bolsonaro's identity, rhetoric and use of media, this research is mainly concentrated on analyzing the conflation of nationalism and populism in their online messages during election campaigns, rather than on political regimes and the type of communication strategy after successful elections.

Data analysis

The empirical generalizations have been developed from content analysis of empirical studies results due to the fact that this type of analysis is an appropriate method when the phenomenon to be observed is communication, rather than behavior, or a physical object (Malhotra, 1996). This study carefully followed the procedures recommended in content analysis literature (Harris, 2001).

One of the most fundamental and important decisions is the determination of the basic unit of text to be classified (Weber, 1990). Six units that have been commonly used in content analysis literature are word, word sense, sentence, theme, paragraph and whole text (ibid.). Sections such as Analysis and Results in articles were chosen as the units of analysis. The aim was to find the data used for analysis and the final results in those studies.

The main codes were connected with central elements of populist and nationalist communication. In populist communication three elements are central: (1) reference to "the People" (2) a battle against the "corrupted elite" and with a possible extension of

(3) the identification of an out-group. These defining elements have been emphasized by several scholars of populism (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde, 2004). For nationalism, they are: (1) trust in other nationalities (perceived out-groups); (2) pride in the Nation; (3) isolationism; (4) the rank of national identity over other identities; and (5) State vs. ethnic identity (Bieber, 2018).

During the process of analysis, special attention is paid to the content and how the nodal points of populism (the "people-as-underdog" and "the elite") and nationalism (the ("people-as-nation") acquire meaning through the articulation of populism and nationalism with their down/up and in/out structure in the candidates' online messages (de Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017, p. 312)

Results

The success of the recent election campaigns of the American and Brazilian presidents exemplifies the combination of nationalist and populist approaches in their online communication rather than a clear nationalist or populist strategy. The content of the messages was cumulatively intertwined with the features of both ideologies and distinguished as a more efficient one in the process of involvement. Thus, according to No. 1, 5, 9, and 12 in the Table 1, and the content peculiarities of candidates' messages, the following generalizations can be made.

G1: A positive association between candidates' personal messages in their online presence, and claims of being an outsider and patriot of the country, are considered an indirect indicator of the predictive potential of online interactions with respect to electoral results.

The notion of an outsider in the candidates' messages refers to the elevation of their status as the representatives of the people and defenders against the others, which is the strategy of populist rhetoric. To reinforce the positive connotation of this word, references to patriotism and national values are applied. Words like *father, mother, son, family, boy* and *school* refer to the narrative of the narrator's past and family connections (Santos et al., 2019, p. 5). It is an attempt to tell the story itself. This rhetorical construction resumes its personal and political trajectory, detaching itself from the main actors of negative reputation and approaching or, at least, illuminating its connections with actors of positive reputation according to their speech.

Regarding the structure of society, Trump and Bolsonaro vehemently defended nationalism using national symbols, such as the flags and their colors, to compose the visual identity of their campaigns. Referring to the phrases "Brazil above all, God above all" or "Make America Great Again", such words as *Brazil, God* and *America* are central nationalist indicators. Other words also gain relevance, especially the verbs *believe, change* and *want* that appear in argument sentences. The verb *change*, for example, appears more than 55 times in Bolsonaro's posts, like "[…] really change the destiny of our Brazil". This content is the construction of an idealized, fraternal and pious nationalism mobilized through an emotional rhetorical approach, using terms such as *friend, hug, heart* and *love* (Santos et al., 2019, p. 6).

Table 1. *The peculiarities of content in candidates' messages according to rhetoric's elements. Summary of Empirical Generalization*

Rhetoric	Generalization		Studies
	Donald Trump	Jair Bolsonaro	
People vs Elite	1. A genuine outsider from elite groups, a newcomer in politics; 2. Personal involvement in the process of online communication; 3. Criticism of parties and major political actors, the current institutional model, Anti-establishment, media (elite groups); 4. Elimination of corruption within the government;	5. Poses as an outsider; 6. Usage of a simple, informal, vulgar language as a way of being closer to people; 7. Criticism of Bolsa Família program (fraud); 8. Criticism of a large delegitimating strategy that targets the oligarchies as opposed to the people;	Enli, 2017; Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Carreiro & Matos, 2019; Fontes et al., 2019; Murta et al., 2019; Loureiro & Casadei, 2019; Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019; Magalhães & Veiga, 2019; Androniciuc, 2017; del Valle et al., 2018;
People as a nation	9. Patriotism, national symbols; love for the country; 10. Security (weapons, transfer of responsibility from the State to the citizen); 11. Freedom for parents to choose educational models.	12. Homeland symbols, Brazil becoming a nation again, Brazil above all; 13. Defense of the traditional family and heteronormativity, moral and religious values; 14. Order: increased criminal law, intolerance of social movements;	Passos de Azevedo, 2019; Santos et al., 2019; Aggio & Castro, 2019; Obschonka et al., 2018; Nai & Maier, 2018; Rudolph, 2019; Nair & Sharma, 2017; Kellner, 2016; Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019; Ituassu et al., 2018; Gonawela et al., 2018; Fitzduff, 2017; Rothwell & Diego-Rosell, 2016; Rowland, 2019; Whitehead et al., 2018; Muller, 2019;
Down/Up structure	15. Protection of the Constitution (through the appointment of conservative members to the Supreme Court); 16. Protection of the country freedom and individual freedom;	17. Decentralization; 18. Defense and apology for the armed forces; 19. Administrative reform, reduction of expenses, fight against fraud; 20. Liberate the country, hostage to corruption, parties and the system;	Braga & Carlomango, 2018; Piaia & Alves, 2019; Vitorino, 2019; Pybus, 2019; Malala & Amienyi, 2018; Demata, 2019; Tadic et al., 2017; Passos de Azevedo, 2019; Yaquba et al., 2017; Yates, 2019; Srinivasan et al., 2019; Bernecker et al., 2019; Magalhães & Veiga, 2019
In/out structure	21. Construction of the wall and illegal immigration; 22. Xenophobia and criticism of political minorities (women, LGBT's, foreigners, refugees, indigenous people, blacks and blacks, low economic strata);	23. Animosity towards socialist countries; 24. Remove Brazil from the UN Security Council; 25. The split of country between the good citizens, Christians, and the communists (LGBTs, women, blacks, indigenous people, Northeasterners).	Yaquba et al.,2017; Carreiro & Matos, 2019; Passos de Azevedo, 2019; Santos et al., 2019; Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019; Aggio & Castro, 2019; Ituassu et al., 2019; Lima, 2019; Obschonka et al., 2018; Oh & Kumar, 2017; Costa & Khudoliy, 2019; Darwish et al., 2017; Ahmadian et al., 2017;

It is worth mentioning frank, personal posts on social nets that blur the boundaries between a politician and ordinary people. The candidate's personal involvement was also underlined by the account name, for instance, @real_DonaldTrump, as though to underline the tweets, which came directly from Trump himself and were not managed and crafted solely by his campaign (Enli, 2017). Single-source and experimental studies have repeatedly and independently verified that the combination of a satirical tone with negative and aggressive meaning, used with simple, informal language repeated per involvement cycle, were the language mechanisms of getting closer to ordinary people and braking barriers between them.

Researchers also emphasize the fact that highly personalized and hyperbolized messages on social networks are intended to transform political facts and events into a spectacle. The new technologies contribute to this process. The hyperbolization of broadcast messages on social networks (Facebook, Twitter) is another efficient mechanism used in the image building of these two politicians. The use of epithets appeals to the emotions of voters by means of representing everything that happens in the country in a superlative form, such as *the worst, the most terrible, nightmare, catastrophe,* etc. (Passos de Azevedo, 2019, p. 8).

G2: Exacerbation of nationalist mobilization in the process of giving the oligarchy's power back to the people through the candidate.

According to the statements 3, 8, 9, and 12 in the Table 1, this positioning is part of a larger delegitimizing strategy that targets the oligarchies as opposed to the people (de la Torre, 1992, p. 386), an oligarchy that can encompass various actors, including the social elite, the political class and the media. These politicians have used language to create otherness, with varying degrees of success. Similar tactics of linguistic othering is a prominent example of how they create and disseminate a populist frame.

Trump's strategy, like Bolsonaro's, was to present the mainstream media as the one chasing them. The candidates repeatedly claimed that the country's main media outlets were campaigning against them, defending their main opponent and even publishing lying news that compromised their images (Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019). The intention is to exacerbate nationalist mobilization with the promise to give back power to the people, through the candidate of course (Santos et al., 2019).

For Trump, others' supportive quotes or endorsements were the most common content. As much as 39.3% of his tweets belonged to this category, followed by criticism or attack on other (25%). The attack tweets took up a quarter of Trump's tweets including attacks on other candidates (16.9%). The attacks were often coupled with incivility; one out of ten (10.5%) Trump's tweets and retweets included uncivil wordings attacking other candidates (*clowns, jabronis, corrupt liar, disaster, Ambien for insomnia*), journalists *(outright liar, really dumb puppets*), and debates (*clown competition, garbage*) (Lee & Lim, 2016, p. 850). Such criticism of the main political actors and institutional mechanisms perceived in the two campaigns under analysis highlight the anti-establishment brand (Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019).

G3: Such themes as, (a) violence/public security; b) health; c) the economy are the three key intermediate effects which lead to the success in elections.

Statements 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, and 24 in the Table 1 empirically reconcile both types of rhetoric employed by the candidates. Researchers come to the conclusion, based on Trump's and Bolsonaro's online messages, that politicians who managed to control the themes that are more prominent on the public agenda, covering these subjects in its favor, are more likely to win the elections (Magalhães & Veiga, 2019).

These themes were classified with subgroups which include: (1) topics of public policies (violence, health, housing, education, environment, social security and Bolsa Família Program), which occupies 47.96% of the debate space; (2) development (economy, inflation and agribusiness) with 13.3% of the debate; (3) corruption, with 17.24%, which can be grouped – if desired – into ideology/moral values (dictatorship, gender identity, racism, fascism, Venezuela, human rights, protests, communism, school without a party), which adds up to 21.5% (Magalhães & Veiga, 2019).

Thus, nodal nationalist words in politician accounts referred to security. *Commitment, government,* and *citizen* place a strong emphasis on the topic of public security, combating crime and other related matters. In other words, the posts of the candidates present a vocabulary that often associates the idea of citizen/people to the issue of security, including the use of *commitment* as a way to tie government actions with improving the individual's life via security. The words that make up this class are aggregated around the idea of "security" (Carreiro & Matos, 2019, p. 4).

In the sphere of foreign affairs, both candidates exercised the defense and apology for the Armed Forces in Brazil and the United States. In addition, the candidates strongly defended the legalization of the possession of weapons (including a weapon becoming a symbol of Bolsonaro's campaign) triggered through images, gestures and emoticons.

