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Aims and scope

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. CS&P examines how rapid societal-level changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values — and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- Value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- Changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- Moral reasoning and behavior;
- Variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- The moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- Social exclusion and inclusion;
- Post-secular religious individualism;
- Tolerance and merely 'tolerating': their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- Ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- Educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- Social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.
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EDITORIAL

EDITOR'S NOTE

The current issue does not have any particular theme; rather, in the submitted papers previous themes are developed and the new ones are introduced. Thus, in his paper entitled *Fin de Siècle in the Trajectories of Russian Modernity: Novelty and Repetition*, Maxim Khomyakov continues the discussion on modernity in relation to twentieth century Russia. He demonstrates how in Russian constellation of modernity autonomy came to be understood as a secondary to rational mastery and how collective autonomy started to dominate over individual one. For this purpose, he discusses details of N. Federov's "Philosophy of the Common Task", as well as peculiarities of the development of Russian society of the beginning of the last century. In general, the author follows C. Castoriadis' definition of modernity through double imaginary of autonomy and rational mastery as well as P. Wagner's characterisation of modernity as experience and interpretation. Khomyakov stresses that the centenary of Russian October Revolution has raised question on the role of the peculiar cultural phenomenon of the end of XIX – beginning of XX century, the *fin de siècle,* and put the following questions: Why *fin de siècle* is recurrent, if not because of internal apocalypse of the history or because of the psychologically acute perception of the crises in the light of the end of the century? What does it mean for the history? How the cultural phenomena are connected with social and political catastrophes so characteristic for any fin de siècle? In his paper, Khomyakov makes an attempt to outline general view of a possible approach to this theme.

In the joint paper under the title *Conformity in Modern Science: An Engine of Societal Transformation?* Natalia Popova, Yan Moiseenko, and Thomas Beavitt indicates the changing role of science in the contemporary world. The research purpose of the authors is to investigate the phenomenon of conformity, which has always played a central role in social life, is acquiring new significance through its impact on science. Though science is penetrating all spheres of life, scientists are increasingly being forced to conform to regulation and bureaucratisation. Sociologists, biologists and psychologists have explored conformity (e.g. conformist behaviour) but, to the authors knowledge, there is no generally accepted understanding of its nature. This paper examines conformity through a comprehensive literature analysis and evaluates its role in shaping modern science. The authors provide some illustrations of how this happens in the everyday lives of researchers, such as the distribution of the IMRAD format of research articles. The authors hypothesize that conformity in science has consequences at three levels: (1) within a scientific community, when scientists follow prescribed patterns of conduct; (2) within a particular society when people from all walks of life conform to the standards set by the scientised world-view; and (3) at the global level when non-western societies conform to Western standards of life by adopting the Western scientific worldview.

Leonid Fishman in the paper *The End of Utopias?* reflects upon the place of creating utopia in the contemporary social thinking and discusses the legitimacy of the question: Are we really living in the era of "the end of utopias"? The author argues that contemporary utopian consciousness should be considered taking into account that utopias are inextricably linked with capitalism; they serves its transformation (defining its "spirit" by its criticism) in transition from one stage to another; they are an expression of the worldviews and aspirations of social groups (classes) rising at different stages of capitalism. Therefore, in order to find the place in the social structure in which modern utopias are born, it is necessary to locate the "rising class". In the paper, the rising class is defined as one that has, at least potentially, the greatest productivity. When it comes to a contemporary rising class, the source of technical and cultural innovations allegedly playing a decisive role in the economy is usually considered in terms of "creative class" or "cognitariat". Varieties of modern utopian consciousness are considered, proceeding from the outlined view of the socio-structural transformation of contemporary societies.

The current issue has new section – RESEARCH NOTES – that contain two papers: the first one – *University Students: Connections between Representations of Stress and Coping Strategies* by Irina Kuvaeva, Nadezhda Achan, Ksenia Lozovskaya – discusses the representations of stress (concept of stress) and a variety of coping strategies that people in collectivistic cultures use in attempting to deal with problematic situations. The second one – *Comparative Study of Russian and Slovenian Managers Using Subjective Criteria to Control Their Professional Performance* by Eva Boštjančič, Fayruza S. Ismagilova, Galina Mirolyubova, Nina Janza – presents the results of a Russian-Slovenian cross-cultural study, which describes key structural factors in the subjective criteria of performance monitoring used by Russian and Slovenian managers. The comparative analysis reveals both similarities and differences between Russian and Slovenian approach.

The discussions on the topics raised in the current issue will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal, and new themes will be introduces. We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections, book reviews and other formats from readers and prospective authors and invite you to send us your reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

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ARTICLE

Fin de Siècle in the Trajectories of Russian Modernity: Novelty and Repetition

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ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the discussion on *fin de siècle* in the context of the trajectory the modernity took in the twentieth century Russia. The author follows C. Castoriadis' definition of modernity through double imaginary of autonomy and rational mastery as well as P. Wagner's characterisation of modernity as experience and interpretation. He demonstrates how in Russian constellation of modernity autonomy came to be understood as a secondary to rational mastery and how collective autonomy started to dominate over individual one. For this purpose, he discusses details of N. Federov's "Philosophy of the Common Task" as well as peculiarities of the development of Russian society of the beginning of the last century. Then M. Khomyakov turns to the contemporary *fin de siècle* and discusses what he sees as a major crisis of modernity in general and democracy, in particular. Thus, the article interprets *fin de siècles* as inherent to the modernity crises, the main elements of which are revising, reinterpretation, reformulation and renegotiation of the modernity's fundamentals.

KEYWORDS
modernity, rational mastery, intelligentsia and people, fin de siècle, philosophy of common task, resurrection, crisis of democracy, sovereignty, collective and individual autonomy

Introduction

The centenary of Russian October Revolution has revitalized discussions on the role of this catastrophic event in the trajectory of Russian modernity and, at

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the same time, raised question on the role of the peculiar cultural phenomenon of the end of XIX – beginning of XX century, the *fin de siècle*. It is obviously tightly connected with a number of social catastrophes of the beginning of XX century, of which Russian Revolution was, probably, one of the most significant events. One of the interesting questions, then, is how the October Revolution is intertwined with the cultural phenomena of *fin de siècle* and how they all influenced the trajectories, Russian modernity took afterwards.

Another, equally interesting question is what these phenomena and events mean for the present *fin de siècle* we are arguably living through in the beginning of XXI century. How do the issues we face today relate to our experience, and how is general disorientation of the contemporary world connected with the disorientation of the end of XIX century? These questions are, obviously, not only about the ways of Russian modernity or about Russian re-interpretation of the world, but also of more general philosophical kind – on the relations between *fin de siècle* and modernity as such. Of course, we cannot expect to address all these questions here fully; it would be more than enough just to ask them properly.

Fin de siècle is often seen through the history "of conflicting narratives and trajectories" (Marshall, 2007, p. 3). It is also sometimes considered as connected to the *finis seculi*, the end of the (old) world or *fin du globe* (Oscar Wild), as a kind of the apocalypse's rehearsal. It is not accidental, then, that Russian philosophers of this time saw similar rehearsal in really apocalyptic events of the October Revolution. For Nikolai Berdyaev, for example, "the meaning of the revolution is internal apocalypse of the history. Apocalypse is not only revelation of the end of the world, of the Last Judgment. It is also revelation of the constant proximity of the end inside of the history itself…" (Berdyaev, 1990, p. 107). The concepts of apocalypse, of *fin de siècle* and of revolution, thus, seem to be tightly interconnected. The apocalyptic interpretation of the *fin de siècle*, on the one hand, archetypically refers to old religious millenarist expectations, but, on the other hand, reveals apocalyptic character of the modernity itself. The questions asked above, therefore, are inseparable from the question on the catastrophic nature of modernity.

Interestingly, some scholars find striking parallelism between *fin de siècle* of XIX century and our own time, thus generalizing on the recurrence of this phenomenon. In this way Elaine Showalter explains this parallelism and recurrence with the psychological assumption that "the crises of the *fin de siècle* … are more intensely experienced, more emotionally fraught, more weighted with symbolic and historical meaning, because we invest them with the metaphors of death and rebirth that we project onto the final decades and years of a century" (Showalter, 1990, p. 1). Putting aside the implausibility of this explanation, the parallelism is noticeable and not only between 1890s and 1990s, but also 1960s, which fact enabled Terry Eagleton to claim that "the *fin de siècle* arrived earlier this century" (Eagleton, 1995, p. 11). 1990s and 1890s are parallel in many things, except politics; the end of the twentieth century seems to have forgot about class, state, imperialism and modes of production. This forgetfulness is explained by the crisis of the alternative Soviet form of modernity. Thus, for Eagleton "what we seem left with in the nineties, then, is something of the culture of the previous *fin de siècle* shorn of its politics" (Eagleton, 1995, p. 11).

If we put aside ungrounded psychological or theological speculations, the parallelism still requires explanation. Why *fin de siècle* is recurrent, if not because of internal apocalypse of the history or because of the psychologically acute perception of the crises in the light of the end of the century? What does it mean for the history? How the cultural phenomena are connected with social and political catastrophes so characteristic for any *fin de siècle*? This article will make an attempt to outline a very general view of a possible approach to this theme. On the reasons, which will soon become clear, I believe, however, that even most general view here cannot be given in abstraction from the real time and space that is from the real history of real people. That is why a large part of this text will be devoted to the real *fin de siècle*: of Russian pre-revolutionary and revolutionary society, which, we hope, is a good illustration to the main general thesis of this article.

We will start, then, with a general description of the linkage between modernity and *fin de siècle*. This description, being necessarily abstract and theoretical in the beginning, is a hypothesis, which will be empirically grounded later. In our description, we are going to base our considerations on the theory of modernity as experience and interpretation as it can be found in recent writings of Peter Wagner (Wagner, 2008). Then we will have a closer look at Russian *fin de siècle* to locate a starting point for the trajectory Russian version of modernity took afterwards. Finally, we will try to briefly address the question on the current *fin de siècle*, which has been arguably accompanied with almost as catastrophic events as those of the *fin de siècle* one hundred years ago. Since the main task of this article is describing the questions and laying the problems, the conclusions will necessarily be modest.

Fin de siècle in the trajectories of modernity

After Johann Arnason's and Peter Wagner's seminal works on modernity (Arnason, 1989; Wagner, 1994) it has become almost a commonplace to refer to Cornelius Castoriadis's characterization of modernity as based upon a certain "double imaginary signification". Namely, the modern period, according to Castoriadis, "is best defined by the conflict, but also the mutual contamination and entanglement, of two imaginary significations: autonomy on the one hand, unlimited expansion of 'rational mastery', on the other. They ambiguously coexisted under the common roof of 'reason'" (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 37–38). Arnason thinks of these two principles, or, rather, "significations" as having divergent, mutually irreducible logics so that "the pursuit of the unlimited power over nature does not necessarily enhance the capacity of human society to question and reshape its own institutions, and a coherent vision of the autonomous society excludes an unquestioning commitment to the more or less rationalized phantasm of total mastery" (Arnason, 1989, p. 327). These logics, however, are not only divergent, but also "entangled", and both are present in modernity from its very outset (Carlenden, 2010, p. 57). In short, "modernity has two goals – to make man master and possessor of nature, and to make human freedom possible. The question that remains is whether these two are compatible with one another" (Gillespie, 2008, p. 42).

Importantly, these two pillars of modernity are not definite principles; they are rather significations, in other words, "multiform complexes of meaning that give rise to more determinate patterns and at the same time remain open to other interpretations" (Arnason, 1989, p. 334). The interpretations are given and the definite patters are formed, in their turn, in real historical situations by real people, and thus reflect complex interplay of different elements, including other imaginary significations, pre-modern traditions, popular sentiments or political considerations. The question of how these patterns are formulated against a particular socio-historical background is, then, one of the most important and interesting questions arising in the study of modernity. This is how we understand here the question of the *trajectories of modernity.*

These *trajectories* are determined by particular *constellations* of autonomy and mastery, defined by the current interpretations of them, which are formed, in its turn, on the basis of previous experiences of modernity. However, if autonomy and rational mastery, freedom and control are conflicting but entangled significations, their relations unavoidably go through a number of crises, in which the experiences are re-evaluated, the concepts are re-interpreted and the constellations are re-made. In other words, modernity seems to require revolutions during which the very basics of the society are revisited and new world-interpretations are formed, which, in their turn become foundations for the new experiences. Or, as Peter Wagner puts it, "… the experience with the application of a specific concept leads to processes of reinterpretation. Socio-political change is not least based on conceptual reinterpretation" (Wagner, 2016, p. 11).

To understand this dynamics fully, however, we need to consider briefly relations between the main elements, which define the constellations of modernity. Now, on the one hand, autonomy as *auto-nomy* that is as a capacity of giving oneself one's own laws, consists in overcoming the boundaries, which are necessary for exercising the rational mastery. On the other hand, being a capacity of self-determination, autonomy is also about obeying the self-imposed laws, and thus, about reproducing the boundaries and frameworks. The picture will become more complex if we add here the distinction between individual and collective autonomy. If for the individual, the boundaries are given in the capacities of his/her physical body widened to some extent by the technology, the collectivity does not have any pre-existing boundaries and should be historically formed. Therefore, the very notion of collective autonomy includes some inherent concept of the boundaries, defined through complex exclusion – inclusion interplay. Moreover, if social outcome of the exercise of many individual autonomous wills is very uncertain, the mastery of the situation might call for the exercise of rich collective autonomy with its own collective intentionality (see, for example, Wagner, 2016, pp. 98–101). In other words, any particular constellation of modernity is based at least on some interpretation of the relations between collective and individual autonomy as well as between autonomy and mastery, between emancipation and domination or between transcending the boundaries and laying them… Thus, changing of the constellations is necessarily connected with re-negotiating new compromise, forming new boundaries and re-interpreting foundational concepts. Revolution is, of course, the most radical, catastrophic expression of such re-negotiation. In old Lenin's definition of the "revolutionary situation" it is characterized

by the impossibility for "the tops" to dominate in the old way and by the unwillingness of "the bottoms" to live in the old fashion (Lenin, 1969, p. 218). Revolution, then, happens when the old frameworks of domination (or mastery) hinder autonomy from its realization, and, thus, are re-interpreted as enabling heteronomy and un-freedom. Active entrepreneurial revolutionary minority (such as Bolsheviks in 1917) can grasp this moment, gain the power and political *coup d'état* crowns the revolution.

What is more important and more fundamental, however, is exactly the re-interpretation of the main concepts. Old constellations are reinterpreted as hindering autonomy (while before they were seen as enabling freedom), and new constellations based upon reinterpreted concepts are negotiated. This intense process is accompanied by revisiting (and reinterpreting) collective memory: founding historical moments, personalities and experiences. In result a new world-interpretation is formed as a framework for the new experiences. Thus, the revisiting, reinterpretation, reformulation and renegotiation are the most basic elements of the social change, of which revolution is just one, most radical expression. Cultural phenomenon of *fin de siècle,* thus, is more fundamental than social or political revolution. It is indispensible for the modernity.

The history of modernity, then, is a history of consensuses and various constellations with the ruptures of the transformation moments of *fin de siècle*. It is clear therefore why for the father of Russian social democracy, Alexander Herzen *fin de siècle* started in 1848, and for the European New Left – in 1968. *Fin de siècle* of XIX century, being one of the most radical transformations of the modernity, only contingently, then, coincided with the calendar end of the century and gained millenarist and somehow mystical interpretation. An interesting question for the history of modernity is, however, which particular constellation became the result of one or another *fin de siècle*, and how it defined experience of modernity afterwards… These are the questions we should ask both on Russian *fin de siècle* of XIX century and on our present times.

Autonom(ies) and mastery of Russian *fin de siècle* in XIX century

The experience of modernity of Russian society of XVIII–XIX centuries was anything but unproblematic. And one of the main peculiar Russian problems of this period was conceptualized as a radical divide between what in 1860s became known as the intelligentsia and peasant traditional Orthodox "people". The divide was one of the results of the swift installation of modernity on Russian soil in XVII–XVIII centuries.

To cut very long history short, Peter the Great's reforms created Russian European nobility, who have been perceived as living in Russia like in a foreign colony. This unfortunate divide persisted throughout the nineteenth century. The noble "European" stratum, however, was gradually widening and in the 1860s it started to include lower classes, mostly sons of the clergy, to form a peculiar social phenomenon: a rationalistic intelligentsia. Although they started to talk and to write Russian (before this time French was the main language of the nobility), their rationalistic mindset differed greatly from the Orthodox mysticism of their own fathers and of the majority of the peasant population.

In different times, the basic cleavage of Russian society has been conceptualized differently: as the East-West contradiction, as the Orthodoxy-rational science divide, and so on, but it is the "intelligentsia-people *(narod)*" opposition that became *the idèe fixe* for all Russian literature. Thus, the famous Russian Husserlian philosopher, Gustav Shpet (1879–1937), described this problem of Russia as the main problem of Russian philosophy: "the 'people', and the 'intelligentsia' as the creative spokesman of the people, are related to one another both philosophically and culturally. Russian philosophy approaches its problem of *Russia* as the problem of the relations of the above-mentioned terms, sometimes from the side of 'the people', sometimes from the side of the 'intelligentsia', but always solves the only problem, the problem of the relation itself. The difference and even opposition of the answers – *sub specie* of the people and *sub specie* of the intelligentsia – defines the peculiar dialectics of Russian philosophy…" (Shpet, 2008, p. 76).

Internal and external divides reinforced each other: those critical of Western Europe also wanted to correct the excesses of Russian Enlightenment and to find a specific Russian way in modern civilization; those who thought of the West as the best implementation of modern civilization naturally wanted to finish what Peter the Great had only started and to "westernize" the whole country. The split itself, however, has always been understood as a symptom of a deadly disease of Russian culture. *Westernizers* of the early nineteen century saw the nature of this illness in the ignorance and backwardness of the people, while *Slavophiles* of the time interpreted the divide as a deadly split between borrowed Enlightenment and original Russian life. One of the fathers of Slavophilism, Alexey Khomyakov, in his article of 1845 called this borrowed science "colonial" (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 24) and vehemently condemned its discord with the life that had created great Russia "long before foreign science came to gild its tops" (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 22). Being a follower of Schelling and an admirer of Britain, Khomyakov, however, thought that scholarship (especially in the social sciences and humanities) must correspond to the life of the nation, must be of the same roots, so to speak. The absence of such correspondence leads to a situation in which "there was knowledge in the upper classes, but this knowledge was absolutely remote from life; there was life in the lower classes, but this life never rose to consciousness" (Khomyakov, 1900, p. 22). This split was the primary object of analysis for Russian philosophy and sociology, and arguably became one of the reasons for the radical reinterpretation of Russian *fin de siècle.*

Now, after 1860s in the majority of the discussions the main characteristic of intelligentsia has been seen in the rationality of the educated class, in the "positive science" it supposedly masters (in contrast to the traditional orthodox religiosity of "the people"). In the most radical circles science, thus, was increasingly perceived as a kind of panacea, a kind of the instrument for perfect mastery – both over nature and over society. It is rationality and science, which dominated the discussion. The questions of justice, moral issues as well as social problems were to be solved by rational mastery of science. Radical Russian intelligentsia even tried to derive the whole of morality from positive rationality; not from Kantian rational transcendental self, but – paradoxically – from natural science and evolutionary biology. Famous

Russian philosopher and one of the fathers of Russian *fin de siècle*, Vladimir Soloviev reportedly described Russian intelligentsia as guided by a strange syllogism: "all people descended from the monkey; therefore we must love each other" (Berdyaev, 1989, p. 168). Thus, of two modernity's imaginary significations, autonomy and the mastery, it is the second that was increasingly getting dominance in Russian discussions of XIX century. Formal freedom, autonomy was the object for discussion much more rarely. It has been often assumed, as we will see, that the perfect scientific mastery will finally free human beings, make them truly autonomous. In XX century, this trend found its perfect implementation in the idea of "scientific communism"…

The "educated" worship of science and the "uneducated" worship of God were to be united somehow to solve the main Russian question of the XIX century. These attempts powered Russian *fin de siècle* (including arts and literature), influenced October revolution, and, finally determined the particular form Russian modernity took in XX century. Thus, the same Vladimir Soloviev in a letter to the editor of the Journal *Voprosy Philosohii I Psychologii*, Prof. N.Y. Grot, described his own early philosophical development as an attempt to reconcile the "existence of plesiosaurs" with "the true worship of God" (Soloviev, 1914, p. 270; also see Lukyanov, 1916, pp. 117–120).

