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Aims and scope:

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. *CS&P* examines how rapid societallevel changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- moral reasoning and behavior;
- variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- social exclusion and inclusion;
- post-secular religious individualism;
- tolerance and merely 'tolerating': their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.

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EDITORIAL

The current issue continious the discussion on the main theme of the journal – namely, the value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity, as well as changes in value orientations.

In the paper *Socio-Cultural Differences in Social Exclusion*, Juan Díez-Nicolás and Ana Maria López-Narbona reflects upon the very sharp and controversial issue – social exclusion, which without exaggeration should be considered as a main concern worldwide. The aim of the paper is to analyse social exclusion at the level of the neighbourhood – the place where different people come to live together. The authors argue that "cities and neighbourhoods provide the opportunity to analyse micro-social processes (social relationships), the results of which can be extrapolated to macro-social processes that take place in larger urban spaces and societies", and pose three main questions: "Who is subject of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? Who is the actor of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? What are the factors that explain social exclusion in neighbourhoods?" To answer these questions, they undertake the observation of existing concepts and theories on social exclusion from social relations, as well as provide empirical analysis of social exclusion in neighbourhoods. The paper contains detailed review of the recent literature not only on the concept of social exclusion, but also on related concepts such as stigma, prejudice, discrimination, poverty, deprivation, and inequality. In the empirical part of the paper, the authors use the data from European Values Survey (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS), which altogether cover more than thirty years and almost all regions in the world. In particular, the paper has been based on the World Values Survey data file of the 6th wave, conducted in 59 countries with a total of more than 85,000 personal interviews. They suggest four main explanatory variables – social position, information, post-materialist values and perception of security – and explain their correlation with social exclusion. In analyzing various data, the authors make special focus on Russia, which among other things defines the scientific novelty of the paper.

Victor Martianov in the paper *Revolution and Modernity* analyses the idea of revolution as an "initiating event for the political order" of Modernity. In particular, he reveals the metaphoric meaning of revolution as an "instant transfiguration", chiliastic dream, or rational plan for the implementation of

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the properly ordered society, and stresses that revolution never achieves its initial goals. Martianov underlines controversial perception of revolution, which could be seen as both initiating event transforming socio-political order, as well as political extremism. He himself interprets Modernity as a specific form of revolution – a low-intensity one, which "counterposes the new *morality of change* to the customary *morality of tradition*". In the paper, the reflection upon the essence of revolution then moves to the level of individuals – political subjects, "the Kantian adult citizens who dare to be guided by their own minds and to act without external permits and approvals, without power of attorney and without guarantors", thus comprising the revolutionary political core of Modernity. Martianov goes deeply into paradoxes of Modernity, where persons as politically active subjects play important role in social changes, and at the same time are seen by the state as a threat to political powers, and pays special attention to the spread of the "schizophrenic type of social subject, which loses its ability to effectively organise its interests over the course of history". Based on the assumptions concerning the nature of the revolutions in Late Modernity, Martianov then presents his vision of the possibility of a new revolution, referring, among other things, to the example of contemporary Russia.

Has modernization, globalization, urbanization, and westernization altered Arab ordinary citizens' views on religion, economics, politics, and foreign affairs? Malek Abduljaber in the paper *Effects of Modernization and Globalization on Values Change in the Arab World* endeavors to answer those and other related questions, and criticizes the assumption that public opinion is only relevant in consolidated democracies of western type. He studies public opinion in the region through the analysis of various data sources, mainly, the Arab Barometer, which is selected "because it is one of the most comprehensive survey research projects investigating the values, beliefs, and attitudes of ordinary Arab men and women in a number of countries throughout the Arab world". The Arab Barometer has conducted four waves in 2006–2017 and took place in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Kuwait, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Libya. The data from fourth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), which included Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, is used as well. Abduljaber argues that social transformation processes such as modernization and globalization generate a discernable change in Arabs' political, social, and cultural perceptions, and provides explanation for the reasons and trends of the values changes, thus opening "new horizons for the systematic investigation of public opinion shifts in the region among researchers".

Vladimir Bogomyakov Marina Chistyakova's paper *Interactivity as a Vector of the Socialization of Art* stresses the specific feature of the contemporary art, which "actively draw potential recipients into its orbit, provoking them to participate in unfamiliar activities and providing them with many new (often nontrivial) opportunities for self-expression". They describe the history of interactivity traced back to the last decades of the nineteenth century, as well as its conceptualization, and argue that interactivity radically changes the role of viewer in artistic communication. Even

more, it effects the art itself, opening it to interpretations and making its meanings a subject to variation. The authors ties interactivity in art with the same process in social relations; they conclude that "in the full sense of the word, interactivity only becomes possible when representational art makes the transition to the presentational form. In this situation, art no longer reflects reality, but becomes it". In part, the paper describes interactivity's correlation with the type of media, and stresses that today's world is a post-media world, thus, in art, any combination of intermediators is allowed.

The current issue of CS&P also contains the review of Ronald Inglehart's recent book *Cultural Evolution, People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2018) presented by Ana Maria López Narbona. Ronald Inglehart, the world-famous political scientist and Founding President of the World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp). As it indicated in the review, in his book Inglehart develops a new theoretical framework for modernization theory, which is called the evolutionary one and is based on the analysis of value changes and consequent people's motivations in contemporary world.

Discussions on the topics raised in the current issue will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal, and new themes will be introduces. We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections, book reviews and other formats from readers and prospective authors and invite you to send us your reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

Elena Stepanova,
Editor-in-Chief

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ARTICLE

Socio-Cultural Differences in Social Exclusion

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ABSTRACT
The main object of this research is to describe social exclusion in a comparative world perspective. Social exclusion is a main concern worldwide. Non-desirable social groups as neighbours are used as a proxy measure to answer three questions: who are the most excluded social groups, who are the excluders, and what are the main explanatory variables of social exclusion. Social exclusion, as a multidimensional phenomenon, is defined in relation to concepts such as stigma, discrimination, and prejudice. Social, economic, political and ideological-religious attitudes are used to construct the profile of the excluder. Social exclusion has been measured through three indexes of social exclusion, personal, group and total exclusion, since a main component analysis demonstrated that the degree of social exclusion varied depending on whether the excluded group was more or less based on personal decisions on one's behaviour taken by the individual. Based on theory and previous research, four main variables have been tested to explain social exclusion: social position, exposure to information, post-materialist values and perception of security. But other explanatory variables were also added to the analysis. EVS and WVS databases (from 1981 to 2014) have been used, though most of the analysis has been based on the last WVS-6th wave on 59 countries with a total of more than 85,000 interviews.

KEYWORDS
social exclusion, social relations, neighbourhood, indexes, social position, information, post-materialism, security

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Introduction[1]

Social exclusion has long been a concern for scholars, politicians and citizens. New forms of social exclusion are occurring in the city and at the level of the neighbourhoods such as *Gentrification*, a social process that was detected in the 60s (Glass, 1964), but which has very recently intensified and produced the "displacement from home and neighbourhood" (Marcuse, 1985).

According to Sassen (2005), "the exclusion of groups of city residents from access to all the city has to offer can be made on the basis of: race, class, religion, income, gender, national origin, sexual orientation or some other characteristic… The restructuring of cities and societies… have led to concerns for the fragmentation of the social world, where some members of society are excluded in the'mainstream' and where this exclusion is painful for the excluded and harmful for society as a whole". However, as suggests Mandanipour (2016), "exclusionary processes per se are not the source of social fragmentation and disintegration. It is the absence of social integration, which causes social exclusion, as individuals do not find the possibility and channels of participating in the mainstream society". In the realm of the neighbourhood, Macy & Van de Rijt (2006) "proposes that institutional discrimination is not sufficient to explain the persistence of high segregation without the additional assumption that households have a preference for in-group neighbours".

Understanding the causes and conditions of social exclusion in cities and neighbourhoods is critical, as the UN has reckoned that "today, 54 per cent of the world's population lives in urban areas, a proportion that is expected to increase to 66 per cent by 2050". Social relations and social exclusion are mostly produced in urban areas. Segregation, disintegration, marginalization, poverty and criminality produce and are reproduced by social exclusion provoking a breakdown of social order.

The aim of this paper is to analyse social exclusion at the level of the neighbourhood as "it is important to know what are the forces, which tend to break up the tensions, interests, and sentiments which give neighbourhoods their individual character" (Park, 1984). Three main questions are posed to address this issue: Who is subject of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? Who is the actor of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? What are the factors that explain social exclusion in neighbourhoods? There are independent intra and extra-neighbourhood effects on individuals' behaviours that should be further analysed in order to properly understand the process of social exclusion in neighbourhoods.

Neighbourhoods are privileged places to research social exclusion. Life develops mostly in neighbourhoods where people meet, disagree, and reunite in contiguity, intimacy and vicinity. "Proximity and neighbourly contact are the basis for the simplest and most elementary form of association with which we have to do in the organization of city life" (Parks, 1984). Neighbourhoods are poles of attraction for groups of people with differential characteristics. Society may be divided into smaller

[1] A first version of this paper was presented at the WAPOR Annual Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, 15–17 July 2017. Similar versions have also been presented at the University of Almeria 19–20 October 2017 and the University of Granada 20 February 2018.

units until reaching the level of the neighbourhood without losing the essence of society as "the neighbourhood is a social unit which, by its clear definition of outline, its inner organic completeness, its hair-trigger reactions, may be fairly considered as functioning like a social mind" (Woods, 1913).

Individuals in society can only be understood as processes in the confluence of time, space and place. In the same sense, neighbourhoods are spatially and timely based. Perception of the neighbourhood boundaries is variable and their design is arbitrarily drawn. For Glaster (2001), "certain topographical features are permanent. Sewer infrastructures and buildings last typically generations. Others, such as tax/public service packages and demographic and status profiles of an area, can change over a year. The area's social interrelationships can be altered even more rapidly". Moreover, as Burgess (1984) suggests "boundaries of local areas determined ecologically, culturally, and politically seldom, if ever, exactly coincide".

