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Aims and Scope:

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. *CS&P* examines how rapid societal-level changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- moral reasoning and behavior;
- variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- social exclusion and inclusion;
- post-secular religious individualism;
- tolerance and merely "tolerating": their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.

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EDITORIAL

The Mole of History Burrows His Way ever Forward and Upward

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Transformations and transitions inevitably accompany the history of humankind. Looking backward at different periods of this course, we come to recognize those initially invisible symptoms that gradually merge together and eventually lead to tectonic shifts; as a result, a new social reality emerges. But do we think at such moments about how these subtle and seemingly unimportant marks could affect people's daily lives? Do we understand how changing circumstances make people first to convince themselves that nothing special is happening, but then gradually force them to radically change their beliefs and habits? The world today is undergoing the period of widening uncertainty due to the conflicts, which we all are witnessing; in any case, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the world will not return to its previous state. No one knows what the relations between countries, peoples, and individuals will look like in the future. We can only observe and try to trace the direction of "the old mole" that burrows deep into the soil of history, digging ever forward and upward—a metaphor of the spirit of history used by Hegel and Marx. In other words, although the logic of historical transformations remains obscure, changes are gradually accumulating, eventually revealing their essence to individuals and societies as a whole. The articles in this issue of *Changing Societies & Personalities* shed some light on the internal causes of these transformations, considering their inevitable effect on the lives of a wide variety of people.

In the ESSAY *Ordoliberalism Revisited,* Thomas F. Remington undertakes two tasks: first, to clarify the concept of ordoliberalism—a legal and economic theory originated in the 1930s at the University of Freiburg, Germany, which still remains relatively unknown outside a few scholarly circles. Second, to consider what influence this concept had on German policies and institutions following World War II, presuming that a better understanding of ordoliberalism can be helpful in the contemporary debates about the crisis of liberal democracy and

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capitalism. Remington argues that "for the ordoliberals […], a market economy where the state protected individual freedom by ensuring competition and preventing the rise of concentrated market power was the only guarantee both of economic prosperity and elementary social justice". Consequently, the ordoliberals emphasized that the market economy must serve not only efficiency, but also social justice and society as a whole, not the other way around; for them, the basis of morality was freedom. Remington stresses: "It is regrettable that the architects of market liberalization in Russia and other post-communist countries never took Germany's postwar reconstruction as a source of usable ideas", and the state is responsible for forming and enforcing a competitive order, which is a basis for economic and political freedom.

Konstantin F. Zavershinskiy and Alexander I. Koryushkin in the ARTICLE *Political Socialization in a Changing Society: A Crisis of Value Orientations or Asynchronization of National Memories?* address the need to analyze the emerging qualitative changes of societal cohesion and civic identification. According to them, "the rapid destruction of hierarchical distinctions between the world of 'the youth' and the world of 'the adults' further complicates intergenerational relations and increases the degree of their variability and arbitrariness". Today, the development of digital technologies, which signify the emergence of a new economic and political order, forces younger generations to "fluctuate between apolitical consumerist survival strategies and occasional flares of violent anarchical protests". The authors explore the reasons for the differences in value-normative positioning of the "younger" and "older" generations, which are substantively novel and need to be theoretically and methodologically explicated. They focus on young citizens from mid-teens to mid-twenties, and formulate the following research questions: What theoretical and methodological models of youth socialization are in use by contemporary researchers? What are the strategies for dealing with them? What is the role of symbolic structures of contemporary political memory, especially of the national memory legitimation profiles, in youth socialization?

The ARTICLE *Digital Fears Experienced by Young People in the Age of Technoscience,* by Sofya B. Abramova, Natalya L. Antonova, Riccardo Campa, and Natalia G. Popova is focused on digital fears and anxieties. The authors substantiate the relevance of studying their specific forms reflected in the minds of young people, as well as of outlining approaches to their social diagnostics, prevention, and therapy. In the article, a sociological analysis of fears of young people under the conditions of digitalization of all spheres of social life is presented. Fear is defined as a complex social phenomenon, which has cultural roots and affects social behavior and social life: "Fear is an inbuilt instinct that serve important survival functions […], e.g., the activation of defensive responses […] that encourage an individual to overcome stress and accomplish goals". The analysis is based on a sociological survey among young residents (in total, 1,050 aged 18–30) of the Sverdlovsk region, Russia, conducted in November–December, 2020. The typology includes the following types: fears of social rejection; of loss; of decision-making; of publicity; of various categories of people; postmodern fears; etc. The authors conclude that fear can be referred to as a distinctive characteristic of the social well-being of the youth, and address their recommendations to political representatives and civil society leaders.

In the ARTICLE *From Uncertainty to Trust: COVID-19 Pandemic Responses of South Korea and Sweden,* Andrey V. Rezaev, Natalia D. Tregubova, and Anastasia A. Ivanova argue that such epidemiological situations as the pandemic of COVID-19 pose a significant threat to the manageability of the population in modern states (regardless of their degree of democracy or authoritarianism). That is why "the widespread introduction of lockdowns as a regulatory method during this pandemic could be associated with the need to preserve an understandable and quantifiable management object". Based on an analysis of the data provided by national governments and international organizations, and using the approach of Swedish sociologist Apostolis Papakostas, who regards trust/distrust as an organizational and relational phenomenon, the authors consider, analyze, and compare two different cases of lockdown policies: those implemented in South Korea and Sweden. The main focus in the article is on the following two questions: (a) how do South Korea and Sweden construct their populations as a quantifiable and predictable object of regulation in the times of COVID-19 by using online technologies to control the population? (b) have South Korea and Sweden managed to establish trust in their relations with their populations and other states in coping with the pandemic?

The concept of sustainable development has been at the forefront of global discussions for over 30 years. In the ARTICLE *Sharing Economy and Social Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development*, Evgeny V. Popov, Anna Yu. Veretennikova, and Kseniya M. Kozinskaya outline various directions for achieving and maintaining a certain level of sustainable development: direct investment in social initiatives, responsible business conduct, corporate social responsibility, quality management of goods and services produced according to modern standards. The authors examine some models "in terms of their similarity and suitability for stimulating sustainable development". Two hypotheses are put forward: (a) sharing economy and social entrepreneurship can be used as alternative socio-economic models for sustainable development of a society; (b) the use of digital technologies in projects of the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship stimulates sustainable development. Based on a semantic analysis of websites of 20 sharing organizations and 20 social entrepreneurs, the authors verify whether these models may form a basis for sustainable development in the future.

The ARTICLE *Factors Determining Child Labor: Empirical Evidence from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan*, by Sikandar, Sanaullah Panezai, Shahab E. Saqib, Said Muhammad, Bilal, and Imran Khan argue that the primary determinants for child labor are poverty, income level, migration, education level, and family size. The authors focus on the situation in Pakistan and stress that, due to the geographical and cultural differences among its provinces, the determinants of child labor differ from one region to another. The specificity of the study is based on ranking the factors responsible for child labor. The developed conceptual framework considers (1) demographic factors (parents' age, education, family size, the number of dependent family members); and (2) economic factors (family income, father's occupation, and household assets) of child labor. The study was conducted in two Pakistan districts: Mardan (2.3 million inhabitants) and Nowshera (1.5 million) situated in the central

zone of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The respondents represented 200 households, in which children were involved in child labor.

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of writing on the meaning of home within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, psychology, human geography, history, architecture, and philosophy. Mojtaba Valibeigi, Sakineh Maroofi, and Sara Danay in the ARTICLE *Forgotten Territories in the Iranian Home: Issues of Segregation,* note that "critical studies into the material realm of this concept indicate that home is created by numerous cultural, economic, and social factors". The authors formulate the research question as follows: How the traditional culture of the Iranian home, including the concepts of sanctity and privacy, may lead to segregation and gender discrimination? They respond to that question using space syntax criteria as a way to analyze spatial configurations and the organization of spaces in buildings and settlements. The authors consider the syntax of home in relation to three factors: (a) activities, values, and goals (the pattern of daily activities); (b) physical characteristics (dividing of spaces, separations, sizes and positions, decorations, etc.); (c) communication (level of relationships in different spaces of the house, which includes a range of semi-public, semi-private, and private spaces in the house).

Andrey B. Berzin, Aleksey V. Maltsev, and Natalia A. Zavyalova in the ARTICLE *Conceptual Framework of Teacher Prestige and Well-Being: Regional Aspects* study the challenges faced by teachers in the contemporary world: job satisfaction, professional well-being, career development, and, in particular, credibility crisis. According to the authors, "no longer can a teacher be expected to be the only source of information, the bearer of the highest wisdom or someone whose ideas are not subject to criticism". They note the growing contradictions between the creative nature of teaching and the ever-increasing regulation of the teacher's actions; the need to improve professionalism and competence levels given a lack of time resources; the gap between declarations of a high vocation of teaching and low social status; the increased contradiction within the teaching community between highly motivated professional teachers and those who only go through the motions of fulfilling their duties. The authors seek to identify the attitudes of teachers, students, and students' parents toward the teaching profession, as well as the factors that affect the well-being of teachers and their status in the Russian Federation, through surveys among teachers conducted in 1989, 2016, and 2021.

In the 2000–2010s, a number of new religious communities emerged in the Perm region. Svetlana V. Ryazanova in the ARTICLE *Talking to God: Religion, Para-Science, and Disciplinary Practices as Consolidation Tools*, sets out to explore closed communities that are commonly characterized by permanent membership, limited connections with outside communities, and living within closed compounds. Such small religious groups, which exist in large cities like Perm, are often "invisible" for researchers due to their almost complete isolation from the outside world. The research object in the article is *Pokrovskaya Obitel'* [The Holy Virgin Intercession Abode], which has existed as a community of Orthodox believers for over 30 years and undertaken a long way from a conventional Orthodox parish to an independent religious community with an original doctrine and cult practices. Ryazanova uses

private correspondence with one of the community's founders. Her research is based on specific sources (anonymous personal communication with community members in 2008–2009, 2010–2011, and 2014–2015).

Tigran S. Simyan in the ARTICLE *"Guilty of Being Free": An Intellectual vs. Soviet Penal System (Prison Letters and Drawings of Sergei Parajanov),* seeks to address the following questions: How was the trauma of Parajanov's prison experience (he was imprisoned three times) "reflected in his texts (letters), pen and pencil drawings and collages? What role did the prison period play in Parajanov's evolution as an artist?" Simyan argues that Parajanov turned the penal cology into a creative laboratory; his prison letters are imbued with terror and desperation. At the same time, these sources also provide valuable insights into what life was like in Soviet penal colonies. Simyan emphasizes that there is little literature concerned with this problem in Russian and English, since Parajanov's prison letters have been published in Russian relatively recently.

The BOOK REVIEWS section contains two reviews. The first is of *Dhingra, P. (2021), Hyper Education. Why Good Schools, Good Grades, and Good Behavior Are Not Enough*, by Louie Giray and Jelomil Edem. According to them, the author of the book under review shows how Asian American parents make their children improve academically through hyper education, referring to the practice of extending education through privatized, extracurricular learning. Andrey D. Nazarov in the review of Bennett E., Berndt G. M., Esders St., Sarti L., (Eds.). (2021), *Early Medieval Militarisation*, observes how the authors convincingly demonstrate the impact of warfare on the various spheres of social and political life.

Discussions around the topics raised in the present issue will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal. In planning to introduce new interesting themes, we welcome suggestions from our readers and prospective authors for thematic issues, debate sections or book reviews.

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ESSAY

Ordoliberalism Revisited

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ABSTRACT

The recent publication of Kenneth Dyson's book *Conservative Liberalism, Liberalism, Ordo-Liberalism, and the State* offers an occasion to reconsider the body of ideas known as ordoliberalism. The books reviewed here represent much of the most recent scholarship in English on the subject. In this essay, I undertake two tasks: first, to clarify what the term properly refers to and in particular how it is related to "neoliberalism," and, second, to consider its influence on postwar German policies and institutions. I argue that much of the recent discussion of ordoliberalism and neoliberalism overlooks important differences between early ordoliberal thinking and the ideas associated with neoliberalism. Over time, as neoliberalism evolved and particularly as it became an ideological justification for policies and institutions justifying the accumulation of concentrated market power, these differences have become wider even as they have been obscured by misreadings of ordoliberalism. A better understanding of ordoliberalism can also provide insights relevant to the contemporary debates about the crisis of liberal democracy and capitalism. Is it in fact a "third way" for ordering an economy, an alternative to neoliberalism and socialism?

KEYWORDS

ordoliberalism, liberalism, neoliberalism, democracy, capitalism

I. Introduction

The publication earlier last year of Kenneth Dyson's book *Conservative Liberalism, Liberalism, Ordo-Liberalism, and the State* (2021) offers a welcome occasion to reconsider the body of ideas known as ordoliberalism. The books reviewed here represent much of the most recent scholarship in English on the subject. In this essay, I undertake two tasks: first, to clarify what the term

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properly refers to and in particular how it is related to "neoliberalism," and, second, to consider how much influence it had on postwar German policies and institutions. A better understanding of ordoliberalism can also provide insights relevant to the contemporary debates about the crisis of liberal democracy and capitalism. Is it in fact a "third way" for ordering an economy besides neoliberalism and socialism?

Ordoliberalism is little known outside a few scholarly circles. Some American students of antitrust theory, such as Daniel Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp, have discussed it and related it to other branches of thinking about antimonopoly law (Crane, 2013). Historians of postwar German economic reconstruction treat it as a source of some intellectual guidance for the architects of the "social market economy," of which it formed an integral element (Abelshauser, 2004; Haley, 2001; Murach-Brand, 2004; Nicholls, 1994; Streeck, 1997, 2010). Students of European competition law continue to debate its ideas and the degree to which they have influenced the competition enforcement regime in the European Union (Akman, 2012; Gerber, 2001; Quack & Djelic, 2005). During the Eurozone debt crisis following the Great Recession, ordoliberalism again aroused furor when many blamed Germany's resistance to easing the terms of restructuring Southern European debt on its ordoliberal heritage. The latter issue is the major impetus for the edited volume *Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics* of Hien and Joerges (2017).

Unfortunately, relatively little of the ordoliberalism literature has been translated into English. To the extent the term is used in scholarly literature, it is usually conflated with, or subsumed as a German variant of, a larger neoliberal current of thought associated with figures such as Friedrich Hayek and Chicago School economists[1]. I believe this seriously mischaracterizes ordoliberalism and obscures its relevance.

II. The Origins of Ordoliberalism

Ordoliberalism originated in the 1930s at the University of Freiburg, Germany. Ordoliberalism was a legal and economic theory to defend competition—and all its benefits to society—against the threats posed by state socialism or by the consolidation of market power in cartels and monopolies. Ordoliberalism's core comprised a group of legal and economic scholars—Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, and others—reacting against the spread of cartels and trusts throughout the capitalist world, the establishment of state socialism in Russia, and the anti-democratic impulses that accompanied both (Fear, 2006; Nicholls, 1994). At the time, Germany was completely dominated by cartels, more even than other capitalist countries. German cartels controlled 100% of coal production, 90% of steel, and exerted similar levels of control over many other branches of industry. Cartels' defenders claimed that they stabilized capitalism against the threat of ruinous overproduction leading to crashes, but their opponents saw them as harmful both to political and economic freedom for raising barriers to entry for small businesses, for example, and wielding

[1] Peacock and Willgerodt (1989) is a useful compendium of several ordoliberal essays. A concise summary of some of Eucken's thinking in English is Eucken (1951).

power over government. The triumph of cartels continued into the Nazi period, when Hitler forced all big businesses to join cartels (Schweitzer, 1964).

Eucken took a position as professor of economics at the University of Freiburg in 1927 and remained there until he died in 1950. At Freiburg Eucken met Böhm, who was then working in the Weimar government ministry that dealt with the regulation of cartels. The two shared an antipathy against the power of cartels and concentrations of market power generally. An economist devoted to grounding economic theory in historical evidence, Eucken grasped how hard it was for governments to check the abuses of monopolists. As he noted, "abuse" was itself a vague term (a problem that bedevils antitrust litigation to this day), and corporate entities always acquire substantial political influence. Therefore, the state must act to prevent the rise of entities with market power, not fight them after the fact: It is not in the first instance against abuses of existing power bodies that economic policy should be applied, but rather against the rise of power bodies altogether. Otherwise, it will have no chance to solve the problem (Eucken, 2004, p. 172). His colleague, Franz Böhm, declared that society must not put the principles of the freedom of contract and rights of property ahead of the freedom to compete: "Jus publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest" [a public law cannot be changed by private agreements] (Böhm, 1928/1960, 1933).

The ordoliberals fought the refusal by many economists to look squarely at factual data. They recognized that economic theories were powerful tools, but they did not accept that theories worked independently of their social setting. Eucken insisted that economists take account of historical circumstances in which economic forces play out. This required that economists lift the curtain to recognize the constant struggle of power interests, masked by ideology, often brutal, among concentrated centers of market power (Eucken, 2004). Economic history, Eucken wrote in 1947, is a history of the abuse of power. And power, he wrote, is power, whether in private or state hands. Power is the antithesis of freedom, which—following Kant—he argued should be the moral foundation of the society; freedom is not a goal in itself but a means to serve "eigenverantwortliche Menschen" [free self-responsible people] (Eucken, 2004, p. 178). Eucken always insisted that economic and political power were inextricably tied together. Over history, state rulers fought to dominate the economies of their countries. Guilds fought against outsiders, consumers, and landowners. The history of economics is a history of the abuse of power, he wrote, although to varying degrees in different economic orders. The key question was who was abusing whom, and how (Eucken, 2004).

Eucken and Böhm founded the journal ORDO after the war, continuing to propound ordoliberal ideas. The "ordo" element referred to the idea that the legal framework ensuring market competition and market freedom should be embedded in a constitutional order to protect market competition and prevent concentrated economic power from encroaching on freedom. The state had an obligation, Böhm insisted, to interfere with the freedom of contract and rights of property when they infringed on the freedom of individual producers and consumers. To protect property in the name of efficiency would "etablierung des Rechtes des Stärkeren, eines kommerziellen Faustrechts" [establish the power of the mightier, a commercial right of

the fist]. Such a right of the fist of course was precisely what appealed to communists, fascists, and radical libertarians alike. Such thinking repulsed the ordoliberals, who had watched as the Russian Bolsheviks imposed a totalitarian economy on their subjects and as Hitler imposed a mandatory cartel system on Germany (Schweitzer, 1964). Whether under the Nazis or the Soviets, such monopolistic organizational forms denied freedom both in the economic and the political realms. And while they succeeded in preventing crises of overproduction and mass unemployment, they failed to foster either social justice or technical innovation (Müller-Armack, 1947/1982). For the ordoliberals, therefore, a market economy where the state protected individual freedom by ensuring competition and preventing the rise of concentrated market power was the only guarantee of both economic prosperity and elementary social justice.

The ordoliberals were influenced by American progressive doctrines that giant concentrations of economic power threatened both political and economic freedom, as a 1928 essay by Böhm on private power concentrations makes clear (Böhm, 1928/1960, 1933). But whereas in the United States, where the pro-competition doctrine's influence faded after the 1970s under the influence of the Chicago antitrust school, which insisted on efficiency as the sole criterion of social well-being, ordoliberal ideas became a major influence on the design of German economic institutions following World War II.

III. Ordoliberalism's Core Precepts

How ordoliberalism is related to neoliberalism is contentious. To some degree confusion over this point is understandable. The Freiburg School ordoliberals had close relations to the group of economic thinkers associated with the Mont Pèlerin Society that formed in 1947[2]. Eucken was an original member of the group. Moreover, Hayek himself moved to the University of Freiburg in 1962, taking the chair formerly held by Eucken; the ORDO yearbook became almost entirely a creature of Hayekian neoliberal thought; and the Walter Eucken Institute at Freiburg became part of the Mont Pèlerin's "institutional machinery," as Angela Wigger puts it in the Hien and Joerges volume (Wigger in Hien & Joerges, 2017, p. 170). Confusion therefore between the stream of thought identified as neoliberalism and the body of ordoliberal thinking reflected in the Freiburg school and the designers of Germany's "social market economy" in the 1950s and 1960s is understandable. It is also the case, as the studies reviewed here show, that both streams of thought were themselves highly diverse and often self-contradictory, and both underwent continuous evolution as new generations of thinkers and issues arose. Certainly, it is fair to say that the bodies of thought termed neoliberalism and ordoliberalism did and do overlap.

However, the ordoliberals did not consider themselves to be neoliberals[3]. As Eucken put it, "the term 'liberalism' or 'neoliberalism' is sometimes applied to my

[2] The Mont Pèlerin Society originated as a group of thinkers dedicated to advancing free-market liberal principles in the face of widespread support for collectivist and Keynesian ideas. The group continues to exist. Among its notable figures have been Friedrich Hayek, George Stigler and James Buchanan.

[3] In addition to Dyson, an authoritative German-language study on the ordoliberal philosophy persuasively making this case as well is Föste (2006).

ideas, but it is a poor fit" (Eucken, 2004, pp. 374–375). Although they had strong ties to the laissez-faire liberals (whom they called "paleoliberals" or "Stone Age liberals"), the ordoliberals insisted on treating capitalism as embedded in the social and political environment in which it operates (Föste, 2006, p. 346). It generates power inequalities that can threaten both political and economic freedom. For this reason, the ordoliberals insisted that laissez-faire is not the same as full competition[4]. They did not elevate economic freedom above political freedom. Rather, the ordoliberals advocated firm government protection of market competition. Rent-seeking would be inevitable if market agents thought they could win government administrative support for restricting market rivals. Fairness and freedom, not efficiency, were ordoliberalism's basic principles.

Thus, there are significant differences between ordoliberalism and neoliberalism. Over time, especially as the neoliberal philosophy associated with Hayek, Friedman and Stigler developed, these differences became wider, yet they were almost entirely obscured. Today, as neoliberalism has been used as the doctrinal justification for pressures to dismantle government controls over trade, labor relations, finance, market regulation, public goods, redistribution and social protection policies in all spheres, and blamed for the surging economic inequality witnessed in the United States and many other countries, it is useful to reconsider ordoliberalism. Ordoliberalism's early instincts have significant implications for us today as we confront the crises of market capitalism and liberal democracy. For this reason, to bury ordoliberalism under the broad mantle of neoliberalism is to ignore the points that the early ordoliberals considered most important. Briefly, these can be summarized as follows:

A. An economy consists of a set of closely interrelated elements. To isolate one issue—trade policy, for example, or social policy—and deal with it separately from its interaction with all other elements will never succeed in solving that problem. More likely it will create more problems, leading to still more interventions. Under some conditions, a Keynesian full employment policy is justified, but it would have been better to have avoided the mistakes (such as a deflationary policy) that led to a spiral of deflation and mass unemployment, because a full employment policy can lead to inflationary pressure, and then to price controls that expand and distort the ability of prices as a system to enable rational decision-making by economic actors. Consequently, it is necessary to think of the economy as a system, or a comprehensive order, and to set in place the rules that will govern that order. Rather than intervening on an ad hoc basis each time a crisis arose, the state's role is to establish and enforce basic principles. The core issue, Eucken wrote, is not the "quantity" of state intervention, but rather the "quality" of the intervention (Eucken, 1951, p. 95). From the very beginning, the ordoliberals emphasized the importance of a constitutional legal framework for the economic order; they chose the term "ordo" from Roman law to reflect that crucial point (Böhm et al., 1937/1989, 1937).

[4] Eucken (1938, p. 57): "Teils sehnt man die frühere Zeit zurück, verwechselt laisser faire und Wettbewerb und sieht nicht, daß das laisser faire oft gerade zur Beseitigung der Wettbewerbsordnung und zum Emporwuchern monopolitischer Gebilde führte." [In part one longs for the former time, confuses laisser faire and competition, and does not see that the laisser faire often led to the elimination of the competitive order and to the proliferation of monopolistic entities.]

They recognized that government may be called upon to correct market failures, but argued that an order set up to prevent such failures was better than a sequence of ad hoc policy measures that create new problems requiring yet more ad hoc interventions. These rules need to be set in constitutional law so that the state can enforce them as part of the orderly functioning of the market system.

B. Market competition is the only way to protect the freedom of individuals as economic and political agents. It is preferable to forfeit the (purely apparent) efficiency gains of monopolies, trusts, and cartels before they form rather than to risk allowing them to acquire stifling market power. In direct contrast to the Chicago antitrust school, therefore, the ordoliberals believed that competition itself must be the objective of economic policy. The strong state must act to enforce the rules of competition and to block the formation of large concentrations of market power *before they arise, not afterward.*

C. The market economy must serve not only efficiency, but also social justice. As Eucken himself put it repeatedly: "How can a modern industrialized economy and society be organized in a humane and efficient way?" (Eucken, 1951). Unlike the neoliberals, the ordoliberals always insisted on the normative foundations of the market economy. Their emphasis on the importance of establishing an explicit constitutional foundation for the market economy derived from their conviction that the economy must serve society, not the other way around. Freedom for ordoliberals was the basis of morality.

D. Perhaps most importantly, they held that throughout history, concentrations of market power always ally with concentrated political power to suppress both economic and political freedom. These freedoms in the economic sphere extend not only to would-be entrepreneurs who are squeezed out of a market, but to workers as well as their freedom to choose the place and conditions of their employment is constrained, and of consumers, whose range of choice is narrowed. In the political sphere, they lead to totalitarianism; for the ordoliberals in the postwar Federal Republic, the establishment of a Soviet-type planned economy next door in East Germany provided a close-hand example of the difference between a state socialist planned economy and a market economy in the West. Concentrated economic power always seeks ideological justifications, so we must always look behind the curtain of ideology to identify the power interests deploying them[5].

Therefore, while some government power is required to enforce the rules of a competitive order, excessive government power is just as oppressive as a laissez-faire policy. Laissez-faire as a policy had failed no less than the centrally planned Nazi or Soviet economic models in solving basic questions of freedom and order; both ended up suppressing freedom in favor of market power (Eucken, 2004). Laissez-faire, Eucken wrote, "permits misuses of freedom of contract to destroy freedom" (Eucken, 1951, p. 37). Such words, needless to say, would never be uttered by a neoliberal.

[5] "Auch wir Nationalökonomen müssen den Vorhang lüften, welchen die Interessenten-Ideologien vor die wirtschaftlichen Machtballungen und Machtkämpfe ziehen" [We economists too must lift the curtain that the ideologies of interested parties draw in front of the economic concentrations of power and power struggles] (Eucken, 1947, p. 306).

For Eucken and Böhm, in short, the question of the distribution of power was central to their analysis. Like the framers of the American constitution, they recognized that state power must be sufficient to check the abuses of power by private interests, but not so great as to infringe on the freedom of private interests and citizens to act in such a way as to further socially desirable objectives, such as prosperity and justice. "The problem of economic power," wrote Eucken, "can never be solved by further concentrations of power" (Eucken, 1951, p. 36). It is but a few steps removed to the American pluralist school of the mid-20th century, which saw in the competition of organized interests a "dispersion of inequalities" that resisted such concentration of either private or state power as to infringe on individual rights (Cf. Dahl, 1961, 1982). The question of power—the inevitable pursuit of state power by powerful private interests—was recognized in early writings of such Chicago economists as George Stigler and the early public choice school writers. Over time, however, the neoliberals only saw the abuse of government power by rent-seeking interests as arising from the poor, the minorities, the labor unions, and Democrats; never were they willing to defy their corporate sponsors by suggesting that as corporate power grew larger, more concentrated, and more politically adept, it was the "winners" of market competition that would seize government power to protect monopoly rents, not the losers[6].

IV. Perspectives on Neoliberalism

Vail, Blyth, and Slobodian each offers a distinctive perspective on neoliberal doctrine. Mark Vail's book argues that liberalizing national policies in France, Germany and Italy in recent decades were not in fact applications of neoliberal theory. This is the basis for his characterization of their economies as "illiberal." He ascribes these deviations to the influence of national intellectual traditions on elites. He offers shorthand descriptions of each—"French statism, German neocorporatism, and Italian clientelism" (Vail, 2018, p. 5 and passim). Vail is strongest on France. He is less knowledgeable about Germany, and his treatment of Italy is somewhat cursory. Most of the book is based on interviews, although he has conducted some research into original, secondary, and journalistic sources as well. Vail believes in the power of ideas to influence policy through their effect in guiding the outlooks of policymakers. Therefore, in his framework, when the simple, universalistic doctrines of neoliberalism were understood and applied in particular national settings, it was the intellectual traditions of those countries' national elites that adapted neoliberalism to their own national circumstances.

Slobodian also emphasizes the global outlook of neoliberalism but makes a different point. For Slobodian, neoliberalism has always had a global perspective, and has always aimed at establishing a political order conducive to its free-market,

[6] This insight, articulated in respect of the post-communist economic reform experience of Russia and other East European systems by Joel Hellman in 1998 (Hellman, 1998), would have been consistent with the ordoliberals' view of history but was entirely alien to the neoliberals. I will return to this point below.

In her book *Democracy in Chains*, Nancy Maclean shows that James Buchanan justified denying equal access to education for Blacks on the grounds of the primacy of private property rights and states' rights, effectively joining public choice theory to Southern segregationism (MacLean, 2017).

laissez-faire ideology. Its major proponents, from the very start, toyed with various notions of world government or at any rate world free trade regimes, with varying levels of success. Slobodian illuminates a particular center for the global outlook in the neoliberal tradition, which he calls the "Geneva School," a rival to Freiburg or Chicago as a home to this strand of neoliberalism. Their objective effectively was to make the world safe for capital. Slobodian skillfully traces the continuity of the global framing of the neoliberal doctrine from its origins to the present day. He treats ordoliberalism as part of this project: "I argue that we can understand the proposal of the Geneva School as a rethinking of ordoliberalism at the scale of the world. We might call it ordoglobalism" (Slobodian, 2018, p. 11). However, I believe this represents a serious misreading of ordoliberalism.

Blyth pursues a different line of argument. Blyth treats the doctrine that economic austerity is necessary to squeeze out inflationary forces and restore healthy economic exchange as a malign and "dangerous idea." He characterizes it as generally unworkable, anti-democratic, and punitive toward those least able to bear the burden of fiscal and financial austerity, while benefiting banking interests and others. Often it has a strong moralistic dimension as well.

While Blyth is undoubtedly correct that austerity policies have distributional effects, he overlooks the point that any fiscal and regulatory policy does as well. If neoliberalism's simplistic faith that government is bad, the market good, that as property rights are established, the rule of law will follow along with productive investment and broadly shared prosperity, is flawed, likewise so is the notion that any alternative to austerity will automatically benefit both economy and society. Blyth maintains a singular focus on the history of the idea of austerity, but slights the political and economic contexts in which it is applied. Economists who imagine that their theories give them ready-made policy solutions to a crisis of hyper-inflation wherever it occurs are obviously vulnerable to the empirical evidence that their remedies fail more often than not. But by the same logic, we must be wary of equally simplistic faith in the virtues of public spending. If a government is in bed with its cronies, public spending is likely to make both the cronies and the politicians richer without raising the standard of living of the rest of the society. Under conditions of high inequality in the polity and the economy, any simple policy formula will be applied so as to benefit those with economic and political power.

Unlike Vail or Slobodian, Mark Blyth (2013) deals in detail with ordoliberalism. He even pays it a backhanded compliment: "By way of summing up so far, Germany provided a postwar home for austerity arguments in the form of ordoliberalism, the instruction sheet for how to run a late-developer, high-savings, high-technology, export-driven economy. It's a great instruction sheet—so long as you are indeed the late-developing, high-savings, high-technology, and export-driven economy in question. If you are not, as the periphery of the Eurozone is finding out, then it's a one-way ticket to permanent austerity" (Blyth, 2013, p. 151). This is too pat. Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland all have higher shares of foreign trade in GDP than Germany without having ordoliberal traditions, and all have more strongly positive trade balances. Meantime, US foreign trade as a share of GDP is

far lower than any of them, and is negative, although neoliberalism has had a much greater impact in the United States. Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim that Germany's ordoliberalism's tradition works only in Germany because it is Germany. Because history shapes both the creation and operation of institutions, it is extremely difficult to separate the effects of institutional arrangements from the conditions under which they arose. If this applies to ordoliberalism and neoliberalism, it applies with equal validity to state socialism and Keynesianism.

Vail's treatment of ordoliberalism and of Germany is one-sided. He emphasizes the importance of the corporate organizations of labor and employers but makes no reference to the social partnership principle or the ways in which it has facilitated price and wage restraint, joint investment in skill, and the embodiment of balanced representation by labor and business in institutions such as labor courts and enterprise governance. He overstates the dominance of big business and understates the importance of the *Mittelstand*, the sector of small- and medium-sized firms, often specializing in niche products for export markets, which has been important both to Germany's economic success and to its social stability. Vail's survey of German economic and social institutions overlooks a number of crucial features, such as the social insurance system and its important link to institutions of coordinated investment in skill. The treatment of ordoliberalism lacks important detail, such as its relationship to the principle of the social market economy. Although Vail emphasizes the dualism between labor market insiders and outsiders, he makes no effort to explore ways in which Germany has sought to incorporate outsiders into the system of social partnership. The absence of any comparative metrics for assessing the levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in Germany relative to levels elsewhere leaves an inaccurate impression of Germany's economic system. Although Vail is interested in the "institutional and ideational manifestations" of ideas (Vail, 2018, p. 5), he has not actually explored the primary sources. At the same time, like Blyth and Slobodian and other authors reviewed here, his emphasis on the power of ideas leaves him unequipped to consider how neoliberal doctrines in many countries—the United States and Russia, among others—are used as instruments for rent-capture by powerful corporate interests.

V. Ordoliberalism and Neoliberalism

The two edited books differ somewhat in scope. The subject of Mirowski and Plehwe's book *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (2015) is neoliberalism. The editors frame ordoliberalism as neoliberalism's German version. Dieter Plehwe's introduction argues that the neoliberalism originating with the Mont Pèlerin Society should be seen as a "thought collective," rather than a coherently bounded philosophy (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015, p. 4). This is a similar approach to Kenneth Dyson (2021), who also sees ordoliberalism as an open-ended, evolving tradition rather than a defined school of thought, and as part of a larger movement that he terms "conservative liberalism." Both stress the ways in which Germany's ordoliberals parted company from the MPS neoliberals and, as Plehwe

puts it, "succeeded in developing an alternative third way to the Keynesian welfare and planning state right after World War II—the social market economy" (Dyson, 2021, p. 27). Therefore, although the Mirowski and Plehwe volume tends to treat ordoliberalism as part of a larger stream of neoliberal thought, it is a distinct variant of it, and one which became increasingly distinct as the Chicago School of thinking gained ground from the 1950s.

Of the essays in the Mirowski and Plehwe volume, the one most specifically devoted to ordoliberalism is by a scholar based in Germany who wrote his dissertation on ordoliberalism, Ralph Ptak. Ptak's view is largely negative. He associates the ordoliberals with German traditions of patriarchy and authoritarianism. He attempts to argue that their belief in a strong state was "akin" to Nazi ideology and to Carl Schmitt, the Nazis' legal apologist. They held, in Ptak's view, a "fundamental skepticism toward democracy" (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015, pp. 125). Such influence as they had was thanks to American occupation as well as "massive neoliberal propaganda" disseminated through "veiled multilayer networks" (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015, pp. 121–122). Since the early days, moreover, it has tended to evolve into an Anglo-Saxon version of neoliberalism.

Ptak has studied ordoliberal texts and archival documents but Dyson's much more extensive research in the primary sources and archives refutes much of Ptak's critique. Despite the frequent charge that the ordoliberals drew their belief in the strong state from Carl Schmitt's doctrines (this charge recurs in Werner Bonefeld's chapter in the Hien and Joerges volume, and in writing by Michel Foucault, among others), this is in fact an error. The ordoliberals, like most other European intellectuals, observed the failure of the parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic, and concluded that a stronger executive institution was needed to stabilize a parliamentary democracy. Charles de Gaulle drew the same conclusions in his 1946 Bayeux proposal for a new constitution, which underlay the successful mixed constitutional forms of the Fifth Republic. Germany adopted a "constructive vote of no confidence" into the constitution of the Federal Republic, hardly an anti-democratic provision, and one which has successfully prevented the constant fall of weak coalition governments characteristic of some other European democracies.

Likewise, ordoliberals were hardly alone among intellectuals—Hannah Arendt is a good example—who feared the potential that a "mass society" lacking the fabric of a civil society would succumb to totalitarianism. Likewise, the damning charge that the ordoliberals were tainted by Nazi associations breaks down upon closer examination. It is the case that a number of ordoliberals had ties to the Nazi party at an early stage, before the 1930s. A later ordoliberal, Wolfgang Müller-Armack (who coined the term "social market economy" after the war) was a Nazi party member from 1933. Another early figure in the Freiburg group, Hans Großmann-Doerth, remained a Nazi party member through the war. This led Eucken and Böhm to cut off relations with him.

Krystallnacht in 1938 shocked Eucken and Böhm. Both refused to serve the Nazi regime; Böhm was stripped of his teaching duties at Freiburg, and both

joined a resistance circle in Freiburg and helped in the drafting of the Bonhoeffer Memorandum. Wilhelm Röpke was dismissed from his university position and forced to leave the country; likewise, Alexander Rüstow fled the country. Eucken resisted Rector Martin Heidegger's efforts to impose a "Führerprinzip" at the university, and, at a time of intense political pressure, spoke out against celebrations of irrationalism and moral relativism (Dyson, 2021, pp. 56–66, 425–432). As early as 1932, Eucken wrote against a dictatorship that imposes a "total" state serving as a "substitute for religion". It was precisely against such a regime that state power is needed to protect individual freedom against oppression by governing elites (Dyson, 2021, p. 36). Three of the Freiburg ordoliberals were arrested for anti-Nazi activity. In his private papers, Eucken compared the ordoliberals to the tradition of Galileo, Cicero, and Socrates, who put up heroic intellectual resistance to tyranny. In 1944, Eucken joined with another colleague from the resistance circle and drafted a study to serve as a blueprint for rebuilding the economy after the war. It was in this atmosphere that Eucken turned to a deeper study of Kant, Schiller and Tocqueville, seeking a conception of individual freedom that could counter the temptations of romantic nationalism.

Much of the criticism of ordoliberalism presented in the Vail, Slobodian and Blyth books lacks adequate historical context. The authors tend to apply present-day standards of judgment without sufficient appreciation of the collapse of liberalism in Europe in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The appropriation of militant nationalism by totalitarian fascists and Nazis and of collectivism by communists, the fall of weak democracies, and the loss of social bearings all led to a wide-ranging search for new foundations for a viable liberalism. Slobodian's understates how powerfully nationalism had fueled antidemocratic and antimarket movements throughout Europe, favoring fascist forms of corporatism and cartels. For example, Wilhelm Röpke—whom Slobodian reveals to be viciously racist in later decades—defended free trade in the immediate post-war period as the most effective constraint on the reemergence of German nationalism and monopoly capitalism (Dyson, 2021, p. 36). The ordoliberals' defense of free trade represented a direct response to the ruinous nationalism that resulted in World War II. We must remember that the ordoliberals were engaging with their times, not with ours[7].

Ordoliberals were not alone in the mid-20th century in seeking principles for an international order that could protect peace, justice, equality, and freedom. For that matter, Immanuel Kant had looked to an international federation of republics, even a form of "world cititzenship," guaranteeing basic individual freedom in his essay "Eternal Peace" of 1795. The internationalist perspectives of the mid-20th century can hardly be reduced to the conspiratorial working of a neoliberal technocratic elite. If this soil nurtured the seeds of contemporary globalization, as Slobodian argues, it also fostered the contemporary international human rights, anti-colonial, and democratization movements.

Although we no longer consider Soviet-style central planning a viable alternative to the crises of capitalism, for many in the 1930s, it offered a vividly

[7] Walter Eucken quoted Schiller: "live with your century, but do not be its creature; serve your contemporaries but given them what they need, not what they praise" (Dyson, 2021, p. 64).

present model, debated vigorously throughout the world. The British aristocratic socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb wrote a much-discussed book presenting the Soviet system as a new civilization (Webb & Webb, 1936). Our memory of that time has faded. We are preoccupied with the failures of the capitalist system in the face of multiple financial crises and recessions, and its apparently inability to cope with the existential threat of climate change. But political support today for a communist revolution to deal with these and other crises has disappeared. We are therefore apt to underestimate the attractions of the planned economy for Western intellectuals in the 1930s and wonder at the large amount of attention the ordoliberals paid to it as they developed a model of capitalism that was neither laissez-faire, nor cartel-dominated, or overtaken by state central planning. To fail to appreciate these historical circumstances is therefore to miss the real contribution that the ordoliberals made.

The Mirowski and Plehwe volume includes two useful accounts of the relationship of the Chicago school to neoliberalism, one by Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski and another by Rob Van Horn. Rob Van Horn contrasts the worries of the early generation of Chicago economists, such as Frank Knight and Henry Simons, about the dangers that monopolies and corporate power more generally posed to market economies and political democracies. In a little pamphlet published in 1934, Simons—who studied with Eucken—wrote that

> the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms […] The representation of laissez faire as a merely do-nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition can function effectively as an agency of control. Thus, the state is charged, under this 'division of labor', with heavy responsibilities and large 'control' functions: the maintenance of competitive conditions in industry. (Simons, 1934, pp. 3–4)

Latter-day Chicagoans, of course, rejected this view. They held that no matter how damaging monopoly power might be to social welfare, any effort by government to curb it would produce even worse effects. They regarded the older Progressive view that only government power could curb the concentrated influence of trusts, monopolies and cartels as outdated, even pernicious.

Van Horn shows that the shift in Chicago school thinking about corporate power occurred between the late 1940s and late 1950s. These economists persuaded themselves that competitive forces are always at work—based on the deductive logic that if monopoly power to extract rents in a market is available, a competitor will always enter that market to claim a share of those rents. As Friedman put it, the "workings of competition are devious and hidden" (Cited in Van Horn, Mirowski & Plehwe, p. 219). Forgotten were the analyses of public choice scholars about the ways in which those with monopoly power will expend resources to capture government administrative power in order to preserve those rents, if doing so is less costly than investing in risky efforts to improve productivity.

VI. Ordoliberalism and the Eurozone Debt Crisis

The Hien and Joerges (2017) volume provides more background on ordoliberalism itself, but its contributions are rather cursory. Their main focus is the influence of ordoliberal thinking on German responses to the Eurozone debt crisis. The impetus for the volume is the widely held view that ordoliberalism was the intellectual ground for Germany's resistance to more generous terms for restructuring the debt of Southern European countries. Most of the contributors to the volume, however, have relatively little to say about ordoliberalism itself. Essays by Bruno Amable and by Arnaud Lechevalier discuss French intellectuals' interpretations of ordoliberalism; Stefano Solari discusses the Italian reception of ordoliberalism; William Callison discusses the view taken by the United States, including by Timothy Geithner, who attributed Germany's "Old Testament" rigidity and moralism to its religious and ordoliberal tradition. A chapter by Kenneth Dyson presents a balanced treatment of ordoliberalism as a tradition, which he expounds at much greater length in the recent book. A few essays—notably by Angela Wigger, who treats ordoliberalism as nothing more than a "foundational myth" for Germany's social market economy, with little actual impact on German policy; by Philip Manow, for whom Germany's welfare state is directly contradictory to ordoliberal principles; and by Brigitte Young, who argues that Germany's policies had little to do with ordoliberalism and a great deal with German national self-interest—dismiss its influence as marginal at most.

Other writers ascribe more influence to ordoliberal thought. Josef Hien writes that the "deep grammar" of ordoliberalism is "crypto-Protestant values" (Hien & Joerges, 2017, p. 262). Hien does acknowledge, to be sure, the more generally recognized influence of Catholic social thought on the "social" ordoliberals, notably Alfred Müeller-Armack, who saw "social market economy" as a deliberate effort to marry the liberalism of the Freiburg school with a theoretical and practical commitment to the principle that the economy must serve to raise living standards and opportunity for all sections of society. This emphasis created a constant dynamic tension in the evolution of ordoliberal thinking and in its impact on policy between the "liberal" and "social" wings of the movement. They disagreed, however, more over emphasis than fundamental principles. As Dyson again points out, this divergence also reflects the gap between general economic principle and their application to specific policy issues. Like other political and intellectual movements, the ordoliberals had their purist and pragmatic wings (something like the tension between the "fundis" and the "realos" among the Green party in the 1980s). Eucken was never particularly adept at addressing specific policy issues, whereas others in the movement, such as Alfred Müller-Armack welcomed engagement in them in order to apply general principles to the extent circumstances permitted[8].

[8] Alfred Müller-Armack was an economist who strongly argued that an economy should serve social justice; he therefore rejected the laissez-faire conceptions of most neoliberals. During the war, he advised the German government but fell out with the regime and began turning his attention to the principles of a postwar economy. It was he who coined the term "social market economy," reflecting his conviction that a market-oriented competitive economy must serve the larger good of society.

The contribution by Stephan Pühringer in the Hien and Joerges volume argues that ordoliberalism became an important "guiding principle" for German policymakers at a number of turning points in the postwar period. Therefore, in his view, after the debt crisis erupted, the German response reflected not so much the return of ordoliberalism as its application to new problems. Ordoliberal thinking had remained strong in a number of policymaking centers, such as think tanks and economics departments and key media outlets such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and embedded in a broader international network of neoliberal thinkers (Pühringer, in Hien and Joerges, 2017, pp. 144–158). In this respect, his position is akin to that of other writers reviewed here who tend to downplay the specific theoretical points of the ordoliberals in favor of their membership in the larger international movement of liberals. To some degree, this position therefore understates both the specific contributions of ordoliberal ideas to early German postwar reconstruction and to its institutional legacy. Nonetheless, Pühringer is surely right in demonstrating the continuing relevance of ordoliberalism, which, as Dyson and other authors observe, is part of the "operational code" of German economic thinking (Dyson, 2021, p. 89).

Other contributors declare that ordoliberalism's influence on German institutions was minimal, a matter of myth-making and propaganda. Albert Weale rejects the notion that ordoliberalism influenced the social market economy, or indeed that the social market economy shaped Germany's economic miracle. Whatever successes Germany enjoyed, he claims, owed to Allied pressure for the currency reform, for the CDU's decision to adopt a comprehensive employment-based old-age pension system in 1957, and to collective bargaining between organized labor and organized employers (Weale in Jien & Joerges, 2017, pp. 237–239).

Running through the Hien and Joerges book, the Mirowski and Plehwe volume as well as the books by Vail, Blyth and especially Slobodian, is the persistent claim that ordoliberalism was antidemocratic. Like Ptak, some of the authors attribute ordoliberals' call for a strong state to Carl Schmitt's Nazi-inflected "political theology" (Bonefeld in Hien & Joerges, 2017, pp. 273–288). Others note that ordoliberals feared the potential that mass democracy could assume authoritarian or totalitarian forms. Still others claim that ordoliberalism was anti-pluralist because of its concern that strong interest groups sought to capture the state to advance their purposes. Thomas Biebricher claims that the ordoliberals wanted to "de-pluralize" democracy and replace it with "technocracy" (Biebricher in Hien & Joerges, 2017, p. 113). Michel Foucault, cited by several of the authors in the Hien and Joerges volume, interpreted ordoliberalism as statist and technocratic. For Maurizio Ferrera, the ordoliberals were "obsessed" by anxiety about pressure from "special interests," that needed to be "caged" through market institutions (Ferrara in Hien & Joerges, 2017, p. 116). Albert Weale argues that ordoliberalism stressed, "in a partial form, a few elementary, but essential, economic truths." However, while frugality and productivity are important to advancing prosperity, by themselves, they cannot solve Europe's larger problems. For these, "Europe needs the true democrat to marry the Schwabian housewife"[9]. Here again is the premise that

[9] Weale in Hien and Joerges (2017, p. 244). The swipe at the "Swabian housewife" is a reference to a stereotype that Angela Merkel liked to use at the height of the crisis, referring to the virtues of frugality.

ordoliberalism offers only the discipline of the marketplace and the strong hand of a paternalistic, elitist, and technocratic state as its political theory. The same critique underpins Slobodian's book, which argues that neoliberalism represents an effort to "encase" and "inoculate" market capitalism against democracy.