Theologically speaking, this was a question of creating a new Christian apologetics, of the possibility of uniting western science and Russian Orthodoxy, and thus, of reconciliation in the "philosophy of all-unity" (as Soloviev called his theory) the "people" with the "intelligentsia", and the West with the East. Similarly to the social question, which could be answered either from the side of the "people" or from the side of the "intelligentsia", the apologetic issue could be solved either *sub specie* of Orthodoxy or *sub specie* of science. What almost all Russian *fin de siècle* philosophers sought, anyway, was a reconciliation of science and religion.

These characteristics of Russian *fin de siècle* found their peculiar implementation in the works of one of the most original philosophers of this time, Nikolay Fedorov (1829–1903). This odd personality in spite of his unwillingness to publish his works had a great impact upon Russian and Soviet culture of the twentieth century. Among those who were influenced by his views we can count Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Solovyev, Mayakovski, Khlebnikov, Stravinsky, Platonov, Pasternak etc.; his ideas became the basis for a number of ideological movements, such as Eurasianism (*Evraziystvo*), cosmism, immortalism, hyperboreanism, etc. This surprising success of Fedorov's strange ideas is partly explained by the fact that he managed to give an answer to the question of Russia in a distinctly modern and, at the same time, a peculiarly Russian way. There is no place here to discuss Fedorov's theories in details, but some description of his ideas is necessary to demonstrate the way Russian society tried to find its own path in modernity.

In George M. Young's characterization, "Fedorov … was simultaneously a futuristic visionary of unsurpassed boldness and an archconservative spokesman for ideas usually branded reactionary, a man with a twenty-first century mind and a medieval heart" (Young, 2012, p. 10). It is not surprising, then, that he produced a theory that seemed to be able to transcend all contradictions of the present world, and to lead humankind toward a better future. Fedorov himself calls his theory "a philosophy of the common task" and prefers to name it a "project". His purpose is not to

explain the nature of things, but to transform the world. As he puts it, the main question of philosophy is not why existing things exist, but why "living beings suffer and die" (Fedorov, 1906, p. 296).

Now, any "project" has three main elements: (1) a description of the state of affairs (the-world-as-it-is), (2) a description of the desired condition (the-world-as-it-ought-to-be), and (3) a description of the way from the first to the second, from the reality to the ideal. And Fedorov, trying to offer a new *projectivist* philosophy, does organize it in this three-fold way. "Science should not be the knowledge of the causes without the knowledge of the goal, should not be the knowledge of the primary causes without the knowledge of the final causes (that is knowledge for the sake of knowledge, knowledge without action)…" (Fedorov, 1982, p. 66).

The state of affairs is described as the slavery of humanity, as its absolute dependence upon the blind forces of nature. This dependence is evident, for example, in various natural disasters, such as periodic famines, the last of which in Russia of Fedorov's time happened in 1891 (Fedorov, 1982, p. 58). The main evidence of this dependence, however, is death itself as the inescapable destiny of all living beings. This is the vicious blind circle of birth and death, which, according to Fedorov, makes the current condition of humanity intolerable. Nature, then, is the first and the main *enemy* of humanity, which, however, can become a friend. It is "a power as long as we are powerless… This power is blind as long as we are unreasonable, as long as we do not represent its reason… *Nature is for us a temporary enemy, but eternal friend, since there is no eternal enmity, the elimination of the temporary one is our task…"* (Fedorov, 1982, p. 521).

Interestingly, Fedorov describes this condition in terms of the progress, thus, thinking of the progress itself as of the blind force of the nature to be eliminated through the joint efforts of humankind. In biology progress consists "in the devourment of the elder by the younger", in sociology it is the "attainment of the largest possible measure of freedom … (and not participation of each person in the common task)". In short, "while stagnation is death, and regress is not a paradise either, progress is the true Hell, and a truly Divine, a truly Human task consists in the salvation of the victims of progress, in guiding them from Hell" (Fedorov, 1982, pp. 77–78). This description of the progress strangely reminds us of Walter Benjamin's image of progress as a destructing storm, which is piling debris in front of the eyes of the backward-looking angel of history (Benjamin, 1969, p. 257; Wagner, 2016, pp. 102–103). According to Federov, progress is destruction only because it is natural, "blind" actor of history. Perfect mastery, thus, is mastery over the progress as well as over all other natural forces.

As far as internal human nature is concerned, it is imperfect and blind partly because humans are born as animals. Birth is, thus, the other side of death and should be eliminated together with death and the condition of progress. Only God, being *causa sui*, is immortal. That is why, according to Fedorov, the main path for humanity to God-like immortality is literal self-creation from dead matter.

Human society is no exception, since it is also dominated by the inimical blind forces of nature. This domination is evident in what Fedorov calls the un-brotherhood (*nebratstvo*) and discord (*rozn'*) of contemporary society. Since "history as a fact" is a permanent *bellum omnium contra omnes*, a "mutual extermination" (Fedorov, 1982,

p. 202), “there would be no meaning in the history of humankind as long as history … is not our action, is not a product of our joint reason and will, as long as it is an unconscious and involuntary phenomenon” (Fedorov, 1982, p. 197).

Thus, for Fedorov the-world-as-it-is is characterized by the domination of the blind forces of nature. It pertains to the external world, to internal human nature and to the current condition of society. This world, being an “existing Hell”, must be transformed by the joint efforts of all human beings. Now, in order to complete his “philosophy of common task”, Fedorov had to picture also the-world-as-it-ought-to-be, the world-in-project, the Paradise humankind must aspire to.

This ideal world is pictured by Christianity. Fedorov considered himself an Orthodox thinker and thought that his theory fulfilled the promises and followed the aspirations of Orthodoxy, despite the deeply promethean spirit of this theory. He did not want to build the new world without God; on the contrary, he thought that God himself wanted humankind to fulfill the “common task”. Fedorov interprets almost all the contents of Christianity in this new, “projectivist” way, as a call for humankind to join in the task of “regulating nature”. As one of his disciples explains: “Propagation of life, immortality and resurrection is the essence of the Saviour’s teaching. He calls His Heavenly Father ‘God of Fathers’, that is of the dead, but at the same time also ‘not the God of the dead, but of the living’ (Mark 12:26-27), that is, of those who are going to return to life, of those who will resuscitate; since ‘God has not created death’… and desires ‘all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth’ (1 Tim 2:4)” (Kozhevnikov, 1908, p. 273).

Contemporary Christianity, however, is too contaminated with paganism, the main evidence of which is its “passive” character. Even Russian Orthodoxy, the closest to the true Christian religion, according to Fedorov, transformed *commandments* into *dogmata*, and created *rites* out of *tasks*. The right interpretation of Christianity, then, is to re-interpret all dogmata as commandments, and all rites as tasks. For Fedorov all of them point toward one single project – the project of the “regulation of nature” and of the resurrection of the dead.

Science, art and religion are to be united in the project of resurrection. Or, as George M. Young explains it: “the scientific projects cannot be understood in isolation from the religious, political, sociological, artistic, and economic projects. In contrast to some of his followers, Fedorov repeatedly emphasizes that technological advance, if pursued independently from advances in morality, the arts, government, and spirituality, and if pursued for its own sake or for purposes other than the resurrection of the ancestors, could end only in disaster. And further … he believed that spiritual development alone, without scientific technology, could also lead only to a dead end” (Young, 2012, p. 50).

Now, the picture of “the-world-as-it-ought-to-be” or “the world-in-the-project” is quite clear: this is the world, guided or “regulated” by united humankind. Humanity must fully dominate nature; it should regulate the movements of not only all stars and planets in outer space, but also of all the smallest particles of the matter. Such humans are not mortal anymore; they have finally defeated their main enemy and become immortal and omnipotent. “The common task”, however, consists not only

in achieving immortality for one generation. For Fedorov, this would have been appallingly immoral. Humankind, in Fedorov's project, is united across generations, all to be resurrected by fellow humans, or, rather, by the sons and daughters of the dead. "Universal resurrection is a full victory over space and time. The transfer 'from the earth to heaven' is a victory … over space (or successive omnipresence). The transfer from death to life or simultaneous coexistence of the whole series of times (generations), coexistence of succession, is a triumph over time" (Fedorov, 1982, p. 572).

Now, if such is the ideal, how might it be realized? Since blind forces of nature bring death not because they are evil in themselves, but exactly because they are blind, humanity's path to salvation is, for Fedorov, in regulating those forces. Thus, first, sexuality should be reversed and directed to the dead parents; it must become, so to speak, the main resurrecting force. Or, as Fedorov himself puts it, "resurrection is replacement of the lust of birth with conscious re-creation" (Fedorov, 1982, p. 81). This will transform human society into a society of the sons and daughters, working together on the resurrection of dead. Such a society has one purpose, one task, which is really common, and this task transcends all private particularity of interests and desires. This truly totalitarian society of brothers and sisters eliminates discord and, thus, stops permanent war. Together with the force of sexual attraction, the force of natural selection loses its grip on human beings. Similarly to sexuality, however, this force should not be eliminated, but rather re-directed against the common enemy of humankind. Armies, then, must be converted into troops, fighting nature.

This society is, of course, a matter of the very distant future. Fedorov describes it in daring and fantastic language, but rejects going into details about its possibility. "Earth and then other planets, being created from cosmic dust, will create under the management of the reasonable beings from the same cosmic dust conductors of the force from the sun… Through these conductors… Earth and other planets … will accelerate or decelerate the movement of the whole system. The assemblage of worlds, inspired by the resurrected generations in their close brotherly union, will itself be the instrument of the resurrection of their predecessors, the fathers" (Fedorov, 1982, p. 527).

Fedorov's philosophy is, undoubtedly, one of the brightest, most bizarre and most peculiarly Russian theories, which emerged during the *fin de siècle*. It has a number of very distinct features that helped it to attract a number of adherents in twentieth century Russia. These features also help us to reconstruct the way it paved to modernity for several next generations.

First, this philosophy unites science and religion in a very peculiar way, thus reconciling Soloviev's plesiosaurs with God's worship. Fedorov emphasizes this unity in almost all questions of importance. For him, the "common task" is "positivism in the sphere of final causes (Fedorov, 1982, p. 85). However oxymoronic this idea might seem, Fedorov managed to create an ideology, which became quite popular both among Orthodox Christian thinkers and among communists of the 1920s. In Fedorov's theory science and Orthodoxy are at times kept separate (with *science* providing *tools* for the attainment of *religious goals*), but at times they are fused in the most uncritical way, so that *science is treated religiously* and vice versa.

This peculiar fusion of religion and science can also be easily discovered in the Russian communism of the twentieth century (see, for example, Berdyaev, 1990).

Secondly, Fedorov, interpreting the separation of the "learned" from the "unlearned" as the main cause of the "un-brotherhood" and "discord" of the society, gives his own answer to the Russian question on the re-unification of the "intelligentsia" and the "people". This answer is reunification in action, a practical unification. The goal of universal salvation for Fedorov is so powerful that it is able to heal this wound of Russian modernity. Obviously, the communists acted in a similar fashion: the eminence of their goal helped them to mobilize very different groups in the society.

Thirdly, and relatedly, in the divide between the Slavophiles and Westernizers, Fedorov occupies the middle ground. He describes Russia in distinctly messianic terms, but values Western science and technology greatly. Importantly also, his Russian messianism is not exclusivist or chauvinistic: he thinks that Russia would be the first to take up the task, which must be, however, a common task for the whole of humankind. As George M. Young comments: "Fedorov and the Cosmists eventually offer a synthesis of Westernizer and Slavophile positions, welcoming Western scientific and technological advances, but turning them toward Slavophile goals of communal wholeness, unifying activity, and spiritual consensus – all contained in the well-known Slavophile concept of *sobornost*" (Young, 2012, p. 23). Naturally again, this reminds us of Lenin's peculiarly messianic theory of Russia as a "weak link" in the chain of imperialism, which therefore would lead humankind into the future paradise of communism.

Fourthly, Fedorov's "project" is certainly a deeply totalitarian one. Everything and everybody must conform to the project and the holy goal of resurrecting the parents and regulating nature. No exception is granted, and no other goal is considered worthy. As Michael Hagemeister noted on the Cosmists in general: "the image of humanity spreading its 'noocratic' rule over the universe, whence it can fulfill the "universal cosmic plan" of turning itself into an almighty immortal organism, thus attaining the status of God, is an image that quickly reveals its unmistakably totalitarian character. Even Fedorov's world-delivering common task was totalitarian: no one had the right to be excluded or forgotten, no one could withdraw from the magnificent project" (Hagemeister, 1997, pp. 201–202).

Finally, in Fedorov's project we face that peculiar interpretation of the double imaginary signification of modernity, which we, again, can easily find in Russian communism. This interpretation is heavily concentrated on absolute mastery, on control and regulation, re-interpreting thus autonomy through this mastery, and not vice versa. For Fedorov, total regulation of nature is a pre-requisite for obtaining true autonomy. Only those who work for the common task can be called free and autonomous, while all others are just slaves of the blind nature. Fedorov, thus, values only positive freedom, and not negative liberal freedom.

His freedom is based rather on collective than on individual autonomy. Negatively defined individual autonomy (freedom from the limitations) consists in arbitrariness. One of the main questions for the modernity here would be then how to ensure socially positive results of the independent realization of the multiple individual wills. Or, as Peter Wagner explains, "one does need to recognize that the idea of collective self-

determination contains within itself a tension between a continuous free expression of the will of all, on the one side, and, on the other, the formation of general will, to use Rousseau's words, and the transformation of the latter into effectively behavior-orienting rules and institutions" (Wagner, 2016, pp. 72–73). Fedorov provides a totalitarian answer; according to his faithful follower, N.P. Peterson, he thought that "so-called great principles of the great French Revolution – freedom, equality, and brotherhood – are the product of extremely shallow thought, or even of thoughtlessness, since *brotherhood cannot result from freedom to fulfil one's whims or from the envious desire for equality;* only brotherhood leads to freedom, for brothers who love one another will not envy one brother who is elevated above others… For that reason, we must seek brotherhood first, and not put it in the tail, after freedom and equality" (Peterson, 1912, pp. 88–89).

The image of the human race mastering both outer and inner worlds, both external space and internal nature, both planets and society, turned out to be very relevant for twentieth century Russia. In its attempts to overcome the fateful split between the intelligentsia and the people, Russian society of this time came to value control more than individual freedom from interference. It is not surprising, then, that Fedorov's ideas found wide reception and influenced not only such strange communist projects as preserving Lenin's body in his mausoleum or the project of turning back the Northern rivers' streams, of which some Soviet officials and scientists dreamed for more than 20 years, but also the plot of Dostoyevskiy's famous *Brothers Karamazov* novel, futurist poetry of V. Mayakovskiy and V. Khlebnikov, as well as the quite successful Soviet space exploration projects.

Thus, in Fedorov we see the main principles, which have been both further developed in the Soviet Russia, and, at the same time, determined the trajectory Russian modernity took in XX century. These ideas include such general principles as primacy of the mastery over autonomy, or dominance of the collective autonomy over individual one, but also such peculiar things as unification of religion and science (which in later Russia took the form of religious worshipping of the science) or totalitarianism with its radical emphasis on solidarity and brotherhood.

On the one hand, some of these principles correspond rather to *genus temporis*, to the path European modernity took after the *fin de siècle*. The cultural, social and political cataclysms of this period brought about what Peter Wagner called "organized modernity", based upon "…the cultural reign of a strong conception of society" (Wagner, 1994, p. 86). However, "the organization of modernity was much more radical under socialism than in the West… In all respects, we can see socialism as precisely the epitome of organized modernity…" (Wagner, 1994, p. 101). On the other hand, we demonstrated how these ideas and principles (especially those, which defined peculiarities of the Russian trajectory) were based upon the previous experiences with modernity, in particular the experience of intelligentsia – people divide as well as upon the conceptualizations and interpretations of these experiences, in particular the discussions on the relations between Orthodoxy and rational science. Fedorov's *Philosophy of the Common Task* reveals this complex set of the entangled interpretations in their most radical forms and thus represents one of the best cases for the studies of the modernity crisis of Russian *fin de siècle.*

A new *fin de siècle:* a Russian quest in the context of global challenges

"Dismantling of the conventions of organized modernity" (Wagner, 2016, p. 116) started in the 1960s – 1970s in the West, but in the countries of the former Soviet Union it coincided with the final decade of the century. For Russia, this dismantling was again rather painful, although, unlike previous *fin de siècle*, it happened without major bloodsheds of the revolution and civil war. Collapse of Soviet Union and demolition of the Berlin Wall are the events, the real meaning of which is still very difficult to appreciate fully. For some short time it even seemed that the era of large social transformations and political cataclysms is over, which consideration enabled some social theorists to fantasize about a putative end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). Soon enough, however, Fukuyama's optimism has been substituted with Huntington's dark prophecies and looking forward to the ending of history gave way to expecting the clashes of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). A brief period of the hopes for the united Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok was forced out by the new cold war era devoid, though, of an iron curtain.

Dismantling of the organized modernity in Russia led to the experiences, which partly defined its being in antiphase to the conditions of Global North and which brought it closer to the post-colonial countries of Global South. The reinterpretation started with comprehensive critique of rationality, and, in particular, of its capacity to master nature and society. This quickly led to the emancipation of various religious and pseudo-religious beliefs and, at the same time, to the crisis of the organized science.

The changes were so fast that Russia was not able to develop institutions capable of ensuring socially positive outcome of the exercise of different individual wills, in other words, the democratic instruments of the formation of *la volonte generale* out of the simple sum of individual wills and wishes. Fast emancipation of the individual in this situation brought about a short, but very painful period of social degradation and chaos. These shocking experiences led to a suspicion about possibility of handling society of atomized individuals and to an attempt of another re-emphasizing of the collective agency.

However, by this time the Russian society has already significantly changed. In reality, it does consist of more or less atomized individuals with very limited solidarity between them. The attempts of the government to employ old nation-building mechanisms (such as special memory politics, mobilization of the society against putative or real threats or even quest for the "spiritual bonds" inside Russian Orthodoxy) work only with some groups, whose influence is gradually diminishing.

