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Aims and scope

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. CS&P examines how rapid societal-level changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values — and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to
- Value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- Changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- Moral reasoning and behavior;
- Variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- The moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- Social exclusion and inclusion;
- Post-secular religious individualism;
- Tolerance and merely 'tolerating': their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- Ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- Educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- Social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.
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"Multiple Modernities as an interpretive paradigm: strength and shortcomings"

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Editorial

"Modernity continues to be what structures our historical self-understanding…"

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Modernity remains an axial category within contemporary social sciences. While often contested (Lyotard & Bennington, 2010; Latour, 2002), modernity continues to be what structures our historical self-understanding. Moreover, despite the former sharp division between modern and traditional societies having now been replaced by a continuum of modern and less modernised societies, the classification of societies still refers to the central concept of modernity. The concept of modernity also structures public discussions, figuring prominently in political debates in which the quality of being "modern" *per se* justifies the rejection of values and beliefs that may accordingly be labeled "outdated" or "fundamentalist". Modernity is popularly understood as equating the "new" with the "good", but this assumed equivalence is as often deconstructed as it is postulated. Moreover, critiques of modernity have not been confined solely to conservative discourses: the downsides of modernity have equally been the focus of progressivist movements. Sometimes progressivists have been willing to make a last push or offer a final sacrifice in order to achieve ultimate human happiness; here again, modernity is referred to as a historical movement that promises emancipation across all spheres of life. However, such utopianism, whether one is looking forward or backwards, is typically accompanied by disenchantment with the present. Thus, modernity keeps everyone on the move.

Classical theories of modernity sought to identify a definitive element having the potential to transform traditional communities into new, hitherto unknown societies. Here, constitutive elements of modern society were said to include capitalist economics, scientific rationality, technological innovation and a democratic polity. These elements might not all have originated in Europe simultaneously; nevertheless, cumulatively they produced an engine of social and technical power that made Europe and its emigrant colonies globally dominant. Politically, modernity may be epitomised in the slogan *liberté, egalité, fraternité*. However, the choice of which of these principles should be prior with respect to the other two engendered three modern ideologies. If, of course, a reader would accept that brotherhood, or rather solidarity across generations can be attributed to the conservatives.

Following social-historical analysis of the origins of modernity in the age of Western expansion, the ideological conflict between alternative versions of modernity during the twentieth century was seen as bringing a continuous modernisation agenda to the forefront. When the modernisation trajectories of alternative modernities failed to converge and the Communist version of modernity eventually collapsed, modernisation theory, with its most simplified version of "transitology", came under severe criticism (Kapustin, 1998). Competition between projects of modernity it made clear that modernity was not a "monolithic" unity. Moreover, their internal complex dynamics required qualifications such as "second modernity", "reflexive modernisation" and different "waves of modernisation". With the growing globalisation and transnationalisation of social interactions, modernity becomes "liquid" or is split into a spectrum of "multiple modernities", "entangled modernities", etc. "Multiplication" of modernity – despite the dead-end that was encountered by the alternative (Soviet) modernity – brought traditionally "hard" sociological modernisation theories closer to "soft" civilisational approaches. Thus, while the concept of modernity referred previously to a set of modern institutions (market, democracy, science, etc.) or values, now it could be used to describe the concrete historical experiences acquired by individuals living with these institutions and values. The human costs that modernisation exacted were now analysed as pathologies of the modern personality; henceforth, modernity's conflicts and burdens were to be internalised. As analyses of modern identity, its genesis and dark sides (Taylor, 1998; Seligman, 2000; Bauman, 2015) demonstrate, modernity has not delivered on its promissory note of emancipation as its classical theorists had imagined. Liberty, the core value of modernity, ends up being institutionalised primarily in terms of the freedom of individualised consumption (of things, identities, values); meanwhile, collective solidarities erode and more purpose-oriented conceptualisations of liberty evaporate. We no longer strive for modernity; rather, we are obliged to cope with it.

The new section of the journal – *OPENING THE DEBATE* – begins with Peter Wagner's essay *The End of European Modernity*? Because Europe has never been monolithic, Wagner claims, none of modernity's key components – democracy, markets, individual autonomy, separation of religion and politics – was implemented in the way in which the protagonists of the model had originally conceptualised and anticipated. Thus, what is needed is a re-interpretation of European modernity. The question of European modernity, then, no longer concerns the invention and realisation of a model, but rather a rethinking of self-understandings and world-interpretations in the face of the challenges of different historical moments. This would require a public pan-European conversation on topics such as democracy, the economy, freedom and meaning in our current time.

The current issue of *Changing Societies & Personalities* contains reflections on the modernisation theories from various socio-cultural perspectives. In his paper entitled *Evolutionary Modernization Theory: Why People's Motivations are Changing*, Ronald Inglehart presents his revised evolutionary modernization theory (EMT), arguing that economic and physical insecurity are conducive to xenophobia, strong in-group solidarity, authoritarian politics and rigid adherence to group's traditional cultural norms. Conversely, secure conditions lead to greater tolerance of outgroups, openness

to new ideas and more egalitarian social norms. According to EMT, there is a strong negative correlation between the level of existential security within a given society and its adherence to traditional cultural values. Thus, the greater the economic and physical security found in the particular country, the fewer people will view traditional spiritual values, beliefs and practices as vital to their lives (and / or their communities) and the more people will adhere to the values of self-expression, which presuppose moral autonomy, tolerance, interpersonal trust and free choice. Cultural change is shaped by people's first-hand experience with existential security or insecurity: this correlation is shown in the findings of the World Value Survey held across over one hundred countries between 1981 and 2014. Based on the EMT, Inglehart provides several predictions concerning forthcoming cultural and axiological changes.

In his paper *Apologia of Modernity*, Victor Martianov recognises that modernity presents a continuing ideological problem within the social sciences; consequently, it tends to underlie other axiological, ontological and notional hierarchies. The problem of the global transformation of the national, class-industrial and predominantly Western model of modernity into late, post-national, cosmopolitan modernity is at the centre of today's discussions. In particular, in the world as a whole, the national model of modernity is becoming increasingly irrelevant for describing the actual socio-political and cultural regimes of a large part of twenty-first century humankind. Under the conditions of the historical evolution of modernity, Martianov argues, each of its main narratives – liberalism, democracy, nationalism – undergoes substantial changes: in searching for social laws applying to modern society, the globalisation of modernity confirms the continuing relevance of the formational approach of the Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history (as compared with the positions of so-called civilisational theories, which emphasise the importance of cultural differences between societies). Attempts to synthesise the formational and civilisational approaches into new theories, e.g. those addressing "multiple modernities", on the other hand, tend to be heuristically less satisfactory and to involve additional methodological contradictions.

In her paper *Historical Responsibility, Historical Perspective*, Daria Tomiltseva focuses on the concept of historical responsibility. In exploring the ability and willingness to participate in debates about the past, the discussion here concerns attitudes towards the public acknowledgement of historical guilt. Since the second half of the twentieth century, such practices have increasingly become a "mandatory element" of speeches by politicians, corporate leaders or representatives of other large organisations that have a rich, but not always untarnished history. Tomiltseva considers the possibility of comprehending historical responsibility from a particular historical perspective, paying special attention to the sources of contradictions between a consideration of the eternal and unchanging aspects of responsibility and the temporal, circumstantial contexts in which its burdens are taken up.

The current issue of the journal includes two book reviews. In her review of *Rossiia v poiskakh ideologii. Transformatsiia tsennostnykh reguliatorov sovremennykh obshchestv* [Russia in the Search for Ideology: Transformation of Value Regulation in Modern Societies, 2016] (Viktor Martianov, Leonid Fishman, eds.), Elena Kochukhova claims that the irrationality of political actors and their choices has in recent years

become a central preoccupation of researchers who analyse political events. In Russia, these are increasingly at variance with the calculated scenarios and ideas concerning common values that have developed in the West. Thus, the authors of the monograph rely on the notion that ideologies, which appeal to consciously held common values in order to legitimise permissible violence, are backed up with actions commensurate with these values.

Lilia Nemchenko discusses *Sovetskii mir v otkrytke* [The Soviet World in Postcards, 2017] by Olga Shaburova, who analyses handwritten postcards as something retained in family archives as memoirs of the past. The postcard is seen as an important symbol of the Soviet way of life while the ritual of writing postcards – as an integral part of the Soviet order, a special communication through which the public and private spheres are brought into a state of desired harmony. The author shows how the value of private life correlates with ideological messages of power relationships.

The discussions on modernity and post-modernity will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal. We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections and other formats from readers and prospective authors and invite you to send us your reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

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Opening the debate

The End of European Modernity?

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Diagnoses of our time

If the West declines, how would we know?

There seems to be quite some agreement about how the West rose. From around 1800 onwards, economic historians tell us, economic production increased much more rapidly in Western Europe than in other parts of the world, including areas of China and India that had been similarly rich and productive until then. The "Great Divergence" (Kenneth Pomeranz) between the West, gradually including North America as well, and the rest became ever more pronounced during the 19th and much of the 20th centuries. It started to diminish again only late in the 20th century, first with the rise of Japan, later other East Asian economies, and now China and possibly other countries. Today we can largely take it for granted that the period in which the West was immensely more rich than all other parts of the world is over. This is a major problem for economic policy-making, and it may have considerable repercussions for democracy – indeed it already has. But should we really see it in as dramatic terms as the expression "decline of the West" usually suggests? If the outcome of this economic transformation were a planet marked by lesser material inequality – unfortunately this is far from the case – we should rather welcome this. If the outcome were a less resource-extractive and polluting way of life, even better – but also even much more unlikely. There has never been a good justification for the divergence of the West in terms of material wealth. If it now (relatively) declines in those terms, we need to find ways to cope, but we should not deplore the rise of the East, or possibly the South.

So, let's try another angle. The recent British television series *Downton Abbey* shows vividly and with great nuance the end of a world. One observes how the relations between the aristocratic family owning the estate and their numerous servants are transformed between 1912 and 1926 through war, democracy, the rise of socialist and feminist thinking, legal equality and economic changes. The New Year's parties hat close the series are harmonious, but everyone in the scenes is aware that this world of hierarchy, privilege and subservience is approaching its end. And every spectator knows the outcome, too, since

post-Second World War and much more so current English society show only minuscule traces of that past. Almost every spectator also welcomes the changes that are shown – who is explicitly against equal freedom and abolition of privilege? Significantly, though, one cannot help sympathizing with some of the conservative sentiments that are expressed, with the fear of the waning of a world of warm, personal relations marked by dedication to the other in favour of a colder, more formal and more efficiency-oriented life. But we would not call this the decline of the West either.

Thus, we need to go on searching for other understandings. Often the period between the middle of the 18th and the middle of the 20th centuries is seen as the epoch of high or classic modernity. This periodization roughly coincides with the one of the economic rise of the West. It also marks the era that leads from the revolutions through the long and often overlooked "persistence of the Old Regime" (Arno Mayer) to the advent of formal equal freedom, which inaugurates the era in which we now live. But quite different emphases of interpretation can be hidden behind the term "modernity". And, for the purposes of our reflections here, we need to ask what happens when high modernity is over, whether this is when the decline truly starts.

Cornelius Castoriadis's particular way of looking at the period from 1750 to 1950 is useful. He sees in European societies of the 18th century the second great awakening of the commitment to autonomy, to the principle that human beings give themselves their own laws of living together, after its first appearance in ancient Greece. From then on the commitment to personal and collective autonomy, to freedom and democracy is alive in European history. Castoriadis praises the artists and inventors of this period, but then says that this spirit of autonomy withers away again over the following two centuries to give way to "generalized conformism" in the late 20th century.

This is another possible diagnosis of the decline of the West, and it comes closer to how we may want to grasp it. It is useful to start out from self-understandings of society. If there is rise and decline, there usually is also some consciousness of rise and decline, and be it a partial one. Furthermore, it is fruitful to start out from some notion of modernity as autonomy. When human beings see themselves as able and willing to give themselves their own laws, such moment is rightly considered as a high point in history. This commitment is more telling for the rise of the West than increasing material affluence (though the relation between the two is well worth exploring in more detail). So what does it mean if this commitment rises and then withers away? We need to look at transformations of European modernity to develop a sense of rise and decline.

Individual freedom and purposeful action

There has been something like a European core concept of modernity, in the centre of which stood individual freedom and rational action. But this was not the crown of a series of great achievements, as Europeans tend to portray their history. It was developed in response to crises, namely to the cultural-intellectual and political challenges arising from the encounter with other, unknown people in America and the breakdown of the unity of Christian cosmology in the wake of the Reformation. The last

resort in such crisis situation was the individual: as the subject of certain knowledge, as the source of interests and desires; as the holder of inalienable rights; as the atom with which viable polities could be constructed. All other socio-political phenomena were relegated to secondary status in such individualist ontology: The social contract was supposed to be drafted and signed by reasonable individuals. Popular sovereignty became increasingly to be seen as the aggregate of individual preferences. The thus constituted polity needed to be distinct from the comprehensive world-views that tied human beings to each other, importantly through religious beliefs.

Given the explicitness and radicality of the ways in which the human condition was being rethought in Enlightenment philosophy, the view became widespread that this marked the onset of European modernity – and, by implication, of modernity *tout court*. But today we can recognize that this core concept of modernity was nothing but a very particular interpretation of modernity. Even though it was put forward very forcefully in Europe during the 18th century, the individualist-instrumentalist model of the human being and of society and polity never went uncontested. Alternative proposals were made in response. When European thought underlined the richness and density of social bonds among human beings, it did so in rejection of individualism and instrumentalism. When the emphasis was placed on meaning-providing communities into which human beings are always embedded, then this was meant to oppose the idea that human collectivities only come into existence through a contract between rational individuals. That is why it is always somewhat inadequate, even though not entirely wrong, to denounce European individualism-cum-instrumentalism from a critical, postcolonial or decolonial perspective. These responses brought about a great variety of intra-European self-understandings, which reflected different, and often quite distinct, regional historical experiences. Europe has never been monolithic, and neither has European modernity.

Furthermore, one needs to underline that the core model of modernity was never applied in European history. This is so, partly, because it was rejected by elites aiming to preserve their privileges in the face of the revolutionary agenda entailed by the model, and partly because of the incoherence and inadequacy of the model itself. Europeans have never in large numbers been convinced of an individualist ontology – much less, for instance, than the settler descendents in the US. None of its key components – democracy, markets, individual autonomy, separation of religion and politics – was implemented in the way in which the promotors of the model had conceptualized and expected it.

Re-interpretations of European modernity

Once this is recognized, then the question of European modernity is no longer the one about the invention and realization of a model but one of rethinking self-understandings and world-interpretations in the face of the challenges of different historical moments. The core model was created in the face of unknown alterity and cosmological divide during the period that Europeans call "early modernity". Later transformations are distinct from earlier ones not least by the fact that they take place at a moment

when the core model already exists and shapes the discursive space within which re-interpretation occurs. Major events in the European nineteenth century, which Karl Polanyi analyzed as a "Great Transformation", were marked by the imaginary of market self-regulation and the imaginary of inclusive-egalitarian democracy. In both cases, the individual human being assumes a pivotal role and comprehensive world-views are relegated to a secondary role. But both of this is the case much more in thought than in practice. Recognizing the fallacies of instrumentalist individualism as well as, often enough, experiencing negative consequences of its partial applications, Europeans tried to elaborate smooth compromises between different commitments, such as the "solidarisme" of the Third French Republic, or the inter-class alliances in Scandinavia between the World Wars. But such arrangements worked under rather favourable circumstances only, and they lacked the conceptual coherence of the core model. Under more conflictive circumstances, Europeans embarked on radical re-interpretations, such as the suprematist racial oppression and exploitation of colonialism and the "collective essentialisms" of fascism, Nazism and Stalinism.

A high point of European modernity?

Based on the experience with the earlier trials, both the positive ones and the disastrous ones, it seemed that a stable institutional compromise could be reached after the end of Nazism and the Second World War. This was the liberal-democratic Keynesian welfare and nation-state set in a context of increasing European integration. This organized European modernity was seen – and to some extent experienced – as the optimum combination of individual liberty, competitive-party democracy, social solidarity, and national belonging and community.

When internal and external shocks to this "model" emerged from the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the general assumption was that adaptation was possible without major problems, in particular in the forms of greater individual liberty (later captured as "individualization") and greater openness to the outside (later captured as "globalization"). It was little recognized that these changes, as justifiable as they may partly be in normative terms, undermined the bases of the socio-political arrangement. They undermined democracy by de-specifying the collectivity that self-determines its rules (no longer the nation, but neither Europe nor the globe) and weakening the bonds between the members of a polity. And they undermined social solidarity by withdrawing resources from the polity through fiscal and legal competition.

There was a moment when Europe seemed to be ready to spell out, in the proper name of Europe, the core principles of its particular interpretation of modernity. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in the year 2000 and acquiring legal force with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, may be read as such a document. This Charter commits the European Union and its member states to individual rights, democracy, solidarity, justice. Beyond binding itself, Europe aims at portraying itself globally as the leading defender of these principles. But these insights arrived like Minerva flying at dusk. As we witness every day, Europe easily recedes from these commitments in the face of problems such as the post-2008 recession with rising unemployment and public

deficits and the recent refugee crisis. Importantly, it becomes increasingly clear that Europe lacks criteria for applying these principles. Europe is abstractly committed to democracy but has developed little sense of requirements for democratic deliberation and decision-making. On the inside, there is no self-understanding of the EU as a polity with boundaries enabling collective self-determination. Towards the outside, the rhetoric welcome for apparent "democratization" through movements such as in North Africa, the Middle East or Eastern Europe replaces reflection about conditions for viable democracy. Until the double strike of 2016 with the British referendum and the US elections, similarly, Europe led trade-policy negotiations, such as over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the USA, as if it had remained blindly committed to the idea of the enhancement of peace and the increase of the wealth of nations by expanding commerce without any consideration for negative social and environmental consequences.

Misconceived freedom

Dismantling this European organized modernity may have been unavoidable for a number of reasons. But the dismantling happened without any guidance for re-instituting European modernity in a more adequate way. The destruction of the institutions of organized modernity largely happened in the name of freedom, be it the freedom for personal self-realization hailed by "1968" or be it the freedom of the entrepreneur. But, as Michel Foucault recognized, "the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom" leads into misconceived "projects that claim to be global or radical", without being so.