Cities and neighbourhoods provide the opportunity to analyse micro-social processes (social relationships), the results of which can be extrapolated to macro-social processes that take place in larger urban spaces and societies. Sassen (2005) suggests that "the city has long been a site for the exploration of major subjects confronting society and the social sciences. In the mid 1990s, it lost that heuristic capability. Today the city is once again emerging as a strategic lens for producing critical knowledge, not only about the urban condition but also about major social, economic, and cultural refiguring in our societies". We understand neighbourhoods as concrete space, time and places where social exclusion occurs. Therefore, connecting social exclusion with cities and neighbourhoods may contribute to identify divisions in order to look for cohesion, to give new sense to long defended rights such as social citizenship and social justice, and to cope with social processes that are pressing problems in worldwide cities such as gentrification, parochialism, segregation, marginalization and purification.

Social exclusion has many dimensions like impoverishment, labour market exclusion, service exclusion, and exclusion from social relations, among others. The present study, however, is specifically designed to measure social exclusion from social relations using the World Values Survey[2] (hereinafter WVS) variables 36 to 44 (which pose the questions: "Would not like to have as neighbours…") as a proxy measure. In the context of residential segregation, Clark (1986, 2006) suggests that prejudice is equated to "would not like..." Groups proposed in WVS questions refer to social exclusion from social relations (social avoidance and social distance) in neighbourhoods. The present analysis is structured in six sections.

Section 2 focuses on the main concepts and theories in which the research developed in this paper is based. We address the concept of social exclusion and the concepts closely related to it. The specialised literature has developed different models to explain different categories of social exclusion from social relations. Models of prejudice mostly focus on issues of race, ethnicity and immigration. Models of stigma relate to deviant behaviour and identities, and disease and disabilities. Social

[2] Most of the analysis has been based on the data set of the WVS-6th wave, 2010–2014, which includes 59 countries with a total of more than 85,000 personal interviews, mostly face-to-face. But some analysis have used the combined data set EVS-WVS 1981–2014, which includes six waves (1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010), 110 countries and a total of 506,487 personal interviews.

exclusion, stigma, prejudice and discrimination are concepts closely interrelated. More recently some scholars have developed ethnic preferences models which propose the hypothesis that social distance and preference dynamics could generate and sustain significant levels of segregation in the absence of discrimination (Clark, 2006; Fosset, 2006, 2011). In order to understand what generates social exclusion in neighbourhoods, we carry out a literature review.

Sections 3 to 6 are directed to the empirical analysis of social exclusion in neighbourhoods using the already mentioned question as to persons or groups that would not be accepted as neighbours. To address the statistical analysis, some questions are posed:

a) who is the subject of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? (Sections 3: Describing who are the Excluded social groups, and Section 4: Construction of Social Exclusion Indexes);

b) who is the actor of social exclusion in neighbourhoods? (Section 5: Describing the Excluders);

c) what are the main factors that explain social exclusion in neighbourhoods? Which are the causes and conditions of social exclusion? (Section 6: Explaining Social Exclusion).

The first question tries to determine the main characteristics of the persons subject to social exclusion. We consider that the excluded is objectified, commoditised, standardized, homogenized, equalized, and grouped; in sum, people who suffer social exclusion lose their private and own characteristics as individual persons and become part of a category that elicits social exclusion. The second question addresses the socio-demographic profile of the excluder. Although there are important methodological differences in measuring attitudes, opinions and behaviours, the questions posed by the WVS concerning neighbours will help us to design an image of the person who manifests his or her exclusion to others.

With the third question, we look for causes and conditions of social exclusion. Many reflections arise on this point. First, can we sustain that there is a globalization of attitudes? Second, as Allport (1954) and others suggest, it is very likely that the person or group that shows prejudice or discrimination against one group, also shows discrimination or prejudice against more groups. Can we apply this conclusion to our statistical analysis? Third, can we extrapolate the meso-social level analysis (neighbourhoods) to the macro-social level (society), or the manifestations of prejudice, discrimination and social exclusion are different at different levels of analysis? How can the Bogardus social distance scale be applied in our statistical analysis? Fourth, we have divided the WVS variables used in this research into two groups, Personal Exclusion (mainly referred to voluntary generally non-accepted social behaviours of individual persons like heavy drinkers, drug-addicts, homosexuals…) and Group Exclusion (referred to social exclusion based on racism and xenophobia which implies exclusion based on the belonging to racial, ethnic and foreign groups), which of the two groups of variables attract the more prejudice, stigma and discrimination, in sum, social exclusion? In the case that it is Personal Exclusion, do people blame individual persons for these behaviours? Do excluders

consider that excluded's behaviour is voluntary and could and should be controlled? In the case of Group Exclusion, is blaming out of the question? What would be the main reasons for this kind of social exclusion?

The last section, Section 7, contains the main Conclusions and Discussions on the topics analysed.

The Process of Social Exclusion

Social exclusion is closely related to, but should be distinguished from, concepts such as stigma, prejudice, discrimination, poverty, deprivation, and inequality, although the conceptual distinction is not an easy task. In the following lines, we expose different definitions and conceptualisations of the main terms above mentioned and their relation to social exclusion. Stigma, prejudice and discrimination models have been used to explain social exclusion. Further to these models, scholars after Schelling (1971) are focusing their interest in the preferences and social distance models posing the following question: is social exclusion always based on any kind of rejection of the other, be it stigma, prejudice, stereotyping or discrimination? This question is addressed from a theoretical perspective. We finish with a literature review on the concept of social exclusion and its connections to social relations, social distance and neighbourhood.

Stigma

The concepts of social exclusion and stigma are interrelated. Goffman (1963) suggested that people who possess a characteristic defined as socially undesirable acquire a spoiled identity, which then leads to social devaluation and discrimination. However, according to Deacon, Stephney & Prosalendis (2005), social stigma does not always produce discrimination.

Stigma is a mark or sign of disgrace usually eliciting negative attitudes to its bearer. If attached to a person with a mental disorder (heavy-drinkers or drug-addicts) it can lead to negative discrimination. It is sometimes but not always related to a lack of knowledge about the condition that led to stigmatisation. Stigma can therefore be seen as an overarching term that contains three elements: problems of knowledge (ignorance), problems of attitudes (prejudice), and problems of behaviour (discrimination). Stigma is then related not only to social exclusion but also to ignorance, prejudice and discrimination.

Prejudice

Prejudice is also a concept intimately related to social exclusion. Allport (1954) argued that prejudice is an "antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization". Therefore, according to Allport, prejudices are negative attitudes towards groups and individuals based solely on their group membership. Allport (1954) also suggested that "one of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group". Adorno

et al. (1950) demonstrated that authoritarianism is associated with prejudices against many different groups.

According to Elliot et al. (1982), once a person has been classified (through stigma or prejudice) as illegitimate for participation in an interaction, he or she is beyond the protection of social norms and, as such, may be excluded or ignored altogether.

For Joffe (1999), stigma and prejudice would be fundamental emotional responses to danger that help people feel safer by projecting controllable risk, and therefore blame, onto out groups. These socially constructed representations only result in discrimination and the reproduction of structural inequalities when other enabling circumstances (such as power and opportunity to discriminate) come into play. Phelan, Link, and Dovidio (2008) explored commonalities and possible distinctions between prejudice and stigma, concluding that most differences are a matter of focus and emphasis. One important distinction is in the type of human characteristics that are the primary focus of models of prejudice (race) and stigma (deviant behaviour and identities, and disease and disabilities) which allowed them to develop a typology of three functions of stigma and prejudice: exploitation and domination (keeping people down); norm enforcement (keeping people in); and disease avoidance (keeping people away).

Discrimination

Parker and Aggleton (2003) consider that stigma and discrimination should be understood as part of the political economy of social exclusion present in the contemporary world. The three concepts then are closely interrelated and cannot be conceptualised independently. Discrimination can be seen as the behavioural consequence of stigma, which acts to the disadvantage of people who are stigmatised (Sayce, 2000). The rejecting behaviour of others may bring greater disadvantage than the primary condition itself.

Conceptualisations of the terms referring to rejection of the other have their foundation on the point of view of the actor, i.e., the person or group of persons who stigmatise, discriminate and exclude. For Zick et al (2011), "individuals are looked down upon not on the basis of their personal characteristics but through nothing other than their categorization as a member of an out-group. It is utterly irrelevant whether they see themselves as a member of this group or whether their group membership can be determined objectively. What matters is solely the categorization by the person holding or expressing the prejudice".

There are many scholars who advocate for definitions that take into account the point of view of the stigmatised because the way they respond to stigma can materially affect the impact of stigma in society, whatever the extent of actual discrimination based on stigma (Deacon, Stephney & Prosalendis, 2005).

Social exclusion

The concept of social exclusion was developed in France in 1974 to refer to groups, "les exclus", with no access to the labour market and with limited or not recognized

rights to social citizenship. However, rejection or social exclusion has existed along human history. In the Ancient Greece, ostracism was used to eliminate men seen as a threat to the state (Figueira, 1987). According to Forsdyke (2000), the creation of the institution of ostracism, whereby the people decided collectively whether to banish a single citizen for ten years, provided not only a mechanism for the symbolic expression of democratic power, but also a means for the practical and ideological distinction between oligarchic and democratic rule. The infrequent and moderate use of exile as a means of resolving political conflict helps to explain the extraordinary stability of the Athenian democracy.