The accusation that ordoliberalism is antidemocratic does not hold up to closer scrutiny. For one thing, it elides any distinctions among mass democracy, pluralism, interest group politics, parliamentary democracy, and the likelihood of state capture by oligarchs in a liberalizing state. It is hardly anti-democratic to point out that those groups amassing immense market power will use it politically to suppress any threats to their position either politically economically. No more vivid example of this phenomenon exists than in the deployment of the accumulating power of immensely wealthy conservative and corporate interests in the United States to suppress the voting rights of African-Americans, to block any movement to protect workers' interests or enforce environmental protection laws, to expand the provision of public goods, and to weaken the enforce of market regulation of financial markets. Under these conditions—described and foreseen by the ordoliberals—is it antidemocratic to argue that only robust market competition can prevent the amassing of great market power and thus lead to the suppression of both political and economic freedom? Yet this point, that concentrated market power will always join with political power to suppress freedom, was fundamental to Eucken and Böhm's writings and runs through them from the beginning. This was the premise on which they based their consistent position that a comprehensive constitutional order to protect competition is requisite both to prosperity and to social justice.

Likewise, to believe that policymaking should be based on facts and reason is hardly to cede power to "technocrats." In fact, one of the consistent themes of the ordoliberals is that economics has to look squarely at empirical data, and not rely only on pure deductive axioms; in this they differed from Hayek or the later Chicago School economists. They also argued against the "historical school" in German economics, which held that as conditions changed, so did basic principles of economics. Using this reasoning, many of the historical school argued that the rise of large-scale industrial and financial power, deploying all the resources of modern technology—such as railroads and telegraphy—were an inevitable stage in the evolution of capitalism. These views, shared both on the right and left by figures such as Rockefeller, Morgan, Debs and Lenin, were roundly rejected by the ordoliberals (as they had been by Louis Brandeis in the United States). There was no historical inevitably for the rise of giant trusts, monopolies, and state capitalist structures, Eucken and Böhm insisted. Even the seeming efficiency gains realized by larger economies of scale were nugatory in view of the inevitable tendency of the monopolist to claim rents by suppressing rivals and risk rather than to raise efficiency. Only competition could ensure a continuous stream of pressure for innovation, they held[10]. Most of the books reviewed here ignore this argument.

[10] Likewise, Louis Brandeis argued in 1913 that when a monopoly is efficient, it will absorb the benefit, not the society. For the same reason, if we observe higher earnings on the part of a monopolistic firm, we should not interpret it as a sign of greater efficiency (Brandeis, 1913).

VII. Ordoliberalism and Conservative Liberalism

Kenneth Dyson has studied ordoliberalism for many years. He seeks neither to praise nor to bury it. He has no particular ideological ax to grind and does not seek to interpret ordoliberalism in such a way as to support an argument about the impact of neoliberalism. His study is (to my knowledge) the most authoritative available in English[11].

Dyson places ordoliberalism in the historical context of the "conservative liberal" tradition, which includes such figures as Louis Brandeis in the United States. He seeks to refute the idea that ordoliberalism is a peculiarly German phenomenon, reflecting German traditions and applied largely to specific German conditions. Dyson certainly shows that ordoliberalism plays a key role in the myth-making of German postwar history. Separating myth and memory from actual history is difficult. Both ordoliberalism's champions and enemies position themselves on this issue. Some skeptics believe that its role was mainly myth and PR, as do some of its critics; some of its champions consider it a real force, far more than a myth, while others sympathetic to it consider its effects relatively marginal or limited in time to few early years in the postwar period. Dyson takes a middle ground on both points. He takes pains to show the limits of ordoliberalism's actual influence on policy. He points out, for example, that for all their emphasis on the necessity of a sound currency and price stability to enable all agents in the economic process to make rational decisions about the use of resources, the ordoliberals had surprisingly little to say about the role of a central bank. The establishment of a strong, independent central bank in 1948 owed little to ordoliberal influence (Dyson, 2021, p. 377). They offered little guidance regarding monetary policy, or even fiscal policy. They "lacked a theory of public goods" (Dyson, 2021, p. 400). Many of the difficult policy choices German faced were influenced by ordoliberalism, if at all, only when figures associated with ordoliberal thinking accepted pragmatic compromises to their principles, generally by accepting a larger degree of autonomy for the collective bargaining institutions of labor and employers, a more comprehensive system of social insurance, more government intervention to stabilize employment and the balance of payments, and political compromises as the price of European integration. Often the purists in the movement opposed them. However, both in the early years and later, the fundamentalist and pragmatic wings of ordoliberals agreed on basic principles and values (Dyson, 2021, p. 400).

Dyson sees the importance of ordoliberalism above all in its insistence on moral values as the foundation of the market order, that a market economy must serve a larger good than private gain. One dimension of that normative position was based in Kantian universalism, another in Catholic social thinking about the just society. These strands of moral philosophy found their expression in the notion of the "social market economy," which has proven to be much more workable than most observers thought

[11] Wilga Föste's book (2006) *Grundwerte in der Ordnungskonzeption der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, offers a comprehensive review of the basic theories underpinning the social market economy concept. It therefore covers ordoliberalism in depth. It gives little attention, however, to the relationship of ordoliberalism to German or European policies and institutions, focusing rather on an exhaustive description of the values of freedom, equality, and justice as they are reflected in the social market economy philosophy.

possible at the time. Note that this means that if ordoliberals can be criticized for reflecting the social conservatism of the *Mittelstand*, with the priority it gives to social attachments to family and community, they cannot be simultaneously be criticized for treating individual self-interest as the highest good. Dyson admires their moral integrity but shows dispassionately that they were silent or self-contradictory on many points, and that their actual influence as a result was relatively limited. He acknowledges that ordoliberalism has been surrounded by a somewhat self-congratulatory mythology, but he does not for that reason dismiss the myth as false or unjustified. As he notes, many of the latter-day decisions made by Germany's policymakers have been more influenced by American institutional economics than by older ordoliberal theory, and he points out that many of the great problems facing Germany—and other countries—today must find answers from other sources. These include problems such as global climate change, economic inequality, corporate governance, and the quality of public life. Yet he concurs that whatever the defects of ordoliberalism may be, laissez-faire liberalism is far more vulnerable to criticism, given the fact that it has served as ideological justification for a massive "accumulation of privileges of wealth, income, and access to office" that characterize the United States and some other capitalist democracies (Dyson, 2021, p. 442).

As thorough as Dyson's study is, it tends not to emphasize sufficiently the importance the ordoliberals assigned to competition as the best way to prevent accumulations of market power that would invariably become threats to both economic and political freedom. They treated competition as the antithesis of compulsion through public or private monopoly, and as a precondition of freedom[12]. In direct contrast to Hayek, for example, or the Chicago school, they argued that the rules of a market order do not emerge organically or spontaneously; they are the products of human institutional choice. Economic order emerges through market coordination, but the rules ensuring fair and free competition themselves must be established and enforced by government. These basic propositions are not discussed in most of the works reviewed here, but were fundamental to all their writings from the start (for example, Böhm et al., 1937).

Moreover, these principles influenced German and European antimonopoly enforcement bodies, such as Germany's *Monopolkommission* and *Bundeskartellamt* and the European Commission's Competition Authority. Many interpretations treat Germany's postwar institutional order as dominated by corporate business interests (Angela Wigger, for example, writes that Germany has taken "a permissive approach to economic concentration to sustain Fordist accumulation structures by means of large corporations") (Wigger in Hien & Joerges, 2017, p. 177). Certainly, in the immediate postwar years, the iron and steel and coal cartels were extremely powerful, deriving their power not only from their control over industrial resources critically needed for rebuilding but also by the corporatist ties with the centralized labor unions in their sectors. The ordoliberals, and Erhard, fought hard to minimize their influence, both in Germany, and then at the European level (Abelshauser 2004, p. 166 and passim). It is more than a little ironic that the American occupation

[12] Cf. Böhm et al. (1937), and in Eucken's many writings.

authorities, who had ardently backed most of Erhard's market-oriented policies, turned in the opposite direction once the Korean War broke out. A memorandum from John McCloy on March 6, 1951, demanded "a significant modification of the free market economy" and direct government intervention into production, prices, and currency in order to serve western war needs, making further US assistance conditional on German's compliance with its demands. Erhard made minimal concessions to appease the United States, confining cartel arrangements to the mining and metallurgy industries. In recent decades, industrial concentration has in fact declined, in contrast to the United States[13]. Meantime, the *Mittelstand* of small and medium-scale firms, which contribute over half of German value-added and over one third of total turnover, continuous to remain crucial.

Germany's principle of social partnership is an element of the social market economy ideal, which contains ordoliberal ideas as well as an elite consensus that social peace is required to avert polarization and extremism as well as to achieve the collective commitment to high productivity that enables Germany to succeed in a globally competitive economy. Ordoliberalism is not the source of the social partnership model, but it influenced some of its major institutions.

VIII. Ordoliberalism and German Postwar Institutions

The Federal Republic's first economic minister, Ludwig Erhard, was strongly influenced by ordoliberal thinking and brought both Eucken and Böhm into his government. However, Erhard drew on ordoliberal thinking selectively, basing his decisions on his own judgment about how and when to apply principles to immediate problems. A practical thinker rather than a theoretician, Erhard combined a firm set of doctrinal inclinations with a forceful personality, a gift at articulating his thinking publicly, and a politician's pragmatic instinct about when to compromise and when to stand firm. In contrast, ordoliberal theoreticians such as Eucken and Böhm tended to view policy issues in a more abstract philosophical light. It was under Erhard that the ordoliberal philosophy had its maximum impact on government policy, although Eucken, Böhm, and other ordoliberals frequently opposed him on particular issues.

Erhard remained in power through 1966, serving as chancellor in the last three years of the period. In 1966, the government changed hands and a new Social Democratic government entered government. Although the new government retained many of the initial institutional choices made by the CDU government, they introduced a number of policies drawn from Keynesian theory. They saw their program as building on, not overturning, the paradigm established in the first two decades. As the SPD leader Karl Schiller put it, their vision was a "synthesis of Freiburg imperative and Keynesian message" or a "magic triangle" that "incorporated concepts of the Keynesian model, the Freiburg School, and the neoclassical synthesis

[13] See Monopolkommission (2018); Heidorn and Weche (2021); Wambach and Weche (2018). Note that as in the United States, markups have risen across all industries, although they have risen more for firms in more concentrated branches and those with higher market power. However, profit margins are not rising when weighted by revenue shares.

for economic policy decisions"[14]. Consequently, it is not the case that Germany adopted a Keynesian program at any point. Germany has selectively employed policy measures aimed at boosting productivity, growth and employment without greatly expanding public sector employment or redistributive fiscal and social policy measures. Its system of social insurance remains firmly based in employment, but over the decades has expanded both coverage and financing to include more state budget subsidies and, most recently, a growing element of private provision (such as the "Riester pensions"). The change in German institutions has been continuous and adaptive, very different from the perspective presented by some analysts who believe that there was an initial equilibrium that subsequently broke down under the strain of inflation in the 1970s, globalizing pressures for liberalization or reunification (Cf. Streeck, 2010; Thelen, 2014).

Crucial elements of the social partnership principle are institutionally embedded. One is Germany's apprenticeship system, called "dual education", under which schools and firms share responsibility for providing technical and vocational education under a system of relations balancing cooperation and competition between business and labor (Remington, 2018). Other features of industrial relations also work to realize the broad principle of "social partnership" between labor and capital, which is embedded in multiple institutions. Over time it has evolved incrementally, loosening in some respects as corporatist elements have given way to more flexible labor markets, and tightening in others as the courts have defined the rights of employees and employers more concretely. One of the most distinctive forms of the principle is Germany's co-determination system, under which workers are guaranteed representation on the governing boards—both the management board and supervisory board—of firms, as well as the enterprise-level works councils. Co-determination has been regularly modified and extended (Streeck & Hassel, 2004, p. 103). Workers' right to participate in the selection of the director of a firm, granted by federal law, was upheld by the Constitutional Court over strong objections by business. The system of labor courts, which adjudicate labor disputes and are composed of representatives of business, labor and government, constitute another element of the social partnership principle (Streeck, 1984). Because collective bargaining has been relatively successful in balancing wage and price restraint, the ordoliberals' insistence on price stability has been realized for the most part without imposing fiscal or monetary austerity. Austerity has never been an instrument or goal of German economic policy[15]. The objective of the social market economy is to ensure that sacrifices and gains are shared widely.

Moreover, so far at least, social partnership has not produced stasis or declining productivity. Rather, as Abelshauser argues, it encourages the sharing of the gains of productivity growth among workers and employers (Abelshauser 2004, pp. 431–433).

[14] "Synthese von Freiburger imperativ und Keynesianischen Botschaft." (Quoted in Abelshauser, 2004, p. 413; cf. Katzenstein, 1987, p. 112).

[15] A point Erhard often made. See, for example, Ludwig Erhard (2020, p. 331). To be sure, following the Maastricht Treaty, Germany adopted a constitutional limit on national debt (the so-called "debt brake"). This has not required policies of austerity, however, because economic growth has enabled the budget to avoid running a structural deficit since 2012 and to reduce the state debt.

Although the social partnership concept is not based in ordoliberalism, it is part of the broader social market economy philosophy, and in practice has worked to constrain wage-price pressure and thus to maintain price stability. Because it has constrained competition between labor and business within a cooperative framework, it has helped to preserve the constitutional protections for equality of political rights.

Establishment of the new postwar policy paradigm in the late 1940s represented a sharp break from past systems, although the new system certainly adapted some older elements of Germany's political economy while introducing new features grounded in ordoliberal theory. Since then, Germany has not adopted a new policy paradigm[16]. Germany's liberalization in the late 1940s laid the foundations for a system that retained fundamental features of the original postwar system while adjusting it to new demands. 70 years later, Germany's postwar performance compares favorably to any other advanced capitalist democracy with respect to concrete outcomes such as the growth and distribution of incomes, employment and labor force trends, the quality of public goods, the extent of poverty and deep poverty, the vigor of electoral democracy, and the protection of political rights. Germany has not sacrificed equity to efficiency under the pressure of European integration, globalization, automation, social change, or unification or succumbed to polarization and extremism. Polarization and extremism are present in Germany, as they are elsewhere in Europe, but are nowhere near American levels. Growth has generated widely shared prosperity, as the ordoliberals hoped, reinforcing the stability of the original democratic compact.

IX. "Early Winners"

One final point. It is regrettable that the architects of market liberalization in Russia and other post-communist countries never took Germany's postwar reconstruction as a source of usable ideas. To be sure, Germany's wartime economy differed from that of the Soviet-type communist systems; the Hitler regime had imposed high centralization of control but not full nationalization of property relations. On the other hand, the suppression of workers' rights, consumption, entrepreneurship and market exchange under a totalitarian mobilization regime might have been considered at least somewhat relevant as a comparison. Moreover, the ordoliberal doctrine that economic and political freedom must rest in a competitive order that is formed and enforced by the state could have been considered useful guidance. In the event, however, the post-Soviet architects of reform and their Western advisors never referred to ordoliberal theory. Their theory rested rather on simple neoliberal dichotomies—private property rights must replace state ownership; market exchange must replace central planning; politicians serve special interests, never the public good, therefore government's role must be minimized (for example, Boycko et al., 1995). The concern of the reformers lay in preventing inflationary spending pressure, not in creating or protecting competition among producers.

[16] I use the term policy paradigm in the sense in which Peter Hall defines the term: a major change of course entailing not only a shift in the policy instruments and operating procedures of government, but a significant alteration in the basic hierarchy of policy goals as well (Hall, 1993).

Although they recognized the immense concentrations of market power held by Soviet industrial enterprises, most reformers believed that a greater threat to reform than monopoly power was the large monetary overhang and repressed demand that would drive up prices. Therefore, tightening monetary and fiscal policy coupled with deregulation of prices would cure the harms done by monopoly (Kroll, 1991). Moreover, some believed, giant enterprises were potentially more efficient than their daughter enterprises and would be attractive targets for private investment. Market competition would follow of its own accord so long as privatization and the emergence of a new, private sector proceeded unimpaired (Broadman, 2000; Johnson & Kroll, 1991; Joskow et al., 1994; Leitzel, 1994). As James Leitzel put it, "industrial concentration is not an important reform issue, irrespective of its detrimental impact on the Russian economy" (Leitzel, 1994, p. 46). This position was justified by the faith that "with free enterprise, barriers to entry will largely disappear." Market reform would do "much of this work automatically" (Leitzel, 1994, p. 49). Although major firms might seek protection from being forced to privatize, they were more likely to be seeking "better terms for privatization." The possibility that monopolistic firms might prefer to invest in seeking protection from competition by allying with sympathetic political forces to taking entrepreneurial risk was ignored. Rather, reformers simply assumed that once property rights were established, competition would spontaneously arise and dissipate monopoly rents. That corporate managers and politicians would prefer to share rents by blocking competition seems not to have occurred to the reformers.

In fact, from the very beginning, liberalization was fatally compromised by manipulation on the part of insiders. Spontaneous privatization of state assets began well before shock therapy. Numerous small firms sprang up, often using the premises, materials, and labor of state enterprises. Large state enterprises and even entire ministries began to reorganize themselves into corporate forms such as "concerns" and "associations" to be able to engage in profit-seeking activity without risk of failure (Johnson & Kroll, 1991, pp. 289 ff.). The notorious loans-for-shares scheme and the dominant influence of the Yeltsin-era oligarchs, continuing into the era of Putin's "silovarchs," vividly demonstrate the continuing validity of Hellman's insight (Aslund, 2019; Dawisha, 2014; Treisman, 2007).

Observing the tendency for the "early winners" of reform to become the real obstacles to liberalization, Joel Hellman published a prescient article in 1998 showing that it was not the initial "losers" from market reform—industrial workers and urban consumers—who were the greatest threat to liberalization, but rather the "early winners" who most profited from arbitrage opportunities in the market and used their privileged positions to shut out competitors (Hellman, 1998). By ignoring the theories and experience of establishing market economies in post-World War II Germany, the post-Soviet reformers failed to recognize that, given the enormous distributional implications of entering a globally competitive marketplace, it was far more advantageous for those who acquired ownership and control rights to use their market power to ally with those in government who could protect their streams of rents than to restructure their enterprises. They had no incentive to create a rule-of-law regime so long as they could use their power to extract rents and to share a portion of

them with their allies in government. Some awareness of ordoliberal theory might have awakened the reformers to the fact that power relations always shape the operation of a market economy. By itself, liberalization does not create a level playing field for market participants.

Ordoliberal principles do offer a third way to pure laissez-faire neoliberalism as well as to state socialism. As the ordoliberals themselves emphasized, behind ideologies stand power interests. Therefore, just as neoliberalism has been placed in the service of predatory rent-seeking by corporate interests in the United States and elsewhere, ordoliberalism in practice would need to be backed by a set of interests whose power resources were evenly enough balanced that they shared a stake in an order that encouraged competition under an agreed set of rules. However, far from implying the suppression of pluralism by a strong state, a market order based on the dispersion of power across society would be the strongest guarantee against the threat posed by concentrated market and political power. A government in such a system would treat the market economy as an instrument for serving the public good rather than as an end in itself.

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ARTICLE

Political Socialization in a Changing Society: A Crisis of Value Orientations or Asynchronization of National Memories?

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ABSTRACT

The article examines qualitative changes in the socio-cultural parameters of intergenerational communication that impact social cohesion and civic identification in contemporary society. Diversification of symbol production and an increase in the number of agents of political communications, a greater heterogeneity of political ideologies, and modes of political representation shape political processes. To adequately address these changes, one needs new theoretical models of political socialization. Such models would examine youth political incorporation as a particular form of communication predicated on the spatial and temporal design of political events within national communities. The focus on generational differences in the interpretation of political events helps explain youth positioning vis-à-vis older generations. In this case, political socialization goes beyond the processes of the younger generation's adaptation to institutions and value-normative regimes of the "adult" society. It is a communicative process of establishing generational political expectations. Analysis of the legitimating profiles of national memory—those that include competing symbolic representations of images of the future and the past, typologies of the heroic, concepts of guilt and responsibility—is crucial to studying the political socialization of the younger generation. The authors emphasize the significance of both a theoretical and applied analysis of symbolic structures of political memory and the role of iconic

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power in understanding intergenerational continuity and change. Drawing on the methods of cultural sociology, the authors outline novel theoretical approaches to studying youth political socialization in today's society.

KEYWORDS
political socialization, symbolic structures, political memory, generations, national memory, profiles of legitimation, iconic power

Introduction

Variability and hybridization of political ideologies and institutions transform value-normative foundations of political socialization in contemporary societies. Changes in political communicative processes dissolve spatial-temporal boundaries of national communities and destroy the intergenerational continuity of identity. As national political systems are evolving, traditional value-normative generational conflicts and issues of succession among political elites become more acute than ever. In this paper, we address the need to analyze and theoretically describe the emerging qualitative changes in the socio-cultural parameters of societal cohesion and civic identification.

Contemporary political-cultural processes generate new marginal political *chronotopes* and exacerbate intergenerational confrontations. As asynchronous social communication is becoming increasingly common and there is a lack of stable correlation between generational changes and transformations in institutional and cultural patterns, "the new generation tends to regard society as too conservative or even repressive" (Giesen, 2004a, p. 31). The rapid destruction of hierarchical distinctions between the world of "the youth" and the world of "the adults" further complicates intergenerational relations and increases the degree of their variability and arbitrariness.

Geopolitical processes and digital innovations in economic and political communications have exacerbated authoritarian tendencies and strengthened anti-democratic, ethno-nationalist, and populist discourses. These processes can partially explain the changing demarcations in political identification and the destruction of value-normative intergenerational cohesion (Fouskas & Gökay, 2019). Migration, demographic changes, and inefficient state policies further impacted the precarious "balance between generations" (Krastev, 2020b). Younger generations fluctuate between apolitical consumerist survival strategies and occasional flares of violent anarchical protests. As I. Krastev points out, a *fin de siècle generation* is a "google history" generation that "lives outside history" because it does not link the process of historical knowledge acquisition with experiences of previous generations (Krastev, 2016, pp. 58–59). Younger generations' standardized expectations acquired from older generations through childhood socialization clash with the nonstandard realities of rapid social change. The young generation turns into a precariat class consumed

by “the fear of fear” as it is unable to rely on the experiences of the past generations for guidance (Bude, 2018).

The novel coronavirus pandemic has further aggravated the problem of intergenerational continuity by increasing isolationist tendencies in domestic and international politics and by highlighting the unpredictability of political communications and the emulative nature of current value-normative orientations. More so, the pandemic has led to “ineffective symbolization”, increased the feeling of purposelessness, and destroyed people’s strife for change by emphasizing the imminence of “the new barbarism” (Žižek, 2020). The pandemic exacerbated the crisis in the projects of liberal globalization and in the social construction of cosmopolitan identities by giving rise to ethno-nationalism and populism and blurring the distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism (Krastev, 2020a).

The pandemic has also exposed the limitations of traditional value-normative models of youth political socialization. The young generations can no longer trust the existing political institutions and the value-based rhetoric of political elites. We argue that contemporary problems of political socialization are not only caused by the expected differences in value-normative positioning of the younger and older generations, as it was postulated in the theoretical models of the last century. The qualitative changes in symbolic self-positioning and representation of the younger generation are substantively novel and need to be theoretically and methodologically explicated to adequately address the problem of generational continuity and contemporary political socialization of youth (Zavershinskiy, 2021).

Sociology, psychology, anthropology, international relations, law, pedagogy, and medicine use multiple and often contested versions of terminology and temporal frameworks to describe generational and age-based gradations of their subject populations. This research uses the two key concepts of intergenerational continuity—youth and generation. In this article, we focus on young citizens from mid-teens to mid-twenties because primary active processes of political socialization take place in this age group (cf. Pickard, 2019, pp. 29–30). We base our discussion on Manheim’s ideas of generational stratification. According to Manheim and his followers, youth acquire their social sense of generational identity through their involvement in historical events. A generation could encompass multiple antagonistic groups that nevertheless recognize themselves as a particular wholistic entity in space and time (Mannheim, 1952).

The concepts “political generation” and “political generational identity” are used in this article to characterize the political unity of young people who were born within the given temporal interval (about 20 years) and who share a common collective memory. Generations represent a “symbiosis of life and time”, because “history creates generations, and generations create history” (Strauss & Howe, 1997). We argue that the political-cultural generational identity of youth emerges in the process of practical and semantic involvement in collectively meaningful political events that transform a young political generation into an adult generation. We do not attempt an applied analysis of multiple political groups and sub-groups present in contemporary youth movements. Instead, we articulate the theoretical

and methodological priorities of the research on contemporary youth political socialization that emphasizes communicative aspects of the social construction of political memory in political spaces of Europe, Russia, and the United States.

In this article, we address the questions relevant for understanding the specifics of political socialization in the context of contemporary political communicative practices. What theoretical and methodological models of youth socialization do contemporary researchers use? What theoretical conundrums do such models present and what are the strategies for dealing with them? What role do the symbolic structures of contemporary political memory play in the processes of youth political socialization? How do national memory legitimation profiles affect the political socialization of youth and intergenerational political continuity? The lack of theoretical and methodological foundations in answering these questions creates epistemological aporias and engenders the descriptions of youth political orientation that appear in-depth but fall apart when confronted with facts confirming the crisis in political intergenerational continuity. We challenge the assumptions that the loss of the previously effective socialization practices among youth is a result of the temporary recoils of democratization processes.

Political socialization is not only a dependent variable predicated on the degree of effectiveness of institutions controlled by the older (or adult) generations, as the traditional functionalist paradigm postulates. Its contents depend on dynamics of symbolic structures of society's political memory. We argue that the focus on political socialization as an independent variable in generational dynamics provides an opportunity for developing new theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding political socialization as the production of symbols of political identity in the public sphere. This production of symbols has a high degree of autonomy from the purposeful organizational or ideological activity of political elites or social institutions. The symbolic, often spontaneous structuring of the horizons of specific political expectations of generations in the political memory of modern society is increasingly exacerbating the conflicts between age strata, regardless of the achievements in the socio-economic or professional socialization of young people. Moreover, the technological realities of modern communications increase the number of participants in the production of political content and thus become a major source of symbolic inflation that destroys political trust and exacerbates communicative chaos.

Methodological Conundrums of Studying Youth Political Engagement: The Dichotomous Research Paradigms

Since the 1960s, political scientists have examined theoretical and methodological aspects of intergenerational politics. They analyzed the political socialization of youth as a phenomenon associated with potential generational value-normative cleavages within national communities and foreign policy orientation among political elites belonging to different age groups. The seminal work by D. Easton and J. Dennis *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (Easton & Dennis, 1969) is particularly interesting as an early attempt to conduct a comprehensive

sociological investigation of political socialization of youth and children. Since then, the theoretical understanding of youth political socialization has undergone multiple critical revisions. The last decade, we argue, has seen an increasing epistemological divergence between the two primary research strategies of this subject.

The first research paradigm, currently dominant in political science, defines youth as "citizens in becoming and in anticipation" who require political enlightenment and should be slowly introduced to political processes before they reach the age of official inclusion in electoral processes at all levels. The second paradigm, in contrast, interprets the political socialization of youth as a dynamic socio-cultural process predicated on the impact of the qualitatively novel communicative phenomena that emerge out of the growing autonomy of symbolic communicative structures. At the same time, both paradigms underline the social significance of youth's constructive political activity and effective integration of younger generation in political communications. However, despite some important conceptual similarities between the two paradigms, there is an increasing divergence in methodological positioning evident in researchers' epistemological foundations.

The Politico-Functionalist Paradigm: A Generational Continuity

The first, politico-functionalist theoretical paradigm follows the positivist scientific principles articulated in the early studies of political socialization in political science. As mentioned earlier, even today, studies of youth socialization in politics are built on the theoretical and methodological foundations of early functionalist theories. Politicization, political personalization, idealization, and institutionalization during the course of an individual life remain the primary focus of interdisciplinary research on political socialization in youth politics and political representation of age groups within this generational stratum of society (cf. Sears & Brown, 2013). This research paradigm is premised on the assumption of common institutional parameters of political socialization and postulates the hierarchical structuring of intergenerational relations (via macroeconomic, political, and social institutions). Socio-political institutions define the political orientations and political activities of young people. The goal of political socialization is to ensure stable regulatory attention of the older generations to the younger generations' political expectations. The destruction of such a hierarchical order of generational relations is perceived as anomalous and unnatural. Young people are incorporated in political life and in the social construction of political culture as future potential citizens through the existing democratic institutions of upbringing and education controlled by older generations. Political cultures in a given society define and shape these institutions. Within this theoretical framework, effective political activities of an older (adult) generation are the cornerstone of youth political socialization and identification.

Politico-psychological studies foreground the view that political socialization in general (and socialization of youth in particular) is a social process shaped by older generations. Political socialization is acquired through education and upbringing as its manageable components. The study of these components requires clarification of the connections between various spheres of life in a given political community.

Analysis of youth politics, in this case, is focused on social politics as a factor of providing youth safety and offers a way to realize their social activities. Political and psychological studies of political socialization aim to combine both research strategies and utilize institutional analysis and axiological modeling while also incorporating cognitive and socio-psychological analysis of how the political is represented in youth consciousness. Within the framework of political psychology, emphasis is often placed on understanding social constructions of youth political identification. Such an approach conflates the processes of political identification and cannot go beyond outlining the value-normative models. The temporal dimensions of this process and communicative thematization of political generational expectations remain peripheral within this line of politico-psychological investigations. In modern studies of intergenerational dynamics, the term "political socialization" now tends to be used less and less often. The study of political socialization is reduced to describing young people's participation in election campaigns and protest movements, which means that this concept is replaced by the concept of politicization.

The Symbolic-Interactionist Paradigm: An Inter-Generational Solidarity

The second, symbolic-interactionist research paradigm postulates that there are no universal normative characteristics of political youth socialization because those are dependent on specific historical, social, economic, and cultural conditions. The symbolic self-representation of youth in political culture is predicated on the generational perception of the temporal and spatial boundaries of political communications that characterize communities at different stages of their political development.

Youth is not only a socio-biological, psychological, or socio-economic factor of social institutionalization but also a socio-cultural category, which explains why the concepts of political socialization and youth politics vary in their contents and account for communicative autonomy of different age groups (including the young). Such theoretical argument gives young people voices and ability to be actors in the communicative processes that enable them to be incorporated in and/or excluded from political life (Leonard, 2016). While this research paradigm remains somewhat peripheral and declarative, it explains political obedience or the level of protest activities of youth not only as a function of an institutional order or stability of value-based orientations but shifts analytical attention to the spatial-temporal dimensions of this or that political event that defines youth's actions.

Claims that society needs a new model of relations between generations, mass media and forms of civic engagement frequently lead to fairly traditional judgments typical of the structural and functional analysis of the political socialization of youth (Clark & Marchi, 2017; Zhu et al., 2019). It is stated that young people are more adaptive and creative in relation to the realities of modern mass media and digitalization and therefore are able to overcome the inertial attitudes of the ruling generation, their institutional and cultural dominance. Older generations must contribute to the development of young people's media literacy and unite with them on the basis of new social movements struggling for civil rights for the sake of the "well-being of future generations" (Chevalier, 2019; Levin, 2016).

This paradigmatic approach examines the young generation's involvement in politics not only as adaptation to values of the adult society but also as active engagement in the transformation of the older generation's understandings of the events that are vital for social consolidation and collective functioning. Within this theoretical model, new political generations emerge not only as local alternative youth subcultures but also as a result of internal generational narratives of political identification that clash with dominant discourses.

Asynchronicity of Political Socialization

In resolving the dichotomies of these two theoretical models, Giesen's methodological approach to the study of contemporary communicative dynamics of social life through the concept of asynchronicity seems particularly helpful (Giesen, 2004a). This approach overcomes the inertia of modernist models that consider society as a system of interconnected sub-systems that should ideally be tightly interlinked to exchange information and systematically overcome imperfections of the past and failures in system coordination. According to Giesen's model, social life functions differently from the functionalist or progressivist scenarios. Asynchronicity of generational differences manifests itself in the perception of social time and the corresponding differences in the interpretations of the significance of social events. The paradigm of asynchronicity is associated with the disjunctions between institutional norms and behavior of different generations and explains change as an outcome of intergenerational communication.

Political discourses regarding people's agency in social, cultural, economic, political, and legal communications are always linked with variable time contexts among the actors of such processes. The desire of political elites to preserve the continuous evolution of social institutions and cultural patterns from the past to the present and the future often clashes with differences in the symbolic perception horizons of the significance of such events among young people. Events that one generation remembers as a victory may be perceived as a defeat or an unimportant event by another generation or a group of people living in a different time horizon. The younger generation can reorient themselves towards the events that are meaningful for them or imagined markers of successful life in the present and the future. This can erode or even destroy the foundation of common understanding within society and cause political conflicts. Moreover, extraordinary political events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can rapidly bring young people out of the shadow of the political experience of previous generations and force them to radically reformat the current cultural patterns, institutions, and political narratives. We argue that further development of the theory of political socialization creates the need to define the concept of political socialization as a communicative process of social construction (self-construction) of political expectations among the younger generation, which is categorized and symbolically represented in the national memory of communities as a semantic focus of events significant for the collective memory of generations. National memory as a melting pot of generation-specific political expectations could offer semantic contraction of age-strata's political expectations. It can, however, turn into a nuclear reactor with an uncontrollable chain reaction of conflicting political narratives.

Communicative Dimensions of the Political Socialization of Youth

Political Culture and Political Memory

In the light of the theoretical and methodological challenges discussed above, it is necessary to develop a theoretical and methodological framework for studying political socialization as a specific temporal structuring of the generational political expectations in the political memory of communities. We believe that the concept of political memory allows for a more comprehensive analysis of political socialization, in contrast to traditional interpretations of political culture as a complex of value-normative orientations cultivated in the process of political socialization. As a form of political memory, political culture can be defined as semantic programming of political experience and a set of interconnected mutual expectations, methods, and schemes that bring individuals together as political communities (or exclude them from such communities) through symbolization and typology of political events in space and time. At the same time, expectations do not imply only subjective motivations of political actions, but encompass the structure (configuration of events) and the internal solidarity of expectations, which ensure the likelihood that the required kind of action will be performed (Filippov, 2015, p. 212).

The primary communicative function of political memory is the legitimation and de-legitimation of power in shaping or destroying solidarity in a given society. The symbolic horizons of political memory bring about political expectations that act as generative models of events of political solidarity, providing synchronization/desynchronization of both individual and collective national political memory. The series of events in national political memory is based on the symbolization of the practice of controlling coercion within generally binding decisions, complemented by the symbolization of the bodily sensory perception of the heroic and sacrificial. It is especially important to consider such theoretical premises when implementing public policies orientated towards shaping and directing national memory. This memory based on citizenship codes of solidarity can overcome the differences in the ideation and representation of the significant past, present, and future that are being continuously multiplied and reinterpreted within the realities of modern political communications. Political rights, granted to all socially responsible community members, regardless of their class, ethnicity, or regional affiliation, form the foundation of civil solidarity codes and could facilitate the transition to a more spatially stable level of political solidarity and national identification.

Socialization, Values, and Temporal Structuring

In our interpretation of political and cultural phenomena, we adhere to the conceptual framework that defines political culture as a continually evolving symbolic network of meanings. This approach, in our opinion, counteracts the epistemological limitations of research programs that reduce political socialization only to values, norms, and ideologies derived from the structures of social institutions or behavioral models that do not account for qualitative changes in modern political communications. We follow N. Luhmann's theoretical argument that socialization is always self-

socialization because a person "shapes oneself in such a way that one lives up to the demands of social intercourse, fulfills specific preconditions, or triggers certain reactions, possibly even negative ones" (Luhmann, 2002/2013, p. 97). As "every system develops its structures <of socialization, which> […] are not predetermined by any cultural prescriptions <or> […] copying of a trivial and banal program", it is also true that communications "can always say yet another thing if one gets into trouble" (pp. 97–98). This can increase variability in cultural programs of socialization and unpredictable consequences that can further "formulate a certain modernity and, in comparison to the tradition, a loss of reality" (p. 100). In this context, the success of the political socialization of youth and intergenerational interactions depends not only on the purposeful organizational or ideological youth policy implemented by cultural and political elites but also on the politics of memory aimed at structuring the horizons of societal expectations. The compatibility of socio-economic or socio-political interests of generations does not automatically predetermine the stable political identity of the community. The latter could only arise if the intergenerational consensus is maintained about the common historical fate of both younger and older generations.

Traditional sociological concepts interpret political socialization as a transfer of significant value models from one generation to the next. The success of political socialization is associated with the degree of the younger generations' acceptance of and assimilation to these models and the degree of its value-normative content representation within youth strata. The social construction of the generational symbolic boundaries, in our opinion, involves going beyond the interpretation of political socialization as the socio-cultural dynamics of value-normative preferences. Without refuting the communicative significance of values that signal social problems, communicative practices encompass more than values, because the latter are too abstract. Values are "nothing other than a highly mobile set of viewpoints, rather than a fixed set of viewpoints. They do not, as ideas once did, resemble fixed stars, but rather balloons kept on hand to be inflated when called for, especially on festive occasions" (Luhmann, 1997/2012, p. 204). As Luhmann notes, value justifications occur through ideologies and argumentation. In this case, "ideology commits the big crimes and argumentation engages in the petty stratagems" (p. 205). Values in modern communication often lack the important qualities inherent in other symbolic carriers, and their significance in decision-making is highly controversial. Being increasingly more diverse and hybrid, modern ideologies offer a clear example of that. Labeled as conservative or progressive, dominant ideologies lose their semantic certainty. For example, the communist ideology in modern Russia has included conservative and religious value orientations in its content. In modern Ukraine and some post-socialist countries, the liberal-democratic rhetoric is combined with the radical-conservative ethno-nationalist discourse of "land and blood". In the political space of the EU and the United States, both liberal and conservative parties utilize the rhetoric of fake news and tend to make populist claims.

We believe that when modeling a dialogue between generational communities, it is necessary to account for the differences in the interpretation of the past, present, and future. The peculiarities of their communicative binding in the symbolic

structures of diverse collective representations play an important role in structuring intergenerational communication. When describing the dynamics of the generational political identification, it is important to account for the specifics of national memory as a historical form of social memory that arises through the symbolic definition of the spatial and temporal boundaries of individualized communities. Like other forms of social memory, it is a diachronic clash between different interests and meanings, rather than a form of their static expression (Olick, 2016). At the same time, it is important to account for the autonomy and spontaneity of social memory as a dynamic compulsion to action through its complex symbolic configurations that legitimize the struggle for power. The core of this semantic process is the correlation of real facts and events with the systems of symbols that generate sacred objects (Alexander, 2006a, 2012a). Formation of collective ideas about the political past, present and future is always associated with re-writing of the symbolic calendar of collectively significant political events and the associated sacred pantheon of the heroic and criminal. The symbolic constructs created through this process often acquire new meanings, radically different from the original, and begin a life of their own in the activities of political amateurs.

Political Socialization and National Memory Legitimation Profiles

Despite the rise in globalization and the introduction of novel communicative technologies, national identity processes within local communities continue to affect political socialization. In this regard, we find the theoretical models of S. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen particularly useful. They argued that control over the distribution of values and institutionalization is relevant for the study of the historical dynamics of the inter- and intra-group positioning of national communities, along with social differentiation. Thus, the investigation of political socialization needs to give due regard to the symbolic specificity of the spatial and temporal coding of the boundaries of such communities (Eisenstadt, 2002; Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995). The formation of institutions of national statehood always accompanies and often precedes the qualitative transformations of collective ideas about who has the right to participate in the political changes and what is considered a turning point, thereby establishing a historical event in the political evolution of the nation. The revolutions of the modern era have significantly expanded the space for political participation, spawning new symbols of identity and creating a new symbolic calendar of political events.

While political, economic, and social boundaries in many contemporary national communities could be taken for granted, these communities experience a heightened sense of uncertainty in the symbolic boundaries under the influence of modern communicative practices. Processes in modern social memory do not just reflect the evolution of institutional structures of values preferences of cultural and political elites in the organization of political socialization, childhood politics, and youth policies. These processes are becoming the decisive symbolic triggers of political socialization; they play an important role in production of identities, interests, and meanings over time. The study of the symbolic dynamics of political socialization in the context of modern cultural sociology involves the analysis of temporal regimes and historical forms, levels of national memory, the pragmatics

of its mnemonic practices, and the production of symbolic codes of public spaces (Alexander, 2006a, 2006b, 2012a). This study puts forward a new concept of civil society as a way of life and not just as a set of rational democratic procedures. Since political culture of civil society is formed through symbolic binary coding (denotation) of the existing political institutions and forms of political activity as political evil and good (democratic/non-democratic), civil democratic consolidation of society presupposes an existence of a political conflict. However, the conflict in the civil sphere can be overcome by cultivating forms of solidarity with strangers on the basis of common political expectations in national memory.

To understand the role of national memory in the production and destruction of national identity, it is important to study the specifics of its symbolic figurations that reflect the changes in the past-present relationship. These relations emerge as a result of conflicts between competing memories, different genres and legitimation profiles. Jeffrey Olick introduced the concept of legitimation profile in order

> to describe the unique contours—more and less smooth—of political meaning-making in any period of time. Profiles comprise diverse meaning elements, including images of the past, identitarian claims, rhetorical styles, attributions of present responsibility, policy characterizations, types of heroes, styles, sense of inside and outside, moral and practical purposes, and procedures. The notion of profile captures the impossibility of apprehending these meanings as discrete elements, and the necessity of viewing them as wholes greater than the sums of their parts. This is the mundane sense of a profile: an outline visible only as a whole. In this way, profile looks out from the political field to see it as part of a wider cultural moment. (Olick, 2016, p. 62)

An unprecedented increase in the importance of the political present in contemporary politics accompanies the formation of national identity. Such present becomes a symbolic measure of the suitable past and the starting point in designing a proper future. Images of the past, political characteristics of elites, typology of the heroic, ideas of duty, guilt, and responsibility, priority strategies and practices of dealing with enemies open a wide space for legitimation of political order through the competitive dynamics of various semantic components and symbolic contours of national memory or national memory legitimation profiles.

All these elements determine the direction of the political socialization of young people, while the conflict of these elements can stimulate the politicization of young people, focused on the radical reformatting of national memory legitimation profiles. Therefore, to properly describe the political socialization of youth, it is imperative to examine national memory legitimation profiles, as this will allow us to forecast the emergence, the patterns, and proliferation of identity conflicts within local communities.

In his interpretation of the political and cultural foundations of symbolic representations of the boundaries of collective memory and sacralization/de-sacralization in the context of such ideal-typical concepts as triumph and trauma, B. Giesen described four main symbolic figures underlying national identity—the

Triumphant Hero, Tragic Hero, Victim, and Perpetrator (Giesen, 2004b). Developing the theoretical foundations of this phenomenology of heroism and sacrifice for the case of Europe, Giesen analyzes the transition from heroism to sacrifice in collective identity and shows that in the Western civilization, national identification replaces the death of heroism with an increasing influence of a sacrifice (Giesen, 2013). His observation challenges the division of communities into heroic and criminal. Such obfuscation of differences between the sacrificial and criminal leads to discursive splits in political socialization. These theoretical premises, in our opinion, are very important not only for analyzing the national memory legitimation profiles but also for understanding victimization and de-heroization, which younger generations are increasingly embracing. This contributes to the accumulation of protest potential within the national spaces of Europe, Russia, and the United States. Moreover, images of victorious heroes and innocent victims as representations of the younger generation reproduce this model in the cultural production of the political.

Like other forms of collective identity in complex societies in search of generational continuity, national identity is formed through the social construction of the symbolic boundaries of communities based on symbolic inclusion/exclusion of "others". However, in contemporary society, this process takes place in the context of the growing erosion of the symbolic structures of national identity. Therefore, socio-cultural modeling of symbolic structures of national memory and the profiles of its legitimation helps us better describe the evolution of basic political narratives of political memory that affect the political socialization of modern generations in Eurasia. Consequently, we will be able to better predict the risks and dangers arising in the realities of symbolic practices of modern intergenerational communications.

Symbolic Practices of Modern Political Intergenerational Communications

Political Socialization and the Iconic Power

To examine political socialization as a communicative process, it is essential to analyze how effective symbolic structures are at mobilizing groups, expressing and condensing their emotions in a targeted manner. Members of the younger generation are increasingly challenging the symbolic discourse of older generations and creating novel symbolic content aimed exclusively at a young audience. The recent events in the post-Soviet space (Ukraine, Belarus) and protest movements in the United States and EU provide ample examples of this phenomenon. This phenomenon can also be illustrated by the rapid growth of social networks that produce and circulate sensual-imaginative political content, in particular Facebook[1], Twitter[2], Instagram[3],

[1] Facebook™ is a trademark of Facebook Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, it is recognised as an extremist organisation and its activity is prohibited.

[2] Twitter® is a trademark of Twitter Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, its activity is prohibited.

[3] Instagram™ is a trademark of Instagram Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. In the Russian Federation, it is recognised as an extremist organisation and its activity is prohibited.

and YouTube[4]. Political blogs written by young people and for young people and youth networking communities explore diverse forms of self-expression (Rambukkana, 2015). Both producers and consumers of such symbolic products belong to the young generation, which is heterogeneous and consists of qualitatively diverse groups.

Mnemonic actors offer political visualization of the new generation's priorities that become effective political triggers as symbols of sensual-figurative prototypes of novel forms of heroism. By so doing, these symbols clash with images of the older generation's heroic past. Political memes, associated with the deconstruction of the Soviet heroic content by ridiculing the political leaders of this period or transforming their positive images into criminal ones, illustrate this observation. Something similar is found in the media space of the United States and the European Union, where previously heroic images of politicians of the past, who symbolized the idea of the civilizing, democratic mission of the West, began to be presented as carriers of political racist evil. From George Washington and Theodore Roosevelt to John Marshall and Woodrow Wilson, American heroes are currently standing public opinion trial as historians discover new documents and review old evidence. The younger generation's cultures of memory do not exist independently of the adult world, and their symbolic capital can be appropriated and partially mastered by adult political actors. Nevertheless, they do influence the political world of adults. This can be illustrated by the Internet memes that are born within the Internet space and legitimize both constructive and destructive activity of the younger generation towards the existing political institutions and models of political behavior. The widespread media memes about the corruption and venality of state institutions and political parties mostly target the youth audience.