Europe has fallen into the trap of hegemonic discourse. The new horizons of individualization and globalization, in sociological terms, or of human rights and democracy, in political terms, have caught Europe unprepared. They do not provide for a place for Europe, which needs to be specific, circumscribed in social space and rooted in historical time, without being narrow-minded with regard to others or determined by its past. And, thus, two historical shortcomings have become clear today: in cultural-intellectual terms, first, Europeans have never determined their relation to the individualist ontology promoted in the Enlightenment: is it the foundation for the normative claims on which a new and better society can be built, or is it an erroneous exaggeration of concerns arising in a situation of strife and radical doubt? This cultural-intellectual ambiguity, secondly, became dangerous in political terms: the calls for freedom and self-determination derived from Enlightenment ontology could be adopted by elites for their purposes arguing against existing constraints, as freedom of commerce, as freedom to buy labour-power, as freedom to transform the earth. And even though this ontology also served the dominated groups – women, workers, the colonized – to make their claims for liberation and recognition, in their resistance to elites their political proposals could turn anti-liberal, as they do today again.

Thus, there is a strong tension between abstract normative commitments and the requirements of the current situation, but this tension is barely recognized. We can make it more visible by briefly addressing two questions that are central for any re-interpretation of modernity for our time – of European modernity in particular, but

for modernity in other parts of the globe as well. These are the questions of historical injustice and of the need to give form to processes of collective self-determination.

Putting the past to rest

Across the nineteenth century, the notion that Europe had developed universal commitments that would be applied across the globe became widespread, not least as a consequence of actual European global domination. During the first half of the twentieth century, this notion was strongly shaken and widely abandoned. After Nazism and the Second World War, a self-critical view on one's own collective memory was developed, to some extent pioneered, in many European societies, in contrast to earlier notions of national pride. Some European polities re-constituted themselves in the face of historical injustices experienced and committed in the past. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, this focus on self-criticism gave increasingly way to the notion that the problematic past had been overcome and could now be settled. The apparent success of European integration created the basis for a new kind of collective pride. The "transitions" from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and later the exit from Soviet-style socialism and the reconstitution of polities in former Yugoslavia were guided by the idea that the past needed to be quickly overcome and settled to open the path for a better future. Similarly, the European sense of responsibility for the former colonies, still dominant in a paternalistic way during the 1970s, gave way to a view of co-operation on equal terms with everyone responsible for oneself. In other words, the idea that socio-political organization and co-operation in the present should be based on formal equality and on a "veil of ignorance" cast over past experience became more widespread. Europeans see themselves as committed to values of freedom and equality, but they behave as if everyone on the globe could act as equally free without being conditioned in the present by the consequences of past injustice.

Democracy but little to decide

After the Second World War, Europe had developed a commitment to democracy that was both firm and contained. The nation was the unquestioned site of popular sovereignty, and at the same time European integration and post-colonial co-operation were emerging forms of inter-polity coordination. Within the polity, the egalitarian-inclusive commitment to free and universal suffrage was no longer in doubt, even though political mobilization outside institutional channels was discouraged and radical political views outlawed or marginalized. On these assumptions, democracy seemed stable. From the late 1960s onwards, however, the scenario became much more unstable. Internationally, the terms of trade turned more unfavourable towards the "advanced industrial economies", and at the same time increasing international trade permitted less Keynesian-style control of the national economy. Furthermore, more radical political alternatives emerged in Latin America and in decolonization struggles in the name of democracy. Domestically, "unconventional political participation" increased and raised concerns about a "crisis of governability". By the end of the 20th century, these tensions had found a "solution" that satisfied the elites for a while:

intensified democratic participation was accepted while at the same time collective self-determination was emptied of substance because of global interconnectedness and interdependencies. Here, again, an abstract normative commitment is applied without regard for the specific circumstances. Thus, such "solution" cannot be stable: because of increasing dissatisfaction, governments are regularly voted out of office; but since incoming governments continue to pursue the same policies both citizen disaffection and non-democratic leanings increase. European politics is facing an explosive situation, with ever more cases of extreme political instability and, at the same time, an inability to create new avenues of collective action through deliberation in the public sphere.

Generalized complacency

Over the past half century, the impression was grew – or returned – that Europe and Europeans are on the winning side of history: other societies were inclined to copy the "European model" or at least parts of it; or they aimed to join "Europe" as a collectivity or polity when they had some claim to be European; or people tried – and still try – to reach Europe and settle there in the search for a better life, even risking and often losing their lives. This undeniable attractiveness of Europe has led to a high degree of complacency among Europeans, among elites as well as across society at large. It was – and often still is – widely assumed that Europeans had gotten it right, whereas others still tended to get it wrong and thus had to orient themselves towards Europe. But this is an enormous misconception of the history of Europe and of world-history. This view tends to separate Europe from other world-regions and situate it on a higher plane. Instead, the orientations of other societies and people towards Europe need to be understood as expressions of Europe's embeddedness in a global setting, in two senses: On the one hand, much of the "rise of Europe" is a consequence of past European world-domination and of injustice inflicted on others. While the era of domination is largely over, the consequences are still present and cannot be ignored. And on the other hand, there has never been a European model of modernity that has generally provided a superior mode of socio-political organisation, but a particular, contingent trajectory of historical experiences and interpretations derived from them, not separated from but closely entangled with the rest of the world. Such insight entails the need to explore the possibility that those particular circumstances may have changed for good.

A leap in European consciousness

So what is to be done? Clearly, no model or recipe is at hand. But the least one can say is that a leap in European consciousness is overdue that, in turn, is a precondion for more adequate collective action. An explosive mixture of complacency and disorientation reigns over Europe. It concerns all core aspects of the European self-understanding.

European democracy is not consolidated at all. It has lost its proclaimed, though rarely well practiced, historical nexus of nation and people and has not built any other

ground to stand on. The current fear of so-called populism is another version of the historical hesitations about democracy among European elites; and it is an indicator that no strong culture of democracy has developed in Europe during the times of formally democratic institutions. In contrast, the way to go is to overcome the notion of democracy as a mere institution and strengthen a democratic culture that is capable of self-transformation in the light of new challenges.

In economic terms, Europe did develop a sense of the embedding of markets in institutional frameworks of solidarity and democracy. But it has lost the confidence in being able to keep up such frameworks under changed circumstances and has largely abandoned them without replacement. True, sustaining such frameworks requires their competent monitoring and the continuous judgement of their adequacy. But instead of at least trying to do so, states have left the direction of economic development to the use of indicators that are manipulated at will by self-enriching business elites. It is of great urgency to restore the political capacity to frame economic action.

Among other elements, the abandoning of political capacity was also motivated by the misconceived notion of individual freedom. Not least as a consequence of historical experiences with oppression and restrictions to personal freedom, the prevailing concept of freedom has thinned out and turned increasingly individualistic. Alternative notions that see freedom thriving only in connection with democracy and solidarity do exist, but the need for them to be supported by institutions rarely finds consensus any longer.

And something similar, finally, happened to public religion. Historically, Europeans have contributed to the liberal insight that notions of revealed truth cannot be imposed. Often they have done so in a half-hearted way, keeping the majority religion in institutional connection with the state, and such arrangements have increasingly been criticized in recent years. However, rather little emphasis has been given to consider the question of religion as connected to the need for meaningful self-interpretation of the situation one finds oneself in – something that cannot be done individualistically but only by mobilizing collectively available sources of meaning.

A leap in European consciousness is a first step in a necessary re-interpretation of European modernity, based on experiences in both an earlier and the more recent past. The second step would need to be future-oriented. It would require a Europe-wide public conversation about democracy, the economy, freedom and meaning in our current time. Such conversation already takes place in many sites, in Europe and elsewhere. But it needs to acquire momentum and focus so as to allow reorientation of public affairs. The current state of Europe does not invite for much hope that this will happen soon. But without it decline becomes inevitable.

Barcelona, 19 January 2017

ARTICLE

Evolutionary Modernization Theory: Why People's Motivations are Changing

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ABSTRACT

A society's culture is shaped by the extent to which its people grow up feeling that survival is secure or insecure. This article presents a revised version of modernization theory – Evolutionary Modernization theory – which argues that economic and physical insecurity are conducive to xenophobia, strong in-group solidarity, authoritarian politics and rigid adherence to their group's traditional cultural norms – and conversely that secure conditions lead to greater tolerance of outgroups, openness to new ideas and more egalitarian social norms. Earlier versions of this theory have been presented in publications by Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, Abramson, Baker and others (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013), and a forthcoming book (Inglehart, 2018) tests this theory more extensively, analyzing survey data gathered from 1970 to 2014 in over 100 countries containing more than 90 percent of the world's population.

KEYWORDS

Modernization, social change, existential security, post-material values, self-expression values.

Introduction

For most of history, survival was insecure, with population rising to meet the food supply and then being held constant by starvation, disease and violence. Under these conditions, societies emphasize strong in-group solidarity, conformity to group norms, rejection of outsiders, and obedience to strong leaders. For under extreme scarcity, xenophobia is realistic: if there is just enough land to support

one tribe and another tribe tries to claim it, survival may literally be a choice high levels of existential security open the way for greater individual autonomy and more openness to diversity, change, and new ideas.

The concept that deference to authority goes together with xenophobia and other forms of intolerance was first presented in the classic *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950), which viewed authoritarianism between Us and Them. Under these conditions, a successful survival strategy is for the tribe to close ranks behind a strong leader, forming a united front against outsiders – a strategy that can be called the Authoritarian Reflex. Conversely,
 as a personality trait caused by harsh child-rearing practices. The Authoritarianism concept was controversial from the start (Christie & Jahoda, 1954), giving rise to an enormous literature. Its original theoretical basis and the instrument originally used to measure it have been largely superseded, but over the past seven decades scores of studies have confirmed that there is a strong tendency for deference to authority to be linked with xenophobia, intolerance and conformity to group norms. This seems to reflect a deep-rooted human reaction to insecurity. A review of a massive body of evidence from surveys, experiments and statistical data concludes that a syndrome of authoritarian racism, political and moral intolerance exists and that it is caused by individuals' innate predispositions to intolerance, interacting with changing levels of societal threat (Stenner, 2005). My own research suggests that given generations tend to have relatively high or low levels of authoritarianism, in so far as they have been raised under low or high levels of existential security.

In the 20th century, industrialization, urbanization and mass literacy enabled the working class to become mobilized in labor unions and Left-oriented political parties, which elected governments that implemented redistributive policies, providing an economic safety net. This was reinforced by the fact that during the decades following World War II, the publics of advanced industrial societies experienced unprecedented levels of existential security as a result of exceptionally rapid economic growth and the absence of war. Their younger members grew up taking survival for granted. This brought an intergenerational value shift from giving top priority to economic and physical security, toward greater emphasis on free choice, environmental protection, gender equality and tolerance of gays. This in turn led to major societal changes such as a surge of democratization around 1990 and the legalization of same-sex marriage.

Classic modernization theory and evolutionary modernization theory

Modernization theory has a long history. The idea that economic development brings predictable social and political changes has been controversial ever since it was proposed by Karl Marx. It is intellectually exciting because it not only attempts to explain what happened in the past, but also to predict what will happen in the future. So far, most efforts to predict human behavior have failed, and the key predictions made by Marx's early version of modernization theory were wrong: industrial workers did not become an overwhelming majority of the workforce, bringing a revolution of the proletariat; and the abolition of private property did not bring an end to exploitation

and conflict – it led to the rise of a new ruling class, the communist party elite. Human behavior is so complex and influenced by such a wide range of factors that any claim to provide precise, deterministic predictions is unrealistic.

A central feature of modernization is that it makes life more secure, eliminating starvation and increasing life expectancy. At high levels of development, this brings pervasive changes in human motivations, enabling people to shift from life strategies based on the perception that survival is insecure, to strategies that take survival for granted and give top priority to a wide range of other human aspirations.

The feeling that survival is insecure leads to ethnocentric solidarity against outsiders and internal solidarity behind authoritarian leaders. Indeed, under conditions of extreme scarcity, survival may require closing ranks in a battle for survival. Since humanity lived at the brink of starvation throughout most of its existence, an Authoritarian Reflex evolved in which insecurity triggers support for strong leaders, strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms. Conversely, high levels of security allow more room for individual free choice and more openness to outsiders and new ideas.

Evolution has shaped all organisms to give top priority to survival. Organisms that did not do so, died out, and the vast majority of all species that ever existed are now extinct. Thus, people evolved to give top priority to obtaining whatever is needed for survival when it is in short supply. One can live without oxygen for only a matter of minutes, and when it is scarce people focus all their efforts on getting it. One can live without water for a matter of days but when it is scarce, people struggle desperately to obtain it, killing for it if necessary. When dependable supplies of air and water are available, people take them for granted and give top priority to other goals. Though one can survive without food for weeks, when it is scarce it takes top priority. Throughout history food has usually been scarce, reflecting the biological tendency for populations to rise to meet the available food supply.

There is a huge difference between growing up knowing that survival is insecure, and growing up taking survival for granted. For most of history survival has been precarious, and survival is such a basic goal that it dominates people's life strategies, influencing almost every aspect of their lives. But in recent decades an increasing share of the world's population has grown up assuming that they will not starve, and in societies where survival is taken for granted, major changes are occurring in job motivations, religion, politics, sexual behavior and how children are raised.

Social change is not deterministic but some trajectories are more probable than others. In the long run, once economic development gets underway, certain changes are likely to happen. Industrialization, for example, brings urbanization, occupational specialization and rising levels of formal education in any society that undertakes it. Farther down the line, it brings greater prosperity and better nutrition and health care, which lead to rising life expectancy. Still later, changes in the nature of work and improved means of birth control make it possible for increasing numbers of women to take jobs outside the home. This, together with related cultural changes, leads to rising gender equality.

The cultural heritage of some societies resists these changes, because socio-cultural change is path-dependent and cultural heritages are remarkably enduring. Although classic modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Max Weber thought that religion and ethnic loyalties would die out, religion and nationalism remain major forces. Thus, Protestant societies allowed women to vote decades earlier than Catholic societies; and Japan incorporated women into the work force more slowly than other developed countries. But a growing body of evidence indicates that as modernization proceeds, these and other changes become increasingly probable. Even Japan is moving toward gender equality. Value systems reflect a balance between the driving forces of modernization and the persisting influence of tradition.

The exceptionally rapid economic growth and the welfare states that emerged in advanced industrial societies after World War II brought major cultural changes. For the first time in history, a large share of these countries' population grew up feeling that survival could be taken for granted. The cohorts born under these conditions began to give high priority to other goals, such as environmental quality and freedom of expression.

This led to a process of intergenerational value change that has been transforming the politics and culture of high-income societies, and is likely to transform China, India and other rapidly-developing societies when they reach a stage where a large share of the population grows up taking survival for granted. The best-documented aspect of this process is the shift from "Materialist" values (which give top priority to economic and physical security) to "Postmaterialist" values (which emphasize free choice and self-expression). But this is just one component of a still broader shift from Survival values to Self-expression values (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005, chapter 2) that is transforming prevailing norms concerning politics, religion, gender equality, tolerance of outgroups, and bringing growing support for environmental protection and democratic institutions (Inglehart et al., 2000–2004–2005). The rigid cultural norms that characterized agrarian societies are giving way to norms that allow greater individual autonomy and free choice – and are conducive to successful knowledge societies.

Converging evidence of the importance of existential security

Working independently, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, evolutionary biologists and historians have been developing strikingly similar theories of cultural and institutional change: they all emphasize the extent to which security from survival threats, such as starvation, war and disease, shape a society's cultural norms and sociopolitical institutions.

Thus, Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, Abramson, Baker and other political scientists and sociologists argue that a new worldview is gradually replacing one that dominated Western society for centuries (Inglehart, 1971–1977–1990–1997; Inglehart & Abramson, 1995; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005). This cultural change is driven by the profound difference between growing up feeling that survival is precarious, and growing up taking survival for granted. Similar conclusions have been reached by researchers in several other

disciplines. For example, a team of psychologists and anthropologists led by Michele Gelfand distinguishes between cultures that are "tight" versus "loose," arguing that these qualities are shaped by the ecological and human-made threats that societies historically encountered (Gelfand et al., 2011). These threats increase the need for strong norms and punishment of deviant behavior to maintain order. Tight societies have autocratic governing systems that suppress dissent, provide strong deterrence and control of crime, and tend to be more religious. Testing these predictions against survey data from 33 countries, Gelfand et al. find that nations that encountered severe ecological and historical threats have relatively strong norms and low tolerance of deviant behaviour.

Similarly, a group of biologists and psychologists led by Corey Fincher and Randy Thornhill provide convincing evidence that vulnerability to infectious disease is linked with collectivist attitudes, xenophobia and rejection of gender equality – all of which hinder the emergence of democracy (Fincher & Thornhill, 2008; Fincher, Thornhill, Murray & Schaller, 2008; Thornhill, Fincher & Aran, 2009; Thornhill, Fincher & Murray, 2010). They rated people in 98 societies on a collectivist-individualist scale, finding that a high threat of disease goes with collectivist attitudes, controlling for wealth and urbanization. Again similarly, biopsychologist Nigel Barber finds that religion helps people cope with dangerous situations; while religious belief declines as economic development brings greater economic security and health (Barber, 2011). These findings echo the predictions of evolutionary modernization theory.

Working from still another perspective, historian Ian Morris, after examining a vast array of historical evidence, concludes that "each age gets the thought it needs" – with foraging, farming and industrial societies developing appropriate value systems through an evolutionary process rather similar to the one described in evolutionary modernization theory (Morris, 2015).
This article integrates these findings and examines the causal linkages underlying evolutionary modernization. It argues that economic development brings increased economic and physical security and reduced vulnerability to disease – which are conducive to increased cultural openness, which encourages democracy and more liberal social legislation.

This is consistent with classic claims by Theodor Adorno et al. that dogmatism, rigidity, and intolerance become prevalent when people grow up perceiving threats, and with Milton Rokeach's thesis that existential threats make people paranoid, defensive, and intolerant; absence of threats makes them secure, outgoing, and tolerant (Adorno et al., 1950; Rokeach, 1960). In keeping with these claims, Self-expression values – which include tolerance of homosexuality – are most widespread in prosperous societies with secure living conditions (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005). Socioeconomic development directly affects people's sense of existential security, determining whether physical survival seems uncertain or can be taken for granted. Consequently, as we will see, the values and beliefs found in developed societies differ pervasively from those found in developing societies.