At the same time, two things are still very influential. The first is a fear of chaos experienced by the population in 1990s. This experience, however, is gradually losing its relevance with the lapse of time since for the younger generation the chaos was not part of its personal history. The second is almost post-colonial obsession with sovereignty. This obsession seems to be a reaction to both Soviet experience, when all 15 republics had only very limited collective autonomy, and to the humiliating situation of the 1990s, when Russia almost lost its sovereignty to the western powers. The emphasis on sovereignty, however, is one of the most evident features of emerging postcolonial countries. It is this emphasis on self-determination, national interests and so one, which today puts Russia in opposition to the Western (or Northern) "developed" globalized world and makes it a "natural" member of the Global South.

Thus, it is not solidarity or the national pride of the victory in World War II, which today defines focusing upon collective autonomy in Russia. The fear of internal chaos and assertion of sovereignty are those bonds, which provide otherwise atomized society with a kind of collective agency. The obsession with sovereignty, in its turn, leads to securitization of the foreign policy. That is why contemporary Russia substituted value-politics of Soviet Union, which was based upon some normative considerations (internationalism, class solidarity, anti-colonialism etc.) with extreme political realism of national interests. Here again Russia is in the antiphase to liberal foreign politics of the Western countries. There were many attempts in Russia to reconcile liberal values, nationalism, politics of interests, globalization, and general democratic principles. One of these efforts was a short-lived concept of the "sovereign democracy", which at some point became quite popular in various circles of Russian establishment.

Dismantling of the organized modernity in the West led to the weakening of "the institutional frames for collective self-determination, partly deliberately in favour of supranational or global cooperation and partly because of an alleged escape of socio-political phenomena from the view and grasp of political institutions" (Wagner, 2016, p. 117). In Russia, as we have seen, it resulted in focusing on the sovereignty, rise of nationalism, revival of religion and, at the same time, extreme individualization, and atomization of the society. One of the main questions for the moment is which of the trajectories would fit better the current experiences and which of the interpretations can provide them with necessary stability.

A rather discouraging answer is "neither of the two". Hegemonic discourse of Global North is characterized by what Peter Wagner called the "erasure of space", when there is almost nothing between atomized individual and the globe and when the global politics of the liberal powers is suggested to be based upon recognition of the individual rights. "Every social phenomenon that stood in between tended to be considered as having freedom-limiting effect. Significantly, the notion of democracy, which presupposes a specific decision-making collectivity and thus appears to stand necessarily in an intermediate position between the individual and the globe, tend to be redefined. Rather than referring to a concrete, historically given collectivity, processes of self-determination were, on the one side, related to social movements without institutional reference, and on the other side, projected on the global level as the coming cosmopolitan democracy" (Wagner, 2016, pp. 120–121). Together with an "erasure of time", which strips human beings of any personal history and cultural identity, the erasure of space shapes contemporary hegemonic discourse. Wagner calls the image of the free and equal individuals entering contract-based associations a "utopia" (Wagner, 2016, p. 121). It is utopian in the sense that meaningful democracy does require some boundaries and shared historical identities. Completely atomized free and equal individuals will have problems with mastering their societies. Diminished ability of the contemporary societies to act collectively is compelling evidence in favour of this statement.

Even if utopian, the erasure of space and time is also very real. In today's globalized and interdependent world the ability of the societies to autonomously determine their fate is rather limited. Importantly this ability is radically diminishing if we go from Global North to Global South, from politically and economically powerful states to emerging

countries and the societies struggling with the consequences of colonialism. The decisions taken by, say, the US Federal Reserve System can influence greatly well-being of an average Russian citizen. The "humanitarian intervention" wars, waged almost unilaterally by the USA, say, against Iraq or Libya destroy lives of thousands of the human beings. If this is the case, and if neither Russian nor Libyan citizen has a right to vote in the US elections, the question is to what extent this world-system is democratic and to what extent the human beings living outside of the Global North are able to pursue their life-plans autonomously.

Formal domination of colonial system, when autonomy (freedom) and mastery (prosperity) of one part of the world were achieved at the expense of the formal exclusion of the other part of the world is now substituted with informal structure of exclusion and domination, characteristic for the post-colonial international system. The evidence is a recent (grossly exaggerated) scandal with "Russian hackers" and their putative influence upon the US elections. On the one hand, the scandal is ignited by the American indignation at people, who dared to interfere to "our democracy", "our freedom", "our autonomy". On the other hand, it is not clear to what extent in the current situation the US citizens can justifiably claim ownership of "their" democracy. Arguably, if the influence of the US democracy meaningfully transgresses territorial boundaries of this country, the ownership of the polity erodes. Classical system of sovereign nation states did not know this conceptual problem, but it formally excluded others through exercise of colonial power. Informal postcolonial domination combined with the erasures of time and space, however, makes democracy problematic conceptually. Thus, one can just wonder whether the hackers' "interference" was not a legitimate attempt to realize their autonomy in the situation when all democratic procedures for them were out of reach.

To Wagner's "erasure of time" and "erasure of space" we can also add what is possible to call "erasure of meaning". Namely, with dramatic changes in mass media, development of the social networks, blogs and online media, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish reliable sources of information from falsified ones. Traditional critical thinking skills do not work anymore and publicly available information is getting increasingly liable to manipulation. In a way we enter the era of fake news (it is not accidental that the term is so popular today) and hybrid warfare (another popular term). Humankind is still quite far from mastering the cyberspace with all its strange gods and dangerous demons. Real democracy seems to be in danger until this erasure of meaning is effectively overcome by a new critical thinking skill adapted to the cyberspace.

All these very general observations suggest that democracy today is both in danger and in crisis. Human beings should make sense of its real meaning, of its proper space with newly laid boundaries, of its relation to "thick" cultural traditions and histories. Now, does Russian (Ukrainian, British, American, Catalan etc.) return to the traditional nationalism with its nation-building instruments and to the Westphalia system of the sovereign nation-states help in the situation?

It seems that there is no return anymore, and that humankind has to creatively reinterpret the basic concepts and experiences of modernity. The attempts to restore conventions of the organized modernity in answer to the current crisis will unfortunately lead just to further deterioration of democracy. We witness this deterioration everywhere:

in Russia and in Ukraine, in Spain and in Catalonia, in Britain and in the US etc.

Current *fin de siècle* has just started and we are still to see what fruits it will bring in the nearest future. In Russia, it still definitely awaits its Fedorov to express clearly its defining elements along with its inherent contradictions.

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ARTICLE

Conformity in Modern Science: An Engine of Societal Transformation?

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ABSTRACT
The penetration of science into all spheres of life has self-evidently become a contemporary "megatrend". In turn, science itself is also undergoing distinct transformations, e.g., as a result of such processes as increasing regulation and bureaucratisation within academia. In this context, researchers as active producers of scientific knowledge face multiple challenges, including the need to cope with increasing regulation of their everyday practices. Therefore, our research purpose was to investigate the phenomenon of conformity, which, although always having been inseparable from social life, is acquiring a new significance today. Various representations of conformity (e.g. conformist behaviour) have received a great deal of attention from sociologists, biologists and psychologists; however, to our knowledge, there is no generally accepted philosophical understanding of its nature. In this paper, we provide a phenomenological study of conformity on the basis of a comprehensive literature analysis and evaluate its role as a mode of existence in modern science. For the sake of clarity, some illustrations from the everyday lives of researchers are given, including the distribution of the IMRAD format of research articles. Conformity in science is predicted to involve consequences at three distinct levels: (1) within a scientific community, when scientists follow prescribed patterns of conduct; (2) within a particular society when people from all walks of life conform to the standards set by the scientised world-view; and (3) at the global level when non-western communities conform to western standards of life through borrowing western scientific world picture.

KEYWORDS
conformity, conformism, scientism, technological rationality, social institutions, academic science, transformation of academic science, social adaptation mechanisms, phenomenological approach, globalisation

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Introduction

Although science has long been an important social institution, in recent times it would seem to have become a cornerstone of human social existence. This tendency seems especially pronounced when considering contemporary western societies. In this context, the predominance of scientific discourses can be identified at various levels of involvement, ranging from governmental policy to the everyday being of ordinary people. To an impartial observer, the public sphere might seem to have become obsessed with science, to the extent that any important decision of a political, cultural or educational nature – not to mention different operational decisions in economic and financial fields – can only be taken following a thorough examination of all risks and issues through exacting scientific lenses. Moreover, when examined under the authority of such a *scientistic* world-view (Feyerabend, 1993), a decision can only acquire the approval of the general public whose rationale conforms to the assumptions according to which this scientistic world-view is constructed. Conversely, irrespective of the applicability of the scientistic approach to the issue for which solutions are to be implemented, the general public is consistently provided with a reinforcing message that the consequences of decisions taken according to non-scientific rationales will prove negative.

Meanwhile, the private sphere of human life has also become captivated by the authority of science, with scientific knowledge actively penetrating and even *colonising* people's way of life (Salazar & Bestard, 2015). And, although ordinary people have long relied on science as a tool for acting upon the world and producing certain effects (i.e. in its instrumental aspect), today they are becoming increasingly active themselves in producing scientific knowledge. This phenomenon of research conducted by amateur scientists has even acquired a specific term – *citizen science* (Cooper, 2016). Thus, whether with direct intellectual effort or the commitment of other resources, people are actively participating in – and, in some cases, contributing to – the development of science. Numerous testaments to such participation, e.g. volunteers gathering data on urban bird behaviours[1] or carrying out experiments on themselves in the course of their daily lives[2] can be found on social media networks.

In connection with the abovementioned processes, certain trends in science as a human activity can be observed. One of these may be referred to in terms of a "massification of academic research" (Coccia, 2009): science is no longer an individual endeavour, but increasingly a corporate activity. In terms of the scale and complexity of their organisation, research teams today are starting to resemble medium-size companies (Erzkowitz, 1983; Wuchty & al., 2007) or quasi-firms, whose employees perform highly differentiated roles. As part of this general trend, for example, it has been shown that the number of authors per paper has nearly doubled (in hard sciences) over the last 50 years (Wuchty & al., 2007).

Naturally, such *science factories* cannot function properly in the absence of the necessary bureaucracy – a mechanism, which, according to Max Weber, is inevitably

[1] http://blog.nature.org/science/2015/02/17/citizen-science-10-most-popular-projects-best-nature-conservation/

[2] http://www.artofmanliness.com/2012/08/28/how-to-treat-life-like-an-experiment/

associated with increasing organisational size and scope (Weber, 1978). Unfortunately, bureaucracy also entails secondary effects, some of which may negatively impact on its enabling virtues (Crozier, 1964). These side effects, described in terms of *bureaucratisation*, include inefficiency, rigidity and "bureaucratic entrepreneurism" (Dekker, 2014). Thus, it may be expected that researchers, as active producers of scientific knowledge, will need to find ways to adapt and survive in this new reality.

Anthropologists, sociologists and social psychologists have extensively studied different aspects of adaptive behaviour within large social groups and developed a number of (often contradictory) theories (e.g., Skinner, 1974; Smith, 1992; etc.). Along with such types of behaviour as *payoff-based, social approval seeking*, etc., *conformism* is seen as a behavioural strategy selected in over-regulated social environments that feature increasing restrictions and punishments. For example, in his seminal work (Merton, 1938), Robert Merton showed that *conformity* to goals and means is the "most common and widely diffused" (ibid., p. 673) type of social order in large groups; without such conformity, the continuity of these groups cannot be maintained. Erich Fromm expressed similar ideas in (Fromm, 1965). In extreme cases, when the cultural goal is generated institutionally rather than organically (i.e. from within the group), the conformist behaviour may take the form of ritualism. Under such conditions, "ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive" (Merton, 1938, p. 673).

Despite the phenomenon of conformity and its representations having been extensively studied in the abovementioned disciplines, a philosophical understanding of this phenomenon has yet to be formulated. This is particularly significant, since, considering such trends as the massification of science, the scientisation of life and bureaucratisation, it is reasonable to suppose that conformity will become the dominant mode of existence in science, eventually coming to affect society as a whole. In other words, it can be expected that conformity will become the driver of massive societal transformations.

In response to this, we set out in this work to present a phenomenological understanding of conformity as a social phenomenon. Since this will involve a rather high level of abstraction, we will follow Heidegger's example in presenting a number of illustrations from the everyday life of scientists (viz. his examples of a hammer, cough, fences, etc.). It should be noted that our choice to apply the phenomenological approach is based on Heidegger's claim that only such an approach is capable of grasping a phenomenon in its integrity (Heidegger, 1962).

In order to distinguish our uses of the terms from other possible interpretations, we will now clarify what we mean by conformity and conformism. By conformism, we refer first and foremost to "conformist behaviour", i.e. the concept discussed in social psychology (Ash, 1955). Thus, conformism is seen as a behavioural strategy of imitating the majority, which aims at adjustment to axiological norms and socially accepted conventions shared within a particular group. Conversely, by conformity we understand the underlying phenomenon that generates conformist behaviour. Such a juxtaposition of conformism and conformity demonstrates that conformism is not a self-sufficient social phenomenon. Thus, it is only when considered through the lens

of the question "What lies behind?" that the phenomenon of conformist behaviour can be seen as a simplified representation of something more ontologically loaded: regardless of the nature of the true phenomenon it represents, conformism turns out to be ontologically rootless and consequently inadequate for phenomenological reinterpretation. Therefore, in what follows, we will focus on the concept of conformity and only refer to conformism when we wish to specifically refer to the set of social behaviours so engendered.

In order to pursue our research aim, the following research questions were formulated:

1. What are the philosophical specifics of the modern *scientised* world-view, which determine its dominance over other world-views?
2. How can the modern scientised world-view be interpreted from a phenomenological standpoint?
3. Who are the *bearers* ('Träger' in Heidegger's phenomenological sense) of the modern scientised world-view?
4. What adaptation and coping mechanisms do such bearers demonstrate and what examples of these mechanisms can be found in academic science?

I. Comprehensive technologisation

Whether referring to fundamental or applied science, a crucial component of the modern scientistic world-view consists in the priority status allocated to technological development. Thus, applied science employs technologies in an attempt to satisfy the ever-mounting needs of the consumer society and provide higher standards of taken-for-granted everyday comfortableness. At the same time, fundamental science is increasingly becoming reliant on instrumental technologies in order to achieve more and better results (e.g. laser scanning microscopy, infrared spectroscopy, etc.), which, in turn are expected to establish a basis for the development of the knowledge economy. Such *technologisation* of contemporary science frequently results in the use of specific technologies, which are seen not only as an effective means for achieving short-term goals, but also as permeating all stages of research work – from searching appropriate literature on Internet databases and conducting routine experiments (e.g. genome sequencing) to developing revolutionary approaches intended to shift or replace a dominant paradigm. Moreover, technologies are shown to play an increasingly important role in forming the core set of human cognitive characteristics (Schwab, 2016) that come to shape people's attitude to reality. The embedment of technological systems into the scientific world-view can be captured by the idea of technological rationality, introduced into philosophical and scientific discourses by several German social and political theorists belonging to the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Marcuse, 1982; Marcuse 2002).

In economic terms, the variety of conventional arguments for the unchallenged authority of technological rationality in the area of innovation-based growth could, on the one hand, be easily reduced to the popular notion of progressiveness, taken for the most part as a positive dimension of human orientation to the world. However, it should

be noted that such an elevation of the status of technology is so readily accepted by researchers not only because of their conformity to the social order and procedural norms, but also because such an understanding of technology has been the result of the prolonged reflection of philosophers on its nature. From this perspective, the philosophical and sociological understanding of technology in the modern era may be seen as having developed through Aristotelian anthropological lenses, with Ernst Kapp interpreting the human body in terms of the pattern of human technological activity (Brey, 2000; Mitcham, 1994) and Alfred Espinas introducing the concept of technology as mature art, a product of human thought and experience that finally gives birth to science as such (Alexandre & Gasparski, 2000).

Another equally authoritative approach to the essence of technology takes a more pragmatic approach, thus restricting Kapp's *anthropomorphism of technique* (Mitcham, 1994). The Austrian philosopher Ernst Mach and his Russian populariser Piotr Engelmeier proceeded from the premise that the development of science is influenced by the practical needs of everyday life. Thus, science appears as a *faithful* servant of humanity, whose duty is to cope with technological challenges (Mitcham, 1994). Consequently, Mach's so-called *economy of thought* was established within the second approach, while the intellectual activity of a human being here loses the ontological status of technology's *root*, being reduced to the mere drawing of technical analogies with how *technique* works in and of itself. As a consequence of such *imitation of machines* on the part of human beings, a specific anthropological type of human having an *engineering mentality* was established and encouraged in the Modern era.

Under the conditions of Modernity, the system of technological rationality was deeply embedded not only into scientific, but also social, political and economic spheres, with any philosophical aspects being mostly confined to Marxist and Neo-Marxist discussions. According to Karl Marx, the establishment of technological rationality was a value-neutral result of the historic displacement of *hand-labour* by productive *machine-labour* (Marx, 1977). However, the value system of such rationality is always determined by the authorities, who control the means of production, alienating the worker – on the one hand economically, i.e. from the results of *what he is producing*, and, on the other hand, psychologically, i.e. from the reason *why he is producin*g (Marx, 1977). Neo-Marxist representatives of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Marcuse, 2002) developed Marx's idea of the capitalist system with its fundamental premise of the social alienation of the worker into the complex *critical theory* of society. It is significant here that alienation is interpreted not only in terms of the capitalist class having access to modern technologies, which the proletariat lacks, but also through the technologies themselves being engaged into the value-creating process of subduing human nature.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, humanity's loss of selfhood and *immediacy of existence* is a consequence of *technique* (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002). It should come as no surprise, then, if the development of technologies becomes a catalyst for the explosion of mass culture in the Modern era. Mass culture inevitably reduces and erodes existing ethical and cultural patterns, thus constituting and distributing globally specific socio-political standards. Socio-political systems based on such standards

are absolutely syncretic in terms of their axiological priorities and thereby adaptive to any external agency. In a similar manner, the French sociologist and political thinker Jacques Ellul analysed technique as a self-sustaining and independent power that cannot be ignored or belittled, because it imposes itself upon humanity in its function as a specific *ideology*; as a result, all social, political and economic structures came to be pre-determined by its rigid value system (Ellul, 1964).

The German philosopher Friedrich Jünger also offered a pessimistic prognosis of uncontrolled technologic development. For Jünger, an unrestricted development of technology inevitably leads to a logic according to which human nature becomes something that must be subdued (Jünger, 2010). Thus, in the Modern era an implicit process of devaluation of the human being has become explicit to the extent that any differences between human and technological achievements are becoming increasingly moot. Having previously been interpreted in terms of human activities and skills in the fabrication of goods, under Modernity technologies come not only to dominate the process of producing things, but also to reshape our motivation for developing them. In this way, the remarkable technological achievements of the 20th and 21st centuries have revealed the great power contained within them, one that frames all human problems as due to a lack of societal technologisation and reduces the human being himself/herself to the questions of *operational* decision-making. Since operations are, by definition, carried out on other *things* (regardless of whether that thing is a human body in a surgical ward, a mass of earth to be moved, or an enemy capital to be demolished by atom bombs), this is likely to lead to unpredictable and perilous situations ("Technology versus Man", 1949, p. 3).