From a Durkheimian point of view, social exclusion is functional for society as it helps to establish moral, legal and cultural limits of society and to give stability to the *status quo*. Christianity applies a similar institution called ex-communion (Eliade, 1961; De la Garza & Valdes, 1998). Sen (1992) highlights the lack of capabilities as the key component of the exclusion process. Socially excluded individuals are denied access to the resources (material, cultural, emotional) that enable them to acquire capabilities related to cognitive development and educational success, but also extend to the broader spheres of health and social participation.

According to Rodgers (1995), "exclusion is an evolving pattern that encompasses all facets of an individual's life". For Room (1992, 1995), the main aspects of the concept of social exclusion are "multidimensionality, dynamicity and relationality". Multidimensionality refers to different dimensions of social exclusion (social, economic, cultural, political) and different levels (micro, i.e., individual, household; meso, i.e., neighbourhoods; and macro, i.e., nation state and global regions) along a social exclusion/inclusion continuum; dynamicity implies that social exclusion impacts in different ways to differing degrees at different social levels over time; and relationality (Room, 1995) because it focuses on exclusion as the rupture (or inequality) of relationships between people and society resulting in a lack (or differential) of social participation, social protection, social integration and power.

Levitas (2005) defines social exclusion as "the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political, cultural systems, which determine the social integration of a person in society". Social exclusion used in this research is conceptualised as the process of rejection of a group or a person, in any degree, that keep the rejected group or person out from the social system based on stigma, prejudice, stereotyping and/or discrimination. The main foundations of rejection would be fear, ignorance, blaming, social control, and avoidance of risk.

Ethnic preferences and social distance

Attitude and social distance surveys usually ask what they would do in imaginary situations or what they think most people would do, for example, when faced with a neighbour or work colleague with mental illness. This work has emphasised what normal people say without exploring the actual experiences of people with mental illness themselves about the behaviour of normal people toward them. Further, it has been assumed that such statements (usually on knowledge, attitudes or behavioural intentions) are congruent with actual behaviour, without assessing such behaviour

directly. Such research has generally focused on hypothetical rather than real situations, neglecting emotions and the social context, thus producing very little guidance about interventions that could reduce social rejection.

Bogardus' Social Distance Scale scores ranged from one to seven along a choice continuum in which there is a category regarding neighbours. Its influence is still high despite discrepancies between expressed attitudes and actions. A Reverse Social Distance Scale (Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility) was created to measure minority groups' perceptions of the social distance. Schelling (1971) analysed why groups cluster together in residential neighbourhoods. Small differences in the preference of an individual to be with others of a similar type (ethnicity, e.g.), could lead to quite distinct patterns of separation in the population. For Schelling, micro-level voluntary choices and economic competition can create or maintain macro-level patterns of residential segregation along ethnic and socio-economic dimensions.

Urban-ecological studies of residential segregation try to understand the "urban mosaic", i.e., the complex differentiation of residential neighbourhoods that stands as a fundamental fact of urban life (Fosset, 2011). Segregation occurs along many axes, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic position, age, stage of family life cycle, nativity, and life style producing a highly variegated urban spatial fabric. According to Fosset (2006) many factors contribute to ethnic segregation such as discrimination. However, as past forms of discrimination slowly fade, it is compulsory to direct special attention to the role of ethnic preferences and social distance dynamics associated with in-group attraction and out-group avoidance.

Discrimination alone is insufficient to account for the extent and continuing nature of residential separation and segregation, as the explanation is multi-dimensional (Clark, 1986, 2006). Social preferences (ethnocentrism or in-group preferences) appear as a factor to take into account together with economic status (affordability), urban structure, and discrimination.

In the following lines, we address the three main questions proposed to analytically unravel the process of social exclusion in neighbourhoods. First, who is the person subject to social exclusion, i.e., who is the excluded? Second, who is the actor of social exclusion, i.e., who is the excluder? In the model proposed in this work, the actor of social exclusion cannot be understood without the person subject to social exclusion. Third, why and how is there social exclusion, i.e., which are the causes and conditions of social exclusion?

The point of view exposed in this work is the point of view of the actor, i.e., of the person who answers to the question posed in the WVS: "Would not like to have as neighbours…" The analysis of social exclusion is then inferred indirectly through the answers to questions posed in a negative form ("Would not like to have as neighbours…").

Although there are some limitations of applying a concept (social exclusion) developed in the industrialised countries with welfare systems, to nation states with weak governance, minimal welfare provision, and a majority of the population living in extreme poverty, in this research we will do some inferences to the main world cultural regions using data from the WVS.

Measuring Social Exclusion in a Comparative Frame. Who are the Excluded Groups?

Social exclusion, as measured by the proxy indicator already mentioned, social groups not wanted as neighbours, depends obviously on the social groups listed and presented to the respondents. Values surveys have included this question since the first EVS-WVS wave in 1981, and have continued to include it in all WVS waves in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010, but the target groups of the question have varied in time. In Table 1 we have listed the social groups that have been included in the last completed WVS wave (2010–2014) in order to compare with previous waves. In the first column the aggregate summary for all waves is presented, but in the other columns social groups mentioned in each wave as "not wanted as neighbours" are listed.

Table 1

Percentage That Would Not Like Different Social Groups as Neighbours, WVS-EVS 1981–2014, by Wave

Social groups	**All waves 1981–2014**	1981	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Drug addicts	**65.1**	–	62	67	66	73	79
Heavy drinkers	**58.4**	48	56	59	55	60	65
Homosexuals	**41.0**	–	44	43	42	43	47
People with AIDS	**36.3**	–	40	38	39	35	41
Unmarried Couples	**7.5**	–	–	–	–	19	25
Immigrants	**18.6**	6	16	15	21	19	25
Different Religion	**8.0**	–	–	3	6	15	19
Different Race	**15.3**	8	15	12	18	15	19
Different Language	**4.9**	–	–	–	–	12	17
No. of Data sets	**331**	24	43	67	79	58	60
No. of Respondents	**(506,487)**	(29,685)	(62,769)	(118,253)	(125,531)	(83,975)	(86,274)

In the EVS-WVS 1981 wave only three groups of those included in the last WVS wave (2010) were also included. It must be underlined the high stability of proportions of the total population that reject the same social groups. It is also a surprising finding that there seems to be a certain tendency to higher rather than lower proportions of rejection of the same social groups. Thus, the proportion that would not want as neighbours each of these nine social groups in the last wave, 2010–2014, is in all cases the highest of the total period. The larger increases in absolute terms correspond to the rejection of Immigrants and Foreign workers, Drug addicts and Heavy drinkers, and to a lesser degree, people of a different Race.

We think that every social fact must be interpreted in space and time, and in this case it must be taken into account that the last WVS wave was conducted in the period when the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 was at its very peak. Fears and worries of populations around the world might explain the growth of social exclusion of all social groups. Another factor might be that in the last wave there have been a few more developed countries and an increase of less developed countries, and also an increase of MENA region countries.

Table 2

Percentage That Would Not Like Different Social Groups as Neighbours, by Geo-Cultural Regions and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

All countries		Anglo-Saxon		European Union		East Europe & Balkans		MENA		Asia		Latin America		Sub-Sahara		**Russia**	
Drug addicts	**78.5**	Drug addicts	89.6	Drug addicts	77.1	Drug addicts	93.9	Drug addicts	75.7	Drug addicts	70.4	Drug addicts	72.4	Drug addicts	82.2	**Drug addicts**	**93.2**
Drinkers	**65.0**	Drinkers	70.0	Drinkers	68.3	Drinkers	85.1	Drinkers	66.4	Drinkers	57.6	Drinkers	51.3	Homo-sexuals	66.0	**Drinkers**	**84.3**
Homo-sexuals	**46.6**	Homo-sexuals	17.1	Homo-sexuals	27.0	Homo-sexuals	73.2	Homo-sexuals	57.7	AIDS	49.0	Homo-sexuals	27.1	Drinkers	59.7	**Homo-sexuals**	**66.2**
AIDS	**40.4**	AIDS	14.6	AIDS	25.2	AIDS	67.0	AIDS	55.5	Homo-sexuals	39.6	AIDS	17.4	Immi-grants	24.3	**AIDS**	**54.3**
Couples	**25.2**	Immi-grants	11.2	Immi-grants	19.4	Immi-grants	27.0	Couples	54.1	Immi-grants	33.7	Language	10.4	AIDS	23.0	**Immi-grants**	**32.2**
Immi-grants	**24.8**	Language	10.5	Race	13.8	Couples	25.0	Immi-grants	32.3	Couples	28.1	Religion	10.0	Couples	20.0	**Language**	**18.9**
Religion	**19.2**	Race	4.9	Religion	11.0	Race	22.8	Religion	30.4	Religion	23.6	Immi-grants	9.4	Religion	15.8	**Race**	**17.2**
Race	**18.7**	Couples	4.2	Language	10.9	Religion	22.7	Race	28.1	Race	22.3	Race	7.9	Race	15.5	**Religion**	**14.3**
Language	**17.3**	Religion	3.2	Couples	7.4	Language	16.7	Language	25.1	Language	21.8	Couples	7.8	Language	15.3	**Couples**	**7.8**

Since there seems to be a high stability of exclusionist attitudes, especially regarding the rank order of groups (it has been the same in all six waves, without a single exception), we have focused on the data of the last WVS wave, 2010–2014[3]. To that effect we have grouped the 59 countries in only seven geo-cultural regions[4]. Throughout this article, we have always considered Russia as a separate unit of analysis for comparative purposes.

Drug addicts are unanimously the most rejected social group as neighbours, with no exceptions. The second most rejected social group is heavy drinkers, with the only exception of Sub-Saharan countries. The reason is that homosexuals are much more excluded in those countries, being the second most rejected social group in that world region. The rejection of heavy drinkers is lowest in Latin America (51%) and highest in East Europe and the Balkans (85%), and not in MENA countries (66%), as one might have expected because of religious norms.