The rise of postmaterialism in the West

The earliest and most extensive evidence that the basic values of developed societies are changing, concerns the shift from Materialist values to Postmaterialist values. More than 45 years ago, I argued in the *Silent Revolution* that "A transformation may be taking place in the political culture of advanced industrial societies. This transformation seems to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations as a result of changing conditions influencing their basic socialization" (Inglehart, 1971).

This theory of intergenerational value change is based on two key hypotheses: (Inglehart, 1977):

1. *A Scarcity Hypothesis.* Virtually everyone values freedom and autonomy, but people give top priority to their most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are closely linked with survival, and when they are insecure, people give top priority to these Materialistic goals; but under secure conditions, people place greater emphasis on Postmaterialist goals such as belonging, esteem, and free choice.

2. *A Socialization Hypothesis*. The relationship between material conditions and value priorities involves a long time-lag: one's basic values largely reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years, and these values change mainly through intergenerational population replacement.

The scarcity hypothesis is similar to the principle of diminishing marginal utility. It reflects the distinction between the material needs for physical survival and safety, and non-material needs such as those for self-expression and esthetic satisfaction.

During the past several decades, advanced industrial societies have diverged strikingly from previous history: a large share of their population has not grown up under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This has led to a shift in which needs for belonging, esteem and free choice have become more prominent. The scarcity hypothesis implies that prolonged periods of high prosperity encourages the spread of Postmaterialist values, while enduring economic decline has the opposite effect.

But there is no one-to-one relationship between socioeconomic development and the prevalence of Postmaterialist values, for these values reflect one's subjective sense of security, which is partly shaped by a society's income level but also by its social welfare institutions and its security from violence and disease. Per capita income is one of the best readily-available indicators of the conditions leading to this value shift, but the theoretically crucial factor is one's sense of existential security.

Moreover, as the socialization hypothesis claims, people's basic value priorities do not change overnight. One of the most pervasive concepts in social science is that one's basic personality structure crystallizes by the time one reaches adulthood. Considerable evidence indicates that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and change relatively little thereafter (Rokeach, 1968). If so, one would expect to find substantial differences between the values of young and old in societies that have experienced rising levels of security. Intergenerational value change occurs when younger generations grow up under different conditions from those that shaped earlier generations.

These two hypotheses generate several predictions concerning value change. First, while the scarcity hypothesis implies that prosperity is conducive to the spread of Postmaterialist values, the socialization hypothesis implies that societal value change will take place gradually, largely through intergenerational population replacement. A sizable time lag exists between economic changes and their political effects.

The first empirical evidence of intergenerational value change came from surveys carried out in 1970 in six West European societies, to test the hypothesized shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values.[1] These surveys revealed large differences between the value priorities of older and younger generations. If, as claimed, these age-differences reflected intergenerational value change and not simply a tendency for people to get more Materialist as they aged, we would expect to find a gradual shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values as younger birth cohorts replaced older ones in the adult population. If this was happening, the implications were far-reaching, for these values were closely linked with a number of important orientations ranging from emphasis on political participation and freedom of expression, to support for environmental protection, gender equality and democratic political institutions.

The value change thesis was controversial from the start. Critics argued that the large age-difference found in 1970 reflected life-cycle effects rather than intergenerational change: young people naturally prefer Postmaterialist values such as participation and free speech, but as they aged, they would come to have the same Materialist preferences as their elders, so the values of society as a whole would not change (Boeltken & Jagodzinski, 1985).

The value change hypothesis, by contrast, holds that young people are more Postmaterialist than their elders only if they have grown up under substantially more secure living conditions. Consequently, we would not expect to find intergenerational value differences in stagnant societies – and if future generations no longer grew up under more secure conditions than their elders, we would no longer find intergenerational value differences. But the degree of security experienced during one's formative years has a lasting impact. Consequently, as relatively Postmaterialist post-war birth cohorts replace older, more Materialistic ones in the adult population, we should witness a gradual shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values.

The differences between the formative experiences of the postwar birth cohorts and all older cohorts, produced major differences in their value priorities. But these differences didn't become evident at the societal level until the first post-war birth cohort became politically-relevant young adults two decades after World War II – contributing to the era of Student Protest in the late 1960s and 1970s. A widespread slogan among the protesters at that time was "Do not trust anyone over thirty!"

A forthcoming book analyzes cultural change, using evidence from hundreds of representative national surveys carried out from 1981 to 2014 in more than 100 countries[2], together with economic, demographic and political data. This massive body

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[1] This hypothesis was triggered by indications of intergenerational value change that emerged during the student protest era of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

[2] For detailed information on the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey see their respective websites: www.worldvaluessurvey.org and www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu

of evidence demonstrates that the predicted intergenerational shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist priorities has been occurring (Inglehart, 2018). But it is only one aspect of a broader cultural shift from Survival values that give top priority to the survival needs, to Self-expression values that emphasize gender equality, environmental protection, tolerance, interpersonal trust and free choice. It also includes a shift from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. It is bringing new political issues to the center of the stage and encouraging the spread of democracy.

Cultural change and societal change

Changing values can change societies. A culture is a set of norms and skills that are conducive to survival in a given environment, constituting a survival strategy for a society. Like biological evolution, culture evolves through a process analogous to random mutations and natural selection, but since culture is learned, it can change much more rapidly than biological evolution.

In recent decades, the prevailing values of highly developed countries have changed profoundly, transforming cultural norms concerning gender roles, abortion, divorce, birth control and sexual orientation that had persisted for centuries. One of the most dramatic examples is the emergence of new gender roles. Throughout history, women have generally been subordinate to men and limited to a very narrow set of roles, first as daughters and then as wives and mothers. In recent decades, this has changed radically. Increasingly, almost any job that is open to men is also open to women. Two generations ago, women comprised a small minority of those receiving higher education. Today, women are a majority of the university students in most industrialized countries and a growing share of the faculty. Less than a century ago, women could not even vote in most countries; today they not only vote, they hold a growing share of the parliamentary seats in many democracies and are moving into top political positions. After centuries of subordinate status, women are increasingly taking positions of authority in academic life, business and government.

In another example of recent societal change, openly gay politicians have become mayors of major cities, members of parliament, foreign ministers and heads of government. Since 2000, a growing number of countries have legalized same sex marriage. The rate of change varies enormously, with low-income countries[3] (especially Islamic ones) strongly resisting change. In many countries, homosexuality is still illegal, with some countries imposing the death penalty for homosexual behavior. Thus, in recent Egyptian surveys, 99 percent of the population said that homosexuality is "never" justifiable – which means that even the gays were condemning it. For those adhering to traditional norms, these cultural changes are alarming. They have given rise to some of the hottest political issues in developed countries. And they help explain the current conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and Western societies. The publics of

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[3] We refer to the World Bank's categorization of "low income" countries in 1990: we use income levels at this early date because there is strong evidence that one's basic values are shaped to a greater extent by the conditions experienced during one's formative years, than by current economic conditions.

high-income societies have been changing rapidly, while the publics of most Muslim-majority countries have changed relatively little – and from their perspective, the social norms of today's high-income countries are decadent and shocking. A growing gap has opened up between people holding traditional values in Islamic countries and the developed world. Once, many people in these countries saw Western democracies as a model to emulate. Today, Islamic fundamentalists see Western culture as something to guard against.

Cognition and emotions as sources of value change

Classic modernization theory needs to be modified in another respect – its one-sided emphasis on cognitive factors in shaping cultural change. Weber attributed the rise of a secular, rational worldview to the spread of scientific knowledge: scientific discoveries had made traditional religious explanations of the world obsolete; as scientific knowledge spread, religion would inexorably give way to rationality. Similarly, some modernization theorists argued that education drives the modernization process: within most countries, the more educated tend to have modern worldviews, and as educational levels rise, traditional religious worldviews will inevitably give way to Secular-rational ones.

This emphasis on cognitive forces captures only part of the story. Emotional and experiential factors, such as whether people feel that survival is secure or insecure, are at least equally important in shaping people's worldviews. Higher levels of formal education are indeed linked with Secular-rational values and Self-expression values, but higher education is not just an indicator of the extent to which one has absorbed knowledge. It is also an indicator of the extent to which one has experienced relatively secure conditions during one's formative years, since children from economically secure families are much likelier to get higher education.

But each society also has a distinct social climate reflecting the prevailing mass outlook, which helps shape people's outlook. Thus, although higher education generally encourages people to place more emphasis on Self-expression values, there is much more difference in the degree of emphasis on Self-expression values between the highly educated people of different nations, than *between* the highly educated and the general public within the same nations (Inglehart & Weltzel, 2005, pp. 219–221).

The cognitive component of education is largely irreversible – while one's sense of security and autonomy is not. The feeling that the world is secure or insecure is an early-established and relatively stable aspect of one's outlook. But this outlook can be affected by current economic and political events, and greatly affected by catastrophic events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such events are rare, but an entire group of countries experienced them in 1989–1991, when communism collapsed throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The people of the Soviet successor states experienced sharp declines in living standards, and lived through the collapse of their social and political systems, and the collapse of the belief systems under which they had lived for many decades. Scientific *knowledge* did not disappear – it continued to grow; and educational levels remained high in these societies. But the prevailing sense

of existential security and individual control over one's life fell sharply. If the emergence of modern values were solely determined by cognitive factors, then Secular-rational values and Self-expression values would have continued to spread. But if these values are shaped by feelings of existential security, we would expect to find a regression from modern values toward increasing emphasis on Survival values and religion in the ex-Soviet societies. As we see, this is exactly what happened. Cultural change is not simply determined by cognitive factors. To an even greater extent, it is shaped by people's first-hand experience with existential security or insecurity.

An alternative explanation: rational choice

This article argues that whether one has grown up perceiving survival as precarious or secure, together with historical cultural differences, has a major impact on people's behavior – but we should consider a major alternative theory: rational choice.

Two contrasting types of theories are competing to explain how individuals and societies behave: rational choice theories, and cultural models. The rational choice school, which dominated economics and political science until recently, is based on the assumption that human behavior reflects conscious choices designed to maximize one's utilities. This approach gives little weight to historical or cultural factors, assuming that – facing the same incentives – all people will make the same choices. This school has developed elegant and parsimonious models, but a growing body of empirical evidence indicates that these models don't adequately explain how humans actually behave. Accordingly, behavioral economics has become increasingly influential in recent years, incorporating emotional and cultural explanatory factors.

There is no question that conscious choices by political elites can have important and immediate impacts. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in 2015, it was immediately followed by a surge of such marriages. The proximate cause was the Supreme Court decision. But a deeper cause was a long-term shift in mass attitudes. Same-sex marriage had been not merely illegal but unthinkable for centuries. But, as data from the Values Surveys demonstrate, this norm was gradually weakening through a process of intergenerational value change that took place over many decades. Public support for same-sex marriage became increasingly widespread and articulate until the laws themselves were changed.

A large body of psychological research demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of activity in the human brain takes place on an unconscious level. Since we are only aware of conscious processing, we tend to assume that it determines our decision-making. And since humans are adept at rationalizing whatever choices they make, after the fact one can always fit a rational choice explanation to any set of events. But experimental research indicates that human decisions are heavily influenced by unconscious biases or intuitions (Tvesky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson, 2002; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, conscious and unconscious processing occur in different regions of the brain. Brain scanning indicates that when a decision is made, activity occurs first in unconscious areas and is then followed by activity in conscious areas: apparently, the decision is determined

by unconscious factors, which are then rationalized into a coherent narrative by the brain's conscious component (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & Dolan, 2006; Soon, Brass, Heinze & Heynes, 2008). Similarly, recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggest that moral beliefs and motivations come from intuitions and emotions that evolution has prepared the human mind to develop; and moral judgment is a product of quick and automatic intuitions that then give rise to slower, conscious reasoning that finds reasons to support the individual's intuitions (Green & Haidt, 2002; Heidt & Bjorklund, 2008).

Paradoxically, having emotions is ultimately more rational than being purely rational. The fact that emotions evolved, enables people to make lasting commitments to stand by one's friends or one's tribe through thick and thin, in situations where a purely rational person would defect if it were profitable. Emotions make it possible for people to work together in trusting, long-term relationships. In the long run, natural selection behaves as if it were more rational than sheer rationality itself (Ridley, 1996).

Emotions enable people to make quick choices in situations where a rational analysis of the options might be almost endless. Conscious reasoning then develops a coherent narrative – rational choice only seems to be determining human behavior. But since, in the long run, natural selection is very effective at producing cultural norms that have a good fit with their environment, the end result often resembles what would emerge from a process of rational choice. Accordingly, cultural change often can be modeled pretty accurately using game theory (Bednar, Bramson, Jones-Rooy & Page, 2010). Rational choice models of cultural change may not reflect how given norms actually evolved historically – but they may capture the underlying logic of why a given arrangement fits its environment, and consequently survives. Such models are like evolutionary biologists' explanation that polar bears evolved white coats "in order to be less conspicuous against the snow." Biologists are perfectly aware that polar bears did not consciously decide to develop white coats, but this is a parsimonious way to describe how random mutations and natural selection led to this result. In contemporary social science, rational choice theorists often describe complex evolutionary processes as if they resulted from rational bargaining and conscious choice – even when they reflect evolutionary processes involving complex events with unforeseen consequences, rather than conscious choices.

Slow and fast cultural change

A culture is a set of learned behavior that constitutes a society's survival strategy. The norms governing this strategy usually change very slowly, often persisting for centuries, but under certain conditions they can change rapidly. Though fashions change quickly, basic values tend to change slowly, through intergenerational population replacement, with multi-decade time-lags between the emergence of root causes and the time when cultural change becomes manifest in a society (Inglehart, 1971–1990). Empirical analysis of the Materialist/Postmaterialist value shift supports the idea that basic

values change gradually, largely through intergenerational population replacement (Inglehart, 1971–1977–1990–1997). Instead of spreading across the entire world evenly, as awareness of the optimal choice might do, this shift occurs only when a society reaches a threshold where a sufficiently high level of economic and physical security that younger birth cohorts grow up taking survival for granted. In contrast to this, rational choice theory holds that key institutions are adopted through conscious elite choices – which could change from one day to the next. It also tends to assume that institutions determine culture, in which case basic cultural norms would also change rapidly.

Rational choice explanations do not account for the fact that cultural change tends to occur through intergenerational population replacement, or for the persisting influence of religious cleavage and historical events that occurred many centuries ago. Rising levels of existential security have been reshaping the world in recent decades. Life expectancies, incomes, and school attendance rose from 1970 to 2010 in every region of the world (Human Development Report, 2013). Poverty, illiteracy, and mortality are declining globally (Estes, 2010; Ridley, 2011; Hughes & Hillebrand, 2012). And war, crime rates and violence have been declining for many decades (Goldstein, 2011; Pinker, 2011). The world is now experiencing the longest period without war between major powers in recorded history. This, together with the postwar economic miracles and the emergence of the welfare state, produced conditions under which a growing share of the world's population has grown up taking survival for granted, bringing intergenerational shifts toward Postmaterialist values and Self-expression values (Inglehart, 2008).

But in addition to the shifts linked with intergenerational population replacement, conversion effects are also possible: given birth cohorts can become increasingly tolerant of new social norms due to diffusion of these values through education and exposure to the mass media – which now present these norms in a much more favorable light than they did decades ago. This could eventually transform what are perceived as socially desirable norms.

In secure advanced industrial societies, among successful young people it no longer is socially acceptable to be sexist or a gay-basher. But the publics of low-income societies remain solidly opposed to gender equality and tolerance of gays. Western motion pictures and television programs, cell phones and the internet have penetrated widely even in low-income countries, but they have not yet had much impact on their lifestyle norms (Norris & Inglehart, 2009). Education and mass communications may play important roles in transforming attitudes toward gender equality and tolerance of gays but so far, their impact has been largely limited to societies with relatively high levels of existential security.

It is perfectly conceivable that both intergenerational population replacement and value diffusion can occur. Thus, intergenerational change seems to play the dominant role in the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values, but some value diffusion also seems to be taking place: given birth cohorts not only failed to become more Materialist as they aged – they actually became slightly more Postmaterialist over time.

Major predictions

The theory just discussed, generates the following predictions:

1. When a society attains such high levels of existential security that a large share of the population grows up taking survival for granted, it brings coherent and roughly predictable social and cultural changes, producing an intergenerational shift from values shaped by scarcity, toward increasing emphasis on Postmaterialist values and Self-expression values.

2. As younger birth cohorts replace older cohorts in the adult population, it transforms the societies' prevailing values – but with long time-lags. The youngest cohorts have little political impact until they reach adulthood, and even then they are still a small minority of the adult population; it takes additional decades before they become the dominant influence.

3. Intergenerational value change is shaped by short-term period effects such as economic booms or recessions, in addition to population replacement, but in the long run the period effects often cancel each other out, while the population replacement effects tend to be cumulative.

4. Intergenerational value change can eventually reach a threshold at which new norms became socially dominant. At this point, conformist pressures reverse polarity, supporting changes they had formerly opposed and bringing much more rapid cultural change than that produced by population replacement alone.

5. Cultural change is path-dependent: a society's values are shaped by its entire historical heritage, and not just its level of existential security.

A forthcoming book – *Cultural Evolution: How People's Motivations are Changing, and How this is Transforming the World* – tests these hypotheses against extensive new data.