Both candidates emphasized national security, the review of trade relations with China, strong animosity towards socialist countries, and their insertion in international organizations. Bolsonaro even proposed to remove Brazil from the UN Security Council, "for taking a stand against Israel and only defending what is no good" and defended the establishment of commercial relations without what he calls "ideological bias", which refers to relations with countries with leftist governments (Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019, p. 5).

Regarding the thematic plan, the analysis of relational pairs demonstrated that Trump's strategies in the immediately preceding election served as a showcase and demonstration effect for Bolsonaro's campaign (from the point of view of the agenda adopted and the style, and the strategies of using Twitter for the candidate) filled with political humor techniques, sarcasm, irony, scorn, negative adjectives and nicknames of opponents, to carry out a negative campaign.

G4: The concept of splitting the country into Christian or Family groups (to further their unification with the candidate's help), and the Minorities group, is applied as a paradigm of digital political communication in contemporary electoral contexts.

According to the statements 9, 12, 22, and 25 in the Table 1, populists claim that the will of the people is the only legitimate source of authority, but the concept of people inherently depends on there being some other groups that are opposed

to "us". The politicians use social media to assert themselves as the defenders of the in-group against all out-groups, which is the in/out structure of nationalist rhetoric. Though it is fundamental for populists to position themselves as the defender of the people, it must be clear who they are defending the people against (Caiani & della Porta, 2011, p. 187). Populists often target and attack minority cultural and ethnic groups, both within their sovereign borders and beyond their borders. In these cases, Bolsonaro defended morality and the traditional family, and opposed abortion under any circumstances, whereas Trump gave a voice to Christians and other proponents of traditional family valuesies (Iasulaitis & Vieira, 2019). Though, on the surface, this color-blind and gender-blind language might make Bolsonaro seem to be treating all people equally; in fact, color-blindness and gender-blindness are counterproductive ideologies ignoring the systematic discrimination and prejudice that women and people of color face (Trujillo-Pagán, 2018).

Both politicians use language to position themselves as the defenders of a constructed in-group against a constructed out-group. Presumably, in-groups and out-groups are constructed because the people positioned in each group are not inherently interconnected. The LGBTQ community, indigenous people and the political left are not intrinsically related. Rather, Bolsonaro and Trump groups them together as the out-group in opposition to the in-group, which is similarly a constructed group.

Conclusion

Social media has rapidly accelerated the mediatization of politics by allowing political leaders to disseminate individualized content and directly interact with constituents, as well as creating niche interest networks where people can constantly interact with others who share their ideals (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018). Such opportunities may develop additional features of message building in the process of communication with voters.

This article represents an attempt at identifying some communicative patterns and recent innovations in delivering nationalist messages, which are regarded in conflation with nationalism and populism approaches by political leaders during their election campaigns. When a politician articulates (elements of) different discourses, these are not simply added, one on top of the other. Rather, through the articulatory process (and the elements thereof) each acquires a particular meaning. This means that when different political agents articulate populism and nationalism, this can lead to very different results (de Cleen, 2017).

Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro are the perfect examples of leaders who have capitalized on the mediatization of politics in order to gain political relevance in a relatively short period of time, and they are seen by many researchers as the candidates making use of populist or nationalist rhetoric. The analysis of particular politicians' messages shows the articulation of populism with nationalism and applied literature review approach is aimed at uncovering the specificities of these cases in question.

Overall, the study of the articulation of populist and nationalist online messages boils down to an analysis of the location of the populist and nationalist signifiers in their

messages on social media, of the degree to which that structure of meaning revolves around the vertical down/up or the horizontal in/out axis, and of the signifying relations forged between the populist and nationalist signifiers, and between the down/up and in/out axes.

As a result, the developed generalizations uncover populist messages revolving around the exclusion of certain groups of people from the nation, from the nation-state, and from political decision-making. This style of content creation reinforces the fact that the "people-as-underdog" is a sub-group of the ethnically and culturally defined nation and includes no ordinary people of foreign descent (which are marked as another outgroup, called Communists, in the case of Bolsonaro). Moreover, the "people-as-underdog" is constructed in opposition against migrants and other nationalist out-groups. Indeed, populist messages have interpellated ordinary people primarily as an underdog, using the exclusionary nationalist terms Family and Christian.

Ordinary people, they argue, are the prime victims of multicultural society. Thus, Bolsonaro asked to "Remove Brazil from the UN Security Council", and Trump demanded to "construct a wall from illegal immigration" (Caiani & della Porta, 2011, p. 188). Also, the main argument presenting "the elite" as lacking legitimacy is that it pampers ethnic–cultural minorities and does not take the interests of the ordinary people who suffer from diversity to heart (de Cleen, 2016a, 2016b). Trump and Bolsonaro disseminate an exclusionary frame through messages on social media in order to establish themselves as the single representation of the constructed in-group and the defender against out-groups. What I see here is how positions on the in/out axis (membership of the nation, as well as, serving the interests of the nation) come to determine positions on the down/up axis.

One important consideration for future research is the question of method. The selection of material to illustrate the conflation was drawn from many sources devoted to the analysis of media-based messages, and specifically in the social media, but other types of media were not included. Politicians traditionally exist in mediatized and nonmediatized environments, and future research should be sensitive to the many ways, in which leaders communicate and establish themselves as leaders through speech, gestures, symbols and actions. It is the totality that is important, and future research should go beyond, for example, analysis of one form of data only, be it news items or manifestos.

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OPENING THE DEBATE

The Rise and Decline of Soviet Morality: Culture, Ideology, Collective Practices[1]

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ABSTRACT
In the article, it is proposed that the collapse of Soviet society was presaged by a growing crisis in late Soviet morality. On the periphery of late Soviet morality, collective cultural practices are seen to have successfully functioned based on a limited ethics of virtue. In the absence of an alternative to Soviet ideology, social regulation started to draw upon values intended for the reproduction of local communities. A growing contradiction between the limited values of the new social class/corporate entities and the need to develop universal values for a *big society* is currently the key ideological legitimation problem facing the Russian political order.

KEYWORDS
Soviet morality, Soviet culture, *Homo Sovieticus*, big society, commonality, rental society, virtue ethics, utopia, legitimation, social regulation, heterarchy, double standards

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Introduction

In the present article, we discuss the nature of the post-Soviet moral and social order and consider why such a moral and political scenario transpired. In this context, despite having undergone significant transformations, Soviet morality continues to play an important role in structuring the values that form present Russian society.

In critiques of contemporary Russian society, negative metaphors of quasi-class stratification, neopatrimonialism and neo-feudalism are often deployed to indicate the non-modern, non-market nature of post-Soviet social stratification. A deeper examination of these metaphors may support a relatively consistent elucidation of the source of values inherited from the past, along with a plausible prognostication of the evolutionary vectors of Russian social morality. Ultimately, the origin and transformation of the norms and values pertaining to social classes can be explained partly in terms of the unchanged expectations of the members of these classes, partly in terms of changes in these expectations.

On the other hand, the neo-classist metaphor on the whole reflects aspects of the social reality of modern Russia that only superficially resemble the class – or estates – structure. In any case, this form is quite distinct from the traditional forms of social stratification, if only in terms of the normative content it structures. Indeed, while already in the USSR it was possible to speak of quasi-classes – since these structures could, if desired, reveal intra-class values, norms, codes of honour, etc. – contemporary quasi-classifications resemble them only from the point of view of the administrative hierarchy. Thus, this social stratification can be seen as a purely pragmatic construct, aimed at justifying the existing public resource distribution hierarchy. Since intra-class values can be found only in the higher, governing classes, periodical attempts to formulate codes of honour, e.g. *codes of ethics for officials* etc., can be witnessed in the so-constructed *universum*. While, from the perspective of the hierarchical distribution of resources, the rest of the political elites may be treated as dependent classes, they do not consider themselves to be bound by class codes of honour, but instead can be seen to subscribe to the apparently popular versions of nationalism and patriotism. From a moral point of view, a neo-classist society presents a depressing picture in which, in being openly reduced to the rights of the strong, social relations are simultaneously stripped of their romantic veneer. This represents a version of an atomised society in which the formation of social groups having a distinct collective identity and morality is prevented by the will of the authorities or the repayment of loans acting as a universal regulator of behaviour (see: Dragunsky, 2019).

However, no society or its morality can be objectively described in exclusively negative terms, i.e. in terms of what is not there. Thus, since no society is hell on earth, the same norms and values do not necessarily generate *rogue* or *unmeritorious* institutions and practices. From this follows a basis for possible hope. In the present article, we analyse the cultural and ideological formation process of high, universal Soviet morality, leading to the construction of the *communist personality* along with the destruction of previous class-based values, barriers and practices. In so doing,

we see that the high moral goals set out during the implementation of the Soviet project were only partially achieved as a consequence of many cultural-historical and ontological obstacles encountered along the way. These transformations of Soviet morality, largely taking place as a consequence of the internal evolutionary logic of the Soviet project, resulted in a kind of *moral bear market*, in which the utopian goals of the Communists gradually came to be devalued by the new values of the consumer society. Thus, already by the late Soviet period, the value systems of private and corporate interests had begun to contrast themselves more actively with official morality and public interests, clandestinely preparing the cultural ground for the transition to a new social state.

Homo Sovieticus: Crafty Slave or Victim of Deceit?

Today we are witnessing the gradual loss of the *Soviet idea* as an independent value through its transformation into symbolic material for present struggles, in which the validity of the Soviet experience is either asserted or denied. Due to the *politics of memory*, completely opposing ideological perspectives of view on the Soviet phenomenon are legitimised: on the one hand, standing for *repressive totalitarianism*; on the other, representing the *avant-garde of humanity*, by which means the global understanding of the situation of the working classes was transformed, resulting in the development of a welfare state in all modern societies. Accordingly, subjects of such retrospective value constructions place their Soviet personal, family and group experiences in fundamentally opposing ideological containers without interference or hesitation, marking all contradictions and objections as insignificant exceptions to this experience. However, the much more subtle, complex, historically variable and contradictory value structures actually existing at all cultural levels and in all communities during Soviet times is not reducible to the official hierarchy of higher values. Consequently, it is not justified to reduce the historical phenomenon of the Soviet project or the value motivation of various social groups within it to ideological caricatures; even less so, to interpret this experience in terms of *deviations* from the universal path of human development as described by mainstream contemporary economic and political discourses.

It is generally understood that a sharp moral transformation occurred within Soviet society during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In any case, it seemed so due to the suddenness of the transition; as Alexei Yurchak laconically put it, “everything was forever, until it was no more” (Yurchak, 2014). Although the transition can hardly be said to have occurred easily, it is not necessarily the case that the social catastrophe was accompanied by a moral catastrophe. Even if they did not find their *market niche* from the outset, the majority of people did not generally have to make a huge effort to get over themselves in order to adapt to a new way of life. Of course, this does not imply that all citizens at once rushed to join the mafia and kill each other; on the other hand, they turned out to be surprisingly tolerant of those who did do this. While such behaviour was not condoned in terms of morality, neither did it necessarily provoke an outspoken rejection; at times, excuses were even made for it.