However, perhaps the most penetrating and powerful philosophical critique of technology, significantly influencing both anthropological and pragmatic (instrumental) approaches, is that developed by the German thinker Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the field of technology encompasses not only the manufacture and utilisation of equipment, tools and machines, but also the entire structure of modern philosophy, which organises itself in such a way as to actively and explicitly serve technological ends (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger's thought represents a cornerstone of the present research, since it elucidates not only how the Western *scientised* world-view has come to thoroughly permeate Modernity, but also how the roots of *technologised consciousness* themselves came into being. However, it is only when analysed through Heideggerian lenses that his ambiguous thesis – "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" – becomes clear (ibid., p. 4). Moreover, such an understanding may assist in developing an approach that can overcome technological rationality as the *idée fixe* of modern societies.

II. Phenomenology of the scientised world-view

Inasmuch as Heidegger's assertion seems to form the basis for our following analysis of conformity as a mode of existence in modern science, his phenomenological approach towards technologies will be discussed in a twofold manner, with each elucidation serving its own particular purpose. Firstly, a brief review of the historical background

forming the basis of the *essence of technology* will be carried out in order to expand our comprehension of the matter beyond conventional understandings, in terms of which the only considered means of rethinking technologies is to discover how to make them more and more technological. Secondly – and this is directly related to the prime objective of the present research – the perspective should be switched from the existence of technologies in and of themselves (as well as from the specific forms shaped by them) and towards the *bearers of technologised consciousness*.

In contradicting conventional understandings of Modernity as something emergent or self-grounded, the Heideggerian historical purview grounds the scientific and technological age in antiquity. Thus, Heidegger refers to the ancient idea of ποίησις *(poiesis)* – the *arising of something from out of itself* – as something requiring to be taken into consideration when the genealogy of modern technologies is being considered (Heidegger, 1977, p. 10). The nub of the matter here is that ποίησις, in its *bringing-forth* capacity, also gives birth to a phenomenon called τέχνη *(techne)*, implying the bringing into existence of something that did not exist before (ibid.). Therefore, since referring simultaneously to the *skill of making a particular thing* and the *things themselves* that are so produced, τέχνη was evidently experienced through handcraft and labour, i.e. all creative human activities in general along with human intellectual capabilities or so-called *arts of mind*.

Among those *arts of mind*, it was philosophy itself that was, for Heidegger, to become a paradigmatic example of τέχνη, while philosophy – being a specific mode of metaphysical thinking – considers a specific *reality*, i.e. one that duplicates the existence of things themselves. For example, the primary aim of antique philosophy had been to grasp the world in which a person lived in order to reveal whatever could be imperishable within that world, i.e. the *essence* of all things. In fairness, it must be said that there was no particular mediator implied in the process of comprehension: the world appeared to the philosopher as *revealing itself from itself* like φύσις *(physis)* – i.e. the self-genesis of nature. As for *objective reality*, this concept simply did not exist in Pre-socratic philosophy; nevertheless, the roots of Modernity's *subject / object dualism* can be traced to Plato's philosophy of forms.

Western medieval religious thought represented a reorienting of priorities from revealing the truth of Being towards collaborative strategies for establishing true relationships with God aimed at the assurance of salvation. From a phenomenological viewpoint, medieval philosophy seems to have become overwhelmed in its desperate search for something *permanent* in human, quotidian existence. Thus, Heidegger finds Christian theology to be itself a kind of τέχνη – not only because of its implicit *result-orientation*, but also in its establishment of a specific *mediator* between the human being and the world. How Modernity actually changed this relationship schema, then, was to shift humanity's outlook from a theological to a scientific domain; nevertheless, the same quest for security and permanence was preserved intact.

The fundamentally Modern works of René Descartes and Isaac Newton discovered *self-certainty* within human reason itself (Descartes, 2004), by means of which the *world beyond* was substituted, in a philosophical sense, for *reality* – i.e. in a reflection of the world – thus effecting a more powerful and penetrating τέχνη. This placement of

the world of Cartesian objects into a state of dependence on man's mental abilities was deliberate: it is in maintaining such a belief in reality that the subject's self-assurance can be maintained. Having thus become a Cartesian subject – i.e. the dominating centre of reality – man is able to establish the unity of his thinking and being according to the famous formula *cogito ergo sum*. As a consequence, everything that appears to any human from beyond himself can be shaped, regularised and standardised as a means of satisfying the need for *security*. However, having been reduced to a construction of the human mind, the world thus finds itself caught in a trap, with no means of escaping from the clutches of that cogito, which only the Cartesian subject is able to provide.

When thus described in terms of *subject / object*, modern science takes up its by now familiar position to become the means by which τέχνη can most effectively reinforce itself. Thus, in terms of its teleological consistency, the concern of scientists with investigating the surrounding world seems dispassionate and unchallenged by any alternative form of νόησις (*noiesis*). However, perhaps the biggest difference between the antique and modern-scientistic philosophical approaches lies in the latter's refusal to permit things to be present as they are. For the former, by contrast, the revelation of things in the truth of authentic Being was the highest value (Heidegger, 1977). Freed of this requirement, modern scientists set about *arresting* and *shackling* the world in order to objectify its essence as a "manifold of cause and effect coherences", cleansing it of any hint of *pollution* by the contingency, eventuality or immediacy of Being. By representing things to himself in this way, the modern scientist makes the world amenable to experiments, with the inherent value of the *means-to-an-end* factor in any experimental setup advanced as self-evident (ibid., p. 167). For Heidegger, the significance of this idea is revealed precisely when the *essence of technology* is brought into question, due to the radical departure between anthropological and instrumental interpretations of τέχνη under Modernity being represented exactly from such a means-to-an-end perspective.

When technologies are bound to a means-to-an-end schema, the ensuing instrumental approach supports human domination over nature; the *bringing-forth* potential of τέχνη-as-ποίησις has, by now, been quite forgotten. Nevertheless, even in its modern instrumental interpretation, technology in its essence continues to be a kind of *mode of revealing*, with only one important specification requiring to be taken into account. As was previously mentioned, the anthropological dimension of τέχνη reveals "the Truth of Being of things themselves", while the instrumental mode of revealing is also the mode of so-called "challenging revealing" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16). By conducting scientific experiments on the world of objects in the spirit of "contending with everything that exists", the Cartesian subject appears to exert control over everything he represents and objectifies. Heidegger clarifies his attitude in the following statement: "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of challenging-forth. Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about

ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing that dominate the age of technological Modernity" (ibid., p. 16).

Under this scope, the only relevant quality of things in the world is their readiness for use: the world itself appears as an interconnected network of objects, whose only meaning lies in being available to serve the purpose of "letting-be-controlled" (Heidegger, 1977). Heidegger's special term for describing the phenomenon of undifferentiated availability was "standing-reserve" (ibid., p. 17). The ordering and self-revealing of everything in terms of standing-reserve is the result of the challenging claim of both people and things occurring in a specific configuration of "ordering for use", i.e. *enframing* (ibid., p. 19). This characteristic *enframing* of the *essence of technology* leads to the second perspective of our analysis – human orientation towards technologies and science, with the concept of the subject now being placed into question. In the next two paragraphs, we will clarify what is meant by *enframing* in the context of academic science as well as elucidate the question of who is the *bearer of the* scientised *world-view* under this *framework*.

III. The They as bearer of the scientised world-view

The essence of technologies is itself not technological, but rather concerns fundamental processes of revealing the truth of Being (Heidegger, 1977). When examined through the lenses of Heidegger's approach, it is *human orientation to the world* that becomes such an essence; however, both human and the world are now being put into question. Over the centuries, there have been several modes of revealing; within each subsequent paradigm, the mode of revealing has been perverted in an increasingly explicit way due to moving further from its primordial goal. Thus, under the conditions of Modernity, this mode has finally become enframing, previously described as a way of ordering the world in order to capture its essence. In terms of enframing, there is no possibility for the world to be disclosed as itself and from itself; on the contrary, according to one of Heidegger's contemporary interpreters, the world is liable to be disclosed merely as "a valuable material resource to be extracted, expropriated and used-up for whatever man desires or wills of it" (Nadal, 2010).

The most fruitful result of such kinds of instrumental thinking is the creation of different *enframings* – specific structures and formats, through which different technologies can be used to easily reshape and convert the world into specific forms to be grasped and represented by scientific rationality. Certainly, enframings only complete the process of shifting the concept of the world into the domain of standing-reserve, whereas the question of what the world really is appears to have been left outwith the range of their very concerns. It is at this point that Heidegger makes his famous distinction between ancient and modern philosophies, with the former representing the philosophical world-view and the latter – the scientific world-picture (Heidegger, 1977). Insofar as it is sufficient for introducing the bearer of the modern scientised world-view as well as his mode of existence in science, the distinction between the philosophical world-view and the scientific world-picture should be clearly emphasised.

World-view could be interpreted as *observing-the-world*, implying not only the sense of *dwelling-within-the-world*, but also that the world *is not* an *entity* which is a priori *given* to a human being (Heidegger, 1977). When *world-viewing* starts from the *beyond of nothing*, its spontaneous and all-inclusive reflection *on the world* and on the *human being* can disclose the universe of their Beings simultaneously: this is considered by Heidegger to be an *authentic* mode of existence (Heidegger, 1962). According to his thought, *world-picture* can be understood as having been perverted under a modernistic world-view; however, it should be interpreted as the world grasped as picture, rather than as a picture of the world, implying that such a *world* is primordially *external* to a human being. Consequently, it is impossible for any human to *dwell* in such a world – it can only be described or registered as an *image* or *picture* by somebody standing apart from it. This mode is claimed by Heidegger to be *inauthentic*, while in terms of *world-picture*, the human becomes alienated from the world, resulting in its loss: "Modernity leaves man homeless, without world" (Nadal, 2010).

The Modern scientific *world-picture* appears to be the most explicit and ambitious example of *framework* ever constructed; however, its inauthenticity depends not only on a specific understanding of *the world* (as something to be investigated), but also on a specific understanding of what it means to be human (i.e. that which investigates). In terms of Modernity, "subject" should replace "human", especially when discussing the actor engaged in scientific research. However, here a problem of definition, identified by Heidegger, arises (as a consequence of which the unqualified use of the word "subject" has also been deliberately avoided in the context of our research).

In order to comprehend what is meant by *subject* in a phenomenological sense, it should be noted that the modern word acquired its meaning from Ancient Greek υποκειμένου *(ipokeimenon)* – literally "that-which-lies-before" (Heidegger, 1977). Thus, "subject" tends to play a much more significant role in contemporary philosophical parlance than merely a synonym for "human": it is only possible to *lie-before-something* when the being of *that-which-lies-before* is itself primordial and self-evident to other beings. Conversely, being of the *non-human* refers to the *being of the world;* it is only *world-picture* (world *as* picture), which can be found in such a dependent relationship on *human*. In this regard, Heidegger invoked the question of what *being in the world* really is as well as *who is in the world*. Having returned to the clear phenomenological understanding that we all are already *somewhere in the world*, Heidegger introduced his central pre-concept[3] of *Dasein* – literally *being-there* (Heidegger, 1962). In describing a human being in terms of *Dasein*, Heidegger attempted to escape from the a priori inauthenticity of philosophical notions developed within modern philosophy, especially the *juxtaposition* of *subject* and the *world of objects*. Being already embedded in the world, *Dasein itself* is prescribed neither as *authentic*, nor *inauthentic;* while comprising a new starting point of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, it can exist both in authentic and inauthentic modes (Heidegger, 1962).

In a broad sense, *Dasein* finds *itself* as itself proximally and for the most part in its daily existence through its concern with environment. However, complete absorption

[3] Primordial concept.

into the world of ordinary life experiences, into the world of so-called *average everydayness,* is fraught for *Dasein* due to the *switching* of the inauthentic regime of its existence (Heidegger, 1962). Heidegger suggested this regime to be that of *das Man,* which can be translated into English as *"the They*[4]*"*. Heidegger's *others* must not be interpreted simply as *other people;* otherwise, the whole logic of his argumentation would be contravened, since *other people* are always understood within everyday consciousness as *other people, but not myself.* Having started his analysis from the phenomenon of *Dasein,* Heidegger maintains that its *being-in-the-world* is always and at the same time *being-with-others*, with the generalised character of *others* already implied in every concern of *Dasein* with respect to the world (Heidegger, 1962). Moreover, those *others* are primordial to any particular self, because it is exactly *self* that is *singled out* from the *others* through the *switching* of the regime of *Dasein*'*s* existence from inauthentic to authentic – and not the reverse. That is why, in addition to every human being discovering *Dasein* to be *himself/herself, others* must also be treated as *Dasein,* the only proviso being that *their* existence precedes the first distinction between *my own* and *not my own* Dasein.

Nevertheless, *others* carry the potentiality to become authentic – something that may occur only if *Dasein* individuates *its authentic self* from the totality of inauthentic beings. Without this individuation, *others* remain attached to *the They*, forming an example of *inauthentic self.* In terms of *average everydayness*, where *the They* exists, several existential characteristics may be detached, including *distantiality, averageness* and *levelling-down* (Heidegger, 1962). When discussed in general terms, *the They* appears to consist in the assembly of different clichés that are predominantly *taken for granted* as respectable behavioural or intellectual patterns. In other words, *the They* constrains each *Dasein* to surrender its uniqueness – and, consequently, its authenticity potential – by following their *beaten paths* to commonly defined styles of thinking, communicating, writing, etc. Moreover, these paths have been *paved* not by *Dasein,* but by *the They*. Heidegger was clear that "*the They*, which supplies the answer to the question of the *who* of everyday *Dasein*, is the *nobody* to whom every *Dasein* has already surrendered itself" [emphasis added] (Heidegger, 1962, p. 166).

Thus, the phenomenological analysis of the essence of technologies provided under these two paragraphs may incline the reader to conclude that the fundamental basis of modern scientific world-picture – i.e. *subject / object dichotomy* – is by no means something that should be taken for granted. It is only human orientation to the

[4] Taking into consideration that this concept of Heidegger seems to be quite complicated, especially in terms of its relation to other philosophical concepts that pre-existed it, the interpretation of *das Man* should be clarified as a matter of priority. The simplest and briefest explanation of *das Man* as *everyone and no one in particular* provides a rough outline of the contours of the concept; however, our preferred English translation of *das Man* as *the They* adds an extra dimension to its intrinsic meaning. It should be emphasised that, on the one hand, usage of *the They* in the singular (i.e. in contradistinction with the plural agreement form used with the pronoun "they") corresponds precisely with the grammatical use of German indefinite pronoun *man,* from which *das Man* acquired its currency through nominalisation. On the other hand, the plural sense of *das Man* is also captured here, which is highly relevant due to Heidegger's assertion of *das Man* referring first and foremost to the mode of existence of *others* (Heidegger, 1962).

world that can reshape this topography. We only find the world to consist of *objects to be investigated* when we consider the world to comprise *standing-reserve* in its nature as a whole. As soon as we start perceiving *objects* not as something given to us and human-independent, but as *framework-friendly* concepts, it is precisely the *objectiveness* of the world that appears to be challenged. In a similar manner, a human being conducting scientific research has the status of *subject* only to the extent of being a *bearer of* scientised *consciousness*.

When it is understood that it is the consciousness of *the They* that lies behind the scientised consciousness rather than an individual person, it becomes obvious that scientised consciousness cannot belong to any individual human being. Consequently, the subject, understood as a rationally thinking individual (and bearer of scientised consciousness), immediately becomes an erroneous reference point, because the subjectivity postulated by him or her only serves to deceive us about who he or she really is. After all, subjectivity, by definition, cannot *not belong to somebody*; however, according to the scientised world-view, it belongs precisely to *the They*; that is to say, to *everybody and nobody*. Thus, the very idea of the *subject* as a certain reference point for a scientific world-view becomes little more than a *Potemkin village facade* arranged by *the They* in order to conceal αλήθεια (alethea) – the truth of Being (Heidegger, 1977).

As a typical example of *framework*, the modern scientific world-picture is not something rigid and prescribed once and for all; rather, it is dynamic and continually changing within the processes of enframing being initiated by *the They*. In this regard, the existential characteristics of *the They*, such as *distantiality, averageness and levelling-down*, should be elucidated by examples of their practical influence on modern academic science. Conformity as a mode of existence in science should be also introduced, along with the following analysis of adaptation and survival mechanisms applied by modern researchers – i.e. the bearers *of the* scientised *world-picture* – provided in terms of the societal processes of the *scientisation of life* and *massification of science*.

IV. Conformist behaviour in modern science

As it has been shown in the previous paragraphs, it is the instrumental interpretation of τέχνη that constitutes technological rationality – the most powerful rationality that has ever existed. Initially conceived as an instrument for use by humanity in transforming the world to make it more comfortable for living in, technological rationality has eventually become an actor *in and of itself* by organising the world and forcing humanity to submit to its rules. No wonder, then, if the penetration of technologies throughout all spheres of life and provided under its guidance should come to additionally transform *human* orientation to the world, with enframing acting as the driver of this process. However, the phenomenological analysis of the substitution of the *philosophical world-view* for the *scientific world-picture* that occurred during Modernity showed that the two interdependent processes of the *scientisation of life* and the *massification of science* involved in establishing the scientised world-view only *seem* to evolve on

their own accord. In actuality, it is not just the progressive development of society that determines the contemporary state of affairs in science, but the very manner of thought of *the They*, which configures the whole structure of human daily existence. Conversely, the phenomenon of conformity is the mode according to which *the They* gets accustomed to average everyday existence: it would be logical to assume that conformity can express itself in terms of scientific activity and scientific discourse, while in the contemporary world both are explicit examples of enframing in action.

We will now look at some exemplary representations of how *the They* conducts enframing in order to understand what conformist strategies the bearers of scientised consciousness – i.e. modern researchers – employ in order to adjust to axiological patterns and socially accepted conventions shared within a scientific community. One such illustrative example of how an instrument of convenience eventually became a self-sufficient value can be found in the realm of scientific communication; this is the IMRAD format, which is nowadays used worldwide to present research findings in scientific articles.

The scientific research paper as we know it today has undergone a long evolution (Gross et al., 2002). Initially such texts took the form of letters to colleagues, explaining the details of a study in a narrative style. Then, with the emergence of the first scientific journals and the concomitant need to advance a claim concerning the priority status of communicated knowledge, the scientific text underwent a transformation both in terms of style and composition. Moreover, the professionalisation of the scientific journal brought about the appearance of journal editors, whose mission was to focus articles to meet the interests of other scientists as well as to exclude dilettantes from this increasingly specialised form of communication. The 20th century was marked by an exponential growth in scientific knowledge (Prince, 1963), which also required more efficient means for information exchange and retrieval. Thus, the text composition format acronymised as *IMRAD* (Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion) developed from the conventional historical perspective into its current form.

From the phenomenological perspective, the IMRAD format comprises a rigid schema for text production that provides rules for the textual organisation of research articles. For this reason, it may be treated as a typical example of technologisation in academic science. Moreover, IMRAD is not only widely used, but also *obligatory* in many disciplines, particularly in medicine and the natural sciences; consequently, IMRAD research articles are subject to strong and explicit genre constraints. For example, at the level of the textual surface, the genre constraints can be observed in a linear sequencing of the text, since the format not only prescribes a fixed number of sections, but also the order of their sequencing, regardless of the original vision of the scientific research to be shared within a particular discipline.