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Apologia of Modernity

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ABSTRACT

The article considers key factors and directions of the value-institutional evolution of Modernity as a political project. It is argued that the movement of humankind towards the globalised world paradoxically turned not into a denial, but rather into a consistent radicalisation of the axiological political foundations of Modernity. The thesis of the axiological unity and institutional diversity of global Modernity is advanced in opposition to the concept of pluralist modernity as a rhetorically veiled civilisational approach. It is asserted that the constant self-adjustment of the central value system of globalised Modernity is carried out in the context of a non-simultaneity effect, providing grounds for discussions about the insurmountability of pre-modern cultural barriers and traditions of different civilisations. The conclusion is justified that the success of the globalisation of Modernity is contingent upon the possibility of building out the already existing world economy to include world politics, since the economic assimilation of the world by capitalism has largely outstripped the counterbalancing possibilities of its global political regulatory and compensatory systems, contributing to the intensification of conflicts and various inequalities. The increasingly intensive interaction and interdependence of humanity at the global level first implies the creation of ethical mechanisms of world politics based on concern for the interests of humanity as a whole. In seeking the solution to this problem, it is increasingly necessary to go beyond archaised political forms and the logic of decision-making that relates to territorial nation-states. In the discussion about the ethical and political values and institutions of the global, second or late Modernity, the positionsof those subjects capable of presenting a moral game to humanity –

open, egalitarian, universal, cosmopolitan approaches for solving general problems – will be a priori strengthened.

KEYWORDS

Modernity, globalised Modernity, radicalisation of Modernity, global economics, world politics, capitalism, liberal consensus, postmodernism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, collective action.

The fundamental importance of Modernity as a central problem for the social sciences cannot be overemphasised. According to the figurative expression of E. Hobsbawm, it was during the twentieth century that 80% of the Earth's population finally parted company with the Middle Ages and stepped into modern society. This is a society oriented toward the scientific mastering of nature and freedom to control one's own destiny. Modernity is the most ideological problem of the social sciences, the response to which is used to designate all other axiological, ontological and notional hierarchies. While we are all located in Modernity, its constantly changing face can be seen differently depending on the historical stage of a particular society and the subject of its interpretation. While sharing some common features, the versions of Modernity of the 18th and 19th centuries and at the beginning and end of the 20th century can be differentiated in a number of key aspects. It is the dream of all political and philosophical doctrines, state power apparatuses and social forces to exert an effective intellectual monopoly over Modernity, due to the concomitant ability to legitimatise certain topical socio-political, cultural and economic orders. However, it is impossible to furnish a universal definition of a continuous or unfinished Modernity (Habermas, 2005) within which one is located without also presenting that position within the coordinates of the socio-political, economic and historical context in which the observer thinks. At the same time, the reflection of one's own social engagement and partiality naturally turns into a falsification of any universal concepts and systems of legitimacy that appeal to Modernity. The political project of Modernity presents itself as a globally dominant, historically heterogeneous and far from exhausted political and historical project. Since Modernity is an unfinished project, it cannot be thought of as a whole or as the subject of a final historical outcome. However, we can learn a lot about the Modernity, contemporary society and ourselves if we are able to understand the internal changes that the value-institutional political order of Modernity has undergone over the past several centuries.

Concerning the genesis, transformation, possible alternatives and threats to the dominant political project of Modernity, we can formulate the following interrelated sequence of theses.

I

Historically, the political project of Modernity came to supersede the Ancien Régime (old order), showing the construction of the social order for the first time and justifying

its autonomy from the unchanging divine order. Traditional societies are fundamentally distinguished from their modern equivalents in terms of the *rate* of social change. Before Modernity, the rate of change was so small that during one generation the changes were almost invisible, creating a general illusion that no changes at all had taken place since the creation of the world. Therefore, the speed of change in contemporary society – in which, in fact, only the habitual way of life changes, i.e. its rituals, symbols and values – can seem almost like blasphemy from the point of view of pre-modern social groups.

The speed of social change makes it clear that all societies are explicitly constructed. As a result, the main object of criticism of Modernity is the uncovering of its ontological and axiological *variability* as well as the *constructed nature* of different social forces, interpreted in the context of the sacral tradition as inauthenticity, simulacrality, deconstruction, denial of God, distortion of sacred foundations, etc. Nevertheless, it can be remarked that tradition differs only in the sense that the drawing up of its design is lost in a historical timescale. Abolishing the earthly order is justified by the fact that it is a copy of the divine; consequently, every social evil has an apologia on the basis that *everything real is reasonable*. However, unpredictable results may ensue from citizens and social groups legitimising their right to change the political order. Thus, the political order of Modernity resurrects the scenario of the construction of the Tower of Babel, in which the final goal of achieving the ideal (divine) order has not been lost, but is constantly divided due to the conflicts of alternative perspectives produced by constantly transforming social groups as analogues of *Biblical languages*. Hence the insurmountable theoretical uncertainty and incompleteness of Modernity as the mobile constellation of modern utopias and ideologies and the impossibility of their integration into a metanarrative, which hope J.-F. Lyotard associated with the state of postmodernism (Lyotard, 1979).

A natural way of being for a modern society consists in permanent modernisation as a set of continuously improving changes. The desire for continuous innovation in itself is becoming a key – and perhaps the only – distinctive *tradition* of Modernity: 'Modernisation is a "way of existence" in modernity, and it cannot end, at least until "modernity" is complete.' (Kapustin, 1998) In this case, in order to correspond to the prevailing principles *of the maximisation of collective usefulness*, any innovations must be publicly controlled and legitimated by being the object of a wide, constantly confirmed dynamic consensus of key social groups. Therefore, modernisation is a continuous process, carried out under fundamentally incomplete conditions of freedom and in the absence of social forces that can achieve a *zero sum* victory once and for all. Furthermore, this process is not identical to the movement towards an ideal final state, which often seems to be embodied in one or another political reality.

The Modernist project announced the universality of the human mind and the intelligibility of social and moral laws, leading to Weber's disenchantment of the world. In the ethical field, it is *the project of independent rational substantiation of morals* (MacIntyre, 1981); in the political sphere, *the universal legislation of reason*. At the heart of the political project of Modernity lies the desire to develop universal political legislation for all mankind. The problem is that the class differentiation of the Modern society presented a set of diametrically opposed versions of morality and reason,

which are the result of the free self-determination of peoples, each of which, while striving for universal legislation, is at the same time an expression of particular political interests. An objective (universal) normative rationality (common goals, values, ideals) of the monologic political mind thus becomes impossible. However, without integral instrumental rationality, expressed in terms of the rules of the game – conflict and interaction of social interests – society itself, seen as an institutional, process-based compromise of interests, becomes impossible to sustain. It is for this reason that increasing attention has been paid both to new disciplinary practices and to dialogue – communication of social forces, mechanisms for achieving sustainable agreements (conventions) expressed in various democratic mechanisms and institutions (elections, referenda, direct participation of citizens in making power decisions: demonstrations, rallies, jury trials, citizens' gatherings, public hearings, etc.).

Under the conditions of Modernity, the political community for the first time developed a fundamentally incomplete system of methods for resolving internal conflicts that allow for periodic review of the terms of the social contract, i.e., dominant social forces are given legitimacy for a limited time period. This allows the abandonment of extreme political interactions, in which the winner takes all, in favour of a system of political decision making related to cooperative, dialogical, solidary strategies of various social forces that allow the interests of different parties to be taken into account and society changed in a non-violent way.

Modernity is often criticised by contemporaries both from the left, and from the right. Now as the *iron cell of conformism* (H. Marcuse), then as *the tyranny of the egoistic mind*, leading to a dehumanising depreciation of human existence as well as to totalitarianism. Thus, it seems that the real situation is more complicated. In achieving more rapid *thematisation*, modern theories and collective practices sharply increased the *sensitivity* of society itself to political problems of power, hierarchy, resource distribution, justice, freedom and solidarity in the context of unavoidable contradictions of group interests. These are political problems that have always existed; however, it is only under the glare of contemporary theoretical optics that they have become the focus of attention, bringing their *historical* character to light. In this way, it is shown that these problems are not eternal and can, in principle, be variably resolved by active constituents of the political order.

II

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most classics of European social thought analysed modern society at the ontological level according to the concepts of universal transition: from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism (K. Marx), from traditional to modern society (M. Weber), from organic to mechanical solidarity (E. Durkheim), from community to society (F. Tönnies), from military to industrial society (H. Spencer), etc. Thus, almost all the classical socio-political macro-theories that comprehend the transition to Modernity – and the condition of modernity itself – are built on the identification of evolutionary stages of development thus forming a type of binary time code, one of whose branches has a privileged position with respect to the future, and the other personifying the past. While this transition actually did take

place on a global scale, the Modernist project historically did not end there, setting in motion complex processes of internal differentiation.

In institutional terms, Modernity is expressed in the complexity of the social subsystems – economics, politics, science, art, etc. – each of which acquires a certain autonomy, with its own value system and language of description. At the same time, Modernity does not entirely displace previous social relations. The value system of Modernity functions in parallel with the previous norms of social regulation, gradually coming to displace and replace them. Thus, along with reciprocal and distributive exchanges, patrimonial political order and patron-client relations of elites of different levels, are formed civil nation-states, a self-regulating market, rational bureaucracy, mass parties, trade unions, civil organisations, representative bodies of government, etc. In all modern societies, without exception, we can observe the simultaneity of coexistence and the imposition into various spheres of life of reciprocal (gift-exchange, family, clan), distributive and market relations, as well as a long-term, gradual change in their correlation in favour of the latter. New social norms and regulators seldom replace the old all at once. Typically, this displacement takes the form of a *transplant*, when the values of Modernity at the institutional level are partially mixed with those of an obsolete cultural tradition. Thus, the displacement of old values in the historical perspective creates transitional institutional effects, which are often erroneously explained in terms of the cultural and civilisational specifics (uniqueness) of a particular society.

Now, the problem of global transformation of the model of national, class-industrial and predominantly Western Modernity into the late, post-national, cosmopolitan Modernity is at the centre of discussions. In the world as a whole, the national model of Modernity, which derives habitual everyday life from historical social ideals and utopias, is becoming increasingly irrelevant for describing the actual socio-political and cultural regimes of a large part of mankind in the twenty-first century. Transformations of the basic national model of Modernity were facilitated by:

–   the saturation points of global markets and intensification of non-market competition, leading to the crisis of idealised capitalism;
–   another technological revolution related to automation and robotics; acceleration of the dynamics of changes in late-modern societies *without economic growth* or *mass labour*;
–   transformation of the social structure of society and the principles of its stratification, ever less connected with the market;
–   an increase in the internal *heterarchy* and *heterotopy* of territorial nation-states due to various internal and external challenges;
–   multiplication and strengthening of non-governmental political subjects in the globalised world (TNK, city networks etc.).

However, despite convincing criticism, Modernity remains the basic political model for the relevant description and legitimisation of global cultural and economic-political reality, which has not yet been pushed to the periphery of history by alternative political projects. For this reason, despite the constantly observed institutional and axiological changes, leading researchers emphasise that when we refer to the realities of our society we are nevertheless dealing with Modernity,

be it the *singular modernity* of F. Jamieson, the *fluid modernity* of Z. Bauman, *the hyper-modernity of* A. Turena, *the cosmopolitan, second or late Modernity* of U. Beck or A. Giddens' concept of *radical Modernity*. In the globalised world, the intensity of intellectual challenges to Modernity is growing from the side of the *post-industrial, post-Ford, networked information society, knowledge society*, etc. (Postfordism, 2015). However, the main challenge is not merely institutional, but a more universal value-ethical challenge, whose sources are more widely defined. As a result, none of the concepts that claimed a global alternative to Modernity were able to displace it from the dominant positions. These include postmodernism, post-industrialism, communism, alterglobalism, world empire (M. Hardt & A. Negri), religious fundamentalism, civilisational theories, theories of autarky and isolationism and a variety of utopian and traditionalist projects (Fishman, 2008).

It should be noted that the most heuristic critical challenge to the political paradigm of Modernism was issued by postmodernism. Persuasive examples of the axiological and methodological criticism of the theories of Modernity can be found in the works of J. Baudrillard, J. Derrida, J. Deleuze, J.-F. Lyotard and others. For example, Jameson argues that the intellectual map of Modernity has largely developed its heuristic potential in social theory terms, to all intents and purposes becoming a synonym for capitalism. However, in throwing a real challenge to Modernity, postmodernism itself failed to become a global utopia, merely morphing into the instrumental cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson, 1991). Over time, postmodern theories, which initially claimed to represent a global alternative to the value core of Modernity, came to be reabsorbed into it on the basis of critical self-reflection.

Postmodernism revealed and studied the *dark side of Modernity* from a theoretical perspective (J. Baudrillard). Postmodern theories turned out to be heuristically strong in the study of various kinds of breaks, boundaries, peripheries and cultural contradictions of the political project of Modernity, connected with criticism and challenges directed by various peripheries (geographic, economic, cultural) at the prevailing values and centres. However, postmodernism was unable to offer a global postmodern political project, since it lacks the ability to generate universality and totality in the area of values and aims. The hierarchical values and principles of a political attitude, structured around the criticism of any *overwhelming periphery of centrism*, proved to be unrealisable in practice. One of the networks or communications must remain ordering and dominant; otherwise, we are only dealing with a radical anarchism connected with a denial of the need for society as such. Thus, if Modernity is connected with individual and collective liberation as well as conscious and goal-oriented transformation of the world, postmodernism turns into forced reactive strategies connected with the adaptive accommodation of individuals and their groups to social, technological and axiological changes, over which they, in fact, do not exercise any power.

The formation of the analytical model of late Modernity is carried out against the background of a historical non-simultaneity effect, at a time when some regions of the world are entering the postindustrial stage of Modernity, while others are merely living through the process of being forced to play catch up with modernisation and the institutional adaptation to Modernity in the form of nation-states. The classical

programmes of social knowledge of the original era of Modernity were oriented towards the nation-state as the legitimate political form of its practical embodiment. It is for this reason that Marx could still draw upon *English political economy*, *German philosophy* and *French utopianism*. Under the conditions of globalised or late Modernity, any *national schools* or theoretical models of social knowledge lose their self-sufficiency. Nations become only private or special in comparison with universal laws, which are relevant only to the extent that they apply to humanity as a whole.

At the same time, some popular theories, especially in the field of economics, continue to use ontological modifications of the classical transit discourse no longer in substantiating the transition to it, but in describing the very formation and subsequent transformations of Modernity. For example, D. Nort, D. Wallace and B. Wyngast describe modernisation as a transition from the *natural state* to the *open access society*, carried out by means of a transformation of the interaction of elites. The latter cease to be closed and begin to be guided by impersonal rules (North et al., 2009). A similar course of thought is present in D. Acemoğlu and D. Robinson, who describe the history of modernisation as an institutional transformation of societies in which extractive institutions are dominant, to societies with a predominance of inclusive institutions (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012). However, more insightful and more convincing in this discourse are the optimistic ideas of R. Inglehart and K. Welzel based on many years of global sociological surveys on the transformations taking place in the value systems of modern societies. They consist in a justification of the general transition from the material *survival values* guaranteed for the majority of citizens during the deployment of the early industrial Modernity to the postmaterial *values of self-realisation*, associated with post-industrial societies (Inglehart, Welzel, 2005).

In a radical and idealised form, the concept of universal transition was applied by the apologist *of the end of history* F. Fukuyama, who attempted to argue that all modern societies move "naturally" in the direction of the domination of the market and liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992). Supporters of the movement towards the *flat earth* and *end of history* present rationales for the ethical and political unification of mankind, with globalisation being interpreted as the erasure of pre-modern cultural differences (J. Bhagwati, T. Friedman, I. Wallerstein, A. Maddison, A. Touraine, V. Inozemtsev, F. Fukuyama and others). Accordingly, continuing Modernity can be adequately explained only from within its own value coordinates. And the more we are unable to explain the observed diversity in the logic of Modernity itself, the more it will not turn out in the framework of the more localist and irrational discourse of civilisation that Modernity has supplanted into the field of history.

Finally, there have been enough productive and, perhaps, too hasty attempts by Z. Bauman and U. Beck to model a late-modern society from the latest – however unstable – trends, individual signs and changes in the outlook (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992). In this same connection, there are concepts that predict the turn of modern society towards new mechanisms of self-organisation. Such include, for example, concepts of the post-industrial society, post-Fordism (S. Lash, J. Urry et al.), the network society (M. Castells, A. Bard, et al.) and information society (D. Bell, E. Toffler, F. Webster, V. Inozemtsev, et al.) – all of which had a significant impact on public

opinion at the end of the twentieth century. However, these theories turned out to be too hastily grounded in some peripheral tendencies in social development, which consequently turned into utopias with overvalued social expectations. Theories of the *information society, knowledge society* or *creative class* turned out to be somewhat naively optimistic, a pie *whose slices were not intended for dividing equally among all societies and classes,* and implying a rather more rapid transition to the future than the actual capabilities of even the most advanced modern societies.

III

In its most general form, the value kernel of the political project of Modernity represents the historically mobile construction of interrelated narratives that organise the institutional space of a post-traditional society. First, it consists in an aggregate of modern ideologies/utopias, as well as the conflict inherent between their value justifications, representing the dynamics of the clash of social forces rooted in capitalism. This research tradition relies mainly on the classic works of K. Marx, K. Mannheim, A. Gramsci, H. Marcuse, F. Jameson and others, in which the appearance and transformation of Modernity is due to the new social ontology of capitalism and the class structure of society that it engenders.

The basic modern political narratives are comprised of *capitalism*, *liberalism* and *nationalism*. Capitalism generates a constant increase in resources and assigns the dominant stratification of society into economic classes, each determined by its relation to the market. The strategy of obtaining moral and political compensation for the negative externalities and social costs of capitalism is implemented in the form of a constantly-revised *liberal consensus* (I. Wallerstein) appearing as a fundamental fusion within the institutionally implemented liberal normative field of different versions of conservatism, socialism and left-right radicalism.

Finally, the territorial national state acts as the dominant political form, combining the principles of territorial sovereignty, power apparatus and citizenship. The nation-state permits the establishment of an acceptable balance between the market and the various background, non-economic factors that provide for its existence – which factors capitalism and its theories prefer to bracket out. This consists in a combination of capitalist production, exploitation, competition and the accumulation of capital with the institutional consolidation of a broad list of inalienable guarantees, rights and freedoms of citizens.

The concept *of democracy*, most consistently worked out in the Habermasian idea of communicative consensus, bears responsibility for the coordination and reconciliation of conflicting collective interests in a given modern society. The comprehension and legitimation of the constant changes of modern society as *social norms* are represented by the concepts of *progress* and *revolution*. The immanent theory of progress (modernisation) institutionally represents the differentiation of the new autonomous (self-referential) subsystems of an increasingly complex society, involving a delegation of the functions of social regulation and the power to produce norms. These narratives form the value and functional unity of Modernity along with the basis for its self-description, reproduction and legitimation of the social order.