The third most rejected social group is that of homosexuals, but with two exceptions, Sub-Sahara, where they are the second most rejected group, and Asia, where they are less rejected than people with AIDS. Rejection of homosexuals as neighbours shows a very high variation, so that the least exclusion is observed in Anglo-Saxon countries (17%) and the highest in East Europe and the Balkans (73%).

Other findings that deserve some underlining are the higher exclusion of people with AIDS in East Europe and the Balkans and in MENA region countries (67% and 56% respectively), the higher rejection of unmarried couples in MENA region (54%), the higher exclusion of immigrants and foreign workers in Asia and MENA regions (34% and 32% respectively), and the higher exclusion of people of a different religion, a different race and a different language in MENA region countries (30%, 28% and 25% respectively).

Social groups that seem to be more rejected in general are those based on some personal, rather than group, characteristic. Does it mean that people are more tolerant with individuals who are different because they belong to a group regardless of their choice (i.e., different race) than with those who apparently belong because having made a personal choice (i.e., heavy drinkers)?

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[3] Data sets are usually equivalent to countries, but not always, because in some cases there are two or more data sets for a country (i.e., East and West Germany). Besides, while WVS has conducted surveys in all six waves, EVS has conducted its waves only in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. These data sets have been included in the nearest WVS wave date. Furthermore, some countries have participated in the WVS and the EVS with the same or different teams, as is the case for Spain, Sweden, Turkey and other countries. That is why datasets and countries not always are the same. In the last WVS wave there were 59 countries but 61 datasets.

[4] The distribution of countries by geo-cultural regions is as follows: *Anglo-Saxon* (Australia, New Zealand, and United States), *European Union* (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden), *East Europe and the Balkans* (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), *MENA* (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen), *Asia* (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), *Latin America* (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay), *Sub-Saharan Africa* (Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe).

Table 3

Percentage That Would Not Like Different Social Groups as Neighbours, Russia 1990–2010, by Wave

Social groups	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Drug addicts	86	86	85	94	93
Heavy drinkers	82	76	78	89	84
Homosexuals	81	64	61	66	66
AIDS	68	54	55	58	54
Immigrants	12	11	31	32	32
Race	11	8	16	17	17
Religion	–	–	–	16	14
Language	–	–	–	14	19
Couples	–	–	–	4	8

In general, drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals, and people with AIDS seem to be more rejected than unmarried couples or people who are immigrants, or of a different religion, race or language. In general, East Europe and the Balkans, together with MENA countries, are usually the regions where almost all mentioned social groups seem to be more undesired as neighbours.

Regarding Russia, drug addicts and heavy drinkers are certainly not desired as neighbours by almost unanimity of respondents, and rejection has increased in the past two waves. Homosexuals are excluded by almost two thirds of respondents since 1995, though a little less than they were in 1990. Social exclusion of people with AIDS has decreased, but rejection of immigrants, people of a different race, of a different language and of unmarried couples, has increased, though their social exclusion is still very low, as that of people of a different religion. The general pattern of social exclusion in Russia, according to last wave results, is very similar to the group of countries in East Europe and the Balkans, with the only exception of the social exclusion of people of a different language, relatively much higher in Russia than in East Europe and the Balkans.

As mentioned, persons who discriminate some social groups are more likely to discriminate others. For that reason, and with the objective of constructing an index of social exclusion, some models of principal component analysis have been calculated. This analysis, allowing for the free selection of components, shows that there are two principal components, one composed of five items and another one composed of four items. In the first component we find four items with saturations above .650 and one with a lower saturation of .573 (unmarried couples living together). It seemed advisable to eliminate this item, since it does not seem to belong to either component. The second component also includes four items. Thus, the four items in the first component seem to imply that respondents consider that the individual belongs to each of the four social groups (people of a different race, religion, language and immigrants) because of its belonging to it is not dependent of a specific behaviour, while the four items included in the second component (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, people with AIDS and homosexuals) seem to depend, at least partially, on personal decisions and/or behaviours. This, at least, seems to be

the perspective that respondents may have, whether or not it is correct. In any case, we have computed a second principal component analysis with free selection of components but excluding unmarried couples living together.

Table 4

Main Component Analysis with Items Regarding Social Exclusion (Excluding Unmarried Couples Living Together) (Free Number of Components), Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Social groups	Rotated Component Matrixa	
	Component	
	1	2
Drug addicts	–.209	.751
People of a different race	.776	.037
People who have AIDS	.392	.595
Immigrants/foreign workers	.672	.155
Homosexuals	.269	.631
People of a different religion	.753	.035
Heavy drinkers	–.052	.743
People who speak a different language	.743	–.046

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Similar principal component analyses have been calculated for the seven regions, producing similar but no exactly equal distribution of items in two components. The first component is clearly found with the same items and high saturations in five regions (and in Russia), but not in the MENA region or in Asia. In these two regions the same four items, with high saturations, are found in the second component. But the other four items (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals and people with AIDS), whether in the first or the second component, show a more irregular pattern.

Thus, in Anglo-Saxon countries two items (people with AIDS and homosexuals) make the second component, but drug addicts and heavy drinkers are part of a third component, all with very high saturations. In the MENA region and Asia the four items make the first component, with high saturations. In East Europe and the Balkans the four items are part of the second component, with high saturations, like in the total sample of 59 countries. In Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa the second component has only three items (drug addicts, heavy drinkers and homosexuals), but people with AIDS shows a low saturation and is not part of any component. In the European Union only two items are part of the second component, drug addicts and heavy drinkers, but both homosexuals and people with AIDS are not part of any component because of low saturations. And in Russia the second component includes drug addicts, as well as heavy drinkers, people with AIDS and homosexuals.

A final principal component analysis has been produced, asking for only one component, so that all eight items would rank themselves according to their saturation. Results mean that a person that wouldn't like people of a different race as neighbours is very likely to dislike other social groups too, while those who reject drug addicts may or may not reject members of other social groups.

Table 5

Main Component Analysis with Items Regarding Social Exclusion (Excluding Unmarried Couples Living Together) (One Component Required), Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Social groups	Component 1
People of a different race	.718
People of a different religion	.696
Immigrants/foreign workers	.674
People who speak a different language	.653
People who have AIDS	.608
Homosexuals	.512
Heavy drinkers	.270
Drug addicts	.131

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a. 1 component extracted

As this analysis demonstrates once more, all four of the more "personal" items show the lowest saturations, while all four of the more "group" items show the highest saturations. The same analysis for Russia is very similar, the items with the highest saturation are race, immigrants and language, while the two with the lowest saturation are drug addicts and heavy drinkers, in that order.

Construction of Social Exclusion Indexes

On the basis of these eight items, therefore, we have constructed three social exclusion indexes: a Personal Exclusion Index, a Group Exclusion Index and a Total Exclusion Index.

Total Exclusion Index has been constructed by adding the number of social groups that each respondent mentioned as not wanted neighbours. Consequently, since there were eight social groups for which the question was posed, the index could vary from 0 (no social group was mentioned at all as not wanted), to 8 (all social groups were mentioned as not wanted as neighbours). Only 9% of the total sample did not mention any social group as undesired neighbours, and less than half that proportion (4%) answered that they did not want as neighbours people belonging to each one of the eight social groups for which the question was posed.

The mean number of undesired social groups for the total sample was 3.11, with a standard deviation a little over half the mean. The highest number of social groups excluded is found in East Europe and Balkan countries, and also in the MENA region countries, while the lowest index is found in Latin America, Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries. But the highest dispersion of social exclusion is found in Latin America and in the European Union countries, while the lowest coefficient of variation is found in East European and Balkan countries[5].

[5] The coefficient of variation (CV) is the ratio between the standard deviation over the mean, as a percentage to standardize the measure. The higher the CV the greater seems to be the variation in the number of social groups excluded by the respondents in the population, while a lower CV means that there is a high agreement among respondents in the number of social groups undesired as neighbours.

Table 6

Mean and Standard Deviation in Total Social Exclusion Index by Geo-Cultural Regions and Russia (Mean Number of Social Groups Excluded as Neighbours), WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Mean and Standard Deviation	Total Social Exclusion Index								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
$\bar{x}$	**3.11**	2.11	2.53	4.08	3.71	3.18	2.06	3.02	**3.81**
σ	**1.96**	1.27	1.80	1.73	2.22	1.99	1.58	1.42	**1.72**
CV in %	**63.00**	60.20	71.20	42.40	59.80	62.60	76.70	47.00	**45.10**

In sum, people in East European and Balkan countries and in MENA region countries seem to exclude more social groups as neighbours, and they show the highest consensus on their populations regarding that measure of social exclusion, while people in Latin America and European Union countries show the lowest total social exclusion but with the highest variation in the number of excluded social groups in their populations.

And, coherent with the data already examined above, Russia shows a very high index of total social exclusion (only lower than in the East Europe and Balkan region), but with a low coefficient of variation (small differences among those who exclude many social groups and those who exclude very few, meaning a high consensus in the population). We will examine later what factors explain the great variation in total social exclusion in Latin American and European Union countries, though they are the countries with the lowest total social exclusion as measured by the question about undesired neighbours used as proxy.

We have constructed two more social exclusion indexes, taking into consideration the findings from the principal component analysis mentioned before. Principal component analysis showed, not only for the total sample of 59 countries, but also for most of the seven geo-cultural regions, that there were two main components, one grouping four of the social groups in a component that seemed to measure group social exclusion, and another grouping the other four social groups that seemed to measure personal exclusion.

Table 7

Number of Groups Excluded Labelled Personal or Group, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Number of Groups excluded	Personal Exclusion	Group Exclusion
No group excluded	13.8	59.3
One excluded	13.6	19.3
Two excluded	25.8	9.5
Three excluded	22.3	5.9
Four excluded	24.6	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0

The construction of the two indexes has followed a similar pattern than the one used to construct the Total Social Exclusion Index. It is evident at first glance that, for the total sample of more than 85,000 respondents in the world social exclusion seems to be based more on personal or more individual characteristics (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals and people with AIDS) than in group characteristics (different race, religion or language, and immigrants and foreign workers).