In our opinion, the intergenerational clash can be best described with the help of such sociological concepts as iconic experience, iconic consciousness, social unconscious or sensory consciousness. Iconic forms act as communicative mediators between more abstract symbolic representations and everyday representations of bodily, material experience of existence. Iconic signs display referent concepts as an approximation of their bodily-sensory incarnations. A powerful condensation of meanings of the profane and the sacred amplifies their socio-political significance in the popular imagination. Researchers note that iconic images and symbols have not lost their effectiveness in the contemporary world. On the contrary, thanks to modern communications, their influence has increased. As J. C. Alexander notes, iconic power and iconic images can act without the help of other forces. Once formed, they become independent of the processes that produced them. In modern society, the process of producing iconic images is deeply diversified and therefore escapes the control of official institutions (Alexander, 2012b, pp. 34–35). Political socialization more and more often takes place outside the framework of such previously influential institutions of socialization as the education system, political parties, state political information systems, etc. The emergence of online communities radically expands the circle of participants in the production of political content and behavior models, and involves previously apolitical youth groups in the political process. This enhances

[4] YouTube™ is a trademark of Google Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.

individualization of political communications thus stimulating the replication of superficial, profane ideas about politics (Stiegler, 2016/2019).

C. Bottici draws attention to similar phenomena. Resolving the dichotomy of imagination as a subjective and objective ability of a person in political interactions, she introduces the concepts of political imaginary and imaginal. They are designed to describe the processes associated with the production of collectively significant images and symbols that create a sense of political reality, political corporeality. Political communications, she argues, have reached a critical threshold in their quantitative and qualitative capacity in the production of "imaginal" images. Not only do they mediate political activity but also become rightful actors and take our place (Bottici, 2014, p. 178; cf. Bottici, 2019).

Iconic objects and signs are characterized by a high degree of physical verisimilitude with their signifiers, evoking a collective sensory-emotional response that provides penetration of contents of more abstract symbols of political identification into the everyday life representations. Iconic images and symbols trivialize more rational or abstract sacred forms of symbolic representation of the political. Thus, symbolic representations are transformed into a mythical narrative that binds together the rational and irrational representations in the collective consciousness. At the same time, symbols and more abstract substantiations of the past, present, and future are complemented by the symbolization of the bodily sensory perception of social reality through the symbolization of heroic and sacrificial events. This is central to the political socialization of youth since the sensory-figurative component at this stage of socialization plays a very significant role in cognitive development, inclusion in and exclusion from social communications. The majority of people (especially younger ones) intuitively perceive these symbols as something simple and understandable, which is conducive to the rapid formation of an emotional community. In modern communications such effective use of audiovisual technologies for the creation and replication of iconic symbols, triggers mass political mobilization. There are examples of this in practically all post-Soviet color revolutions or protest actions of new social movements, which engendered numerous traditional and new imaginal symbols, presented in political advertising, art comics, hashtags, flash mobs, etc., evoked a strong emotional response and instigated a tragically dramatic political confrontation.

In the context of socio-cultural concepts and symbolic practices of positioning the modern youth, iconic power can be viewed as an important strategy of political socialization. Its iconic forms increase their influence on the participation of young people in political communications by controlling the sense of political solidarity in national communities and giving rise to new forms of political and cultural hierarchy.

Political Socialization and Dynamics of Legitimation Profiles

Studying the role of symbolic structures and practices of political memory in the political socialization of modern youth allow us to make several practical explications regarding the problems of legitimation and transformation of political socialization of youth in Europe, Russia, and the United States.

Contemporary problems of the political socialization of young people in Europe and Russia are linked with political problems and symbolic inflation of the structures of older generations' political memory. The transformation of the European symbolic space that followed the collapse of the Soviet political space became a catalyst for qualitative changes in the structures of national political memory. The economic and migration crisis in the EU and the coronavirus pandemic have created a heightened potential for conflict inherent in such processes and increased the asynchronization between younger and older generations' ideas about the significance of certain milestone political events of the past. It is obvious that the processes of political socialization of youth in the space of the modern Western world differ in their dynamics and contexts, in the symbolic representation of the place and role of youth in the political space. At the same time, the dynamics of legitimation profiles in different societies exhibit common tendencies in the asynchronization of political identifications of generations. In the context of increasing differentiation and asynchronization of communications, symbolic inflation is growing due to the loss of confidence in the institutions of power, which are proclaiming unrealizable, illusory policies (Luhmann, 1997/2012, pp. 230–231). The proliferation of digital technologies for the replication of symbolic content leads to symbolic poverty—people's loss of ability for sustainable self-identification and the erosion of the spatio-temporal articulation of events, thereby destroying the process of generational continuity (Stiegler, 2004/2014, pp. 10–33).

To analyze the national memory legitimation profiles in modern Russia and their influence on the interaction between political generations, it is important to examine event structures of the generationally specific forms of political socialization. In Russia, national memory is characterized by a conflict between various politics of memory that can be traced to competing narratives of political identification in domestic and foreign policy relations. The processes of political socialization and resocialization of youth symbolically reformatted the spatio-temporal boundaries of the younger generation during the collapse of the Soviet Union; they unraveled and delegitimized the structures of its political memory. The dissolution of the USSR was accompanied by the disintegration of the Soviet political identity in the search of the newly independent states for a new symbolic political calendar and political narratives to legitimate their sovereignty. These events triggered the processes of symbolic coding, brought about an intense competition of generational political narratives and inspired a frantic search for a unifying political narrative that would be adequate to the socio-cultural characteristics of political memory in Russia. Such dynamics of political communications inevitably diversify and misalign generational time horizons and manifest themselves as novel symbolic representations and iconic content. In modern Russia, the political discourses of different generational strata offer qualitatively different interpretations of the founding political events significant for these generations. Some continue to focus on the events of the Soviet Union while others fixate on "New Russia" and the related traumatic events.

The dynamics of the profiles of the legitimation of national memory of modern Russia can be interpreted as an evolution from the grand narrative of new Russia

in the 1990s to the narrative of national consolidation in the 2000s. While the grand narrative was oriented towards Russia's entry into the civilized community and followed the principles of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, the consolidation rhetoric of the early 21st century explored more stable forms of national identity and adhered to the symbolic core of civil patriotism. Focusing on the Russian elites' memory politics, some authors distinguish two large periods characterized by different concepts of the official historical narrative—new Russia and millennial Russia (Malinova, 2019).

Liberal-minded researchers often argue that the narrative turn of the early 2000s, both in Russia and in some Eastern European countries, which led to the development of novel forms of national patriotism, should be considered a particular, isolationist tendency (Koposov, 2018). We, however, subscribe to the view upheld by the scholars who, despite all the critical reservations about the risks of abandoning the paradigm of persistent study of the painful past, note the fundamental importance of consolidating Russian society around positive national symbols (Malinova, 2021, pp. 1001–1002). We believe that such narrative turn in the evolution of Russia's national identity can smooth out the intense conflict of the intergenerational political narratives that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and facilitate compatibility of the ground generational expectations in contemporary Russia.

The temporal differences between generations affected political socialization of the Soviet youth in the late 1980s. In the late USSR, the Soviet heroic meta-narrative was devalued and the iconic images of young people in politics were desacralized. The images of Soviet heroes acquired negative or criminal features, and antiheroes, on the contrary, were endowed with the features of the heroic and sacrificial. These processes concluded the early 2000s with the appearance of new national memory legitimation profiles.

The political and cultural realities in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Russia show that symbolic representations of heroic fighters from the Soviet legacy did not have an expected socializing effect on youth. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the discourse of the heroic within the youth strata began to transform into the discourse of victimization. At present, changes and conflicts in the national memory legitimization profile are quite obvious, due, inter alia, to the inconsistency of the temporal horizons of generations. The politicization of racial, gender, social distinctions and, accordingly, the re-definition of such iconic concepts as "victim", "criminal", and "external enemy" contribute to increased tensions and fragmentations within and across the generations.

Cases of recent racial unrest in the United States exhibit similar tendencies. Radical reformatting of the images of the heroic, sacrificial, and the criminal, the death of the triumphant hero and the sacralization of the victim overturn the referent symbols used by mass protest movements, whose active participants were representatives of youth strata.

While problems of youth political participation in public life are evident worldwide, we can be cautiously optimistic regarding the adaptation of the younger and older generations to the ongoing communicative turbulences both in their national spaces and in the space of political communities. European social scientists who study youth

political participation as a form of political socialization show that, despite the global wave of youth protests and the growth in repressive practices of state institutions, the political activity of youth, intent on making the world a better place for all, contributes to the democratization of societies and establishes a constructive dialogue with the authorities and older generations (Pickard, 2019; Pickard & Bessant, 2018). Similarly, E.B. Shestopal, an authoritative scholar who has researched the dynamics of political socialization in Russia over the past two decades, points out that the results of the young people's political inclusion and the resocialization of older generations in post-Soviet society were mainly positive (Shestopal, 2019).

At the same time, the research focus on communicative strategies in studies of the intergenerational dynamics of political socialization methodologically captures the high degree of heterogeneity of this process. In the political spaces of Russia and Western countries, the national memory legitimation profiles are radically different. Accordingly, the political socialization of young people with their interpretation of basic constituent events and the conflict of practices of victimization and heroization follow divergent scenarios and engender discursive schisms and memory wars. Thus, there is a need to symbolically reformat the memory of older generations and construct new national memory legitimation profiles of new generations to overcome the growing semantic confrontation caused by the qualitative differences in the political and cultural foundations of political solidarity. As the generational splits in Europe, Russia, and the United States show, the pendulum of youth political anomie and political activism can suddenly turn into intense spontaneous destructive activities of young people to delegitimize the existing social institutions.

The dynamic consensus between generations in modern communications requires not only the development of organizational resources of political socialization, ideological campaigns to maintain the importance of its heroic content or the axioms of political values but it also necessitates the participation of young people in the symbolic construction of the political future and active creation of its event content. This content could be both real and imaginary, and it can bring the expectations of young people from beyond the horizon of the consumerist everyday reality and overcome the radical political rejection of the older generations.

Conclusion

The semantic diversification and moral devaluation of communications in modern communities and the increasing variability and hybridization of political ideologies and institutions that implement policies of generational succession necessitate a significant correction of the research agenda in understanding political socialization and positioning of youth in modern society. In the realities of modern political communications, one needs to account for the risks of increasing asynchrony (different timing) of differences in the perception of social time by generations and the consequent changes in the semantics, axioms, and even aesthetics of formative political events.

The more traditional research agenda deals with the political socialization of youth as politicization of an age-minority (future or novice citizens) that emerges as

an outcome of political activities of the older (adult) generations. In our opinion, it would be more productive to supplement this research agenda with studies that focus on political socialization as a set of socially constructed communicative practices of political expectations among young people as those expectations are categorized and symbolically reflected within the national memory of communities. According to this approach, young people do not just adapt to the institutions and ideological regimes of an adult society, but actively select and challenge political ideas of the older generations by creating their own, often alternative narratives of national identity. Such narratives are ambivalent in a communicative sense and can destroy the dominant ideas, but they can also act as a connecting link between the projections of the past and future and can strengthen civic identity.

This perspective on youth political socialization better captures the dynamics of temporal structuring in the communicative spaces of the contemporary political memory and explains the successes or failures of the political socialization of young people as largely predetermined by intergenerational communicative (mis)understanding. The study of temporal changes in the national memory legitimation profiles sheds light on the dynamics of the conflict between its various competing semantic components (images of the past and the future, political characteristics of elites, typology of the heroic, ideas of duty, guilt, and responsibility, priority strategies and practices of dealing with friends and enemies). All these elements determine the direction of youth political socialization, and their conflict can act as a semantic trigger for reformatting of the existing profiles of political legitimation.

In the context of socio-cultural studies of the pragmatics and symbolic effectiveness of political socialization, the production of sensual images of the political is a primary strategy to implement modern iconic power, whose symbolic forms significantly affect the positioning of young people in political communications by cultivating/suppressing the sense of generational solidarity and generating new forms of political activism/escapism. Iconic images addressed to and produced by young people play a significant role in political and cultural reproduction and modern political socialization. These images are a significant resource for studying the processes of social construction and replication of political values and behavioral models.

The aforementioned theoretical and methodological agenda for the investigation of the political socialization of modern youth and the methods of symbolic representation of its political expectations in national memory through the concept of iconic power explain the struggle between the memories of political generations, the collisions of memory politics of the younger generation with the symbolic structures of the older generation's political memory. Society responds to the fast cultural, political, economic, and technological transformations sweeping the globe by changing national memory legitimation profiles within its constituent strata—images of the past clash with images of the future; the key symbolic figures of the heroic are transformed; young generations radically redefine the notions of duty, guilt, and responsibility for events of the past and of the present. It is in this context that we observe the rise in conflicts between different political generations. A better understanding of these dynamics can help prevent or relieve the intergenerational tensions in contemporary politics.

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ARTICLE

Digital Fears Experienced by Young People in the Age of Technoscience

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ABSTRACT

With the advance of technoscience, digital technologies have started to reshape the traditional array of social fears experienced by younger generations by triggering the appearance of new, digital fears. In this article, we undertake a sociological analysis to investigate the concept of digital fears both theoretically and empirically. Our survey conducted among Russian young people aged 18–30 in 2020 (N = 1050, Sverdlovsk region, RF) showed that fear is a distinctive characteristic of the social well-being of this generation. Moreover, fear tends to become more pronounced both quantitatively (i.e., the frequency of emergence) and qualitatively (i.e. the emergence of new types). The identified digital fears of young people allowed us to draw their typology. Depending on the specifics of digital threat, the following types were distinguished: those associated with impact and control, crime and security, communication and activity, technology and innovation, and social inequality. We show that the expanding

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range of social fears leads to the formation of catastrophic thinking in young people, thereby affecting the level of social well-being and distorting the image of the future.

KEYWORDS
social fears, digital fears, digitalization, youth, social well-being

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Introduction

Fear is an emotion that accompanies almost every person throughout life. Some fears become a source for mobilization and activity, while others may lead to isolation and frustration. Modern fears are associated with the turbulence of modern society: political and economic uncertainty, insufficient protection against crime, new forms of deviation, expansion of various subcultural and countercultural practices, uncontrolled migration, information noise, etc.

Following the approach of Russian sociologists, three basic levels of fear can be defined (see e.g., Shliapentokh et al., 1999; Zueva, 2013). Macro-level fears are global fears associated with natural and man-made disasters. Meso-level fears include social, nation-related fears arising from political and economic risks, inter-ethnic and religious relations, etc. Micro-level fears are those experienced by individuals or small groups in response to health and personal safety concerns. Social fears exert a negative impact on the well-being of a given society, deteriorating the emotional balance and adaptive potential of generations. Fears reduce the quality of life of individuals, social groups, and entire communities.

The advance of technoscience has changed the way people live and interact, to a point that quite a few authors talk of our times as “the age of technoscience” (Reichle, 2009). The Internet, being both an outcome of applied science and a propeller for scientific research, can be seen as the system’s cornerstone and the symbol of the age. On the one hand, the Internet provides new opportunities for the development of relationships and preservation of social ties by facilitating communication between people regardless of their location. On the other, new technologies have become the reason for the emergence and reproduction of negative social processes and phenomena.

Modern researchers note an increase in addiction, especially among younger generations, to social networks, with such negative consequences as sleep deficit, emotional stress, anxiety, lack of control over emotions (Altuwairiqi et al., 2019; Cham et al., 2019; González-López et al., 2021). In a digital society, individuals develop new types of fear, including fear of being excluded from the virtual community (Deniz, 2021; Elhai et al., 2020), fear of missing information (Alutaybi et al., 2020;

Franchina et al., 2018), fear of being microchipped (Chipizatsiia, 2020; Kirziuk, 2021), fear of total social control (Keshet, 2020; Mason et al., 2014).

Social fears and anxieties are a common problem among young people (Alfano & Beidel, 2011; Walsh, 2002; Yli-Länttä, 2020). It is often difficult for specialists—psychologists, psychotherapists, psychiatrists—to determine the specifics of anxiety-phobic disorders (Alonso et al., 2018). Social anxiety is a broad continuum of conditions, and young people with exacerbated symptoms are at risk of developing various mental disorders (Hur et al., 2020). At the same time, as noted by P. Jefferies and M. Ungar, young people aged 18–24 are at the greatest risk of developing extreme social anxiety forms (Jefferies & Ungar, 2020).

Digital fears, being reflected in the minds of young people and refracted through the prism of uncertainty, indicate a state of social anomie. Therefore, it seems highly relevant to study specific forms of digital fears and anxieties experienced by younger generations, as well as to outline approaches to their social diagnostics, prevention, and therapy.

Although it may seem that we treat fear as an absolute evil, it should be noted that fear is an inbuilt instinct that serve important survival functions. Among them is, e.g., the activation of defensive responses (Slobounov, 2008) that encourage an individual to overcome stress and accomplish goals. Through experience, people learn to gain benefits and rewards from dangerous circumstances, which may explain the phenomenon of risk-taking behavior (Bantinaki, 2012). Fully acknowledging the idea that fear performs some positive social role, we consider it a promising venue for future investigations.

In this article, we present a sociological analysis of fears of young people under the conditions of almost total digitalization of all spheres of social life. The current pandemic with its restriction and disruption of off-line interactions makes the problem of digital fears even more pressing. We chose to focus on the analysis of younger people because today's youth, more than any other generation, is immersed in a digital reality, using technology to solve all everyday problems. This trend may have important implications for the future development of society.

Theoretical Framework

Sociological Conceptualization and Interpretation of Fear

The phenomenon of fear in modern scientific discourse appears as an interdisciplinary subject of research. In order to analyze the concept of fear from a sociological perspective, fear should first be defined as a social phenomenon.

The Polish researcher A. Kępiński distinguished the biological and social components of fear (Kępiński, 1977). Thus, biological fear is caused by life-threatening situations, with the threat coming both from the outside (social environment) and from within (violation of the internal balance in the individual's body). The nature of biological fear, as a rule, is an instinctive response towards danger, which most often manifests itself in the desire to run away or hide. This type of fear, therefore, serves a protective function.

Unlike biological, social fear is a complex social phenomenon, which have cultural roots, according to R. Watson (1995). Following a review of more than 600 articles on anxiety disorders, S. Hofmann et al. concluded that social fears have their own features in particular cultures. One and the same social behavior can be perceived as normal in one culture and unreasonable and excessive in another (Hofmann et al., 2010). Heinrichs et al. carried out a comparative analysis of the behavioral practices of representatives of individualistic and collectivist countries and revealed a higher social anxiety and refusal to interact in collectivist countries compared to individualist ones (Heinrichs et al., 2006).

Social fear is an emotion that people experience when they expect any danger or threat. At the same time, as a sensory-emotional factor, fear affects social behavior and social life. P. Sorokin defined fear as an instrument of struggle against fundamental human afflictions (death, disease, poverty, crime) to ensure a solidarized humanity (Sorokin, 1954). As a universal human emotion, fear can become a basis for behavioral practices aimed at achieving the common good.

The complication of social systems and social life expands the range of social fears experienced by people. According to D. Sik, fear is constructed inter-subjectively (Sik, 2020). The reality of everyday life is an inter-subjective world shared by people (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Following this logic, fears operate and replicate in social systems. Their dissemination is based both on individuals' personal experience of past events and on the experience of others communicating their fears and anxieties. This process is also supported by the phenomenon of growing conformity, which requires individuals to conform to socially accepted rules (Popova et al., 2017).

Promotion of certain fears, primarily through the media, can lead to moral panic as a form of collective behavior (Ungar, 2001). Panic is presented as an extreme, ungrounded fear that spreads rapidly in crisis situations or as irrational behavior that entails serious implications for everyday life (Johnson, 1985; Satawedin, 2020).

Social fears embodied in collective perceptions can be perceived by the mass consciousness as a catastrophe. Fear can be contagious, spreading across groups, communities, and society as a whole. Catastrophic consciousness is a shift of human emotions towards fear, anxiety, and uncertainty, leading to a permanent emotional-sensory imbalance (Shliapentokh et al., 1999). As a result, individuals come to perceive life as uncertain and anticipate looming disasters. People feel helpless and vulnerable when they think about a risky situation (Terpstra, 2011). According to U. Beck, risks are not a unique/exceptional special case; rather, risks are constantly reproduced by society (Beck, 1986/1992). N. Luhmann emphasized that there is no risk-free behavior (Luhmann, 1991).

Since some risks and dangers have an objective basis, the total eradication of social fear is neither a plausible nor a desirable goal. At best, the reduction or elimination of unmotivated fears may be a goal. It should also be noted that, just as fears can be differently distributed in different groups, similarly the real dangers can be different for different groups. A threat may be more or less real depending on social class, gender, ethnic group, age, education, or other features of the individual. There are situations of false consciousness. Groups that are actually in danger do not

perceive the risk, while other groups that are not in danger at all are prey to unmotivated fears. To further complicate the picture is the fact that we cannot know the future with certainty, and some fears concern the future. Based on the available data, we can only decide if fears are grounded or groundless with respect to past or present situations. Such fears are intertwined with the everyday life of individuals and groups, only their direction and scale may change.

Sociologists investigating emotions (Tudor, 2003) argue for the existence of a special "culture of fear" in modern societies. Thus, the American researcher V. Glassner published a landmark work "The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things" (Glassner, 1999). Following an analysis of more than 10,000 newspaper, radio and television reports on social problems, the author emphasized the destructive nature of inflated fears. Some social groups may promote pseudo-fears, thereby sowing panic and mass hysteria, with the purpose of exploiting large communities and organizations.

F. Furedi also highlighted the importance of a more systematic theoretical analysis of fear in its social context (Furedi, 1997). A. Tudor developed a set of fear parameters in order to elucidate how fear is created, embodied, and overcome. This model can also be used to investigate those aspects of social life that are transformed by social fears and catastrophic consciousness. Among them are processes associated with the modern trend of digitalization.

In a broad sense, digitalization can be seen as a global trend in the development of society, which is based on the transformation of information into digital form. Digitalization has replaced informatization, the period when computing technologies and computing machines were used to solve specific economic, military, or social problems. Today, in the age of technoscience, with the emergence of Industry 4.0, digitalization is forming integral technological environments (ecosystems, platforms, services), within which users can generate the friendly environment they need, and, in fact, design their own social reality (see e.g., Przhilenskiy, 2021; Sushpanova, 2018; Till, 2021; Veraksa et al, 2021). This allows social actors to solve entire classes of problems and build an alternative social structure of society, i.e., to structure the reality (Giddens, 1991). Thus, in 2015, the Davos Economic Forum identified more than 20 events predicted until 2025 that could have a significant impact on the life of society (Global Agenda Council, 2015). Among the most significant anticipated events related to digitalization are the following: Internet of Things (clothes and glasses connected to the Internet, smart homes and smart cities), cloud technologies (the possibility of unlimited free cloud storage, smartphones with constant Internet access), SD-printing (human organs, cars, consumer goods, etc.), artificial intelligence.

Digitalization, on the one hand, acts as a unifying and integrating principle; on the other, it creates even greater social faults, generating new forms of inequality and discrimination. In this regard, a comprehensive examination of the processes and effects of digitalization is required. One aspect of this process is the formation of digital fears. By digital fear we mean a response to a real or perceived danger generated by the digitalization of various spheres of public life and threating the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual well-being of the individual and social communities.

Digital Fears in a Postmodern Society

We live in the age of technoscience. *Technoscience* is a term crafted and used by postmodern thinkers such as Gilbert Hottois, Bruno Latour, and Donna Haraway to emphasize that current science and technology are mutually interacting at an unprecedented scale (Kastenhofer & Schwarz, 2011). Several denominations have also been introduced to indicate the society in which we are living, such as "postmodern society" (Lyotard, 1979/1984), "late modern society" (Giddens, 1991), "liquid society" (Bauman, 2000), "risk society" (Beck, 1986/1992), and, more recently, "digital society" (Delgado, 2016; Third et al., 2019). We decided to use the term crafted by Lyotard; namely "postmodern society". However, a clarification is needed.

"Postmodern" is a polysemous adjective used in different contexts. It is used in art and literary criticism to indicate artworks based on the ironic play with different styles and narrative levels. It is used in the philosophy of science to indicate epistemologies that emphasize the socially constructed character and relative validity of any scientific theory and, therefore, dispense with the category of truth. It is used in sociology to indicate a specific stage of society in which skepticism and nihilism prevail, the "grand narratives" of Western culture—such as Enlightenment, Marxism, Liberalism, and Christianity—have lost their persuasive power, technoscience has assumed a central role, and the virtual is often preferred at the expense of the real. These uses of the term, although different, are obviously related, as behind them there is always a fundamental questioning of the supposed boundaries between *reality* and *virtuality*. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, here, we use the adjective "postmodern" in its sociological meaning.

There is no consensus about the beginning of postmodernity. It has been set at the end of the Victorian Era (1901), at the end of the Second World War (late 1940s), in concomitance with the worldwide escalation of social conflicts comprised under the term "Protest of 1968", or in the late 20th century (especially the 1980s) with the spread of cable television and the diffusion of personal computers. This debate is however invariably focused on Western Europe and North America. In Russia, the main features of the postmodern society are visible only after the transition from socialism to capitalism that is starting from the early 1990s. This means that in Russia concepts such as "postmodern society" and "digital society" tend to overlap. Still, if all "digital fears" are postmodern, not all "postmodern fears" are digital.

Some fears we encounter in the digital society are not detectable in previous societal stages. For example, the fear arising when a temporary network failure occurs or smartphone data runs out has no precedent. In this circumstance, we fear of being disconnected from the Internet for a long time and, therefore, not being able to perform the tasks that are required of us by social institutions (school, work, family, etc.). New is also the fear of being connected for too long, becoming psychologically dependent on the Internet, social networks, computers, and smartphones. There are also situations in which the two digital fears of "being disconnected" or "too much connected" arise confusedly in the same individuals, revealing a new form of schizophrenia.

Then, there are old fears that in the postmodern society take on a new form, which we could define as "final", because it represents the *non plus ultra*, the unsurpassable culmination of previous fears. We will give four examples.

The fear of a jobless future. The fear of losing a job due to the increased productivity of technology is found in all stages of the industrial revolution. Manufacturer workers in the eighteenth century feared mechanical looms, nineteenth-century factory workers feared the steam engine, assembly line workers in the twentieth century feared robotization, and ever since computers appeared, service company employees fear computerization. Technologies are different, while the fear—whether motivated or unmotivated—is the same. It is the fear of technological unemployment (Campa, 2015, 2019). However, the "final" phase of this fear has specific determinations. Since artificial intelligence can replace not only arms but also brains and perhaps creative work itself, the fear of a jobless future is emerging (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015). That is, not only the disappearance of a category of workers is feared, but of work itself. John Maynard Keynes (1930/2010) assumed that the increase of productivity would eventually give birth to a leisure society in which the fruits of automated labor would be equally redistributed. Alternative dystopian scenarios are gaining the scene today. When the prospect of a jobless society is accompanied by the distrust of the elites, "exterminism" is included among the possible outcomes of the process (Frase, 2016, pp. 120–143). It is feared that, if workers become superfluous, the elites could consider exterminating a large part of the world's population, or promote ways of life that make reproduction impossible. For example, the current pandemic has been interpreted by some as a conspiracy by the elite against the commoners. The fear is also fueled by continuous statements by experts who affirm that the world population is out of control and a reduction is urgently needed to remedy the problem of scarcity of resources, pollution, and global warming. The fear of extermination is of course not new, but, in the past, it was linked to the hostile actions of foreign nations. People have always feared being *exploited* but never *exterminated* by their own elites. Exterminism is a new digital fear.

The fear of deepfakes. Identity theft has existed in the past as well, but it was a rare event that required an extraordinary coincidence of circumstances, such as an incredible physical resemblance, to occur. Think of the identity of Count Alessandro Cagliostro and Giuseppe Balsamo: it is still debated whether it was the same person or two different ones. However, in the digital society, identity theft takes on a final form, because anyone's identity can be perfectly simulated. We refer to the fear of the so-called "deepfakes", or the use of artificial intelligence to create synthetic images, videoclips, audio or voice recordings indistinguishable from the natural ones of an individual. The suspicious attitude towards this technology is not without foundation as deepfake videos or telephone calls have already actually been used in attempts at blackmail and fraud, or for personal revenge. For example, it happened that the CEO of a British energy company was deceived by a deepfake voice from the head of his parent company. The synthetic voice called for the transfer of an emergency fund of $243,000. The manager obeyed the order. Subsequently, the real CEO asked for a fund transfer again and the manager realized he was being duped.

However, the money had already been transferred to a third party's bank account and was no longer recoverable (Stupp, 2019). The fear of deepfake is widespread, even if it is more motivated when felt by people who manage large assets or have great responsibilities, such as the CEOs of large companies or politicians. But sometimes even people whom no one cares about are afraid of identity theft. In this case, a paranoid component plays a role.

The fear of the matrix scenario. Another fear typical of postmodern society is the fear of an unknown, unrecognizable, totally different, dystopian future. For a long stretch of human history, the dominant idea was that tomorrow would be more or less like today, just as the present world did not appear as radically different from yesterday's world. Nothing new under the sun, it was often said. With the Industrial Revolution, the world began to change at an increasing pace, causing adaptation problems such as the "cultural lag" already studied by William F. Ogburn (1922). Still, in Ogburn's time, adaptation problems notwithstanding, the common conviction was that tomorrow's world would be better than today's world. The idea of progress born with the Enlightenment and Positivism was still alive. A whole series of events, such as totalitarian regimes, the two World Wars, the Holocaust, the invention of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological), the Cold War, pollution, global warming, global terrorism, economic crises, etc., has spread the belief that the future may be worse than the present. The aforementioned catastrophes and risks of the 20th century stimulated a dystopian imagination prefiguring new future catastrophes. Among the apocalyptic scenarios typical of the digital society is the emergence of a malicious artificial intelligence capable of assuming total control over the life of human beings (Bostrom, 2014). It is the scenario imagined in films such as *The Matrix* or *Terminator*. A malicious AI could enslave all humans, or eliminate them at will, by taking direct control of drones, combat robots, supercomputers, nuclear weapons, and other electronic devices that our lives depend on. People fear a future in which they do not have freedom of choice, personal objectives, meaningful lives. Driven by machines, they would be reduced to living and thinking like machines.

The fear of a digital panopticon. Perhaps we need to go back to the Paleolithic hunter-gatherer societies to find human groups in which there was no privacy and everyone knew everything about everyone else. With the Neolithic revolution and the birth of stratified societies, the question of information control also arises. In stratified societies, the ruling classes have always exercised forms of control over the ruled classes. Armed guards kept an eye on slaves in ancient societies or serfs in feudal societies. Both government's officers and conspirators against the established order have always feared the presence of spies, infiltrators, double agents, traitors. In short, the fear that our information could be 'stolen' and used against us is as old as complex societies. In the postmodern society, however, this fear reaches its final stage, once again. Novels like George Orwell's *1984*, Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, or Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451* have foreshadowed societies in which an unscrupulous elite exerts total control over the population by using the most modern technological devices. Afterwards, postmodern thinker Michel Foucault has brought to attention

Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, by presenting it as a metaphor for the surveillance tendencies of disciplinarian societies (Foucault, 1975/1977).

The appearance of the Internet, smartphones, video cameras placed everywhere, and pieces of software capable of reading conversations by detecting lip movements, or intentions and sexual orientations by means of facial recognition, has confirmed that certain fears are not entirely unmotivated. There are multinational corporations that systematically collect data on our movements, shopping, preferences, and conversations to create digital profiles that can be sold to other corporations or governments. Big Data is mainly used to elaborate targeted marketing strategies, but, in perspective, it can be used for any malicious intent, such as blackmailing dissidents or competitors. The censorship exercised by the Silicon Valley giants over some information or opinions of citizens not aligned with the dominant narrative has further spread this digital fear among ordinary people. The posts published on social networks are constantly scrutinized by teams of private observers and sometimes censored. The President of the United States of America himself has been censored in several situations, raising the question of what the real locus of power is in democratic nations. Although the dominant narrative talks about "fact-checking" for the good of people, the social networks themselves have had to admit that censorship is often based on mere "opinions". In the digital world, therefore, some opinions are worth more than others, in contrast with the basic rules of democracy and free speech. The establishment in some countries of digital passports that prove anti-COVID vaccination and make the possibility of working, attending public events, or making purchases dependent on the regularity of the QR code has only further fueled these fears. The fear that spreads is that the elite's control finally arrives inside the human bodies themselves, through the installation of microchips. Some companies have actually patented an implantable microchip that allows users to carry their COVID-19 vaccine passport under the skin, instead of downloading the QR code on the smartphone (Teh, 2021). Especially in those countries in which the vaccine passport is mandatory also to work or do shopping, people start fearing a future in which humans are permanently microchipped like farm animals.

A corollary of this fear, which only the future will tell us if motivated or unmotivated, is that the microchip will not only collect data on our state of health, communications, preferences, or movements, but also heterodirect human behavior to make it functional to the political and economic interests of the elites. Already back in 1981, Jean Baudrillard noticed that postmodern society is moving beyond the panopticon model and the propaganda system, due to microprocessing, digitality, and cybernetic languages. These are his words:

> That is what inspires fear, and what is thrilling. The 'thrill' of advertising has been displaced onto computers and onto the miniaturization of everyday life by computer science. The anticipatory illustration of this transformation was Philip K. Dick's papula—that transistorized advertising implant, a sort of broadcasting leech, an electronic parasite that attaches itself to the body and that is very hard to get rid of. (Baudrillard, 1981/1994, p. 89)

Materials and Methods

In November–December, 2020, we conducted a sociological survey among young residents (aged 18–30) of the Sverdlovsk region (Sverdlovskaya oblast'), Russia. The Sverdlovsk region is a large federal subject of Russia located in the Ural Federal District. As of January 2021, the population exceeds 4 million people, with its fourth represented by young people (18–30 years old)[1]. According to the statistical data (Informatsionnoe obshchestvo, 2020), 75.8% of households in the Sverdlovsk region have Internet access, which level is comparable with the EU countries. Out of all young people aged 15–24, 99% are Internet users.

Following the analysis of literature sources presented above, as well as based on the surveys conducted the Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izucheniia Obshchestvennogo Mneniia (VTsIOM) [Public Opinion Research Center] (Karta strakhov rossiian, 2019) and Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie [Public Opinion Foundation] (Trevogi i opaseniia, 2019), we developed a typology of personal fears, which can be considered fundamental for modern social systems. This typology includes the following nine types:

(a) fears of social rejection (condemnation, disapproval, loneliness, indifference);
(b) fears of loss (work, friends, income, physical attractiveness);
(c) fears of decision-making (taking responsibility, choosing a job, place of study, partner);
(d) fears of publicity (showing feelings, declining other people's requests, public speaking, conflicts);
(e) organizational fears (lack of self-realization, failing to cope with a task/work, making mistakes at work, losing in a competition);
(f) systemic fears (persecution for political or other beliefs, corruption, unemployment, lower living standards);
(g) fears of various categories of people (criminals, terrorists);
(h) fears for life and health (death, own illness or illness of close people, consequences of an illness, side effects of treatment or vaccination);
(i) postmodern fears (uncertainty, unknown future, loss of purpose, lack of plans, meaninglessness, uncontrollable situations).

The above classification covers postmodern fears formed during the pre-digital period, thus giving a general description of the postmodern society. However, this classification does not distinguish digitalization as a basis for the appearance of new types of fear.

At the empirical level, for each type of personal fears, four indicators were proposed (a total of 36 indicators), each of which was assessed by the respondents on a 4-point scale (where 1—"I never experience this fear" and 4—"I am constantly afraid of this"). For the sake of elucidation, consider the following example. The category "systemic fears" includes four indicators: (a) fear of persecution for political

[1] Department of the Federal Statistical Service for the Sverdlovsk Oblast and Kurgan Oblast https://sverdl.gks.ru/storage/mediabank/bjOs84l9/%D0%A7%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB._%D0%9F%D0%92%D0%A1_2016-2021.xlsx

opinions; (b) fear of violation of civil rights, arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies, corruption, (c) fear of lower incomes, unemployment, decreasing family living standards, inability to sustain oneself or family, (d) fear of defenselessness before the authorities. After obtaining the respondents' answers, we calculated an index for each indicator using the principle of arithmetic average. Each indicator could take a value from 1 to 4 (4 points if all respondents indicated that they constantly experience this fear, 1 if no one ever experiences it). Further, the indices for 4 indicators were added up, and the final score for this type of fear was obtained.

The data was obtained by the method of formalized online survey. To this end, we developed a questionnaire consisting of 45 questions (closed, open, and semi-closed). The questionnaire was open for participant input from November 5 to December 31, 2020. The questionnaire was distributed through social networks, websites of educational institutions and urban communities, city portals, etc.

In total, 1,050 questionnaires were collected after rejecting those failing to meet the survey's requirements. The respondents were selected based on the following criteria:

- *City of residence*. Among the respondents, 650 (62%) were from Yekaterinburg (a megapolis, the 4th largest Russian city) and 450 (38%) were from small towns of the region;
- *Gender*. 60% were female, and 40% were male;
- *Employment* (approximately equal presence of students and working youth). About 37% of the respondents were students, 32% worked, 25% combined work and study, 6% had temporarily no occupation.
- *Age*. According to this parameter, the age distribution was as follows: 18–22 years old—57.7%, 23–26 years old—25.8%, 27–30 years old—16.5%.

The average duration of completing the questionnaire was 20–30 minutes. The obtained primary data was processed using the IBM SPSS software, subjected to cross-tabulation and correlation analysis (calculation of percent, medians and correlation coefficients).

It should be noted that our sample cannot be considered representative, because it included young people residing in only one Russian region. The Sverdlovsk region differs from other Russian regions in terms of several economic and social indicators. Therefore, our findings cannot be directly extended to all Russian young people and may not agree well with other studies of the social fears of young people.

Results and Discussion

Fear is experienced almost constantly by the majority of the study participants: 22% experience it almost every day, and 41.1%—several times a week. Assessing the impact of fear on a person, young people emphasize the following negative consequences: 80% believe that fear reveals negative traits in a person, making him or her more aggressive, selfish, and distrustful. For 66.1%, fear is a factor that complicates life, since it makes a person's behavior less conscious, more impulsive and emotional, and therefore, prevents a person from making reasonable choices. In a certain sense, fear limits the freedom of choice.

Fully recognizing that the number of risks and dangers in modern societies is constantly growing, the respondents, however, assessed this process differently. About 26.4% see the growth of risks as an inevitable and natural payment for progress. Conversely, 73.6% of the respondents believe that risks should be fought at all levels (institutional and personal). Women and people with low income and low education are more likely to see an increase in the number of risks in the modern society as a disadvantage; this attitude becomes more pronounced with age and the advent of children.

Postmodern fears (excluding digital fears) were ranked the 2nd most frequent fears experienced by young people (9.79 points), yielding in importance only to systemic fears (10.26 points). The total indicator of postmodern fears includes the following: fear of the unknown and a lack of ability to make plans (2.53 points out of 4 possible); fear of losing a goal, meaninglessness of life (2.51); fear of the future (2.43); and fear of situations that cannot be controlled (2.32). A high proportion of postmodern fears among the younger generation can indicate a negative scenario of further social development, under which the younger generation will be neurotic and despaired. R. Carleton believes that the fear of the unknown is the fundamental fear that drives all other anxieties, affecting somatic and eating disorders, causing depression and other mental/psychiatric illnesses (Carleton, 2016).

Postmodern fears today are supplemented by new fears and anxieties. The COVID-19 pandemic has extended the range of social fears by the emergence of "pandemic" fears. For example, young people began to experience the following communication difficulties: 26% are afraid to come into contact with a sick person; 22%—to commute by public transport; 14%—to be physically close to other people; 14%—to visit mass events; 7%—to go shopping. The emergence of new fears indicates changing social trends that require a deeper understanding.

In turn, these pandemic fears make people use digital technologies more actively and broadly. As part of the survey, the respondents were asked to assess which digital threats they found more worrying. As a result, we divided all digital fears into the following five types (see Table 1):

A. *Impact and control.* These fears are related to the problem of external interference with life privacy through the use of digital technologies. These fears affect the individual's consciousness and behavior. This category of fears was found to be of the greatest importance for our respondents: 55.8% fear for total control by means of video surveillance, built-in tracking programs on mobile devices, etc.; 48.5% believe that they run the risk of wiretapping or being monitored on social networking sites, leading to the impossibility of maintaining the secrecy of correspondence. A high level of fears (45.8%) is associated with the manipulative influence of the media, an increase in the number of fake news, and ideological violence. Similarly, having interviewed more than 3,000 students from the University of Shanghai, Y. Jiang (2021) found evidence for a psychological negative impact of social networks on students during the pandemic. The respondents reported an increase in anxiety levels, deterioration in academic performance, and physical exhaustion. The technologies based on biological intervention raise a lesser concern: fear of microchipping was reported by

27.8% of the respondents, and genetic hybridization (animals, plants, humans) worries about 18.1%. These technologies are likely to be perceived as controllable by both the person (through food and medical treatment choices, etc.) and governmental bodies.

B. *Crime and security.* This group of fears is related to the possibility of illegal action using digital technologies. One of the main fears among young people (56%) is associated with the security of personal data. No doubt, this trend is associated with an increase both in the volume of personal information posted publicly (social networks, messengers, advertisement portals, etc.), and the number of external threats (hacker attacks, virus programs, targeted advertising, etc.). About 42.9% of young city dwellers are afraid of Internet scammers, with the spectrum of threats being extremely wide: from cyberbullying and death groups, to twin sites and the security of Internet payments. The fear of victimization in the online communication environment (Alam et al., 2021) can be defined as a fear of digital victimization. Every fourth respondent fears for the loss of important information, which anxiety is frequently based on self-mistrust (fear of breaking the phone, not saving data, forgetting the password, etc.) and the distrust of electronic devices (their breaking down, running out of power, not connecting to the Internet, etc.). Therefore, it seems logical that personal information security is increasingly included in the range of basic competencies that a modern person should possess.

C. *Communication and activity.* These fears are based on technology-related changes in the way and pace of life, as well as human interaction. About 28.4% of our respondents indicated a constant lack of time and acceleration of communications, which give rise to the fear of failing to complete all the tasks and meet the deadlines. A quarter of young people are susceptible to the fear of being offline, being without a phone or being disconnected. These fears can be supplemented by the fear of missing out (FoMO), which, according to N. Bloemen and D. De Coninck (2020), determines the need for young people to be constantly online to check social networks. This state generates new (including well-being-threatening) feelings and psychological problems in the period of the pandemic (Hayran & Anik, 2021). For example, K. Sekscinska and D. Jaworska, having interviewed 295 Polish female users of social networks after the famous outage on October 4, 2021, concluded that women with low self-esteem might experience negative emotions in response to technological outages due to increased fear of missing out (FoMO) (Sekscinska & Jaworska, 2022). A significant part of modern fears is associated with the growth of online communications (mediated by electronic devices) and communications with electronic systems that replace interpersonal communication (bots, answering machines, ordering systems for taxis, goods, etc.). As a result, the respondents (15.3%) mentioned problems associated with the growing social distrust against the background of an increasing dependence on electronic systems (on public transport, airplanes and elevators, medical intervention, etc.).

D. *Technology and innovation.* These anxieties are related to the unfolding discourse about the nature of artificial intelligence and its social implications. Today, the threats of artificial intelligence have become a topic of discussion in serious scientific publications, business media, and yellow press. Experts offer analytical forecasts with

significantly different assessments. Thus, according to RANEPA specialists, half of the able-bodied citizens in Russia can be excluded from active economic life as a result of robotization (Zemtsov, 2017). However, D. A. Medvedev (who was Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in 2018) claimed (Polovine rossiian, 2018) that automation and robotization would not necessarily lead to unemployment. A lack of consensus, contradictory information, controversial concepts, unresolved ethical dilemmas, and uncertain prospects for professional life result in disorientation and confusion for ordinary people. About 22.2% of young citizens are afraid of robotization in the workplace and the displacement of humans by robots. About 14.6% speak directly about negative emotions connected with the expansion of artificial intelligence. A number of experts in Russia predict a deterioration in the attitude of the population towards new technologies along with their active deployment (Uskova & Astrakhantsev, 2020).

E. *Social inequality.* These fears are associated with negative expectations about the growing inequality in access to information resources and technologies, the polarization of society and the exclusion of citizens from economic processes, depending on the level of their digital competencies and education, age, etc. As a result, there is a danger that economic benefits will be distributed more and more unevenly among people and countries. The "digital divide" as uneven and unequal access of countries, social groups, and individual users to network telecommunications infrastructure, digital devices, and digital services significantly limits people's opportunities (Vartanova & Gladkova, 2021). Today, 12.4% of young urban dwellers are worried about potential digital discrimination. In turn, a new type of personality possessing new types of competencies is being formed. It can be expected that individuals and groups being capable of producing and effectively using digital technologies will become more competitive than those lacking these skills. In this respect, an emergency transition to online learning undertaken in many countries during the pandemic seems to be beneficial from the standpoint of consolidating and developing digital skills. In our study conducted before the pandemic at the end of 2019, 37% of students considered involvement in the modern information and digital environment among the advantages of this form of education (Antonova et al., 2021). It seems important to improve our understanding of the fear of digital divide by analyzing issues related to both the digital inclusion of young people and asymmetric distribution of power between those who collect data and those who are the objects of the data collection process. This process is commonly referred to as the "Big Data divide" and is associated with the issues of digital literacy education (Pawluczuk, 2020).

A number of differences can be distinguished between the perceptions of digital threats by different categories of respondents. In comparison with megapolis residents, residents of small towns fear the following phenomena more frequently: total control and tracking, microchipping, Internet fraud, robotization of work, and the treat of a malicious artificial intelligence. Conversely, small town residents showed lesser concern for the security of personal data, loss of information, loss of communication. Women are more likely than men to experience digital fears in general; they have a wider personal range of digital fears. On average, a female respondent selected more answers than a male

respondent: 5.2 and 4.3, respectively. Women are more worried about the threats of robotization, biotechnology, chipping, total control, lack of mobile communications, and Internet fraud. Our results agree with those obtained by Swiss researchers, who found that young women experience more stress and anxiety in the face of pandemic uncertainty (Mohler-Kuo et al., 2021). Despite the fact that only young people took part in the study, we found some distinctive trends within this group. Thus, the older the survey participants, the fewer digital fears they report (the respondents aged 27–30 and 18–22 gave an average of 4.3 and 5.4 answers, respectively). Older participants had fewer fears related to microchipping, security and loss of personal data, manipulation of consciousness, wiretapping, and Internet surveillance.