However, under the conditions of the historical evolution of modernity, each of the indicated narratives undergoes substantial changes. The narrative of liberalism demonstrates a tendency to abandon the liberal consensus of collective political interests a) on the basis of modern ideologies and b) within individual nations in favour of shaping the contours of global liberal ethics based on agreement on universal human rights and freedoms and the development of moral conventions for maintaining the legitimacy of post-national political institutions. A negative trend running in parallel to this is the loss of ideological content on the part of the liberal consensus. It thus begins to express itself, not at the level of ideology, but at lower rhetorical levels, e.g. those of *common sense*, *populism* and *pragmatism*.

The narrative of democracy is undergoing an evolution, with the principles of the dictatorship of the majority, the mobilisation of the masses and the expansion of the circle of citizens endowed with political rights giving way to problems of the coexistence of a multi-component society, access to civil rights and equal opportunities for citizens and immigrants. The evolution of the narrative of nationalism is connected with the movement from the sacralisation of territorial sovereignty to extraterritorial principles of *open law* and cosmopolitanism. Territorially organised nations in a *flat world* (T. Friedman) lose credibility in the field of developing dominant political values. Under conditions of reflexive modernity, global openness of borders and increasing mobility, the process of legitimation inevitably shifts from nations to humanity as a whole.

Thus, the political logic of nation-states no longer corresponds to the increasingly intensive interaction and interdependence of humanity at the global level. The transition to late Modernity is characterised by a kind of disintegration and loss of legitimacy on the part of normative nationalism in terms of unity of individual rights, collective autonomy of citizens and territorially limitations to sovereign space. The factor of space as a sacralisation of limited territory ceases to be significant. Accordingly, all nations as territorial communities are experiencing an increasing deficit of legitimacy. The same assertion relates to nationalism supporting territorial political communities as well as to concepts of sovereignty in terms of the historical, ethnic and linguistic proximity of members of the territorial community. In this way, the historical realisation of the utopia of national Modernity in the form of nation-states for the greater part of humanity simultaneously turns into its profanation as a consequence of the loss of the transcendental dimension to the political sphere.

In addition, if nationalism emerged as a historical means for integrating and internally unifying a heterogeneous political space during the centralisation of large states, now it can also be rethought as a way of protecting a particular society from the global expansion of the world economy, which polarises national communities and increases their dependence on external factors, actors and contexts of interaction. For a certain historical period, the effects of modernisation served to obscure the moral limitations and inhumane goal-orientedness of the capitalist world-system. The complete globalisation of capital and technological revolutions devaluing *working people* make it necessary to reconsider the classical narrative of capitalism associated with constant geographical expansion and market competition in favour of its rental models (Martianov, 2017).

It should be especially noted that the value kernel of the political project of Modernity *is ambivalent*: it is simultaneously a method of *explanation,* but also of *remoralisation/legitimisation* of practices within capitalism. Modern ideologies and utopias are designed to mitigate the permanent moral deficit provoked by capitalism under the conditions of the expansion of the limited model *of homo economicus*, which is absolutely inadequate for keeping society from decay (Martianov, 2017). In turn, capitalism tends to identify itself with Modernity by reducing it to *neutral* theories *of modernisation, progress, development*, specifically designed to mask the absence in it of any social goals and collective hopes (Jameson, 2009). Thus, capitalism does not have a general political goal or any socially utopian horizon and cannot therefore produce effective self-legitimation that relates to society as a whole. Therefore, capitalism has to resort to palliative options of non-economic justification of its economic practices, primarily to an identification with Modernity as the embodiment of the idea of the infinity of progress. Nethertheless, the original logic of the expansion of capitalism in terms of *colonialism* and *progressorism* [term introduced by the Strugatsky brothers] was subsequently subjected to substantiated criticism. Equally critical was the expansion of capitalism into all spheres of social life, which went beyond the limits of market exchanges, giving rise to the total commodification of all other social relations.

In this context, the ideological genesis of political Modernity is evident from the crisis in Christian morality, which was caused by the birth and development of the capitalist world-system. First emerging in sixteenth century Europe and subsequently developed through the cycles of bourgeois revolutions, processes of colonisation (Westernisation) and globalisation of cultural, economic and mass media communications, the principles of the capitalist world system, freed from the limitations of traditional Christian morality, gradually came to embrace the whole world.

Founded by liberal consensus, the concept of human rights and freedoms has emerged as a distinctively post-traditional means by which Christian values in their humanistic interpretation can coexist with the functional logic of capitalism, which is largely built on the systematic violation of these values. Modern ideologies were used to substantiate hybrid intellectual constructions reconciling Christian principles of charity, equality, brotherhood and mutual assistance with the values of the market, competition, personal success, the endless accumulation of capital and the class inequality of people inherent in the social relations of the era of capitalism. As a consequence, the axiological field of Modernity is characterised by a duality that is not inherent in traditional societies: the gradual separation and autonomisation of private and public spheres in such a way that Christian morality still prevails in the field of private life, while the rules of the public sphere are determined by the more limited pragmatic or utilitarian morality of *homo economicus*.

As an effective strategy for the constant ethical self-correction of Modernity, *theories of justice* are advanced in the field of political philosophy that allow a utopian dimension to be maintained. In terms of theories of justice in modern political thought, the theory *of repair* of late Modernity is gaining popularity in the context of maintaining the legitimacy of the status quo. However, from a future perspective, it is not the discourse of *repair* (J. Alexander), a return to an ethics of virtue (A. Macintyre) or the

preservation of some universal model of Modernity (F. Fukuyama) that is required, but the fundamental ability to construct ever more universal political and ethical grounds for Modernity's existence.

IV

Concerning the continuing internal unity of the political project of Modernity, it is possible to assert its axiological integrity despite (or perhaps because of) the variability of its institutional implementation. Modernity can thus be viewed as an open constructor of values and the various possibilities for their interaction, including institutional. However, the presence of an axiological *interpretation space* neither abolishes the conceptual unity and finality of the value set of Modernity, nor its hierarchical structure. Otherwise, the very confirmation or recognition of the political project of Modernity as *a holistic concept* and/or *phenomenon* would be extremely difficult if not impossible (Wagner, 2008).

In the course of the historical evolution of Modernity, it is possible to observe the successive processes of its disengagement with the European version, which has nevertheless continued to assert itself as canonical and the only correct one in the discourses of colonialist theories *that refer to catching up with modernisation, Westernisation, civilisation* and *transitology*. Postnational Modernity, then, consists in a geographical extension to the whole world of its original European model, which has rid itself of its *particular* cultural and historical content and traditions in favour of political ideas and institutions that have become universal. At the global level, post-national Modernity jettisons its nontransitive, unique features in favour of such properties that are actually universalisable through building on any previous traditions and cultures.

However, while postnational Modernity may be normatively universal, in terms of an institutional plan for the realisation of its value kernel it is quite heterogeneous. This competition of institutional versions of Modernism is a prerequisite for its flexible, non-regulatory and competitive development throughout the world. The non-simultaneous development of Modernity in different parts of the world was conditioned by the fact that, in addition to the European version, all the later versions of the institutionalisation of a modern society already had ready-made models of modernity to which reference could be made in entering into various cultural conflicts and interrelations.

Thus, if the initial cultural-historical nucleus of Modernity was determined by the West, then, concerning the growing cultural indifference of post-national Modernity, it can be subsequently argued to have achieved autonomy from *path dependence* (dependence on the previous development), something that is confirmed by many examples of the effective modernisation of states and regions culturally different from Europe. In searching for the social laws of modern society, the globalisation of Modernity confirms the greater relevance of the formational argumentation approach of the Hegelian-Marxist philosophy of history than the positions of the civilisational theories (Ch. Taylor, S. Huntington, P. Buchanan, J. Thompson, etc.), which emphasise the importance of cultural differences between societies. Moreover, attempts to synthesise the formational and civilisational approaches into a third entity, for example, taking the

form of the *sociocultural approach* embodied by the concept of *multiple modernities* (S. Eisenstadt, J. Arnason, W. Schluchter, B. Wittrock, etc.) are heuristically less satisfactory and methodologically more contradictory (Eisenstadt 2000). The main methodological problem of these theories is that ideas based on the idea of a particular civilisational norm necessarily describe the entire diversity of societies that fit into them only as temporary deviations. As a rule, however, deviations do not disappear in the course of time, but continue to accumulate, while the legitimacy of the norm itself is not questioned, including also for the civilisation that spawned its historical model; nevertheless, it inexorably retreated more and more from it. Undoubtedly, during the expansion and intensification of Modernity there are receding waves and rejectionist reactions to excessively rapid processes of catching up or the authoritarian modernisation of the semi-periphery and periphery of the capitalist world-system. At the same time, it is tempting to counter-modernise these waves and adopt reactionary positions proving the existence of irresistible cultural differences and advocating a return to tradition along with an apologia for the civilisational uniqueness of specific societies, which determines the inapplicability of modern values to them. However, acknowledging the challenges of modernisation is by no means the same thing as repudiating Modernity per se.

The thesis of *multiple modernities* presupposes the preservation of pre-modern cultural differences in the value system of Modernity, turning into a civilisational approach that only uses the modernist conceptual apparatus and rhetoric for its effective refutation. This approach attempts to integrate the universalism of the values of Modernity – the background patterns of human development that go beyond the limit of any civilisation – with the obvious difference between cultural environments and models for their realisation. The vulnerability of the methodological compromise inherent in the concept of *multiple modernities* consists in Modernity in the form of competition between various *cultural programmes* being transformed into an attempt to present some particular societies as *civilisational models* of Modernity, determined by the historical and cultural characteristics of world civilisations. However, this does not mean that Modernity abolishes the historical civilisations that preceded it; on the contrary, civilisations become modern without losing their irresistible cultural differences. Thus, the *multiplicity of modernity* is transformed into a conserved set of civilisations in the era of Modernity, comprising an aggregated set of unconnected modernities.

It seems that in reality the fundamental conflict between Modernity and individual culturally-based civilisations is essentially impossible since under the conditions of modernisation the previous cultural differences invariably depart to the periphery of public life. The cultural norms of Modernity may have first appeared in the West, but this does not by any means imply *colonisation* and *westernisation* when spreading beyond it. However, the acceptance of market values, liberalism, democracy, human rights, progress, etc. is not equivalent to an undermining of the foundations of any non-Western culture: these pose a challenge to *any previous* traditional culture, including those of the Western tradition. Therefore, the increasingly popular *culture-centric* concept *of multiple modernities* results in a fundamental *conceptual stretch* – cultural

factors refer to significant pre-modern differences in human communities, but are unlikely to retain such a form under the conditions of global Modernity (Martyanov 2010). In this context, any culture is important, but cultural versions cannot be considered as dominant explanatory factors within Modernity, whose cultural anamnesis comprises the history of the West, albeit freed from its particularity. It seems that the problem of the influence of cultural factors in the context of global Modernity is more complex. The difficulty lies in the fact that each society seeks to pick up more subtle sociocultural settings conducive to an effective combination of market and state regulation in the implementation of modern values, taking into account the dependence on prior cultural development. Here the adjustment of the cultural environment to the deployment of Modernity in a concrete historical society consists solely in a particular problem that is overestimated *on the increase* and located by the proponents of *multiple modernities* at the centre of their conceptual constructions.

The problem is that the global deployment and intensification of Modernity are carried out under the conditions of *historical non-simultaneity* of different societies. This gives rise to intellectual speculations about the insurmountability of cultural barriers and traditions of different civilisations, although in fact the cultural unity of any modern nation-states was formed simultaneously with their economic and political consolidation and did not precede it at all. Moreover, globalisation processes affecting politics, culture, economy and law in the modern world dominate the secondary reaction to these processes, expressed in attempts at the cultural, ethnic, religious fragmentation of the world. Therefore, drawing on the resources of further development in pre-modern discourses – historical analogies, civilisational approach, traditionalism, fundamentalism and cultural genetics, insurmountable identity or models of ethno-nationalism – appears as an increasingly effective enterprise.

Globalised Modernity presupposes the ability of a particular society to live in accordance with transnational, universal political rules, while still in the process of developing them; to think from universal human positions, taking into account more universal laws and background factors that go beyond the limits of sovereign territoriality and historical national myths to embrace all of humanity. *If the national version of Modernity appears as the institutionalisation of a liberal utopia, then the movement towards a post-national Modernity turned paradoxically not into denial, but a radicalisation of its value bases.* For example, A. Giddens views globalisation as the process of Modernity's axiological radicalisation, encompassing the whole world, as it transitions from its *limited* origins to the *mature* version (Giddens 1990). This transition is characterised by the growing dynamics of social changes and the triumph of individuality, radically exempt from external regulators and expressed by the growth of conscious or "reflective" sociality that comes to replace the social order regulated by society. Globalisation appears as *mega-trend*, increasingly adopting a non-Western view, embracing the world as a whole and challenging the customary system of nation-states.

Global Modernity is less and less consistent with the cultural, geographic and historically classical theories of modernisation, trying to build the universal modernist hierarchy of the world on a global scale, where the countries of the centre of the world system will set the example of the *end of history* for the ever-lagging periphery, which

strives towards capitalism, democracy, nation-state formation, rational bureaucracy, autonomy of the individual, separation of power and property, etc. When common ideological universals are realised in practice in different regions of the world, institutional invariants of the fusion of liberalism, democracy, nationalism and capitalism inevitably arise within Modernity. However, the transfer of the model of a specific national Modernity in an unchanged form to any other sociocultural reality is impossible. For example, political norms in the foundation of a united Europe differ fundamentally and in many respects deny the original principles of the European nation-based Modernity. Therefore, it is inevitable that the organisation of a political society will be transformed into the form of sacralisation of the territoriality of nation-states in favour of more universal projects that presuppose the whole world and all mankind as their place of action.

It seems that the intermediate stage of the movement from nation-states to the global politics of Modernity can be the strengthening of the regulatory role of intercountry associations, for example the European Union, various customs and currency unions, free trade zones, common markets, etc. Thus the axiological and institutional integration of humankind implies a weakening of the geographical and political centre in global politics. The centre will function not as an economic monopoly or a political hegemon, but rather as a place for the accumulation of resources and the imposition of hierarchies and networks across different areas. The centre will be less capable of expressing itself institutionally, but more at the level of general rules and objectives, i.e. axiologically.

V

From the perspective of its further development, the political project of Modernity simultaneously faces significant obstacles and challenges while at the same time its potential for maintaining its global dominance is undiminished. In the context of the complex processes of modern globalisation, one of the key axiological challenges involves the possibility of completing the already existing capitalist world economy to conform to a *world politics*. The increasingly intensive interaction and interdependence of humanity at the global level requires the creation of more effective world political mechanisms for the regulation of issues concerning the interests of mankind as a whole. This problematic preserves the utopian dimension of Modernity, its openness to the future and capability of further value-institutional improvement and dominance in relation to any alternative projects.

Presently, increasingly archaic territorial political institutions govern the economically globalised world. The economic integration of the world has far outstripped the political and ethical. The globalisation of the value bases of Modernity thematises the ethical foundations of the limited interests and strategies of nation-states. Global politics assumes the alignment of the political, economic and legal space of nations, while allowing the maximum cultural diversity: ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. For the first time in human history, global Modernity contains the possibility of creating a global politics in which the political domain loses its external space, i.e. the one that is traditionally populated with potential enemies.

Potentially, any country and any communicative association – even individual people – can become initiators and conveyors of more universal principles of Modernity. In the global political discussion about dominant values players will have a greatly strengthened a priori position who are able to present to humanity the most egalitarian, cosmopolitan variants of solutions for general problems, i.e. those problems emanating from the long-term interests of all mankind and not primarily to the benefit of individual elites, classes, nations or regions of the world. Such idealistic logic does not always bear direct and tangible dividends to the actors and societies that initiate it; moreover, these actors often stipulate material costs that are only paid off symbolically. As, for example, in the case of the USSR, which helped the world national liberation movements and raised its own periphery to the level of the metropolis.

The new task of states that have lost their habitual functional status of key modernisers is not so much the control and distribution of resource flows, but rather the provision of infrastructure to support the necessary conditions for the individual and collective modernisation of society, which is expressed in the concept of the *service state*. Effective connection to global Modernity and the world economy assumes the path *of organic modernisation*. Here the driving force of social changes is associated with the creation of institutional opportunities for expanding the available range of the self-realisation of citizens in the context of the increasing influence of post-material values.

Any nation can improve its position in the world system not only in economic terms, but also in terms of caring about a common future in which there is a worthy place for everyone (Martianov, Fishman, 2010). The future comes first of all as an ethical turn towards a new value system. We do not know what the future will be, but we can know how it should be. Elements of global political ethics are currently being developed in alternative globalisation, communitarian, cosmopolitan, environmental, anarchist and technocratic discourses, including those directed against the costs of the dominant neoliberal model of modern globalisation. In particular, the work of researchers including S. George, A. Buzgalin, B. Kagarlitsky, A. Callinicos, E. Laclau, C. Mouffe, F. Jameson, S. Žižek and others, who advocate alternative mechanisms for the globalisation of Modernity, also obtains a significant ethical charge through its adherence to a neo-Marxist or post-Marxist vision of the globalised world. However, this kind of ethics is typically built on opposition to the secondary costs of globalisation, acquiring the character of extremist endeavours seeking to turn the history of mankind back to some idealised fork at which it left the true path of development, whether that be fundamentalism, terrorism or extremism. In reality, such criticism, exaggerating all the complexity and duality of the development processes of the modern world, only strengthens its objects.

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Historical Responsibility, Historical Perspective

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the problem of understanding historical responsibility in the context of historical perspective. The author questions what makes responsibility historical, in which ways responsibility can be written into a chronology and how the meaning of responsibility should be understood. Based on Agamben's reconsideration of Pilate's trial of Jesus, an analysis of the origins of contemporary dualism in understanding the responsibility of the metaphysical perspective of an unchanging semantic value and the variability of the requirements of contingent situations for the execution of an act is carried out. In addition, the article examines the relationship of responsibility for the past (primarily constituted through the prism of guilt and memory) and responsibility for the future as viewed in an instrumentalist vein and in the context of messianism. Historical responsibility can be conceptualised on the basis of an ontological approach to understanding responsibility (Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, Nancy), according to which the connections of responsibility are not limited to imputations of obligations to recognise guilt, but rely on the fundamental basis of human activity. With this method of consideration, the historicity of responsibility does not lie in the localisation of certain events on time intervals, but rather is seen as the unfolding of the meaning of human deeds, thanks to which people, actions, intentions and ideas are organised into a single historical perspective. Historical relationships of responsibility are not limited by the time, space or social status of people, but are tied by the finitude of the existence of those whom they bind.