Table 8

Mean Personal and Group Social Exclusion Index by Geo-Cultural Regions And Russia (Number Of Social Groups Excluded as Neighbours), WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Index	Mean Social Exclusion								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
Personal	**2.30**	1.91	1.98	3.19	2.55	2.17	1.68	2.31	**2.98**
Group	**.80**	.30	.55	.89	1.16	1.01	.38	.71	**0.83**

The mean number of social groups based on personal characteristics rejected is much higher than the mean for those based on group characteristics. And once again MENA countries show one of the highest means in Personal and Group Exclusion, though East European countries have even a higher Personal Exclusion Index, and Asian countries rank second in terms of Group Exclusion. Latin American and Anglo-Saxon countries are the ones with lowest Personal and Group Exclusion. Russia, once more, shows the second highest Personal and Group Exclusion Indexes (only lower than those in East Europe and Balkan region).

Describing who are the Excluders

Following our objectives, we have described who the excluded social groups in present societies are, and then we have constructed three indexes to measure Social Exclusion. Now we must try to find out who the excluders are.

Table 9

Correlation Coefficients among the three Indexes of Social Exclusion, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Index	Personal Exclusion	Group Exclusion	Total Social Exclusion
Personal Exclusion	1	.190**	.801**
Group Exclusion	.190**	1	.740**
Total Social Exclusion	.801**	.740**	1

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The three correlation coefficients are high and statistically significant, but the stronger is between Personal Exclusion and Total Exclusion, and the weakest is between Personal and Group Social Exclusion. Similar results are found in Russia, the three coefficients being statistically significant and in two cases even stronger

than for the total sample: *r* total vs. personal = .769, *r* total vs. group = .790 and *r* personal vs. group = .216.

Traditionally one would look for differences in the mean values of Social Exclusion among different segments of the population, usually demographic characteristics, in order to find out who are the groups of people who are more likely to socially exclude other groups, measured through the proxy question used in WVS surveys, and more specifically through the indexes just described. Thus Total Social Exclusion seems to be a little higher among males than among females, it is usually higher among the young ones than among the elderly, and it seems to be negatively related to education, income and employment status, with some minor exceptions. And it is certainly confirmed that in all segments of the population Personal Exclusion is higher than Group Exclusion.

But interesting as that may be, it seems more appropriate to use theoretical assumptions and try to formulate hypothesis about certain explanatory relationships. In fact, centre-periphery theory combines in a single index many of the demographic variables (Galtung, 1964, 1976; Díez-Nicolás, 1966, 2009, 2013) to measure social position of individuals in society.

Table 10

Mean Value of the three Indexes of Social Exclusion, by Some Demographic Variables, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Demographic Variables	Indexes of Social Exclusion		
	Personal	Group	Total
Total	2.30	0.80	3.11
Sex			
Female	2.31	0.78	3.09
Male	2.30	0.82	3.12
Age groups			
18–29	2.31	0.83	3.14
30–49	2.32	0.79	3.12
50–64	2.28	0.79	3.07
65+	2.27	0.76	3.03
Education			
Less than primary	2.41	0.93	3.35
Primary	2.27	0.91	3.18
Secondary	2.31	0.78	3.09
University	2.28	0.69	2.97
Income			
Low	2.20	0.91	3.11
Middle Low	2.37	0.78	3.15
Middle High	2.33	0.77	3.10
High	2.26	0.84	3.10
Employment status			
Not employed	2.36	0.85	3.20
Partial job or self employed	2.32	0.89	3.21
Full time job	2.28	0.70	2.98

According to this theory some social positions are more central than others (they have more information, as well as more opinions and they generate or support new attitudes and social values earlier than the social periphery). Accordingly, individuals in the social centre should be less socially excluders than those in the social periphery. We also know that individuals in the social centre are more exposed to information than those in the social periphery, so that more individuals more exposed to information should be less socially excluders than the less exposed. For similar reasons, since the social centre is more supportive of new values (post-materialistic, more oriented towards self expression values than the social periphery, more oriented towards materialistic, survival values), we should also expect a negative relationship between post-materialist values and social exclusion (Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1990, 1997; Díez-Nicolás, 2013). And finally, taking into account that security (in all kinds of different aspects) is becoming one of the more important values in present societies, one should expect that people who feel less secure would be more likely to be more socially excluder than those who feel more secure (Díez-Nicolás, 2015).

Therefore, we can summarize our main hypotheses as follows: social exclusion (as measured by the proxy Indexes of Social Exclusion) is negatively related to social position, to information, to post-materialist values and to perception of security. We have measurements for all five main groups of variables through different indexes. Thus, we have three measures of Social Exclusion, two of Social Position, three of Exposure to Information, one of Post-materialist values and four of Security. We have proceeded to examine these relationships before including other potential explanatory variables of Social Exclusion in a comparative world perspective and with a special focus in Russia.

The construction of the Social Position Index has followed the modification already established by Díez-Nicolás in 2009, with full agreement by Galtung[6]. The distribution of the SP-5 Index in three categories (social centre, middle and social periphery is the following).

Table 11

Distribution of the Population in three Categories of Social Position, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Categories of Social Position	Geo-cultural regions								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
Social Periphery	**22.7**	3.5	13.8	11.9	34.4	15.1	19.5	51.1	**13.4**
Middle	**54.5**	45.2	51.5	65.0	52.8	58.5	56.6	43.9	**59.8**
Social Centre	**16.7**	37.2	28.3	21.5	8.0	19.0	12.2	3.6	**22.4**

[6] The index is based on sex (male = 1, female = 0); age (–18 and +75 years = 0; 18–25 and 65–74 = 1; 26–35 and 55–64 = 2; 36–54 = 3); educational level (less than primary = 0; primary completed = 1; secondary or technical completed = 2; university = 3); income level (low = 0; middle low = 1; middle high = 2; high = 3); centrality of place of residence (low = 0; middle low = 1; middle high = 2; high = 3); and employment status (not employed = 0; partial job or self employed = 1; full time job = 2). The complexity of measuring these six demographic characteristics is very high, so that some variable, like occupation or urban-rural habitat, has not been included because of lack of information or because of lack of comparability among countries. Since the correlation between the two Indexes of Social Position is r= .95 for all countries (r =.98 for Spain), and in order to lose as little information as possible, we decided to have income for as many countries and individuals as possible, and therefore have used Social Position-6.

As expected, the social centre is higher than the social periphery in the populations of Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries, in East European and Balkan countries and in Asia and Russia. Only in MENA and Sub-Sahara regions the social periphery is larger than the social centre. Nevertheless, the middle category is more than half the population in the total sample and all regions except Anglo-Saxon Countries and Sub-Sahara. This finding is important because if Social Position is negatively related to Social Exclusion, as has been stated as hypothesis, then we should expect more exclusionism among the populations of MENA and Sub-Saharan regions, and less in Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries.

First, we have analyzed the relationship between Social Position and Social Exclusion. The correlation matrix between the two indexes of Social Position and the three indexes of Social Exclusion shows that Social Position and Social Exclusion are negatively and statistically significantly related in all six correlation coefficients. But the three coefficients of Social Position-5 are a little stronger than with Social Position-6. And the correlation coefficients with Group Exclusion are higher than with Personal Exclusion, but negative as said before. In the case of Russia the six coefficients are negative, as expected, but the relationships are weaker, especially with SP-5. Nevertheless, for the total sample, the three correlation coefficients between SP-5 and the three social exclusion indexes are statistically significant at the .05 levels and negative, as indicated and expected, while they are significant at the .01 level for SP-6. For all these reasons we have used Social Position-6 as the independent explanatory variable.

Table 12

Correlation Coefficients between Social Position-6 Index and three Indexes of Social Exclusion, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Indexes of Social Exclusion	Social position-6 Index								
	Total sample 59 countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Personal Exclusion	**–.065****	–.089**	–.123**	–.027**	–.018*	–.081**	–.040**	–.071**	**–.049***
Group Exclusion	**–.087****	–.088**	–.100**	–.039**	–.027**	–.142**	–.018	.007	**–.029**
Total Exclusion	**–.098****	–.117**	–.140**	–.043**	–.028**	–.151**	–.040**	–.048**	**–.050***

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

It may be observed that the relationship of Social Position-6 with the three Social Exclusion Indexes is negative in all geo-cultural regions and Russia, like in the total sample, with the only exceptions of the relationship with Group Exclusion in Latin America and Sub-Saharan countries. And all relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level and most at the .01 level, with the previous exceptions plus the relationship with Group Exclusion in Russia. People in the

social periphery are therefore more likely to be social exclusionists, especially personal exclusionists, than people in the social centre, a finding that is coherent with centre-periphery theory.

The second hypothesis refers to exposure to information. In this case we have constructed four indexes. The WVS survey had information about recent exposure to daily newspapers, printed magazines, TV news, radio news, mobile phone, e-mail, internet and talk with friends, a total of eight sources of information. We constructed a first general Index of Information by adding one point for each source to which the respondent had been exposed recently. But then we decided to construct two separate indexes, one for Traditional Information sources (daily newspapers, printed magazines, TV news and radio news), and a second one for New Social Media (mobile phone, e-mail, internet and talk with friends). Furthermore, we constructed an additional Traditional Information Index excluding exposure to TV.

Most respondents all over the world use regularly between three and five media, in a distribution that looks very much as a "normal" distribution, with only 2% who admit they don't use any media at all, and 7% who declare using the eight media regularly. But there are significant differences on the use of media in different geo-cultural regions of the world.