It is hardly surprising that in the age of obsessive human relationships with different technologies, the popularity of IMRAD is immense – currently, almost 95% of all publications in natural sciences journals are presented according to this logic (Popova & Beavitt, 2017). Moreover, some researchers claim that in medicine this is the only pattern adopted in original papers (Sollaci & Pereira, 2004). A steadily

increasing number of journals in social studies and even in humanities insist that authors compose their manuscripts according to international publication standards, which in most cases means adherence to the same IMRAD format. Thus, rather than being an arbitrary option, IMRAD has become not only a standard to which every paper must conform, but also an enframing, which is ostensibly imposed by *the They* in order to make scientific communication more user-friendly through its reduction to a standardised, depersonalised and generally accepted style.

When IMRAD is seen in terms of enframing, conformity to the rules provided under its guidance becomes a mode of existence. While such a mode is inauthentic due to its belonging to *the They*, nevertheless, it appears to be justified by the following reasons of convenience, which *the They* guarantees to any participant in scientific communication:

1. *Convenience for authors.* The underlying logic of the IMRAD format provides an autological reflection of the scientific research process: the research questions are initially stated, then the necessary tools selected, results captured and relevant conclusions drawn therefrom. Thus, the IMRAD format not only provides rules for the organisation of a text at the macro-level (strict sequence of sections), but also structures the micro-level, i.e. in terms of the order of semantic units. This pattern is disseminated throughout the global academic community in academic writing classes, both at undergraduate and graduate levels. Writing papers in such a manner is particularly convenient for non-native speakers of English, who greatly outnumber natives in contemporary scientific communication.

2. *Convenience for readers.* According to researchers in cognitive psychology, reading scientific texts is a complicated human activity, multidimensional rather than linear in character (Kintsch, 1998). IMRAD papers facilitate modular reading, because each section of the paper contains information in a semantically preordained manner: e.g., the research question follows the description of the research gap and can normally be browsed by phrases such as “although much research has been carried out to…” or “despite significant progress in…” Linguists have shown that the diversity of semantic “moves and steps” in contemporary IMRAD papers is almost negligible (Swales, 1990; Brett, 1994; Hopkins & Dudley-Evans, 1988; Kanoksilapatham, 2005). Thus, for an experienced researcher, reading a well-formed English-language scientific article can be commenced from virtually any section, including keywords and title, since each part may be seen as a holographic representation of the whole.

3. *Convenience for editors and peer-reviewers.* Over 3 million manuscripts are submitted to journals every year (Report of the Science and Technology Committee, 2011), imposing a considerable burden on their editors and peer-reviewers. The IMRAD format with its strict rules is helpful in providing a coarse sieve for selecting works for subsequent peer-review.

4. *Convenience for citation engines.* In an age of burgeoning information, an increasing number of parameters are being processed not by humans, but by machines. Standardised forms used to present information allow global citation and scientometric indexes (such as Scopus or Web of Science) to effectively analyse

connections between scholarly papers (i.e. citations in later work based on earlier articles), thus providing a tool for measuring research performance.

Despite all the above-mentioned benefits, IMRAD is increasingly criticised for its rigidity, over-simplicity and over-standardisation. From a phenomenological perspective, it could not be any other way, since the only possible outcome of blindly surrendering to *the They* is mediocrity. Indeed, while the future of science as a human activity has been shown to depend on creativity (Hadzigeorgiou, 2012), academic writing is becoming more and more rigid – not only at the macro-level (compositional structure), but also on the micro-level (semantic units). As a consequence of such rigid enframing, many papers in natural sciences are virtually indistinguishable from one another, varying only in terms of the numerical information so presented. This fact even led some researchers to make a bold prediction: we may soon witness the end of scientific articles, which will be substituted by "ontologies" (IMRAD carried to an extreme) (West, 2016): such an outcome would mark a kind of technological singularity moment at which *the They* is seen to triumph over the authentic self of individual researchers. Researchers will no longer be required to create texts; it will be sufficient to simply upload properly formatted information into pre-assigned spaces.

Being a reflection of the world-view of *the They*, IMRAD may be seen as increasingly stifling spontaneous narrativity due to *the They* being highly intolerant of creativity as such. Perhaps it is for this reason that any interested researcher can find various IMRAD templates or "cheat-sheets" on the Internet that can be used to create a paper[5]. In conformance with the current state of affairs in science, most editors expect to see papers written in this format; there have even been cases when some clearly non-scientific papers were published simply because they had the external appearance of IMRAD papers (Bohannon, 2013). It can be concluded that, due to the supremacy of technological rationality in general and such conformist modes of existence in particular, IMRAD has burgeoned from an optional instrument of convenience into a self-sufficient value, dominating and even domineering the world of academic communication.

The widespread distribution of technologies such as IMRAD can also be analysed from the perspective of the process of bureaucratisation. Max Weber showed that increases in the size and scope of every social sector are associated with the implementation of a bureaucratic principle (Weber, 1922) as a response to the need for rationalisation and ordering of any human activity. This – according to Weber, inevitable – process is characterised by greater division of labour, standardisation, hierarchy and decentralisation. The growth of organised science (Adams et al., 2005; Wuchty et al., 2007) and its increasing massification is likely to also result in its greater bureaucratisation. Indeed, as it has been conclusively shown (Walsh & Lee, 2015; Coccia, 2009), science as a human activity is becoming more: (a) hierarchical, with multiple levels of supervision appearing (growth of administrative structures, such as FANO and VAK in Russia); (b) decentralised, which means that those lower in

[5] See, e.g. https://www.cmu.edu/gcc/handouts/IMRD%20with%20Examples.pdf

the hierarchy can make independent decisions though formally approved by those higher in the organisation (which is demonstrated in Russia by reduced governmental budgetary funding for research); (c) highly labour-divided (Popov et al., 2017), with every researcher in a research team performing her narrow circle of responsibilities (e.g. some researchers in the natural sciences); and (d) standardised, meaning that all the work is governed by strictly specified rules and fixed procedures (IMRAD, reports, requirements for applicants for scientific degrees, scientometric indicators measuring research performance, etc.).

To a lesser or greater extent, all these dimensions of bureaucratisation can be also considered as a result of the enframing of the sphere of academic science by *the They* for its own convenience. As was previously mentioned, *the They* mostly acts through such existential characteristics as *distantiality, averaging* and *levelling down*, imposing conformity as a mode of existence to everybody who gives up responsibility for his own Dasein and instead *plays by the rules* of the scientised world-view. Namely, these characteristics manifest themselves in science in terms of *alienation* (distantiality) of a researcher's personality from the results of his work; *disregard* (averaging) of any personal impact and achievements in order to bring to the fore the part of *bureaucratic structures* and *self-producing machines* (West, 2016); *standardisation* (levelling down), which appears in a reduction to a common denominator of everything beyond established standards. Therefore, it can be concluded that, with conformity being a mode of existence, science has become a highly-bureaucratised activity, whose performance is entirely dependent on how effectively such technological instruments, e.g. as IMRAD, are used. It should be mentioned that IMRAD is just one illustration; among other technologies that disseminate the academic others into *the They* are global scientometric indexes, systems of academic ratings, rankings and tenure, etc.

Taken all the above mentioned into account, the next step would be to look at how people respond to these transformations. This idea seems to be consistent with the concept of the *bureaucratic personality* (Merton, 1940; Thomson, 1961; Bozeman & Rainy, 1998), which was developed to capture the changing nature of personality in the context of an environment that is becoming more and more bureaucratic. Increasing specialisation and division of labour, along with such benefits as increasing rationality and a movement from dilettantism to professionalism, eventually leads to the pathologic distortions – or "bureaupathologies" – of Weberian virtues (Thomson, 1961), including alienation and impersonal attitude, loss of creativity and enthusiasm, mechanistic behaviour and lower personal responsibility for the result – all qualities whose overall contribution to knowledge generation may be suspected to be negative. The underlying reason for all such responses was shown to be the loss of personal security (Thomson, 1961). An impressive list of 175 bureaupathologies was given by Caiden (1991), who insisted that these "systemic shortcomings" (Caiden, 1991) are the result of forcing individuals within an organisation to conform to extensive norms and rules.

In other words, conformist behaviour becomes the strategy of choice used by the bureaucratic personality to avoid penalties. This is particularly so in science,

since contemporary researchers are expected to conform to the established order: publish in journals indexed in international databases, conduct experiments that fall into mainstream frameworks, promote their research within academia to get more citations, establish a rapport with scientific administrators to obtain stable funding and position, etc. It comes as no surprise then that technological instruments become an undisputable value, providing a means for achieving conformity – and, consequently, "social survival" (Fisk, 2016).

There seems to be an interdependent relationship between the concepts of technologised consciousness (as described following Heidegger's phenomenological theory) and bureaucratic personality. Significantly, these concepts helped us to analyse the transformations that the contemporary human activity of science is undergoing, as well as to take a closer look at the instruments that researchers as bearers of technologised consciousness apply nowadays to survive in a highly-enframed and bureaucratised environment.

Conclusion

In this paper, our purpose was to investigate intricate connections between science as a transforming human activity, researchers as active producers of such transformations and society as a whole.

We have shown that the contemporary social reality features such distinct processes as the penetration of science into all social spheres (scientisation) and the associated massification of science as a human activity. These trends, like any social process involving growing complexity, are accompanied by increased bureaucratisation, whose function is to organise and regulate the social order by establishing norms, restrictions and penalties. The bureaucratic mechanism exerts a definite pressure on researchers, forcing them to search for appropriate approaches for dealing with the more challenging environment. As has been shown, conformism frequently becomes the strategy of choice, since imitating socially approved behaviour can lead to stability and success.

However, we have also shown that conformism is merely a representation of a more ontologically loaded phenomenon – conformity – whose nature we attempted to reveal using Heidegger's phenomenological approach. In the initial analytical step, we looked at technological rationality as a modern state of being and showed how technologies are often transmuted into teleologies. Thus, technologies become part of human consciousness. Such a technologised consciousness can properly function only within a specific configuration, which Heidegger calls enframing. In modern science, this enframing, which alters human orientation to the world, takes the form of conformity and becomes the primary mode of existence.

Conformity as a phenomenon inherent to modern science has a number of societal effects, which can be predicted to drive massive social transformations. These effects can be considered at various levels: within a scientific community, a particular society, and / or at a global level. Their detailed analysis should become a focus of another investigation; however, let us here briefly draft some possible outcomes of

the abovementioned trends. It should be noted that these outcomes can be both of a positive and negative character. The results of conformity within a scientific community may involve lower creativity and responsibility for the product, increased focus on empirical methods of research, accumulation of empirical results that will never be theoretically examined and discrimination against non-western research approaches. However, conformity, with its clearly formulated rules and standardised procedures, also serves to make such a previously elite form of human activity as science accessible to ordinary people.

Within a particular society, conformity is manifested when people uncritically absorb standards imposed by technologised consciousness. An example is the emphasis of many societies on the goals of material prosperity, resulting in greater concern with the technological instruments conducing to such an outcome. At a global level, conformity can be analysed from the standpoint of non-western communities conforming to western standards of life through borrowing from the western scientific world picture. Thus, in aiming to be included in the international citation indexes of Scopus and Web of Science, many Russian journals face the need to introduce substantial changes in almost all aspects of their work, from the traditional model of peer-review to the selection of content.

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ARTICLE

The End of Utopias?

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ABSTRACT

The present article discusses the legitimacy of the question: Are we really living in the era of "the end of utopias"? It is argued that a positive response to this question is possible only if, when considering utopias, their predominantly "left" content, left phraseology and the declaration of left anti-capitalist goals are placed at the forefront. However, if we approach utopias from the point of view of their objectively executable functions, their primary content is no longer utopian in the usual sense. A utopia is always a "function of the real" (Labica, 2004, p. 291). Contemporary utopian consciousness should be considered taking into account that: (a) utopias are inextricably linked with capitalism; (b) they serves its transformation (defining its "spirit" by its criticism) in transition from one stage to another; (c) they are an expression of the worldviews and aspirations of social groups (classes) rising at different stages of capitalism. Therefore, in order to find the place in the social structure in which modern utopias are born, it is necessary to locate the "rising class". The article defines the rising class as one that has, at least potentially, the greatest productivity. Its role in social production is increasing; around it are formed production, cultural and other relations, which become decisive according to the foreseeable historical perspective. The "creative class" is considered in terms of a contemporary rising class. Dazzled by its bright prospects, it is inclined to impose its utopia of the "creative economy" on the majority. The consequence of the rise of the "creative class" is a concomitant growth in the precarious social group of service workers and other social strata for whom the prospects of gaining entry into the ranks of the cognitariat are becoming increasingly unstable. Now that these strata are more likely to struggle for their existence, they find themselves trying to defend what has been lost without raising questions about the need to radically transform the social system. Variants of modern utopian consciousness are considered, proceeding from the outlined view of the socio-structural transformation of contemporary societies.

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Introduction

Today, it is difficult to resist the fact that "the end of utopias" did not transpire as predicted by G. Marcuse (Marcuse, 2004). No less often is it said that utopias have changed, e.g. become "concrete" or "private", that their only function was "civil repair" (Alexander, 2002) or that their object was the reform of democracy. According to F. Ainsa, the creation of "partial" or "fragmentary" utopias is, apparently, the task of developed democratic societies, which should be solved by social collectives not loner-dreamers. At the present time, the traditional contradiction between the struggle for a complete renewal of society and maintenance of the status quo is being gradually replaced by a multiplicity of such mutually agreed "partial" utopias appearing in the spheres of education and labour or seen in the development of certain "segments" of contemporary urbanity. This becomes possible thanks to the recognition of two fundamental truths: the increasing complexity of the manifestations of a multipolar, interdependent world, and the need to search for a "consensus" (Ainsa, 1997).

However, reasoning of this kind differs little from the statement concerning the "end of utopias" if by the latter we refer to revolutionary utopias whose stated goal is to go beyond the limits of capitalism. In this case, if, when considering utopias, the predominantly "leftist" content, left-wing phraseology, declarations of anti-capitalist goals, etc., are at the forefront, we certainly live in the era of the end of utopias.

Nevertheless, if utopias are approached from the point of view of their objectively executable functions, their main content is no longer utopian in the traditional sense; perhaps those who proclaim the "end of utopias" are simply looking for and failing to find them in their usual place "under the sun". However, a utopia is always a "function of the real" (Labica, 2004, p. 291). It is from this point of view that contemporary utopian consciousness should be considered, irrespective of the form it takes.

Such an approach implies that utopianism:

a) is inextricably linked with capitalism;

b) serves its transformation (defining its "spirit" by its criticism) in the transition from one stage to another;

c) is an expression of the worldview and aspirations of social groups (classes) rising at different stages of capitalism.

Utopianism and the spirit of capitalism

The inextricable connection between utopia and capitalism is best viewed in the light of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello's concept of the changing "spirits of capitalism". In the light of this concept, a utopia consists primarily in a criticism of capitalism.

Utopian consciousness is closely connected with the image of capitalism, which serves as the object of its criticism. To a large extent, this determines both rising and descending consciousness and, as such, consists in the suspended state of relevant social groups. From this point of view, liberal utopianism is a critique of real capitalism in the sense of the pragmatic and not ideologically overburdened continuation of the domination of capitalist class – not to mention socialist criticism, which in this sense is the direct heir of the liberal (Rosanvallon, 2007, p. 219).

Thus, utopian-critical consciousness is, so to speak, negatively shaped by the existing image of capitalism and the legitimising strategies transformed under its influence (i.e., the "spirit of capitalism"). Even in a critical reaction to the discomfort of social existence, utopian consciousness cannot raise itself far above this existence. Thus, utopian consciousness and imagination objectively perform the function of transforming (but not overcoming!) capitalism by influencing its "spirit". The "spirit of capitalism" depends on utopias to the extent that it responds to the aspirations of the rising classes, placing upon their aspirations the means of their legitimisation. In legitimising itself, capitalism must connect its existence with the satisfaction of the aspirations and needs of the representatives of these classes, in such a way that these become possible (or even uniquely possible) precisely within the framework of capitalism (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2011, pp. 56–61).

In other words, if we were actually living in the period of the end of utopias, this would imply the end of capitalism. Capitalism certainly – and unambiguously – exists, although its continued existence is hardly problem-free. And this also means that utopias (or at least utopian consciousness and imagination) exist; their existence is a logical necessity. Those who talk about the "end of utopias" are referring in historical terms to the specific socialist, communist, anarchic and other left-wing critiques of capitalism that are characteristic of its industrial stage. The present "end of utopias", however, is just the end of the utopias of the era of industrial capitalism, traces of which are still evident in the vague dreams of some leftists concerning an "educational dictatorship" in the Jacobin style (Johnson, 2012).

These utopias ceased to be relevant because they had already done their critical work on the transformation of early capitalism, with its "Protestant work ethic", into the "labour society" (Castel, 2009) with – to use the terminology of Boltanski and Chiapello – the "second spirit of capitalism". In so doing, they already managed to make way for those critiques that, to a large extent, determined the "third spirit of capitalism." However, these critiques are not generally considered to be "utopian" since "utopias" are necessarily communist-socialist in their orientation.

Political discourses of the rising minority

Adhering to the position of K. Mannheim, we proceed from the assumption that utopianism, at least in the epoch of capitalism, creates rising classes (Mannheim, 1991, p. 122). Therefore, in order to locate the place in the social structure in which modern utopias are born, it is necessary to identify the "rising class". In what does it consist? Which classes can today be considered to be "rising"?

Taking as samples the leading classes of the Modern era (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat), we can say that the rising class is that which disposes, if only potentially, the greatest productivity. Due to its increasing role in social production, the members of such a class occupy key positions, are able to defend themselves, can sabotage production and communications, etc. Around it are formed production, cultural and other relations, which become decisive according to the foreseeable historical perspective.

When it comes to a contemporary rising class, the source of technical and cultural innovations allegedly playing a decisive role in the economy is usually considered in terms of “creative class” or “cognitariat”.

In the past, utopias that transformed the spirit of capitalism were associated with rising classes, which constituted, if not a majority of the population, then a very significant (quantitatively and qualitatively) part thereof: hence the “Third Estate”, the working class and, finally, the “middle class”.

However, the specific character of the present time consists in the fact that, if there are now rising classes, then they are quantitatively rather insignificant. Even if we delineate the boundaries of the creative class as widely as possible, as R. Florida is inclined to do, it still represents a clear minority of the working population of even the most advanced countries. A critical examination of the concept of the creative class reveals that the majority of the social groups attributed to it are in fact representative of the service sector, which was, so to speak, renamed in advance into “also creative class”.

Moreover, due to ongoing economic and technological changes, these individual groups are constantly shrinking. No sooner does one imagine oneself to be the main beneficiary from the achievements of progress, to which a bright future is almost guaranteed, than the next stage of development demonstrates this is not so. The periodic flaring up and fading of the utopias of the middle class, the creative class, and the bohemian bourgeoisie are cyclically accompanied with outbursts of jubilance and the loss of hopes. The utopia of “self-realisation” and the involvement of the majority of the population in a certain “creative economy” look very problematic in the outlined perspective. This understanding is reflected, in particular, in the following passage of R. Florida, the creator of “creative class theory”. In his view, the creative class has enough power, talent and strength to play a significant role in the transformation of the world. Its representatives (in fact, the entire society) have the opportunity to turn their inclination towards introspection and the revaluation of values into practical action aimed at a more ambitious renewal and transformation of society...” In practice, things are never quite so simple. In order to achieve genuine social cohesion, the creative class must offer representatives of other classes a realistic vision of ways for improving life, if not by participating in the creative economy, then at least by accessing some of its benefits. If it does not take these actions, the already constantly deepening social and economic contradictions will become even more significant. I am afraid this will lead to the result that our life at the top of an unhappy society will be far from serene. It is time for the creative class to grow up and take responsibility (Florida, 2016).