On the other hand, from the point of view of officially declared values, the difference between the Soviet *before* and the post-Soviet *now* appeared significant. A similar consideration arises when considering relations between people in everyday life: during the 1990s, many suddenly realised that in terms of *human relations*, Soviet life had been quite tolerable. There had been more trust, warmth, mutual assistance, etc. – and where had all this gone?

To the last question, domestic and foreign social scientists gave two main answers, in equal measure ideological and crudely one-dimensional.

The first was that Soviet people themselves were irredeemably duplicitous and hypocritical. Advocates of this point of view were not shy to express themselves; for them, Soviet society comprised a colony of three hundred million slaves for which there were neither moral values, nor religious – only propaganda and ideology constructed on lies and hypocrisy (see: Panfilov, 2016). As A. Yurchak notes, in emphasising the categories of universal duplicity, lies, bribery, denunciation and immorality as basic principles in the relations of Soviet people with the system and each other, the authors construct a new binary model in which the lies and immorality of the "socialist subject" are opposed to the integrity and honesty of some other, unnamed, "normal" subject (obviously a liberal subject) (see Yurchak, 2014, p. 44). In other words, in order to account for what grew out of it, it is necessary only to note that the Soviet moral climate was already sufficiently permeated by evil. Thus, *Homo Sovieticus* can be conveniently described in negative categories: in the first place, he lacks a sense of his own self-worth, which is either substituted either with pusillanimity or arrogance. In yielding to totalitarian oppression, the Soviet people said one thing on the record, but another in private; they swore public allegiance to various values and ideals, while in their hearts they nurtured something quite different. Thus, it was clear that, with the advent of freedom, these slothful servants of the regime quickly showed their true faces and behaved accordingly; the majority of them turning out to be philistine, greedy and self-serving, with only a minority turning out to be simultaneously civilised and liberal. However, such explanations were based on rather simplistic ideas about Soviet realities and human behaviour. In addition, retrospective ideologisation must be taken into account: recalling their lives in Soviet times, those whose standpoint is distanced by hindsight tend to be *unreliable eyewitnesses*, instead ascribing to their past selves the views and motives of the present (see Yurchak, 2005, pp. 42–43).

In other words, the present-day critics of Soviet society did not necessarily perceive their contemporaneous Soviet reality as a totally immoral hell in which they were forced to hide their true faces. Indeed, we can assume that it was exactly this binary narrative featuring *dissembling slothful servants* that was accepted after the fact, when it was necessary to explain and justify how morally decent people seemingly left to their own devices (i.e. not under compulsion), arranged at first *wild capitalism* with *criminal revolution*, followed by an atomised society characterised by a low level of interpersonal and institutional trust. The starting point of the discussion consists in the thesis that, if Soviet society had consisted of *decent and worthy people*, then it could not have reached such a moral nadir in terms of everyday (and political)

life. For this type of detractor, the after-fact of evil always and only grows out of evil. Thus, it was only natural for them to convince themselves that the society to which they had given the best years of their lives was never morally sound, being comprised of individuals and collectives that to some extent resembled moral freaks – with the exception, of course, of the few critics themselves, who were either at that time *not like all the others*, or else came to see the light later, belatedly realising all the immorality of their former existence.

The second simplistic response was based on the idea of a single *value model*, which formed the moral basis of the overwhelming majority of Soviet people, as well as the idea of a highly moral and highly cultured society, which, with the beginning of reforms, was subjected to forced degradation. The reformers lowered the threshold of society's sensitivity to social pathology. Since the 1990s, public immoralism has begun to spread in the country; there has been a looting of the state accompanied by a total erosion of culture and morality (see: Simonyan, 2011). And, if moral degradation has not yet swept all before it, this is only because it encounters the resistance of traditional Russian values, which found support and substantial development in the Soviet period of history (see: Rutkevich, 1998, p. 9). Or, as Sergei G. Kara-Murza wrote, since the end of the 1980s, Russia has been carrying out a comprehensive and well-developed relativisation programme, followed by the dismantlement of moral standards and prohibitions and the introduction of radically amoral values (see: Kara-Murza, 2005, p. 546). From this, it followed that Soviet people with high moral virtues had been cynically deceived. Appealing to their moral feelings, as well as partly to ideologies, malefactors from the foreign and domestic elites were able to connect high moral ideals and ideas about a worthy life with an anti-Soviet project, i.e. capitalism. By the time they realised their mistake, it was too late. This answer already looked somewhat more plausible, since it was based on the well-known facts of the manipulation of public consciousness in the era of *perestroika* and Yeltsin's reforms. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to believe that, through manipulation alone, it was possible to turn black into white, to seduce people of a highly moral and highly cultured society, forcing them to exercise comparative tolerance with respect to the moral realities of the *Great Criminal Revolution*. After all, as Abraham Lincoln said, you cannot fool all the people all the time. And, most importantly, why did this period become a moral disaster only for a relatively small number of alarmists, while the majority survived it with relative sanguinity?

It is not difficult to notice that, despite all the differences, both of these answers proceed from the observed fact that, during the 1990s, a *sharp* transition took place from a society that had some moral and cultural values to one having completely different values. Both answers are aimed at trying to explain the high speed of this transition, described in terms of a genuine collapse in moral values. But was it really like that? Having reason to doubt the above answers, we propose to outline the main features of a third. Of course, this alternative response cannot be considered exhaustive either; however, we hope that it avoids the gross oversimplification and limitations of the two already mentioned.

A Soviet Upbringing… Based on Non-Soviet Models?

We will proceed from the fact that Soviet morality was not based on a single *basic value model*. At a minimum, it consisted of two-tiers; that is, like the morality of every *big society*, it consisted of universal principles combined with *virtue ethics*.

The highest universal principles of Soviet morality were determined by communist ideology, which in many respects was the continuation of a wider, progressive-humanistic worldview having its roots in liberalism. Looking retrospectively at the evolution of the highest values of the *Soviet political project*, we can confidently say that it was based on the desire to actualise universal left utopias, intended not only for citizens of the USSR, but also for the rest of the world. This utopian ideological programme included the following elements: emancipation of *working people* from the rule of the bourgeois minority; the dismantlement of the estate structure in favour of civil equality; the expansion of social benefits addressed to the majority; egalitarianism; classical liberal ideas of the growth of opportunities for everyone and progress as a form of the unfolding of history; the value of the future; the world revolution as a catalyst for necessary social changes; and hence the original Bolshevik eschatology, later to be replaced by moderate ideas of the evolutionary superiority of socialism followed by peaceful coexistence. Thus, in the dynamics of its core of values, Soviet society appears as a leftist late-liberal revolutionary project that takes the reasons for the failures of the European revolutions of the *first wave* into account, whose political and economic results were largely attributed, on behalf of the *Third Estate*, to the bourgeois elites. While the party vertical of power played a key role in the management of Soviet society, the role of other authorities (the system of councils, the economic and judicial verticals, etc.) only decreased with distance from the revolution (Orekhovsky, 2019, p. 32). Thus, the Communist Party was responsible for the development, dissemination and control of the highest values that integrated Soviet society across all social boundaries and inequalities. At the political level, the values of Soviet society were purposefully inculcated with the help of various mechanisms of institutional implementation, functionally *opening* them for the majority. During the Soviet period, ideological *bullishness* was pushed at all levels of the social system, starting with a single hierarchy of media and ending with the organisation of special forms of collectivism (Party, Komsomol and pioneer meetings, political literacy lessons, meetings of labour collectives, community work days, demonstrations on public holidays calendar etc.), which were formed to support and reproduce the highest Soviet values.

It is true that, from a certain point of view, there was no Soviet social *morality* as such since, inasmuch as pre-revolutionary Russia did not manage to achieve a moral phenomenon similar to the Western model, the conditions for its formation in Soviet Russia were even less favourable (Gudkov, 2013, pp. 125–126). Adhering to a less radical point of view, some authors consider Soviet morality to be an inferior form of *pseudo-morality* (Zinoviev, 1994, p. 261), taking it as axiomatic that there should no place for ideology in *the normal*, which implies that morality and ideology should be kept separate (Stolyar, 2010, pp. 87–88). These authors assert that it is possible to

distinguish between ideological morality (or pseudo-morality) and personal morality (or actual, proper morality). Here ideological morality is subsumed into ideology, interpreting what a person in a communist society should be like and urging people to follow this model. Although such morality closely resembles real (personal) morality, in reality it only approximates to it to the same extent as communist ideology comprises a new form of religion (see: Zinoviev, 1994, pp. 261).

Here we see the idea of a particular *real* or *personal* morality, which exists separately from ideology or religion. However, if such morality also exists somewhere, then this must consist in the familiar *virtue ethics* that is characteristic of local communities and undoubtedly forms the actual moral horizon for such authors.

Finally, such a distinction between true morality and Soviet *pseudo-morality* can never be made coherently, since the authors accept the need, if not for ideology, then for something analogous (typically religion) in order for the morality of modern society to coalesce into a necessarily complete form (i.e. serving to indicate the proper placement of virtue ethics). In particular, the inconsistencies in this position arise from its advocates' excessive zeal to distinguish between ideology and morality. As Marina Stolyar notes, ultimately, people were interested not in ideology itself, but in its supporting pillars – morality, philosophy, art and especially religion – that allowed Soviet ideology to hold out for such a long time (see: Stolyar, 2010, p. 175). She states that too often in the last decades of its existence, Soviet ideology resorted to borrowing the energy of the "moral factor" for its own support. Here, in accepting that in its fall, the bankrupt system pulled down everything connected with it – so that the socialist moral crisis turned into a devaluation of morality in general. She argues that the opposition of ideology and morality ended in the fall of ideology and the victory of morality; however, it was a Pyrrhic victory (see: Stolyar, 2010, pp. 87–88).

In one sense, it can be agreed that a *victory of morality* really did occur following the collapse of the USSR. However, this should be seen in terms of a victory of *one-half of Soviet morality over the other*, rather than *morality in general* over *ideology*. In our opinion, such confusion arises from the indistinguishability of universal morality and virtue ethics. To avoid this kind of confusion and inconsistency, we proceed from the realisation that the urge to distinguish between ideology and morality is not as productive as it might once have seemed. In the societies of Modernity, ideologies have long played a similar moral role to that formerly performed by religions; indeed, they are often with some justice referred to as *civil religions* (Fishman, 2014). Therefore, we see no reason not to accord such a full value to Soviet morality.

We consider that other major component of Soviet morality, virtue ethics, to focus on the values of commitment to the local, collective community, i.e. they do not claim universality and do not refer to the transcendent in any form, whether that be religious, ideological or ethical. This explains both the inevitability of virtue ethics and their limitations. Although clearly unsuitable for integrating individuals into a complex *big society*, virtue ethics are indispensable for creating the ties characteristic of a small *community*, without which the functioning of most social institutions remains unthinkable. However, being left to its own devices, a virtue ethics approach is equally (un)suitable for the Communist Party and the Christian

church, as well as for the gang, the mafia, or any of the other communities of *friends* fighting for a place under the sun that may arise during the crises that periodically afflict *big societies*. During the turning point of the 1990s, when the universal principles of Soviet morality crashed, ethics of virtue, suitable for various purposes including any social system, survived and remained popular. It was this that made the *Criminal Revolution* acceptable to the majority.

Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the Soviet project entailed elevating man through culture, proceeding from the fact that it has historically been the case that the poor are poor and the rich are rich, but this must be done away with. The rich must be punished, while the poor must be accustomed to the idea that their poverty will be replaced not with coveted wealth, but by high leisure (see: Cantor, 2011, p. 211). As evidenced by numerous artistic experiments that completely denied the pre-revolutionary achievements of Russian culture, Soviet culture began with a promise to give the people a kind of new heaven on a new earth. However, over time, radical cultural experiments gave way to a more realistic strategy of mastering the cultural heritage of mankind, which turned out to be valuable for the cause of Communism. According to Konstantin Bogdanov, the arguments of Lenin and Trotsky about the world revolution, which justified the herostratic attitudes of the cultural elite of the twenties, already looked like an anachronism by the mid-thirties. By the mid-1930s, futurological utopias as represented in literature and art became balanced and gradually replaced by historical retrospection, designed to present the present as a logical outcome of previous history, which, over its entire course, "dialectically" prepared the ground for the flourishing of Stalin's rule (see: Bogdanov, 2009, pp. 107–108).

As a result, the area of historical dynamics of Soviet morality that interests us has always been heterogeneous enough to allow (and even welcome) a number of ethical, personal and broadly cultural patterns that are not directly related to communist ideology, but borrowed from the area of *universal human values*. Objectively, a major role was played by attempts to integrate pre-revolutionary cultural achievements into the Soviet cultural hierarchy, including folklore (fairy tale, myth), as well as the ancient heroic epic and other elements borrowed from noble or bourgeois culture, not to mention science and technology. The success of the Soviet moral and cultural project depended both on the degree of subordination of *Communist morality* to virtue ethics, as well as on the integration of previous neoclassical and on other cultural paradigms. When this connection turned out to be strong, the values of virtue ethics began to glow with the reflected light of the universal moral values of the communist project – or, in its broader interpretation, the values of humanism, progress, beauty, goodness and truth. Although these values were *kept in their place*, in reality, their carriers tended to overestimate them, considering them to be self-sufficient. Conversely, to the extent that the connection between Communist morality and virtue ethics turned out to be weak and formal, Soviet morality and culture acquired a deep resemblance to other cultures – either *bourgeois*, or *noble* (in its heroic form, closest to virtue ethics), which was unable to effectively resist the *Criminal Revolution*.

Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to acknowledge the content of those cultural strata (primarily literature) in which virtue ethics, heroic values and *bourgeois morality*, being never digested, were waiting in the wings.

The ethics of virtue is primarily associated with all kinds of literature that describe the acts of heroes. In the Soviet context, these heroes initially consisted of prominent actors of the revolution and subsequent civil war. This can be seen as indicative of an attempt to *tame* the heroic problematic. Thus, already by the 1920s–1930s it was being acknowledged that the cult of heroes was not in itself something fundamentally socialist. To some extent, this cult was not very desirable, since, in its orthodox historical and materialistic interpretation, Marxism did not accord the same importance to the *role of personality in history* as *bourgeois*, *feudal* and even utopian-socialist. Soviet writers emphasised that the main basis of our heroism is a correct understanding of the consciousness of class duty and, at the same time, overcoming the fear of death, which leads the hero to victory, which should be shown by us as a natural embodiment of class duty as correctly understood (see: Bogdanov, 2009, p. 176). Therefore, in particular, a hero of the Civil War had to be a collective type of hero; although it was not necessary to *pull out* the hero from the mass, at the same time the mass should not be faceless. Here, it was necessary to show that the heroes were driven by class duty; the hero himself had to be of a proletarian background, not a *fellow traveller*, etc. (ibid., p. 177).

Whatever else might have been the case with the characters in Soviet literature, archetypes produced within the genre were insufficient on their own to form a basis for upbringing and education. Thus, the country of victorious socialism could not limit itself to educating its citizens solely on the example of heroic proletarians. The reason was banal: neither world nor domestic culture had in its repertoire enough sufficiently attractive and holistic samples of a *harmoniously developed personality* drawn entirely from the oppressed classes. However, these samples were abundant among the ruling classes, i.e. the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, which historically had sufficient leisure time for personal self-improvement.

Despite Russian literature becoming highly critical of the nobility from the second half of the 19th century, increasingly describing them as a decadent, parasitic class, along with the aristocracy in general, they had already established patterns of a harmoniously developed individual, including personality and patriotism. Just as, at one time, such heroes were the subject of imitation by the bourgeoisie in Europe, they were to also become the model for emulation by *Homo Sovieticus*. An educated nobleman of the 18th century was characterised by such as definitions as “nobleness”, “service”, “honour”. Nobleness and honour were understood in terms of a person’s characteristics, the basis on which his reputation is earned. Service was understood as love for the Fatherland, duty and readiness for self-sacrifice. But wasn’t that also what was required from *Homo Sovieticus*? Thus, there was no essential contradiction between the figure of an ideal nobleman and the ideal of patriotic Soviet citizen.

Returning to the cultural meaning of the Soviet project, we once again note that it can be seen as largely consisting in equating citizens with the nobility on a moral level. Of course, this cultural transformation also implied the exclusion of all sorts of

material excesses and material inequality as a potential factor in personal and moral degradation. It is no coincidence, for example, that Soviet science fiction emphasised the asceticism of the people of the future, who understand that the endless expansion of material needs is meaningless, especially when it becomes an end in itself (Efremov, 1957/2020). A specific cultural problem relating to the Soviet period concerned the definition of a *sufficiently deserving* level of needs, based on a kind of public consensus. In a certain sense, the Soviet cultural and educational project comprised a project to inculcate victorious workers into a high noble culture: according to Galina Ivankina, many people love the USSR for the aristocracy of its culture, its literacy and breadth. For those same Krapivin boys who turned out to be the refined heirs of the offspring of nobility with the same heightened sense of justice (see: Ivankina, 2015).

The bourgeois cultural influence on Soviet people was perhaps less noticeable due to the fact that Russian pre-revolutionary history did not allow the Russian bourgeoisie to survive the great and heroic times. Consequently, Russian culture lacks a holistic, heroic or positive personality model of bourgeois culture. However, the objective needs of modernisation resulted in the need to learn from the champions of such culture, i.e. Western capitalists.

Marxism recognised the great historical role of the bourgeoisie, which did not immediately become reactionary and corrupted. Therefore, at least in the early years of Soviet power, the Bolsheviks did not hesitate to openly take lessons from the bourgeoisie – not only technically, but also culturally in the broad sense of the word. It was not only Lenin or Gorky who called for this engagement, but also other Bolshevik leaders and cultural figures of a lower rank. Accordingly, it was not only their material and scientific achievements that should be borrowed from the capitalists, but also those character traits that contributed to the emergence of these achievements. Based on these borrowings, an extensive subculture arose to encompass those Soviet social strata that participated in military-political, cultural and economic competition with the West (Karacharovsky, Shkaratan, Yastrebov, 2015, pp. 86–87).

Paradoxically, in the field of upbringing and culture for bourgeois cultural discourse, things were not so bad in the USSR. Many of the foreign classics available to the Soviet reader contained images of bourgeois heroes, which, in the Soviet interpretation, were often served as *of the people*. Often these comprised images of heroic bourgeois – participants in revolutionary and liberation struggles (Till Eulenspiegel, The Gadfly, heroes in the works of Victor Hugo, etc.). The bourgeois was attractive not only as a revolutionary, but also as an active, purposeful entrepreneur and *hero of labour* – and even more so, as an adventurer, a gentleman of fortune. Although bourgeois economic science was condemned by Soviet ideological workers for being addicted to *robinsonades*, fictional characters like Robinson Crusoe himself or those inhabiting Jules Verne's "Mysterious Island" were represented to enthusiastic young Soviet readers as *heroes of labour*. In authors such as Balzac, we encounter bourgeois characters like Gobseck, who, if not morally flawless, were at least colourful and not inferior to aristocrats in terms of the nobility and beauty of their souls. In general, the classical foreign literature of the 19th century often portrayed attractive patterns of interference of bourgeois and noble personality patterns (see: Ossovskaya, 1987,

pp. 427–460). In such cases, the Soviet reader could recognise in the bourgeois a social type who, like himself, strove for the sublime, as well as possessing attractive complexity and depth of personality. Even negative bourgeois characters like the *Renaissance man* archetype had *bright personalities*, which were welcomed by the intelligent reader, their transgressions instinctively forgiven.

In this connection, we cannot fail to note that all the above-described processes took place in the USSR against the background of the formation of an actual *personality cult*, which was initially formed in a framework bounded by ideological contingencies. However, towards to the end of the Soviet era, the practice of forming a personality by imitating heroes had mostly been left behind; moreover, it was not necessarily officially sanctioned (Kharkhordin, 2002, pp. 463–472). One of the characteristic symptoms of this process was a change in the teaching of literature at school, which is described as a process of liberation from the ideological standards of the interpretation of literary works. In this endeavour, more and more attention was paid to the inculcation of pure *morality.* As Evgeny Ponomarev states, more and more often teachers transfer morality to the everyday level, saving it from a loop of abstract ideologies. Thus, the history of Russian literature turned into a textbook of practical morality. This trend had existed before, but never taking such a complete and explicit form (see: Ponomarev, 2017, p. 133).

In many respects, Soviet upbringing and education can be seen as having cultivated in a person either altogether *bourgeois* qualities or those attributable to the ethics of virtue, being independent of high communist ideals.

Informal Late Soviet Cultural Practices: From the Renewal of Communism to Instrumental Ethics

It was not only in culture and in art that the highest form of communist morality in the Soviet project was undergoing rapid historical evolution. A variety of informal movements was also making a significant contribution to a critical rethinking and consequent weakening of official morality. Even more intensely, than in the small dissident groups that directly opposed the Soviet political system; these movements were involved in re-evaluating official Soviet morality, albeit without significant social support. Although not explicitly contradicting official ideology and morality, these informal cultural movements, which aimed at inculcating children and youth with cultural values according to various alternative canons, were engaged in stress testing the highest form of Soviet morality at the level of experimental cultural practices. These movements (Communard youth organisations, student song clubs, travel clubs, etc.) were quite numerous. In the USSR the amateur bard song movement alone had around 5 million members. There is reason to believe that the general vectors of the moral evolution of the participants in these movements were approximately equivalent – if only because they were presented with a similar range of choices in the directions of moral evolution, arising as responses to similar challenges and determined by similar constraints. From the point of view of ideology and morality, the informal social minority hardly differed in practical terms from the majority that did not

participate in such activities. Therefore, informal activities consisted in such a type of deviation from the ideological and moral *norm* (wider, from the norm of *practical reason*) that, at least in part, anticipated the moral transformation of the majority in the process of large-scale changes.