Table 1

Typology of Digital Fears Experienced by Young People

Type	%
IMPACT AND CONTROL	
Total control over a person using electronic devices, video cameras, etc.	55.8
Wiretapping, checking the content of messages and statements, Internet surveillance	48.5
Impact on the person's consciousness and opinion using the media through manipulation, propaganda, fake news, etc.	45.8
Microchipping people	27.8
Biotechnology, human intervention in the genetics of humans, animals, plants	18.1
CRIME AND SECURITY	
Security of Personal Data	56.0
The rise in the number of Internet scammers (twin websites, online payments, dating sites, death groups, etc.)	42.9
Losing information stored on personal phones, tablets, etc.	25.8
COMMUNICATION AND ACTIVITY	
Lack of time, fear of not being able to meet the deadline	28.4
Fear of being left without communication, without a phone, out of range	25.6
The dependence of life and health on strangers (public transport drivers, pilots, builders, etc.)	15.3
Replacing interaction between humans by interaction with electronic systems	12.0
Shifting all interactions to online mode, difficulties of offline communication	11.7
Being invisible on social networks (having few likes and subscribers, etc.)	6.1
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION	
Robotization of processes, replacing humans with robots	22.2
Distribution of artificial intelligence	14.6
Creation of unmanned vehicles	4.6
Technological progress, emergence of technological innovations that need to be constantly mastered	4.5
SOCIAL INEQUALITY	
Increasing polarization of people and countries in terms of access to resources	12.4

Conclusion

Today, more and more voices are heard that humanity is rapidly entering the so-called "new normality" (Khodykin, 2020; Tesar, 2020). Habitual rules, familiar values, and everyday practices are undergoing drastic transformations, which makes people's judgments and behavior extremely uncertain. The radical transformation of the way of life brings about the emergence of new attitudes, assessments, behaviors. The unpredictable consequences of this process make the stability of human beliefs, perceptions, and opinions highly uncertain.

This process is inevitably changing the structure of fears experienced by younger generations. Interestingly, the traditional range of social fears of young people undergoes both hierarchical changes, when some fears become more prominent, and those related to the appearance of new types of fears. The empirical part of our study conducted among Russian young people aged 18–30 in 2020 (N = 1050, Sverdlovsk region, RF) showed that today's young people experience more fears connected with the uncertainty of the future, self-realization, and decision-making. In addition, digital fears are becoming more intense. The most pronounced among them are the fears of total social control, security of personal data, surveillance over telephone conversations and correspondence, as well as the impact on consciousness through the media. Therefore, fear can be referred as a distinctive characteristic of the social well-being of this generation.

Consequently, digital fears not only substitute traditional anxieties, but complement and reinforce them, thereby significantly expanding the range of fears experienced by modern young people. The task of overcoming social fears, reducing the level of uncertainty, and mitigating possible negative consequences of digitalization requires new personal competences, including developed emotional intelligence (Campa, 2020), creativity, collaboration readiness, etc.

It should be noted that the digital fears of young people reflect the anticipated, perceived threats and worries about the future society. Therefore, fears of the postmodern society have a principally different structure, due to a growing uncertainty, an increasing number of forces uncontrollable by humans, and changing attitudes towards the idea of progress. The fear of the future is capable of transforming, to the point of destruction, the socio-cultural foundations of society.

This poses special challenges for governments in terms of regulation and management of social fears, as well as implementation of anti-crisis measures as a complex of political technologies for supporting the population during periods of crisis and instability. Digital fears also raise such questions, as digital human rights, digital justice, digital education, as well as the limits of implementation of digital technologies.

Our empirical research revealing the presence of a social problem, such as the discomfort shown by our respondents towards certain technological trends, cannot but stimulate reflection on possible solutions. Even if our research does not allow us to generalize, it is clear also from other research and theoretical literature that digital fears and worries about the future concern many nations. Our final reflections

are therefore not specifically focused on Russia, but extend to all technologically advanced countries.

As we mentioned above, remedies to social fears can also come from public policies. Political leaders can benefit the countries they govern by finding ways to manage fears of real threats and convincing citizens to get rid of unmotivated fears.

We cannot, however, take this will for granted. This would be naïve. There is a vast literature pointing out that unmotivated fears are sometimes knowingly generated by the elites in order to maintain their rule over society (Lupia & Menning, 2009). The Oceania imagined by George Orwell, in which unscrupulous rulers control the subjects by terrorizing them with an imaginary war, is just a fictional extremization of situations that fill history books. The mechanism is well-known. If citizens are afraid of an external or internal, visible or invisible enemy, a government that protects them is necessary. If the "danger" is great, governments claim special powers to fight it. The state of emergency is accepted by citizens out of fear. A prolonged state of emergency may eventually turn into a permanent state of exception. It yet remains to be seen whether the current pandemic indeed threatened the existence of the mankind.

Our recommendation can therefore only be addressed to political representatives and civil society leaders who sincerely want to reassure citizens about the future. If this is the goal, the most effective solution is to put in place policies that have a concrete impact. Reassuring words are not enough. Those who fear technological unemployment can only get rid of their anxiety if they see governments doing everything possible to redistribute the benefits of digitization and robotization to the entire population, for example by reducing working hours or rapidly reabsorbing unemployment. If, on the other hand, they see that unemployment is on the rise and profits from increased productivity are flowing into the bank accounts of national or global economic oligarchies, the fear of the future can only grow. This also applies to data security, privacy, social control, deepfakes, etc. The only way to reassure citizens about these threats is to pass strict laws to protect private information and communications, even if such laws harm the interests of large corporations.

In short, all the solutions that have been conceived and exposed here, or in the literature we have cited, only make sense if there is an actual will to benefit society as a whole. As obvious as it may seem, everyone can see that this obviousness is not always reflected in the reality of observable public policies.

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ARTICLE

From Uncertainty to Trust: COVID-19 Pandemic Responses of South Korea and Sweden

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ABSTRACT
Epidemiological situations, such as the pandemic of COVID-19, pose a clear and significant problem for the states in their efforts to construct and to control their population. The widespread introduction of a lockdown as a regulatory method during the current pandemic could be associated with the need to preserve an understandable, quantifiable, and predictable management object. This paper considers, analyses, and compares two deviant cases of COVID-19 pandemic responses: South Korea and Sweden. In South Korea, the pandemic regulations were dominated by large-scale testing and contact tracing, while lockdown policies have played a supplementary role. Sweden's attempt to develop population immunity by introducing less stringent measures that its neighbours has attracted much attention worldwide. The authors conduct desk research and analyse secondary data on pandemic regulations and their effects in these two countries in 2020. Similarities and differences between Swedish and South Korean cases are formulated regarding trust inside and between the states.

KEYWORDS
trust, modern state, COVID-19, pandemic regulations, healthcare in Sweden, healthcare in South Korea, democratization of expertise

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Introduction

Epidemics have always been more social rather than biological processes since the spread of infections is mediated by social interactions. Therefore, the investigation of the ways pandemics unfold requires joints efforts on the part of natural sciences and health sciences, mathematics, economics, and social studies. In research literature, the success in dealing with epidemic crises is often attributed to the actions of central governments and their ability to foresee the future and lead governmental agencies and societies in the right direction.

This paper is based on the idea developed in the scholarly literature: *modern states (regardless of their degree of democracy or authoritarianism, corruption, and other characteristics) need an understandable, quantifiable, and predictable object of regulation—population* (see, e.g., Foucault, 1975/1995; Papakostas, 2012)[1]. Epidemiological situations, such as the pandemic of COVID-19, pose a significant problem to the modern states in their efforts to construct and to control their population. Thus, the widespread introduction of lockdowns as a regulatory method during this pandemic could be associated with the need to preserve an understandable and quantifiable management object.

This paper considers, analyses, and compares two "deviant" cases of lockdown policies: South Korea and Sweden. In South Korea, large-scale testing and contact tracing dominated the pandemic regulations, while lockdown policies have played but a supplementary role. The other case is Sweden, whose social distancing regulations were less stringent that its neighbours' and which for this matter was widely criticized for its efforts to develop population immunity.

Therefore, our main focus in this paper will be on the following questions:

A. How do South Korea and Sweden construct their populations as a quantifiable and predictable object of regulation in the times of COVID-19?
B. How do these states use information technologies in their regulations to control the population?
C. Have South Korea and Sweden managed to establish trust in their relations with their populations and other states regarding their ability to cope with the pandemic?

These questions will be address through secondary data analysis and desk research. In addition, we are going to analyse the data provided by national governments and international organizations in 2020 (and earlier).

[1] Foucault's and Papakostas' works belong to different theoretical traditions and present different empirical foci. Papakostas belongs to organizational materialism and reflects on state as an organization. He is interested in how modern states have developed records of population to provide effective direct tax collection (Papakostas, 2012, p. 15). "These records transform concrete individuals and resources into abstract individuals and resources in the form of more or less sophisticated statistical abstractions of the population and its resources. This is a matter of the state making organizational observations of the same individuals and resources, and based on these observations it is possible to create accurate statistical representations of people and resource" (p. 17). Foucault develops poststructuralist critique of state with a special attention to the ways to control the population, for instance, through imprisonment: "the need to measure, from within, the effects of the punitive power prescribes tactics of intervention over all criminals, actual or potential: the organization of a field of prevention, the calculation of interests, the circulation of representations and signs, the constitution of a horizon of certainty and proof, the adjustment of penalties to ever more subtle variables" (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 101).

The paper will be structured as follows: The next section describes the theoretical framework of our research. Then, a description of the cases of South Korea and Sweden will be provided. Finally, we are going to compare these cases, discuss the results, and make preliminary conclusions.

Theoretical Framework

The state regulations of social interactions during a pandemic ultimately seek (albeit indirectly) to influence the epidemiological dynamics. In one way or another, any regulation aims to control the incidence rate and the consequences of the pandemic, regardless of the declared goals or specific measures being taken (epidemiology, state security, individual freedoms of citizens, etc.). The regulation policies rely on a particular epistemic foundation and have a "knowledge" background: regulation requires a conceptualization of regulation, which inevitably acts simultaneously as the subject of specific knowledge and regulation or management itself (Foucault, 1975/1995).

In this paper, we use the theory of trust developed by Papakostas (2012) to trace these regulations' relationship with the formation of trust inside and outside the states i.e., public trust in the government and the trust of other states and external organizations in the state's implemented strategy. Social sciences tend to explain trust through particular cultures. Belonging to a specific culture and path-dependency are important explanations in answering the question as to why there is trust or there is no trust between individuals or other units of social analysis. Papakostas (2012), however, suggests that social relations, which lead to mutual trust or distrust, cannot be exhaustively explained in these terms: trust is regarded as an organizational and relational phenomenon. Papakostas' theory is based on organizational materialism. The structural context of trust/distrust is conceptualized as "a social landscape," which includes "what is going on inside, outside, and between organizations" (p. x). He follows Göran Ahrne and Charles Tilly in defining an organization as "all sorts of well-bounded clusters of social relations in which occupants of at least one position have the right to commit collective resources to activities reaching across the boundary" (p. x).

The concept of boundaries becomes critical in considering the mechanisms behind trust maintenance or undermining. Trustor distrust is a relational concept devised by using the following formula: "A trusts or distrusts B in respect to X but in a social context defined by the boundary Y" (Papakostas, 2012, p. ix). An important point here is the third part, which includes boundary work: the division of social space into zones of conditional trust. Physical, social, and organizational barriers are involved in creating boundaries. They divide and "mark up" the social landscape, building certain social relationships within and outside them.

These two different modalities of trust relationships depend on internal control and problematization of the organization's actions from the outside. There is a problem of transparency for those outside the boundaries, while within the organization itself; there is a lack of trust in specific individuals. In the latter case, the

basis is the belief that individuals behave differently depending on whether they are being watched or not (Hanson, 1993, as cited in Papakostas, 2012). Thus, the basis of trust in individuals outside the organization of which they are members is not their personal qualities but the organization that provided the check results.

During the pandemic, the world becomes an ordinary social landscape divided into nation-states with clear boundaries and their particular structures and institutions. Thus, we are interested in the relations of trust or distrust within states and outside of them. Whereas borders usually create trust inside and the problem of trust outside, the global crisis problematizes both relations. The COVID-19 pandemic has set a new unstable context in which trust relations are being reassembled in both ways.

The relationship of trust in the social context Y is determined, according to Papakostas, by specific social mechanisms (Papakostas, 2012, pp. ix–xi). These are manifested in the transformation's reliability of particular individuals and their resources into abstract categories and the quality of their accounting and identification (including the possibility of localization of individuals and their resources as various representations). Thus, the relationship of trust A to B, that is, the trust of external organizations or the state's population, is a question of the ability to trust that the state has created reliable ways of observing this individual and their resources. At the same time, the states in the world differ in their ability to perform this function.

Following the premises outlined by Papakostas, it can be stated that the differences in quarantine regimes in different countries are associated with the following: first, with the specific bureaucratic procedures for accounting and control in each country; second, with the socio-political characteristics of the government's interaction with the population; and, finally, the expectations of the citizens of the country themselves.

Mechanisms of accounting play a crucial role in trust formation. Scholarly interest in accounting stems from management and finance studies; however, it goes beyond, to the issues of governmental control over individuals and construction of "governable persons" (Miller & O'Leary, 1987). In this paper, we define accounting in a broad sense, as an ability of a bureaucratic organization "to be able to transform individuals into abstract administrative cases [...]; it also requires citizens to have a relatively high level of education, accept that they are transformed into abstract individuals and moreover understand the operational logic of a bureaucracy applying general rules to individual cases" (Papakostas, 2012, pp. 73–74). Records of the population are the key source of the information for tax collection and they are also the key source of the government's infrastructural power (Papakostas, 2012, p. 15). Papakostas argues that this ability is necessary for establishing and maintaining trust between and within organizations.

When analysing the results of a certain policy, it is crucial to consider the three factors at work: detection (i.e., testing capacities and their implementation), containment (i.e., how this country manages to inhibit the virus from spreading), and treatment of confirmed patients (e.g., see Kim et al., 2021). This paper focuses on the first two factors, detection and containment, since they are crucial in keeping the

records of the population on both levels: abstract representations of individuals and their localization based on these representations. We analyse both detection and containment with a particular emphasis on information technologies. Trust, as we have already mentioned, is related to the problem of transparency. The use of information technologies helps, at least partly, to solve this problem.

Finally, in this paper, we are interested in the problem of expertise. There are three crucial elements for trust relations to function effectively in a society in times of uncertainty and crisis: relations between policymakers and experts, between policymakers and citizens, and public trust in government (Cairney & Wellstead, 2021).

South Korea's COVID-19 Crisis Management

South Korea exemplifies the case of a country that quickly flattened the epidemic curve with outstandingly minor infection and death rates. Besides, the COVID-19 burden was not heavy on the country's economy compared to other high-income countries since South Korea implemented relatively less strict measures than the latter (Lim et al., 2021). Experts outline three main reasons for such a success: (a) sophisticated large-scale testing with the help of the latest molecular diagnostic kits and innovative testing infrastructures; (b) innovative technologies for contact tracing; and (c) free medical treatment (Kim, 2020; Kim et al., 2021; Lee & Lee, 2020).

South Korea was one of the first countries to report on the first case of COVID-19 on January 20, 2020; by March 12, South Korea had reached the plateau (Park & Chung, 2021). It was one of the most timely and sophisticated responses to the COVID-19 epidemics in the world. In August, the country experienced a mild second wave with 200s and 300s cases daily, and by October, the numbers had declined to double-digits. However, since November 2020, there has been a noticeable increase in daily new confirmed cases. On December 7, the South Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare reported that the situation had worsened, and the need for stricter mitigation measures emerged. For example, on December 12, there were 1,030 new registered cases (See Figure 1).

According to South Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW, n.d.), by December 13, 3,374,595 people had been tested with 42,766 (1.27%) positive results, 90,129 (2.67%) being in progress, and 3,241,700 (96.06%) being negative. Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency state that people who visit temporary screening stations for a COVID-19 test are advised to return home immediately, stay home, and avoid contact with family and friends until finding out the test result. In case of a positive outcome of a rapid antigen test, people are required to give a nasopharyngeal PCR test, after which these individuals must be quarantined until the PCR test result becomes available.

Innovative testing strategies deliver first results in as little as seven minutes. Temporary screening stations or "phone booths" are small spaces where a glass fence separates healthcare professionals and patients. The former uses the telephone to communicate and arm-length rubber gloves to perform testing. These precautions have allowed South Korea to increase the testing capacity tenfold.

Moreover, these stations are disinfected and ventilated after each test. Reducing the space in which the patient is tested has made it possible to speed up the room's disinfection procedure. Currently, a medical professional can take 70–80 tests per day. Active detection of COVID-19 cases thus happens irrespective of clinical symptoms.

Figure 1

Daily New Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in South Korea in 2020



Note. See: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/south-korea?country=~KOR

In the Press Release of November 11, 2020, The Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) reported on the elaborated classification of social distancing levels (KDCA, 2020). They distinguish five levels:

- Level 1 refers to preventive measures when the weekly average of daily local transmission cases is below 100 in the Greater Seoul Area, below 10 in Gangwon and Jeju, and below 30 in other regions.
- Level 1.5 is announced when local circulation begins with 100 or more, 10 or more, and 30 or more cases in the respective areas.
- Level 2 refers to local transmission intensification and the beginning of nationwide community transmission and involves at least one of three criteria met: case numbers 2x or more of the criteria for Level 1.5; transmission continues in two or more regions; more than 300 cases nationwide. For this level, there are supplementary indicators. The first criterion is the weekly average number of patients aged 60 or above. For the second criterion, experts add the hospital bed capacity to treat severe or critical cases, and

this indicator is considered relevant for moving up to Levels 2.5–3. For the last criteria, the epidemiological investigation capacity is calculated. Other vital indicators are the primary reproduction number, cluster infection situation, percentage of cases with the transmission chain under investigation, and percentage of cases confirmed while under home quarantine.

- Level 2.5 represents the intensification of nationwide community transmission with 400–500 new daily cases or a rapid surge in the number of cases.
- Finally, Level 3 corresponds to the nationwide massive community transmission wherein 800–1,000 or more new cases are registered daily.

The KDCA also provides detailed information about COVID-19 related issues on their website in the section of press releases in both Korean and English. In their daily report on the COVID-19 situation in the country, the KDCA presents the number of new and cumulative cases in the whole country and divided by regions, the number of imported cases and the region/country where it has been imported from, and the place of confirmation (either at the point of entry or in a community). Moreover, the reports include information on confirmed cases status (the number of people discharged from isolation, under isolation, severe/critical cases, and deceased). Furthermore, the reader finds the information about the recent major local clusters of outbreaks (their location in the region, the specific place where it happened, e.g., school, construction site, university, the number of recent cases, and total cases). Then the KDCA provides a table with weekly risk assessment indicators with data for four previous weeks. They also provide the calculated values of the risk of possibilities with the chain of transmission under investigation, percentage under management (percent of new cases confirmed while under self-quarantine), the new cluster, reproduction number (Rt), and the number of average critical/severe patients, deaths, and intensive care units available. There is also a table with the ranking of the transmission sources by age group, that is, the most common places where people may catch the infection for different age groups counted since October 1, 2020. Finally, the KDCA reports on test results and confirmed COVID-19 cases. First, the table shows the overall case and test status since January 3, 2020 (cumulative) and daily difference. Then, it describes how many individuals were tested in total and tested positive PCR (including confirmed, under isolation, discharged from isolation, and deceased), the number of tests in progress, and tested negative (PCR).

Further, the KDCA provides graphs showing the dynamics of testing and confirmed cases. Second, the reader finds a table with the regional distribution of cases with the number of new cases (local and imported), the cumulative total number of cases (since January 3), the share of people infected, and the incidence rate per 100,000 population. Furthermore, the reader can find out the socio-demographic characteristics of confirmed cases and groups (gender and age group for confirmed cases, deaths, severe/critical cases). The KDCA also provides diagrams with new cases by the chain of transmission (for the last two weeks) and the dynamics and distribution of imported cases. The report ends with a table of regional distribution and epidemiological links of confirmed cases.

New information and communication technologies such as GIS, mobile applications, and mobile phones are central to the containment and control of the spread of the virus. Leveraging technological advances has enabled South Korea to actively detect recent cases through contact tracing and establish fast and effective communication between the health authorities and the public (OECD, 2021; Kim et al., 2021). For example, in an investigation or confirmation of a new case of infection, citizens receive an SMS alert. In addition, data from cell phones, credit cards, and security cameras are used to track movements and contacts. South Korea also counts mobile traffic and includes it in the metrics. An increase in the traffic volume indirectly points to a decrease in the intensification of personal contacts. Thus, a change in the traffic volume can also be used to assess the consequences and success of the measures introduced (for example, when moving from one stage of restrictions to another).

South Korea's response to COVID-19 and its citizens' compliance with such drastic accounting measures could be explained by the specific cultural context (see, for example, Yan et al., 2020). However, it was the Korean experience of dealing with previous pandemics that prompted the introduction of such measures. Thus, the state and the people had to make conscious efforts to build trust in situations of an epidemic threat. The significant difference between South Korea and other high-income countries is its focus on hospital-based care. Even before the outbreak in 2016, Korea had 12 beds per 1,000 people. In 2020, the number of beds became 12.4 (OECD/WHO, 2020). This is more than double the average number of beds in OECD countries.

Ensuring such a high number of hospital beds became possible primarily because of the policy decision taken after the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak (Kim et al., 2021). In many ways, following this outbreak, the legislation regarding the prevention of epidemiological threats was changed. As a result, epidemic preparedness has become a vital function of the public health system. Following this premise, the mechanisms of interaction between the ministries and local governments have been reoriented to ensure a fast response in case of an emergency. In addition, in 2015, the government's collection and sharing of personal data became possible and legal with the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act, which specifies that the prevention and control of infectious diseases is the only goal of this process.

During the failure of the fight against the MERS-CoV outbreak, the public trust in the state was undermined (Kim et al., 2020; Lim et al., 2021). The pandemic governance, in its turn, increased public support for the government (Kye & Hwang, 2020; Park & Chung, 2021; Rich et al., 2020). Thus, the trust within the state has been reassembled and re-established. As Kye and Hwang (2020) put it, "South Korea may be transforming from a low-trust to a high-trust society". Moreover, the global approval of South Korea's response to COVID-19 (assessed in epidemiological terms) demonstrates an increase in trust in the state from outside its borders. Thus, an organized and urgent response to an epidemic threat resulted from the pre-established and strengthened response mechanisms to epidemiological threats in general.

Sweden's COVID-19 Crisis Management

When the COVID-19 came to Europe, most EU countries opted for a nationwide lockdown in late March, 2020, which lasted until May with varying degrees of preventive measures. However, Sweden chose a less strict approach, relying on providing recommendations for the population rather than imposing mandatory rules of behaviour in new circumstances (Capano et al., 2020; Pierre, 2020). As a result, the government avoided introducing a lockdown and allowed further business operations and gatherings of up to 50 people (OECD/European Union, 2020). Such a course of action gained an entire global spectrum of assessments and attitudes, from heavy criticism to excitement and appraisal. Some experts' estimations of Sweden's COVID-response report that social distancing and isolation of confirmed patients without lockdown has proven effective in reducing the negative direct health impact from the COVID-19. However, such an approach results in a higher death toll (Pierre, 2020). Usually, Swedish statistics are compared with those of the neighbouring Scandinavian countries because of the apparent similarities in their economies, politics, and culture. Other assessments suggest that the time needed for people to adjust to new rules without restrictive measures resulted in higher infection rates (Cho, 2020).

The first case in Sweden was reported on January 31, 2020 (First case, 2020). The country followed the logic of "flattening the curve," but in a particular way, which has riveted the world's attention from the very beginning. The difference in Sweden's approach is avoiding lockdowns, which is a popular measure in most countries, especially in Europe. Instead, the government followed the strategy of mitigation rather than suppression of community transmissions (Sjödin et al., 2020). Although such an approach is often believed to be driven by economic considerations and Sweden's economy indeed has suffered less in comparison to other EU countries, the country's measures, even without lockdowns, resulted in a considerable contraction of the labour market and businesses' closure (Hensvik & Skans, 2020). For example, the largest cinema chain *Filmstaden* announced in March 2020 that it would be shutting down the next day because of the scarcity of visitors (Filmstaden, 2020). Thus, it would be too far-fetched to say that life in Sweden remained "normal" as in "being the same as in the pre-pandemic times."

For European countries, it has been crucial to increase their testing capacities during the pandemic. In a bit more than a month after having reached ten deaths per million population, Sweden and eight other EU countries achieved a doubling of the cumulated number of tests per thousand people (OECD/European Union, 2020). However, there is still a limited number of COVID-19 tests (Viktigt att testkapaciteten, n.d.). In the second half of November 2020, the Public Health Agency of Sweden announced new recommendations on testing procedures imposing limits on who can get tested (Swedish health agency, 2020). The report states that one reason for these limitations is the rapid growth of cases combined with the high incidence of other respiratory diseases during the season.

Moreover, different regions exhibit different testing capacity levels, and in some of them, the demand exceeds the offer. In this case, it is rational to adopt stricter criteria

by which individuals can get tested. These enduring symptoms of COVID-19 (more than 24 hours) are not linked to some other possible reasons (for instance, allergies) or contact cases. In some cases, self-sampling is possible. The antigen test can be done as an addition to the PCR test. The procedure of booking a test depends on the region to which a person belongs. It can be done by logging into *1177 Vårdguide*[2] [Healthcare Guide], or by contacting a health centre. For the former option, if a person does not speak Swedish, they need to use an online translation tool since there is no information in other languages. In some regions, anyone older than eighteen can get tested for COVID-19 antibodies.

In analysing the containment strategies in Sweden, it is essential to consider the role of digital technologies. From the beginning of the pandemic, digital health tools have played a crucial role in limiting the spread of the virus by enabling and encouraging people to get e-services for health (for example, online consultations). In pre-pandemic times, Sweden had already set a goal of making the country a global leader in e-health by 2025. It has achieved considerable success in implementing electronic healthcare services (Glenngård, 2020). For example, more than 90% of prescriptions were electronic, i.e., they were issued through the digital network linking patients with the doctors' prescription systems and the national e-prescription database (Deetjen, 2016). Telemedicine has also been expanding and developing and has achieved its boom since the COVID-19 outbreak. For example, the service *1177 Vårdguide* [Healthcare Guide] mentioned above used to register 200,000 calls per day in the pre-COVID times, and on March 12, 2020, the national e-health hub got 1.6 million patient calls. In Stockholm, digital medical visits increased to 36,000 in April, 2020 compared to 3,000 in January, 2020 (Cederberg, 2020). At the same time, the use of e-health technologies could be regarded as compensation for underdeveloped hospital-based care (Anell, et al., 2012). In contrast with the case of South Korea, Sweden had 2.1 hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in 2018, one of the lowest rates (OECD, n.d.).

Scholars and experts have come up with various explanations for the Swedish government's decision to take a different path in regulating social interactions during the current pandemic and not introducing lockdown policies. There are generally four kinds of such explanations emphasizing the following arguments.

One of the most widely discussed reasons to introduce an exceptional policy is population immunity achievement. Since the pandemic's beginning, scholarly literature, media, and other public domains of discussion have focused on Sweden as an "experiment" in processing through the pandemic to develop population immunity naturally (see, e.g., Capano et al., 2020). Although the Swedish government insisted that population immunity was not their goal (Irwin, 2020), this explanation line has been very prominent (see, e.g., Orlowski & Goldsmith, 2020).

The second most discussed reason is saving the economy while sacrificing public health. While strict lockdown measures are the most appropriate in epidemiological terms, they have severe economic consequences. As the country

[2] a website https://www.1177.se/ or an app.

that imposed low-stringency measures, Sweden attempts to save itself from the economic fallout (Cross et al., 2020).

The third explanatory framework stresses the role of Sweden's Constitution in setting the state's response rules. While such measures as lockdown are ruled out by Chapter 2, Article 8 guaranteeing freedom of movement, a particular set of policy-making strategies in response to COVID-19 are granted by Chapter 12, Article 2 and Chapter 14, Article 2 establishing unique independence for public agencies and giving remarkable powers to local governments respectively (Jonung, 2020).

Finally, there is another view of the advantages of the Swedish approach and, therefore, the reasons why the government chose this line of action. Flattening the curve without implementing strict measures can be considered more sustainable in the long term from the psychological and social perspectives. For example, keeping schools open can be seen as intended to avoid a negative impact on mental health and childcare problems (Pierre, 2020).

Despite the differences in the explanations, there is one feature that they have in common: they all highlight Sweden's exceptional reliance on the high level of trust between the government and the population (Sjödin et al., 2020). Esaiasson et al. (2021) found that from the very beginning of the epidemiological crisis in Sweden to the acute phase in the spring of 2020, the approach resulted in higher institutional and interpersonal trust levels in Sweden.

Furthermore, the way the Swedish government led the country through the pandemic did not result in a polarization effect. On the contrary, institutional, state, and government support and cooperation were crucial for responding to the epidemiological crisis effectively.

Sweden has been referred to as a country of state individualism, i.e., a combination of individualistic attitudes of Swedish people flourishing within a strong state and governance (Orlowski & Goldsmith, 2020). What is particularly interesting in Sweden's case is the state's reliance on the population and tendency to empower the people to play an essential and active role in the situation of uncertainty. The government opted for balancing between the state's response and individual responsibility. Consider, for example, these lines from the Swedish news website *The Local Sweden*[3] quoting Li Bennich-Björkman, a Swedish political scientist:

> It's important to underline the confidence from the government and authorities towards the citizens. It's important for the trust to go both ways because if the authorities start to be harsher in pushing people to do things, you could see citizens respond by having less trust and confidence in them in the future. It's not just about the model of ministries and government, it's also about safeguarding the confidence we have between individuals and the government. (Edwards, 2020)

However, Sweden's unique low-stringency approach has been heavily criticized outside the country's borders. While initially the global and national public discussion

[3] https://www.thelocal.se/

domains (such as scholarly literature, media, other governments, and others) responded to the Swedish government's decision with interest, this interest later faded and turned to disapproval. For example, Simons (2020) demonstrates how the attitudes to the Swedish model changed from seeing it as an exemplary model to heavy criticism within just a few months since the start of the pandemic.

The criticism of the Swedish government's decisions "from the outside" often concerns numerous deaths. However, the number of fatalities is not so much associated with how the country conducts testing and containment but with its treatment capacities. It is hardly possible to talk about any unique "Swedish model" here. For example, the number and dynamics of infections per million people make Sweden comparable to Denmark (see Figure 2). At the same time, the differences in governmental reports published in different countries make cross-country comparisons problematic and it is very difficult to make any conclusions as to how successfully this or that country has tackled the crisis. For example, the Swedish authorities continuously check the list of people who test positive for the virus, and each time it is found that one of them died within 30 days of the test, this is recorded as a death from COVID-19, even if the cause was cancer or a heart attack. Thus, Sweden reports on the number of people who die "with" COVID-19, not "from" COVID-19. In contrast, in the neighbouring country Norway, a doctor must come to a straightforward conclusion that it was the coronavirus that killed a person.

Figure 2

Daily New Confirmed COVID-19 Cases in Scandinavian Countries in 2020



Note. See: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/sweden?country=DNK~FIN~NOR~SWE

Comparing Two Cases: COVID-19, Reassembly of Trust, and Democratization of Expertise

Sweden and South Korea have approached the uncertainty caused by the current pandemics differently. While Korea aims at minimizing the uncertainty to the maximum extent possible, Sweden opted for reliance on its population's conscious and responsible decision-making. South Korea has followed the path of virus suppression with testing and containment mechanisms established and institutionalized in advance. Other countries, for example, European countries, lacking such tools, are forced to follow the path of adaptation and recovery (OECD/European Union, 2020). In the absence of mechanisms for keeping comprehensive records of individuals concerning their movements and infection, most EU countries introduced lockdowns. Thus, Korea's ways of keeping records and lockdown can be seen as extreme measures of population control during the pandemic, whereas Sweden is a case of a less invasive policy.

South Korea is an extreme case illustrating the state's capacity to gain knowledge about the population and to control it. In addition to mass testing, the state uses the latest technological tools (information technologies) to track contacts and movements. From the description of the data that the KDCA presents in its daily reports, it can be seen that the record-keeping techniques are extraordinarily detailed. Since the disease was contained, no lockdown was necessary. Sweden avoided the latter as well, yet without using such accounting techniques. Although Sweden has a well-established and reliable system of public and citizen records (Papakostas, 2012), this was not enough to reproduce a similar effect of trust in the situation of a pandemic. The Swedish state won the trust of its citizens but failed to build trust with its neighbours.

In times of COVID-19, the reassembly of trust occurs mainly through supervision. We primarily associated this tendency with the trust of other states, that is, external organizations, as it is directly related to the problem of transparency. In the case of COVID-19, it is testing and non-pharmaceutical interventions, i.e., containment measures, such as the techniques of keeping records about individuals. It should be noted that keeping records is crucial in order to move between abstract representations of individuals and the specific local details about them. The former come as general statistics, including the presence or absence of infection and other relevant demographic, social, and economic parameters crucial for further consideration and response. The opposite is also important: it is necessary to identify a particular individual and trace their contacts.

Besides, different strategies of detection and containment imply various expertise deployment. In the cases where a state opts for less stringent accounting techniques, it essentially democratizes expertise and decision-making.

One could suggest that extreme measures operate in traditional decision-making frameworks, whereas Sweden is an example of the realization of the principles of "post-normal science". Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) developed this concept to grasp the challenges of policy issues concerning risk management. Post-normal science is opposed to traditional problem-solving strategies like core and applied science and professional consultancy since it implies the inversion of domination of hard facts over

soft values. That happens because "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent" (p. 744). This version of science suggested by Funtowicz and Ravetz involves democratization of science and, eventually, expertise and decision making by extending the community, which assures the quality of scientific inputs to the policy. Thus, the "extended peer community" would involve all the people related to the issue in various ways. Martin et al. (2020) demonstrate how the current policies encouraging or compelling the use of face-coverings in non-clinical settings ran counter this suggestion by incorporating claims which are based on very little evidence and, at the same time, do not include all the relevant communities into the discussion (for example, deaf people).

In Sweden, one can observe a situation described by Evans and Collins (2008), wherein the state grants the population the right to exercise their expertise within the national borders. "In these situations, access to specialist or technical expertise is not a barrier to good decision making, implying that expertise to be everywhere has been overstated" (p. 618). The fundamental premise here is that individuals are able "to make good decisions based on simple and widely available information" (p. 617). Therefore, when analysing the failures of Sweden's response to COVID-19, the government's failure to provide complete and accurate information about the coronavirus becomes one of the central factors (Habib, 2020). That is, failures are not a matter of the strategy per se but of how the information is conveyed to the population.

While a controversy "travels" beyond the field of science and enters a heterogeneous arena, scientific expertise can lose its authority and give way to other social groups with various and contradictory claims. The uncertainty over COVID-19 reinforces the role of science in decision-making. In the current pandemic situation, science can no longer be sufficient, especially since there is still a lack of evidence. At the same time, the most prominent figures who frame Sweden's response to the pandemic stress that the guidelines need to be evidence-based for the government to discuss stricter measures. The lack of evidence also indicates the absence of a definitive way of straightforward critique. Johan Giesecke, a prominent Swedish epidemiologist who hired Anders Tegnell, the current state epidemiologist of Sweden, emphasizes that the lack of evidence-based arguments underlying the lockdown introduction is a matter of possible criticism (Sayers, 2020). Anders Tegnell supports this line of reasoning in his interview to the *Nature:* "Closedown, lockdown, closing borders—nothing has a historical scientific basis, in my view" (Paterlini, 2020). Kavaliunas et al. (2020), in their turn, argue that the Swedish model is evidence-based, that is, based on the evidence the world community has at their disposal currently.

Conclusion

The accounting of individuals becomes the central mechanism of trust enhancement in the epidemiological and pandemic crises both within and beyond the borders of nation-states. In a situation of uncertainty, it becomes necessary to take measures to establish epidemiological control over the population. States opt for different ways to reduce the level of uncertainty. South Korea, for example, has followed the path of

total control and accounting of individuals, their movements, and contacts. Countries whose technological and other capacities are not enough to introduce a similar control system resort to lockdowns and other high-stringency measures, which also serves to reduce uncertainty. Sweden took the third way, in which the absence of evidence-based hard facts meant a choice in favour of self-regulation and individual responsibility. In contrast, the authorities have sacrificed subtlety to certainty in the first two cases. Swedish authorities gave priority to the values of government-population cooperation.

Technologies engineered and introduced to deal with epidemics represent a distinct "style of knowing" (Kwa, 2011) since they rely on visualization to obtain a concrete picture. However, these technologies can be used in different ways and for different purposes. In South Korea, technology is used (as opposed to the active involvement of individuals) to build mechanisms of testing, observation, and tracing. In Sweden, the technology is applied to enhance the population's active participation in solving a common problem.

Social conceptions of what is desirable and possible in the times of epidemiological crises differ from and sometimes contradict each other, mainly because the world has become an arena of rigorous scrutiny and politicized criticism and decisions. While the Korean government attempted to increase trust and legitimate their power and this aim dictated their ways of dealing with the COVID-19, the government of Sweden based its decisions on the current high level of trust. Both countries had institutionalized particular mechanisms for their strategies: for South Korea, it was testing and digital technology, whereas for Sweden, it was the institutionalization of mutual trust. However, when it came to outside assessments of the state's success and correspondent trust in the government decisions, the outcomes were different. South Korea enjoyed a high level of trust from other states, while Swedish policies were widely criticized internationally.

It is too early to say which strategy was the most appropriate. Each strategy has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, South Korea seems to handle the epidemiological crisis exceptionally well. However, the country faces severe problems in the sphere of public mental health (Lee et al., 2021). Sweden empowers its population and reinforces mutual trust relations but has a high death toll and worse COVID-19 epidemiological indicators than its neighbours have (though, as was discussed above, comparability of indicators from different countries is problematic). At the same time, the world community has lost trust in Sweden's strategy to counter the pandemic. The only criteria we can apply to evaluate the situation are the number of deaths and infections rate, which are reliable criteria in the short-term but not so reliable from a long-term perspective. Social, cultural, psychological, and other repercussions can become visible only after decades.

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ARTICLE

The Sharing Economy and Social Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development

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ABSTRACT

In the present work, the authors set out to identify common ground between social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy, justify the application of these models for the sustainable development of society, as well as conduct a bibliographic study into these concepts to identify areas of overlap between them. For a more in-depth analysis, we studied 20 social entrepreneurs and 20 English versions of websites of organizations that implement the sharing economy model. Based on semantic data analysis and latent Dirichlet allocation, the texts under examination were grouped into 5 topics according to frequency of occurrence of keywords using the Python programming language. In order to trace a connection between these topics and sustainable development, we selected words that can serve as markers of environmental, social and economic aspects of the activities of these organizations. Each identified topic has

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appeared to have an aspect of digitalization. The study revealed that the application of the sharing economy model by social entrepreneurs and companies contributes to the sustainable development of society. The obtained results can be used in elaboration of approaches to provide the sustainable development of society.

KEYWORDS
sustainable development, sharing economy, social entrepreneurship, digitalization.

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Introduction

Originally developed by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, the concept of sustainable development has been at the forefront of global discussions between researchers and practitioners for over 30 years. The essence of this phenomenon largely corresponds to the main concept set out in the definition by WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development), where sustainable development is considered as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987). The design and scaling of solutions having an impact on sustainable development goals can be understood as presenting major and complex challenges requiring the introduction of new approaches. In this regard, it is potentially beneficial to look for new forms of economic interaction that ensure the sustainable development of society.

The concept of sustainable development is closely linked with the need to tackle environmental and social problems arising at various levels of economic activity. All governments implement regulatory procedures to control environmental pollution and stimulate a global transition to sustainable development.

As part of the activities of economic entities, new business models are developed and applied to increase the social responsibility (Zhang et al., 2017). Companies widely apply digital technologies (George et al., 2021) in an attempt to identify more efficient means for utilizing tangible and intangible resources. Such solutions to sustainable development problems potentially include the development of social innovations.

The search for solutions to environmental problems and approaches to improving resource efficiency stimulates interest in the sharing economy as a novel business model based on the use of digital platforms (Schwanholz & Leipold, 2020). Its rapid development, which is due not only to the transformation of production and business models but also to the transformation of consumption patterns, helps to create an environment for civic initiatives, including solving social and environmental issues.

In practice, there are various options for forming and maintaining the sustainable development, such as direct investment in social initiatives, responsible business

conduct, corporate social responsibility, quality management of goods and services produced according to modern standards. Thus, working together with the government, companies establish new approaches that tackles the problems of sustainable development.

In the search for solutions to social, environmental and economic problems, social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy release resources and involve civil society in sustainable economic interconnections. However, they should be seen as alternative or supplementary business approaches that provide new opportunities rather than constituting a comprehensive economic revolution.

This study was aimed at examining these models in terms of their similarity and suitability for stimulating sustainable development. From the conducted semantic analysis of websites of 20 sharing economy organizations and 20 social entrepreneurs, it can be concluded that these models can serve as growing points of sustainable development in the future.

Social Entrepreneurship and the Sharing Economy as New Opportunities for Sustainable Development

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development, now generally considered to be among the most important economic goals, implies a balanced solution to socio-economic problems to preserve a favourable environment and natural resource potential in order to meet the needs of present and future generations. The 1987 Brundtland report, on the basis of which the concept was formed, placed an emphasis on integrated development, including economic, environmental and social components, which is understood as managed sustainable development.

Economic sustainability implies solutions that provide financial support to organizations that takes social and environmental perspectives into account. Although economic sustainability ensures a company's efficient operation that meets the needs of key stakeholders, an exclusive focus on economic aspects in the process of reproduction of goods fails to provide the stability of the socio-economic system. The necessary balance is achieved through a harmonious combination of social, environmental and economic factors, which contributes to the integrated development of individual economic entities and society as a whole. At the same time, the economic factor is significant not only for short-term, but also for long-term goals (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002; Steurer & Konrad, 2009; Vachon & Mao, 2008).

The most important factor in the formation of environmental sustainability is the appropriate conservation of natural resources (Goodland & Daly, 1996; Sun et al., 2020), which is not only necessary for solving environmental problems, but increasingly also used by economic entities to achieve competitive advantage. Achieving environmental sustainability fulfils the key function of the sustainable development concept, since it is by this means that the well-being of present and future generations will be ensured. Hence, it is this component of sustainable

development that places the concept in its global environmental, socio-economic and political context (Klarin, 2018; Madsen & Ulhøi, 2015; Sharpley, 2000).

The multidimensional concept of social sustainability is based on the social goals of sustainable development. However, despite the current focus of European politics on "sustainable communities" and social cohesion, there is a lack of theoretical clarity surrounding the definition of social sustainability (Alipour & Galal Ahmed, 2021). The UK's 2003 Sustainable Communities Plan abbreviates its definition of sustainable communities as "places where people want to live and work, now and in the future" (ODPM, 2006, p. 12). This document notes that such places meet the diverse needs of existing and future residents, are sensitive to their environment, and contribute to a high quality of life. As well as being well-planned, -constructed and -maintained, sustainable communities are safe and inclusive, offering equality of opportunity and good services for all categories of citizens.

Such a definition implies that different generations have equal access to resources and opportunities to benefit from development. Thus, meeting the needs of the present generation should not sacrifice the ability to meet the needs of future generations, which includes three important elements: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are combined to improve the quality of life through two critical concepts: needs, especially the basic needs of people living in poverty, which should be prioritized in the development process; and an understanding of the limited capacity of the environment to meet current and future needs, especially given the current state of technology and social organizations. Thus, sustainable development is closely linked with efforts to reduce poverty, since those living in poverty cannot meet their most basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Nevertheless, a correct understanding of the limitations of technology and social organization implies a realization that everyone's actions have environmental consequences.

While the institutional regulation of both environmental and social problems implies the top-down initiation of sustainable development by government, this process can also be initiated "from below" through the active involvement of civil society. Thus, the concept of sustainable development not only implies the design of formal institutions, but also to the emergence of informal rules and norms, in particular, those arising in relation to ethical patterns of consumption (Kanaeva, 2018).

In this regard, Soubbotina (2004) emphasizes equitability in sustainable development, defining it as a "fair and balanced" approach to ensuring sustainable access to opportunities and prosperity. Equity can be achieved by balancing the interests of different representatives of society, whether belonging to the same or different generations.

The increasingly important role played by civil society in implementing the concept of sustainable development mirrors the function of civic initiatives in driving processes of social change. In the course of a more detailed analysis of business models widely used by civil society to implement sustainable development, we identify the potential of the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship in the implementation of this concept.

The Sharing Economy: Essence of Concept and Potential Application to Ensure Sustainable Development

The dissemination of the sharing economy concept has consisted in a response to the search for a more sustainable and inclusive business model that would help resources to be managed in alternative ways, bypassing traditional institutions (Akhmedova et al., 2020). "Sharing economy" is an umbrella term that encompasses various aspects. Other terms used to describe this phenomenon include "collaborative economy", "sharing economy", "access economy", "collaboration economy" and "on-demand economy" (Veretennikova, 2020). Acquier et al. (2017) note that sharing economy and organizations implementing this model are associated with the sharing or exchange of underutilized resources such as real estate, instruments or financial assets (e.g., Schor & Fitzmaurice, 2015). While it is not necessarily a common feature of all sharing economy organizations, the possibility of underuse of resources is evidence of the potential of the sharing economy to mitigate sustainability concerns (e.g., Botsman & Rogers, 2010). In addition, the sharing economy employs agents to draw attention to the exchange and prospects of developing inclusive organizational forms (Frenken & Schor, 2017).

The sharing economy encompasses various entrepreneurial initiatives in terms of the legal form of their business organization including value creation, the utilization of technological resources, and presence of underlying values (Acquier et al., 2017; Sundararajan, 2016). Entrepreneurs who apply the sharing economy model generally share a common desire to optimize underutilized resources. Many such organizations claim that their business models have the potential to transform society and promote social initiatives: improving access to goods and services by reducing the income of large businesses, building social networks, extending the life of facilities, encouraging recycling, etc. Thus, the sharing economy model can be considered as a hybrid economic model between ownership and exchange. Within such relationship models, transactions between economic agents are typically streamlined by actively utilizing various online services and digital platforms.

The bibliographic study of the sharing economy revealed two main perspectives regarding its development. The first is based on the idea that the major goal of the sharing economy is to create an alternative to existing economic models. Advocates for this view argue that it allows for a more inclusive and collaborative financial system, involving equitable production and a new social order (e.g., Bauwens, 2006; Rifkin, 2014; Sundararajan, 2013).

The second perspective of the sharing economy relates to the idea that it could lead to the end of capitalist relations (e.g., Benkler, 2017; Sundararajan, 2013). Adherents of this position generally assume that a shared system for the production and management of resources, as well as cooperative social practices, will become more widespread, transforming the existing economic system to create a more democratic and inclusive social order. The underlying concept of human well-being focuses on social values such as collaboration, solidarity, social cohesion, equality and participation. Proponents of this point of view typically argue that the purpose of the sharing economy should be to create an alternative economic system that

emphasizes social and environmental values over economic ones (e.g., Benkler, 2017; Rifkin, 2014).

Sharing economy initiatives that involve broader social groups mainly operate within non-profit business models, advancing their mission through the development of social innovation. Since the purpose of this type of organization is to fulfil a social mission, such initiatives also have significant potential for environmental innovation.

The advancement of the sharing economy (Botsman & Rogers, 2010) has encouraged economists and policy makers to consider this model as a new type of economic interaction with the potential for sustainable economic development (Heinrichs, 2013; Martin, 2016). Sharing can reduce overconsumption and minimize energy expenditure, while lower prices can increase the consumption of goods and services (Pargman et al., 2016). At the same time, researchers express opposing positions regarding the sharing economy. For example, Dillahunt and Malone (2015) believe that sharing economy organizations can provide employment opportunities, while others (Erickson & Sørensen, 2016) argue that sharing economy employment structures do not provide a high level of security for employees.