Whatever may be said in the sense of creativity not being “the prerogative of a select few geniuses”, the most recent utopia that engenders capitalism cannot

be a utopia for the majority. As V. S. Martianov notes, "the utopias of the creative class, e.g. hipster urbanism, gentrification and the creative industries, are oriented towards privileged urban minorities" (Martianov, 2016, p. 49). In reality, fully-fledged membership of the "creative class" consists in only a very few leaders, e.g. engineers, scientists, top-managers, etc. The peculiarity of their social position generates a utopian consciousness typical of the self-defeating branch of the Enlightenment, which is not oriented to the progress of mankind as a whole, but rather to the progress of Reason (Fishman, 2016) and, of course, its most "advanced" adepts. These latter, as winners, will receive everything, while all the others are taken into account at best as a problem to be solved, an annoying hindrance. It is possible to consider the specific utopia of the top of the "creative class" to be transhumanism. A worldview that pins its hopes on technological progress is not surprising for a social group that considers itself to be the main productive force, whose role will only grow, while other people will gradually become superfluous. However, in its fantastical variant, it is also attractive – both to superfluous and potentially superfluous people – to the extent that it promises a future in which artificial intelligence, robots and some kind of universal machine are engaged in production and service and the human being is fully supported by them. However, objectively speaking, this is precisely the utopia of a shrinking minority, which actually addresses itself not to "humanity" and "society", but to that chimerical state of singularity when both humanity and society become superfluous. It only has a chance to transform capitalism if its adherents become more socially conscious than they are now.

It would certainly be a mistake to reduce the political discourses of this rising minority to transhumanism, with its attendant deviation from social issues. Representatives of the same minority, who understand the limitations of the "utopia of the creative class", reflect on the rather gloomy prospects that the continuing progress of science and technology implies for everyone else today. For example, Martin Ford devoted a whole book to these perspectives, whose title speaks for itself: Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future. In this book, Ford already comes very close to raising the question of the need for another transformation of capitalism: "We will have to get rid of the idea that workers are a source of funds for supporting pensioners and financing social programmes and instead admit that this source comprises our entire economy as a whole" (Ford, 2016, pp. 368–369). However, it is just this kind of criticism on the part of the (so far) rising minority, which in the future can also be assimilated by the majority that, in its mass form, expresses itself politically in other ways.

Political discourses of the non-rising majority

What about the majority that does not belong to the "creative class"? This consists, for the most part, in the service sector workers for whom to join the ranks of the creative minority is an almost impossible dream. This class, if not yet comprising "superfluous people", consists of people involved in "useless work", the demand for which is conditioned by the existence of other people engaged in similarly useless

work (Greber, 2014, p. 151). Moreover, the scope of this useless labour is reduced in proportion to the development of processes of technological substitution.

In the classical Mannheimian scheme, the specificity of ideologies and utopias is explained by the class position and the distorted point of view dictated by it, from which only a part of the real state of things is visible, and the other part is not visible or not completely visible. This "over-rational" scheme can be corrected in the spirit of D. Greber by replacing the point of view with the "point of imagination", with the illusory consciousness being explained by a "skew of the imagination" (Greber, 2014a, p. 139). It is possible that this new interpretation is itself the product of the consciousness of certain social groups (service workers), whose representatives are guided primarily "by imagination", and therefore that the position of the other groups is also assessed from the point of view of their "imbalances".

Since there is no sustainable role in social production for social groups that are clearly not "rising" ("useless work" cannot be assigned to such), they also cannot offer projects for the reorganisation of society as a whole, i.e. analogues of classical utopias. The opportunity here, consisting not even in improving one's position, but simply in not losing what one has, is illusory for these groups; therefore, they cannot see a "bright future". However, they are still capable of expressing outrage at their position, clothed in rhetoric whose ideological zeal is neither right nor left (Žižek, 2012, pp. 150–152). Unlike the utopias of the industrial period, which were expressions of the aspirations of classes possessing the real possibility of empowered communication (because they really controlled important spheres of the economy), these sentiments are engendered by social groups whose ability to communicate with power centres is very limited. W. Beck noted that nowadays the voice of a person as a citizen and a producer does not mean much; however, the voice of a consumer, a "global client", which grabs more and more power, means a lot. Like capital, it disposes a global "no", a no-buying power. Like capital, a political consumer can use the "no" policy as a calculated side effect of economic actions; that is, uncontrolled and with insignificant own costs" (Beck, 2007, p. 317). But, apparently, this point of view no longer fully reflects reality. If, for the majority, salaries, in terms of purchasing power parity, do not increase (which is already a fact repeatedly confirmed by statistics), arguments concerning the alleged "power of non-buying" acquire a distinct shade of bullying. In addition, since the consumer does not constitute a class, consumers can neither sabotage communication nor production. At the same time, in the workplace, this consumer is usually a service worker, in which context he is obliged to understand a client who does not need to understand him, because he is "always right". The skewing of imagination is thus caused by the fact that the service sector worker is doomed to constantly enter into a relationship of one-sided, "impotent" communication. In this process, he must constantly show benevolence and cordiality, affability, politeness, affability and graciousness, restraint, finesse, solicitude, skill and erudition, as well as the ability to use a smile (Basova, 2008).

The position of the service worker – the proletarian of contemporaneity – is characterised by the fact that he or she produces someone else's "quality of life" at the

expense of his or her own. A large part of the service worker's life, therefore, consists of pretending to be something that one is not. It's not even about selling one's labour, time or skills, but rather about disposing one's spiritual qualities, one's personality. In a literal sense, the service worker is involved in "selling oneself". His or her natural desire therefore consists in life on the rent, which implies the cessation of such a trade. Today it leads, for example, to downshifting, in which attitude many find an attractive alternative to the "rat race". It also includes many alternative ways of life - in squats, anarchic communities, eco-villages, etc.

Be that as it may, if the rethinking of the connection between a social position and a political discourse with an emphasis on "imagination" is adequate to the current state of things, it is obvious that a "skewed imagination" creates very specific forms of political thinking. Utopias (as well as ideologies) in the former sense imply the primacy of rational goal setting, which goes beyond the framework of self-consciousness entirely as a consequence of "skewing of the imagination". Suspension within the framework of this distortion, as presently seems to be the case, gives rise to the absolutisation (if not ontologisation) of the communication method inherent to the social group (in this case, based on a quick reaction tailored to the customer's desires). This leads to the justification of the "concrete utopia" that is embodied "here and now" in forms of social organisation that reveal a clear "similarity with capitalism itself" (Manche, 2015).

Today's majority political discourses are almost diametrically opposed to the utopias of the left in the traditional sense. This is an expression of the political aspirations of the "non-rising-class" and concerns the need to change the world to incorporate the virtues of a "concrete utopia". Since the skewed imagination of these social groups simply cannot imagine a "place that is not there", it rather focuses on a "place that (and only that!)" is located in "civil society" and "democracy". This kind of political imagination is easily assimilated by populist identity politicians and (thus) unlikely to transcend the emerging rental society. These modern "utopias" reflect the worldview of those social groups that cannot seriously count on this or that form of income as compensation for their lost former social subjectivity. Therefore, they fluctuate between the desire for income compensation for the loss of subjectivity (which they often do not have and do not expect in a stable form) (Fishman, 2016a, pp. 116–129) and gaining some "autonomy", which for them becomes the only realistic strategy in relation to the formation of the rental society.

Ideologically, the requirements of income compensation can be disguised in the clothes of the former utopias; however, then we should refer to "reactionary utopias", whose adherents want to return to a place that is no longer there. It has been repeatedly observed that members of movements like "Occupy Wall Street" do not demand anything concrete; rather, they protest to signal their indignant outrage. But why? With full and frank awareness of their situation, they cannot demand anything but their share of rent; however, that entails admitting that they are superfluous people. Nevertheless, recognising oneself as such either implies being reconciled to one's position or posing the question more radically than these superfluous people are

capable of doing. They are not yet able to coldly face the facts because they believe that they still have something to lose.

Is a revolutionary utopianism possible today? (From the "function of the real" beyond the limits of capitalism)

The foreseeable future will bring (and is already bringing) a steady decline in jobs due to technological substitution, including for those who are still engaged in the service sector. Here we refer not to a skewed imagination, but about the fact that the social position that generates such an imagination itself ceases to be economically in demand. If an increasing number of people turns out to be banally superfluous, then it becomes more than simply another kind of utopia of self-actualisation; to that will be added another clear inflection of the utopia of demand, contrasted with the utopia of the total superfluity of a person in the context of transhumanism.

The present situation is quite reminiscent of early capitalism, in which the bourgeoisie was an unquestionably rising class, while the proletariat was the non-rising - moreover, "suffering" – class. Now it is the "creative class" that is rising. Like the bourgeoisie before it, it is just as dazzled by its bright prospects and just as inclined to impose its utopia of the "creative economy" on the majority; in this way, it closely resembles the classic utopia of the self-made man, according to which every hired worker can join the bourgeois. The consequence of the rise of the "creative class" is a concomitant growth in the precarious social group of service workers and other social strata for whom the prospects of gaining entry into the ranks of the cognitariat are becoming increasingly untenable. Now that these strata are more likely to struggle for their existence, they find themselves trying to defend what has been lost without raising questions about the need to radically transform the social system. But must it always be thus? And is today's analogue of the proletariat also only temporarily a non-rising class, which will proclaim its revolutionary utopias at some point in the future?

The hope for the realisation of this assumption is that the proletariat of the industrial phase of capitalism's development was not originally a rising class in many respects. It was a class whose political rights, access to culture and education were highly circumscribed; they did not even have enough free time for such things. And it created revolutionary utopias, because in the socio-political sense the prospects for its rise under capitalism seemed precarious and untenable. For the workers, the prospect of recovery through overcoming capitalism looked more realistic and convincing than the utopia of the bourgeoisie, which claimed that everyone could become a bourgeois. Nevertheless, the industrial proletariat was an objectively rising class, since its economic role was growing by leaps and bounds. This seemed so obvious that even a look directed towards a fantastic future revealed [as in H. G. Well's novel *The Time Machine* (1895)], along with the privileged "Eloi", the oppressed "Morlocks" on which, in fact, everything depended. Ultimately, for several decades, a socio-political model was victorious in which the economic role of the working class (and then the "middle class" of wage workers) had become a condition for ensuring its political, cultural and

educational rise. Thus, it was that the revolutionary utopias of going beyond capitalism turned into a critique that was functional for capitalism.

With the social layer of service workers replenishing the ranks of the precariat, the situation is different. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that workers in the service sector have long represented a major part of the working population of most developed countries. On the other hand, the development of new technologies is buffeting them with increasing force; they are the primary candidates for victimhood of technological replacement processes. A single development of a particular kind of software is all that is necessary to force many workers out of the labour market, beginning with accountants and ending with taxi drivers or workers in the spheres of trade and fast food. Many have already been superseded; others will be in the foreseeable future. Today, technological progress destroys more jobs than it creates; in addition, the majority of newly created jobs are worse paid and require fewer qualifications (Ford, 2016, pp. 93–177).

Of course, the growth of the creative class, accompanied by the process of its gentrification, creates vacancies for all sorts of domestic servants, which partly takes care of matters that were formerly a strictly familial sphere. A portion of this new servant echelon, according to R. Florida, even has sufficient social capital to qualify for entry into the ranks of the creative class (Florida, 2007, p. 94). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the new gentry cannot provide employment for all those in need of it. In addition, there is no guarantee that the process of technological replacement will not in the foreseeable future lead to a reduction in the ranks of the creative class itself.

Thus, by contrast with the industrial proletariat and even with the “middle class”, the majority of workers in the service sector have no prospect of social recovery. The prospect of such a rise (“involvement in the creative economy”) can only ever apply to the minority of this class, consisting of the servants of the new gentry. Others gradually turn out to be the “suffering class” or “underclass”, whose condition can be maintained by the payment of “basic income” or some other kind of benefit. According to Z. Bauman, “in a society where consumers, and not producers, are the driving force of economic prosperity (it is precisely in a revival caused by the growth of consumption that we place our hopes as a means of solving economic problems), the poor do not represent value as consumers: they are not spurred to make purchases by flattering advertisements, they do not have credit cards, they cannot count on current bank account loans and the goods they need typically bring tiny profits to traders or even do not bring any profits at all. Not surprisingly, these people have been relegated to the “underclass”: they are no longer a temporary anomaly awaiting correction, but a class outside classes, a group outside the “social system”, an estate without whose existence it would be more convenient and everyone else would feel better.” (Bauman, 2005, pp. 93–94) Therefore, a stipend will be provided not so much for humane reasons as for the sake of maintaining the purchasing power of the majority of consumers, which is necessary in order to continue the mass production of goods and services and to make a profit.

In fact, given the development of technological substitution processes within the framework of capitalism, the most favourable future variant for the majority of service

workers and other members of the precariat is the construction of a kind of neo-feudalism. This means that, in general, members of the creative class, who do not need many servants, will nevertheless keep them for humanitarian reasons, for preserving social stability and in order to ensure a relatively comfortable social environment. But even this comparatively favourable scenario does not give rise to real opportunities for the social uplift of the majority, since, according to the logic of capitalism, such opportunities can only appear in social groups whose economic role is growing, not decreasing.

The logic of capitalism, which, from the economic point of view, leaves open the possibility of cultural, educational, etc. rises for the majority – a possibility still representing economic value – is also the logic of utopia as a "function of the real". If there is no room for such a possibility (the neo-feudal perspective looks more like an anti-utopia), this implies that the path of utopia as a "function of the real" is closed to the majority. It also means that the prospect of recovery for the majority is now associated only with a society in which the production of "goods" and "services" in itself will lose its meaning, both as a leading way for human self-identification and as a source of profit; however, it does not imply the cancellation of a person's need for creative activity and participation in public life. Therefore, it is quite possible that it is only now that the time of real, revolutionary utopias – irreconcilable and reducible solely to the "function of the real" – is truly upon us.

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RESEARCH NOTE

University Students: Connection between Representations of Stress and Coping Strategies

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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the representations of stress (concept of stress) and a variety of coping strategies that people in collectivistic cultures use in attempting to deal with problematic situations. The Conceptual Representations of Stress technique and Adolescent Coping Scale are applied. An assumption was made that correlations between the representations present in a culture and coping strategies selected by its representatives may reveal the specific features of coping behaviour in this culture. The sample comprised 98 Russian, 70 Turkish and 58 Chinese students. The results have proven the fact that culture affects both the representations of stress and choice of coping strategies. As the comparative analysis has demonstrated, the more differentiated the concept of stress is in a culture, the more differentiated and individualistic coping strategies its representatives select. Comparing the characteristics of coping strategies in the studied cultural groups has shown that group-oriented strategies play different functional roles in the way students manage stress. Practical relevance of the research lies in developing and implementing of stress-relieving programs, targeting different cultural groups with account of specific interpretations of stress and patterns of coping with difficult situations. Limitations of the research are noted.

KEYWORDS
stress, representations of stress, concept of stress, coping strategy, collectivistic culture, cultural differences, university student

Introduction

In everyday life a person faces multiple challenges that make him/her search for ways to manage and cope with their stressful effects. Ambiguity and emergency,

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increased responsibility, a need to decide and carry out control, the lack of time, constant information overload – inclusively, can contribute to a person's stress and disturb the homeostasis, subsequently claiming psychological efforts to restore well-being. In the terms of psychology, stress is the state of the fundamental mobilisation of the body's resources, developing under the influence of various factors, long-term action of which leads to negative consequences (Leonova, 2007).

Different aspects of living, such as global social changes, hardships and routine actions (at work, while studying, within the family, via interpersonal communications etc.) may arouse stressful feelings in humans. The state of stress proves itself in physiological, psychological, and behavioural changes (Selye, 1976; Sapolsky, 2004). The consequences of stress may be positive for a person – eustress – and be expressed in personal development, professional achievements, the improvement of life standards, etc. Negative consequences of stress – distress – manifest themselves in deterioration of physical state, mental well-being, self-efficiency, in the rising of interpersonal conflicts, etc. Personal perception of difficulties and subjective assessment of them determine the choice and realization (or activation) of coping strategies (Lazarus, 1966). Focus on the problem solving, regulation of physical and emotional state, a search of social and religious support, aggressive and antisocial actions, denial or distraction from the problem – are all the possible ways of regulating human internal stress and overcoming difficult situations. However, personal attitudes in relation to difficulties, coping strategies, and possible behavioural practices are heavily predetermined by their cultural context.

According to G. Hofstede, culture helps to distinguish the members of one group from another (Hofstede, 2011). Culture is a filter consisting of national value systems, traditions, language system, etc., through which a person perceives and interprets the reality. Language as a tool of communication is the mirror of a culture; it aims to reflect the specific mentality of a nation. One and the same category can find different representations in different cultures, which in turn determine specific behavioural patterns selected by their representatives.

Numerous works have shown that cultural background determines both the interpretation of stress (concept or conceptual structure) and the choice of coping behavioural patterns (Kholodnaya, 2012; Kholodnaya et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2004). Cross-cultural studies in the field of stress and coping behaviour are frequently dedicated to a comparative analysis of the intensity of experienced stress and preferred coping strategies among the representatives of individualistic and collectivistic cultures.

According to the data provided by Poltavski & Ferraro (2003), Russian students tend to experience a higher level of stress in comparison with their fellow students from the USA; however, Americans mentioned suffering from more diseases. In comparison with German respondents, Turkish high school students experience tougher stress, and therefore they are in need of extended social support (Yeresyan & Lohaus, 2014). Frydenberg et al. (2003) have found out that Palestine and Columbian youth comparing to German and Australian students extensively use such strategies as belongingness, social actions, problem solving, positive focus, religious support and concern. Kryukova (2005) established that non-productive styles of coping behaviour prevail among

Polish students; Australian youth relies on both, productive and non-productive coping, whereas Russian students greatly use a social style of overcoming difficult situations. Australian domestic students in comparison with non-resident fellows (mostly from Asian countries) enjoy stronger social support and use more functional coping strategies in achieving coherence between personal expectations and reality of the university life (Khawaja & Dempsey, 2008). The abovementioned studies have proven that the intensity of perceived stress and routes of overcoming difficulties are determined to a large extent by whether the culture belongs to the individualistic or collectivistic type. However, connections between perceived stress concepts and coping strategies, which reflect personally meaningful aspects of stressful events and acceptable ways of stress regulation in a specific cultural context, remain to be elucidated.

The present study aims to analyse the correlations between the concept of stress and coping strategies among representatives of different collectivistic cultures. Collectivistic cultures are characterized by a high level of interdependence among their members, social conformism and a high rate of uncertainty avoidance following with respect for traditions (Hui & Triandis, 1998; Matsumoto & Juang, 2012). Russian, Turkish and Chinese cultures are generally classified as collectivistic (Karabati & Cemalcilar, 2010)[1]. We assume that correlations between the stress concept and coping behaviour strategies inherent in a culture can help to reveal group-oriented aspects of overcoming stress specific to this society. The resource approach was employed to study a variety of key strategies within the system of resources of personal coping behaviour (Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993; Khasova, 2015). Among other research methods were structural analysis of concepts and psychological testing of coping strategies preferred by respondents in overcoming stressful events. By using the abovementioned methods, we were able to find correlations between the concept of stress and coping strategies. Our results have shown that group-oriented coping strategies perform different functional roles in Russian, Turkish, and Chinese cultures.