The status of informal movements in Soviet life remained uncertain. On the one hand, they were not illegal or oppositional in the literal sense of the word; therefore, participating in them cannot be attributed to the phenomenon of *internal emigration*. At various times, to a greater or lesser extent, they enjoyed the patronage of official structures. Conversely, ever-changing limits to their adoption were frequently imposed by Soviet officialdom.

What, for example, was the source of the increase in mutual alienation between Soviet officialdom and the Communards and other related movements? Alexander Shubin explains this in terms of the contradiction between the needs of industrial society, which was satisfied by the Soviet school, and the humanistic traditions of Russian culture, which developed under the slogan of the formation of the *diverse personality*: how many workers can be churned out – but society also needs a creative personality! (see: Shubin, 2008). It is difficult to give a comprehensive answer: individual fates, along with cultural, demographic, economic and other social transformations, were intertwined too closely at different stages of the history of the USSR, from which a different understanding of the essence of the social order, which was satisfied by the appearance of such movements, ensued. Informal movements were the result, on the one hand, of a recognition of the formalism and insufficiency of the Soviet education system, while on the other hand, they consisted in the objective result obtained within the Soviet educational paradigm when attempts were made to overcome its insufficiency. The Communard and related movements initially appeared in view of the need to provide a more solidly founded inculcation, a greater degree of consciousness than was objectively achieved within the framework of official education institutions. However, a greater degree of consciousness implied a significant degree of individual independence, which in many respects predetermined the logic of the evolution of the Communard and related associations. Regardless of the subjective wishes of their founders, these movements objectively responded to an *already manifested* need on the part of a significant number of individuals for a self-realisation and personal growth space, which was not being provided by officially sanctioned spaces.

The principal social paradox, which became apparent at the early stage of such movements, was that ideological involvement could only be successfully achieved within the framework of smaller social groups. This was due to their being fused with a virtue- or heroic ethic to a greater extent than could be achieved or afforded by the official *system* or indeed any *big society*. The key problem here was that the didactic techniques for cultivating virtues began to assume a greater significance than the two-tier ethical paradigm implied. Over time, it became increasingly difficult in practice to combine such inculcated virtues with the high ideals of communism and humanism. In any case, the educators themselves did not find this necessary, instead, simply paying tribute to the formalities. For such educators, what became necessary – and, most importantly, comprehensible – was the *education of creative personalities*,

which at the same time cohered with emerging corporate structures and networks. This inevitably led to an increase in the role played by personality patterns alien to the Soviet state, both in the sense of class ideology and the techniques used to cultivate them. As a result, various kinds of moral collisions arose that were not objectively inculcated in the people of the *communist future*, but in some others committed to *instrumental values*, which later came to predetermine their comparatively conflict-free entry into the *era of markets and democracy.*

It should be admitted here that socialism comprised a largely *artificial system*, which could retain its specificity only under the conditions of political, ideological and moral leadership of the ruling party. Socialism was impossible without the constant and relentless correction of the grey realities of everyday life by the efforts of ideology and culture, concentrated in the ideal. According to Evgeny Dobrenko, if we try to mentally subtract socialist realism from the picture of "socialism" – novels about enthusiasm in production, poems about joyful work, films about a happy life, songs and paintings about the wealth of the Soviet country, etc. – we will have nothing left that could be called socialism itself. There will be grey everyday life, routine daily work, an unsettled and difficult existence. In other words, since such a reality can be attributed to any other economic system, nothing remains of socialism in the sediment. We can therefore conclude that socialist realism produced the symbolic values of socialism rather than the reality of socialism (see: Dobrenko, 2007).

Consequently, the goal of communist education and the morality of lofty ideals resulting from it should have been closely intertwined from the outset with the cultivation of virtue- and heroic ethics required here and now, which typically became the moral limit of the education programmes carried out within the framework of socialist institutions and collectives. The secret lurking at the heart of socialism, therefore, consisted in the fact that no specific dominant socialist *consciousness* could exist in its presence: upon closer examination, such consciousness is decomposed into the moral equivalents of phenomena that occur in all class societies. At the same time, in order to avoid them conflicting with the same objective social development needs as understood by communism, a person had to achieve a high degree of understanding of his objective needs and desires.

However, in the collective practices of informal movements, relatively stable results in communist mass education were achieved not on the path of high *consciousness* gained by mastering Marxist-Leninist theory, but rather by applying well-known educational methods taking the form of not allowing free time, setting new goals and objectives, as well as involving participants in collective activities, etc. The turbulent history of the first half of the twentieth century itself contributed to such an educational approach. The result was a person brought up with a clear bias towards heroic and virtue ethics, in which such heroism and virtue were associated with the high ideals of communism and humanism by *knowing their place* rather than presenting themselves as intrinsically valuable. However, when the enthusiasts of the late 1950s, noticing the clear moral exhaustion of Soviet society, set out to achieve similar moral results to those obtained during the early Soviet period, they needed a form of organisation with an even greater degree of artificiality (since the heroic age

of the Soviet system had already passed): this form of organisation was the *commune* and its various analogues. The bias towards early Soviet practices was one of the reasons why the Soviet officialdom took a dual position in relation to communardism. In such communes, one could see a hidden reference to the days of Stalinist rule with their moral rigour and the potentially dangerous enthusiasm of indoctrinated adherents. Nevertheless, under the new conditions, the Stalinist methods increasingly objectively served not socialist goals, but rather to educate in the spirit of *abstract humanism*, resulting in the emergence of an almost openly bourgeois *creative personality*, albeit one hiding behind the fig leaf of Soviet ideology.

The communard experiment, as its enthusiasts intended, was originally aimed at educating a person in a communist society. Although it never sat very well with official communist values, in terms of inculcating the virtues necessary to achieve more modest intermediate goals it was much more successful. Here we touch on the other side of the moral problematic of the communard movement. Since communardism initially arose as a reaction to the incompleteness and inconsistency of communist education, it had to be guided by high values and goals. This implied a fairly serious tension in the disparity between the actual and the due. Nevertheless, simply in terms of ideology and other *consciousness*, the communardist education project did not imply anything specifically communist. The *self-confidence* – nowadays being taught on a large scale by coaches of various kinds – involved in *the inculcation of a creative person* and imposing a gratingly banal *love for the people* has a common place in a number of religious and moral teachings.

Thus, inculcation in the ethics of virtue quickly came up against its natural limits. While neither heroic ethics nor the aim to achieve personal realisation contradicted official ideology, nevertheless the communard educators rebelled against the inconsistency of real-life practices with declared ideals – above all, ideals that implied a high degree of heroism and altruism. In fact, the official Soviet upbringing inculcated children with that which they could hardly apply in reality: specifically, the foundations of heroic ethics at a time when the possibility of carrying out any truly heroic deeds was almost completely absent. Although the communist education system tried to break this deadlock, objectively it created only palliative organisational structures along with correspondingly dubious educational practices. As a result of such an upbringing, people grew up with a vague longing for *heroism*, a desire to be members of a community welded together by strong friendly relations, as well as a desire to do at least something useful for others, in order to bring joy to themselves. Did this make them immune to the blandishments of a *bourgeois lifestyle*? Hardly.

This small shift in emphasis was enough to begin to educate people who were notably able to fight for their *private interests*. On closer examination, such attitudes quite closely resemble the contemporary revelations of *successful people*. Counterintuitively, such people are also *creative personalities*, who enthusiastically *create* and – quite in the spirit of the arguments of the apologists for capitalism – assert that they work not for themselves, but for the benefit to others.

Thus, the paradoxicality of the phenomenon of communardism and similar movements consisted in the following: the ideological substantiation of the need

for communardistic experiments appealed to high humanistic and communist ideals that required the cultivation of a *versatile personality* – not just on the scale of narrow social and professional groups, but on the scale of society as a whole. Nevertheless, the communard movement led to the formation of communities quite far from the high goals articulated from the top floor of the Soviet ethical pyramid. It can be seen that, neither in the Soviet Union, nor in the capitalist societies of the West, has industrial society matured such as to permit all citizens to become creative individuals. Consequently, the Communard experiment was doomed – both by the nature of society itself and by the sabotage and opposition of official authorities – to break into many local groups formed around individual pedagogical successes, leading to the formation of communities welded together almost exclusively by virtue ethics. After all, this was more intelligible and comfortable for the participants of such groups, who had apparently not seriously considered any values and goals other than those corresponding to the interests of local communities or individual creative development, who did not strive for anything other than their emotional comfort and that of their associates. This paradox was resolved by the gradual reduction of communardism to purely pedagogical experiments, which lacked an orientation towards changing social reality itself.

Thus, the communard movement was for the most part transformed into a set of pedagogical techniques equally appropriate for participants in business trainings and totalitarian sects. The overstated self-esteem of these innovators, who only felt like something more than business trainers when they were dominated by a formal – but ideologically determined – system of values, is even more revealing. This self-esteem disappeared when the Communards gradually realised that they were merely the owners of a certain *pedagogical technology*: the "centennial communardist cycle" has closed, and on a new spiral, we can again see the "original" attempt to create the same "new school" that Lev Tolstoy and Stanislav Shatsky also tried to create (see: Sokolov, n.d.).

Ultimately, the general vector of the Communard educational experiments boiled down to the cultivation of a kind of alternative to official Soviet quasi-class stratification. More precisely, it consisted of splitting society into small groups with their own locally applicable codes of honour, in which priority was given to the education of the *creative person* and development of *personality*. The result was a person whose moral coordinates were no longer determined either by the moral norms of Soviet quasi-class stratification or by the high ideals of communism. Nevertheless, while such a person might fervently adhere to the internal norms of such small groups for a while, an eventual parting of ways was almost inevitable due to a growing unwillingness to obey the leader, whose moral authority inevitably eroded over time. However, since inculcation was carried out with the aim of forming *personality*, such a result was considered to be a pedagogical success. Perhaps this was indeed so. However, the question then arises as to the capabilities of such a person in the context of high Soviet morality. He or she was naturally inclined toward a naive struggle for his or her own comfort (see: Dragunsky, 2019). The horizon of this person's ability to create social institutions (if we understand the latter as a symbiosis of norms and structures)

consisted in the tendency to unite into common interest groups. On the one hand, such a person could not become a committed citizen of a modern society, since *already* or *still* lacking a conscious commitment to any universal value system. On the other hand, he or she could only be involved in the emerging post-Soviet social stratification according to his or her outward position in the evolving hierarchy of social groups that did not yet have their own corporate codes.