Thus, research into the sharing economy creates a series of debates about whether it can lead to a society's equitable and sustainable development. In some studies, the sharing economy is presented as a model for sustainable development and as a driving force behind sustainable economic growth (Heinrichs, 2013). It improves standards and quality of life by more efficiently allocating existing resources (Bonciu & Balgar, 2016). In addition, some scholars believe that applying the sharing economy model can reduce costs (Plewnia & Guenther, 2018), thereby decreasing inequality and providing income for people from all social strata (Fraiberger & Sundararajan, 2015). On the other hand, scientists question the real impact of sharing economy on sustainable development. For example, Hamari et al. (2015) point out that the sharing economy does not necessarily contribute to sustainability; it is time to reinforce the presence of fragile economic paradigms (Martin, 2016), which could lead to a breach of government regulation and possible monopolization of these emerging firms with the sharing economy model (Cheng & Edwards, 2019; Williams & Horodnic, 2017). Some argue that the sharing economy is vulnerable to the formation of monopolistic practices and that this reflects an intensification of an ongoing neoliberal trend that abuses the concept of entrepreneurship (Matzler et al., 2015; Qiang et al., 2016; Zervas et al., 2015).

Social Entrepreneurship and Its Potential According to the Concept of Sustainable Development

Another emerging economic phenomenon, offering high potential for solving social and environmental problems through the development of business activities, is social entrepreneurship. Increased research interest in this topic is accompanied by the further institutionalization of social entrepreneurship in the academic community.

The multidimensional concept of social entrepreneurship refers to business activities undertaken to achieve a social mission (Mort et al., 2002). Definitions of social entrepreneurship generally fall back on those of classical entrepreneurship

(Abu-Saifan, 2012; Santos, 2012). The most commonly used definition of an entrepreneur formulated by Schumpeter (1954/1994) is that of an innovator who combines production factors in an economic development approach. Such a combination can take the form of production methods that solve production problems and encourage the invention of new products. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurship entails a process of creative destruction since entrepreneurs trying to find a unique combination of factors of production may ignore existing technologies and products. By adding the word "social" to the word "entrepreneur", Schumpeter emphasizes that social entrepreneurship is not just "business as usual" but necessarily focuses on social development. Dees and Anderson (2006) and Dees (2001) understand social entrepreneurship as an action aimed at achieving change implemented through entrepreneurial principles and models, which meets social needs, overcomes social problems and maintains social values. From this definition, it is clear that social entrepreneurship does not prioritize the achievement of economic value.

However, social entrepreneurship cannot be equated with classical entrepreneurship. As opposed to classical entrepreneurship, the main feature of social entrepreneurship lies in its social mission and performance measured according to social criteria. As shown by Mair and Marti (2006), the main priority of social entrepreneurship is the creation of social welfare, while other types of business activity (for example, business entrepreneurship) prioritize the advancement of economic interests. Santos (2012) similarly highlights the underlying motivations of social entrepreneurs. According to Santos, the primary motivation for any social entrepreneur is to create value for society. Whether such value is achieved through business activities, business organization, or business/venture capital management, it is aimed at achieving desirable social change (George, 2009).

The well-known social entrepreneurship theorist J. Gregory Dees defines this type of activity as a change-based process that creates social value through innovation and creativity (1998). Since the creation of social value is considered as a prerequisite for social entrepreneurship, Choi and Majumdar (2014) believe that it can be seen as a necessary factor. However, the creation of social value is not a sufficient factor for social entrepreneurship: the creation of social value must be supplemented by one of the following conditions: the presence of a social entrepreneur in a type of organization (social enterprise) that takes a market orientation, as well as participation in social innovations that tackle social issues.

According to another point of view, social entrepreneurship is seen as charity, usually aimed at achieving specific social goals. According to Dacin et al. (2010), social entrepreneurs are social investors who use their resources and capital to run businesses that are primarily designed to support the poor. The philanthropic impulse underlying these non-profit organizations emphasizes the social impact created by rigorous business and management principles, venture capital and strategic approaches. Thus, social entrepreneurs can also be called venture philanthropists (Robinson, 2006). The Ashoka foundation, which has been recognized as the first organization to use social entrepreneurship, identifies social entrepreneurs as offering innovative solutions to social problems that plague their societies (Mair & Marti, 2006).

Such people tend to be forward-thinking and ambitious, as well as having a solid understanding of the potential for a better future. As such, they are always searching for new ways to realize their vision and overcome social problems. Ashoka stresses the role of other agents (that is, those outside the government and the private sector) in finding solutions to social issues. Social entrepreneurs can transform existing systems, propose alternative solutions and inspire others to change the direction of the social problems they face. In this way, social entrepreneurs both understand the critical value of ideas and use them to bring about social transformation through "changing direction".

Seelos and Mair (2017) argued that some social enterprises have been able to find new solutions to social problems through innovation. In this way, social entrepreneurs use the most effective methods to provide services taking the form of social activity (Ratten, 2018). Social entrepreneurship is an innovative approach that explains various subjects in education, environment, fair trade, health and human rights; more broadly, it is an essential component of the sustainable development framework (Korsgaard et al., 2015). Nowadays, entrepreneurship can be a source of many social and economic consequences. The broader entrepreneurship culture fostered by the social focus creates an opportunity for entrepreneurs to identify resources, opportunities and challenges, as well as inventing new solutions to expand various aspects of their workspace to create a context for sustainable development (Korsgaard et al., 2015).

In this way, social entrepreneurship contributes to the sustainable development of a particular society. In addition to increased levels of uncertainty in politics, economics and environmental development (Seelos & Mair, 2004), as well as the growing diversity of social needs, various social needs are unmet due to market challenges (Phillips et al., 2015). Market failures exclude certain social groups, especially the poor, from access to resources, as well as preventing them from participating in and taking advantage of existing economic opportunities (Rauniyar & Kanbur, 2009). Sustainable development mitigates the adverse effects of market failures, reducing poverty and helping to create a prosperous society (Maeda et al., 2014). According to Hansson et al. (2014), when traditional approaches funded by public institutions and government agencies fail to address social needs or have a negative impact on social life, social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy must play a more critical role in development than before as components of sustainable development. In their study, Hansson et al. point to the importance of social initiatives in achieving sustainable development, as evidenced by the efforts of the Swiss government to develop a long-term development plan designed to become the primary vehicle (private or public) of social innovation. In a similar vein, Phills Jr. et al. (2008) emphasize the use of social entrepreneurship to overcome market disruptions, pointing to the novelty, improvement, and sustainability of social entrepreneurship. Through social entrepreneurship, new ideas and approaches can be applied at a cross-sectoral level to better address social needs. By focusing on long-term solutions, social entrepreneurship can ensure environmental, economic and organizational sustainability.

Social entrepreneurship activities are often associated with social innovation, which can be seen as forming their essential foundation (Dees, 1998). Social entrepreneurship refers to the activities carried out by agents to bring about social change, while social innovation is a process that can result in specific social change (Cunha et al., 2015). Thus, social entrepreneurs are seen as harbingers of creative destruction, contributing to social change and social movement. This is often referred to as unconventional ways of acting and thinking, and it is a common characteristic of social entrepreneurs. Unconventional methods such as collaborative and creative work can be an essential step towards achieving sustainability (Manzini, 2012).

Since the sustainable social development concept is fairly recent, there are few studies that broadly examine its relationship with social entrepreneurship. However, works by Buzinde et al. (2017) and Sheldon et al. (2017) show how social entrepreneurship in tourism can positively impact sustainable development. Wanyama (2014) investigates the vital role played by social entrepreneurship in achieving sustainable social development—in particular, in increasing wages. Meanwhile, Ramani et al. (2017) examine the role of social entrepreneurship in achieving sustainable development in water and sanitation management in India. Drawing on the theory of Schumpeter, Rahdari et al. (2016) depict a framework for realizing sustainable development with social entrepreneurship.

Seelos and Mair (2004) also show the link between social entrepreneurship and promoting sustainable development. They argue that sustainable development can be realized via three approaches:

a. meeting basic needs;
b. building communities that use shared norms, rights and actions to encourage active participation in social and economic development;
c. considering the needs of future generations in every currently undertaken activity.

As well as solving environmental and social problems, social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy contribute to economic growth becoming tools for the sustainable development of society.

Thus, social entrepreneurship and sharing economy organizations are not new forms of economic activity. Social entrepreneurship is one of the forms taken by classical entrepreneurship, in which the emphasis on making a profit is shifted to solving social problems. At the same time, the goal of creating a profit remains one of the most important goals. Sharing economy organizations also have a classical form of economic interactions built into the tasks and needs of modern society.

Whether undertaken in developed or developing countries, the basis for the development of social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy is formed by civil initiatives that solve social problems—that is, involving the formation of these types of activities “from below” (Stephan et al., 2015). At the same time, the formal institutional environment should support and not hinder the development of these initiatives.

Since most research works are devoted to the concepts underpinning these activities, in our study, we consider social entrepreneurship and sharing economy

as models for sustainable development. Thus, we put forward the following hypothesis:

H1: Sharing economy and social entrepreneurship can be used as alternative socio-economic models for sustainable development of society.

Digitalization is an essential condition for the development of institutional environment of social entrepreneurship due to its ability to reduce transaction costs, accelerate the obtaining of necessary information, ensure the mobility of resources and support the emergence of new ways of support. The studies into this topic (for example, Hajli, 2014; Igarashi & Okada, 2015) demonstrate the relevance of research investigating the role of digitalization in socio-economic change.

In this way, digitalization provides the context in which contemporary socio-economic processes are manifested. We studied three components of the sustainable development of society: economic development, social progress, responsibility for the environment. Digitalization is considered as an add-on that accelerates these processes. Thus, we put forward the hypothesis H2:

H2: The use of digital technologies in projects of sharing economy and social entrepreneurship stimulates the sustainable development of society.

Methodology

Researchers into social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy focus above all on the essence and features of these phenomena (Choi & Majumdar, 2014). Most of the studies investigate the motives, main characteristics and success factors of organizations that use these models. Social entrepreneurship researchers focus on the study of leadership issues and individual features of entrepreneurs. As a result, more relevant aspects remain unexplored. Our bibliographic analysis showed that the number of conceptual papers investigating the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship (Bacq & Janssen, 2011; Desa, 2012; Dhesi, 2010; Estrin et al. 2013; McMullen, 2011) exceeds the number of empirical studies. Moreover, those empirical studies that do exist are often largely descriptive and omit rigorous analysis methods (Short et al., 2009). For instance, mathematical analysis tools are quite rarely used in such studies. We believe that the main reason for this problem is the lack of statistics. Studies on the sharing economy are often based on data from surveys that disregard dynamic aspects. Data on social entrepreneurship by countries is not updated more frequently than every five years.

The research procedure developed in the present study is based on the methodological analysis tools that were presented in the work of D. Wruk, A. Oberg, J. Klutt, and I. Maurer (Wruk et al., 2019). Although these researchers investigated how value propositions and business model features are interlinked in sharing economy, we were able to adapt successfully this approach for our own study.

Topic modelling approaches are efficient due to about 80% of big data being available in unstructured text forms, such as blogs, websites, and social networks (Cogburn & Hine, 2017). Thus, this method allows all data sources related to natural language to be used. In order to extract information from these sources,

it is possible to apply various tools for processing texts, including semantic and social data.

Topic modelling comprising an unsupervised machine learning technique capable of scanning a set of documents, detecting word and phrase patterns within them and automatically clustering word groups and similar expressions that best characterize a set of documents. As such, topic models are a form of latent variable model. In order to identify latent variables, fuzzy clustering is used. This comprises an algorithm in which each element has a probability of belonging to a particular cluster. In our study, we used the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) probabilistic data analysis method (Landauer, Foltz & Laham,1998; Glushkov, 2018).

LDA comprises two parts. The first consists in a probabilistic model for describing text data in terms of a likelihood function. In the second part, given the impossibility to maximize the likelihood function, LDA uses an inference algorithm. The probabilistic LDA model considers that each document *d* of *D* documents in the entire text can be described as a probabilistic combination of *T* topics. The value of *T* (the number of sections) is determined by the user according to the required precision.

Latent semantic analysis (LSA), which is the essence of topic modelling, allows for mapping texts (or documents) into the so-called "semantic space" (Landauer et al.,1998). Since, according to this type of analysis, texts are assumed to be just a collection of words, their order in sentences making up documents can be ignored. The only important thing is how many times a particular word occurs in the document. Although semantic meaning is determined by a set of words that are usually collocated, each word has its own unique meaning. As a result, we obtained groups of words forming so-called "topics". As well as taking into account the distance between these words and their weight in texts, such topics are united by a common meaning.

To conduct the latent semantic analysis, we used tools and libraries written in the Python programming language. In order to use the off-the-shelf software libraries, it was necessary to limit our analysis to texts written in English.

The research procedure included three main stages comprising the selection of texts, as well as their coding and analysis. In the first stage, we selected social entrepreneurship organizations that were presented on the Causeartist[1] platform, which comprises a global community of social entrepreneurs, business leaders and individuals who support social projects. Thus, Causeartist serves as a platform providing the newest information, tools and resources for collaborative activity having a global impact potential.

The operator of this platform forms an annual list of new social enterprises that represent the most interesting projects worldwide. In this study, we used organizations operating in English-speaking countries in 2020 and having a description in English. Thus, from a total of 37 options, we selected 20 organizations, including social entrepreneurs from the UK and the USA.

In order to form texts pertaining to the sharing economy organizations, we used American news resources dedicated to sustainable development. Companies

[1] https://causeartist.com/

from the USA, India, the UAE, and Germany were also included. Of these, we also selected 20 organizations.

Next, we analysed the websites of the selected organizations and formed texts for latent semantic analysis. To prepare these data, we used the "about" sections. As a result, 40 texts were selected.

In the second stage, using the latent semantic analysis and the Python programming language, these texts were divided into topics. The index of the topic for each text is presented in the Appendix (Table 2). In addition, the Table 2 indicates the likelihood of this text being relevant to a particular topic.

In the third stage, we analysed if the topics obtained correspond to the three components of sustainable development: social, economic and environmental.

Results

Using the latent semantic analysis (LSA) described above, all texts were divided into five blocks covering social, economic, environmental and digital development issues. This grouping responds to the inclusion of these aspects in the concept of sustainable development and the importance of digitalization processes in this area. The obtained results (Column 2 in Table 1) present most frequently used words (or parts of words) within a given topic. For example, the text «people 0.017» means that the frequency of using word «people» in topic 1 equal 0.017.

Table 1

Semantic Analysis Results

The number of topic	Content	Distribution of results by topic			
		Social	Economic	Environmental	Digital
Topic 1	People 0.017 Idea 0.013 Support 0.011 Make 0.010 Startnext 0.010 Platform 0.009 Creat 0.008 Ola 0.007 Commun 0.006 Wifi 0.006	People 0.017 Support 0.011 Commun 0.006			Platform 0.009 Wifi 0.006
Topic 2	Student 0.014 Good 0.009 Job 0.007 One 0.007 Profit 0.007 World 0.007 Cape 0.007 College 0.007 Mission 0.005 Provid 0.005	Mission 0.005 Provid 0.005	Good 0.009 Job 0.007 Profit 0.007	World 0.007	

Table 1 Continued

The number of topic	Content	Distribution of results by topic			
		Social	Economic	Environmental	Digital
Topic 3	Talent 0.010 Creat 0.009 Home 0.008 World 0.008 People 0.008 Skillharbour 0.007 Work 0.007 Skill 0.007 Make 0.007 Connect 0.006	People 0.008	Work 0.007 Skill 0.007 Skillharbour 0.007	World 0.008	
Topic 4	Food 0.016 Make 0.009 Healthi 0.009 Common 0.008 Work 0.007 Pet 0.007 Creat 0.006 Spread 0.006 Note 0.006 Raw 0.006	Healthi 0.009 Common 0.008	Work 0.007	Pet 0.007 Raw 0.006	
Topic 5	Give 0.014 Social 0.009 People 0.008 Home 0.007 Business 0.007 Care 0.007 Want 0.007 World 0.007 Commun 0.007 Live 0.006	Social 0.009 People 0.008 Commun 0.007 Care 0.007	Business 0.007	World 0.007	

Thus, four out of five topics cover all three aspects of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental. Word combinations related to digitalization processes were only found in the first topic.

In the last stage of the study, we determined the topics to which the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship texts belonged. The results are presented in Figure 1, in which the Y-axis represents the number of organizations related to a particular topic from the fields of social entrepreneurship or sharing economy.

The presented one-dimensional linear distribution of information resources over these topics demonstrates reasonably uniform distribution. However, in the first topic, texts relating to sharing economy organizations are prevalent. At the same time, this is the only topic for which the digitalization block has was filled. The same topic combines the most significant number of resources.

Figure 1

Distribution of Information Resources of Social Entrepreneurship and Sharing Economy in the Identified Topics



Discussion

The analysis and results presented above allow an assessment of the main goals and values within which organizations operate using the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship models. It was revealed that the main goals of the majority of analysed organizations are social or economic; in some cases, they were environmental. Since all these components form the basis for the sustainable development of society, we concluded that the social entrepreneurship and sharing economy models are part of the development of this phenomenon. It is important to note that these models are bottom-up initiatives—that is, formed by the society, but not government.

Thus, we confirmed the hypothesis H1 that the organizations of social entrepreneurship and sharing economy could serve as the basis for developing new models for sustainable development, as well as having similar features in terms of the goals and objectives defining their activities.

The established link between social entrepreneurship and sustainable development is empirically relevant. This can be seen in the example of the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC). Through its network of volunteers, BRAC has provided poor women with the help they need to obtain adequate health care and education about the best and safest ways to provide food for their families. BRAC has successfully reduced poverty by giving communities economic and social access, including but not limited to access to education, health care and microcredit programs aimed at promoting sustainable development (Seelos & Mair, 2004).

The social entrepreneurship organization SEKEM, which aims at promoting sustainable business practices in Egypt, has had a similar impact. This organization shows how business can combine profitability and participation in the global market with a humane approach to people and environmental awareness. SEKEM's business activities are based on four principles of sustainability, also known as the "Flower of Sustainability": (a) economy; (b) social life; (c) cultural life; (d) environment. These four principles indicate that SEKEM can implement sustainable business practices and

implement them through seven activities, namely those related to economic life, social life, cultural life, water, soil, plants, animals, energy and air. First is the sustainability of economic activity, which is realized through equity and ethical values, as well as environmental, social and cultural development. In order to measure the level of business sustainability, the Sustainable Business Practice Self-Assessment Tool is used. This method allows SEKEM and its business partners to anticipate sustainability gaps or other issues that hinder the sustainability of their business and identify the correct form of intervention needed to bridge those gaps. The second component is social stability, which is implemented for the development of interpersonal relationships. SEKEM has developed a culture of mutual understanding and trust with its business partners and supporters. The goal of this approach is to create a sense of equality. SEKEM also drew attention to the need to promote gender equality in order to create a sustainable society. This is followed by cultural sustainability, for which purpose SEKEM focused on individual development—in particular, on innovativeness and social responsibility, realized through a holistic cultural approach. Education is also being used to promote sustainable development, especially among the youth of Egypt. Finally, in terms of the environmental component, SEKEM has pioneered the successful transformation of desert into productive agricultural land. This was achieved by practicing sustainable organic and biodynamic agricultural techniques to reclaim desert lands in a sustainable manner that allows them to be used for agricultural purposes (Seelos & Mair, 2004).

Thus, numerous studies and research projects indicate the increasing importance of social entrepreneurship in the sustainable development of society since many social entrepreneurs successfully overcome economic problems and promote social change through, among other things, social innovation. As agents of change, social entrepreneurs take advantage of opportunities that others cannot. They also develop new approaches and solutions to bring about social change and build a better society.

Hypothesis H2 was not confirmed, since all topics, except for one, lack content that includes digital aspects of the activities of the considered companies. At the same time, digitalization is typical for the topic “0”, whose analysis demonstrates its social functionality. However, as shown in Table 1, the economic and environmental components are not affected in this case. Since no unambiguous conclusions can be drawn from the obtained results, further research is needed.

The presented analysis shows that the basis for social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy is the uniformity of values. The aim of the sharing economy is to increase the efficiency of underutilized assets, which has a beneficial effect on the environment by prolonging the working life of particular resources. Although social entrepreneurship is generally focused on solving social problems, it contributes to increasing civic responsibility, thus combining environmental and social values, which are at the heart of the concept of sustainable development.

Although the regulatory mechanisms corresponding to these concepts differ, the idea of sustainable development has been approved at the international level, as well as being enshrined in the relevant federal documents. This gives rise

to the need to consider this paradigm when designing business processes and formulating an appropriate environmental and social policy for large enterprises. The effectiveness of social entrepreneurship resulting from the increase in civic initiatives is dependent on the conditions for information, material, financial and consulting support provided by the relevant institutions. Although, on the one hand, the sharing economy generates the risk of the transformation of traditional market institutions, it also serves as value guidelines for sustainable development, realizing ethical consumption and use of resources. For example, this concept is actively used for the development of urban areas.

We can directly observe the role of social entrepreneurship and the sharing economy in sustainable development, in which the involvement of civil society in solving social and environmental problems contributes to the formation of a solidarity economy. At the same time, various institutional contradictions and barriers prevent the potential of these concepts from being more thoroughly realized at the current development stage. Future work will involve a more detailed analysis of the stated limitations.

Conclusion

The discussed social entrepreneurship and sharing economy models can form the basis for sustainable development. The results of the present study demonstrate the similarity of these models, as well as testing their suitability for stimulating sustainable development. The latent semantic analysis of sharing economy and social enterprise organizations confirmed the high potential of these models for pursuing sustainable development. At the same time, despite the obvious conclusion that digitalization improves resource-use efficiency, the role of the digital component in the sharing economy and social entrepreneurship projects for the sustainable development of society remains to be clearly defined.

Of additional significance is the presented thesis about the significance of the presented models in terms of enhancing the civil initiative in sustainable development, as well as the need to design mechanisms for harmonious interaction for eliminating institutional contradictions that limit the potential of these concepts. We believe that the obtained results can be useful when developing tools to maintain the sustainable development of a given society.

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Appendix

Table 2

The List of Organizations for Analysis

Company	Country	Type	Sphere	Index of the topic	Probability of the text relation to the topic
Bea	UK	Social entrepreneurship	Employment	5	0.9868873
Era92	UK	Social entrepreneurship	Design and technology	5	0.9927051
Millie Giving	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Donation	5	0.99074644
FreeWill	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Consulting	1	0.9933407
Rooted School	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Education	2	0.99449664
YesCacao	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Production	4	0.99380136
Madison Grace Boutiaue	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Production	5	0.9891996
CNote	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Found	4	0.99722916
Branden Harvey	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Media	2	0.9791897
Vera	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Ecology	1	0.99246365
Unlocked	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Employment	5	0.9854808
Panion	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Employment	3	0.98748225
Cape Cod	USA	Social entrepreneurship	IT	2	0.9934011
mauiraw	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Food production	4	0.9975811
TribesforGOOD	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Education	5	0.98888355
folksandtales	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Production	3	0.9933092
venturewithimpact	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Work and travel	4	0.99319035
Mauro	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Agriculture	1	0.9870728
NataKellam	USA	Social entrepreneurship	Education	5	0.99438983
Silvernest	USA	Sharing economy	Renting	1	0.97181207
Couchsurfers	USA	Sharing economy	Renting	3	0.9884213
At Fiverr	USA	Sharing economy	Employment	3	0.9686699
network.fon	USA	Sharing economy	IT	1	0.99174255
Fat llama	USA	Sharing economy	Renting	1	0.9962474

Table 2 Continued

Company	Country	Type	Sphere	Index of the topic	Probability of the text relation to the topic
Aarp	USA	Sharing economy	IT	1 2 3 4 5	0.010198279 0.010030525 0.9595116 0.010167937 0.01009168
Dolly	USA	Sharing economy	Renting	4	0.9965199
Spotahome	USA	Sharing economy	Renting	3	0.99276215
Ola	India	Sharing economy	Transport	1	0.9938339
Careem	UAE	Sharing economy	Finance	1	0.98475534
The Balance	USA	Sharing economy	Consulting	5	0.99049836
Poshmark	USA	Sharing economy	Ecommerce	1	0.9648382
Sittercity	USA	Sharing economy	Marketplace	4	0.99409854
Eatwith	USA	Sharing economy	Entertainment	5	0.99432355
99designs	USA	Sharing economy	Design	4	0.9941824
Foodcharing	Germany	Sharing economy	Food sharing	4	0.9947868
Startnext	Germany	Sharing economy	Crowd funding	1	0.99670476
Skillharbour	USA	Sharing economy	Services	1 3	0.020016285 0.97631294
FREIFUNK	USA	Sharing economy	IT, education	4	0.99250764
COMMON	USA	Sharing economy	Housing and renting	1	0.98884165

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ARTICLE

Factors Determining Child Labor: Empirical Evidence from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

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ABSTRACT
Children are forced to work when their families face financial pressures due to poverty, illness, or the loss of jobs. There is, however, still a perceived lack of research on the key factors contributing to child labor in Pakistan. This study examines the determinants of child labor in Mardan and Nowshera districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province of Pakistan. A total of 200 households were interviewed. A semi-structured questionnaire was developed to collect data from the

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family heads whose children are in child labor. A stepwise-regression model was adopted to explore the strength of the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. The dependent variable was the child labor ratio and the independent variables were the socio-economic and demographic' characteristics such as age, education, family size, parents' occupation, the number of adult males and females, family income. The findings show that the family size was the most important determinant of child labor. Likewise, the number of adult females, parents' occupation as daily wages labor, and the parents' age had a positive influence on the extent of child labor. However, the number of adult males, family income, and parents' education had a negative relationship with the extent of child labor. The questionnaire survey had shown that families considered poverty to be the main reason behind child labor, unemployment was the second reason and the third was number of dependent females within the families. Therefore, the government may target these families from lower socio-economic backgrounds to disseminate information about family planning and also include these people in the current governmental program to help them financially.

KEYWORDS
child labor, family size, dependency, poverty, Pakistan

1. Introduction

Child labor is frequently characterized as work that affects children in their initial stage of life; it effects their hidden capacity, dignity, and is harmful to their physical and mental health (Hilowitz et al., 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2020). It is estimated that 121 million children will be engaged in child labor by 2025. Among these children, 48% are aged 5–11; 28%, 12–14; and 25%, 15–17 (Thévenon & Edmonds, 2019). Boys are more often than girls engaged in outside domestic work. However, according to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target No. 8.7 aimed to eradicate child labor in all its forms by 2025 (Thévenon & Edmonds, 2019). Therefore, national governments and international organizations are trying to reduce child labor, which has already brought some results: in 2016, 152 million children were in child labor compared to 246 million in 2000 (Thévenon & Edmonds, 2019). However, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to cause in increase in child labor. Not all types of work are considered child labor, but only those that can influence children's health and deprive them of education (Ibrahim et al. 2019). Moreover, child laborers are from poor families and may suffer from malnutrition, which makes them more vulnerable to various diseases (Ibrahim et al., 2019).

According to the International Labour Organization, in 2008, 8.3% (3.3 million) out of 40 million children (UNICEF, n.d) were full time and/or low protection laborers in all the territories of Pakistan (Ahmad et al. 2020; Asis & Piper 2008). Furthermore,

low-income families cannot afford to pay school fees and have to send their children to labor to add to the family's income. The main factors involved in child labor are the socio-cultural factors, i.e., large family size, agro-based economy, family issues, divorces, and the joint family system. According to Awan et al. (2011), the prevalence of child labor results from the combination of issues and factors, i.e., illiteracy of the parents/guardians, health issues, failure in child law enforcement, social inequality and poverty. However, other social factors contribute to the curse of child labor (Lareau, 2011) such as living from hand to mouth, and lack of job opportunities for parents (Lassus et al., 2015). According to the United Nations understanding, "children are classified as child labourers when they are either too young to work, or are involved in hazardous activities that may compromise their physical, mental, social or educational development" (UN, 2020). Poverty, income level, migration, education level, and family size were the primary determinants for child labor (Khan et al. 2003). There is also evidence that low family income is the main source of child labor (Abrar & Arsalan, 2010; Ahmed et al., 2012).

Child labor has venomous impacts on society. Therefore, international laws have been established to safeguard the rights of children and put an end to child labor around the globe (Doytch et al., 2014). Simultaneously, there have been laws for the protection of children's rights in Pakistan (Ullah et al., 2017). Pakistan complies with the international child protection laws; the country has banned early child labor to protect children's rights (Basu & Tzannatos, 2003).

The Constitution of Pakistan has safeguarded the rights of children (Cole, 2002). Article 11 (3) of the Constitution prohibits the employers to hire children below the age of 14 to work in mines or take up other hazardous jobs at industrial facilities. Article 3 of the ILO Minimum Age Convention states: "The minimum age for admission to any type of employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of a young person shall not be less than 18 years" (ILO, 1973). There is a desperate need to regard children's privileges at the individual, cultural, and state levels (Edwards, 2009).

Several studies have been conducted in Pakistan that reported different determinants of child labor. For instance, Kakar et al. (2011) explored poverty, lack of resources, and bigger sizes of families in Sindh. Another study from Southern Punjab revealed a lack of educational opportunities for children from low-income families and increasing poverty (Haider & Qureshi, 2016). Moreover, parents' education level, ownership of assets, and household composition have a significant effect on schooling and child labor in central Punjab (Khan, 2003). Due to the geographical and cultural differences among all provinces of Pakistan, the determinants of child labor are different in different regions (Haider & Qureshi, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, most of the studies has explored the factors responsible for child labor. However, to rank these factors, no study has been found. This study is unique in three aspects: first, it has explored the important determinants of child labor in Pakistan. Second, we have measured on the basis of estimated results the strength of relationship of these determinants with child labor. Third, we used multiple responses technique to rank important reasons.

2. Literature Review

About, 12.5 million children in Pakistan suffer from the curse of child labor largely because of poor economic conditions (Jaafar et al., 2013). Child labor has a strong correlation with poverty (Anderson, 2018). According to Hafeez and Hussain (2019), the primary areas for child labor are manufacturing, transportation, and agriculture. According to the study of Srivastava (2011), child labor has associated with many issues and factors i.e. illiteracy of the parents/guardians.

We have searched the literature and summarized the obtained data in tables. The literature that was most relevant to our study objectives is included in review. Moreover, the literature on the consequences of child labor is also included in this section. The literature review summarized in Table 1 shows that there are several factors (Latif et al., 2018) responsible for child labor that include poverty, parents' education, or low social status Two categories of child labor are identified: children working in factories, and children engaged in work (Latif et al., 2018). Poverty is a global issue, which affects developing countries all over the world. Pakistan is one of the countries in South Asia with millions of people living in extreme poverty (Abdullahi et al., 2016), supposed to be the main reason of child labor.

3. Conceptual Framework

In Table 1, we have reviewed the literature. The literature review has helped us to find out the determinants of child labor that are shown in Figure 1. To guide do such analysis, we have developed a new framework for explaining child labor (Webbink et al., 2013). Our framework is based on considering (a) demographic factors and (b) economic factors. These factors affect the child labor which is our dependent variable.

Figure 1

Factors of Child Labor



Note. We created it on the base of the literature review.

Table 1

Summary of Research Literature

S. No	Author, year	Country/ region of the study	Publication Type	Depended Variable	Independent Variables	Findings
1	Bhalotra and Heady (2000)	Pakistan and Ghana	Discussion paper	Child labor both girls and boys	Farm size, household income. Household size	Child labor is increasing with increase in farm size and decreasing with increase in household size for both boys and girls in Pakistan and Ghana. Increases in household income have a negative impact on work for boys in Pakistan and for girls in Ghana.
2	Daga (2000)	India	Journal article	Physical and mental health of child labor	Child labor work, rural and urban areas	Various types of illnesses were associated with child labor in rural areas.
3	Brown et al. (2002)	Global	Discussion paper	Prevalence of child labor	Socio-economic factors	Poverty and low household income sources are the main source of child labor.
4	Basu and Tzannatos (2003)	Global	Journal article	Child labor participation	Factors responsible for child labor	The poverty and less investment in education are the main reasons of the high prevalence of child labor in many developing countries.
5	Khan (2003)	Pakistan	Journal article	Prevalence of child labor	Socio-economic urban areas	Education of the head of household and parental education is positively associated with child schooling and negatively associated with child labor. The ownership of assets negatively associate with child labor, the household size affects work positively. Children from urban areas are more likely to go to school and are less involved in child labor.
6	Bass (2004)	Sub-Saharan Africa	Book	Issue of child labor	Miscellaneous occupations, poverty, illiteracy, household size, family income	Poverty, illiteracy, household size affects the child labor.
7	Hilowitz et al. (2004)	Global	Report	Issues of child labor around the globe	Parents attitude, low income, family size, parents needs help	Parents attitude is that their child should work with them and help them, they have low family income, and Many parents fear school will teach their children to rebel against the family's traditions and norms. Others fear that the children will learn bad habits away from home

Table 1 Continued

S. No	Author, year	Country/ region of the study	Publication Type	Depended Variable	Independent Variables	Findings
8	Nkamleu and Kielland (2006)	Côte d'Ivoire	Journal article	Child labor in cocoa sector	Gender and age of children, whether or not the child is the biological child of the household head, parents' education, the origin of the farmer, household welfare, household size, the household dependency ratio, the size of other perennial crop farms, the number of sharecroppers working with the household head	Parents' education, the origin of the farmer, household welfare, household size, the household dependency ratio, the size of other perennial crop farms, the number of sharecroppers working with the household head, and communities' characteristics are all pertinent in explaining the child labor
9	Dimova et al. (2008)	Tanzania	Discussion paper	Child labor	Migration and remittances	The migration and remittances sent by the emigrating parents might enable their children to stop working as a child labor.
10	Srivastava (2011)	India	Journal article	Child labor issues and challenges	Socio-economic and policy	Poverty is one of the important factors for child labor problem. The endurance of young children is higher and they cannot protest against discrimination. Many NGOs like CARE India, Child Rights and You, Global March Against Child Labor, etc., have been working to eradicate child labor in India
11	Ahmed et al. (2012)	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan	Discussion paper	Child labor	Socio-economic and demographic factors	Head of the household's education and household's average income are significantly and negatively correlated with child labor. The age of the child and family size are insignificantly correlated with child labor.

Table 1 Continued

S. No	Author, year	Country/ region of the study	Publication Type	Depended Variable	Independent Variables	Findings
12	Latif et al. (2018)	Pakistan	Journal article	Prevalence of child labor in different sectors	Occupational sectors	Child labor is present in four major sectors namely mechanical, agricultural, industry and general labor. Power looms and agricultural sector is the worst and most affected sector of child labor.
13	Ram et al. (2019)	Pakistan	Journal article	Child labor issues and consequences	Status of children daily earning. Type of work done by children and their parents/guardians. Status of education of the children engaged in child labor	The major reason of the child labor is poverty, children work to fulfill family needs. A large number of children work at automobile repair shop. The major reasons behind not going to school involve poor economic conditions, which lead to work to support family.
14	Ahmad et al. (2020)	Pakistan	Journal article	Prevalence to child labor	Socio-economic and demographic factors, and policy factors	The major factors behind child labor include generational poverty, high illiteracy ratio among the parents, unemployment, large family sizes, feudalism and flexibility in the existing child labor laws.
15	Quintero (2020)	Pakistan	Report	Child labor issues	Policy factors	In Pakistan, it is illegal to employ children under the age of 18 in factories. Until recently, the country lacked a law prohibiting children from working at home in most states. On Aug. 6, 2020, Pakistan banned child domestic labor for the first time, passing an amendment that makes it illegal for children to participate in domestic labor. The government recognized the consequences of this labor, such as trauma and abuse, among young domestic workers.
16	Enebe et al. (2021)	Nigeria	Journal article	Prevalence of child labor	Socioeconomic predictors of child labor	The prevalence of child labor among junior students in public secondary schools in study area was high, and was predicted by the level of schooling and income earned.

Demographic factors such as age, education, family size, number of adult male family members of child labor, number of adult females in the household are affecting child labor. Child labor is also more prevalent among the poor families and is often used to make ends meet (Nkamleu & Kielland, 2006). Decision-makers in these families are generally parents or caretakers of the child, but other family members may also have a voice (Dimova et al., 2008). Therefore, the socio-economic characteristics of the household and parents play a significant role in child labor (Homaie Rad et al., 2015). Child labor is a global phenomenon (de Lange, 2009) and mostly takes place in rural areas. Parents' age, their education, family size, the number of dependent family members are important determinants of child labor (Hussain et al., 2018). As for the economic factors, the following determinants are usually identified: family income, father's occupation, and household assets (Quintero, 2020).

4. Materials and Methods

4.1 Study Area

This study has been conducted in two districts Mardan and Nowshera situated in the central zone of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province of Pakistan (Figure 2). Mardan district has 2.3 million inhabitants and Nowshera has 1.5 million (PBS, 2018).

Figure 2

Study Area Map

Source: Authors' adaptation

4.2 Sampling Procedure

Mardan and Nowshera districts were purposively selected because they are more densely populated than other districts in Pakistan, except Peshawar (PBS, 2018). The number of children in child labor in the province is estimated as 1.5 million (Zia, 2012). However, the total population in the province is 35.53 million (PBS, 2018). Proportionately distributing the number of children by districts we get the average figure of 164,000 for each district. According to Yamane formula (1967), the total sample of child labor households were 203.

For our study, we selected and interviewed 200 households in which the children were involved in child labor. We have obtained the data on child labor from the Education Labor Organization offices in Mardan and Nowshera districts. The Education Labor Organization office had already shared with us some information for academic purposes. These households were interviewed at their homes. Consents for interview were obtained prior to start it.

4.3 Data Collection

This is a cross-sectional study design in which we have collected data from the samples of child labor households in the Mardan and Nowshera districts at a specific point in time. The respondents were the households' heads. Through semi-structured questionnaires, the data were collected from these respondents. The questionnaire contained two parts: in the first part, the child labor information was collected, in the second the respondent's information was asked.

4.4 Data Analysis

4.4.1 Descriptive statistics (parents and children)

The socio-economic characteristics of child labor such as age, education, and occupation were descriptively analyzed. In addition to this, the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation values for household information such as the age of the household head, education, family size, number of adult males and adult females, number of children in child labor, the total number of children and occupation were calculated.

4.4.2 Regression Model

Stepwise regression has been employed in this study (see the formula). Stepwise is a kind of multiple regression that is usually used in social sciences (Fox, 1991). In stepwise regression, the researchers are more interested in explaining the most important predictors that cause variability in the dependent variable (Lewis, 2007). The dependent variable is the child labor ratio that is obtained from the number of children involved in child labor in the family and the total number of children. In our case, we have obtained the predictors with their variability in child labor.

$$y = \alpha + \beta_i x_i + \varepsilon$$

where y is the dependent variable, α is constant, β_i shows the co-efficient of predictors, x_i are the predictors in the regression model, ε is the error term.

5. Results

5.1. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Child Labor and Households

Results in Table 2 show that the mean age of parents is 34.88. It implies that the parents were mostly young. Moreover, they had only primary-level education (6.45 years of schooling). The family size was 8.35 persons. The number of adult females was 5.18 and adult males, 4.42. On average, there were 2.21 children per family. Most of the respondents were from the working class. Results in Table 3 show that the mean age of child labor was 12.21 years. They on average have received 4.27 years of schooling.

Table 2

Results of Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Explanation	Min	Max	Mean	SD
	Parent Characteristics				
Age	Parents' age in years	22.00	47.00	34.88	6.21
Education	Parents' education in years of schooling	0.00	16.00	6.45	3.81
Family Size	Number of family members	4.00	14.00	8.35	2.91
Adult Females	Number of females	2.00	8.00	5.18	1.80
Adult Males	Number of males	2.00	8.00	4.42	1.35
Monthly Family Income	Converted to USD	32.5	110.5	59.58	16.82
Child Labor	Number of family members Child Labor	1.00	3.00	1.33	0.48
Children	Total No of Children	1	4	2.21	0.52
		f		**%**	
Occupation	1=labor, 0= non-labor	122		60.10	

Note. Source: Field Survey.

Children were involved in different occupations (Table 3). The most part (14.8 percent) were employed in grocery shops while 9.9 percent were working as trainees in various mechanic garages (bike shops). In addition to this, 7.4 percent worked in tailors' shops.

Table 3

Child Labor Characteristics

Child Characteristics		Min	Max	Mean	SD
Age	Child age in years	6.00	16.00	12.21	2.20
Education	Of a child involved in child labor in years of schooling	0.00	9.00	4.27	1.87
Occupation	Children working in different occupations	**F**		**%**	
	Bike Shop	15		7.4	
	Hotel	20		9.9	

Table 3 Continued

Child Characteristics	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Cycle Shop	20		9.9	
Tailor Shop	15		7.4	
Car Mechanic	15		7.4	
General Store	30		14.8	
Salesman	10		4.9	
Heavy Vehicle Mechanic	5		2.5	
Bakery Shop	5		2.5	
Car Washing	15		7.4	
Clothes Maker	5		2.5	
Handcrafts	20		9.9	
Bookshops	15		7.4	
Medical Store	5		2.5	
Ice Cream Shop	5		2.5	
Driver	3		1.5	

Note. Source: Field Survey.

5.2 Correlations between the Variables

The variables were used to check the correlation between the child labor ratio (as a dependent variable) and the parents' age, parents' education, family size, the number of adult males and adult females, family income and parents' occupation as independent variables (Table 4). The correlation analysis revealed seven variables that have a significant ($p < 0.05$) relationship with the dependent variables. These variables were further used for the regression analysis.

Table 4

Correlation Matrix of the Study Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Dependent	1							
2. Parents' Age	0.11*	1						
3. Parents' Education	-.241**	.184**	1					
4. Family Size	.751**	0.041	-.144*	1				
5. Adult Females	.721**	0.052	-.169*	.469**	1			
6. Adult Males	.366**	0.045	-0.120	.375**	.261**	1		
7. Family Income	-.288**	0.091	.430**	-.242**	-.190**	-.232**	1	
8. Labor	.597**	0.035	-.195**	.634**	.312**	.295**	-.283**	1

Note. * = significant at the 5% level and ** = significant at the 1% level.

5.3 Stepwise Regression Model

The socio-economic factors are regressed by the stepwise method to explore the importance of the selected variable based on the R^2 criteria. Six models were obtained after the regression analysis. Model 1 shows that 56.4% of the variation in the dependent variable that is child labor is due to family size. Similarly, 17.4% variation is explained by the number of adult females. Moreover, daily wage labor, 2.2% by number of adult males in the household, 0.7% by parent education, 0.5% by family income, 0.4% and parentage, and 0.7% variation is explained in the dependent variable. All the models were significant at the 5 percent level of significance.

Table 5

Results of the Regression Model

Model	Depends on	R Squared (%)	Significance
1	Family Size	56.4	0.000***
2	Adult Females	17.4	0.000***
3	Labor	2.2	0.000***
4	Adult Males	0.7	0.000***
5	Family Income	0.5	0.000***
6	Parents' Education	0.4	0.012**
7	Parents' Age	0.7	0.015**

Note: * = significant at the 5% level and ** = significant at the 1% level.
1. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size
2. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female
3. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female, Labor
4. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female, Labor, Adult Male
5. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female, Labor, Adult Male, Family Income
6. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female, Labor, Adult Male, Family Income, Parent Education
7. Predictors: (Constant), Family Size, Adult Female, Labor, Adult Male, Family Income, Parent Education, Parent Age

5.4 Results of the Regression Model

The results of the whole regression model included all independent variables. Results for the family size show that if it is increased by one family member, the dependent variable (child labor ratio) will increase by 0.09. Furthermore, the number of adult females has a positive and significant (0.160, $p < 0.01$) relationship with child labor. Daily wage labor as father occupation, has positive and significant (0.233, $p < 0.05$) association with child labor the number of adult males in the family has a negative and significant association (–0.040, $p < 0.00$) with child labor. As for the parents' education, this indicator is highly significant and positively associated with the child labor mentioned in Table 6. As for the monthly family income, a 1 USD increase causes the child labor ratio to decrease by 0.011. Parents' age was also significantly positively associated with child labor. These results are significant at 99% ($p < 0.01$).

Table 6
Results of Regression Coefficients

Independent Variables	Un standardized Coefficients	Standard error	Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	VIP
Family Size	0.090	0.010	0.414	0.002***	1.938
Adult Females	0.160	0.014	0.452	0.000***	1.306
Labor	0.233	0.057	0.180	0.000***	1.708
Adult Males	–0.040	0.016	–0.086	0.000***	1.008
Family Income	–0.011	0.003	–0.288	0.000***	1.007
Parents' Education	–0.014	0.006	0.087	0.012**	1.099
Parents' Age	0.008	0.004	0.083	0.015**	1.047
Constant	–0.494	0.156			

Note: *=significant at the 5% level and **= significant at the 1% level.

5.5 Reasons for Child Labor

The respondents were asked to select the reasons for child labor from the list of seven reasons (Table 7). Poverty was ranked as the main reason for child labor. Among the respondents, 22.6% of parents reported that they children had to get a job because of the family's poverty. Education expenses were the second-ranked reason that the patens reported, 11.3% couldn't provide their children with basic education. Unemployment (no regular work) was the third-ranked (17%) reason besides a percentage; 15.1% depend on the female while the current inflation was 13.2% according to the respondents. Because of the natural disasters and floods, the people from other areas migrated to the districts in question. There were also ongoing migrations within the district. These contributed to the level of child labor and to the lack of access to education.

Table 7
Reasons for Child Labor

(Multiple responses)

Responses	Rank	f	Percent of Cases
Poverty	I	120	22.6%
Education Expenses	II	60	11.3%
No Regular Work	III	90	17.0%
Dependent Females	IV	80	15.1%
Current Inflation	V	70	13.2%
Natural Disaster	VI	60	11.3%
Access to School	VII	50	9.4%
Total		530	100.0%

6. Discussion

The present study has applied a different approach from that of the earlier studies in the sense that this study has used the ratio of number of children involved in child labor to the total number of children in the family. Second, this study has used the step-wise regression model that was probably never used before in this field of studies. The families in which the child labor ratio was higher were larger in size and had a higher proportion of more adult females. In these families, the burden on the male earners were more. Therefore, their children were entered in child labor. Furthermore, the parents of these children were from the daily wage labor group (Chowdhury, 2021); it implies that these children were from the lower socio-economic strata of society. Moreover, most children worked in grocery stores (Camilo & Zuluaga, 2022). Many of the children were working in motorbike, bicycle, and car repair shops (Quintero, 2020).

The findings of the regression model show that the family size was the most important determinant of child labor. Child labor was more common in such households in which the household size was larger. It implies that with more household size, the dependency on parents increased. They were unable to finance their family expenditures. Therefore, they sent their child to work instead of going to school. The findings of the study agree with the results of Hussain et al. (2018) who revealed that the family size has a positive correlation with child labor. These families tend to be larger because of the large number of children, who generate more family income for the family to support their parents (Koohi-Kamali & Roy, 2021). A study conducted in Faisalabad has reported that families consider children as a means of obtaining more income (Hussain et al., 2018). Furthermore, they revealed that child labor was more prevalent among the large family-size households. In these households, poverty and illiteracy were common characteristics. They couldn't provide basic needs life to their all children such as provision of better food, education, clothing, recreation, etc. the findings of our study are in agreement with the abovementioned studies that children involved in child labor is due to large family size, low poverty level, and uneducated parents. Our results taken from Pakistan case study are similar to that of Nigeria. Olaitan et al. (2017) revealed that the family size is one of the prominent reasons behind child labor in Nigeria.