KEYWORDS

Responsibility, historical responsibility, past, messianism, history, chronology.

Introduction

Despite its relevance to political discourse, the topic of historical responsibility is not widely covered in contemporary Russian research. As such, it is rarely seen as a topic in its own right, but is instead raised in relation to issues of historical memory or national consciousness. Among recent interesting initiatives in this area, mention should be made of the proposal of the editorial board of the journal Historical Expertise "Global Memory: A Culture of Historical Responsibility in the 21st Century" ("Global Memory", 2016, p. 10). The authors of the programme refer, in particular, to a possible direction for research in terms of an "investigation of the culture of historical responsibility, increasingly expressed in public apologies by political and public figures for crimes of the past" ("Global Memory", 2016, p. 10) and suggest the possibility of "the adoption of the concept of historical responsibility in the political culture of the 21st century" ("Global Memory", 2016, p. 10).

When getting acquainted with the programme, the question arises as to whether such an understanding of historical responsibility is sufficient. After all, in the text presented, it is almost impossible to ascertain who should apologise to whom and for what; likewise, whether other gestures and practices are possible within the framework of a culture of historical responsibility and where is the limit after which sincere regrets and willingness to cooperate turn into mere politeness and cynical calculation? Of course, in this case, the main emphasis is placed on the concept of global memory, compared to which historical responsibility is something of an auxiliary practice: the discussion primarily concerns a project that points out vectors for further research. However, it should be noted that K. A. Pahluk (2016) asks questions similar to those expressed herein, but already applied to the concept of global memory.

Despite the text failing to present a detailed description of the concept of historical responsibility, it becomes clear that the discussion concerns itself with some practices of public acknowledgement of historical guilt and the ability and willingness to participate in discussion and a rethinking of the past. Since the second half of the twentieth century, such practices have increasingly become a "mandatory attribute" of speeches by politicians, heads of corporations or other large organisations that have a rich, but not always untarnished history. In the research literature, these practices have been correspondingly referred to as institutional responsibility (Green, 2002), corporate social responsibility (Frank, Nezhyba, Heydenreich, 2006) and political responsibility ("Thinking Justice after Marion Young", 2013). Admittedly, these all have a broader interpretation and do not revolve exclusively around a concern with formerly committed acts.

Additionally, problems of interaction with the tragic past enter the research interests of many disciplinary areas, each relying on its own conceptual framework and accordingly presupposing the realisation of its own goals and a solution to specific methodologically and theoretically grounded problems. From this point of view, a study can approach these problems e.g. from socio-philosophical, anthropological or even psychoanalytic outlooks. However, a whole series of concepts used in such an examination have no affiliation to any one discipline: this generates many interpretative

discrepancies and rifts and also makes it extremely difficult to describe the root phenomena. The concept of historical responsibility can be counted among these.

The difficulties associated with this concept are enumerated by the following: firstly, the problematic division in understanding moral, legal, political and even theological aspects of responsibility, of which discussion is unavoidable at the same time both as a form of ethical obligation and as a duty (in these sense the boundary between responsibility and accountability becomes blurred); secondly, the need to explain the nature of the writing of responsibility in the historical context. This article sets out to clarify these complexities whose purpose is to consider the very possibility of comprehending historical responsibility from the (same) historical perspective, which suggests tracing the sometimes-complicated relations between history, the temporal direction and the ways of conceptualising responsibility. Since such a trajectory of purpose presupposes the solution of multifaceted tasks, the structure of this article will be organised as follows: starting from the complexities associated with the problematisation of responsibility itself, the two most common ways of measuring responsibility will be considered first, avoiding a division into disciplinary and functional affiliation. Then, problematising the possibility of writing responsibility into the historical context, we consider the sources of the contradiction between a consideration of the eternal and unchanging sense of responsibility and the temporal, circumstantial context of its adoption; we analyse the possibilities of assigning responsibility to a chronological extent. Finally, we will provide a conceptual basis for understanding historical responsibility and its consideration in the context of understanding the future.

However, is it necessary to begin our examination with the question of what constitutes historical responsibility itself? Due to the multifaceted nature of the issues that fall under consideration in this context, it is not a simple matter to find an adequate definition. In this article, the following positions will be supported: Historical responsibility presents itself as a complex social phenomenon, presupposing the forging of such connections about the past, the future, and possibly also with bi-directional relations where the realisation of the past in the present, as well as the formulation of the future as a projection of the past, are implied. They are acted out both by individuals and various communities against a backdrop of feelings of guilt, retribution, repentance or recognition of merit, and are represented (mainly) in narrative, commemorative and political practices. In the context of such relations, the boundaries between individual and collective are often eroded, and legal and moral criteria for assessing unfolding events are problematic. Not only does the study of historical responsibility not fit into any one thematic or disciplinary dimension (as we have already said), it also assumes the free inter-transitivity of various discourses from the position of research.

As we can see from this definition, we do not limit our understanding of historical responsibility solely to practices of repentance and apology, but also include in it representations concerning positive responsibility, which involve the topic of merit recognition and the commemoration of outstanding events and figures. In addition, paying attention to the temporal aspects of responsibility, we propose to examine it in the context of both the past and the future (the need for such aspiration, though

in terms of understanding global memory and the ethics of altruism, is proposed by Sergei Ehrlich (2016).

Two measures of responsibility

Why is the writing on responsibility in a historical perspective a problem at all? This question is by no means absurd in its salience and relevance, despite the fact that it is easy to answer when referring to the superficiality of problems of historical politics and historical soldiers (Miller, 2016; Finkel, 2011).

At the same time, the complexity that is concealed in the very notion of responsibility with this perspective of foresight remains unremarked upon. The fact is that, with regard to responsibility in the context of history and time, we simultaneously oppose (in the act of imputation) and connect (in acts of acceptance and recognition) something immutable and eternal – for example, human rights, with the (quasi) determination of the deeds and actions committed. For example, S. Ehrlich presents a thesis, in agreement with "an ethics of history based on human rights, which in turn are derived from the Promethean pity for people and from Christian love for one's neighbour." (Ehrlich, 2016, p. 21). Considering this statement, it can be assumed that, through responsibility, the diversity of relative values, in the case of the researcher's stated position, could be called egotistical, to be governed by good as absolute debt-love to one's neighbour and compassion towards all men. Such a position, in turn, presupposes the development of a certain system of requirements and prescriptions, pre-emptive, in the case of the future, and being maintained "retroactively" in the case of the past.

However, regarding such a vision of responsibility, it is necessary to make two important qualifications. The first one assumes that we are dealing with the universalisation and absolutisation of certain values, without relating them to the cultural and historical context, both intentional and not (see, for example: Pakhliuk, 2016, p. 36; Guibernau, 2007). In addition, we should not ignore the consequentialist positions that are widespread in environmental ethics, and examine the problem of historical responsibility, for example, in the context of climate change (Jamieson, 2013; Brennan, Lo, 2016). It should be noted that this line of argument can be not only about moral obligation towards the actions of the participants in the situation, but also about giving the absolute value status of the event itself, thus accumulating in itself the completeness of moral mandates. In the modern Russian context, the Great Patriotic War can be regarded as such an event. (In this connection, a body of research has been compiled "Victory-70: Reconstruction of the Jubilee" [2015]).

The second reservation indicates that these perspectives of responsibility are not the only possible ones and that there are approaches – for example, those of Heidegger, Levinas or Nancy – in which neither the correlation of the idea of good nor the universalisation of value is presupposed. Instead, responsibility receives a different, ontological reading, in which it builds upon the initial foundation of basic human deeds and actions, tied to neither the eternal absolute and immutable senses, or to any prescribed practices.

Thus, the very concept of responsibility turns out to be the more complex relative to imputation of obligations and recognition of merit, and acquires two dimensions, one of which is established and functions within the prescriptive systems (mainly moral and legal); the other relates directly to evolution and, therefore, infinitely changing human existence. This division leads to the fact that every discussion about responsibility, like every decision to be made, is built on the interoperability of these two dimensions, which sometimes even contradict each other. In this case, we have not only the factor of difference between moral and legal values, but also the impossibility of examining certain events and deeds adequately. At the same time, such "incommensurable" events become authentically historical for us, as they serve both as an expression and a point of problematisation of historical responsibility. In our opinion, through the source and signification of a similar understanding, a characteristic of the Western way of thinking became the trial of Jesus.

Responsibility: between historical and eternal

In his modest work "Pilate and Jesus," Giorgio Agamben quoting Carl Schmitt remarks that "Christianity is a historical religion, that the 'mysteries' of which it speaks are also and above all historical facts, is taken for granted. If it is true that the incarnation of Christ is a 'historical event of infinite, non-appropriable, non-occupiable singularity', the trial of Jesus is therefore one of the key moments of human history, in which eternity has crossed into history as a decisive point. All the more urgent, than, is the task of understanding, how and why, this crossing between the temporal and the eternal and between the divine and the human assumed precisely the form of *krisis,* that is, of the juridical trial" (Agamben, 2015, p. 2). This specific position is interesting for many reasons, but mainly because it highlights the borderline or crisis event, as the researcher calls it, which, in reality, involves too many fields of social knowledge concepts customary for us and widely used in ethics – above all, responsibility, guilt, history and repentance. Considering the scene of the trial of Jesus, Agamben investigates the origins of the problem present in the Western way of thinking of the nature of inter-transitivity in history and responsibility, within the fullness and complexity meant by the rationale, including the contradictions between universalist ethics and case law.

Indeed, irrespective of what views – religious or atheistic – one adheres to, the irresolvable inter-transitivities between the historical and the eternal, asserted by the researcher, leave an imprint on many customary phenomena and practices. With such an examination of political differences in connection with history, questions of the ethical and legal dimensions of certain events, one's own methods of judging the past or looking at future prospects, determinism and indeterminism, one way or another accompany any assessment – condemnation and sentencing – become an approximate replica of Pilate's court. In other words, concerning extremely important events, those whose relevance and significance are perceived as enduring and endowed with some higher meaning, we find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: how to make a decision about these higher and enduring values using no other tools

than those represented in the contemporary arsenal of legal and moral criteria. In connection with this, questions of who should be held accountable for what and to whom, acquire a new and sometimes paradoxical tone. This situation, for example, is responsible for such painful debates about "ancestral territories", the emergence of national states, political values and the consequences of geographical discoveries, say, in the context of postcolonial research, being made circular and insoluble.

For this very reason, the conversation about historical responsibility turns to considering the book Pilate and Jesus. It is precisely responsibility, despite the fact that this word itself is almost not used by Agamben, that is the only and absolute (absolutely insoluble) content of the unfolding confrontation between the temporal and the eternal, the divine and the earthly. It is very likely that such a view may give the impression of an overly complicated interpretation, though in reality only two "kinds" of obligations for making decisions are being dealt with – secular ones, to which legal criteria are applied, and spiritual ones, viewed from the standpoint of religious ethics. In that case, should these criteria be separated from each other and considered separately?

This is the primary difficulty of our consideration. At first glance, it seems that in both cases it is necessary to follow the traditional logic of reasoning that recognises whosoever is guilty only when a number of conditions are met, and only in connection with the violation of certain regulations or prohibitions alleged by one system or the other (moral, legal, etc.). Of course, from this position, the question of whether it is possible to implicate Pilate in the death of Jesus can be approached. Then one of the possible considerations will be to try to resolve the situation within the parameters of the modern legal discourse of guilt, thus avoiding any reference to the metaphysical context of the problem. But the thesis put forward by Agamben (Agamben, 2015; Dusenbury, 2017) in essence is that Pilate does not make a final judgement on execution (does not pass sentence), and thus the question of legitimising the execution of Jesus from the point of view of the law remains open and the whole situation is insoluble. Moreover, religious methods of determining guilt are also untenable, it seems to the researcher that the ontological foundations of the unfolding evangelical drama are deteriorating: "If Pilate, however, has not handed down a legitimate judgement, the encounter between the vicar of Caesar and Jesus, between the human law and the divine, between the earthly and celestial cities, loses its raison d'être and becomes an enigma. At the same time, every possibility of a Christian political theology or of the theological justification of profane power turns out to fail" (Agamben, 2015, p. 57). In Agamben's narrative, Pilate is portrayed as a man tormented both by his own inability to make a decision and the impossibility of ridding himself of the pressure of circumstances and the demands of the social context to which the trial must conform, and turns out to be "not entirely" responsible if the traditional logic of reasoning is followed.

However, in his criticism of Agamben's research, David Lloyd Dusenbury (2017) argues that Pilate nevertheless passed the verdict; moreover – "This is the tragic interest of Pilate's psychology in the canonical gospels: he declares Jesus to be innocent, but he orders the crucifixion. In terms of Aristotle's *Poetics*, Pilate kills

Jesus like Medea kills her children: *consciously"* (p. 12) (italics are the author's – D.T.). It would seem that the problem is simply resolved, because the main criterion that makes a person responsible – consciousness – is observed. However, instead, the researcher pays attention to another dilemma, interpreting from early Christian texts: "The Roman prefect is neither crazed nor deceived. [That is, regarding an ability to bear responsibility – D.T.] And, because of this, the question – however misdirected – can be raised: is Pilate's decision to crucify the Son of God an act of consummate impiety (since Jesus is not only innocent, but 'the light of the world')[a], or a sign of reluctant piety (since Jesus, nevertheless, '*must* be lifted up' for the salvation of the world)[b]?" (In this passage, the author refers to the Gospel of John. When quoting, these references were designated by us as [a] and [b]. [a]: John 8:12, cf. 12: 34-36, 46. And for "Son of God": John 19: 7; [b]: John 3: 14-15).

When put in this way, the issue of responsibility is radically changed, since it is not the guilt itself that is at the centre, but rather the "quality" of this guilt. Moreover (Agamben also draws attention to this), the messianic character of the decision is highlighted. Then the actions of Pilate are already simultaneously both intentional and predestined, although, this circumstance no longer allows responsibility to be discussed solely in the secular context and with the traditional logic of reasoning. In other words, using the "messianic perspective" interweaves the secular chronology of events into a timeless metaphysical context.

Indeed, therein lies the paradox insists on by Agamben: when we consider Pilate's decision, there is not and can be no responsibility arising without a mutual interweaving and amalgamation of the temporal and eternal. Consequently, it may be noted that it is not the question of whether or not the procurator of Judea was able to render a judgement that is being dealt with, but rather whether or not we ourselves are able to decide on what happened by using this criteria and means. "The hermeneutical canon that we will maintain is, rather, that only as historical character does Pilate carry out his theological function and, vice versa, that he is a historical character only insofar as he carries out his theological function. Historical character [personaggio] and theological persona, juridical trial and eschatological crisis coincide without remainder and only in this coincidence, only in their 'falling together', do they find their truth" (Agamben, 2015, p. 35).

This tension between the historical as temporal and worldly, and historical as eternal, which causes their mutual infiltration of each other, has had a decisive impact on the formation of our modern (Western-style) notion of responsibility, in all its ambiguity and multidimensionality. If Agamben supposes that Pilate's legal decision was necessary for a kind of theological legitimisation, then in our ordinary life we are dealing more with the opposite statement: in order for some legal or moral decision to acquire meaning, it must acquire a "metaphysical" legitimisation within the event. The point, therefore, is not about separating the wheat from the chaff – separating responsibility into faults: moral, legal and political, but about the possibility or impossibility of writing the very principle of responsibility with the inherent articulations of truth and justice in the earth's historical perspective. Such a statement of the question itself is problematic – indeed, what exactly is meant by it?

Responsibility and chronological expanse

The simplest method for understanding history, to which the Agamben interpretation of the trial of Jesus seems to refer, is to present it as a way of isolating relations within an era or event. In other words, a chronology is needed into which some situation are slotted, or vice versa, a chronology is created as a consequence of the situation – different interpretations are possible here. The familiar division of the time of the entire world history into the periods "before the birth of Christ" and "after" is the clearest example of this understanding. But how should historical responsibility be presented? In our opinion, there are two different approaches.

The first will consist in trying to describe the historicity of responsibility, i.e., to construct history of responsibility itself. It could be described as the most traditionally academically. Then we will proceed from the need to write responsibility in the chronology already existing, based on the fact that some ideas and some practices – imputations, recognition, pride, repentance, commemoration or oblivion – will be examined as establishing and transforming in time and space, through eras and cultures. For example, Alexei Miller, in his article "The politics of memory in post-communist Europe and its impact on the European culture of memory" (Miller, 2016) presents the causes, formation and development of two cultures and memory politics at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries each establishing its own understanding of responsibility. Thus, the researcher notes that for Western European countries "the consensus on the Holocaust in itself was of great importance. He excluded the construction of national historical narratives in this part of Europe in which the primary loser would be the titular nation. It was impossible to demand preference, referring to previous suffering. At the centre was the question of personal responsibility – and the measures that should be taken to prevent the recurrence of crimes such as the Holocaust "(Miller, 2016, p. 112). At the same time, Eastern European countries have a completely different understanding of the role of their citizens in the history of the twentieth century and instead of a consensus on common responsibility, their understanding is characterised as "export of guilt" (Miller, 2016, p. 116).

Therefore, in setting the corresponding task, the transformations of responsibility in history will be possible to be described and analysed for trends and divergences from them, in order to emphasise, depending on the chosen approach, some generalising teleological line or the fundamentally random nature of occurring developments, based on for example the methodology of Michel Foucault. Certainly, in this case there is always a choice: either the creation of an individual history of responsibility will be attempted, or – much more difficult – the tracing of a genealogy of responsibility. An obstacle in committing to this trajectory arises after turning to various concepts, historical and philosophical endeavours – or to the archives of quotes and practices: the problem with this practice is that it will scatter the logic of the initially chosen trajectory. In other words, this approach shows how responsibility is constituted in the past – allowing us to identify the various premises for such a constitution, for example, political or economic – but does not say anything about how the chronology itself is constituted through the prism of responsibility.