1990s: Moral Non-Catastrophe

Although the abrupt change in the social order resulted in a restructuring of priorities, this did not imply a complete moral collapse. Was socialism replaced by capitalism? Even if it was not, in many ways, Soviet society had become more bourgeois than socialist. Although under the conditions of the Soviet period, bourgeois values did not manifest themselves, so to speak, in their purest forms – and while Soviet ideology and socialist phraseology condemned and inhibited bourgeois or philistine motivations in official life – in real life these latter, of course, dominated (see: Voeikov, 2015, p. 134). As the significance of the upper stratum of Soviet values decreased, consumer discourses strengthened along with a painful sensitivity to the material dimension of life, inequalities of consumption and lack of access to scarce goods. Meanwhile, a reverse movement was taking place from universal quasi-aristocracy, not even to bourgeois values and behaviour, but into new proto-class stratification on the basis of professional, corporate and administrative access to resources. Over time, the official Soviet project began to lose its ability to coherently define and defend the public/state interest, which was increasingly being eroded by private, group, corporate, regional, sectoral, republican, and other non-universal interests (Glinchikova, 2011, p. 157). Strictly speaking, the expansion and institutionalisation of shadow schemes for the exchange of these resources among the *nomenklatura* and *resource crafts* classes (farmers, speculators, cultural figures, managers of shops and consumer goods bases) created those active minorities that later became the fertile soil for the emergence of post-Soviet elites.

Of course, various structural changes simultaneously taking place in the background played a key role in influencing the transformation of Soviet morality and ideology over the 70 years of its existence. The constant complication, individualisation and rationalisation of everyday life, especially in cities, increasingly reduced the effectiveness of moral regulators of the pseudo-collective type. Along with an expansion of the space of differentiated regulation for different spheres of life and creeping de-ideologisation, the everyday practices of citizens gradually started to lose their connection with the sphere of higher values.

During the period of Stalin's rule, various critical problems associated with the survival and modernisation of Soviet society were being tackled, requiring the exertion of all available forces and resources. Due to the existential nature of this effort, it was not compatible with dissent or competition between groups of political elites. However, by the second half of the 1950s, having succeeded in becoming a world superpower, Soviet society began to allow much more freedom, competition, difference of opinion –

and even dissent – in the process of expanding the individual freedoms of citizens. According to Alexander Shubin, the Soviet social dress of the 1960s and 1970s only "didn't fit too tightly" due to the extreme constrictiveness of the pre-war version. In moving into separate apartments, former residents of communal apartments experienced a great surge of freedom. In familiarising themselves with the secrets of the Stalinist era (albeit only to a limited degree), intellectuals were practically choking on freedom. By the 1970s, people were already growing out of such "suits", and while a lack of freedom was being felt more acutely, as we will see, the sphere of freedom was actually expanding – it's just that was expanding more slowly than the need for self-expression and results of intellectual questing. Having "dispersed" the growth of needs, Soviet society now failed to keep pace with them (see: Shubin, 2008, pp. 8–9).

The most important factor in the devaluation of the highest Soviet values was the gradual suspension of the revolutionary impulse underlying them. The evolution of the value core of the Soviet project demonstrates a transition from the revolutionary phase, in which images were strongly associated with control of the future, to a more conservative cultural logic, involving a revision of the position of the Soviet project in the value hierarchy of world culture. The sacral centre of the Soviet project was under increasing pressure of depoliticisation and profanisation, as a consequence of which higher symbols and ideological systems were transformed into material for low literary genres, anecdotes and *urban legends* (Arkhipova & Kirzyuk, 2020). For the Soviet political order, the semiotisation of the communist cultural space brings about the failure of the legitimising function.

The desacralisation of the highest Soviet values was the result of losing the utopian dimension associated with the revolutionary transformation of the world, along with the capability to offer hope. In particular, A. Yurchak interprets the *performative shift* taking place in the official Soviet culture of the 1970s–1980s as a sign of growing stagnation and crisis. This is a shift from meaningful production and discussion of ideological facts and meanings to the reproduction of ritual actions and formal linguistic usages, aimed only at confirming the subject's external loyalty to the moral standards/values adopted by the Soviet society. As a result, the living language of party disputes and discussions gradually turns into a *wooden language*, a frozen, constantly repeating and awkwardly complex linguistic form (see: Yurchak, 2014, pp. 72–75). Analogous processes of ossification and formalisation occur in diverse areas of culture and art, as well as in the collective practices of social and everyday life.

Meanwhile, a decline in the powerful value impulse of communist ideology was also occurring due to a proportion of the tasks set by the revolution in late Soviet society having been successfully implemented in the social state, transforming utopia into part of everyday life, which was supposed to remain *the eternal* achievement of the working people. However, the implementation of these values – for example, in the form of the Soviet social state – simultaneously became their profanation, since they became part of everyday Soviet life, which, since apparently established forever, no longer needed any additional value justification. At the same time, another of the highest axiological components of the Soviet project, which related to the global

expansion of socialism as the more progressive and humane social system, failed to receive historical confirmation and began to be emasculated in the form of pedestrian plans by Nikita Khrushchev to catch up with the United States in the *per capita* production of meat, milk, pig iron and various other goods.

As a result, late Soviet society gradually began to transform into a *society without utopias*, in which the hopes, aims and opportunities of citizens began to find their ideological justification at the lower levels of the value hierarchy. The ideas of revolution, cosmopolitanism, the class struggle and transformation of mankind finally gave way to various ethics of virtue under the conditions of developed socialism, which naturally began to fall into a state of *stagnation.* It is evident that the expanding autonomy of lower-level values led to a strengthening of corresponding shadow networks and institutions for the distribution of public resources. Thus, the logical next step was that they would start to present a challenge to the highest ideological values and institutions. As a result, *perestroika*, although aimed at reviving the highest Soviet political values (democratisation, transparency, acceleration, self-government), turned into a final defeat of these values, due to the gaining confidence of *non-Soviet* social groups interested in changing the entire political economic order and its moral foundations.

What actually happened in the 1990s? It is appropriate to consider the situation in the field of public morality of the 1990s as resulting from the extemporary dominance of the ethics of virtue, as a result of the re-actualisation of those values, virtues and personality patterns that had hitherto played a subordinate role in the integral structure of Soviet morality. Nevertheless, it was the presence of such values, on the one hand, that prevented the moral catastrophe from being as total as it appeared to many during the 1990s, and, on the other, ensured moral continuity between the past and the future. For the later Soviet generations, the morality formed by the October Revolution and Great Patriotic War, which "would live a native country, and there are no other worries", was already being gradually superseded by the ethical priorities of *concern for oneself and the environment*. Following the collapse of the USSR, this long-term trend of moral de-universalisation would continue, albeit in a more consistent and legitimate form. Moreover, the active value transformation in the post-Soviet period was carried out mainly in private life, with surprisingly little effect on the public sphere as an area of common life, now freed from the highest *communist* values of the Soviet project: the growth of diversity and individualism primarily characterises the private sphere, consumption and everyday practices, while the symbolic sphere remains as if frozen (see: Volkenstein, 2018). This trend is also confirmed by the strengthening of symbolic policies aimed at appropriating the highest achievements of the USSR, since current Russian politics, being saturated with virtue ethics, are not capable of providing consolidating moral models at this level.

Although, during the reform process, society turned out to have disintegrated, with Soviet collectives disbanding and the level of mutual trust and trust in state and social institutions having significantly decreased (Martianov, 2017), nevertheless this disintegration still had not reached the stage of complete *atomisation* or *individualisation*. People remained *friends* and *classmates*, colleagues and allies in *shared struggles*,

as well as continuing to be part of families and other small communities. The latter were held together by bonds of mutual fidelity, comprising the main elements of virtue ethics, which, in appealing to the best aspects of human nature represented by heroic values, justified the struggle for *their own*. Ultimately, it appears as if the presence of high moral values inherited from the Soviet era not only failed, in some cases, to prevent people from participating in the *Great Criminal Revolution*, but can even to seen to have prompted it. Participation in various criminal or quasi-criminal groups, in essence, required the same moral qualities as those pertaining to the idols of millions of Soviet boys, those musketeers, pirates, noble robbers, adventurers, rebels, revolutionaries and other similar heroes who populated classic literature, folklore and cinema. Finally, it should be emphasised that the criminal culture of the 1990s did not appear from scratch, but continued the rich traditions of Soviet criminal subculture, whose actual dimensions were concealed for ideological purposes along with the increasing late Soviet statistics on crime and suicide (Rakitin, 2016).

Is it any wonder that people of the sufficiently numerous *subculture of traders* not only responded tolerantly to the *criminal revolution* of the 1990s, but even took to it like a fish to water? However, as we can see, this new way life was not so very far from the old, being similarly regulated by various codes and rules of the criminal world. Therefore, it would be an exaggeration to state that the loss of universal moral values led to total moral relativism, which is determined by a situation where people are primarily guided by internal corporate standards. It is the clear correspondence of such norms with the equivalent norms of other corporations in a classless society (Fishman & Martianov, 2016) that allows both moral communication and the existence of something like a *social contract*.

In the late USSR, the flip side of Soviet values was a generalised image of the *West* taking the form of a consumer paradise, all the power of its advertising being used to destroy the habitual Soviet asceticism, which had failed to take account of everyday life, the comfort and amenities of the private life world against the background of the movement towards communism in the discourse of the total liberation of mankind. Thus, the *Great Criminal Revolution* was fed by the energy of the destruction of the Soviet value core. It was widely believed that its collapse would in itself lead to the triumph of universal values that had already taken place in the imaginary West. However, no *natural* value transition occurred; instead, the 1990s came to function as a magical negative mirror used by the political regime of 2000s–2010s to obtain legitimacy from its *converse*. Thus, the political elites are effectively *selling a bear market* by presenting extremely mundane, pragmatic and contradictory values to form a populist *patchwork quilt* (Martianov, 2007). However, they did not propose a new stable value hierarchy, structuring ideas of the common good and taking a form capable of supporting a *big society*. As a result, the symbolic transition from liberal-market to sovereign-patriotic rhetoric only strengthened the corporate, rentier social structure, in which all the basic characteristics of neo-patrimonial political elites, including management methods and opaque regimes of ownership, have yet to undergo qualitative axiological and ontological transformations over the course of post-Soviet history.