Table 13

Mean and Standard Deviation in Information Indexes by Geo-Cultural Regions and Russia (Number of Media Used Last Week), WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Mean and Standard Deviation	**All countries**	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
Information index 3									
$\bar{x}$	**4.29**	4.88	5.17	4.12	3.99	4.21	4.22	3.82	**4.37**
σ	**2.03**	1.92	1.95	1.83	2.08	2.11	1.91	1.95	**1.88**
Social networks use index									
$\bar{x}$	**2.03**	2.49	2.45	1.86	2.11	1.92	1.92	1.67	**2.05**
σ	**1.38**	1.35	1.40	1.25	1.42	1.40	1.40	1.22	**1.35**
Traditional media use index									
$\bar{x}$	**2.26**	2.40	2.72	2.26	1.88	2.28	2.30	2.15	**2.32**
σ	**1.10**	1.10	1.08	1.06	1.06	1.12	1.01	1.10	**1.05**
Traditional media use index (excluding TV)									
$\bar{x}$	**1.37**	1.55	1.79	1.32	1.02	1.38	1.37	1.41	**1.39**
σ	**.99**	0.92	.99	1.01	0.94	1.03	0.93	0.85	**0.98**

As expected, use of all types of media, new social networks or traditional media, is higher in the more developed world, that is, European Union and Anglo-Saxon countries, and lower in MENA region and Sub-Saharan countries. It must be observed that the use of new social networks is lower in Latin American and Asian countries than in MENA region countries, while the opposite is true regarding traditional media (even if one takes out use of TV). Probably this indicates that new social networks or media had a very significant role in MENA region countries in recent years (since 2010 onwards), because their index of use is higher than in all other regions and Russia, apart

from Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries. Russians use media very regularly, since their Information index is only lower than in Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries, its use of New Social Media is only lower than those two regions plus MENA region, and it ranks third after Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries regarding the use of traditional media, even if TV is not taken into consideration.

All correlation coefficients among the four indexes of information are statistically significant at the .01 level, not only for the total sample of 59 countries, but also for the seven geo-cultural regions and Russia. The relationships are rather strong, especially between the general Information Index-3 and the index of use of new social networks media.

Table 14

Correlation Coefficients between Information Indexes and Social Exclusion Indexes, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Index	Information index-3	New Social Media Use Index	Traditional Media Use Index
Total Social Exclusion Index	–.062**	–.043**	–.063**
Personal Exclusion Index	–.055**	–.033**	–.060**
Group Exclusion Index	–.041**	–.033**	–.037**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The initial hypothesis on the relationship between information and social exclusion is confirmed, in the sense that it is negative, so that respondents more informed are less likely to be socially exclusionists and vice versa. We have decided to use Information Index-3 to measure the total exposure to information.

Table 15

Correlation Coefficients between Information Index-3 and three Indexes of Social Exclusion, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Exclusion	Information index-3								
	Total sample 59 countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Personal Social Exclusion	**–.055****	.000	–.090**	–.063**	.067**	–.098**	.006	–.008	**–.031**
Group Social Exclusion	**–.041****	–.016	–.027**	–.069**	–.012	–.008	–.006	.047**	**.000**
Total Social Exclusion	**–.062****	–.009	–.076**	–.085**	.038**	–.077**	.001	.030**	**–.020**

**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

But the relationship does not hold for Anglo-Saxon and Latin American countries, neither for Russia, in any of the three indexes of social exclusion. It doesn't hold either for group exclusion in MENA region and Asia, or for personal exclusion in Sub-Sahara. And more surprisingly, the relationship is positive and not negative, but statistically significant for group and total social exclusion in Sub-Saharan countries.

The lack of full confirmation of the relationship between exposure to information and social exclusion deserves more analysis in the future regarding the regions involved, but the relationship is confirmed in most regions and for the three indexes of social exclusion.

However, and according to the theory, the relationship between social position and information is strongly positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, implying that the social centre uses much more than the social periphery all types of media, traditional or new social networks. The relationship is positive, strong and statistically significant at the .01 level in the nine coefficients, in all seven regions and also in Russia.

The third hypothesis refers to the values system. According to the theory new post-materialistic values are positively related with social position and with information, and therefore should be negatively related to social exclusion. That is, people oriented towards new post-materialistic, self-expression values, should be less exclusionist of any social groups than people oriented towards the more survival, conservative and traditional values. Inglehart developed two indexes, one with 12 items and another one with only four items (two measuring materialism and two measuring post-materialist attitudes). The four items index has proven to be much better predictor in all countries, and it is the one we use here (Díez-Nicolás, 2000).

Table 16

Percent Distribution of the Population by Values, by Geo-Cultural Regions and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Values	**All countries**	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Materialist	**34.2**	19.1	25.3	49.0	38.9	34.0	23.9	37.4	**52.7**
Mixed	**52.0**	56.3	58.4	45.3	44.4	52.1	57.3	57.4	**41.8**
Post-materialist	**8.2**	16.9	12.7	2.8	5.1	7.0	14.8	5.0	**2.1**
Total	**94.3**	92.3	96.4	97.1	88.4	93.2	96.0	99.8	**96.6**
Missing; Unknown	**5.7**	7.7	3.6	2.9	11.6	6.8	4.0	.2	**3.4**

Usually more than half the population in each territory shows mixed values, materialist and post-materialist, and the proportion of materialists is generally higher than the proportion of post-materialists. As may be observed, all distributions are very similar (a very frequent finding when using this scale), but the proportion of the population oriented towards the new post-materialist values is a little higher in Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries, as well as in Latin America. And it is extremely low in East Europe and the Balkans, and even lower in Russia.

Table 17

Correlation Coefficients between Post-Materialist Values and Social Exclusion, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Index	Post-materialist index (4-item)
Personal Exclusion Index	–.134**
Group Exclusion Index	–.036**
Total Social Exclusion Index	–.113**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The relationship between post-materialist values and social exclusion is negative and statistically significant at .01 level, as expected from the theory. New post-materialistic values include tolerance and social acceptance of people who are different. Therefore, those with post-materialistic values are expected not to be social excluders.

Table 18

Correlation Coefficients between Post-Materialism-4 and three Indexes of Social Exclusion, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Exclusion	Post-materialism-4								
	Total sample 59 countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Personal	**–.134****	–.065**	–139**	–.040**	–.018*	–.116**	–.053**	–.029**	**–.018**
Group	**–.036****	–.040**	–.093**	.038**	.055**	–.003	.013	.048**	**.050***
Total	**–.113****	–.070**	–.147**	.002	.020*	–.086**	–.030**	.015	**.021**

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The three coefficients are generally negative and statistically significant in most regions, with only two a few exceptions on the significance, usually regarding the relationship with group or total exclusion. There are also some exceptions regarding the sign of the relationship in East Europe and the Balkans, in MENA region, in Latin America, in Sub-Sahara and in Russia.

Confirming also the theory, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship of Social Position and Information with Post-materialist values, implying that people in the social centre and those very much exposed to information tend to be more oriented towards the new post-materialistic values, while the less informed and in the social periphery are more oriented towards survival and traditional values. And this is true in all regions and in Russia, with only one exception: Anglo-Saxon countries and only regarding the relationship between social position and post-materialism.

The fourth and final hypothesis regards the relationship of Perception of Security and Social Exclusion. In previous research we have explained why Security has become one of the most important values (Díez-Nicolás, 2011, 2015). Perception of Security has been measured at four levels, personal (that includes family), community and national or external, plus total that summarizes the first three.

Table 19

Mean Perception of Total Perceived Security (Scale 1 to 4) by Geo-Cultural Regions and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Perceived Security	**All countries**	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Personal	**2.08**	2.80	2.60	2.10	2.03	1.96	1.84	1.73	**2.33**
Community	**3.16**	3.28	3.46	3.26	3.21	3.37	2.64	2.86	**2.69**
National	**2.18**	2.81	2.80	2.02	1.83	2.15	2.14	1.92	**2.06**
Total	**2.52**	2.98	2.99	2.50	2.36	2.56	2.25	2.24	**2.36**

Perception of community security seems to be higher than personal and national security in all regions and also in Russia. Perception of all kinds of security is higher in Anglo-Saxon and European Union countries than in any other region. Perception of security in Russia is lower than in those two regions, but higher than in any other region with respect to Personal Security. But, regarding Community Security Russia scores lower than any region except Latin America. National Security in Russia is only higher than in East Europe and Balkans, MENA region and Sub-Saharan countries. And Total Security in Russia is only higher than in Latin America and Sub-Saharan countries. The lowest perception of personal security and total security is found in Sub-Saharan countries, but the lowest perception of community security is found in Latin America, probably due to organized crime in some countries like Mexico and some other countries, but countries in MENA region are the ones that show the lowest perception of national or external security, an expected finding given the conflictive situation of the region because of violence in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

All correlation coefficients of the four indexes of security among themselves are high and statistically significant, implying that the four aspects seem to be overlapping. But total perception of security shows the strongest relationships with the other three indexes. This is also true in each of the seven regions, and in Russia.

Table 20

Correlation Coefficients among the four Indexes of Perceived Security and Social Exclusion, Full Sample WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Exclusion	Standardized Total Security Index	Standardized Personal Security Index	Standardized Community Security Index	Standardized External Security Index
Personal Social Exclusion	–.048**	–.058**	.087**	–.101**
Group Social Exclusion	–.064**	–.035**	.020**	–.090**
Total Social Exclusion	–.072**	–.061**	.071**	–.124**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Our initial hypothesis about a negative relationship between perception of security and social exclusion is confirmed. People who feel secure do not fear other different peoples. All the correlation coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the .01 level, with the only exceptions of perceived community security, which shows a positive correlation with all three indexes of social exclusion. We decided to use Perceived Total Security as a predictor, since it includes the other three indicators.