In this case, we do not mean the problem of giving meaning to the events inscribed in the chronology, which is precisely what this approach aims at solving. As a result, there is always a danger that, starting from some of the most popular ways of understanding the human relation organisation we call responsibility, we will reconstruct the dynamics of this organisation in the past, giving it some arbitrary duration in time and ascribing it meanings common to us in our modern context. In like manner, the history of all things and phenomena can be created. However, in such a history, the crises of the temporal and eternal, deliberate and predestined, legitimate and illegitimate as such are not understood or problematised.

The second way is to try to define some perspective, from which responsibility with an unchanging value throughout time can be discussed, in the same way that some self-same idea or practice places a limit on the extent of the self-evidence of its own value, making any additional attempt towards a "dictionary" definition pointless. So, when it is said that it is impossible to overestimate the significance of the discovery by Fleming of the discovery of penicillin or the discovery of America made by Columbus, it seems to us that it is about the same understanding of responsibility. This understanding allows transitions between the comprehension of responsibility, as relating to private life and the responsibility extended to "wider" communities, to be made – for example, citizens of one state or persons united by a common history.

Indicative in this respect is the text of Vladimir Yakovlev entitled "My grandfather – Chekist and murderer", in which the author shares his experience of his own moral trauma in connection with the discoveries of his family history and encourages readers to responsibly rethink the past, advocating a broadening of all residents' understanding within the country: "We often think that the best way to protect ourselves from the past is not to disturb it, not to dig into the family history, not to dig into the horrors that have happened to our relatives. It seems to us that it is better not to know. In fact, it is worse. Much worse. What we do not know continues to influence us, through childhood memories, through relationships with parents. Simply, without knowing, we do not recognise this influence and are thus powerless to resist it." (Yakovlev). It should be noted that this publication caused two radically different types of reader reaction: a general agreement with the call for responsible rethinking of the past, and radical denial, as well as scepticism about the authenticity of the narrative. In fact, such reactions are both indicative and predictable, since they reflect the poignancy and sensitivity associated with the task of rethinking the history of the twentieth century in contemporary Russian society.

For that very reason, any determination of the meaning, explanation or interpretation of responsibility becomes meaningless: this will only complicate the already developed system of relations, overload it with "superfluous" meanings and confuse both those who make the decision and those who must be held accountable. Let us recall the classic example already given of Eichmann's recognition of moral guilt, but denial of criminal guilt (Arendt, 2006). Pilate's court and all subsequent courts and decisions, becoming milestones in the continuous chronology of mankind's responsibility, no matter whether it is about protecting the environment or about past episodes of injustice, violence or exploitation, address self-evidence, and at the same

time always need to be explained or correlated with the place in time. Derrida saw this problem (with regard to the politicisation of forgiveness), in the following way: "It is between these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be taken" (Derrida, 2005, p. 45).

When referring to this text, in the context of our consideration, it is necessary to pay attention to the following. Listing the various politicised practices of recognising the guilt and turmoil of the traumatic past and substituting forgiveness (that is, practices that most often fall under the definition of historical responsibility), the researcher uses the notion of historical ecology (Derrida, 2005, p. 45). This concept can be useful for understanding historical responsibility because it enables the limitations of the two approaches described above to be overcome. Therefore, if we proceed from the most general definition of ecology as the interconnection of elements with each other and the environment that organises these interrelationships, and depends itself on their organisation (see, for example, Sarkar, 2016), so with such an interpretation responsibility becomes the very method of organising the interrelationships of various elements of history (history as an environment): meanings, people, dates, events, intentions, goals, motives and results, both in the past and in the future. This very way of organising interrelationships is both self-evident and indefinable; the discussion, however, is not about an unchanging meaning, which could also be called substantivisation, at the basis of responsibility, and it is not being attempted here to write some events into the available chronology to the detriment of the rest that do not fit into a predetermined framework. It is noted that the understanding proposed here turns out to be close to the notion of the "signature" proposed by Agamben (2009).

Historical responsibility as the unfolding of meaning

But what is signified by the understanding of historical responsibility as an organisation of event interconnections, people and phenomena? On what principles can this interconnectedness be established? In order to answer this question, we need to turn to an ontological approach to understanding responsibility. In general, this approach assumes that resorting to responsibility not only does not imply the existence of any substantivist understanding, but is born every time from a single, concrete act of human interaction, becoming the very way of realising these interactions (as was noted above, referring to the concept of historical Ecology). (On ontological approaches in the understanding of responsibility, see: Raffoul, 2010). From this point of view, it must be said that responsibility does not arise after the fact, but becomes inherent in the event itself. With this understanding, historical responsibility is not bound by the need to be fully isolated in the existing chronology or completely governed by any external prescriptions and restrictions, say, in space and time. For example, in this context, responsibility could be said to begin at some defined moment in time, and end after the passing of a certain time period, in connection with, for instance, the expiration of a statute of limitations, or in connection with the advent of punishment or in finding those answerable in a different situation of political or legal status (as we can see in the case of criminal liability).

The investigation conducted by Denis Karagodin of the circumstances surrounding the shooting of his great-grandfather, Stepan Ivanovich Karagodin serves as an illustrative example of this position. The researcher established the name and title of all persons involved in this shooting, beginning with those who directly committed the act and those who supported it and ending with the city authorities who signed the death warrant. It should be noted that the progress and results of the investigation were widely covered by Internet publications, and its author started an open Internet page for posting the latest news and updates in the investigation (http://blog. stepanivanovichkaragodin.org/). The interest generated by this story can be explained for several reasons: firstly, clarification of the tragic fate of people's ancestors and the identification of specific culprits has never become a widespread Russian practice; Secondly, in this case it is completely impossible to discuss criminal responsibility in full (following the expiry of the statute of limitation and due to a lack of living culprits). However, the very relations of responsibility themselves do not disappear with time, thus marking events and people included therein.

Of course, in this case it is impossible not to analyse the question of whether such responsibility extends likewise to descendants. Since this topic deserves a separate study, it will not be examined in detail here; it is noted that the discussion in this case cannot be about the responsibility of descendants for the past actions of their ancestors, but instead must concern the responsibility for comprehending and representing the events of the past. It is worth noting that in an interview with channel AT2, on the question of whether he will acquaint the descendants of the accused with the results of the investigation, Denis Karagodin responded as follows: "Descendants (if any) have no obligation towards me and do not owe me anything; the same as I owe them nothing. I do not track them in principle; their appearance in the "study" is always a kind of surplus to requirement – /.../ they are like an echo of an investigative thread – nothing more. /..../ disturbing them is unacceptable – they are not guilty of anything. This is essentially my position" ("To call the names of executioners", 2016).

On November 20, 2016 Denis Karagodin received a letter ("Civil Accord") from the "granddaughter of Nikolai Ivanovich Zyryanov – the executioner of the Tomsk City Department of the NKVD." Expressing feelings of regret and shame over newly discovered facts in her family history, the author of the letter notes: "So now it comes out that in one family there are both victims and executioners ...It's very bitter to realise this, it's very painful... But I will never disown my family history, whatever it may be. Knowing that neither I, nor all the relatives whom I know, remember and love had anything to do with these atrocities that occurred in those years will be a solace to me" ("Civil Accord", 2016). In the responding letter, Denis Karagodin suggests extending a hand of reconciliation and "nullifying the whole situation" by not distributing the tragedy and the blame to the descendants ("Civil Accord", 2016). The new situation of reconciliation must now be built upon the knowledge of past events that have occurred and the principal agreement on their value.

But, in this case, the very situation under discussion about historical responsibility changes, implying that we will consider history itself as responsibility. In this understanding, we again will conceptually proceed from an ontological way

of understanding responsibility. Then, with a similar perspective of examination, the main task of the research becomes not only the analysis of objective facts, dates, conditions, prescriptions and norms, but also the establishment of the ethical nature of current events. This evaluation is a paradox in that the timelessness of the idea of responsibility and the inscrutability of its practices into the existing Earth chronology are deprived of any external criteria for measurement, imputation and evaluation. As such, historical responsibility becomes an insoluble problem, determined only by the connecting objects themselves, primarily people and events.

In the opinion of the researchers, the most appropriate concept of responsibility for this understanding is the concept of "responsibility for existence" J.-L. Nancy (1999). Researcher denied the understanding of the responsibility as some prescription and arguing that "We exist as this responsibility; that is, in Heidegger's words we ek-sist, we are exposed to one another to the world – the world which is nothing but this very exposure. Existence is responsibility for existence" (p. 8). Based on the views of the researcher, it can be said that the very constituting of historicity is no longer an external supplement to responsibility like a predicate, as, for example, a line of chronology or a successively unfolding scientific theory, but becomes the very method of its (responsibility) becoming. At the same time, this becoming is what Nancy himself calls the responsibility of sense, where the sense is "the commitment the several between each other" (Nancy, 1999, p. 8). The researcher notes the fundamental infinitude and untransmissibility of a sense connoting something that has been formed, is already taking place or which possesses substantial completeness. In contrast, Nancy refers to the fact that sense is always expressed through the other, and that this, in turn, depends on the readiness of the person transmitting the thought to always be accountable for it (Nancy, 1999, p. 7; p. 9).

The becoming of sense is in fact, the way in which historical responsibility is phenomenalised in various social practices. The problem of the context of the future, which has hardly been touched upon in this discussion, is indicative of a greater attachment not to predicting the consequences, but towards the meanings that may arise in connection with deeds to be realised in concrete actions or events. True, in this case, we need to pay attention to the distinction between the concept of historical responsibility as the establishment of meaning and messianism, where the latter again refers us to the substantivist notion and the external justifications for history and chronology.

Historical responsibility as an aspiration for the future

The problem of historical responsibility as an aspiration for the future is developed to a lesser degree. Risking the use of the phrase, the imagination of the future, always seems less painful as a rule; therefore, the projection thereof produces a somewhat smaller emotional reaction. We can talk about such methods of presenting responsibility in two ways: the global, which most often involves understanding the responsibility of all mankind (which has already been touched upon in relation to environmental ethics and climate studies), and the local, which tends to be associated more with the notion of messianism. On the notion of messianism, we should examine in a little more detail.

What is messianism? In connection with this discussion, Peter J. S. Duncan offers the most appropriate definition of messianism: "The proposition or belief that a given group is in some way chosen for a purpose. Closely linked to this is the view that the great suffering endured by the group will lead somehow to the redemption to the group itself and possibly of all humanity" (Duncan, 2000, p. 1).

Thus, conversation in the context of historical responsibility can only go so far where obligations are concerned that are accepted by any community for the achievement or establishment of some desired state, say, economic, political, religious or legal, both within itself and other communities. Ideas in the secular variations of messianism, can feature liberal worldviews of permanent revolution, ethnic unification, the construction of an open market, etc. In short, there are many versions, each of which presupposes the establishment of some uniform order, or the formation of social unity, initially based on ontological premises, for example: lineage, the past, or even an idea broadcast in scientific or political theories. At the same time, the task of establishing this order demands the exertion of efforts from a single, "elected" figurehead. (See, for example, Duncan, 2000; Merkel, 2008). For the formation and legitimisation of such concepts, it is necessary to reference historical grounds which may be derived from the declaration of past inherent merits, recognition of their significance (achievements, chosenness, righteousness), greatness and radical difference from other communities, which, therefore, cannot derive such self-positioning. Note that this form of messianism is associated not so much with the figure of the Messiah as with the Mission. The community that has laid such obligations upon itself ascribes characteristics of the Messiah to itself.

But messianism can take a different form, resulting from the recognition of one's own (global, universal) guilt, distributable to all humanity – if the discussion, for example, is about ecological ethics, or the need to preserve the memory of crimes against humanity. In the context of historical responsibility, this approach is manifested not only in religious, but also in purely secular interpretations. The opposite way of interpretation of messianism in this register is becoming obligatory in some communities: ethnic, religious or gender group, etc. where members of different communities represent their tragedy as something unique (Finkel, 2011).

But when it comes to the future, it should be borne in mind that the past, in the context of the event interpretation, can be perceived as an independently operating player, and in its metaphorical form, plunges one into a peculiar eschatology of responsibility, which in an instrumentalised way solidifies into real actions or processes. In this way, for example, we can talk about archives. For example, Randall C. Jimerson (2007) says: "In addition to protecting the rights and interests of all citizens, archives preserve vital aspects of cultural heritage. These dual responsibilities give archivists significant power, not only over questions of recordkeeping in today's society but for future generations. Such power carries an obligation to employ it for positive purposes, as archivists search for a role to play for the benefit of all people in society" (p. 254). However, if above we talked about the link to the past and the events that have already occurred to date, then, with regard to the future, such a linkage disappears. In this regard historical responsibility is viewed as a retroactive act imputing or acknowledging

the imminent pronouncement of guilt; that is, after the execution of certain planned acts as a means to an ends had been achieved.

Conclusion

Thus, in this article, we turned to the solution of a rather difficult task – to study how historical responsibility is conceptualised in the historical perspective. The very formulation of such a task, as well as the body of problems, issues and contradictions that had to be tackled during our consideration, showed the fundamental non-localisability of the problem of historical responsibility in some separate disciplinary and discursive boundaries, as well as its fundamental irreducibility to a limited set of practices. This means that we are dealing with a way of organising some people, events and phenomena into a single semantic field, the parameters of which are simultaneously mobile. Moreover, now we can say that the writing of responsibility in the historical perspective does not mean how it should be expected, nor the fulfilment of an act of methodological reduction, or the fixing of certain events as points on the time scale. On the contrary, historical responsibility is nothing other than a meaningful unfolding and becoming of this very historical perspective, which covers looking back or seeking to look ahead, beyond the horizon of events, we conceive and cast our obligations into eternity.

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In recent years, the irrationality of political actors and their choices has become a central preoccupation of researchers who analyse political events. In Russia, these are increasingly at variance with the calculated scenarios and ideas concerning common values that have developed in the West. The "Brexit" vote for Britain's withdrawal from the EU and the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election forced analysts and researchers to rethink the assumption that influences on people's emotions are not a significant component of ideologies. In this connection, "Post-truth", the latest buzzword in political rhetoric, refers not to facts and logic, but rather to personal emotions that ignore counterarguments; "post-truth" verities are instead constructed around the ritual repetition of certain phrases.

In this situation, all attempts to understand politics and ideology as rational phenomena are perceived sceptically, if not ironically. Despite this, the authors of this monograph rely on the notion that ideologies are aimed at *legitimising* permissible violence through appeals to *consciously* held common values and are backed up with actions *commensurate* with these values. In the case of the study of the ethics and politics of modern Russia, this methodological move unexpectedly turns out to be justified.

For the authors, Russia appears as one of several possible configurations of a contemporary society. However, when considering it in the context of global

contemporaneity, it is not possible to lay bare ideologies and their corresponding institutions, but only to expose the fault lines in the value system and political framework. In the introduction to the monograph, it is suggested that the relevant common values for contemporary Russia consist in notions of a "desirable present and future [...] for humanity as such" (p. 14). In particular, these include concern for the future and the ethics of trust. But if Russia, according to the authors, is to take increasingly peripheral positions relative to global contemporaneity, are there any domestic ideologies with the capability of carrying the ethical ideals of a common future for humanity, or are we here purely dealing with speculation? To answer this question, it is necessary to turn immediately to the third part of the monograph, which studies the appropriation in Russia of ideologies that were formed as part of a widely understood European political process.

The first two parts of the monograph are devoted to the theory of ideologies, allowing the authors to place the ideological development of Russia in a global context. The history of the development of the ideologies of modernity is reprised. The securing of individual human freedoms is seen as a reference value around which the liberal consensus of modernity is constructed. Turning to the subjects of the history of the 20th century, the authors show how liberalism became a meta-ideology, which, by entering into alliances with conservatism or socialism, softened the forms of left and right radicalism. The various crises in the project of modernity are associated with the inability of this fluid consensus to recast political arguments in the face of social transformations. Investigating the features of neoliberalism that accompany late modernity, the authors consider first of all the institutional consequences of the introduction of the model of the "economic man" into the ideological value kernel. The substitution of the concept of the public good with its economic derivatives and the creation of an "ideology of the propertied" receives sharply critical treatment in the monograph.

The chapters of the first two parts partially overlap each other in terms of content. The line of argument concerning theses of rootedness of ideologies in morality, the inhumanity of neoliberalism and the inadequacy of the postmodern idea of the "end of ideologies", is thoroughly discussed. However, the new formats of collectivity and their value bases are given little attention. The tendency to more distinctly designate the generality of the theoretical positions of the authors leads to key ideas being systematically repeated and the monograph becoming in places more like a textbook. Particularly suitable for educational purposes are chapters 2.2 "Ideologies of Modernity in the Structural and Functional Perspective" (a variety of ideologies is clearly presented in tables and diagrams) and 2.3. "The Concept of Ideology in the Second Half of the 20th to the Beginning of the 21st Century: from the End of Ideology to its Global Return" (the concept of ideology is presented as a necessary element of the modern era; the idea of the end of ideology is considered alongside the critique of this position in the work of F. Jameson).

Perhaps, of all the theoretical texts of the monograph, the one that is freest from repetitions and most frankly expresses the general values of the authors is chapter 2.4, in which the advantages of communitarianism as a contender for meta-ideology

are described. The hope is expressed that the communitarian turn will be adopted in Russia, since it "does not infringe upon the national sentiment", allowing us to move from the logic of catch-up modernisation to an ideological common space in which a new world system can be created.

An investigation of the grounds for the communitarian turn in Russia is to be expected in the third part of the monograph, which deals with contemporary domestic ideologies. But the pathos of the movement towards communitarianism is stymied in its first appeal to Russian political discourse. V. Martianov considers the rhetorical reinforcement of various anti-modern steps of the authorities in some detail. Promising stability for a share of rent, the anti-modern consensus consolidates Russia at the periphery of contemporaneity. Conversations about non-economic values turn out to be speculation to the extent that they are not supported by institutional changes. The author retains the hope of overcoming this peripherality through "political and ethical projects and approaches that claim to be more universal, appealing to the more egalitarian future of all mankind" (p. 186).