Conclusion

The prospects for further moral transformation seem limited and ambiguous. On the one hand, collective disappointment in the once-idealised West is growing inexorably. On the other hand, the Russian political order has not been able to offer a strong institutional and axiological framework for the just and universal integration of values. In the absence of a common system of higher values, the radical individualism of the majority of Russian citizens prevents them from creating effective structures of collective action capable of supporting a *big society*. There is a poorly-reflected public demand for a change in the subjects of collective value-institutional regulation when, in the place of their *big hierarchy* there were only strong grassroots social connections (family, work collective, neighbours, etc.). In such a situation, the observed growth of individualism turns out to be in many respects an inductive mechanism revealing the impossibility of institutional trust and reliance on stable collective structures – including the state, which has ceased to guarantee fundamental ideological constants that structure the common existence of its citizens. An increase in the diversity of behavioural patterns, social norms and identities, as well as types of interaction and practices, does not lead to an expansion of available opportunities, but rather appears as a necessary means of adapting individual citizens to the new social order. As a result, local values derived from virtue ethics continue to prevail in the form of competitive individualism, as implemented within corporate-class communities. Accordingly, social innovations often conceal the archaic survival practices of various *itinerant workers* and *migrants*, placed in an updated technological setting. The lack of universal values confirms the specific rentier character of modern Russian society, which is yet to develop a moral alternative to the interests of key social groups that came to power during the *Criminal Revolution* (Fishman, Martianov, & Davydov, 2019). In universal public spaces supported by the state and having common goals defined by official discourses, social groups cease to interact with each other. The collapse of Soviet society resulted in the possibility for other groups, classes and corporations to become effectively invisible, even when occupying the same urban space. Delimited by a variety of local rules and social codes, such collective entities construct their communications topologically as disjoint or extremely mediated. Due to being limited by self-sufficient corporate interests in the new space of rentier hierarchy and intergroup differentiation, society acquires more and more *blind spots*, preventing the emergence of a general relevant picture from any one collective position.

In fact, in the 1990s and partly in the 2000s, the majority did not experience *catastrophic moral discomfort* concerning the lack of universally valid values that went beyond the ethics of virtue. Following the collapse of the two-level Soviet morality, society switched to an emergency mode of regulation by peripheral and auxiliary values, which became established as the new *working* norm. At first, the authorities felt some discomfort in this connection, since *from the top down* there were notions to formulate something like a *national idea* or nationwide value system that should appear organically. In any case, the *national idea* was considered as a domestic

invariant of the liberal, democratic, Western idea – in a word, *universal*. However, over time, in view of the objectively evolving realities of a neo-classist society, its essential axiological banality and class-corporate boundedness at the ideological level led to the effective rejection of this claim. Thus, the political order prevailing in the decade 2000–2010 was forced to distance itself from the liberal universalist principles and foundations proclaimed during the 1990s.

It became evident that the search by the new elites for a system of common values combining alternative-liberal ideas with a Soviet heritage came to a standstill, becoming an *extracurricular activity* or *traditional national entertainment* in the expression of Vladimir Putin. Even when the need to consolidate society around common values is actualised for some reason, it is still necessary to try to satisfy it by issuing universal versions of various local values: whether structured by Orthodox Christianity (to the extent that it is identified with *culture* and *tradition*) or located directly in *family*- or *traditional values* and *patriotism*. Consecutive attempts by political elites to simulate the *higher echelons* of post-Soviet morality, imitating the form of the *external* moral discourse on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church, have not met with any obvious success. The latter is seen as too biased in the public space, raising many questions regarding the application of *double standards* in moral assessments of contemporary realities of political life. Thus, religious institutions and major Russian denominations are used in a technical sense by the Kremlin to legitimise the political regime albeit, but without significant institutional and moral autonomy (Stepanova, 2019).

Against this background, insistent attempts *to legitimise the new Russian elites in terms of the Soviet project* are turning into a symbolic appropriation of the highest achievements of the USSR, accompanied by a careful removal and suppression of the ideological values that underlie these achievements. The latter is not surprising, since Soviet *big society* values directly contradict the currently dominant rentier model. The formation of truly new *big society* values, on the other hand, implies serious social transformations, suggesting a critical reflection on the rentier and corporate values and practices of Russian political elites. However, the political discourses circulating in public space are unable to solve the principal problems associated with a genuine *understanding of the society in which we live*; all the more so when it comes to providing a justification of the highest values for this society. Therefore, even if the need to seek an axiological alternative to the Big Soviet Society is proclaimed, this quest inevitably becomes frozen halfway. It boils down, in essence, to a *single protracted attempt to reformulate a class ethic of virtue in such a way that it becomes suitable for the moral nurturing of a* ***big society****.* How productive such a strategy could be and how soon it would cease to satisfy both the *top* and *bottom* social echelons is a question that deserves a separate study.

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BOOK REVIEW

Marlene Laruelle (2018). Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields. London: Routledge.

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In her book, Marlene Laruelle – the Director and Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University (Washington, DC) – discusses the multilayered and multifaceted nature of Russian nationalism as (1) a way to imagine the nation, (2) the set of doctrines and ideologies, and (3) a political movement. She begins with a review of Western scholarship on Russian nationalism as a independent research field with the following main directions: nineteenth-century Russian political philosophy with its special attention towards the so-called "Russian idea"; the revival of Russian nationalism in late Soviet times; the "dual"-nature nationalism in the post-Soviet period with fluctuations from being an indicator of reactionaries rejecting democratic changes to a form of official state policy. The conducted study allows Laruelle to make the following conclusions: first, "the Western – in particular US – field of Russian Studies has been deeply molded by the state of the US–Russia relationship"; second, "in Western discourses, Russia's evolutions tend to be systematically interpreted in terms of what they mean for Russia's place on the international scene and its relationship with the West", thus missing the interpretation of Russia as "a conglomerate of diverse groups and institutions with largely decentralized voices and agendas"; third, "the study of 'Russian nationalism' is still marked by a prism of Russian exceptionality", thus missing the comparative perspective; fourth, "priority has always been given to the ideological content of 'Russian nationalism' over its social construction"; fifth, studies often "aim to produce an easy, unidirectional mapping" of nationalism, thus losing sight on its polyphonic nature; finally, "Russian nationalism" is mainly seen as a political ideology, thus missing that nationalism is also expressed "in the intellectual, cultural, and communication

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worlds", as well as in "banal nationalism" of "folk culture, everyday habits, and routines grounded in common sense" (pp. 6–8).

In accordance with the title, the book contains three parts. In Part I ("Nationalism as imperial imaginary") Laruelle focuses on several features of the imaginary realm of Russian nationalism – cosmism, geographical metanarratives and alternate history – which could not be considered as typical characteristics, especially in comparison with "traditional" research stereotypes such as Russian socio-cultural exceptionality proclaimed by past and present Russian scholars. Laruelle provides a comprehensive analysis of Russian cosmism as a common ground for post-Soviet Russian nationalisms (p. 34), starting from its roots in German Romantic philosophy of the nineteenth century through the concept of All-Unity (*Vseedinstvo*) and the Russian intellectual tradition of the Silver Age, to Nikolai Fiodorov's and Konstantin Tsiolkovskii's cosmic utopia of the 1930s. In addition, she considers cosmism as a specific form of occultism, although with some major differences:

> Cosmism awaits the re-animation of humanity into a single universal organism – and the conjunction between two adjectives, single and universal, is a sign of totalitarian thought – whereas occultism sketches a world of awakening filled with multiple, diverse, specific individualities, each one of which has, via different paths, formed its consciousness of the harmony of man and the cosmos" (p. 31).

Such a statement, although attractive by itself, seems to be under-elaborated; it is worthwhile to note that the chapter devoted to cosmism looks slightly alien to the following chapters devoted to geographical metanarratives and alternative histories. There Laruelle stresses that, for many centuries, the territorial size and location in space have served as the justification of Russia's mission in the world; however, today's resentment about the diminished space of Russia compared with imperial and Soviet past becomes "a fundamental driver of these present-day narratives" (p. 38). Laruelle gives prominence to three types of such narratives: first, Russia as a specific continent (Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism), which is aimed at rejecting "Atlanticist" domination and stating that Russia–Eurasia is the only possible driver of today's multipolar world; second, the unique relationship between the Russian nation and the cosmos (Cosmism), which legitimizes the idea about the cosmos as a natural extension of the Russian territory (which looks rather unsubstantiated); third, the Arctic region as a potential fore-post for twenty-first century Russia (Arctism), which is seen as a crucial element in the revival of Russia's great-power status. Laruelle emphasizes several common traits of these three narratives: their proponents derive ideas from the underground counterculture of late Soviet times. These ideas are built, on one hand, on resentment and, on the other, on keeping promises of better days ahead. The narratives not only rest on the assumptions of previous intellectual traditions, but also receive an updated version: "Eurasianism is presented as an example of multipolarity and regional economic integration; Cosmism has been rebranded by linking spatial conquest with Russia's

need for modernization and high technology; and Arctism applies to both new quests for energy resources and the concern with preserving the planet's fragile ecosystems" (p. 50).

Laruelle argues that alternative interpretations of history – so-called "memory wars" (about 1941–45 Great Patriotic War in particular) – and constant rewritings of pre-revolutionary and Soviet history are widespread in today's Russia as a means of understanding the present through the past. Alternative histories indicate the decline of the Marxist historical metanarrative, which has resulted in the revolt of alternate historians against academic specialists and their exclusive right "to draw the line between truth and lies" (p. 55), as well as in the attempts to diminish the trauma caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union; that is why alternative histories are closely linked to conspiracy theories concerning the struggle against Russia led by internal and external enemies. Analyzing in depth the past and present alternative histories, such as various nationalist historiographies, the "Jewish question", the "New Chronology" movement, etc., Laruelle highlights their commercial nature and notes their "indirect influence on the university milieus", in particular, such academic disciplines as culturology, geopolitics, ethno-politology, and others (p. 66). Commenting on the Russian public's perception of the alternative histories, Laruelle mentions a particular sensitivity towards the postmodern question of personalizing the historical narrative, which results in the "right of each individual to create his own national and world history" (ibid.) as a form of symbolic compensation for the post-Soviet trauma.

Part II "Nationalism as a doctrine" begins with an analysis of Aryanism as an alternative attempt to prove Russia's full identification with Europe. Laruelle considers Aryanism as a form of "white" racism very similar to the ideology, which has spread in Europe and the United States. She also explores some types of neo-paganism and esoteric practices, which have become quite popular in Russia in recent decades. Considering various far-right doctrines and their promoters, Laruelle focuses on the most famous of them, namely, Aleksandr Dugin as "the main manufacturer of a neofacism *à la russe* that is both within and outside the circles of power" (p. 95), whom she characterizes as the aggregator of doctrines from diverse origins, particularly, esoteric Nazism, Traditionalism and the European New Right (p. 96). Following an in-depth analysis of Dugin's ideas, Laruelle raises two important questions: Is the promotion of fascism in Russia being successful? Can Dugin be considered a mainstream thinker? She gives negative answer to both these questions and notes that Dugin has succeeded in promoting Russia's great power and its leading role in Eurasia, interpreting the Soviet Union's messianism, and referring to conservative values as Russia's own identity; "but he has failed to anchor new ideological toolkits – be they esoteric Nazism, Guénon's and Evola's Traditionalism, or the German Conservative Revolution – in Russian public opinion or in the minds of decision-makers" (p. 124). However, in spite of labelling Dugin as a marginal figure, the chapter devoted to him is the longest in the book. The final chapter of Part II analyses the phenomenon of *Izborskii Club* – a large group of Russian and foreign conservative experts, where Laruelle indicates its three main contexts: planting government/oligarch sponsored think tanks, defence of so-called traditional values, and aggressive nationalism.