Adult females in the family are positively associated with child labor: the more females a family has, the more likely this family is to send the children to work at an early age. This situation largely stems from the socio-cultural context in Pakistan since women are expected to work at home rather than take up paid jobs. Therefore, they are dependent on care givers in the family. An earlier study conducted by Malik et al. (2019) revealed that in Pakistan the households are headed by male members and the females are dependent, which creates a positive correlation between poverty and male dominance and which further leads to the more extensive use of child labor. Ray (2000) argues that because of cultural or religious restrictions against women working outside home, households in Pakistan rely more on child labor.

The third determinant was the father's occupation. Whether the father is in formal job or working as daily wage labor. The results show that when the father was

daily wage labor, there is more child labor in those families. This variable is used as a proxy for the economic position of the family. Hence, when a person is daily wage labor, having no regular work, will send their children to work to help him in family expenditure financing. These people are mostly poor and dependent on children income. While, the poverty and low income of the families are the factors that are determine child labor (de Carvalho Filho, 2012). It implies that like other nations around the globe, poverty and low income is one of the important determinants of child labor in Pakistan. For instance, unlike the number of adult females, the number of adult males is negatively associated with the extent of child labor in the study area. It implies that as the number of adult males' increases, less children are involved in child labor.

Parents' education has a negative correlation with child labor. The better educated the parents are, the less it is likely that their children will engage in child labor. Same is the case in Nigeria. Owoyomi et al. (2017) revealed a negative relationship between parental education and child labor in Nigeria. Parents' age is positively associated with child labor. The older the parents are, the more likely they are to send their children to work. When the parents are getting old age. They might have less energy to work, or unable to work. Therefore, the responsibility comes to the shoulders of children. Children starts go to work instead of school. Our results are consistent with that of Homaie Rad et al. (2015) who revealed that in Iran, the mother's age is positively associated with child labor.

The findings for the family income show that the higher is the family income, the less likely the children in the given family to be engaged in child labor. Thus, child labor is more common in among poor families. Poor families need diversification in their income sources. Therefore, they send their children to work to remove their financial hurdles. Similar to our findings, the other studies reported the same association between child labor and income. For instance, Ram et al. (2019), who reported from Sindh Pakistan that child labor was common among the low income households. Another study from Majeed and Kiran (2019) revealed that parents' income is a very important determinant of child labor.

There is ample evidence that poverty and low income are linked to the prevalence of child labor. Nizamani et al. (2019) stated that Pakistan is one of the countries in South Asia with millions of people living in extreme poverty. Certain steps are taken to decrease poverty in Pakistan but there is still much to be done in this sphere. Pakistan ranks 157th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index (Ram et al., 2019) and 44% of children work to earn money for their families (Asian Human Rights Commission, 2011). When parents have either low wages or when they do not get enough work to provide basic needs to their families, they are forced to send children to work.

7. Conclusion

To achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) and eradicate child labor in all its forms by 2025, it is necessary to gain a more in-depth understanding of the reasons behind child labor. This study has focused on the case of Pakistan to show that the large family size, number of female family members, poverty, and low income are the

leading causes of child labor in this developing country. Moreover, the government should extend financial help to these families. Simultaneously, there is need of awareness programs to encourage these parents to send their children to schools. Moreover, the law enforcement is needed to completely ban child labor in all it's forms and all industries. Government interventions should be implemented to reduce fertility and to raise family planning awareness.

Limitations of the study

This study was conducted in two districts of the central zone of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, where trade and commerce are more developed than in other districts. Therefore, the findings of the study may not be generalized to other parts of the province. Moreover, this study has explored number of adult females who are not working as one of the important determinants due to the local cultural context. The findings may be different in societies where the females are mostly working and have no cultural obligations for females to outside homes.

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Appendix 1.

Questionnaire for Household Survey

My name is *Sikandar* I am currently pursuing MPhil degree at *Abasyn University* "MS Economics". My research topic is **"Determining Child Labor: Empirical Evidence from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan".** All the information collected through this questionnaire are highly confidential and purely for academic purpose. So kindly do not hesitate to express your real situation and personal opinion. Thus, I appreciate your cooperation for giving your time and for the success of my research.

Respondent's Name: _____ Date: _____

Village: _____ Union Council: _____

Tehsil: _____

A. Demographic profile of the Respondent or Family Characteristics

1. Age: _____ (Years)
2. Education: _____ _____ (Years of Schooling)
3. How many people are there in your household _____?
4. How many are female in your household above age 18 who are not working _____
5. How many are Male in your household above age 18 who are not working _____
6. What is monthly family income _____?
7. How many children are working in your family _____?
8. What is the total number of children _____?
9. What is your main occupation _____?

B. Children Characteristics of child who is working.

Please mention below, children working in different occupations.

S. no	Age	Gender	Education	Occupation
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

Section c: Reasons behind child labor

In your opinion what are important reasons behind that your children are working.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

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ARTICLE

Forgotten Territories in the Iranian Home: Issues of Segregation

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ABSTRACT
This article addresses issues associated with segregation and gender discrimination in the traditional culture of Iranian home. The concept of Iranian home with an emphasis on its territories and social characteristics, as well as segregation and gender aspects, was investigated. Using expert opinions, seven house samples were analyzed. Following a review of plans and maps, interviews, and visual observations, a content analysis of activities, social relations, and physical features was conducted. The results show that individual values have been forgotten, and the privacy is defined as a collective state for a family. Under the management of the father, home has a biological and economic nature. All household activities and social relationships are determined by gender. Among the things having distinct segregation attributes are permanent house elements, such as walls and entrances. Finally, it seems that the culture of Iranian home further emphasizes such concepts as confidentiality, purity, cooperation, and humility.

KEYWORDS
home values, space syntax, territory, segregation, gender discrimination

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Introduction

The concept of home is a result of complex, dynamic, and competitive processes developing under the action of external and internal factors. In recent years, the meaning of home has attracted much attention within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, psychology, human geography, history, architecture, and philosophy (Mallett, 2004). Critical studies into the material realm of this concept indicate that home is created by numerous cultural, economic, and social factors (Lewis et al., 2018; Peil, 2020). These approaches reflect that all architectural spaces are determined by the underlying social-cultural contexts. A possible approach to identifying socio-cultural contexts in architecture consists in studying spatial patterns or space syntaxes. Home syntax seeks to describe living spaces in terms of spatial configurations that express social or cultural meanings. This approach can also be used for developing practical solutions to the problems of segregation and gendering (Luisa Maffini & Maraschin, 2018; Peil, 2020; Zerouati & Bellal, 2020).

In this research, we aim to elucidate whether the traditional culture of Iranian home, including the concepts of sanctity and privacy, may lead to segregation and gender discrimination. Personal syntaxes in Iranian households seem to be ignored, while gender segregation is emphasized. Using space syntax criteria, we investigate forgotten territories, spatial segregations, neglected values, and gender discrimination in Iranian homes.

The study was conducted according to the following logic. First, we describe the specifics of Iranian home with an emphasis on its gender aspects and territories. Second, the home syntax and its social characteristics are reviewed. Third, the research methodology is explained. Then, according to three concepts of space syntax (i.e., activities, social relations, and physical features), the questions of socio-spatial meaning and gender segregation in the culture of Iranian home are discussed.

Home Concept: Territories and Syntaxes

Various aspects of the concept of home were discussed in relation to issues concerned with segregation or gentrification (Peil, 2020). Home spaces are seen as those shaped by inclusion, exclusion, and power relations. Lived experiences, social relations, and emotional significance contribute toward making a living space a site of personal history and memory (Ellis et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2019; Peil, 2020). Feminist research has pointed out that the concept of home entails political implications both at the family and society levels (Hurdley, 2013; Scicluna, 2017). Geographical works also examine the use of space, for example, the spatial separation of men from women and children at home, and discuss the implications of gendered spaces such as the kitchen, suburbia, or home as work (King, 2013; Scicluna, 2017). The gendering of home informed by feminist research since the 1970s, and more recently by postcolonial theory, has formed a prominent field focusing on issues of housework, house design, and the house as an expression of status. Feminist theory has been used to challenge the idea of home as a bounded place of security and retreat, and to criticize the public–private dichotomy (Lonergan, 2018; Madigan & Munro, 1991; Smith & Johnson, 2020). Feminists also identify home as

a site of oppression, where women are constrained to reproductive and domestic labor with no economic control over its management. Recent research has introduced a more varied approach, examining home as a site of resistance where repressed groups in a family (women, girls) or society (minorities) can gain control over certain aspects of their lives. This allows home to be viewed as a potential site for radical subversive activity. For example, this can be the case in an autocratic society where home may become a center for opposition. Discussions held at home, or inside activities undertaken in private, may have an effect on public life, thus distorting the established division between the private and public spheres (Brickell, 2012; Domosh, 1998; Duncan & Lambert, 2004).

As Davidoff and Hall (2018) pointed out, the concept of home as a private realm resulted from the realignment of economic, political, moral, and spatial orders at the end of the 18th century. At that time, the middle class redefined home and dwelling culture through the lens of a spatial moral and gendered separation between collective (public) and personal life (private). As a "territory of the mind" (p. 319), the distinction between public and private was reproduced in the rules of etiquette, regulating social interactions, and, importantly in the bricks-and-mortar understanding of home. For instance, bricks represent order and organization in a house, while the outer walls represent social structure, strength, and security. Family relations were played out in private homes, which were physically distinct from the marketplace; productive work was banished from dwellings, or was restricted to domestic servants (Blunt, 2005; Domosh, 1998; Dowling, 2012). For example, family and home life of English middle class was created according to an idea that home should be a place enclosed from the intrusion of people who were neither family nor friends. Hence, the late 18th century treated home in terms of privacy parameters, viewing it as a sanctuary or haven for a family with specific class and gender characteristics (Blench, 2001; Brickell, 2012; McDowell, 1989).

Regarding home as a haven or sanctuary forms the central idea in the concept of home privacy. While public space outside someone's home is seen as imposing and dangerous, the inside home space is enclosed and safe. Home is a sanctuary, a place to retreat into, providing a respite from the uncertainties of commerce and the messiness of politics. Home is also a respite from work, a place of relaxation, a haven (Dowling, 2012). However, feminist researchers question the pertinence of home as a sanctuary to women, who bear primary responsibility for domestic labor and childcare. As such, home is a space of work for many women and cannot, by definition, be a sanctuary or respite from work. Moreover, in the context of domestic violence and emotional abuse, home becomes a site and source of alienation and upheaval, rather than a haven. Indeed, the presumed sanctity and privacy of home, in legal and cultural terms, can lead to an underreporting of domestic violence and work to exacerbate these situations (Bowlby et al., 1997; Scicluna, 2017).

Home Territories

Home as a private space or realm is one of its key meanings. In defining the privacy of home, comparisons are often made with what home is not. Home is not a state/government, home is not work, home is not a church, home is not the realm of politics, and home does not encompass commercial activities. Hence, the contrast

with the public is central to the definition of the private (Birch, 2008; Madanipour, 2003). Essentially, home as the private denotes its separateness from the collective nature of public life. Important concepts in this field include such terms as privacy, intimacy, and territory interactivity. Private, familial, and social territories are defined, respectively, by solitude, confidentiality, and interactive realms, (Dowling, 2012; Fahey, 1995; Sciama, 1993).

Personal space is a behavioral and environmental concept. Sommer (1969) believed that personal space is a protective, small, and invisible territory that makes a bubble between oneself and others. Private space is dynamic and creative. A person may feel annoyed because of the infringement of others to this space. Personal specifications (personality, emotions, gender, and age) along with physical environmental contexts like social norms and cultural rules affect personal space (Hecht et al., 2019; Wells et al., 2016). Personal syntax can be regarded as a bubble with a person at its center, forming an area, which the person does not wish to be invaded. It is a spatial and behavioral hierarchy that manifests itself most clearly at home.

Confidential syntax is reserved for close friends, lovers, children, and family members. The confidential syntax in Islamic sexual jurisprudence is related to the word *Mahram*. A Mahram is a trustworthy family member who is allowed to enter the house. Thus, Mahram syntax brings intimacy, kinship, and closeness (Aryanti, 2013; Majid et al., 2015). In-home confidentiality is formed by separating inner space from the outside world. Strict admission formalities are necessary to enter a house, as well as any inside space. Strangers are supposed to have a special entrance permission (Habib et al., 2013; Hajian et al., 2020; Karimi & Hosseini, 2012). Each space in a house has its own identity.

According to the presented classification, semi-private spaces are home territories that guests can attend upon arrival. These spaces are clearly distinct from the inner spaces where privacy is guarded.

Home and Space Syntaxes

Space syntax is mainly used to analyze spatial configurations. This theory was developed by Hillier and Hanson in their work *The Social Logic of Space* published in 1984. The researchers outlined a syntactic theory for the organization of spaces in buildings and settlements. It was argued that buildings, towns, and cities exhibit particular spatial properties, which are governed by social rules regulating human interaction. The spatial configuration of a dwelling or settlement is believed to present a fairly precise map of the economic, social, and ideological relations of its inhabitants (Dursun, 2007; Hillier, 2007; Hillier & Hanson, 1984; van Nes & Yamu, 2021).

The theory of space syntax assumes that space is the primary core of sociocultural events. However, since space is shaped through social, cultural, and economic processes, it is usually regarded as invisible. As a result, its form is not taken into account (Asif et al., 2018; Pafka et al., 2020). Spatial and social forms are in such a close relationship that a certain spatial configuration may define a number of social patterns, including the distribution patterns of land use, movement, urban crimes, and location of immigrants (Rashid, 2019).

Early space syntax approaches offered mostly quantitative solutions, neglecting all design traditions and spatial cultures. However, in developing various methodological aspects of this theory, Apiradee Kasemsook proposed qualitative approaches to analyzing society and human beings, including the relationship between humans and the physicality of a city (Kasemsook, 2003).

According to Canter (1983, 1997, 2016), spatial syntax can be analyzed based on four factors: land-use differentiation, place goals, interaction scale, and design aspects. Land-use differentiation is connected with current activities occurring in the space; place goals and interaction scale are linked with personal, social, and cultural aspects; design aspects are related to physical features.

Based on this, the syntax of home can be considered in relation to the following three factors: (a) activities, values, and goals; (b) physical characteristics; (c) communication. The factors of activities, values, and goals describe daily activity patterns. Physical characteristics determine how to separate spaces, their sizes and positions, decorations, etc. Communication factors determine relationships between various house spaces, including a range of semi-public, semi-private, and private spaces. Figure 1 shows a theoretical framework for studying the space syntax of Iranian homes.

Figure 1

The Theoretical Framework of the Research



Note. Source: The Authors.

Methodology

Content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique, whose current variations include conventional, directed, or summative approaches. Although all three approaches can be used to derive meaning from textual data, they differ in terms of coding schemes, origin of codes, and threats to trustworthiness. In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the textual data under investigation. In the directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as a guidance for initial codes. Summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually based on keyword lists or summaries followed by the interpretation of the underlying context (Kyngäs & Kaakinen, 2020). Content analysis expresses relationships between the components of a research topic, which can include, e.g., paintings on the wall of caves, music, books, articles,

handwritings, post cards, films, maps, direct and indirect observations, etc. (Banks, 2018; Flick, 2018).

In some cases, a research topic needs further description based on an existing theory. The directed content approach aims to conceptually extend a theoretical framework or theory. The existing framework can lead to a more focused investigation of a research question. It can provide a way to identifying the key concepts and main components followed by their classification. In addition, it helps to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between the codes.

In this study, we used the method of directed content analysis. According to Canter's place facets, the space syntaxes of Iranian traditional homes were studied in terms of three factors, including activities, social relations, and physical characteristics. By comparing these factors, we tried to perceive the culture of Iranian home. According to the conducted review of documents and texts, five different types of traditional Iranian houses can be distinguished according to the location of buildings and open spaces therein (Figure 2). These include:

(a) the central courtyard and four-side building;
(b) three-side building;
(c) two-side building;
(d) one side building;
(e) central building in the form of a pergola.

In fact, there are four types of structure in the spaces of Iranian houses:

(a) three rooms and a porch;
(b) closed spaces and connection between the ground floor and the first floor from inside the building;
(c) spaces allowing free passage to one another;
(d) one room in the middle and two corridors on two sides.

Figure 2

The Location of Open Space and Buildings



Note. Source: The Authors.

Five open interviews were conducted with experts in the field of traditional architecture to reach a theoretical saturation. One of the most important questions in the interviews was "Could you please introduce the types of traditional Iranian houses?" Based on the opinions of 5 experts, a list of seven houses was compiled, including:

- Boroujerdi Home: The Borujerdi House is a historic house museum in Kashan, Iran. It was built in 1857 by architect Ustad Ali Maryam for the bride of Borujerdi, a wealthy merchant. The bride came from the affluent Tabātabāei family, for whom the architect had built the nearby Tabātabāei House several years earlier.
- Bekhradi Home: The Bekhradi's Historical House was built during the Safavid dynasty (17th century) in Isfahan. This historical building is the first and only Safavid historical house that has been restored and used in Iran as a traditional residence since 2005. The house is located in Sonbolestan, one of the oldest neighborhoods in northeast Isfahan.
- Zinat al-Muluk Home: The historical house of Zinat al-Mulk is one of the monuments of Qajar era in Shiraz, which was built by Ali Mohammad Khan Ghavam al-Mulk during 12 years. This house is part of the Narenjestan mansion, connected through a door in the basement. At first, this house was the residence of Ghavam and his family and named after Ghavam child, Zinat Al-Muluk, because she lived there for a time.
- Ansari Home in Oromie: Ansari's house is one of the oldest houses in Orumieh, which was built between 1330 and 1334, according to the form and inscriptions in the decorative tiles of the house during Qgajar era.
- Samadian Labaf Hom: The Labaf House is a historic house dating back to the Qajar era, located in Isfahan.
- Tadayon home in Semnan: Tadayon House is a historic building belonging to Qajar era located in Abbasieh district, one of five districts of Semnan County. This house is positioned next to the north-south Rasteh (a group of shops) of Semnan Bazaar built almost at the same time.
- Beheshti Home in Qazvin: Seyyed Mahmoud Beheshti's house is a three-store house of the Qajar era. The house has a large interior and exterior, a formal vestibule, a beautiful corridor leading to the same vestibule and two courtyards. This house is located in one of Qazvin's old neighborhoods called Dimaj.

These houses were selected among different types in order to reach the representativeness of the sample. Subsequently, the space syntax factors i.e., activities, social relations, and physical features, in these houses were examined.

For qualitative field research, we used qualitative sampling, also known as purposeful sampling or theoretical sampling. The sample size was determined by a theoretical saturation of the contents, culture, and context of the case study. Saturation implies that research themes are well developed in terms of features and dimensions (Hennink & Kaiser, 2020; Kyngäs & Kaakinen, 2020; Lambert, 2019; Low, 2019).

Finally, in these houses, daily activity patterns, gender norms, social relation norms, and other cultural aspects were examined. Then the gendering and segregation issues of Iranian houses were discussed in comparison with contemporary houses.

Results

First, the physical features of Iranian homes were examined by reviewing plans, observations, and interviews. Then, different spaces and activities for identifying gendering and segregation issues were classified. Finally, by comparing activities, social relations, and physical features, the socio-spatial meaning of the concept of Iranian home was derived.

Analysis of Physical and Spatial Features

Gender segregation clearly forms the culture of Iranian home. This aspect seems to be one of the main factors that promotes introversion in Iranian homes. The desire to protect the inviolable privacy of the family away from the eyes of strangers has justified such introversion in home cultures.

Introversion in Iranian homes was found to be manifested in the avoidance of ostentation, tendency to suppress emotions and their expression. For instance, the culture of Iranian home appears in the form of tortuous passages, mud and soil walls. Houses frequently look simple from outside, although featuring beautiful and detailed interior design.

Figure 3 shows that Zinatolmlouk house represents a complete example of an introvert Iranian home culture with its tendency to separate from the outside space. The central courtyard plays the role of isolating inside and outside spaces. There are five syntaxes in Zinatolmlouk house, including family, individual, welcome, service, and courtyard.

Figure 3

The Principles of Introversion in Zinatolmlouk House



Note. Source: The Authors.

Home Culture from Outside to Inside

In traditional cultures, houses are separated into the inside and outside parts. The central courtyard can be considered as the peak of introversion in Iranian home culture. Such houses have a history of eight thousand years (Soflaei et al., 2017; Soleymanpour et al., 2015). As Pirnia (2005) notes, in Iran, a garden and a pool were built in the middle of the house, with the rooms and halls wrapping around them like a closed embrace. There was no window or hole in the house, or outside the wall. Therefore, nothing could be seen from the outside. The exterior was designed with arches, gates, and congresses. For example, in Figure 4 (Boroujerdi's House), the opening only leads to the courtyard, and a complete wall without any window or view from the outside proves the importance of this aspect. In Boroujerdi's house, the space of the family members (blue section) where mostly assigned to women. This house section was completely separated from the guest's room (black section); the central courtyard was located in the center.

Some features of the culture of Iranian home include the following:

- a lack of direct visual connection between the interior (private and semi-private) and exterior (public) spaces;
- the presence of such spaces, as a courtyard and porches such that the entrance could lead into these spaces.

Figure 4

The Issues of Segregations in Boroujerdi's House in Kashan



Note. Source: The Authors.

For a long time, Iranian home culture has placed a special emphasis on courtyards, gardens, porches, pergolas, and other introverted structures that surround the naves and create attractive and familiar environments. The key features of the traditional cultural concept of Iranian home are privacy for a family as the smallest social entity. A house is a private place for such a social entity, but not a place for having personal privacy. Moreover, architects have used special strategies to reach those purposes. Spatial order (step-by-step movement from alley or street to the entrance space of the house and then private spaces), as well as the internal and external system operation, is a way to provide decent privacy. Figure 5 demonstrates that the entrance is separated from the main building by a corridor. In order to maintain complete privacy, this entrance first leads to the porch and then to the courtyard.

In Iranian homes, such private spaces as rooms have a more restricted connectivity. The reason was for a non-Mahram to have no control over these spaces, allowing the women of the family to feel more comfortable at home in these spaces. Figure 6 "Tadayon's house" shows a house with two parts—exterior and interior. The inner part was the living space of the family members (southern part), which included summer and winter halls; the outer part (northern part) was a space for men, where the housefather usually met the guests. Family members occupied the southern and eastern parts. In this section, women performed their daily routines. This part of the house was separated from the northern entrance, such that strangers could not access easily. The T1 rooms in the northern part were related to guests, while the T1 rooms in the eastern part were related to women and household activities.

Figure 5

Bekhradi House in Isfahan



Note. Source: The Authors.

In general, all Iranian homes feature three main space types, including public, semi-public (semi-private), and private (confidential territories). Depending on their functions, some forms of gender segregation are obvious. Figure 7 demonstrates these divisions clearly in the plan of Bekheradi's house. The public space (black section) covers the entrance and porch of the house, the semi-private space (blue section) is related to the yard and porch, and the private space (yellow section) are the rooms of the house.

Figure 6

The Gender Segregation in Tadayon's House in Semnan



Note. Source: The Authors.

Figure 7

Territories in the Iranian Home Culture in Bekhradi House



Note. Source: The Authors.

Public Spaces

- *Entrance:* The entrances themselves manifest interconnected spaces in a house. For entering, the door and front of the house are both a barrier to entry and a place to greet semi-familiar guests. It is used as a waiting space for guests, where the residents of the house pay some usual compliments.
- *Porch and corridor:* Porch or *karbas* is a space that has many types of entrances. It is often located right after the entrance space; one of its functions is to divide the entrance path into two or more directions. In some public buildings or houses, two or more paths led into the porch, each of which led to a specific space, including the interior of the building, which is the courtyard.
- *Corridor:* The corridor is the simplest part of the entrance space, the most important function of which is to provide communication and access between two places. In some types of buildings, such as houses, baths, and in some cases mosques and schools, the extension and direction of the path is changing the corridor. The corridors that led indirectly to the courtyard are aimed at solving the issue of confidential territories.

Semi-public spaces

- *Balcony:* It can be considered as a space filter and a common part between open and closed spaces. This space can be either open or semi-public. In Iranian architecture, the balcony is used as a joined space.
- *Yard:* Housing is important in Islamic architecture due to its direct connection with family life. A Muslim's house should be the safe keeper of the family and should be built in accordance with Islam. In this regard, the main effect of Islam in the structure of a traditional house is introversion. Burckhardt (2009) points out that the courtyard is an element of Muslim house, which receives light and air not from the street, but from inner courtyards.

Private spaces

- Types of rooms: The interiors of the house are the most varied part, so that the residents of the house would not feel tired. The rooms in a traditional house were arranged around the yard according to their importance and purpose. Summer rooms were usually located in the southern side in order to be less exposed to the sun during summer days; winter rooms were located in front of the summer rooms exactly on the side that gets most of the sun during the day. Other spaces, such as storage, kitchen, and stables were located in the second row and behind the rooms (Mamani et al., 2017)

Service space:

- A backyard was a yard type that usually had a secondary function as an open space for service. It was designed and built in that part of the house to provide light and ventilation; its location and types are highly diverse. Service areas, including the kitchen or bathroom were typically built away from the private spaces of the house.

Gender Norms and Activities in Iranian Home Culture

Different home syntaxes shown in Table 1 identify the issues of gendering and segregation in Iranian home culture according to gender norms and activities.

Table 1

Investigation of the Gender Norms and Activities in Iranian Home Culture

Syntaxes	Male/Female	Daily/Nightly
Entrance	To enter the house, two different clones were installed on the door; the women used the clone with the lower voice (sound) and the men used the clone with the bass voice (sound).	Depending on the type of life and hours of activity, the amount of entry and exit during the day was much more than at night.
Room	Girls had rooms separate from boys, and at the ceremonies and parties, women gathered in rooms separate from men.	In the rooms, activities such as eating, playing, reading, talking for the day and activities such as sleeping, getting together and talking and reminiscing were provided.
Living room	The living room was mostly a place for parents to rest, especially the father of the family.	Due to the life style of the period, this space was mostly used in the evenings and nights for activities such as talking and reminiscing.
Winter Living	All the family members gathered in the winter, and the girls and boys shared their memories of the grandmothers.	At night, it was a gathering place and the main living space, so activities such as eating, sleeping, talking, reminiscing, etc. took place in it.
Summer Living	They gathered in a shady and airy space during summer nights and days.	Due to its location on the north side without direct sunlight, it was a suitable space to use in days and nights.
Warehouse	The warehouse used by women was mostly related to the kitchen. Sometimes women used livestock storage.	This space was much more used during the day in the waking time and work and activities of men. At night it was limited to essential uses.
Pasto	Pasto was mostly used for women-specific activities and for their greater comfort in the presence of their in-laws (changing clothes, etc.).	Due to the fact that the closet was on a steeper level than the yard, the light reaches it with less intensity, so there was more silence, calm and comfort in them. At all times of the day, it was suitable for activities such as rest and more private activities.
Restroom	Most of the time, toilets used by men and women was different.	There was no difference in day and night use.
Balcony	The activities that took place in the living room took place in this space when the weather conditions allow outdoor use.	This space was very active during the day as a semi-open and sunny space, and in summer nights, due to the possibility of enjoying the pleasant breeze and watching the sky, it was a suitable place to sleep.
Yard	The yard was a place to spend time with neighbors and friends, as well as doing daily household activities such as washing, sweeping, cleaning vegetables, and so on.	This space was used more during the day due to the time of awakening and activity. At night, it was a space for division and in summer, due to the possibility of enjoying the pleasant breeze and watching the sky, it was a suitable place to sleep.

Different territories in a house are described in Table 2.

Table 2

Confidential and Formal Territories, Semi-Public and Private Territories in Iranian Home Culture

Syntaxes	Formal/Intimate	Public Private
Entrance	It is a formal space. Strangers stopped there to get permission from the owners to let them in.	As the most public house space, it connects the house with the outside.
Room	Strangers usually have no way into the room.	It is considered as the most private space for the family of the house.
Living room	For the reception of guests, it was male space; in other cases, it is used by the father of the family.	It is mostly a public space.
Winter Living	Opportunity to gather around the chair and people recounting the memories of the chair in the winter, usually strangers at parties can enter this space.	It is a place to receive guests and a place to talk to others.
Summer Living	This living room has been very popular in summer as a place to rest and eat family meal.	It is a place to receive guests and for others a place to talk.
Kitchen	Serving the living room and access to the warehouse, a space that strangers have no access to.	This space is especially for women used for food preparation and cooking and located in the corner of the house.
Warehouse	Located near the front door for ease of transportation of equipment and fodder for livestock, used by family members, especially father.	Due to their functional nature, warehouses are mostly used individually and have minimal spatial qualities.
Pasto	Enclosed space for storing things and food behind the warehouse with access for members of the house; strangers have no access to it.	A very private space is in the third category of space relative to the courtyard, after the porch (semi-open), room (closed), pasto, (completely closed).
Restroom	Formal space is used by members of the house and guests due to its location in a corner of the yard.	The toilet is an individual and private space. According to the behavioral patterns of Iranian society, the toilet is a space that tries to be kept out of sight.
Balcony	Semi-open space is a filter for entering space for strangers, space for eating, sitting together for family members and acquaintances.	The porch is a semi-open space that is used collectively and individually in summers.
Yard	The yard is a space for children to play and the general daily activities of family members and to hold ceremonies and occasions.	The yard, in addition to group activities such as children playing, was used for ceremonies, meeting with neighbors, etc.

Discussion and Conclusion

This research was aimed at analyzing the issues of segregation and gender discrimination in the traditional culture of Iranian home. The study was based on three factors: (a) activities, values and goals, (b) physical characteristics, and (c) communication. According to the factor of activities, values, and goals, Iranian home is a collective entity and an economic unit managed by the father. In the past, the inhabitants produced most of their necessities at home. The kitchen, on the other hand, was a place for providing and preparing food. Today, food is prepared outside the house but is consumed inside. Most of the activities that families used to do at home in the past are now mostly done in different places outside the house. Today's houses mostly play a residential role; therefore, a reduction in the size and area of houses is observed.

Concerning physical characteristics, our study shows the importance of axial space. In other words, the definition of various spaces in traditional houses is based on permanent elements, such as walls and entrances. A kind of axial space is described through the division of spaces, separations, sizes and positions, and decorations. Compared to traditional houses, today's houses contain more semi-permanent elements—furniture, which is frequently used to separate and define spaces. Traditional houses used to be decorated with permanent elements. At present, a greater tendency for non-fixed, movable elements is observed.

Work and family relationships are directly linked. The division of labor was done by the father of the family. Most of the time, he and his children worked together, and the children continued the father's business. Moving some activities outside the house has resulted in a decreased family control and power. In addition, previously enjoyed opportunities for family members to interact have been lost.

The traditional culture of Iranian home is masculine, and values such as Hijab (veil), cooperation, purity, contentment, God-centeredness and obedience, and humility in home design are considered to be critically important. Therefore, the most private spaces are interactive spaces and confidential territories. Confidential territories are not places where one can be alone; rather, they are interactive places for two or more people who feel semantically and physically comfortable with each other. At the same time, they create security for a family. Thus, in the traditional culture of Iranian home, privacy was defined for a family, but not for a person.

Concerning communication factors, open and semi-open spaces in the traditional Iranian houses, such as courtyards, balconies, and porches, played a critical role in organizing, dividing, and separating spaces. This is no longer the case in contemporary houses. In the past, the house played a multifunctional role. The house was a place for large families, sometimes spanning three generations. It was both a place to live and sometimes a place to work. It was a kind of an economic unit inside a house where housework was done by women and girls; usually it was continued by men outside. Home also performed a protective function for women, a role that clothing and veils also played in a different way. The gender function of the traditional home was to create privacy for women and protect them by making a distance (a veil) between women and the outsider.

The concept of privacy has changed from a collective state to an individual state. In the past, privacy was defined for a group of people and the space did not belong to a specific person. The room where they used to sleep was the same space as for other family members. Therefore, the space did not belong to a specific person. For comparison, spaces today are defined according to the location of furniture, such as tables, chairs, beds, in other words, more private realms.

The Iranian perception of home presupposes introvert architecture. As an economic and livelihood unit, the Iranian house focuses on the father as the manager and authority.

Traditional houses had gender functions. Home, like other social categories, was treated as a masculine concept, implying the comfort and well-being of men and protection of women. According to the traditional division of labor, women played the role of housewives; however, everybody loved and respected them much more than any other member of the family.

The concepts of privacy and individuality are cultural concepts that differ from one culture to another. In societies where individualism is more developed and individualistic values prevail, one of the key concepts of social life is personal territory in both spatial and social sense. In these home cultures, each member of the house can have their own "privacy" inside the house. Therefore, it is the division of space in a house that matters, rather than its area or form. Conversely, in Iranian home cultures, the main cultural function of the home is to preserve family collective values. In other words, home is a place to express traditional religious values and preserve the family. The reason why there is no syntax between family members may be rooted in Persian language. Hence, children never have their own private rooms. In contemporary houses, a change from social to personal values can be observed. The human becomes freer from some family and social limitations, which has caused a challenge to the family subjectivity and agency. In redefining traditional and modern concepts, it seems that the traditional culture of Iranian home can be seen as the source of creative design patterns. In such a redefinition, traditional collective values of moral and rational concepts could be combined with feminist and individualistic values, at the same time as maintaining privacy, peace, and security of the inhabitants. In this regard, Iranian home culture can cause personal growth and create a sociable place for households.

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ARTICLE

Conceptual Framework of Teacher Prestige and Well-Being: Regional Aspects

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ABSTRACT

The paper presents a comparative analysis of sociological data concerning teachers working in the Sverdlovsk region (Russian Federation). The data were collected in 1989, 2016, and 2021. The surveys investigated social ideas and stereotypes reflecting public attitudes towards teachers in Russia and teaching communities. The research is based on a hybrid multi-paradigm methodology comprising systemic, structural, functional, generalized, temporal, and procedural descriptions. We used the data obtained from questionnaires surveying teachers in 1989 (n = 1183 participants), 2016 (n = 529 participants), 2021 (n = 412 participants). Data processing was carried out with the help of the VORTEX software application.

The comparative data analysis demonstrated that, while the proportion of female teachers and teachers of older age groups has increased over three decades, this has been accompanied by an increase in the education level. It is significant that the motivation for selecting the teaching profession and overall levels of satisfaction remained the same. However, at the same time, assessments of the possibility to advance through a teaching career and professional well-being have noticeably deteriorated. Among key factors affecting

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teachers' satisfaction are physical conditions, low wages, lack of time for private life and the stress of endless school reforms. All of this has led to a decline in the prestige of the teaching profession along with the formation of a negative image. The paper describes efforts required to ensure the enhancement of the teaching profession in the Russian Federation.

KEYWORDS
social representations, teacher, career, professional and social well-being, secondary education, status

Introduction

Recent changes in Russian education practices relate directly to the transformation of all aspects of life in the country. Changes in the economic, political, and legal spheres, as well as the wider culture, have radically affected Russian schools. Under more traditional social conditions, school education was the main—sometimes the only—channel for the transmission of knowledge about the world, its traditions and customs, as well as a means of reinforcing codes of conduct. Self-evidently, the education system was responsible for all the information that a young person needed for a problem-free life during this specific period. Today, however, the role of mass media and especially the Internet has significantly increased, including the direction of educational and leisure practices. Although school remains an important factor in the primary socialization of children under contemporary conditions during the transition to a post-industrial society, it is no longer by any means the only one. Since official authorities must take such ongoing changes into account, the Russian school system has been in a state of continuous reform for several decades already.

Russian society also imposes an increasing number of new requirements for education in connection with the ongoing scientific and technological innovations. However, the main educational challenge consists in achieving potential social development. Since the educational system is expected to play a leading role in delivering these requirements, it becomes necessary to adapt schools to the new conditions. Thus, as comprising a social and professional community, teachers are viewed as the primary agents of this ambitious goal.

The role of the teacher in the contemporary world is changing. No longer can a teacher be expected to be the only source of information, the bearer of the highest wisdom or someone whose ideas are not subject to criticism. Along with the widespread availability of information, the ability to check facts in electronic media and the development of consumer society, teachers around the world find themselves working in a credibility-crisis environment. Moreover, since teachers do not have ready-made recipes for self-enrichment, their role as social drivers of development has diminished.

In addition to the credibility crisis, the modern teaching profession faces additional challenges in terms of job satisfaction, professional well-being, and

career development. By successfully overcoming such challenges, professional instructional functions can be more effectively performed. In demonstrating the global character of these contradictions, Chinese researchers Qu and Shao assume that the living space and choice space of teachers as special professionals are in transition (Qu & Shao, 2020). Their systematic study provided ample evidence that teaching is an emotional profession in which it is becoming harder to achieve a sense of job satisfaction. This idea may be explained by the fact that emotional jobs require several factors to be united in order to reach a desirable level of satisfaction. In their influential study, the American social experts Maslach and Jackson (1981) found that younger teachers are more inclined to have higher expectations and suffer from concomitant burnout than their senior colleagues. Consequently, problems facing teachers relate directly to individual features of instructors, including their age group. A year later, Schwab and Iwanicki (1982) presented a portrait of the typical burned-out teacher. Their major finding demonstrates that low teaching performance is a complex factor, since each case is unique and must be carefully examined according to the criteria of teachers' individual backgrounds (education), individual personality (age, sex, the number of children in teacher's own family), and organizational factors (work environment, workload). Friedman and Farber (1992) explained teachers' fatigue in terms of class sizes and the high number of challenging adolescents.

Among the contradictions identified by professional researchers, the following should be noted: the growing contradiction between the creative nature of teaching and the ever-increasing regulation of the teacher's actions; the need to improve professionalism and competence levels given a lack of time resources; the gap between declarations of a high purpose of teaching and low social status; the increased contradiction within the teaching community between highly motivated professional teachers and those who only go through the motions of fulfilling their duties. In addition, there are contradictions between the measures required by the state and the possibilities for their implementation, as well as the readiness or otherwise of the professional community to implement them. All these contradictions undoubtedly affect the prestige of the profession and the social well-being of teaching, ultimately leading to a decrease in the effectiveness of instructional work.

Teachers as a community comprise a generalized figure endowed with a certain set of characteristics that are more or less adequate to the existing reality. In professional literature, this generalized figure appears as an image or representation that symbolizes the particular professional community. Each of these concepts reflects the most significant features of the community from a certain angle by focusing on certain properties and qualities. Consequently, while accepting the limits of the terms *vision* and *image* to analyze the perceived characteristics of the professional teaching community, it is more expedient to use the term *representation*, which includes the object-matter of *vision* and *image*. Obviously, if a study of a community's characteristics focuses on the social nature of representations, then social influence on the understanding of the figure of the teacher will be seen as more significant. Such an emphasis includes certain distortions, deformations in consciousness, artificially created characteristics and traits. Social ideas

include historical facts representing the memory of certain events and processes. All these factors are determined by their ideological interpretation, as well as the characteristics of the national mentality and culture.

Social representations as a specific way of understanding and comprehending the surrounding reality is based on Emile Durkheim's concept of collective representations (Durkheim, 1982) and the works by Serge Moskovici, in which social representations act as a certain set of various statements generated in the process of communication representing a kind of everyday knowledge based on "common sense", with this knowledge existing independently of the subject as a kind of objective property inherent in one or another object (Moscovici, 1988/1993). Representations are one of the forms of mass consciousness, often appearing as metaphors and associations that form a flexible combination of images that change over time. Thus, the source of representations consists in the everyday individual human experience including experience of other people, which is accepted by the individual in the course of interpersonal interactions (Bovina, 2010). In considering the perceived positions of other people, social representations manifest themselves in assessments and opinions about certain events, people, professions, and communities. In combining elements of social and individual cognition, scientific and everyday thinking, such representations thereby serve as a reference point in the surrounding reality.

Through social ideas, the surrounding reality can be interpreted in the space of standardizing associations, which comprise mental constructs that arise in the process of human interaction. Proceeding from the concept of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman set out in the work *Social Construction of Reality*, the social structure as a whole, as well as the structures of its various communities, represents a set of standardizing and routine models of behavior (Berger & Luckman, 1966/1991, p. 323). According to the concept of social representations, the professional teaching community appears as a set of the most typical patterns of interaction between teachers and other people, in particular students and their parents, as well as a set of typical features that generalize the personality of the teacher. The weight of scientific evidence produces a specific set of the characteristic features of teachers, combining the most significant qualities, both personal and professional. Data from several studies suggest that the pivotal role of stereotypes in the perception of communities is formed primarily by educational and special theoretical literature. Teachers are also responsible for public perceptions of their actual professional role as children's instructors, who act in a particular situation (Kuzmenkova, 2005).

Internationally, the public images of teachers are relatively consistent. Concerning the Chinese experience, Lijun and Xiangshu point out: "In both traditional and modern Chinese politics, the portrayal of teachers and their roles as spiritual guiders have been both nourished and restricted, according to a broader political agenda" (Lijun & Xiangshu, 2020, p. 179). Developing the concept of an ideal teacher, the researchers state: "The ideal teacher is someone who helps children to grow not only academically but also personally. Their ideal teacher is responsible, selfless, and particularly happy. If a teacher is not happy in the classroom, their students will not be happy, and they will not want to or be able to learn from that teacher. The ideal

teacher is also kind, caring, encouraging, supportive and patient" (p. 191). Wang Chen's study further supported the idea that teachers are traditionally viewed as selfless social workers, susceptible to continuous burnout, which negatively affects their job performance (Wang, 2020, p. 126).

Regarding Russian social reality, the role of the teacher can be seen to change with the advent of the classical education system (class-lesson), while maintaining its central position in the education process. The development of novel information technologies in the 20th–21st centuries led to fundamental changes in the role of the teacher in children's education and upbringing. Unfortunately, the prestige of the teaching profession and professional community has begun to decline noticeably in the present context. The general view of education as a sphere of service provision has become more and more widespread. Such changes have not only affected the social status of teachers but also their well-being.

There is a growing body of literature featuring the problems concerning the social and professional well-being of Russian teachers at the end of the 20th century. Important research includes the works carried out by the Institute for Philosophy and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ural Branch) in the 1990s (Bodnar et al., 1990), the Ural sociologist L. Rubina (1996), and the Moscow sociologist L. Orlova (1998). The main challenges of the teaching profession include dissatisfaction with various aspects of professional life, including endless reforms and the attitude of society towards education. In research on well-being, two main underlying paradigms can be identified: sociological and psychological. However, medical and economic perspectives are also seen to make significant contributions.

The psychological approach is based on the understanding of well-being as a generalizing indicator of the emotional-value state of a person, depending on the impact of social factors and responding to changes in the living conditions of an individual (Rusalinova, 1994). Here, the main emphasis is on subjective activity. Well-being becomes in itself a factor influencing other aspects of human life. The psychological approach also features the concept of social well-being, which is based on Western European and North American traditions. Although the term *well-being* has become widespread in psychological research, it seems to us that it cannot fully reflect all the diversity of relationships and interactions that arise in mass consciousness. In addition, in the Russian culture *well-being* implies among other things success, prosperity, and security, which contributes to a one-sided view of this social phenomenon.

The sociological approach to the study of social well-being is expressed in an understanding of the emotional and value attitudes of the population, social groups and communities to social reality. This approach reflects the degree of social stability reflected in terms of a state of satisfaction with various aspects of social life and the individual in it. The sociological approach has become more widespread since the publication of Zh. Toshchenko and S. Kharchenko's book *Sotsial'noe nastroenie* [Social Mood], in which social well-being is defined as the main and initial component of the social mood (Toshchenko & Kharchenko, 1996, p. 195). Here, social well-being functions on two levels: on the one hand, it is the result, outcome or consequence of

certain transformations or reforms, while on the other, it comprises the starting point, factor, and criterion for assessing social changes.

Having both dynamic and static characteristics, well-being is characterized by the accumulation or concentration of certain states of consciousness on the part of communities, socio-demographic groups or society as a whole. In addition, individual concepts of well-being are of particular importance. Whether comprising a socio-demographic group or a professional community, each group or community has its own well-being paradigm. Along with the conditions for its implementation and the totality of knowledge and changes, general activity creates a specific attitude towards a professional community (Gang, 2021). Such an attitude has a more or less pronounced emotional and evaluative coloring, for example, that which characterizes a profession. That is, professional well-being is formed as a kind of derivative that can be considered both as a consequence and justification for certain actions (Green et al., 2016).

Professional well-being can be considered as a concretization of the well-being of a social community that is based on the typical characteristics of a particular profession. Therefore, we can consider *successful* professional communities, which are in great demand under specific socio-economic conditions and *surviving* professional communities, which only maintain their existence with some difficulty. For the sake of greater differentiation, it is worth highlighting an intermediate option, i.e., *adapted*, and the most extreme option, i.e., *vanishing*. In our opinion, based on various studies, the professional community of Russian teachers should be attributed to the axis with the extreme points stretching between *adapted* and *surviving*.

As already mentioned, the first studies of professional well-being can be traced to the 1990s. There is still interest in this issue at the moment (Szentes et al., 2020). The attention of researchers to issues of teachers' well-being has significantly increased in the past decade. This should include various monitoring studies (carried out in Russian cities such as Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Tyumen, Surgut, etc.), as well as episodic measurements of teachers' social attitudes in other regions of the country. F. Ziyatdinova reported on a decline in the prestige of the profession alongside a deterioration in the financial situation of teachers and a decline in the quality of education. The problem of the unpopularity of this profession among the children of teachers was formulated (Ziyatdinova, 2010). A study among Moscow teachers showed that the decrease in professional well-being is associated with the introduction of the Unified State Exam (EGE), the financing of schools according to the number of students, which involves a noticeable increase in the teaching load, as well as with a deterioration in the material situation of teachers (Gasparishvili et al., 2013).

Various surveys carried out over the past decade confirm that salaries are the main reason for the deteriorating professional health of teachers. The changes in wages did not improve the situation: a 2015 survey of 457 teachers in Vologda region showed that only every third respondent was financially incentivized to work efficiently, while 64.5% answered this question negatively (Solovieva, 2016). Similar figures (63% of teachers dissatisfied with the salary) were received by sociologists in the Tyumen region (Shafranov-Kutsev, 2016). Questionnaire data of a study carried out almost annually over the last three decades by a group headed by V. Sobkin and

D. Adamchuk (2016) to analyze the well-being of Moscow teachers shows an increase in positive assessments of creativity in teachers' work, its intellectual satisfaction and the presence of conditions for the development of professional abilities. Satisfaction with work and conditions of communication remained at comparable levels along with assessments related to labor content and professional complexity. Researchers also recorded retained dissatisfaction with wages and career opportunities (Sobkin & Adamchuk, 2016). An interesting study was conducted on the professional well-being and prestige of teachers from public and private educational institutions by a group of researchers from Kaliningrad and Nizhny Novgorod (Fedorov et al., 2020).