Table 21

Correlation Coefficients between Total Perceived Security and three Indexes of Social Exclusion, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010-14)

Exclusion	Total perceived security								
	Total sample 59 countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Personal	**–.048****	–.051**	–.080**	.000	.057**	–.037**	–.058**	–.046**	**–.011**
Group	**–.064****	–.079**	–.076**	–.004	.092**	–.109**	–.111**	–.007	**–.056**
Total	**–.072****	–.084**	–.097**	–.002	.093**	–.099**	–.109**	–.040**	**–.044**

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

In general, the relationships are negative and significant, with only a few exceptions. For example, total perception of security does not seem to be significantly related to any of the three measures of social exclusion in East European and Balkan countries and coherently in Russia. There seems to be no relationship either between total perceived group exclusion in Sub-Saharan countries. But it must be pointed out that even in those cases the relationship between perceived security and social exclusion is generally negative.

We may then summarize our main findings, and especially the results of our main hypotheses about how social position, exposure to information, values and perception of security may affect social exclusion. For each of the four predictors we have selected the index that seems to give a more global measurement of each concept.

Table 22

Correlation Coefficients between Total Social Exclusion and Social Position-6, Information-3, Post-Materialist Values-4, and Total Perception of Security, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Index	Total Social Exclusion Index								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Saharan Africa	**Russia**
Social Position Index-6	**–.098****	–.117**	–.140**	–.043**	–.028**	–.151**	–.040**	–.048**	**–.050***
Information Index-3	**–.062****	–.009	–.076**	–.085**	.038**	–.077**	.001	.030**	**–.020**
Post-materialist-4 index	**–.113****	–.070**	–.147**	.002	.020*	–.086**	–.030**	.015	**.021**
Total Security Index	**–.072****	–.084**	–.097**	–.002	.093**	–.099**	–.109**	–.040**	**–.044**

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

We have supplied enough evidence to confirm our initial hypotheses, in the sense that Social Position, Information, Post-materialist values, and Perception of Security are negatively related to Social Exclusion. Most correlation coefficients adjust to the described pattern, that is, they are negative and statistically significant. But the data for MENA region and Sub-Saharan countries seem not to support entirely these hypotheses, and partially that is also true in East Europe and the Balkans, in Russia and in Latin America. However, data from Anglo-Saxon, European Union and Asian countries support fully our hypotheses. More analysis is needed to find out why some relationships are a little different in some regions.

Explaining Social Exclusion

The four independent, explanatory variables, that have been analyzed, probably contribute to the explanation of social exclusion in different societies around the world, more in some countries than in others. It seems now the time to establish

how much they explain, and whether or not there are other variables that may contribute to expand the degree that social exclusion can be explained. From the analysis of correlation coefficients one might conclude that values, that is, post-materialist values, would be the variable that contributes more to the explanation of social exclusion. But we also know that the four variables analyzed as explanatory variables are quite related among themselves.

Therefore, it seems necessary first to establish how much the four of them together can explain, and how much each one of them contributes to the explanation.

Table 23

Regression Model for Explaining Total Social Exclusion on the Basis of Social Position, Information-3, Post-Materialism-4 and Total Perceived Security, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Variables	Total social exclusion								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
R^2 adjusted =	**.022****	.023**	.041**	.015**	.020**	.035**	.005**	.007**	**.005**
	Standardized Beta Coefficients								
Social Position-6	**–.074****	–.110**	–.119**	–.040**	–.011	–.116**	–.025*	–.067**	**–.061**
Information-3	**–.028****	.019	–.004	–.110**	.082**	–.025*	.024	.065**	**.001**
Post-materialism-4	**–.089****	–.062**	–.117**	.009	.066**	–.079**	–.025*	.017	**.047**
Total Security	**–.051****	–.082**	–.085**	–.016	.104**	–.119**	–.068**	–.035**	**–.051**

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

The model explains only 2% of the total variance in Total Social Exclusion for the total sample of 59 countries and more than 85,000 respondents, and the relationship is significant at the .01 level. As may be seen, all four indexes are negatively related to Social Exclusion, confirming our initial hypotheses that the higher the social position, the higher the exposure to information, the higher the post-materialism and the higher the perception of security, the lower would be the number of social groups not wanted as neighbours. When the model is calculated for the seven regions, it is observed that the adjusted total regression coefficient (R^2 adjusted) is higher in European Union countries and Asia, and lower in Latin American and Sub-Saharan countries. It is also very low and statistically not significant in Russia. Nevertheless, most adjusted regression coefficients (beta) are negative and statistically significant, as expected. But there are two types of results that do not follow the general expected pattern. Some relationships are positive instead of negative, and some coefficients, regardless of their direction, are not statistically significant. The first type of deviation is found mainly in MENA region countries, and the second type is in most cases related to the relationship of information with social exclusion. In the case of Russia none of the four coefficients is statistically significant.

Post-materialism and Social Position seem to be the two variables that contribute more to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion in the total sample.

But there are many differences when looking at the regression coefficients in each region. Social Position and Post-materialism are the two variables that explain more in European Union countries. Social position is the best predictor in Anglo-Saxon and Sub-Saharan countries, Information is the best in East Europe and the Balkans, Total Perceived Security and Social Position are the best in Asia, and Total Perceived Security is the explanatory variable that contributes more to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion in Latin America. As we said, a great variety and not one single pattern, which means that the region, and even more, the country, continues to be the most useful unit of analysis. In any case, these results suggest that it would be appropriate to look for additional variables that, according to previous research, and especially, according to the variables available in the combined data set of European and World Values research, and to the potential capacity to explain that they have shown in other pieces of research on values, are expected to increase the percent of the variance explained by the model.

Table 24

Regression Model for Explaining Total Social Exclusion on the Basis of a Group of Explanatory Variables, by Geo-Cultural Region and Russia, WVS-6 (2010–2014)

Explanatory variables	Total social exclusion								
	All countries	Anglo-Saxon	European Union	East Europe & Balkans	MENA	Asia	Latin America	Sub-Sahara	**Russia**
R^2 adjusted =	**.052****	.056**	.068**	.055**	.026**	.052**	.030**	.014**	**.018**
	Standardized Beta Coefficients								
Social Position-6	–.040**	–.087**	–.077**	–.025	–.004	–.142**	–.004	–.065**	–.057
Information-3	–.018**	.023	.028 *	–.080**	–.043**	–.005	.043**	.054**	.050
Post-materialism-4	–.089**	–.038*	–.102**	.004	.063**	–.101**	–.011	.020	.045
Total Perception of Security	–.040**	–.031	–.051**	.023	–.002	–.113**	–.040**	–.044**	–.053
Feeling of happiness	–.029**	–.011	–.053**	.001	.003	–.046**	–.010	–.010	–.004
Self-evaluation of health	–.015**	–.016	-.031*	.019	.011	.057**	–.052**	.020	–.059
Satisfaction with life	–.085**	–.093**	–.051**	–.117**	–.004	–.009	-.049**	.007	–.032
Ideology	.056**	.159**	.062**	.015	.040**	.004	.030 *	–.033**	–.021
Importance of democracy	–.061**	–.045**	–.057**	–.038**	–.079**	.008	–.065**	-.038**	–.091
Religious person	–.014*	.065**	.040*	–.112**	.053**	.000	.075**	.029**	.096
Importance of God in life	.091**	–.007	.073**	.156**	.001	–.021	–.017	.069**	–.120**
National pride	–.033**	.008	.011	–.069**	–.111**	–.061**	–.107**	.028*	.373

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

We have therefore constructed a regression model to explain total social exclusion with the same four independent variables and eight additional ones[7]. This model explains 5% of the variance in Total Social Exclusion, more than twice what was explained by the model with the four explanatory variables. But there is a high degree of variation regarding the proportion of the variance explained in the different regions. We may observe that the model explains more in European Union countries (7%) and very little in Sub-Saharan and MENA countries (1% and 3% respectively). The model explains almost 2% of the variance in total social exclusion in Russia, even much less than in the East Europe and Balkans region.

The important finding is that, in spite of the possible relationships between each variable and the other eleven, all the variables contribute to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion in a statistically significant manner in the total sample. The variables that seem to contribute more to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion, in the total sample, are the importance of God in their life (positively), post-materialism and satisfaction with life, (both of them negatively related). Those who say that God is not important in their life, the post-materialists and the satisfied with their life are less likely to be exclusionists.

In Anglo-Saxon countries, the variable that contributes the most is ideology, but the relationship is not negative but positive, which means that individuals who consider themselves in the right are more likely to be exclusionists. The same would apply to self-evaluation as a religious person; those who consider themselves religious are more likely to be exclusionists. However, social position and satisfaction with life do contribute negatively and significantly to explain Total Social Exclusion (those in the social centre and those who are satisfied are likely not to be exclusionists).

In European Union countries post-materialism and social position are the best predictors of Total Social Exclusion, and in a lesser degree also importance of democracy, feeling of happiness, perceived security and satisfaction with life, all of them negatively related to Total Social Exclusion. But importance of God in their life and ideology are positively and significantly related to the dependent variable.

In East Europe and the Balkans satisfaction with life and being a religious person are the variables that contribute the most to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion, and less but always in a negative and significant manner, information, national pride and importance of democracy. But importance of God in their life is related positively to Total Social Exclusion, so that those for whom God is more important tend to be exclusionists.

In MENA region countries only six variables contribute the most to explain Total Social Exclusion, in order from more to less, national pride, importance of democracy and information (negatively) and post-materialism, being a religious person and ideology (positively).