Part III – "Nationalism as political battlefield" – describes three main actors of political Russian nationalism in three generations: classic far-right groups; National Democrats supporting the European-inspired populist ethnonationalism; and the resurgent militia groups connected with the expansion of "Novorossiya", as well as the actors' ambivalent relationship with state powers due to the unclear legal definition of "extremism" and Kremlin's intention to consider "everything related to Russian nationalism as a potential rival for legitimacy, and therefore as something it should bring 'under control'" (p. 171). Characterizing changing faces of the far-rights – Russian National Unity (*Russkoe natsional'noe edinstvo, RNE*), National Bolshevik Party (*Natsional-bolshevistskaia partiia, NBP*), skinheads (*britogolovye*), anti-migrant movement, etc., Laruelle underlines that all of them display typical fascist elements: the cult of the leader; the white racism; the celebration of violence; the belief in a widespread plot against Russia that unites enemies of all kinds; the exaltation of military and paramilitary actions, and doctrines calling for a reactionary revolution, etc. (p. 156). Nevertheless, she concludes, "yet one critical feature has remained relatively stable over time: a direct embrace of historical fascism or national socialism systematically provokes rejection from the Russian public and therefore marginalizes those who claim it" (p. 170).

The next chapter of Part III is devoted to the popular political activist Alexei Navalny along with other National Democrats (*Natsdems*) who combine pro-Western liberal narratives with ethnic nationalism and virulent xenophobia – the characteristic, which may look confusing for Western audience (p. 174). Laruelle proves that Navalny does not see any contradiction between democracy and nationalism because, for him, the term *russkii* has a civic, rather than ethnic, connotation. Nevertheless, his position concerning the annexation of Crimea remains ambiguous, as well as framing North Caucasians (Chechnya in particular) as archaic and alien to Russian culture, and the call for the introduction of a visa regime with the Republics of Central Asia in order to control the migration. Thus, "his stance and actions may be labeled democratic, but not liberal. He believes in democracy as a form of government…, but his liberal convictions are less easy to capture… Navalny considers that *demos* – the citizenry – should also be *ethnos* – the primordial group" (p. 189). In general, Laruelle concludes, National Democrats "have failed to offer a concept of civic belonging to the nation that does not reproduce the classic clichés of Russian nationalism. They do not know how to articulate a liberalism that is founded on individual rights and a nationalism that believes in essentialized collective identities" (p. 191).

The final chapter of Part III explores the concept of Novorossiya (the self-name of parts of the Eastern Ukraine) as a "live mythmaking process", which is characterized by the convergence of three competing but partly overlapping paradigms. The first paradigm is "post-Soviet" labelled by Laruelle as "red", since it emphasizes the memory of the Soviet Union "in promoting a large unified territory, great-powerness, opposition to the West, and a socialist mission" (p. 197). The second paradigm is motivated by political Orthodoxy traditionally symbolized by "white" colour (in reference to the White movement of 1918–1921), in which Orthodox Christianity is seen "as a civilizational principle that makes Russia a distinct country

with strong religious values that should shape the theocratic nature of the regime" (p. 201). The third paradigm (labelled as "brown") is borrowed from the European fascist tradition and claims that Novorossiya will be the battleground "where Aryan supremacy could defeat Europe's decadence, and where young people could be trained in urban warfare to prepare to overthrow the regimes in power across Europe" (p. 208).

In the book, Laruelle limits herself to studying nationalism as an ideological doctrine and as a political movement, which is not directly sponsored by the state. Thus, she argues, "the Russian state cannot be termed 'nationalist'", although interacting with various state actors at many levels (p. 9), and nationalism could hardly be interpreted as the mainstream ideological trend. Laruelle provides a detailed and accurate depiction of the events, which have taken place in Russia over the past twenty years. In general, the readers of the book might enjoy not only its content, but also its form. The structure of the book represents a perfect harmony: the title contains three concepts, the book has three parts each divided into three chapters, and in most of them three main arguments are discussed.

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BOOK REVIEW

Sara Wheeler (2019). Mud and Stars. Travels in Russia with Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Other Geniuses of the Golden Age. New York: Pantheon Books.

Rachel Polonsky (2010). Molotov's Magic Lantern. Journey in Russian History. London: Faber and Faber.

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Published within nine years from each other by British authors with a philological background, these books have quite a lot in common, primarily, the deep love for Russia – "a country which is lovable despite it all" (Wheeler, p. 16). Both of these books can be described as superb examples of post-modernist travelogue aiming to embrace the whole complexity of the traveler's physical, intellectual and emotional experience (as Sara Wheeler puts it, the focus of her book is "a Russian literal landscape, and its emotional counterpart" [Wheeler, p. 16]). Thus, the journey or, to be precise, multiple journeys across Russia encompass not only the movements from point A to point B but also the author's reading list, her attempts to learn Russian or to cook Russian dishes. In S. Wheeler's book, the latter adds a new sensory dimension to the author's quest as she is trying to recreate Russian dishes back home in the UK with the help of a recipe book compiled by an exiled Russian princess and adopted for America ("a sentence in uppercase in the preface to The Best of Russian Cooking expresses an acute source of anguish concerning the produce available in Massachusetts: 'NOT ENOUGH DIFFERENT KINDS OF MUSHROOMS!'" (Weeler, p. 47).

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Both *Mud and Stars* and *Molotov's Magic Lantern* can be considered as an "intellectual" version of a footsteps travel narrative[1] as their geography is organized around famed literary figures: the "big-beast Russian writers of the nineteenth century" in the case of "Mud and Stars" or, as is the case with "Molotov's Magic Lantern", in addition to poets and writers, around a diverse array of political and social leaders, spies, explorers, party functionaries, scientists and literary scholars. Thus, S. Wheeler's and R. Polonsky's travels turn into a pilgrimage of sorts to places associated with the names of these famous men and women. Interestingly, the figures and places can coincide in both accounts or in some cases the footsteps destination for the same writer can be different: e.g. both authors pay tribute to Dostoevsky by travelling to Staraya Russa while for Chekhov, R. Polonsky goes to Taganrog and S. Wheeler takes the Trans-Siberian to travel to Sakhalin. The travel across space thus turns into a travel across texts and time as multiple allusions, references and associations are invoked along the way.

The latter circumstance adds complexity to the country's imagined landscape as modern, twenty-first century Russia gets mixed with nineteenth-century or Soviet Russia. In both cases, the travelogue presents a sophisticated narrative, brimming with facts, anecdotes, digressions, personal reminiscences and ruminations. Contrary to popular preconceptions, as S. Wheeler explains, she is not aiming to search for the mysterious Russian soul, which is a concept that fails to capture the diversity and grandiosity of this country: "There is no such thing as the Russian soul, or perhaps even Russian culture – it's too big a country: one-sixth of the earth's landmass, and it's too diverse and too socially divided" (Wheeler, p. 16). This description agrees with that of R. Polonsky, who adds to the cultural and scenic diversity a temporal dimension: in her book, different Russian regions are "inhabiting" their own time as the south is associated with Scythia, Siberia, with prehistorical times, and so forth.

This complexity and multidimensionality in terms of content and structure, however, do not make these travel books particularly reader-friendly (R. Polonsky's book is especially demanding on the reader). They do not provide "light" reading as the authors are not too eager to "play by the rules" of the genre. Their insistence on juggling strangely sounding Russian names of people and places may be seen as "pretentiousness", leaving the reader confused or frustrated or both. Some of the reviewers on Goodreads web-site describe S. Wheeler's book as "neither fish nor fowl", and R. Polonsky's, as "disjointed, distracting encyclopedia of Russian history". It may seem that these books should appeal simultaneously to two groups of readers: those interested in travelling and those who like Russian literature and history. However, it is precisely this quality of combining the two domains that may be off-putting to the reader and that leads to these books coming across as an incoherent collection of facts or, as one of the reviewers complained on Goodreads, the failure of the book "to come together".

[1] In a footsteps narrative, the traveler seeks to retrace the same route as his or her predecessor or another famous figure, that is, to follow in his or her footsteps.

While for an English-speaking reader *Molotov's Magic Lantern* and *Mud and Stars* may be quite a challenge primarily due to the lack of background knowledge, which can be insufficient to trace this winding path across the Russian spatio-temporal landscape, for a Russian reader they may present a challenge of a different kind. Since most of the figures mentioned are a part of the secondary school program in literature or history in Russia, it is mostly the way these figures are approached that may be a problem. To the best of our knowledge, neither of these travel books have been translated into Russian. Therefore, we can only speculate about the extent and tone of the public controversy that would have surrounded their publication in contemporary Russia. For example, in the case of S. Wheeler's book, it is quite likely to be seen by some as an encroachment on the Russian holy of holies – the golden canon of Russian literature – as she brings to light the details of the famous writers' private lives that are considered to be inappropriate to discuss openly in the public domain. For example, the "Sun of Russian Poetry" Alexander Pushkin is dealt with rather unceremoniously in the first chapter of *Mud and Stars*, which begins with the following characteristic: "Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin was a lugubrious, bawdy, impetuous, whoring gambler who seldom missed an opportunity to pick a fight" (Wheeler, p. 18). In general, however, the book offers a refreshing perspective on these iconic figures, making them slightly less awe-inspiring but at the same time much more human.

Meanwhile, R. Polonsky's text may present another kind of problem: it is not the figures of the past as such that may raise objections, but mainly the period she is interested in – Stalin's Purge of the Thirties – as her narrative mingles together the victims and executioners. In doing so, Polonsky raises some tough questions – Russia's "damned questions" – about inequality, violence and power, pointing out the connection between the monstrous regimes of the past and the present of Putin's Russia. The same question, though approached from a slightly different angle, is put by Wheeler as she describes the love-hate relationship between the Russian writers and their home land and shows how the legacy of state violence persists in contemporary Russia in "its miasma of rumor, intrigue and killing" (Wheeler, p. 45).

Strangely enough, there are few ordinary Russians in the vast panorama of the country's life portrayed in Polonsky's book: the narrator appears to be disinclined to "go to the people", like the *Narodniki* did, and prefers to marvel at the twists and turns of the fates of those long dead (in some cases, e.g. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, they are not exactly dead but can hardly be described as "ordinary Russians" either). R. Polonsky's Russians, unless they are prominent and/or dead, are for the most part bleak, static and unfriendly, not much more than a backdrop for the drama of Russian history. In contrast, S. Wheeler gives much more consideration to Russia's everyday life: her characters inhabiting *khrushchevkas*, "that are as Russian as cucumber", and striving to get by are infused with a peculiar charm of their own and portrayed with warmth and humour.

Both of these books make an enjoyable reading, tempting one to visit (or revisit) the books and places so lovingly described. It should be noted, however, that the pleasure of reading these books is proportional to the reader's willingness to approach them with an open mind and on their own terms rather than following her own preconceptions.

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	Miller, R. (Producer). (1989). The mind [Television series]. New York, NY: WNET.
Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. *Journal Title*, 8(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
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