The cultures under study – Russian, Turkish and Chinese – are known to differ significantly in understanding of what stress is (Kuvaeva, Achan, Lozovskaya, 2017). Our findings have demonstrated that the perception of stress in Russian culture is associated with various stress manifestations and its chronic course. In Turkish students, stress results from everyday educational activities and concerns about future prospects. In Chinese students, stress is described by generalized stress indicators, as well as by the need to react immediately to challenging life situations. All respondents, regardless of their cultural identity, pointed out that stress as a mental state requires adjustment and prevention measures.

Method

1. Procedure

Testing was performed according to the generally accepted ethical norms. Testing was anonymous.

[1] https://geert-hofstede.com , last accessed date: 29 August 2017.

Data was collected in each of the cultural groups by using a simple instrument (a pencil and paper). Russian and Chinese students were surveyed together in the university classrooms while Turkish respondents were surveyed separately (in person or via e-mail). In our research, the students were provided with instructions in their native languages – Russian, Turkish and Chinese. The translation procedure, which involved back-translation, was used with Chinese and Turkish respondents.

The translation procedure for the Chinese version of the questionnaire, for example, included the following steps. First, three Chinese language specialists and two Master's degree students (Chinese native speakers) translated the instructions into Chinese and provided five translated versions. To select the most appropriate version, the group of specialists assessed the translations: one professor of the Russian Language, two Chinese language PhD specialists, and one PhD specialist in Psychology. Second, in order to ensure that the equivalence is continuous across both languages; three other bilingual consultants provided back translations of the instruments. The first-translation and the back-translation were thoroughly compared for equivalence. Third, to ensure clarity and comprehensibility of the translated instructions, a Chinese language PhD specialist assessed the translated versions of the instruments. Eventually, a Chinese language PhD specialist, two PhD psychologists, one PhD specialist in Culture Studies and two native speakers (Master's degree students) translated the respondents' answers into Russian. In order to process and interpret the results, two native speakers and Chinese culture PhD specialists were involved as consultants. A similar translation technology was applied to the instruments' versions prepared for the Turkish sample.

2. Participants

The sample consisted of 226 university students (102 m. / 124 f.) aged 17–30 (mean 20.8±2.5). Respondents were selected based on the following criteria: (1) a first, second or third university student; (2) specialisation – Linguistic and International Affairs; (3) voluntary decision to take part in the research.

The Russian sample comprised 98 people (25 m. / 73 f.) aged 18–23 (mean 19.28±1.05). The Turkish sample comprised 70 students (43 m. / 27 f.) aged 17–30 (mean 22.49±2.6); the Chinese sample comprised 58 students (34 m. / 24 f.) aged 17–27 (mean 21.74±2.6). Russian and Chinese students were students from the Ural Federal University, Russia. Turkish respondents were students either from the Ural Federal University or from Turkish universities (Gazi, Anadolu, Atatürk, and Trakya).

3. Demographics form

This form was used to gather information about participants' age, gender and program type, faculty of enrolment, course name, university title and country of citizenship or nationality.

4. Assessment of the stress concept

A Conceptual Representations of Stress (CORES) technique was used for quantity and quality assessment of the stress concept and different stress indicators. CORES

is a modified, validated, and shortened version of the 'Integral Conceptual Structures' technique (Kholodnaya & Volkova, 2016). CORES contains three questions, which allowed us to estimate a degree of differentiation/integration of concept of stress, its content and structural organization. The mean Cronbach's Alpha for the CORES was obtained as 0.80 (Russian sample), 0.78 (Turkish sample), 0.74 (Chinese sample).

According to Kholodnaya (2012), concepts are basic cognitive units activated by specific verbal stimuli and characterized by own structural organization and content. The structure of a concept comprises the following modalities: sensory-emotional, verbal-semantic and visual. The sensory-emotional modality reflects a human experience of interaction between a person and particular subject environment, gathering so-called "luggage" of various impressions and experiences. The verbal-semantic modality is formed on the basis of acquisition of words and their meanings from a natural language. The visual modality organizes visual experience, which reveals typical and essential features of the object. The content of a concept is an internal, personal understanding of a specific subject, social phenomenon, or a scientific concept. According to Volkova, any cognitive unit (concept) can be presented in the form of a psychological model that includes various types of experiences (Volkova, 2014). Therefore, we singled out the following content criteria of stress assessment: its causes, cognitive appraisal and immediate effects, long-term effects (consequences), and dynamics.

Participants were asked to describe their psychological perceptions and representations of stress and experiences of overcoming difficulties in the line with the open-ended tasks given below:

1. Write as many adjectives as possible to characterise the word STRESS. Time: 3 minutes, (sensory-emotion modality).

2. Outline problems, which, in your opinion, could occur while studying STRESS. Time: 2 minutes, (verbal-semantic modality).

3. Draw a picture of the STRESS object with its most essential characteristics. Time: 2 minutes, (visual modality).

We estimated the degree of differentiation/integration of the concept of stress by calculating the total number of categories of stress reflected in the three modalities. According to the method, maximal differentiation in each modality was 4 points and implied the presence of four stress characteristics in the respondents' answers. Captions that the respondents made to the pictures were taken into account when assessing visual modality. The points were assigned when a respondent mentioned all four stress criteria indicated above.

Thus, the total list for statistical treatments included 8 indexes: 1 degree of differentiation/integration of concept, 3 modalities and 4 content criteria. Table 1 demonstrates these indexes of stress concept.

5. Assessment of coping strategies

For the assessment of coping strategies, we applied an 80-item "Adolescent Coping Scale" (ACS) developed by E. Frydenberg and R. Lewis to measure coping

behaviour (Frydenberg et al., 1993). This instrument measures 18 strategies of overcoming difficulties and the frequency of their selection in dealing with hardships and anxiety. The students were asked to use a Likert-Scale to assess different coping strategies. The authors of the ACS identified eighteen strategies, which can be broadly categorized as productive, social, and non-productive styles. However, some studies proposed other criteria for estimating the efficiency of coping behaviour, arguing that ACS styles appropriately describe only western cultures. For example, by using cluster analysis, four styles were distinguished for a group of Russian students (n=336): problem-oriented, mobilization, emotion dominated, and sociotropic (Kholodnaya et al., 2007). Table 1 below demonstrates these styles and involved strategies. The description and interpretation of our research results were performed in accordance with the given classification.

The mean Cronbach's Alpha for the ACS was obtained as 0.86 (Russian sample), 0.74 (Turkish sample), 0.84 (Chinese sample).

Table 1. Research variables

Instrument	**Variables**
A conceptual representations of stress technique	*Structural organization (modalities):* (1) Sensory-emotional – a human experience of interaction between a person and particular subject environment, gathering so-called "luggage" of various impressions and experiences; (2) Verbal-semantic – is formed on the basis of acquisition of words and their meanings from a natural language; (3) Visual – a visual experience, which reveals typical and essential features of the object.
	Content categories: (4) Causes or stress-factors; (5) Cognitive appraisal and immediate effects; (6) Long-term effects (consequences); (7) Features of stress process (dynamics).
	(8) Degree of differentiation/integration of the concept – result of calculating the total number of categories of stress reflected in the three modalities.

Adolescent coping scale	*Problem-oriented style:* (1) Problem solving – systematic reflection on the problem; (2) Working hard and achieve – responsible attitude to work and orientation towards success; (3) Social action – organization of group activities; (4) Professional help – consulting specialists.
	Mobilization style: (5) Ignoring – consciously blocking out the problem; (6) Self-absorption – keeping to oneself; (7) Positive focus – optimism; (8) Active leisure – playing sports and keeping fit.
	Sociotropic style: (9) Social support – discussing the problem with other people; (10) Friends – seeking support from close friends; (11) Feeling of belonging – caring about other people's opinions, seeking their approval; (12) Relax – trying to relax and distance oneself.
	Emotion dominated style: (13) Anxiety – concern about one's future; (14) Miracles – wishful thinking; (15) Not coping – being unable to deal with the problem and developing psychosomatic symptoms; (16) Tension reduction – tears, aggression, harmful habits; (17) Self-accusation – criticising oneself for feeling worried; (18) Spiritual support – seeking spiritual guidance.

6. Statistical analysis

The data obtained were processed using the standard software 'SPSS 21.0 package for Windows'. To test the data for the normality of distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterion was applied. The Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to determine the impact of the independent variable 'culture' on the dependent variables (concept indicators and coping strategies). Correlation analysis (Pearson) was also applied to find correlations between the research variables.

Results

1. Dependence of the stress concept and coping strategies on culture

Our results shown in Table 2 have proven the fact that culture affects both the representations of stress and choice of coping strategies. Our research failed to reveal, however, any statistically significant impact of culture on the visual modality of the stress concept and on socio-tropic strategies.

2. Correlations between the stress concept and coping strategies

Table 3 depicts significant correlations in all compared groups, with the highest number of correlations found in the Russian sample and the lowest in the Chinese sample.

For the Russian students, the degree of differentiation/integration was connected primarily with the strategies of "social supporting" and "anxiety". Other two groups did not show any correlation between the chosen coping strategies and the degree of differentiation. However, we found correlations between modalities and coping strategies for the Russians and Turks. In the Russian sample, all four content characteristics of stress correlated with different strategies. The strategies and only two content characteristics – the causes and immediate effects – correlated in Turkish and Chinese samples. Turks compensated the negative effects of stress with "friends" and "positive focus", while the Chinese familiarly overcome stress with the help of "self-absorption". The cognitive appraisal/immediate effects had a negative correlation with "spiritual support" (Turks) and "ignoring" (Chinese).

Table 2. Dependence of stress concept and coping strategies on the culture

Dependent variables	**Cultural groups**			**Chi-square test**
	Russian (*n*=98)	Turkish (*n*=70)	Chinese (*n*=58)	
Degree of differentiation/ integration	146.01	89.03	80.65	50.85***
Sensory-emotional modality	147.61	87.15	80.17	59.17***
Verbal-semantic modality	132.30	93.99	98.75	20.18***
Visual modality	119.95	109.70	100.76	3.77
Stress causes	117.36	127.96	82.13	18.45***
Cognitive appraisal and immediate effects	138.04	79.71	106.70	39.90***
Long-term effects	134.28	99.07	88.76	24.77***
Process of development	128.72	92.96	106.44	15.46***
Problem solving	126.74	108.96	89.60	12.03**
Working hard and achieve	128.51	102.12	95.16	11.93**
Social action	77.82	119.10	163.86	64.74***
Professional help	88.70	122.81	141.54	27.70***
Ignoring	106.97	127.28	101.52	6.04**
Self-absorption	122.74	111.98	92.98	7.64*
Positive focus	118.74	121.32	88.12	10.19**
Active leisure	118.06	107.65	106.75	1.56
Anxiety	142.87	101.05	70.93	46.97***

Miracles	127.57	113.08	82.89	17.02***
Not coping	117.29	118.46	94.36	5.52
Tension reduction	121.07	94.66	117.91	7.53*
Self-accusation	131.91	98.97	93.11	17.05***
Spiritual support	92.95	165.80	77.47	73.50***
Social support	122.07	106.35	101.25	4.49
Friends	104.02	118.52	117.93	2.70
Feeling of belonging	115.24	97.59	124.56	5.88
Relax	109.72	115.69	111.36	0.36

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Table 3. Correlations between the concept and coping strategies in three cultural groups

Indicators of the stress concept	**Cultural groups**		
	Russian	**Turkish**	**Chinese**
Degree of differentiation/ integration	Social support (r=0.205*), Anxiety (r=0.284**)		
Sensory-emotional modality	Anxiety (r=0.312**), Self-accusation (r=0.202*)	Spiritual support (r= –0.269*), Belonging (r=0.270*)	
Verbal-semantic modality		Spiritual support (r= –0.333**)	
Visual modality			
Stress causes	Working hard and achieve (r=0.261*)	Friends (r=0.323**), Positive focus (r=0.282*)	Self-absorption (r=0.319*)
Cognitive appraisal and immediate effects	Not coping (r=0.233*), Self-accusation (r=0.202*)	Spiritual support (r= –0.274*)	Ignoring (r= –0.276*)
Long-term effects	Ignoring (r=0.330**)		
Process of development	Anxiety (r=0.309**)		

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

Discussion and conclusion

Our findings distinctly show that the stress concept and coping strategies both have cultural specifics (except for the visual modality and socio-tropic coping style strategies). In the investigated collectivistic cultures – Russian, Turkish and Chinese – both the indicators of the concept, the degree of its differentiation and coping strategies showed a dependence on culture. The representatives of Russian culture were shown to share a more differentiated concept, which reflects a long-term experience of surviving stressful situations and emphasizes individual differences in coping strategies. Our results are in good agreement with those studies that proved stress to be a constituent feature of contemporary social life in Russia (Pietila & Rytkonen, 2008; Poltavski et al., 2003), with its key stressors being information overloads, deprivation of sleep and tight deadlines (Kosheleva, Amarnor & Chernobilsky, 2015).

Our comparative analysis has demonstrated that the more differentiated the concept of stress is in a culture, the more differentiated and individualized coping strategies are used by its representatives. It is only in Russian culture that stress is associated with certain coping strategies. For instance, overcoming difficulties in Russian culture means an activation of various strategies, the most popular of which being anxiety and self-accusation. As soon as stressful experience is accumulated, the personal need in social support increases. In Turkish culture, religious support appears to be one of the most productive strategies, which helps Turkish people find relief from negative emotions and thoughts. As for the representatives of Chinese culture, they tend to turn to self-absorption when the number of stress factors increases: growing inner tension mobilizes them to accept problems on the conscious level.

In our view, a wide differentiation of the stress concept in Russian culture can be connected with a substantial experience of surviving stress situations. Persistent stress conditions present in modern Russian life contribute to deeper knowledge of the stress factors, stress reactions, and the negative effects of the phenomenon.

Comparing the characteristics of coping strategies in the studied cultural groups has shown that group-oriented strategies play different functional roles in the way people manage stress. In Russian culture, e.g., social support enables people to regulate their emotional states. Russian students demonstrated predominantly individualized coping strategies, such as anxiety and self-accusation, more often than the representatives of the other two groups. As for Turkish students, reliance on friends and feeling of belonging are important ways of regulating their emotional states and managering difficult life situations. Spiritual support as an emotional dominant strategy is a great coping recourse for Turks. Our study has contributed to the understanding of coping behaviour displayed by Turkish students, highlighting its social orientation and reliance on religion in coping with stress. Thus, Kaynak Key, Donmez & Tuzun (2004) stated that passive leisure is a popular method of physical relaxation for Turks. Concerning Chinese students our results have demonstrated the correlation between stress representations and mobilization style coping strategies.

It should be mentioned that our research has some limitations. The term “stress” has a different duration of existence in the Russian, Turkish and Chinese languages. The

word stress has been used in everyday language and academic vocabulary for the last fifty years (both in the Russian and Turkish languages). Having been adopted from the western culture, this term is rather new for everyday speech in China and mostly popular within young people. This was the reason why we used a combination of hieroglyphs 紧张 as a synonym for the word "stress" in our research. It may be recommended that researchers working on similar problems take into account the degree of awareness of the respondents on used terms.

Another limitation follows from using the Conceptual Representations of Stress (CORES) technique in assessing cultural concepts. The Russian language is rich in adjectives, which are used to describe various features of subjects and phenomena. Native Turkish speakers, on the contrary, tend to use participles. Thus, our Turkish respondents used different parts of speech in describing stress: adjectives, participles and synonymous nouns. Chinese hieroglyphs strongly depend on the contexts, which substantially determine the meaning of the word and the part of speech. Hieroglyphics are less specific – they can transmit a wide range of expression (for example, from a light fright to horror). Thus, future studies should carefully interpret concepts, taking into account the linguistic features of the language as culturally specific ways of perceiving and processing information.

Practical relevance of the research lies in developing and implementing of stress-relieving programs, targeting different cultural groups of students with account of specific interpretations of stress and patterns of coping with difficult situations.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Comparative Study of Russian and Slovenian Managers Using Subjective Criteria to Control Their Professional Performance[1]

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ABSTRACT
In this article, the first stage results of a Russian-Slovenian cross-cultural study are presented. The main purpose of the study is to describe key structural factors in the subjective criteria of performance monitoring used by Russian and Slovenian managers. The study, which comprises three steps, is of a comparative nature. In the first stage, differences between the monitoring systems of Russian and Slovenian managers are investigated. In terms of the theoretical background of the study, the Model of subjective criteria used by managers to control their performance efficiency (G. Myroliubova & F. Ismagilova) was applied. In order to collect empirical data, a Questionnaire was developed and implemented on

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the basis of that Model. The study discovered that the measurable and weakly measurable monitoring criteria used by Russians and Slovenians are similar. Significant differences were identified: (a) between the mean values of measurable criteria for Russian (56.11) and Slovenian (60.39) samples; (b) within the structure of measurable criteria for the performance monitoring of Russian and Slovenian managers; (c) between the mean values of all measurable criteria (natural, binary, relational and conformity criteria) in the Russian and Slovenian samples.

KEYWORDS
control of performance, measurable and weakly measurable monitoring criteria, efficiency

Introduction

In the field of contemporary socio-economic studies, interest in performance issues has never been higher. This relevance is connected not only and not so much with the need to expand the production of goods and services, but rather to an attempt to locate internal resources within the activity itself. Today, it is not only the important result of the activity itself, but of the optimisation of the cost-effectiveness ratio. In this cotext, considerable attention is paid to solving issues of organisational effectiveness. However, despite the fact that this issue has long been on the agenda, there is still no consensus among researchers on either the key efficiency metrics, the methods for measuring them or the determinants of their efficiency (Matthews, 2007).

Of course, the same kind of problematic is encountered at the level of research into the effectiveness of individual activities. To the existing unresolved problems one more is added: the powerful influence of the human factor, which hampers the diffeentiation of activity-based and personal components of efficiency.

Staying within the framework of psychological research, we precisely concentrate attention on the activity component of individual effectiveness in the belief that the individual's ability to monitor the effectiveness of his or her own professional activity is one of best the ways of improving it. The monitoring of activities (job monitoring) is defined by us in terms of an employee's ability to influence the process and end result of his or her own work. From our point of view, this is an extremely important aspect of the professional competency of key specialists and managers.

In this study, we focused on the cross-cultural aspects of the monitoring of management effectiveness. We sought to clarify similarities and differences in those aspects of the activities that Russian and Slovenian decision makers view as key – i.e. as zones of special attention or zones of influence – into which business leaders are prepared to invest the resources at their disposal.

Research problem. A key aspect of increasing the effectiveness of management activities concerns whether the head of the subjective system possesses criteria for

monitoring his or her own activities, which are congruent to the criterial system of organisational effectiveness. In this respect, it seems relevant to note P. Drucker's point that an effective manager needs to employ criteria that will allow him or her to focus on what is most important, in terms of his or her contribution to the success of his organisation, for determining the final results (Drucker, 2011).