As analysis shows, all these factors contribute to three most obvious consequences: the first consisting in a decrease in the effectiveness of the educational process itself, the second—in the growth of protest moods and social discontent, while the third leads to professional burnout, increased fatigue and morbidity. However, despite the sense of negative social well-being, teachers as a community are not ready for collective action taking forms of social protest. According to the questionnaire surveys, which were conducted almost annually, the number of positive assessments of the creative potential, intellectual satisfaction, and the conditions for developing one's abilities in teaching jobs have increased in the last 30 years. Assessments of job satisfaction with work and professional communication conditions remained at the same level, along with those related to the job content and professional complexity. The surveys were conducted in different regions of the Russian Federation.

Drawing upon the critical issues stated above, the present study attempts to identify the changes that have occurred in the professional teaching community related to a significant period of more than 30 years in the Middle Urals region. The following research objectives emerged:

A. To identify the attitudes of teachers, students and parents of students towards the teaching profession in the Russian Federation.
B. To demonstrate prevailing ideas about the teaching community in the Russian Federation.
C. To identify factors that affect the well-being of teachers and their status in the Russian Federation.

Research Methodology and Methods

The theoretical and methodological basis of the study comprised systemic, structural-functional and activity approaches, as well as an analysis of social facts from the standpoint of community and spatial perspectives. Empirical data were collected during a questionnaire survey. In 1989 and 2016, we generated a handout questionnaire (paper and pencil). However, in 2021, we conducted an online survey (using the Google Forms application). The questionnaire presented a large number of questions (from 77 to 85 in different versions), mostly in closed form, with the possibility of choosing one or more answers. The questions were structured into sections which are as follows: (a) opinions about the prospects of the teaching profession; (b) social and professional well-being of teachers; (c) ideas about teachers and their prestige (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

Three-point Analysis Model of Teachers' Social Representation



The processing of the obtained information was carried out using IBM SPSS and VORTEX software, including the calculation of frequencies and percentages, correlation coefficients for nominal and ordinal variables (Chi-square, Cramer's V, Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma). The processing of psychological methods was carried out according to their keys. The study was based on a questionnaire survey of teachers carried out in the Sverdlovsk region in 1989. The survey was conducted by the Institute for Philosophy and Law of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (n = 1183 people). The survey was presented under the title *Sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoe Samochuvstvie Uchitelia: Vremia Peremen* [Socio-Psychological Well-being of the Teacher: Time for Change] (1990). This allowed a comparative analysis of the answers received on coinciding questions to be carried out with a sufficient time lag.

In 2016 and 2021, questionnaires' surveys were conducted among teachers in two cities of the Sverdlovsk region: the regional center of Yekaterinburg and Novouralsk (2016: n = 529 people; 2021: n = 412 people). When compiling the samples, we considered territorial division, type of school, subjects taught, and socio-demographic characteristics. Given the degree of urbanization in the area, the urban community of teachers was the dominant group of respondents. If the number of respondents in a territorial entity was less than 1,000, a continuous sample was taken.

When characterizing the respondents, the indicators that served as the basis for organizing the sample were as follows: gender, age, work experience, education, type of school, level of education of students, the subject taught, marital status, wages, and living conditions.

According to the website *Geogoroda.ru*, there are 47 cities in the Sverdlovsk region, where more than 80% of the region's population lives (Sverdlovskaia oblast'. Spisok gorodov, n.d.).

In the Sverdlovsk region in the 1987–1988 academic year, 31,700 teachers worked in the education system, of which more than 70% were in cities (Bodnar et al., 1990, p. 5)

According to the Ministry of General and Vocational Education of the Sverdlovsk Region (the Ministry of Education and Youth Policy of the Sverdlovsk Region since May 20, 2019) in 2016, there were 68,147 teachers in the Sverdlovsk region, most of whom worked in the general education system (60.7%). 29,367 people worked as teachers, 98.5% with vocational education. 23.5% were under the age of 35, 79% had work experience of more than 10 years, while 22.4% had already reached retirement age. Over 90% of teachers were women (Ministerstvo obshchego i professional'nogo obrazovaniia Sverdlovskoi oblasti, 2017).

The Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation provides the following information: in the 2021–2022 academic year, 36,380 staff worked in the general education system of the Sverdlovsk Region, of which 30,922 were teachers. (Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, 2021).

Results and Discussion

As the subject of comparative analysis of teaching in 1989–2021, the following criteria were selected: the socio-demographic portrait of the teacher, attitudes to the profession, professional well-being and psychological state, the image of the teacher in the perception of the professional community and public opinion, as well as the system of dominant values. In addition, we compared the attitude of teachers to the reforms carried out in the general education system based on the survey results in 2016 and 2021.

The socio-demographic portrait of the respondents is characterized by the significant predominance of women (1989—94%; 2016—91%; 2021—89%), as well as an increase in the proportion of people over 55 years old (1990—6.5%; 2016—16%; 2021—23%). The length of service in the general education system has also increased. For example, the percentages of teachers who had worked in school over 19 years were as follows: in 1989—41%; in 2016—57%; in 2021—68%. The level of education increased over the period covered by the study (74% with higher education in 1989; 94% in 2016; 91% in 2021); overall, more than 70 percent of the respondents had graduated from the Teachers' Training University.

An improvement in housing conditions was noted: in 1989, 60% lived in separate comfortable apartments; in 2016—77%; in 2021—93%. The number of single teachers has increased. The percentage of married teachers declined from 70% in 1989 to 57% in 2016, increasingly slightly to 60% in 2021.

Opinions about the Prospects of the Teaching Profession

The motivation for choosing the teaching profession over the past three decades has not changed: firstly, a passion for the subject that is being taught; secondly, the vocation of a teacher itself, i.e., to constitute an example of a beloved teacher. These reasons for choosing the profession were indicated by more than a third of the respondents in each survey. Out of a total of 9 offered options, the distribution of answers by year is almost identical. Moreover, few significant changes in satisfaction with the profession were

noted. The number of teachers satisfied with the profession is stable, i.e., fluctuating between 85% and 86% respectively. However, when answering the question "Would you like any of your children to become a teacher?", teachers revealed a certain trend: the number of those wishing their offspring to continue the family tradition has decreased over the years (1989—30.7%; 2016—18.1%; 2021—17.2%).

In order to explain their dissatisfaction 45.8% of the respondents in 2021 used the following terms: lack of personal life, disrespect for the teacher's work, insecurity, high responsibility, low salaries, etc. Here is one of the complete answers:

> Today the school does not have enough time for children, there are continuous checks, the teacher has to accept a heavy workload in order to survive; this workload load represents a conveyor belt offering little creativity and a lack of communication with children. For me, being a teacher is a creative profession, which creativity I cannot realize at the moment. Again, teachers are assessed according to the results of the Unified State Exam (EGE) and the Basic State Exam (OGE). Since textbooks do not contain tasks for preparation, you have to train, not teach. A contemporary school does not resemble the school I wanted to work in when I was choosing the profession. The teacher today is a defenseless hostage, sandwiched between uneducated parents, impudent children and insatiable school administration" (female physics teacher at a gymnasium with 38 years of teaching experience).

A change, albeit not very noticeable, in attitudes towards the profession was also recorded in response to the question of readiness to change jobs in the immediate future: a desire to change the field of professional activity was expressed by 7% in 1989; in 2016—by 12%; in 2021—19%.

There is much evidence that the assessment of opportunities offered by the teaching profession may be sufficient to explain the emerging trend. Interestingly, the assessment of the profession's pluses and minuses in all the surveys was similar, e.g., pluses included (a) the rich variety of professional situations; (b) the demonstration of competencies, creativity; (c) the ability to communicate with interesting people. However, the quantitative expression was surprisingly different, especially in the assessment of minuses (see Table 1).

Table 1

Options Decline in Teachers' Professional Field in Comparison with Other Professions (% of respondents by year; ± sampling error)

Options	Year		
	1989 (n* = 1183)	2016 (n = 529)	2021 (n = 412)
Free time	88 ± 3	72 ± 4	70 ± 4
Personal life	48 ± 1	62 ± 3	57 ± 3
Financial security	46 ± 1	69 ± 3	44 ± 2
Service promotion, career-building	57 ± 2	37 ± 2	36 ± 2
Opportunity to be upwardly mobile in society	35 ± 1	22 ± 1	20 ± 1

Note. * n is a number of respondents.

It is now understood that career dissatisfaction plays an important role in the emerging trend. Dissatisfaction with the possibilities of the profession found its expression in the teachers' answers to a hypothetical situation, i.e., what kind of job they would prefer to choose. The number of those wishing to choose a profession that allows them to earn more has tripled, while half as many stated the desire to find a job where no one orders they around, they decide everything themselves, success depends only on them (1989—17%; 2016—49%; 2021—43%).

While paying much attention and respect to all these alarming signals, it would be fair to assume that career dissatisfaction is not a uniquely Russian trend. In his study, the Australian scholar Dorman (2003) maintained that continuous stress on teachers in his country makes educators less tolerant of their students, resulting in their reduced commitment to work, e.g., failure to prepare for classes. Cheek et al. (2003) showed that most teachers suffer from frustration in teaching at some point in their professional development.

Teachers' Social and Professional Well-being

As already noted, the respondents rated the teaching profession very poorly regarding financial opportunities, arrangement of personal life, etc. This concern found its expression in the issues of greatest importance to the respondents. Closer inspection of the data shows that the most prominently cited factor of physical condition is not directly related to the teaching profession (the importance of health factors mentioned in the surveys was as follows: 1989—42%; 2016—48%; 2021—65%). However, if we analyze the socio-demographic portrait of teachers regarding age parameters, a noticeable aging of teaching staff over the years becomes evident. Among the factors directly related to work, financial difficulties came out on top (1989—19%, 2016—47%, 2021—46%). Thus, financial factors are significantly determining of professional well-being and relationships affecting the educational process.

When analyzing the respondents' assessments of existing relationships, interactions with students' parents and school administration are stated by teachers to be the most problematic. Here, a significant outcome can be noted: over the past years, the assessment has improved (see Table 2). We used a 4-point scale where 4 represents complete mutual understanding, while 1 denotes misunderstanding or alienation.

Table 2

Relationships: Good, Complete Mutual Understanding (% of respondents by year ± sampling error):

Relationship Type	Year		
	1989 (n* = 1183)	2016 (n = 529)	2021 (n = 412)
With students	28 ± 1	54 ± 3	62 ± 3
With students' parents	22 ± 1	33 ± 2	37 ± 2
With colleagues	41 ± 1	55 ± 3	68 ± 3
With school administrators	30 ± 1	43 ± 2	45 ± 2

Note. * n is a number of respondents.

The majority of the respondents assessed relationships in terms of a desire to achieve mutual understanding (3 points). One of the key findings is the opinion that the most difficult relationship type involves interaction with parents and school administration. The improving trend in assessments of these relationships over the years is very likely due to the extensive experience of interaction and dissemination of the ideology of tolerance and patience. As an example, let us note two poles representing positions taken by teachers: (a) tolerant, and (b) countering the maximalist views of students. According to the assessment of colleagues, tolerant teachers are significantly more successful. However, the professional well-being of teachers is negatively influenced by continuous reforms and the ongoing transformation of general education.

As the studies carried out in 2016 and 2021 show, the majority of teachers are inclined to the idea of a partial change in the content of the educational process (2016—74%; 2021—67%). Only the minority of teachers react positively to radical changes (2016—22%; 2021—32%). Among the factors that negatively affect the level of educational outcomes, respondents cited a weak interest on the part of parents in the quality of their children's education (66% of respondents for both 2016 and 2021), a low level of abilities or interest on the part of students (2016—56%, 2021—58%), ineffective management on the part of the educational system (33% and 34%, respectively).

Teachers have formed a negative attitude towards reporting requirements: in their opinion, it needs to be reduced. More than a half of the respondents reacted positively to proposals to limit the reporting requirement (2016—66%; 2021—54%). Teachers reacted differently to the introduction of the Unified State Exam (EGE) (6% of respondents in both samples fully support it; 2016—18%, 2021—12%). With respect to distance learning, while teachers believe that it is suitable for use in emergencies, 94% suppose that it necessarily results in decreased education quality. 33% of teachers in 2021 (the COVID-19 pandemic year) assessed the degree of self-organization of students at 3 points out of 10, while 24% put it at 1–2 points. The retention of educational materials was assessed similarly.

In considering financial aspects, we proceed to a description of teachers' wages. At the time of the study in 2016, the average monthly nominal accrued wages of teachers in schools in the city of Yekaterinburg amounted to 35,943 rubles, while the average salary in the city was 43,910 rubles. The wage gap is quite large (Iakob et al., 2017). At the same time, the average monthly wages of the respondents in 2016 was distributed as follows: up to 15,000 rubles—8%; 15,000–25,000 rubles—49%; 25,000–35,000 rubles—33%; over 35,000 rubles—10%.

Social Opinions about Teachers and Their Status

The final stage of the study comprised the description of social ideas about the role of teachers in terms of their social significance, prestige, and image. These variables were studied with the help of an associative test and a questionnaire. The respondents were asked to choose from 15 images of a teacher, which represented metaphors that would best express the profession of a teacher, i.e., carrying out a certain differentiation

and categorization (placing the image in one or another community). Surprisingly, the largest support in each survey (50% and 60%) was given to the image of the hamster in the spinning wheel, then—actor, friend, mentor. It should be noted that the teaching community thus highlighted the important features and functions of the teacher's personality, i.e., the necessity to assist, to save face in any circumstances, and a rather low coefficient of efficiency despite all the efforts being made.

The perception of the teacher's image via such metaphors was supplemented with assessments of qualities that hamper effective work. The largest number of votes for each group of respondents received the opinion that the teacher with a compliant character suffers most in school (1989—46%; 2016—53%; 2021—38%). Teachers who actively oppose maximalist, immature views of students, prefer to stay independent, self-motivated, proactive, as well as use well-established methods of work received an average percentage of 12%. These characteristics of the teacher's image are complemented by the respondents' assessments of how certain features of professional image are perceived by the teaching community and how a teacher appears in terms of public opinion from the point of view of the respondents.

Teachers characterize themselves primarily as people having a creative attitude to work (1989—44%; 2016—63%), possessing a sense of their own dignity (1989—36%; 2016—44%; 2021—64%), while the third position was given to a sense of defenselessness (1989—35%, 2016—40%). The teaching community considers the perceptions of the teacher's image in public opinion to be negative, i.e., dominant positions were given to such characteristics as "defenseless" (1989—18%; 2016—28%), "indifferent to children" (1989—28%; 2016—27%). Mass media representations support the formation of such an opinion (see Table 3).

Table 3

Role of the Media in Shaping the Influence of the Teacher (% of respondents by year ± sampling error)

Meaning	Year		
	1989 (n * = 1183)	2016 (n = 529)	2021 (n = 412)
Actively promotes credibility of teachers	12 ± 0	10 ± 1	12 ± 1
Does not promote; moreover, discredits the activities of teachers	43 ± 1	72 ± 4	70 ± 4
Virtually does not influence the perception of teachers	46 ± 1	18 ± 1	19 ± 1

Note. * n is a number of respondents.

It is important to stress that negative media attitudes towards the teaching profession are not an entirely typical Russian feature. As the Saudi researcher Alghamdi (2021) demonstrated in his research, media everywhere tend to attribute negative connotations to teaching: "Findings affirm the imperative that teacher education programs intentionally sensitize to the benefits of critically deconstructing media images. This will help stave off negative connotations of teachers and make teaching become part of future teachers' professional identities".

More than a half of the respondents, i.e., 56–57% in the 21st century (in 1989 there were only 42%) think that the values structuring the world of Russian teachers have not changed significantly over the past decades. Priority is still given to family matters, i.e., love for one's children and partners, as well as a good education. An important finding is that the value accorded to life wisdom has also increased. The average age of the community of teachers has increased over the years, the number of respondents for whom this terminal value has become significant has also increased: 1989—13%; 2016—23%; 2021—24%. Among instrumental values, teachers particularly distinguish responsibility (1989—38%; 2016—59%; 2021—62%). More than half significantly prioritized good manners, closely followed by education, breadth of knowledge and high general culture.

Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to inspect the social image of teachers in Russia. The comparative analysis of survey results (1989, 2016, and 2021) showed a number of negative trends compared to the 1990s. In this regard, there is a need to deepen research on this issue, as well as to analyze the reasons that prevent the transformation of the teaching community into a more organized integral body, involving the formation of those qualities and properties that contribute to the successful activities of the socio-professional community. This change may lead to a higher level of development or already be part of a transition to a higher quality of education.

The analysis of the obtained statistical data and the results of the survey show that teachers in the Middle Urals region face similar problems to those of the professional community in the country as a whole, including the predominance of women in the profession and increasing number of older age groups. Along with their life strategies, the main trends in the development of the value world of teachers were identified on the basis of the study results. A significant decline in the prestige, status, and role of teaching in modern Russian society was shown both in the professional community and general public opinion. The decrease in the well-being of teachers is influenced by a deterioration of their financial situation, a perceived decline in the level of education and factors affecting quality of life. Changes in the system of values and priorities affecting the established system of relations between the teacher and schoolchildren, as well as with their parents, is also of key importance. With respect to the social well-being of teachers, the analysis showed that well-being and perceptions of the importance of the teaching profession are influenced by the continuous reform of the Russian education system. According to the analyzed data, only a small number of teachers actively support the reforms, while the majority prefer to take a wait-and-see attitude.

Another alarming trend identified by the study consisted in an increasing lack of interest in studying among school students, which is confirmed by teachers, parents, and school graduates. Their criticism is mainly aimed at the ineffective management of the education system, including organization of the educational process, as well

as its material and technical support. Significant dissatisfaction arises from the introduction of the Unified State Exam (EGE), the quality of distance learning, as well as the willingness of students to participate in distance learning.

The research revealed the prerequisite for new study methods aimed at describing the structure of communities. New types of community emerge from the interaction of teachers with other professional networks or social subjects. The applied methodology of active survey and interviews related to teachers showed the need to use a wider arsenal of methods, including qualitative data collection methods. Significance evidence supports the idea that it is only by identifying the most diverse methods and resolving existing contradictions that the efficiency of the professional teaching community may be improved.

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ARTICLE

Talking to God: Religion, Para-Science and Disciplinary Practices as Consolidation Tools

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ABSTRACT
The article examines social instruments used to consolidate small religious groups in modern society. Such groups are viewed as a variation of the development of a local Orthodox parish founded as a community of like-minded people. The research subject is closed religious community that has existed in the Perm region (Russia) for over thirty years. The community has evolved from a typical Orthodox parish to a modern-type spiritual group that used non-Orthodox sources of information and devotion, and was led by a woman. The study identifies most effective social instruments for the consolidation of those type of religious community. The research includes reconstruction of the history of the community and the analysis of the materials of spiritual seminars held there, reflecting gradual transformation of the teachings and change of the leader's status. The research data were acquired from several sources: interviews and personal correspondence of the author with former members of the community, materials of journalistic investigations, etc.

KEYWORDS
contemporary religiosity, closed religious community, Perm region, *Pokrovskaya Obitel'*

Introduction

In the 1990s, Russia had witnessed not only the transformation of the political regime but also the proliferation of diverse religious groups, including completely new, as well as the old ones, which underwent significant changes in that period (Akhmetova, 2010; Dubin, 2006; Filatov & Strukova, 2003; Kaariainen & Furman,

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2000; Konacheva, 2001; Mitrokhin, 2004; Sinelina, 2014). In the 2000s and 2010s, the region of upper Kama[1] became a site of turbulent transformations in the sphere of religion, which had led to the emergence of new religious communities. One of those new forms was the closed community led by small group of religious activists, usually located in a single region or urban area. In this article, the term "closed religious community" is used to describe the specific way of religious community's life in the urban environment. Those communities are usually characterized by permanent membership, limited ties with the outside environment, and living within closed compounds. They also use consolidation methods that will be discussed below. The modern city inspires a new rhythm of religious life, new forms of piety, new the ways to consolidate a group of believers and to protect them from the outward influence.

Small religious groups, which exist in big cities (in this case—the city of Perm), are often "invisible" for researchers. This is partly determined by the situation, in which such communities emerge and act. Under state legislation, every group of believers regardless of its size has to be registered as a religious group and to constantly report local authorities about its activities. Such a group has no chance to attract a sufficient number of neophytes, and to compete with other religious groups; its missionary work could only be conducted "indoors", in its place of worship. Usually, such "non-traditional" communities have no representation in inter-religious organizations like Interconfessional Advisory Committee[2]. They do not participate in the official events on a par with the leaders of Christian churches or the Muslim Ummah, and seldom attract media attention. A major part of the population views such communities as "sects", harmful to their adherents and the adherents' families. As a result, such groups are faced by a lot of complications in their religious and social life.

Nevertheless, in the religious history of Russia, we have numerous examples of small religious groups, which are capable of be proud of both—a long, harrowed history and an impressive story of survival. Among them are different communities of Old Believers (especially, so-called *bezpopovtsy*, the "priestless" strain of the Old Believer movement), unregistered Pentecostals, *initsiativniki* (unregisted Baptists), Krishna worshippers, etc. They all were under significant administrative pressure, yet strove to preserve their spirituality and lifestyle (about the persecution of the Old Believers, see, for example, Zenkovskii, 2009, pp. 531–605; about unregistered Pentecostals: Beliakova & Kliueva, 2017; Kliueva, 2015, 2020; about *initsiativniki*: Glushaev, 2011; Glushaev, 2012; Glushaev & Glushaeva, 2016; about the Vaishnavas: Pudov, 1989, pp. 466–477).

While those groups were open to new members, yet they continued to exist as "closed communities" mostly because of the hostile environment around them. Those communities that were consolidated around the figure of a leader were interpreted

[1] The European territory of the Urals, which includes part of the basin of the River Kama. The Kama region is traditionally defined by historians as the upper Kama region, whose administrative center is the city of Perm.

[2] Interconfessional Advisory Committee—public organization, which includes 7 confessions of the Perm region—was established in October 1998. The tasks of the committee is organization of interreligious dialogue and holding of joint non-confessional cultural events.

by the authorities and some researchers as “sects” (for a detailed review of the term, see: Panchenko, 2004, pp. 45–54). Most of these groups now function as religious communities and are transparent for an external observervation.

In the article, I would like to analyze the case of the religious organization’s transformation into a closed community due to its leader’s activities, which resulted in obtaining the new status of the group, new elements in doctrine, and specific principles of religious management. As a result, such communities become isolated from the society and face conflicts between former and actual members.

Pokrovskaya Obitel’ [The Holy Virgin Intercession Abode] as a Research Object

In the city of Perm, a striking case is the community of *Pokrovskaya Obitel’* (The Holy Virgin Intercession Abode). For over 30 years, it existed as a community of the Orthodox believers and has come a long way from a conventional Orthodox parish to an independent religious community with its original doctrine and cult practices.

The main research question is the following: What were the way of the community’s consolidation under the conditions of the religious diversity of the 1990s and the administrative pressure of the 2000–2010s? What were the methods to convince the believers to prefer a small closed group to the official Orthodox church parish and vernacular doctrine?

First of all, let us briefly examine the history of the community. *Pokrovskaya Obitel’* [The Intercession Abode] was founded by four religious activists from the Karelia Republic (George Pervushin, George Andrievsky, Alexander Altmark, and Olga Budilova). They planned the revival of the Orthodoxy in the Urals (Private correspondence with George Andrievsky). They started to work as a team under the original name *Istok* [The Source], whose members trained their sponsees to solve so-called “inventive problems” according to the method of Genrich Altshuller (Private correspondence with George Andrievsky). Altshuller (1926–1998) was a Soviet engineer and inventor who tried to find patterns of solving engineering tasks and devised a set of mental techniques (Altshuller, 2010; Altshuller & Shapiro, 1956). The emphasis on secular methodology was gradually substituted by the Orthodox dogmatics. In 1990, four partners and their followers decided to organize an Orthodox community.

Activists’ first actions included organization of home chapels for the residents of orphanages, male and female labor camps, and mental hospitals. Meanwhile, the founders of the movement received the official ecclesiastic status: three men who were part of the original team became priests, while the only woman among them remained the mastermind of the movement with new adherents joining it. The main problem was to find affordable housing and headquarters for the community. The problem was solved thanks to one of the woman–adherent, who exchanged her flat to a wooden house that became the base for the community, which henceforth became known as *Pokrovskaya Obitel’* [The Intercession Abode]. The title “Abode” had to emphasize the communal cohabitation of its members (Private correspondence with Georgy Andrievsky). The house was reconstructed and soon supplemented

with additional premises. The newly-ordained priests provided Orthodox services for The Intercession Abode parish. The main focus of the religious group was charity.

2002–2011 period brought some major changes into the community's life. All members who dwelt on the premises had to take part in religious services led by the priests and to work in the house, garden, or farm. Meanwhile, Olga Budilova's task was to teach the Holy Scripture and other sacred texts. She was in charge of the spiritual education for the faithful leading seminars devoted to the Christian way of life and spiritual upbringing of the members of community. Those educational activity attracted some Orthodox Christians from Perm and other places (for example, ex-members of the George Kochetkov's Orthodox Fraternity). In the years 2002–2015, more than 100 people became members or temporary inhabitants of community of The Intercession Abode. About 40–50 of them became the core of the community, and Budilova was able to consolidate believers as her followers. For some of them, she became incontestable authority even higher than the Orthodox Church clergy, and more important that their relatives. Eventually, George Pervushin and George Andrievsky left the community (the former faced difficulties in his family life while the latter was accused in abuse by the local religious authorities). Alexander Altmark has lost his status as the head of the Perm Orthodox Gymnasium and served at the parish as an ordinary priest. The exceptional position of Budilova as a spiritual leader remained unchanged and unchallenged. It is worth noting that she never had any official status in the community.

In November 2019, after the inspection from the diocesan commission and several lawsuits from a former member, The Intercession Abode community was excluded from the diocese and declared heretical. Alexander Altmark was stripped of his priesthood, and the community became legally independent. Nevertheless, the expulsion from the local Orthodox diocese did not hinder the community's ongoing activities.

Below, I would analyze instruments and methods used by Budilova in order to strengthen her control over the community in the situation when its leadership was partially disintegrated. My aim is to prove the eclectic character of the community, which leadership had used not only religious but also some mythological and secular methods in order to attain the obedience of its members.

I have used various types of sources to gather information about community of The Intercession Abode and its doctrine. In recent years, the community has existed in complete isolation from the outside world, which made proper observations almost impossible. The community's members unanimously rejected any contact with researchers or journalists. There were only two interviews conducted with the former followers of Olga Budilova; both were highly problematic and partisan. To compensate the lack of information, I have used private correspondence with one of the community's founders (with the informant's permission). Thus, my research is based on anonymous personal communication with community members in 2008–2009, 2010–2011, and 2014–2015.

From theoretical point of view, the main problem for researcher is to find the demarcation line between contemporary and traditional religiosity, new religious

movements and parishes, which belong to so-called “traditional” churches. In my opinion, such demarcation would help to determine the place of a newborn religious group in the confessional space, and to explain the features of its doctrine, cult practice, and management.

Basically, we have a ready-made classification toolkit in our hands. There are quite many publications about new religious movements (NRM) both domestically and internationally. Contemporary researchers single out their basic features: exotic origin; new lifestyle; deep level of involvement into the movement; and charismatic leadership (Barker, 1989, 2009, 2015; Wilson, 2005). Dianna Stone and Bruce A. Campbell added to this list the following characteristics: new sacred power in the ordinary life of people; new structures of social cohesion (new communes); new task and means of spiritual healing; a gearing-up for the arrival of a new age, anti-institutionalism and decentralization; accept of the authority of science; pragmatic attitude; organizational openness (Arweck, 2006; Campbell, 1978; Derek & Hankins, 2003; Stone, 1978; Zeller, 2010). Many Russian researchers agree with these characteristics (Gurevich, 2019; Kanterov, 2018; Mitrokhin, 1985), adding to this list active proselytism (Astakhova, 2011; Fedotov, 2018; Pronina et al., 2018; Tkacheva, 1991), and syncretism (Balagushkin, 1999).

However, in the case of community of The Intercession Abode it is problematic to identify it as NRM. The community lacks several characteristics related to the lifestyle, origin, and principles of relationship with society (proselytism, organizational openness). During the first half of the community’s history, its members were incorporated into the religious life of the Orthodox parish. Despite the exclusion of the community from the Orthodox parishes and the suspension of its priests, the members consider themselves as Orthodox Christians. In 2020–2021, the community took an active part in various social events of patriotic character, and received grants from local authorities. In the autumn of 2020, the community received grant from the administration of the Ordzhonikidzevsky district of the city of Perm to organize series of patriotic celebrations. As a result, *Uchebno-prakticheskii tsentr Russkogo Boevogo Iskusstva imeni general-maiora Iuriia Ivanovicha Drozdova* [The Training and Practical Centre for Russian Martial Arts Named in the Honor of Major General of Foreign Intelligence Service Yuri Drozdov] was founded[3].

However, the community cannot be classified as a sect, since they have existed in isolation from the society (for a detailed analysis of the term see: Panchenko, 2004, pp. 45–54). At the same time, the community has exhibited some clearly ”sectarian” features—specific interpretations of the Holy Scripture, as well as sacred plots and images; charismatic role of the eaders; social isolation. In the following section, I would analyze whether the community bears any characteristics of either new religious movement or historical sect.

[3] https://vk.com/upcrbi

Olga Budilova and Her Interpretation of Faith

Officially, community of The Intercession Abode was a part of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate until autumn 2019. The community's website describes it as an "Orthodox village" (Ob Obiteli Pokrova Presviatoi Bogoroditsy, 2019). All members of the community were baptized, and for twenty years they visited Orthodox services. In the seminars, Olga Budilova used various religious terms associated with Christianity. She cited the Holy Fathers and called her followers to devote their lives to God, to conquer their arrogance, and to grow up spiritually (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015). The most popular idea of the seminars was to refrain from relying on one's own abilities and to entrust one's life to God: "Spiritual affairs must be subordinated to Jesus Christ, Our God" (Anonymous source, personal communication, October 13, 2019; my translation—S. R.). At the same time, Budilova offered a path to salvation that was different from the one offered by the traditional Orthodox Church. In the special seminar devoted to Russian Orthodoxy, Budilova defined the latter categorically: "The church paves the way to hell. It is the beginning of Apocalypse. The new Church is found in the invisible sphere […] The Church is the place where the Word of God is killed" (Anonymous source, personal communication, September 4, 2019; my translation—S. R.). The denial of the official church makes Olga Budilova's ideas close to some teachings of Old Believers and so-called Orthodox sects. Unlike a significant part of new religious movements, Budilova does not insist on the idea that all religions are the same or that they originate from a single source. Her criticism of the Orthodox Church implied a hostile attitude to its members. Instead of attending services, she suggested her followers to establish a personal contact with God through her mediation techniques. This accent becomes a central point of her interpretation of the Christian doctrine (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 25, 2015).

Budilova's assertions that "God began to talk to us […], that He started a direct intimate interaction with us" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 21, 2015; my translation—S. R.) testifies strengthening mystical component of the religious faith. In the Orthodox tradition, mystical experience is acceptable; but in this case, it has been interpreted specifically. The leader of the community becomes the primary translator and mediator of the mystical experience. On one hand, at every seminar, she talked about the communication and even some disputes with the Almighty. On the other hand, requiring constant spiritual efforts from each member of the community, she influenced religious behavior of her followers, even in the smallest everyday things. This practice is similar to the role of the guru in so-called neo-orientalist doctrines (International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Transcendental Meditation Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, etc.). Many researchers note the increasingly significant role of the leader in the community as a characteristical feature of the new religious movements in general (Arweck, 2006; Astakhova, 2011; Balagushkin, 1999; Barker, 1989, 2009). At the same time, it should be noted that historically many new religious groups were consolidated due to the authority of their leaders.

Budilova has created a sense of belonging her followers to the chosen people destined for salvation through contact with the leader. The formation of an elitist consciousness is typical for the religious movements that arose in Western culture in the second half of the 20th century and in Russia after the 1990s. The case of Olga Budilova is interesting because she does not claim to create a new teaching and to revive any tradition. Formally being within the boundaries of Orthodoxy and using the format of training seminars, she broadcasts a specific worldview, and thereby formates the worldniew and behavior of her followers.

Perhaps, such interpretation of Orthodoxy could be attractive to some representatives of the modern urban population, dissatisfied with everyday religiosity. In modern cities, the parish—as a basis of vernacular religiosity—is gradually melting away (Ryazanova, 2018). If believers seek more intense spiritual life and cannot realize it independently, they may find satisfaction within communities like The Intercession Abode. Such leaders as Olga Budilova promise to follow the traditional doctrine of faith. For those dissatisfied with the inconsistency of historical religion (as is is often the case in our time), it is proposed to adopt just some part of Orthodoxy, which does not contradict modern cultural life. An adherent of such a leader simultaneously receives membership in a community of like-minded people and share their religious worldview, which helps to answer critical questions about the way of life and to obtain a sense of elitism. Olga Budilova's disciples, as a rule, did not have either opportunity or desire to check how correct her interpretation of the Orthodox doctrine and cult was. Most of them had no experience of religious life before joining the community. Psychological comfort and comfortable existance within a group replaces theological discussions and the inclination towards the pursuit of spirituality.

Eclecticism as a Worldview and a Way of Management

Mystic ideas are not the only instrument that increases the cohesiveness of the community. It represents itself as a community of like-minded people. Its main goal is to unite all adherents into a single movement. "The community is a place of deep learning where persons continually explore themselves and their relationship with the whole World and its Creator; that's why this community is in the permanent movement never staying at the same place or existing in the only one adopted form. The community is in continual development and search" (Chto takoe Obitel'? Ee ideia ili glavnaia mysl', 2019; my translation—S. R.). This fluidity of behavior and vision characterises mythological or secular worldview rather than religious consciousness, which implies following canonical norms.

The members of the community had created sacred spaces, for example, training center, "which has an octagonal form and symbolizes the Inner Sense of Russian Martial Art—the Mystery of Stone with eight sides" (Ob Obiteli Pokrova Presviatoi Bogorodits, 2019; my translation—S. R.). They utilized cultural heritage of other countries (for example, performance of the *El'fiiskaia Pesn*' [Elf Song], composed in the community), Old Russian vowels, and different "magic things" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 21, 2015; Interview with S. Hvatkov).

They not only prayed but also meditated and tryed to confront magically the enemies of the community, which is very typical for the mythological worldview.

At the same time, the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the group was built up on several secular instruments. In my assumption, it was the *Teoriia resheniia izobretatel'skikh zadach* (TRIZ)[4] [Theory of Inventive problem solving] and its principles, which became the theoretical and organizational basis for community seminars. By its nature, this theory is based on secular methods aimed at the development of creative thinking and contrivance. In Budilova's young years, when she worked in *Istok* [The Source], she had received necessary teaching experience. She regularly used a set of methods developed by Altshuller, including the classic brainstorming methods like "yes and no" answers; the search for the primeval sense; devise of fantastic objects; getting the perception of an object as a part of larger one; uncovering contradictions; analysis of a phenomenon as if it existed in the past, present and future; creating imaginary situations and situations "what if"; heuristic questions; hyperbolization; and agglutination of images. Undoubtely, the teaching method of the interactive seminars, which is typical for TRIZ, can be used in teaching religion. Budilova's experience, in which she successfully used that method and was even able to unfluence the way of life of her adherents proves that she was quite skilled teacher.

According to the witnesses, Olga Budilova's seminars contained plenty examples of the TRIZ methods and practices. Her most popular method of explaining her ideas was creating the imaginary situations. Sometimes, such situations were connected to religious services or practices:

- "Imagine that the Holy Gates have been opened, and you are the first who can come in" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

Quite often she used imaginary social situations:

- "Imagine that you have bought an agricultural area and one carbuncle was put up there" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "You are a poor person standing in the street with a hand out" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "When you join a battle in the war, you have no task to storm Reichstag at once" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 16, 2007; my translation—S. R.);
- "As if you are studying at the university and every day you have to pass an exam" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

Budilova had a rich imagination, and sometimes she offered her followers fantastic plots:

- "If you were taken away from this planet […] where would you take a communion?" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

[4] TRIZ is a set of methods developed by G. S. Altshuller for solving various types of problems, see Kuznetsova (2018).

This way of explanation is completed by the so-called "What if" method. It looks like the way of "imaginative situations" but evokes deeper and clearer images:

- "Imagine that you have inner organs […]; imagine that they will not work" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

The method of "hyperbolization of characteristics" gives us better understanding of Budilova's religious ideas. Very often she used physical and chemical terms:

- "This is each grain of time, a millisecond, a part of a second. We feel it to be overvalued" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "There is a boundary, which, I say, is thinner than an angstrom" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 2, 2014; my translation—S. R.).

The excessive use of scientific language is typical of some groups that identify themselves as Orthodox (Mitrofanova, 2021). At the same time, the use of scientific terms creates similarities between Budilova's texts and the eclectic doctrines of new religious movements. The difference between those methods and the use similar examples in the sermon was that the listeners took an active part in the process and offered their ideas of solving the problem.

The method of "yes and no" answers and the analysis of the phenomenon as existing in the past, present, and future are very useful for the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving. The leader of the community applies them in the following way:

- "Each marriage exists between 'yes' and 'no'" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 16, 2007; my translation—S. R.);
- "The Holy Spirit has shown us some kind of future with great clarity. It is not our present time in which we are now but some kind of future" (Anonymous source, personal communication, Janiary 24, 2015; my translation—S. R.)

The method of "uncovering contradictions" has the same effect, assisting disciples in evaluating all aspects of the phenomenon in question:

- "It was transported to our world by Satan. It is profitable for him […], but there is no such intension in the Holy Scripture" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "She ('Virgin Mary'—S. R.) has embedded what is not embedded" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "In human life, it (marriage—S. R.) destroys incompatible contradictions" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 16, 2007; my translation—S. R.);
- "Each crystal […] stays on three pairs of contradictory categories" (Anonymous source, personal communication, November 25, 2014; my translation—S. R.).

The most important goal of these methods is to get used to the object of comprehension and to find "primary sense". As a rule, Budilova had only one such object—God. And only this term proves the religious character of these seminars:

- "You must be concentrated on being directed to God" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);

- "You need to grow together with God" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.);
- "The attendance of God living between us" (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 21, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

According to Budilova, this kind of comprehension gives one a possibility to be connected with the "primary sense" (Anonymous source, personal communication, January 24, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

The methods used in the seminars are secular by their nature[5]. Their active use, in my opinion, indicates the desire of the leader to adapt the content of Christian teaching to them. Intensive learning not only influenced the way of followers' thinking but also made them active advocates of the proposed lifestyle and social behavior.

Community Regulation as a Way to Individual Salvation

One more instrument of influencing the followers is enforcing control over the group. First of all, it is the authority and control of the leader:

- "You need all your ideas to be fixed and weekly come to the leader with this list of them" (Anonymous source, personal communication, October 13, 2019; my translation—S. R.).
- The "correct" assumption of the disciple usually leads to thoughts like "I am the worst", "I deserve punishment for my sins" (Anonymous source, personal communication, October 13, 2019; my translation—S. R.).
- The members of the community are not able to analyze their ideas independently (Anonymous source, personal communication, October 13, 2019).

The community is recognized as the only way to salvation, as "a spiritual loupe". It helps to recognize false things and correct them. If a person has been living in the community for a long time, they can understand everything and keep a "hawk eye" on the flock. All the punishments in the community, even corporal ones, are interpreted as useful and helpful for personal improvement (Anonymous source, personal communication, October 13, 2019). That is why members should avoid to be by themselves. To be alone means to contrapose one's own opinion to the opinion of the community guided by the Holy Spirit (Anonymous source, personal communication, February 21, 2015). Budilova urges to "part with everything that one has supported earlier because these are false anchorages" (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015; my translation—S. R.).

The reverse side of such a directive is the strong criticism of the society and the external social environment. The leader insists:

- "Society is a monster, which forms artificial interactions between people. It is a form of suicide, created by people to stop their relations with God" (Anonymous source, personal communication, December 4, 2016; my translation—S. R.).

[5] In this case, by secular I mean an anthropocentric worldview, which is not based on religious views and prioritizes the scientific explanation of phenomena.

By that token, social marriage was considered a form of unfreedom; social unit like a city excluded the opportunity to pray to God (Anonymous source, personal communication, May 11, 2015). Those people who were disillusioned with the spiritual activity of the community were considered the enemies of the believers as their desire was to physically eliminate the Holy community.

Every believer needs to minimize their social contacts through their membership in the community, the perception of the mystery of God's love, and the integration of their nature with the nature of God. Community of The Intercession Abode was interpreted as a non-social phenomenon that can save the follower from the terrible reality (Anonymous source, personal communication, December 4, 2016). Budilova called the neophytes to refuse from any form of travel (Anonymous source, personal communication, January 24, 2015), to stay constantly in the community, and to stick to the recommendations of the spiritual leader. For the "chosen" members of the community she organized a special group *Voiny Sveta* (Warriors of Light), which purpose was to conquer enemies of the community and to provide spiritual grouth (Anonymous source, personal communication, January 12, 2015). The status of a warrior becomes an additional attractor for those who have problems with the routine of social life.

Conclusion

The characteristics of community of The Intercession Abode described above allows me to argue that it can be hardly attributed to the NRM. Community members perceive themselves as Orthodox believers who follow Christian teaching. The leader does not declare the emergence of a completely new doctrine. The principles of the community's organization and lifestyle could be better characterized as eclectical. The regulation of the lifestyle and social behavior is not typical for the majority of the Orthodox parishes; using the idea of self-restraint and fulfillment of God's will corresponds to the lifestyle of non-Orthodox religious groups.

In my opinion, this community is an attempt to institutionalize a modern interpretation of the Orthodox doctrine. The leading role in the emergence of a community of such type undoubtedly belongs to the leader. Budilova equally effectively uses her experience as a secular trainer and her religious authority as an elder. Religious terms, mythological context, and secular methods have turned out to be very useful to organize a spiritual community and to keep control over it for a long time.

A case of community of The Intercession Abode, I argue, shows the limitations of the terms "new religious movements" and "historical sects". Their application makes sense only when analyzing the phenomena localized in particular time and place. These terms do not reflect the specifics of contemporary religiosity. In modern religious life, there is an intensive development of various doctrines, cult practices, and communities of believers. The individual religiosity plays important role as a major factor of the development of religious life in the modern society. If the carriers of new ideas turn out to be able to lead people and transmit to them their

ideas about God, they become a centre of emerging of a new religious group. The educational qualification, gender, and competence of the group leader in the field of theology are much less significant. The success in the forming and functioning of the community of believers depends mainly on whether there is a demand for the religious product offered by the leader. If at the next stage of the group's existence its leader can find effective methods of managing the followers, then the community of believers becomes highly resistant to external influences. Such closed religious group may exist in an urban area, but they are not really popular among urban residents; rather, it enhances the unification of the worldview of its members and reduces the possibility of unwanted contacts. Thus, a small group of like-minded people can turn out to be very tenacious in the face of competition between various religious trends.

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ARTICLE

"Guilty of Being Free": An Intellectual vs. Soviet Penal System (Prison Letters and Drawings of Sergei Parajanov)[1]

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ABSTRACT
Sergei Parajanov was one of the most innovative directors of postwar Soviet cinema, which made him suspect to the Soviet authorities and eventually led Parajanov to serving a prison sentence. This article discusses how the trauma of Parajanov's prison experience was reflected in the textual and visual output (letters, drawings and collages) that he created during his imprisonment out of the materials at hand. The study relies on comparative-historical and semiotic methods. Parajanov's homosexuality made his position in prison precarious and ambiguous. He went through a variety of occupations and laboriously navigated both the prison hierarchy and Soviet penal system's vigilant control. However, by his own count, Parajanov crafted 800 objects during his imprisonment. The article explores the recurring motives such as the crane hook, halo, and a hunched posture. This imagery is placed in the context of Parajanov's everyday life in prison and is interpreted in the light of his textual documents from that period.

KEYWORDS
Soviet prison, punitive system, USSR, thieves' hierarchy, homosexuality, homosexual discourse, status in the zone, intellectual in the zone

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[1] "Guilty of being free" was a caption that accompanied Parajanov's photo at his retrospective exhibition in California in 2004 (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 21).

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Introduction

Sergei Parajanov was one of the most innovative directors of postwar Soviet cinema, known for such films as *Teni zabytykh predkov* [Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors] (Parajanov, 1964), *Tsvet granata* [The Color of Pomegranates] (Parajanov, 1968), *Legenda o Suramskoi kreposti* [The Legend of the Surami Fortress] (Parajanov, 1985), and *Ashik-Kerib* (Parajanov, 1988). The film *Teni zabytykh predkov* made Parajanov world famous. In the West, he was called "Maestro of the 20th century" and "hope of the cinema of the Third Millenium" but, unfortunately, as Roman Balayan aptly puts it, Parajanov had to live in a "colourless, mediocre" epoch (as cited in Shirman, 2008, pp. 11, 16). For this "epoch of mediocrity", Parajanov was too bright and eccentric figure, which made him suspect to the Soviet authorities and eventually led Parajanov to serving a prison sentence.

"The Zone split his life in two: the life *before* and *after*" (Katanyan, 2001, p. 50; my translation—T. S.). Three times Parajanov was imprisoned. For the first time he was arrested on account of his homosexuality in Tbilisi in 1948 and sentenced to 5 years in prison. However, since he was a student of the *VGIK* (All-Union State Institute of Cinematography), after staying in prison for 3 months, he was released under an amnesty (Karapetyan, 2006).

In 1973, the Chairman of the Ukrainian KGB V. V. Fedorchuk sent a notice to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine V. V. Scherbitsky to inform him that Parajanov had been trying to defend dissident I. M. Dzyuba. Later, Fedorchuk also reported that Parajanov had been openly criticizing the Soviet government, drawing the First Secretary's attention to Parajanov's friendly relationships with Ukrainian dissident writers and warning him that Parajanov had been trying to organize mass protests against these dissidents' political trials in 1972 and 1973. In July 1974, Parajanov was arrested for the second time and charged with "seducing men" and "organizing a den of debauchery" (Grigoryan, 2011). This time he was sentenced to 5 years in a highly secure facility. He served his sentence in different Ukrainian colonies: Gubnik, Strizhevka, and Kommunarsk. On December 30, 1977, he was set free on parole but was forbidden to live in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, or Yerevan (his flat in Kiev had been confiscated). The real reason behind Parajanov's arrest was the speech he gave to local students and young professionals in sciences and arts. The verbatim transcript of his speech marked *Confidential* was sent by the Chairman of the KGB Yury Andropov to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR[2].

Parajanov was arrested for the third time on February 12, 1982 on charges of bribery. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison but was released on probation after 9 months after Eduard Shevardnadze, who at that time served as the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, had pulled some strings on his behalf (Karapetyan, 2004). The real reason behind Parajanov's third arrest was his speech during the discussion of the performance of *Vladimir Vysotsky* staged by Yury Lyubimov on October 31, 1981. Parajanov's friend, poet Bella Akhamadullina gave the following

[2] For the text of Parajanov's court speech see Katanyan (2001, pp. 204–222).

laconic explanation of the persecutions he suffered: "He was guilty of being free" (as cited in Katanyan 2001, p. 43; my translation—T. S.). Parajanov's non-conformity and impulsivity was punished by the state through imprisonment and administrative harassment while his homosexuality made him particularly vulnerable as it made easy to subject him to humiliation and persecution.