The second chapter elucidates the metaphor of "spiritual bonds". L. Fishman points to the lacuna between the rhetorical figure that refers to a religious conception of spirituality and the hidden request for modernisation. The appearance of this metaphor is interpreted as an attempt by the authorities to create a value basis for capitalist development. Here the request for social capital, which is a necessary component of modernisation processes, comes into conflict with the logic of raw capitalism. It is suggested that the anti-capitalist premise of the "spiritual bonds" formula can be deciphered in terms of civic virtues. The author distinguishes the secular term "morality" and the religious term "spirituality", showing how an attempt to conflate them into one metaphor leads to the emergence of an ideological tool for consolidating the existing political order. Consequently, the task of developing social capital remains unresolved. In the following chapter, Y. Startsev explores how the metaphor of neo-feudalism is used when describing Russian realities. It is hard to know whether it is simply intended to shock or rather as a means of expanding upon contemporary processes that cannot be described in other research languages. The author offers an open list of topics for which the optics of neo-feudalism may be productive. Recognising its high methodological potential, the author confines himself to examples of individual phenomena that acquire a new signification if thought of as neo-feudal.

Also functioning as a metaphor is the idea of the "Soviet past". M. Ilchenko argues that this metaphor is not applicable as a methodological tool for humanitarian research since the concept of "Soviet" is significantly blurred and the "past" is often confused with the "present". In contrast, when used as a rhetorical device by political authorities, it works productively since it allows significant political tasks to be solved through addressing collective emotions. Firstly, the legitimisation of power since the 1990s and up to the present day has been constructed by means of a transformation of emotional attitudes towards the "Soviet past". Secondly, the metaphor becomes a source of different (often opposing) meanings for filling an empty axiological or ideological field. The study of statements made by presidents of the Russian Federation and symbolic organisation of contemporary state holidays allows us to make the move

from analysing political discourses to a consideration of the collective unconscious. However, the author dwells upon the statement that a thorough understanding of the Soviet past is yet to be achieved.

In the fifth chapter, I. Fan discusses the notion that a lack of reflection on its own past may be what is preventing Russian society from breaking out of the resource state trap. Developing the analysis of political culture within A. Etkind's conceptual framework of internal colonisation, the author focuses on the relations of the "colonialists" with the "natives" and on the forcible displacement of borders. The rhetoric of ideologists close to the top leadership is considered alongside some works of literature and cinema in terms of carrying nationalistic and militaristic ideas into the mass consciousness. The author does not provide any positive examples of new cultural forms by which society comprehends itself. At the same time, it is to precisely such cultural forms to which the texts of the researchers, whose rationalisations support the argumentation of the original author's thesis, relate. Thus, it becomes impossible to raise the question of how the anti-modern discourse can be transformed.

The shortcomings of the rhetoric of threats and violent changes are explored in the next chapter in terms of their conformity to the global context. V. Martianov contrasts soft hegemony (means of creating attractiveness) with the politics of hard power (instrumentality of military-economic pressure). The author reprises the main positions of supporters of the theory of soft hegemony. It is argued that political elites of different countries need to cultivate openness and trust, since, in the post-industrial world, the attractiveness of a society is made up of the combined efforts of each participant. The readiness of the Russian elite to take a step towards openness and learn to use soft power to advance the interests of the state on the global agenda is viewed sceptically.

In the seventh chapter, K. Kiselev addresses a typically pessimistic contemporaneous agenda. According to the logic of modernism, all predictions of the end of history, economic collapse or environmental disasters are transformed into growth points. The author shows that, in the case of Russia, this mechanism does not work. The analysis of everyday ideas about the fundamental orientations of human existence, i.e. space and time, shows that pessimism is reinforced by daily practices, whereas modernistic optimism is emasculated to cheers and patriotic slogans. In a situation where all greatness is located in the past and the normal achievements of modernity (from civil rights to everyday comforts) are still a matter of the distant future, the present is eternally hopeless. The vast Russian expanse translates into everyday life as poverty; its state of disorder is justified by its scale and climate. This pessimism, which covers all of the conceivable space of Russia as well as its entire foreseeable future, serves to block possibilities for its modernisation.

The attempt to escape from pessimism is discussed in the subsequent chapter on the example of fantastical literature. L. Fishman sees political science fiction as mirroring the last three, post-Soviet decades. Three ways of responding to ideological constructs are coherently discussed: revanchism-revisionism (in texts that can be conditionally combined as utopias), humanism (in anti-utopias) and social constructivism (in the stories of contemporary people who have fallen into the past). The question of how

contemporary people will construct ideologies in reality, rather than in fictional worlds, is deferred to the following chapter.

Both mythological and reactionary ideas about the desired future are found not only in fantasy literature, but also in reality. The problematic of the third part of the monograph is again concentrated on details concerning the anti-modern consensus. It is shown that legitimisation of permissible violence is carried out by the authorities with the help of "protective logic", which, in turn, requires the idea of nationalism. Post-Soviet variants of ethno-nationalistic ideologies are criticised by the author as neither being able to unite within a shared set of common values, nor to conclusively defeat other ethno-nationalisms, for example, Ukrainian. The paradoxical Soviet version of "nationalist internationalism" is seen as a possible source of a new ideology: in the Soviet era, there were enough achievements to be used as the basis for constructing a national myth. It remains an open question whether this strong – albeit compromised – source is likely to be used.

Summing up the research of ideological discourses in modern Russia, L. Fishman, the editor of the monograph, traces value transformations in Russian society achieved through changes in the symbolic messages of Victory Day. Victory as an archetype presupposes a confrontation in which the currently existing carrier of ideas has prevailed over other subjects and ideas. The fact that the victories of post-Soviet Russia are not connected with August 1991 (victory over the *putschists*), October 1993 (shelling of the parliament), June 12, 1990 (Independence Day) or December 12, 1993 (day of the Enactment of the Constitution), makes it possible to suspect political elites of impotence.

The ten studies of modern Russian ideologies presented in the third part of the monograph consist primarily of research simulations. Unlike the plastic liberal consensus, at the core of which it is possible to identify stable basic values, anti-modern discourses are fragmentary and negative. Of course, liberalism can consist of nothing more than moralising (which is also happening in Russia and is indicative of the attempt to treat civil virtues as "spiritual bonds"). Even if one accepts the theory of Russia's special path, neither its nationalistic justification nor the idea of resurrecting Soviet-inspired premises correlates with real infrastructural changes, and, in this sense, cannot be considered in ideological terms.

In analytically following the political changes, the third part of the monograph is more focused on addressing what ideologies are not and why. The presented studies of the paradoxes of authoritarian rhetoric provide a contour outline of the discursive traps that can impede modernisation. In the longer term, the results of this complex collective work make it possible to take one more step – towards an effective study of the mechanisms that support a non-critical attitude to political decisions or create the (mere) appearance of a "community" in the understanding of values. In this sense, the third part of the monograph will be of interest to researchers attempting to understand irrational mechanisms of contemporary politics.

In general, the monograph is of a theoretical character. Chapters that manage to avoid a long digression into the history of concepts are few and far between. For those who only wish to get acquainted with the theory of ideologies and criticism of

neoliberalism, this is a source of concentrated information, referring to the landmark works of I. Wallerstein, F. Jameson, D. Harvey, L. Boltanski, E. Chiapello and others. Following the logic of critical theory, an analytical investigation of the established order will necessarily involve a call for the creation of a new order. The communitarian turn and consequent possibility of going beyond the neoliberal logic of the late contemporaneity is explored only at the theoretical level, as a possible but not obligatory response of the fragmented societies of the Russian Federation to the anti-modern consensus imposed by the authorities.

Olga Shaburova. Sovetskii mir v otkrytke [The Soviet World in Postcards] (2017). Moscow-Ekaterinburg: "Kabinetnyj uchenyj"

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Contemporary humanitarian studies sometimes resemble current artistic practices. Both artists and scholars select as their object the exploration of uncontemplated phenomena and subjects. Thus, as early as the 1970s, Vadim Siddur transformed a shapeless heap of scrap metal into the face of Einstein; when, several years ago, the street artist Pasha 183 placed the memorial poster "All remember. All mourn" on the window of the "*Akademkniga*" bookshop in Ekaterinburg, which was no longer functioning at the time, his gesture became a kind of requiem for the community of scholars and students who met at the checkout, united by their love of books in the unique environment provided by this shop in the university city.

In her topic for scholarly analysis, Olga Shaburova selected something originally costing no more than a kopeck, something that people (some with regrets and others without compunction) took for recycling, or retained in family archives as memoirs of the past, something without which it is impossible to imagine any Soviet family. We are talking, of course, about handwritten postcards.

The postcard is seen as an important symbol of the Soviet way of life; the ritual of writing postcards – as an integral part of the Soviet order, a special communication through which the public and private spheres are brought into a state of desired harmony.

The author promptly explains that, in considering the postcard as an agent that has absorbed the visual symbols of the Soviet era, not all its axiological and symbolic resources can be revealed.

Shaburova's book recalls the popular science film, a cinema genre developed and popularised during the Soviet period. This was a rather complex genre inasmuch as it was not always possible to transform scientific knowledge into an art form. In successfully incorporating the rich graphic material (hundreds of

everyday Soviet life. Since the potential readership of the book is wide, the author has managed to keep a balance between purely scientific and informational discourses. Capturing the phenomenon of the postcard requires dual encoding for the two surfaces – postcards) into a scientific framework, the author has relied on research in the field of social philosophy – in particular, the concept of everyday life – thereby expanding the research field of picture and greeting text – representing two different information sources: the generic stock imagery and the individual private messages.

Although in terms of type of communication and decorative and applied arts genre, the birth of the postcard had already taken place at the end of the 19th century, the author limits the subject of research to the Soviet period – specifically, the period from the 1950s to the 1980s. The term "Soviet world" acquires a literal as well as figurative meaning [translator's note: the Russian phrase "*Sovietskiy mir*" can be translated as either "Soviet world" or "Soviet peace" – *Pax Sovietica*]. *Pax Sovietica* refers to the time of peace after World War II, following the Twentieth Congress of the Party and leading up to the late Soviet period. With its diverse institutions, commonality and disciplinary practices, the Soviet world encompassed particular communication forms. After all, despite its ideological unity, the Soviet world was highly varied if only because of its multi-ethnic character. And here immediately it is desirable to learn from the author: was the specific national character traced in the outer and inner sides of the postcard or did these differences reside only in the language of the message? The Soviet greeting cards differed from those of the other socialist countries, in a way that, for example, the newsreels of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and others, which wholly reduplicated Soviet newsreels, did not.

The book draws attention to the fact that the postcard boom coincides with the "thaw" and ensuing late Soviet era. This is understandable, since it was during these periods that the burgeoning interest in private life, which is expressed marvelously in the literature and poetic cinema of the "thaw" period, was taking place. However, the author shows how the value of private life (a postcard is an open, private message) is correlated with ideological messages concerning power relationships. Indeed, in order for the postcard to enter into everyday customary life, it was necessary, at least, for it to have been produced in large editions with a certain specified iconography. And here the author provides stunning gigantism of numbers (for example, the printed output of the postcard artist Zarubin during the 70s-80s totaled 1,588,270,000 copies). Thus it was that a minimal private missive came under the close attention of the authorities; in referring to the 1953 decision of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the improvement of the mass media of graphic art products and literature according to artistic criteria", and on the Council of Ministers' decision, which adopted in 1966 a resolution "On the expansion of the production of high-quality color postcards and art books", the author shows how design affected the officially promulgated system of values.

Thus, postcards are issued, their quality improves with their diversified subject matter, and, once transformed into a mandatory ritual of Soviet life, the practice of writing, sending and receiving postcards acquires the character of everyday practices. Indeed, recalling my own childhood and youth, I can admit that in our family the topic of the necessity to buy cards for the upcoming holidays was regularly discussed. The

phenomenon of the postcard is curious in the fact that it combines the everyday and the festive. The routine of writing text messages and the cyclicity of the correspondences was connected with the desire to produce a new kind of quality. The author examines the canon of writing the text, in which the official is adjacent to the private. All postcards conform to a two-part form – "holiday congratulations and wishes"; this is the name of the first chapter of the book, in which the postcard is compared with the form of the poster. The dominant heroic discourse of the poster is lyrically complemented in the postcard; in the postcard, the admonitory tone characteristic of the poster will be replaced by one simulating free choice.

The ritual greeting is seen in terms of a mass communication practice, in which power-related problems for the organisation and consolidation of the axiological construction of the Soviet world are combined; this takes place according to the Soviet festive calendar, e.g. "November holidays", New Year, "May holidays". Postcards also refer to the emergence of new holidays – Day of the Soviet Army, International Women's Day on 8 March, and, from 1965, Victory Day. People voluntarily took on board the prerogatives of power and authority, converting them into personal stories expressed in postcard texts.

Olga Viktorovna considers the practice of postcard holiday congratulations following Yurchak's definition of the "endorsed ritual" (Yurchak 2014). Is the author interested, as an individual, in "breaking through" into the mechanically-induced behaviours? In exploring greeting texts, we find ourselves witnessing the emergence of the personal. As a rule, official congratulations on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet army, May Day or the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution were supplemented by a set of stories about health, illness, consumer victories or defeats (about the carpet her husband did not like, about the great piece of luck on the purchase of a "gift for a first grader", or the inability to "obtain" a Voskresenskaya primer). The study of greeting texts reveals a hierarchy of material wealth: the first priority is to obtain an apartment, then a TV then a refrigerator.

The author explores the postcard messages so passionately and enthusiastically that she sometimes loses the sense of distance, not noticing that these texts contain a lot of clichés and stereotypes. There is an idealisation of the process of writing holiday congratulations, which does not take into account the fact that writing such greetings was very often a formalised ritual.

The second chapter, entitled "Glory to Labour: Soviet matrix", marshalls a huge quantity of graphic material to examine the ideological dominance of greeting cards, showing how the official rhetoric of labour achievements, struggle and progress is transformed into personal, joyful, festive stories.

The studies of a number of different representations of socialist labour allow us to discover in them the characteristics of festive activities. Firstly, socialist labour is understood as free labour, not in the sense of individualistic liberalism, but rather in terms of harmonious unity with the team. Secondly, it is this feeling of harmonious unity that led to a positive emotional effect. On holiday pragmatics, Gadamer pointed out: "The essence of the holiday is not only in its separation from the ordinary, and not only in aimlessness and unconcern, which is anticipated and enjoyed – in the holiday

there is also a certain **positive** content" (Gadamer 1991, p. 157). Arkadii Eremeev also wrote on the positive leitmotiv, understanding the holiday "as the production of happiness, positive emotions, as well as harmony, optimal conditions, additional enjoyment, pleasure, etc." (Eremeev 1997, p. 189). It is this specifically this labour, having not only a utilitarian but also a symbolic component that was necessary for the realisation of the socialist project.

Leisure activities (having a bourgeois character) were replaced by non-alienated labour; moreover, primarily, by hard, uninterrupted physical work ("Saturdays" and "Sundays" at weekends), but it is precisely such a way of life that should be realised as something desirable (holiday). People who lost their jobs during the collapse of the USSR retained this basic attitude. For example, in the video film by Leonid Tishkov, constituting one of the parts of the project by the artist about the *Verkhoturye* skate factory (Art Residence II Industrial Biennale), an employee acknowledges that "going to work was a holiday and going home was not always what you wanted."

In order to construct a new type of everyday life ("festive everyday life"), it was not only political means that were used, but also artistic – posters, newsreels and postcards. In contrast to the above-mentioned means, the postcard is relatively democratic; the communications it conduces are mainly private in nature and its public is broad. It is a consequence of the special aesthetic form that the representations of work activities portrayed on postcards have a festive character.

Joy in labour in terms of creativity and making was an integral leitmotiv value for the Soviet citizen. However, the post-Soviet citizen is more likely to refer to work simply in terms of necessity: as noted by D. Bykov, "to glorify the process, it is all the same whether one glorifies alimentation or defecation, since all three components of the cycle (labour – consumption of its products – output of secondary product) are, in general, immanent and rather coarse features of human nature" (Bykov 2014). But, on the other hand, continues the author, "it turns out that labour involves self-hypnosis of the very highest order. What kind of plot of land, ploughed by you personally, inspires you to think about your own power ... What is even fear of destitution – the main fear of the Soviet population during the transition – partly overcome by labour, moreover, by normal, systematic labour" (Bykov 2014).

The iconography of labour receives a variety of interpretations in the Soviet postcard: firstly, industrial-construction symbolism; secondly, rural labour; thirdly, various professional holidays; and finally, the benefits of labour to children. Images of work processes are presented in the main types of postcards – November holidays, New Year, International Women's Day, and, of course, May Day. The frequency of images of various objects of labour turns out to be representative. So, the champion in terms of the number of "visual references" in the postcards becomes the crane, a new vertical of Soviet life: it is construction cranes and tower-blocks on the shop floor as well as cranes outside of construction projects, generally expressing the idea of construction as the main leitmotiv of Soviet post-war life. If in the 30s, industrialisation found its visual expression in the form of tractors and tractor-drivers (viz. the 1939 cult film "The Tractorists" [*Traktoristy*] by I. Pyr'ev and the song "Give us a ride on the tractor, Petrusha" [*Prokati nas, Petrusha, na traktore*]), then, in the 60s, the place occupied

by the tractor was taken by the "high-riggers". Postcards apparently complement the popular song "We are not stokers or carpenters" ["*Ne kochegary my, ne plotniki*"] from the 1957 Aleksander Zarkhi's movie "The Height" ["*Vysota*"]. The postcard unwittingly served as a navigator in the world of working professions – plumbers, masons, welders, metallurgists and surveyors looked at the Soviet man, inviting the worthy to celebrate the New Year and the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The journey through professions was not limited to the city either – the rural working life was transformed into an aesthetic form of a card in a holiday greeting card that looked at combine drivers, breeders, growers and jolly farmers returning from haymaking. Naturally, after April 1961, a new hero emerged – the astronaut.

Separate chapters are devoted to the analysis of the iconography of cities, in which the urban environment appears like a Renaissance landscape through the window, to postcards about friendship and love; in a word, outgoing paper with a sad figure of a postman.

And although I do not always agree with the author's nostalgia for the Soviet world as a constructive life practice, one thing that is placed before us in an excellent design performance new slice of everyday life, which Baudrillard (one of Shaburova's favourite authors) referred to as the mythological subject, minimally functional and "most significant".

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