Conditions determining the specifics of the formation of a subjective system for monitoring the effectiveness of management activities can be considered in both external and internal terms. It is assumed that the management model forming the basis for organisational practice predetermines key efficiency orientations both at the organisational and individual levels. However, psychological studies were not carried out in order to examine this assumption. At the same time, in the scientific field of investigation of psychological efficiency, there are approaches to this problem in the context of activity, but none referring to personality. We observe that the vast majority of studies are aimed at considering the influence of personal characteristics on the effectiveness of the activity. Thus, the salient need to research means for increasing individual effectiveness is not supported by research in this field. This necessitates a search for a means by which the problem can be approached and potentially solved.

By identifying the factors determining the formation of such a subjective system, the optimal ratio of subjective criteria is modelled in terms of key monitoring points of the effectiveness of management activity based on the strategic objectives of the organisation. In the long term, this involves solving the issue of managing individual performance and integrating individual effectiveness into overall corporate performance.

The **aim** of the present Russian-Slovenian cross-cultural study is to identify key factors influencing the structure of subjective criteria for monitoring the activities of Russian and Slovenian managers. The study, in which a comparative approach is taken, is comprised of three stages:

Stage 1. Study of structural differences in the subjective criteria used for monitoring the activities of Russian and Slovenian managers.

Stage 2. Investigation of the dependence of the structure of subjective criteria on organisational factors, in particular, organisational strategy and management policy in Russian and Slovenian companies.

Stage 3. Investigation of the dependence of the structure of subjective criteria on the personal qualities of managers belonging to different cultures, i.e. Russian and Slovenian. The dependence of the criterial structure on individuals' need for structuring and tolerance towards uncertainty was investigated (Benjamin, Riggio & Mayes, 1996), (Herman, Stevens, Bird, Mendenhall & Oddou, 2010).

In the present article, the results of the first stage are presented and discussed.

Theoretical analysis of the problem

In both psychology and management fields, the concepts of performance monitoring are based on the assertion that monitoring comprises a standard (benchmark) against which the employee processes and performance results are compared. These standards are also used to monitor methods for regulating activities and the

effectiveness thereof. Criteria are advanced either in terms of subjectively chosen or independently created standards, which are used by employees for self-orientation and monitoring his or her activities.

What determines the features of the formation of such a criterial system? In the broadest sense, the answer to this question lies in the features of the specific national culture. There is little doubt that national culture determines differences in management and that a given scientific model will be effective in different national management systems to the extent that it is congruent with the specificities of the national character (Hofstede, 1980). The practice of organisational management, in turn, sets standards for administrative work. The studies confirm the differences in the value systems of managers from different national cultures and their influence on the style of decision-making, interpersonal behaviour, priorities and career paths, attitudes toward risk, correlation of personal and organisational goals, etc. (Negandhi & Prasad, 1971), (Farmer & Richman, 1965), (Ronen, 1986), (England, Dhingra & Agarwal, 1974).

We assume that the structure of subjective criteria used by managers and specialists for monitoring the effectiveness of their work (activities) varies according to the national cultures of which they are the bearers.

The monitoring of work (or monitoring of activities) is an integral part of any management system; however, in different national cultures both the place of monitoring differs as well as the special emphasis on how the monitoring is applied. G. Hofstede, in particular, describes in detail the impact of the "avoiding uncertainty" index on the organisational behaviour of employees and managers, while paying great attention to aspects related to the level of work monitoring and the extent of the need to have work structured according to established standards (Hofstede, 1980). However, there are no studies in which attention would be paid to the way in which managers monitor the effectiveness of their own activities, on what guidelines they rely when exercising such monitoring and how the structure of subjective criteria for supervising managers ensures the monitoring of organisational effectiveness.

Thus, there are also differences between national cultures in terms of the extent and detailed modality of the monitoring of employees and managers. In the studies of D. Gallie, in particular, it was noted that the highest level of monitoring of work was recorded in the Nordic countries of Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden; it was somewhat lower in France, the Benelux countries and Great Britain. In most southern European countries, as well as in Ireland, the level of monitoring is below the European average. In addition, researchers point out that there are differences in the content of performance monitoring of employees from different national groups (Gallie, 2011), (Boštjančič & Ismagilova, 2017).

Efficiency is understood as the optimal cost-performance ratio for a given situation. In this context, we are referring to management efficiency (or "operational" efficiency), which is determined by the business qualities of managers, as well as by how rationally their potential is used. Psychologically, we share the assertion that effectiveness is an attitude that reflects individual values and preferences (Cameron & Whetten, 1983). This gives us grounds for assuming that individual subjects possess a set of subjective criteria on the basis of which the effectiveness of their activities is controlled. Subjective monitoring of activities determines the extent of the individual's

personal influence on the main characteristics of work carried out on behalf of the employer and is characterised by subject-object relations (in contrast to the subject-subject nature of self-monitoring activity). The monitoring criteria are considered in terms of an internal means of performing an activity (Klimov, 1998). We assume the sources of their formation to consist of environmental and psychological factors (Fig. 1).

Criteria for monitoring activities can be externally assigned to the subject through a system of cultural imperatives, according to organisational-activity standards, or be personally mediated.



Figure 1. Factors influencing the formation of a system of subjective criteria for monitoring of management activities.

Surveillance "Subjective criteria for the monitoring of activity efficiency" (Survey "SCC")

This Questionnaire was developed on the basis of the *Model of Subjective Criteria for Monitoring Performance Efficiency*, by G. Mirolyubova and F. Ismagilova (Ismagilova & Mirolyubova, 2012a, 2012b, 2013), (Ismagilova, Mirolyubova, Malysheva & Mugatabarova, 2014). The Questionnaire (Fig. 2) is aimed at revealing the correlation of groups of criteria (i.e. the structure of subjective criteria) in the individual sets of criteria that managers use to monitoring the effectiveness of their activities. With the help of the Questionnaire, an individual criterial profile of each manager, including professional-activity preferences, is determined. The comparison of such an individual profile with the organisational-activity standard allows the advantages and limitations of the manager's administrative competences to be identified on behalf of the organisation.

The Questionnaire included criteria that were distinguished on the following grounds (Ismagilova & Mirolyubova, 2015):

1) Measurability of the criterion (measurable – weakly measurable). The measurable criteria used were those that are easily reproducible with reference scales obvious to all participants (in the first place, quantitative). The monitoring criteria whose possibility of measurement is often not obvious even for the bearer (the subject finds it hard to name the measuring scale) were classified as weakly measurable. Weakly measurable subjective monitoring criteria contain not quantitative, but qualitative characteristics of the work.
2) Place of the criterion in the general process of activity (criteria for preliminary, concurrent and final monitoring).
3) Primary source of formation of the criterion (based on a standard – based on experience).
4) Scale of measurement used (absolute – relative). In turn, the absolute and relative criteria were divided into groups (classes) depending on the type of scale used: binary, natural, relationships, comparisons.

The criteria based on professional experience were divided into explicit and implicit criteria. Explicit subjective criteria are those presented in the subjective experience of the manager in terms of a construct differentiated by the degree of manifestation on an individual scale of measurement. Implicit subjective criteria comprise an indivisible construct subjectively interpreted by its carrier.

The Questionnaire comprises 40 statements. Below are examples of statements from the corresponding groups (classes) of criteria (Table 1 and Table 2).



Figure 2. Model of subjective criteria for monitoring the effectiveness of activities.

Table 1. Examples of subjective criteria based on the standard of work

Criteria in the monitoring stages	**Groups (classes) of criteria**		
Criteria at the pre-confirmation monitoring stage	Absolute	Binary	*Availability / lack of resources*
		Natural	*Completion deadlines tasks / jobs*
	Relative	Relationships	*Tolerance level to deviations from norms and standards (degree of regulation of work)*
		Compliance	*Extent to which task corresponds to organisational goals*
Criteria at the stage of ongoing monitoring	Absolute	Binary	*Uniformity / unevenness of workload assigned between executives*
		Natural	*Time taken to perform task main part of the work*
	Relative	Relationships	*Dynamics of the number of errors in the process of work*
		Compliance	*Degree of conformity to established performance standards*
Criteria at the final (concluding) inspection stage	Absolute	Binary	*Availability / absence of proposals for changing instruction / regulation of work schedule*
		Natural	*Quantity / volume obtained result, overall number of solved tasks*
	Relative	Relationships	*Relationship of expenditures to results*
		Compliance	*Correspondence of result to established quality standard*

Table 2. Examples of subjective criteria based on professional experience

Criteria in the monitoring stages	**Groups (classes) of criteria**	
Criteria at the pre-confirmation monitoring stage	Explicit	*Degree of novelty of the problem*
	Implicit	*Understanding of criteria, according to which they are evaluated fulfilment of task*
Criteria at the stage of ongoing monitoring	Explicit	*The ability of workers to make their own decisions within the framework of their competence*
	Implicit	*Overall level of satisfaction as to work progress*
Criteria at the final (concluding) inspection stage	Explicit	*Personal contribution to results of company activity*
	Implicit	*Expert appraisal of goals achieved by the management*

For unambiguous interpretation of the statements included in the Questionnaire, native speakers of Russian and Slovenian languages used English as an intermediate language.

Based on the theoretical principles on cultural differences in management practices outlined above and the differences in the subjective monitoring criteria recorded in the Model and Questionnaire, we formulated the main and two additional hypotheses that were tested at the first stage of the Russian-Slovenian study.

*Main hypothesis (**MH**):* Structural differences exist in terms of the subjective criteria used for monitoring the activities of Russian and Slovenian managers.

*Additional hypothesis 1 (**AH 1**):* Slovenian managers use measurable criteria to monitor their performance more often than Russian leaders.

*Additional hypothesis 2 (**AH 2**):* There are structural differences in the measurable criteria for Russian and for Slovenian leaders.

The main and both additional hypotheses are represented graphically in Fig. 3.



Figure 3. First stage hypotheses for the cross-cultural Russian-Slovenian study.

To test the proposed hypotheses, a comparative study programme was developed and implemented.

Research base

The survey involved 268 respondents, of which 171 were Russians and 97 – Slovenians. The main characteristics of both samples are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.

The study involved business leaders with experience of working in the relevant organisation for at least one year. Data collection was carried out simultaneously in both countries in 2015.

Table 3. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample

Samples	Total quantity (pers.)	M/F (%)	Average age (%)	Business education (%)		
				primary higher education	additional education in management	degree in management
Russian	171	56.1/43.9	34.86	100	100	0
Slovenian	97	59.8/40.2	38.03	99	65	10.3

Participants and graduates of the Presidential Programme for Management's Personnel Training were invited to participate in the Russian part of the study, which was carried out under the auspices of the Business School of the Ural State Federal University named after B. N. Yeltsin (Yekaterinburg). The students were given a paper version of the Questionnaire; graduates participated in an online version of the survey (the electronic version of the Questionnaire was prepared using the https://www.1ka.si website).

Postgraduates of UrFU, E. K. Mugatabarova and P. Lobanova took part in the collection and processing of experimental data.

The Slovenian side also prepared an electronic version of the Questionnaire via https://www.1ka.si, which was published on the Internet. Participants were involved in the survey by exchanging links to the study on social networks, publishing links to relevant websites, electronic newsletters of institutions, sending emails directly to managers and companies of 500 fastest growing companies in 2014. The overwhelming majority of participants filled in the Questionnaire on the website; however, a number of managers completed it directly in paper form in the context of professional training.

The average duration of completing the Questionnaire was 15 minutes.

The following independent variables were distinguished and approved:

1. Permanent place of work of the subjects (implemented administrative practice) in Russia or in Slovenia as an indicator of the national cultural orientation of the subject and his or her inclusion in a specific (national) management system, conditioned by national culture.

2. The proportion of measurable criteria in the total selected criteria is interpreted in terms of an orientation toward the observance of organisational standards while supervising the effectiveness of the organisation's activities.

3. The proportion of non-measurable criteria in the total selected criteria is interpreted in terms of an orientation towards professional experience while supervising the effectiveness of the organisation's activities.

4. The ratio of the number of absolute or relative criteria to the total measurable criteria is considered in terms of the orientation / lack of orientation towards monitoring performance.

5. The ratio of the number of explicit and implicit criteria in the total weakly measurable criteria is considered in terms of an orientation / lack of orientation towards the monitoring of activities.

Table 4. Professional sampling characteristics: management experience

Samples	Total quantity (pers.)	Average duration of employment as a manager	Number of subordinates (%)				
			up to 5 people	6–10 people	11–50 people	> 50 people	not indicated
Russian	171	6.4	49	30	19	2	0
Slovenian	97	8.6	24	48	24	2	2

Table 5. Professional sampling characteristics: area of activity of managers

Samples	Total quantity (pers.)	Characteristics of the organisation (%)							
		area of activity				with participation of foreign capital		type of ownership	
		production	sales	construction	public administration, insurance	national	international	state	private
Russian	171	29	16	11	2	94.7	5.3	17.5	82.5
Slovenian	97	16	10	5	15	76.3	24.7	29.9	70.1

Results of the study

For data processing correlation analysis using non-parametric criteria (Kendall's tau-b and Spearman's rho), Mann-Whitney U-test, method of descriptive statistics. The statistical analysis of data was carried out using the SPSS Statistics 17.0 software package.

The table presents the results of testing the main hypothesis regarding the differences in the structure of subjective criteria for monitoring the activities of Russian and Slovenian managers (Table 6).

Table 6. General results of sample alignment

Samples	**Mann-Whitney U-test (middle results)**	
	measurable criteria	weakly measurable criteria
Russian	56.11	58.66
Slovenian	60.39	60.19

In the Slovenian sample, measurable and weakly measurable criteria of the effectiveness of professional activity are presented equally in the general structure of subjective monitoring criteria by managers (the distinction is not significant).

In the Russian sample, statistically significant differences were revealed in the representation of measurable and weakly measurable monitoring criteria by managers of the effectiveness of professional activity in the overall monitoring criteria structure.

Conclusion. In the structure of subjective criteria for monitoring the effectiveness of management activities, roughly equal proportions of both groups of criteria, both measurable and weakly measurable, apply to both Russian and Slovenian managers. The obtained data do not allow the main hypothesis to be considered as confirmed.

The results of testing additional hypothesis 1 are also presented in Table 7. From the data, it can be seen that Slovenian leaders use measurable criteria more frequently than Russian leaders when monitoring their performance.

Conclusion. Additional hypothesis 1 was confirmed. A significant difference was found between the mean values of the measurable criteria in the Russian (56.11) and Slovenian (60.39) samples (Table 6).

The results of testing additional hypothesis 2 are presented in Table 7. It is clear from the data that there are differences in the structure of measurable criteria for Russian and Slovenian leaders. A significant difference was found between the mean values of the measurable criteria in the Russian (56.11) and Slovenian (60.39) samples (Table 6).

Significant differences are observed for eight (out of twenty) measurable criteria: four criteria from the “absolute” group and four from the “relative” group. Two criteria are relevant to the monitoring of activities at the stage of preliminary monitoring, according to three criteria for monitoring activities at the stages of preliminary and final monitoring.

Table 7. Comparative data by type of criteria

Measurable criteria		**Mann-Whitney U-test**
absolute	natural	0.006
	binary	0.037
relative	correlation criteria	0
	compliance criteria	0.006

Table 8 below shows the distribution by monitoring stage of criteria that have selection differences in the cultural groups.

Pre-confirmation monitoring stage. A significant difference was found according to two criteria:

a) According to the binary criterion "Measurability of planned results": in 25 % of the selections, Russian managers indicate this criterion to be insignificant for monitoring work effectiveness (selection of "never" and "very rarely"); Slovenian managers define this criterion as insignificant in only 6 % of cases.

b) By the criterion of the ratio "Percentage of the total volume of my work that can be delegated to my subordinates": in 48.1 % of cases, Russian managers do not use, or rarely use this criterion; Slovenian managers choose this criterion as important in 83.5 % of cases (selections are "often" or "always").

Ongoing monitoring stage. A significant difference in the selection of criteria among different cultural groups of managers was found in the following types of criteria:

a) The natural criterion "amount of time devoted to the execution of work". The main difference in the data concerns the selection labelled "rarely": Russian managers – in 30.4 % of cases; Slovenian managers – in 17.5 % of cases.

b) The criterion "cost/benefit ratio when making my decision". In the Slovenian sample, this criterion is more common (83.3 % of cases) than in the Russian sample (54.6% of cases).

c) The criterion "degree of compliance of the management methods (methods) used by me to those used in the organisational culture". There is little difference between the Russian and Slovenian samples concerning the average position of the selection ("rarely" and "often"). The interest in this case is represented by the data of the extreme selections (selections "rarely" and "always"). The ratio of Russian and Slovenian data is as follows: at the selection of "never" 9 % versus 3 %; at the selection of "always" 5.4 versus 17.5 %, respectively.

Table 8. Criteria that have selection differences between the cultural groups (by monitoring stage)

Performance monitoring stage	Criterion group (class)	Formulation of criterion (content)	Selection (%)			
			"never", "rarely"		"often", "always"	
			Russians	Slovenes	Russians	Slovenes
preliminary monitoring	binary	Measurability of the planned results	25	6		
	relationships	Percentage of the total amount of my work that can be delegated to my subordinates	48.1	16.5	59.9	83.5
ongoing monitoring	natural	Amount of time devoted to the execution of work	"rarely" 30.4	"rarely" 17.5		
	ratios	Cost/benefit ratio when making my decision			54.6	83.3
	compliance	Degree of compliance of the management methods used by me with those used in the organisational culture	"never" 9	"never" 3	"always" 5.4	"always" 17.5
final (concluding) monitoring	natural	Number of complaints and comments on the results of my work			54.6	83.5
	binary	Correspondence / mismatch of the achieved results with those planned	"rarely" 18	"rarely" 5.2	"always" 37.5	"always" 51.5
	compliance	Degree to which expenditures are planned	34.5			89.7

Stage of final control. A significant difference in the selection of criteria among different cultural groups of managers was found in the following circumstances:

a) By selection of the natural criterion "Number of complaints and comments on the results of my work". In the Slovenian sample, this criterion is more common (83.5 % of cases) than in the Russian sample (54.6 % of cases).

b) On the selection of the binary criterion "Correspondence/non-correspondence of the actual results with those planned". It should be noted that marker "I never use it" it was not given by any of the respondents either in the Russian or in the Slovenian groups; 43–44 % of respondents in either group use this criterion frequently. However, according to the data of the estimated markers differences are observed "rarely" – 18 % of Russian managers and 5.2 % of Slovenian managers; "always" – 37.5 % and 51.5 % respectively.

c) By selection of the compliance criterion "Degree to which expenditures are planned". In 34.5 % of cases, Russian managers do not use or rarely use this criterion for the control of the effectiveness of their own work; in 89.7 % of cases, Slovenian managers consider this criterion as important and significant.

Conclusion

During this phase of the Russian-Slovenian study, we focused our attention on the influence of national cultural factors on the formation of a system of subjective criteria for monitoring work activities. The hypotheses concerning the existence of structural differences in subjective measurable criteria used by Russian and Slovenian managers was confirmed. There are significant differences in the preferences of Slovenian and Russian managers for subjective criteria at different stages of monitoring (preliminary, current and final).

The proposed Model and Questionnaire developed on its basis can be considered as working tools for diagnosing the content and the set of subjective criteria for systematic monitoring of managers' activities.

In subsequent studies, this method will be tested in companies of various types operating in different markets and under various sociocultural conditions.

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Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. *Journal Title,* 8(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
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