The main questions that this article seeks to address are as follows. How was the trauma of Parajanov's prison experience reflected in his texts (letters), pen and pencil drawings and collages? What role did the *prison period* play in Parajanov's evolution as an artist?

The study analyzes Parajanov's prison letters to friends and relatives and the visual content (drawings and collages) that he created out of the materials at hand. The author of the article limited himself to analyzing Parajanov's prison letters and visual content, since in future work the correlation of his prison life and films will be analyzed. This study also draws on the previous research on this topic—for example, Steffen (2013, pp. 186–201), Razlogov (2018), Mikaelyan (2019), Simyan (2019). It should be emphasized that there is not much literature on this problem in Russian and English, since Parajanov's prison letters were published in Russian relatively recently. Accordingly, they have not yet been translated into English to generate second-level scientific texts.

Methodologically, the study relies on comparative-historical, semiotic, interdiscursive and discourse analysis methods. Of course, Parajanov's prison life is described in the context of the Soviet punitive system with the help of oppositions *top vs. bottom, power vs. intellectual*. By describing Parajanov's life are also used the metalanguage concepts of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), the theory of Michel Foucault (1926–1984), associated with the description of the transition from severe corporal punishment (torture, quartering, gallows, etc.) to non-corporal (Foucault, 1975/1977).

From the Grand-prix to Granite Quarry

Parajanov was impulsive and often acted on the spur of the moment. He also had a "loose tongue" (Karapetyan, 2004). He lived as if he was constantly walking on thin ice (Karapetyan, 2006). Bella Akhmadullina shrewdly described his character by pointing out that "it was not the prison that wanted him, but rather he wanted to get into prison" (Katanyan, 2001, p. 105; my translation—T. S.).

For Parajanov the 5-year sentence was a severe shock because he had expected to get just one year for *sodomy* according to Article 121 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. As Parajanov's common-law wife Svetlana remembered later, when the verdict was announced, Sergei's face had the look of a wounded deer (Katanyan, 2001, p. 48).

The persecutions of homosexual men in the USSR started in the 1930s[3] (Healey, 2018). One of the ideologists of proletarian literature and the mouthpiece of the

[3] For our context and understanding of the attitude of the authorities to homosexuality as an invective in the 1960s, we should recall Khrushchev's criticism of the exposition of young avant-gardists on December 1, 1962 in the Manege. For more details, see Zelenina (2020).

political leadership, Maxim Gorky in his article *Proletarskii gumanizm* [Proletarian Humanism] (1934) wrote the following:

> In the country ruled by the proletariat, fearlessly and successfully, homosexuality, which corrupts the morals of our young people, is considered socially criminal and punishable by law. (Gorky, 1957, pp. 238; my translation—T. S.)

The same year the Soviet government adopted a law that expressly prohibited male homosexuality—Article 121 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. The crime of sodomy (*muzhelozhestvo*) was punishable by up to 5 years in prison. In case of a forced sexual intercourse with a nonconsenting person or a minor, the punishment could be up to 8 years in prison (Kon, 2010, p. 133).

For Parajanov, his prison sentence signified a transition from one existential state to another: from freedom to unfreedom, from civilian life to prison life. Parajanov had to adjust to the new environment. In a letter to Lilya Brik, he wrote that he was not Mowgli in order to learn the language of the jungle (Katanyan, 2001, p. 50), by which he meant the language of the prison.

To make matters worse, the investigator used a witness who gave a false testimony that he had been raped by Parajanov to fabricate shameful and humiliating charges against the film director. In his letter to Lilya Brik, Parajanov wrote that he had been deprived not only of his flat but also of "his coat of an artist and a man" (in original "mundira khudozhnika i muzhchiny") (Katanyan, 2001, p. 60; my translation—T. S.). Parajanov's son Suren wrote:

> I am not saying that my Dad did not break the law but this article [of the Criminal Code—T. S.] was chosen deliberately to humiliate him. They found some three random witnesses and, which is the most ridiculous thing, on top of this charge they stacked a naked women pen and playing cards, like the ones you can buy from almost any kiosk. (as cited in Tsereteli, 2008, p. 268; my translation—T. S.)

In an attempt to defend his masculinity, Parajanov proposed to Svetlana but she declined (Katanyan, 2001, p. 60).

Another severe blow was the loss of his "coat of an artist". In his letter to sister Ruzanna, Parajanov writes that the system deprived him of his profession, authority, and name (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 72), referring to his expulsion from the Union of Cinematographers of Ukraine in May 1974. In her memoirs about Parajanov, Kora Tsereteli quotes Alina Litinskaya, Parajanov's friend from Kiev, who described Parajanov's expulsion the following way:

> There was a meeting at the studio where the decision was taken not to let Parajanov ever again join the Union. This decision was documented in the special minutes of the meeting. It was legal nonsense but it was not this fact that upset him the most: among those who signed the document there were some people he cared much about. (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 93; my translation—T. S.)

In his prison letters, Parajanov described various prison jobs that he was assigned to. In his letter to Tamara Ogorodnikova, for example, he vividly depicted his work as a scrap metal cleaner (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 222) (Fig. 1).

This was a grueling, physically demanding job, which is reflected in the picture in his slouching posture. Igor Ushakov, who was Parajanov's co-mate in the prison in Perevalsk, remembered the hard work in metal shops where cranes and elevators were manufactured and assembled (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 226). This also explains why in all the self-portraits drawn by Parajanov in this period there can be seen a crane hook. Not only is it a realistic detail but it also has a certain symbolic significance: metaphorically, a crane hook may represent the threat coming from the Soviet penal system, like the Sword of Damocles hanging over the artist's head. On the other hand, the hook may also represent an invitation to suicide, which could be perceived as a way out of the unbearable situation.

After the release from prison, Parajanov made up a pun to describe his experience:

> When I was told that I was going to work in a granite quarry ["gran-kar'er" in Russian], I thought it should be something enormous because I knew the word "gran" only in connection to "Grand-prix", like the prize I had been awarded in Argentina. It turned out this time I was awarded a granite quarry. (Katanyan, 2001, pp. 52–53; my translation—T. S.)

Figure 1

Drawing on a Letter to Tamara Ogorodnikova. Sergei Parajanov as a Metal Cleaner



Note. Source: Tsereteli (2008), p. 222.

During his time in prison, Parajanov was, as Roman Balayan puts it, a regular *frayer* (a private person not linked to the criminal circle) within the rigid hierarchy of the Zone (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 225). There he was given a name *Serega the kinshchik*. The inmates used to call him *kinshchik*, which literally meant "a cinema-man", a person who showed movies (as in a widespread saying "No cinema tonight—the *kinshchik* is ill!"). He also drew playing cards for fellow inmates and angels on the postcards they sent home (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 226). Other prisoners liked him: Igor Ushakov describes a situation where the *blatnyie* (thieves-in-law) ordered the inmates to let Parajanov go first to the prison commissary ("Clear the way! Let the *kinshchik* stock up") (as cited in Tsereteli, 2008, p. 227). Obviously, Parajanov would not have managed to survive in prison without the assistance of the *blatnyie*.

Blatnyie provided protection for Parajanov. Quite illustrative in this respect is the story of Parajanov's relationship with Mirgazym, who was the *smotriashchii* ("watcher")—the person who maintained order in the workplace or in the cell. Mirgazym was asked by the *zampolit* (political officer of the guards) in Strizhavka to look after Parajanov. When the inmates there found out that Parajanov was a famous film director from the entry *School of Parajanov* in the reference book, Mirgazym gave him a top bunk first (the top bunks were meant for *frayers*). After Parajanov asked Mirgazym for a job in the workshop assembling maize harvesters, the latter gave him a bottom bunk (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 233). This transition signified a change in Parajanov's status in the prison hierarchy as he became closer to the *polozhenets* (a criminal who replaces the boss in his absence and is usually appointed by the latter to control the territory and conduct matters).

To avoid attracting excessive attention from the criminals, Parajanov refused to accept the position of a *kultorg* (the person in charge of cultural and educational activities) or bath director and instead chose to work as a floor sweeper in Mirgazym's workshop. Parajanov knew that one wrong move could get him into trouble, which is why he chose a harder job but under Mirgazym's wing. When Mirgazym was about to be released, he appointed a *regular guy* (in original "patsan") from Kiev to look after Parajanov (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 233).

It should be noted that the Soviet authorities constantly kept Parajanov in view and measures were taken lest his punishment should be mitigated and he should be sent to an open-type correctional facility (the so-called *khimiia*) or be released on parole (Zakoyan, 2020, pp. 74, 81).

The Parole Commission considering Parajanov's parole eligibility noted the following cases of rule violation: (a) Moustache; (b) Slippers—wore them to go to the canteen; (c) Demonstrates little enthusiasm for work (when sweeping). To this Parajanov sadly commented: "No enthusiasm, no consciousness, and no feeling of responsibility and, which is more important, I want to go to Iran[4]" (Zakoyan, 2020, pp. 232–233; my translation—T. S.). On top of that, the Commission made a note of Parajanov's hunger strike and of being friends with the *blatnye.*

[4] Parajanov wanted to go to Iran to make the film *Layla and Majnun*. He wrote a letter to Brezhnev, asking him for a "joyful change in my fate—my return to life" (as cited in Katanyan, 2001, pp. 67–68; my translation—T. S.).

The notes made by the Parole Commission show that in the eyes of the penitentiary system, Parajanov had failed to be "corrected" and, on the contrary, aligned himself with people from the criminal world, rejecting the moral foundations of the Soviet society. Parajanov saw himself as a captive of the Soviet system, physically confined to the space of the prison rather than a convict (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 232).

In his letters to his wife Tamara, Parajanov depicts himself as a metal workshop sweeper with angel wings and a halo (Fig. 2).

The third picture (Fig. 3) emphasizes his innocence (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 235).

A pensive looking and bent sweeper calls for sympathy and at the same time exposes the cruelty of the Soviet penal system, which cripples the prisoner's soul.

The picture portrays a street sweeper dodging a crane hook, which symbolizes the threat coming from *above*—from the political establishment. One of the captions in the picture— *Khodataistvo o pomilovanii bylo otkloneno* [Motion for freedom declined]—refers to the Commission's refusal to let Parajanov be transferred to the *khimiia* while the slogans "Labour and only labour! Correct yourself and your friend!" (my translation—T. S.) were probably widely used within the penal system itself.

The motives of a "saint sweeper" and hook of a crane recur in his letter to his friends—Galina and Gurgen Misakyan. In this portrait, Parajanov drew a sacred trident and spiked halo as a sign of sanctity (Fig. 4) (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 328).

These recurring motives in Parajanov's drawings indicated his belief in his innocence of the charges brought against him. Looking at the shot breakdown of the film *Confession*, we come across a street sweeper with a halo (Fig. 5) (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 113).

Figure 2

Sergei Parajanov. Page of Letter Addressed to Tamara Stepanovna Shevchenko, 1975

Note. Source: Zakoyan (2020), p. 264.

Figure 3
Sergei Parajanov. Page of Letter Addressed to His Wife Svetlana Shebatyuk, 1977

Note. Source: Zakoyan (2020), p. 235.

Figure 4
Page of a Letter Addressed to Parajanov's Friends Galina and Gurgen Misakyan, 1977



Note. Source: Zakoyan (2020), p. 328.

Figure 5
Sergei Parajanov. Street Sweeper. Storyboard from the Film Confession

Note. Source: Tsereteli (2008), p. 113.

Thus, Parajanov could have emphasized the status he held at the Zone rather than his innocence: "I consider December 17, 1973 to be my date of death. I died that day. I am being accused of something but I don't know what" (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 108; my translation—T. S).

Interestingly, Parajanov continued using this avatar—the floor sweeper—in his post-prison period: for example, in 1988, he created a self-portrait—a doll of a floor sweeper (Fig. 6) (Mikaelyan, 2019, p. 109).

The very fact of such ironic self-presentation points to a certain degree of frustration but from a hindsight perspective. Even 11 years after his second release and 6 years after his third, Parajanov continued to mentally revisit his prison experience, drawing ironic self-portraits in the *zek* uniform. This irony is particularly evident in the doll he created with the help of bottle brushes for the beard and twigs for the broom. The greyness of these brushes points to the filth and dirt of the epoch; Parajanov's brush-beard is also dirty.

Figure 6

Sergei Parajanov. S. P. Prisoner with Broom.

Note. Source: Zakoyan (2020), p. 153.

Artistic and Sexual Non-Conformity

Male homosexuality in the Soviet Russia was criminalized and stigmatized any man who was involved in the proceedings over sexual offences. In his seminal work on sex in Russian society, Igor Kon gives the following figures: even though we don't know exactly how many people were convicted under Article 121, it was used to send to prison 1,000 men annually from the 1930s to the 1980s (Kon, 2010, p. 134). According to Dan Healey, in the 59-year period that this article remained in force, the number of convictions reached 60,000, and in the year when Parajanov was convicted this figure was 1,355 (Healey, 2001, pp. 311, 316; Valodzin, 2020). The total number of convicts shows that the Soviet punitive system went against biology, biological (genetic) *failure*. The mistake was in the incorrect interpretation of the phenomenon. The law on homosexuality *solved* the problem of an external factor, propaganda. The law severely crippled the fate of biologically (genetically) determined homosexuals or bisexuals[5].

As mentioned, Parajanov was arrested in 1948 and charged with an offence under Article 121 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. He was aware of the fact that it would be impossible to conceal his first conviction and in his last speech in court, he admitted openly that he had been previously convicted in the so-called *Mikava case*. Mikava worked in the state security apparatus of Georgia. When 20-year-old Parajanov met him, Mikava was the chairman of the Georgian Society of Cultural Relationships and, as Parajanov himself described him, "an experienced professional *pederast*":

> He occupied a high rank, was older than me, he took advantage of my gratitude for his helping me to enter the conservatory, and so he seduced me, Parajanov said. At Mikava's initiative, Parajanov had repeated intercourse with him, playing the "active" sexual role. Then he found the strength to break up with Mikava, dropped out of the conservatory and travelled to Moscow. In Moscow, Parajanov entered the Institute of Cinematography hoping that what he called his "sin" would never recur. (as cited in Korchinsky, 2008; my translation—T. S.)

In his court speech, Parajanov pointed out that he had been trying to overcome "the abnormality and hideousness" of his behaviour, the "abnormal feeling", "shameful passion", "sin", "pernicious" attraction (as cited in Korchinsky, 2008; my translation—T. S.). It should be noted that Parajanov struggled with his homosexuality by actively pursuing heterosexual relationships. Neither his first nor second marriage, however, was successful. His second wife Svetlana Shcherbanyuk left him. Parajanov's speech reveals the mixed feelings he had about his sexuality as his attraction was not equally split between genders and was fluid. Parajanov was worried about his strong sexual attraction to men, not

[5] For more on the discourse on the normalcy and pathology of homosexuality in the 1920s and 1930s and the struggle for the traditional family see: Healey (2001, pp. 155–185); Reich (1966, pp. 157–166, 211–214); on the case of Leningrad: Ivanov (2013, pp. 126–144).

> …to all of them but to some that I was drawn to and that evoked passion in me. [...] Sexual relationships with men were more attractive to me than with women. I could easily abstain from relationships with women but the bursts of passion towards men literally burned me from the inside. (as cited in Korchinsky, 2008; my translation—T. S.)

Parajanov's words reveal a great tension between his aspiration for a conventional heterosexual relationship and homosexual desire.

In his last word in court, Parajanov said: "Your Honours! I am homosexual and I have never concealed it. It's my tragic disease" (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 127; my translation—T. S.). He also said that quite possibly "this sin has been in my genes since birth" (as cited in Korchinsky, 2008; my translation—T. S.).

It should be noted that Parajanov often raised the topic of homosexuality in his prison letters. In his letter to wife Svetlana, for example, he wrote:

> Sociologists in this country have come up with a new idea: the son of a communist should be a communist. The son of an accountant—an accountant. The son of an engineer—an engineer. The son of a street sweeper—a street sweeper. So, the son of a pederast should be a pederast, obviously. (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 228; my translation—T. S.)

This means that Parajanov was afraid of not only what the Soviet penal system could do to him but also how his conviction might affect his son. He was afraid that Suren could also end up in prison: Suren might get arrested under a contrived pretext, for example, buying smuggled goods such as a used T-shirt with a Mickey Mouse print. Parajanov's greatest fear was that his son's freedom would be sacrificed so that investigating officer Makashov could get another star on his shoulder straps for his 60th anniversary (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 228).

Parajanov recognized the dangers of his "hard and tragic situation" and asked his sister Ruzanna to send him the record of his conviction to dispel the rumours in the zone and thus avoid the stigma directed at the homosexuals playing the *passive* role (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 48). In criminal and prison communities, passive homosexuality was considered acceptable only for those of inferior "prison castes". Moreover, if someone was suspected of being the "passive one", they could be raped or even killed: "If they think I was passive, I could be murdered!" he wrote, "It's appalling in strength and mass" (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 63; my translation—T. S.). Marina Vladi expressed hope that the letters by her husband Vladimir Vysotsky, a famous Soviet singer-songwriter, as well as his photographs with Parajanov that had been sent to the zone could have helped alleviate the situation for the latter. As Marina Vladi noted, *zeks* (inmates—T. S.) were very fond of Vysotsky because he wrote many songs about them and about the *zone*" (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 38; my translation—T. S.).

In a letter to Svetlana Parajanov described the horrors of the *zone* and asked to show his letters to their son to help him overcome "the period of mutation—the crisis of adolescence and childhood pathologies" (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 126; my translation—T. S.).

Figure 7
Sergei Parajanov. Prison Bitches

Note. Source: Zakoyan (2020), p. 151.

> Dystrophia, drug abuse, during the night I hear them screaming "Mum"; they wet their beds and put their mattresses reeking of urine on the snow to dry. They are all from the crater of Kiev. The gays—golden-haired *twiggies*[6] with beautiful hands, yet unshaven. When they—*men*—turn up here, at the zone, they are adopted by code-bound thieves, who turn them into their bitches and errand boys (*shestiorki*). (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 126; my translation—T. S.)

Within the prison social hierarchy, *twiggies* occupied an inferior position. The only way for them to survive in prison was to be *adopted* by the thieves and to become their *sonnies*, *slaves* or *shestyorkas* (errand boys) and thus acquire the necessary protection.

In his drawing *Tiuremnye suchki* [Prison Bitches] (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 151) (Fig. 7), Parajanov depicted the inmates who had been *turned out*—coerced into having sex

[6] The word *twiggies* was derived from the name of the British supermodel famous for her gamine look (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 126).

and thus branded as victims of sexual abuse[7], although nothing in this drawing indicates the inferior status of these people. In his memoir about Parajanov, Roman Balayan describes a situation when Parajanov was saved by one lieutenant. When a certain code-bound criminal (*vor v zakone*) found out that Parajanov was a homosexual, he chased him off from the bunk bed and threw him out in the rain. After three hours outside, Parajanov was almost dead with cold until he was seen by some lieutenant passing by (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 223).

Apart from adopting a *twiggy*, another way to cope with the sexual deprivation was to seek contact with the women inmates whom one could meet through the pen pal system (the so-called *zaochnitsy*). In high security prisons, however, inmates were allowed to have visitors only once in 6 months. In one of his letters Parajanov is telling about an 18-year-old prisoner who killed his stepmother for beating his father. This young man

> …is drawing one and the same girl—his beloved—and dresses her in various robes. Then tries to undress her. [...] He will leave prison at Christ's age. I already have 1,001 such novellas. Each more horrible than the other. (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 109; my translation—T. S.)

Once an Italian journalist in Venice asked Parajanov:

> "How do you feel about the fact that Pasolini was homosexual?" "Excuse me", Parajanov replied, "Where are we? In Italy? In the country of Leonardo da Vinci? Michelangelo? Who cares what they were doing in bed! But since we are on the subject of homosexuality, out of the three of us—you, me and Pasolini—it is you who is the sexual minority!" (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 88–89; my translation—T. S.)

In 1988, at a press conference in the USA, Sergei Parajanov spoke of homophobia in the USSR:

> When I was in Rome, I gave some lectures. Someone said that the Soviet people don't like Pasolini's work because he is homosexual. There were 20 students at the lecture, all looking very much like Pasolini. All of them had purple collars made of paper lace. They had also put some purple-coloured lilies on the windowsills. It was a wonderful theatre—a continuation of Pasolini. I replied that Russian people like Tchaikovsky's music very much, forgetting that he was homosexual. I have been to prison three times. I was accused of homosexuality—*active*, but it doesn't matter... In Italy, I saw the works of Leonardo, Michelangelo. I am glad I am neither sexologist nor sexopathologist. I was looking at their works and I didn't remember that they were homosexual.

[7] For more on this, see Starkov (2010, p. 174). It should be noted that in the prison world there were double standards in relation to homosexuality: deprived of the opposite sex, inmates of a higher status could engage in situational homosexual encounters since masturbation was considered inappropriate for the higher castes.

> In my case, our government have made their deepest apologies to me. The Soviet Criminal Code states that the hormones can be cured in prison. When an active [homosexual] becomes *passive* and vice versa. (Karapetyan, 2006; Tsereteli, 2008, p. 127; my translation—T. S.)

Parajanov was a free mind in his views on sexuality and claimed that for creative artists it was utterly irrelevant. Moreover, it was not for the viewer who evaluated an aesthetic oeuvre to assume the role of sexologist or sexopathologist. Parajanov's words reveal his ironic attitude to the Soviet penal system, which was trying "to fix the hormones" by locking people up.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Parajanov managed to gain more freedom by distancing himself from his traumatic experience in prison although he still found himself compelled to address the topic of homosexuality (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 191). But he did it in an ironical manner when, for instance, talked of his supposed *connections* with the Communist government: after the film *Ashik-Kerib* was shown in Munich, it lost the right to participate in the film festival in Venice. In Italy the film received a lot of publicity, media also paid much attention to Parajanov's biography, in particular, as he put it, his "homosexual connections with the Communists" (Karapetyan, 2006; my translation—T. S.).

Intellectual Isolation

Parajanov's criminal conviction caused a kind of intellectual lethargy because during his stay in prison, he found himself in a thoroughly dehumanizing environment, in an intellectual and information vacuum, deprived of the personal, cultural, and professional connections he used to have. Parajanov expressed his feeling of isolation and his dismay at being unable to follow the cultural and cinema news in multiple writings. In his letter to sister Ruzanna Parajanov asks her to bring him some books—*Metropolitan* [the Metropolitan Museum of Art—T. S.], *Bosch*, etc. "You will take all of them back. In case you want to leave something—if Igor has got the Impressionists or the Dutch, etc., maybe he could give them to me as a present or find where to buy them cheaper" (Zakoyan, 2020, p. 145; my translation—T. S.). This letter shows how much he hungered for new impressions, yearning to refresh the paintings in his memory.

The following drawing can be considered a visual metaphor of his intellectual ordeal in prison (Fig. 8).

A castle represents the isolation and the suppression of creativity as Parajanov's forced silence between the films *Tsvet granata* [The Color of Pomegranates] (Parajanov, 1968) and *Legenda o Suramskoi kreposti* [The Legend of the Surami Fortress] (Parajanov, 1985) lasted 15 years. Only in 1985 his film received international recognition at Pesaro International Film Festival of New Cinema.

In 1988 in New York, at the press conference following the screening of *Ashik-Kerib* Parajanov remarked that he had "left his energy in prison" though this was where he became an artist. "From there I brought 800 works" (Karapetyan, 2006; my

translation—T. S.). For Parajanov, collage became a quasi-narrative, a unique kind of cinematography in a compressed form.

Collage *Perechen' opisannogo imushchestva* [Property Inventory List] (1977) (Fig. 9) can be a perfect example of such narrative.

In this laconic work, the penal system is embodied in the hands of an officer writing the inventory list. The system had taken away the Parajanov's most treasured possessions—vintage and antique things, personal memorabilia. This collage is also a way to say goodbye to the things that were precious for Parajanov.

Parajanov turned the *zone* into a creative laboratory. As Parajanov once said, "they thought that in prison I would become anti-Soviet but instead while being in isolation I studied life" (as cited in Mikaelyan, 2019, p. 101; my translation—T. S.).

Parajanov could see beauty even in the most trivial or horrifying things:

> Imagine a wooden latrine sitting in the corner of the yard, all covered in colourful stalactites and stalagmites. These appeared because *zeks* peed in the freezing cold and their piss—of different colours—got frozen: those who had nephritis had green piss, those with bruised kidneys peed with red, those who drank *chifir*, orange [...] It all sparkled in the sun, a sight of unspeakable beauty—like a Venus Grotto! (Katanyan, 2001, p. 53; my translation—T. S.)

Figure 8

Sergei Parajanov with Lock



Note. Source: Katanyan (2001), p. 100.

Figure 9

Sergei Parajanov. Property Inventory List, 1977

Note. Source: https://parajanovmuseum.am/ru/gallery/?catId=3

As Zaven Sarkisyan, the director of Parajanov's museum in Yerevan observes, Parajanov considered beauty the most important thing in nature. He was obsessed with beauty and created beauty out of nothing. For him the beauty is the revelation of the transcendent (Sarkisyan, 2014).

In one of his interviews, Parajanov complained that the prison had robbed him of 15 years of his life—the years of "complete stagnation, destitution, with no means of support [...] I am destroyed, primarily as a creator. I am ripped off, first and foremost, regarding my creative work" (Karapetyan, 2004; my translation—T. S.). Parajanov's experience of incarceration had a devastating effect on him both mentally and financially.

Parajanov liked being deliberately provocative in his public speeches: for example, in the speech he gave at the Taganka Theatre in Moscow he started talking of his immortality and said that he was pampered by the Pope, who sent him diamonds and jewels, which he sold to buy caviar. Parajanov complained about the time he lost in prison: "Someone wanted me to do nothing. Must be some rival who wanted to get rid of me" (Karapetyan, 2004; my translation—T. S.). Despite his outward audacity, however, Parajanov could not but feel bitterness and frustration about the fact that his mature years, which might have been his creative prime, had been stolen from him by the Soviet state.

Figure 10
Sergei Parajanov



Note. Source: Katanyan (2001), p. 65.

He also struggled to socialize: his friends tried to find him a job in Tbilisi and Yerevan, on television in Moscow, but he was still traumatized by his incarceration experience and explained that he needed more time. He said that he had seen too much "*there*—in prison: The dead can resurrect, it's much harder for the living" (Katanyan, 2001, p. 78). In this context, the observation of Parajanov's friend is quite remarkable: Roman Balayan remembered having a "paradoxical feeling" after Parajanov's release that "it was all of us that were in prison while he was free [...]" (Parajanov, 2006, p. 221; my translation—T. S.). Balayan also noted: "Soviet Ukraine wanted to bury Parajanov but in reality, it immortalized him. They locked him up but he managed to give to them, to himself, to all of us—such a beauty" (Parajanov, 2006, p. 221; my translation—T. S.). In other words, Parajanov transfigured his unfreedom into the creativity of a free spirit—in his collages, drawings, and letters[8].

He had, however, fits of severe depression and despair: in the drawing of 1964, one of the angel wings is cut off, leaving him incapable of a creative flight (Fig. 10) (Katanyan, 2001, p. 65).

[8] After his release, Parajanov gave away some of his collages to his friends and relatives but most of his prison works are now exhibited in his museum in Yerevan.

The suffering and the vulnerable state of the artist's soul are represented by the drops of blood. This transience of artistic creativity is conveyed through the combination of what looks like a halo and barbed wire as if Parajanov binds together innocence and sanctity with suffering and unfreedom. Similar emotions are described in Parajanov's autobiography:

After thirty years, I returned to the city where I was born in 1924. I came back an old man, carrying behind my back, like two wings, on one side—fame, triumph, and recognition, and on the other—humbleness of a slave, prisoner, *zek*. (Tsereteli, 2008, p. 9; my translation—T. S.)

Conclusion

Impulsive and eccentric, Parajanov found himself to be in constant antagonism with the Soviet government and its doctrines, which resulted in his personal tragedy and severe creative crisis lasting for 15 years. The stress, monotony and hardships of prison life drained his artistic energies although he did manage to create a variety of *compressed* texts—collages and drawings. In prison, Parajanov took on a variety of jobs, including that of a builder, fabric mender, laundry worker, floor sweeper, orderly (*dnevalny*), janitor, fireman, metal cleaner and so on. The daily routines of his prison life, his state of mind and body are described in his letters and drawings, where recurring motives such as the crane hook, halo, and a hunched posture play an important role. His prison letters are imbued with terror and desperation as he feared not only for his own life but also for his son's. They also give us valuable insights into what life was like in Soviet penal colonies. Thanks to his friends' help and support (Vysotsky, Katanyan, Lilya Brik and others) and his own cautiousness, Parajanov managed to survive even in a seemingly deadlock situation when he was *sandwiched* between the Soviet penal system and the inmate community, consisting of code-bound criminals (*vory v zakone*), *underbosses* (*smotriashchie*), and so on. In his prison works, Parajanov turned the homosexual and prison discourse into an object of creative play and means to convey his irony and disdain towards the Soviet political system.

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[9] Доступ к информационному ресурсу ограничен на основании Федерального закона от 27 июля 2006 года №149-ФЗ «Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации»

10 Доступ к информационному ресурсу ограничен на основании Федерального закона от 27 июля 2006 года №149-ФЗ «Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации»

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BOOK REVIEW

Dhingra, P. (2021). Hyper Education. Why Good Schools, Good Grades, and Good Behavior Are Not Enough. NYU Press.

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

"Open your kids up to more this school year" is one of the advertisements of Kumon, a famous educational network that has learning centers in various parts of the world. Parents then are urged to enroll their children so as for the latter to succeed more. Kumon is only one of the numerous afterschool programs that is growing as an answer to the increasing demand of many parents wanting their children to become academically skillful and competent. Meanwhile, some parents look for tutors or, on their own, they lend their time to teach their children, as a supplement to the school education. This trend is named hyper education. This is a common practice of middle to high-class families, with the belief that it can ensure the future success of their children.

This topic is explored in Hyper Education, written by Pawan Dhingra. A multiple award-winning author and former museum curator at Smithsonian Institution, Dhingra is a professor at Amherst College. His research interests range from American studies, cultural sociology, and education. In the book, the author shows how Asian American parents make their children improve academically through hyper education, referring to the practice of extending education through privatized, extracurricular learning. Divided into three

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parts, this well-researched book talks about the different sides of hyper education and how it becomes a habit for Asian American parents to use it as part of their parenting style.

Part I starts that a good school being a learning environment that nurtures children's capabilities and skills. Through schools, students learn and become better. However, the author contends that parents and families increasingly become dissatisfied with their children's learning in schools, leading to their engagement in different private learning centers. This also results in the establishment of many private learning centers.

Greenblatt et al. (2019) comment that education is a means to acquire skills that are relevant to their development, which can subsequently mobilize individuals socially and economically. Parents understand this and so they want their children to have leverage in life. One way is through extra academics. Many Asian American parents do not have a choice but to engage their children in different learning centers that can help the latter develop more, because schools are not enough anymore given their inherent weaknesses. Even schools that follow innovative curriculum cannot satisfy some parents, these various expectations result in the foundation of different learning centers.

Moreover, Dhingra explains that public schools are not enough for some high-performing students. This also leads their parents to engage them in private learning centers, leading to more academic workloads for children. Nevertheless, schools are still viewed as the main source of education for students.

Part II focuses on the case that Asian Americans, especially the Indian American, parents infuse to their children that life is a competition, and the latter must stand out to get ahead in life and so the earlier that children are equipped with the skills that can differentiate them from others, the better. It is viewed as the safest course to any opportunity in the future.

Concerted cultivation, which refers to the parenting style that incorporates organized activities in the life of the children (Lareau, 2011), is present among Asian American families. Parents believe that academic pursuits. especially in math, are an important tool for the future. Hence, they enroll children in activities or learning centers that help them improve in academics, though the children express little fun. However, this does not mean that parents do not care about the enjoyment of kids and so they make sure that the tasks are enjoyable to do.

Parents believe that had they not pushed students in extra academics, they would have become violent or be led astray. Also, this is an anti-assimilation tactic that can make children immune from negative behaviors in the American culture. Parents believe that it can lessen uncertainty about the children's future, and this can be a way to compensate for the failings of the school and the curriculum.

Asian Americans see hyper education as a source of pride and a way to develop cultural values. These parents feel the responsibility to nurture the interests and capacities of children. Besides, it is a tool to develop hard work and to not spoil their kids, complemented with the delay of gratification. Hyper education and tiger parenting are commonly linked together. However, the author asserts that it is

incorrect because hyper education is barely done without the appreciation for the activities; it is not also utilized in a tortuous manner.

Part III accentuates that hyper education has become a normal part of the lives of the youth, which is supported by parents and the community. Hence, extra academics and competitions have become part of their identity also. The usage of family outings, purchasing of software programs, and traveling abroad for contests are a manifestation that parents are willing to go the extra mile to facilitate children's success. These youths, however, sacrifice friendships and entertainment because a lot of time and effort is devoted to extra academics.

Meanwhile, parents may sometimes force children to compete against their will, thinking it would do good for them. They may use threatening techniques; the consequent effects, of course, are less enthusiasm or, worse, resentment among kids. Asian Americans are viewed still as foreigners and are frequent topic to racist critiques that no "real Americans" have been winning competitions, most especially in math and spelling bee (Pandya, 2017). This is contrary to the warm support of families and community members. Hence, youths feel that there is a disconnect.

Furthermore, teachers and other school personnel have mixed reactions to students who are taking extracurricular education. While some believe on its importance, others see it in a negative life since it exceeds the school norms and can cause children stress. These children try to fit in by not talking much about their academic achievements; seeing their extra academics as equals to sports, hence "brain sports"; and connecting it with popular endeavors. But, at the same time, they take pride in their unique academic which spotlights their good behavior.

The book contributes to the understanding of hyper education trend which is becoming prevalent not only among Asian American parents in the US but also in other parts of the globe. Interestingly, similar practice can also be seen among Hispanic and African American parents (America after 3PM, 2014). This book is well-researched, extensive, and has a lot of narratives. Moreover, Dhingra has painted a brilliant picture of the positive and negative effects of hyper education, incorporating the vivid voices and perspectives of the people who are engaged in it.

Though it is insightful, the book has points for improvement. First, there are numerous chapters and subchapters per part. Surprisingly, in the conclusion, it has many subdivisions, also. This can lead to confusion among readers. The primary points may not be well impressed and may not come across clearly to the readers. Valuing brevity, limiting it to three or four chapters per part is suggested. Second, curtailing the narratives to representative cases can help readers not be overwhelmed. Repetition of ideas across the chapters is noticeable. Hence, deleting the redundancy and focusing on the salient points can be helpful to make the book more impactful. All these can be put into consideration once the author plans to publish its next edition.

Overall, the contribution of this book is unparalleled. This is still recommended for parents, teachers, and other stakeholders who are engaged in the field of education. This can offer meaningful discussions and productive undertakings that can result in further enlightenment of hyper education practice.

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BOOK REVIEW

Bennett E., Berndt G. M., Esders St., Sarti L. (Eds.) (2021). Early Medieval Militarisation. Manchester University Press.

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Enormous political transformation in Europe was catalyzed by the disintegration of the Western Roman empire. Political instability and frequent military conflicts reshaped social relations in the Germanic kingdoms. Yet, a broader context which includes the developments in the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) empire, whose borders were threatened by Slavic and Arabic invasions in the 7th century, is important for understanding the changes in early medieval Europe.

Collected volume *Early Medieval Militarisation* edited by Ellora Bennett, Guido M. Berndt, Stefan Esders, and Laury Sarti and published in 2021 showcases recent scholarship on social militarisation from the 7th to 10th century. It covers vast territorial expanse and a variety of topics ranging from the legal status of military classes in early medieval kingdoms, to the image of an ideal king in various narrative traditions, to the theories of "just war." The papers work both with material evidence such as burials and settlement structure and with textual sources.

In the editors' view, the central notion of "militarised society" was best defined by one of the volume's authors Edward James: "By a militarised society I mean a society in which there is no clear distinction between soldier and civilian, nor between military officer and government official; where all adult free men have the right to carry weapons […] where the symbolism of warfare and weaponry is prominent in official and private life" (p. 10).

In the early medieval period, there was hardly a widespread militarisation of societies. Philip Rance and Kai Grundmann show that a rigid demarcation between the military and the civilians persisted in the Eastern Roman empire

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and the Ostrogothic kingdom (pp. 37–38, 52). In contrast with the barbarian polities, Byzantium preserved most of its political structures. In the Ostrogothic kingdom, there occurred a relatively painless power transfer from the "Romans" to the "Germans". However, the Byzantine-Ostrogothic wars (535–554) and the Lombardian migration (568) destabilized political situation in the Apennine Peninsula. Guido M. Berndt argued that Lombardian army was manned by diverse militias commanded by kings, dukes or gastalds (pp. 69–70). Ryan Lavelle also showed that free male population was involved in the military campaigns of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom (pp. 84–86). The last two cases mark the growing permeability of boundaries between the military and the civilians.

The authors analyzed laws that regulated the military or were relevant to military sphere. Legal acts provide the best evidence for the attitudes of the ruling elites to warfare. Upper classes were eager to strengthen their own power, therefore, they were interested in the effective functioning of the military system. Construction of fortifications and maintenance of strongholds fell within the purview of emperors, kings, and nobles, but also allowed them to expand their influence. Conor Whately pointed out how important the system of fortifications was to ensure the Byzantine presence in the province of *Palaestina Tertia* in the 6th century (pp. 100–103). Luc Bourgeois, in turn, demonstrated that during the Carolingian period, Roman fortresses were actively exploited, many of which were reconstructed. In addition, new strongholds were built, used not only to protect the settlements, but also as residences of the aristocracy (pp. 130–146).

Apart from wide range of approaches the volume offers, different voices are presented in its chapters as, for instance, we can see to what extent the views of clerics with respect to war and warfare varied in narrative sources. This diversity stems from the requirements of the genres, or the needs and expectations of the audiences, or from authors' life experience. However, many early medieval authors interpret warfare by through the lenses of their Christian identity. Gregory of Tours († 593/594) and Notker the Stammerer († 912) saw nothing but evil and destruction in wars, which by its very nature was contrary to Christian values (chapters by Edward James and Thomas Wittkamp). For Bede the Venerable († 735), faith divided people into friends and strangers, which was to some extent a manifestation of Northumbrian patriotism (chapter by Ellora Bennett).

The volume contributes to our knowledge of the commoners in the early Middle Ages, of those who often are described as "silent majority". Benjamin Hamm highlights that in the 5th century the number of burials with weapons increased on the territory of the Western Roman empire. Such burial practice allowed "to display the martial skills of the deceased, or to show that they belonged to a community of fighting men" (p. 245). This fact best demonstrates the nature of the socio-political changes in the early Middle Ages. Looking at military laws or historical chronicles alone might be misleading in our assessment of militarisation. We ought to explore how the masses reacted to the changing circumstances. In general, Hamm's argument and conclusions are consistent with Stefan Esders's chapter on the Ripuarian Franks, whose military organization was based on the militia of freemen.

Nevertheless, a reader might be puzzled, if not confused, by the structure and the choice of topics in the volume. Perhaps, the book might have benefited from a clearer focus or from the editors' spelling out its internal logic. While no author disputes the militarisation of early medieval societies, the collection gives no answer to the question of its extent or scope. Giving the due to the contribution this volume makes to the scholarship of early medieval militarization we might conclude that there was no uniform way of socio-political development.

The disappearance of the *pax Romana* led to a significant increase in the number of centers of power. This could not but provoke clashes between them. Such situation led to the involvement in warfare of a significantly larger number of individuals, whether active participants or victims. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with Guy Halsall, who wrote in the final essay that early medieval militarisation was not so much a process as a discourse (pp. 340–341). It would be more accurate to talk of the influence of the political situation on a discourse. Different social groups and individuals perceived the realities of the changing world in different ways. We can better understand these developments as creative adaptation to such changes based on the tradition, Antiquity primarily.

It is also important to take the specific historical background into account. The fall of the Western Roman empire and the rise of the Arab Caliphate led to the collapse of the *pax Romana*. There was hardly ever the peace (pax) within its limits. The Romans had to deal with civil wars, rebellions, enemy invasions of the frontier provinces. However, since the 5th century the intensity of hostilities in the Mediterranean region has increased significantly. Sicily is an excellent example as it lived in peace for almost 500 years: from the war between Sextus Pompeius and the Second Triumvirate in 42–36 BCE to the conquest of the island by the Vandals in 440 CE. Afterwards, Sicily was attacked by the Ostrogoths, the Byzantines, the Arabs and even the Vikings.

Thus, the book *Early Medieval Militarisation* is an important contribution to the medieval studies. The authors convincingly demonstrated the impact of warfare on the various spheres of social and political life. It would be important to develop these studies and explore how the early medieval militarisation affected particular realms and regions with the help of all available sources.

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Edition	Author, A. A. (2012). *Book title: And subtitle* (4th ed.). Abingdon: Routledge (place of publication is optional).
Translated	Author, J. J. (2012). *Book title: And subtitle.* (L. Khan, Trans.). Abingdon: Routledge (place of publication is optional).
Not in English	Doutre, É. (2014). *Mixité de genre et de métiers: Conséquences identitaires et relations de travail* [Mixture of gender and trades: Consequences for identity and working relationships]. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 46, 327–336. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036218 For transliteration of Cyrillic letters please use the links: ALA-LC Romanization Tables at the web-site of The Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/roman.html
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Multivolume works	
Multiple volumes from a multivolume work	Levison, D., & Ember, M. (Eds.). (1996). *Encyclopedia of cultural anthropology* (Vols. 1–4). New York, NY: Henry Holt (place of publication is optional). Use Vol. for a single volume and Vols. for multiple volumes. In text, use (Levison & Ember, 1996).
A single volume from a multivolume work	Nash, M. (1993). Malay. In P. Hockings (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of world cultures* (Vol. 5, pp. 174–176). New York, NY: G.K. Hall (place of publication is optional). IIn text, use (Nash, 1993).
Journal	
One author	Author, A. A. (2011). Title of the article. *Title of the Journal*, *22*(2), 123–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/xxxxxxxxxxxxx Volume numbers in references should be italicized, but do not italicize the issue number, the parentheses, or the comma after the issue number. If there is no DOI and the reference was retrieved from an online database, give the database name and accession number or the database URL (no retrieval date is needed): Author, A. A. (2011). Title of the article. *Title of Journal, 22*(2), 123–231. (*The website name*) https://www.w3.org
Two authors	Benjamin, L. T., Jr., & VandenBos, G. R. (2006). The window on psychology's literature: A history of psychological abstracts. *American Psychologist*, *61*(9), 941–954. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.9.941
Three authors	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (1987). Title of the article. *Title of the Journal*, 22, 123–231. https://doi.org/xx.xxxxxxxxxx
More authors	Include all names up to twenty. If there are more than twenty authors, list the first nineteen authors, followed by an ellipsis and the last author's name.
Organization as author	American Psychological Association. (2003). Title of the article: Subtitle of the article. *Title of the Journal*, *22*(1), 12–23. https://doi.org/xx.xxxxxxxxxx
No author	Editorial: Title of editorial. [Editorial]. (2012). *Title of the Journal*, 14, 1–2.
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Supplemental material	If you are citing supplemental material, which is only available online, include a description of the contents in brackets following the title. [Audio podcast] [Letter to the editor]

Other article types	Editorial: Title of editorial. [Editorial]. (2012). *Title of the Journal*, 14, 1–2. Author, A. A. (2010). Title of review. [Review of the book Title of the book, by B. Book Author]. *Title of the Journal*, *22*(1), 123–231. https://doi.org/xx.xxxxxxxxxx
Article in journal supplement	Author, A. A. (2004). Title of the article. *Title of the Journal*, 42(Suppl. 2), p–pp. https://doi.org/xx.xxxxxxxxxx
Conference	
Proceedings	To cite published proceedings from a book, use book format or chapter format. To cite regularly published proceedings, use journal format.
Paper	Presenter, A. A. (2012, February). Title of the paper. *Paper presented at the meeting of Organization Name*, Location.
Poster	Presenter, A. A. (2012, February). Title of the poster. *Poster session presented at the meeting of Organization Name*, Location
Thesis	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of thesis* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation or master's thesis). Name of the Institution, Location.
Unpublished work	
Manuscript	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (2008). *Title of the manuscript*. Unpublished manuscript. Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, C. C. (2012). *Title of the manuscript*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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Web page	If the format is out of the ordinary (e.g., lecture notes), add a description in brackets. Author, A. (2011). Title of document [Format description]. (The website name) https://URL
Newspaper or magazine	Author, A. (2012, January 12). Title of the article. *The Sunday Times*, p. 1. Author, A. (2012, January 12). Title of the article. *The Sunday Times*. http://www.sundaytimes.com/xxxx.html Title of the article. (2012, January 12). *The Sunday Times.* http://www.sundaytimes.com/xxxx.html
Reports	
May or may not be peer-reviewed; may or may not be published. Format as a book reference	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Report No. 123). Location: Publisher. Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Report No. 123). (The website name) https://www.w3.org

Working paper	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Working Paper No. 123). Location: Publisher. Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Working Paper No. 123). (The website name) https://www.w3.org
Discussion paper	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Discussion Paper No. 123). Location: Publisher. Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Discussion Paper No. 123). (The website name) https://www.w3.org
Personal communication	Personal communication includes letters, emails, memos, messages from discussion groups and electronic bulletin boards, personal interviews. Cite these only in the text. Include references for archived material only.
Other reference types	
Patent	Cho, S. T. (2005). U.S. Patent No. 6,980,855. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Map	London Mapping Co. (Cartographer). (1960). Street map. [Map]. (*The website name*) https://www.londonmapping.co.uk/maps/xxxxx
Act	*Mental Health Systems Act*, 41 U.S.C. § 9403 (1988).
Audio and visual media	Taupin, B. (1975). Someone saved my life tonight [Recorded by Elton John]. On Captain fantastic and the brown dirt cowboy [CD]. London: Big Pig Music Limited (place of publication is optional). Author, A. (Producer). (2009, December 2). *Title of podcast* [Audio podcast]. (The website name) https://www.w3.org Producer, P. P. (Producer), & Director, D. D. (Director). (Date of publication). *Title of motion picture* [Motion picture]. Country of origin: Studio or distributor. Smith, A. (Writer), & Miller, R. (Director). (1989). Title of episode [Television series episode]. In A. Green (Executive Producer), Series. New York, NY: WNET. Miller, R. (Producer). (1989). The mind [Television series]. New York, NY: WNET.
Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. *Title of the Journal*, *8*(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
Dataset	Author. (2011). *National Statistics Office monthly means and other derived variables* [Data set]. Retrieved March 6, 2011, (*The website name*) https://www.w3.org If the dataset is updated regularly, use the year of retrieval in the reference, and using the retrieval date is also recommended.
Computer program	Rightsholder, A. A. (2010). *Title of program* (Version number) [Description of form]. Location: Name of producer. Name of software (Version Number) [Computer software]. Location: Publisher. If the program can be downloaded or ordered from a website, give this information in place of the publication information.

Social media	
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