In Asia, social position, perceived security and post-materialism are the best predictors of Total Social Exclusion, but also national pride, self-evaluation of health

[7] Feeling of happiness (4 categories), self-evaluation of health (4 categories), satisfaction with life (10 categories), the self positioning in the ideological scale (7 categories), importance of democracy (10 categories), self-evaluation of religiosity (3 categories), importance of God in one's life (10 categories), and national pride (4 categories).

and feeling of happiness. All of them are negatively related to the dependent variable except self-evaluation of health, which means that those who think they are in good health are more likely to be exclusionists.

In Latin America, national pride is the best predictor of Total Social Exclusion, so that those who are very proud of being nationals of their country are likely to be less exclusionists. Other significant negative relationships are importance of democracy, self-evaluation of health, satisfaction with life and total perceived security. But those who consider themselves to be religious and who are very exposed to information tend to be more likely to be exclusionists. Social position, perceived security, importance of democracy and ideology are the variables that in Sub-Saharan countries contribute more to the explanation of Total Social Exclusion, all of them in a negative direction. But importance of God in their life, being a religious person and information contribute positively to that explanation.

Finally, only one variable contributes significantly to explain Total Social Exclusion in Russia: Importance of God in their life, meaning that Russians who answer that God is important in their life tend to be less exclusionist[8].

We have constructed a second regression model to explain personal social exclusion with the same twelve independent variables. This model explains also 5% of the variance in personal social exclusion. The model explains more in Asian countries and in European Union countries (6%) and very little in Latin America and MENA countries (2% and 3% respectively), and even less in Russia. The variation among regions is therefore quite less than regarding total social exclusion. All of the twelve variables contribute to the explanation of personal social exclusion in a statistically significant manner in the total sample, except the self evaluation as a religious person. The variables that contribute most to the explanation of the variance in personal social exclusion, in the total sample, are the importance of God in their life, and post-materialism, but with different directions, positively in the first case and negatively in the second. This finding is basically the same than was found regarding Total Social Exclusion.

When examining the relationships of the independent variables with the dependent one, personal social exclusion, it is evident that most are similar to what was found with respect to total social exclusion. In order not to repeat the same comments, we only comment which are the variables that contribute more to the explanation of the variance of the dependent variable. Thus, in Anglo-Saxon countries that variable is ideology (positively related with personal social exclusion), but in Sub-Saharan countries the same variable is the best predictor, though the relationship is negative. In European Union countries the best predictor is post-materialism, negatively related to the dependent variable. In East Europe and the

[8] The fact that a variable does not contribute to the explanation of social exclusion does not mean that it is not related to the dependent variable, it only means that it does not add anything to the explanation over what other variables have already explained, probably due to its relationships with these other variables. We want to insist on this issue because too frequently some analysts will come to the conclusion that the specific independent variable is not related to the dependent variable. The fact is that it doesn't add anything to what other variables explain, but we don't know really what would be the case if the said variables were not present.

Balkans, and in Asia, importance of God in life is the variable that contributes more to the explanation of the variance in personal social exclusion, in the sense that those for whom God is very important are likely to be exclusionists. National pride and information are negatively related to personal social exclusion as the best predictors of its variance in MENA region countries. Being a religious person is positively related to personal social exclusion in Latin America, and is the variable that contributes more to explaining its variance. And finally, none of the independent variables seem to contribute significantly to the explanation of Personal Exclusion in Russia.

The third regression model includes the same twelve independent variables to explain the variance in group social exclusion. This model only explains a 3% of that variance, that is, a little more than half what the previous two models explain. The variation among regions is therefore less than regarding total or personal social exclusion, from 3% in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa to 7% in Asia. However, the model explains 4% of the variance in Group Exclusion in Russia, and in this case this finding is highly statistically significant (at the .01 level).

Eight of the twelve variables contribute to the explanation of group social exclusion in a statistically significant manner in the total sample. The variable that contributes most to the explanation of the variance in group social exclusion, in the total sample, is importance of democracy. This finding is quite different to what was found in the previous two models. It implies that those who don't consider democracy important tend to be more exclusionists.

When examining the relationships of the independent variables with the dependent one, group social exclusion, it is evident that most are similar to what was found with respect to total and to personal social exclusion. In order not to repeat the same comments, we will only comment which are the variables that contribute more to the explanation of the variance of the dependent variable. Thus, in Anglo-Saxon countries that variable is again ideology (positively related with group social exclusion). In European Union and Asian countries the best predictor is social position, negatively related to the dependent variable. In East Europe and the Balkans three variables contribute more to the explanation of the variance in group social exclusion, two negatively (importance of democracy and religiosity), and one positively related (importance of God in their life). But in Russia religiosity is the best predictor of Group Exclusion, in the sense that those who consider themselves more religious tend to be also more exclusionist. Importance of democracy is negatively related to group social exclusion as the best predictor of its variance in MENA region countries. Importance of God in one's life (plus social position mentioned above) is negatively related to group social exclusion in Asia, and they are the variables that contribute more to explaining its variance. National pride is negatively related to group social exclusion as its best predictor.

Conclusions and Discussion of Results

This research paper has been based almost exclusively on the World Values Survey data file of the 6th wave, conducted in 59 countries with a total of more than 85,000

personal interviews collected almost entirely through face-to-face interviews at the home of the respondent[9].

Based on the evidence presented here we can conclude that drug addicts, heavy drinkers, homosexuals and people with AIDS are the four more undesired social groups as neighbours worldwide. The only exceptions are that Immigrants are more undesired than people with AIDS in Sub-Saharan countries.

Two main reasons could explain why drug-addicts score first in all geo-cultural regions. On the one hand, excluders manifest fear of them linking drug-addiction with crime and poverty. On the other hand, people tend to blame drug-addicts, heavy-drinkers, people with AIDS for an allegedly voluntary behaviour. March, Oviedo-Joekes, and Romero (2006) conclude that, despite the diversity of characteristics between countries, socially excluded drug users showed high scores in specific exclusion indicators, such as incarceration, illegal drug use, housing problems, poor health status, lack of employment, and engagement in criminal activities. According to Seddon (2006), Santana (2002), and Foster (2000), the problem of drug-related crime is inextricably linked with issues of socio-economic disadvantage and social exclusion.

The association of drugs with criminality and poverty has come to be seen as natural rather than historically novel. Pearson (1989) suggests that this is part of a wider process of the social construction of drug problems, which, as observes, has tended historically to focus on the drug consumption of socially disadvantaged groups. Mathiesen (1990), Bauman (1998), and Wacquant (2001) consider that there is a "criminalization of the poor" as criminal law and penal responses tend to focus most on the activities of the socially and economically disadvantaged. For Foucault (1991), Healy (2001), and Voruz (2005), this relation has come to be an objective and unquestionable truth that invariably begins as a response to a concrete situation which is "*real*" but that also offers scope for a more radical critical account that can destabilise the present.

Alcoholism is a severely stigmatized condition, which is heavily associated with a notion of blame and enforcement of social norms. Furthermore, alcohol-dependent persons are seen as unpredictable and dangerous and alcoholism is seen as a voluntary condition. Negative stereotypes like being dangerous or unpredictable cannot simply be rejected as being wrong, as drunken driving and alcohol-related domestic violence are societal problems. Phelan et al. (2008) argue that in those diseases presenting as a deviant but voluntary behaviour, the purpose of stigmatization could be enforcement of social norms. The function of stigma and prejudice may be to make the deviant conform and rejoin the in-group, or it may be to clarify for other group members the boundaries for acceptable behaviour and identity and the consequences for non-conformity. Schomerus, Lucht, Holzinger, Matschinger, Carta, and Angermeyer (2011) concluded that compared with people suffering from other, substance-unrelated mental disorders, alcohol-dependent persons are less frequently regarded as mentally ill, are held much more responsible for their condition, provoke more social rejection and more negative emotions, and are at particular risk for structural discrimination. Their conclusion is that alcoholism is a particularly severely stigmatized mental disorder.

[9] Retrieved from: www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Bayer (2008) and Burris (2008) think that, seen from a perspective of purpose, the question arises whether stigmatization of alcoholism could not simply represent a rational, successful strategy to improve public health, forcing people to cut down their drinking to avoid stigmatization. Drinking per se, however, is not stigmatized. On the contrary, drinking alcohol is a social behaviour that is often associated with inclusion in a social grouping; it may even be a signal of power and status (Room, 2005), and often, even heavy drinking is socially accepted behaviour, examples are wedding receptions, business meetings and parties. Thus, when a person's drinking behaviour violates these norms and evokes stigmatization, the drinking problem has presumably become quite severe.

Taken together with the results from Ethiopia, a country with a low per capita alcohol consumption (Rehm et al., 2009), which depict alcoholism as a comparatively less exclusionary condition there, the question arises whether alcoholism may be generally less stigmatized in societies with lower alcohol consumption like many Islamic countries or India (Rehm et al., 2009), or to what extent the stigma of alcoholism depends on cultural belief systems about health and illness in general (Mulatu, 1999). For Santana (2002), alcohol has been shown to be responsible for a substantial burden of disease in Europe and other established market economies, especially in the area of morbidity and disability, as well as in terms of substantial social costs. For De Toledo, Piza Peluso, and Blay (2008) individuals with alcohol dependence are perceived as violent and capable of arising negative reactions among members of the community, such as negative ideas and reactions of avoidance and distancing.

Scott (1998) observed that attitudes towards homosexuality were becoming slowly more tolerant, especially among women, but condemnation of extra-marital sex remained high. She concluded that religion played an important role in explaining within and cross-national variations in attitudes and that provided a powerful counterbalance to permissiveness trends. Changing attitudes to sexual morality were not as revolutionary as claimed and the demise of traditional values was over-stated. Simmons (2008) has developed an analysis on the ways in which immigration and homosexuality are jointly produced and regulated by the state through immigration policy. Cross-national surveys suggest that negative attitudes toward homosexuality are more prevalent in the *new* Europe (Štulhofer & Sandfort, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Among the new members of the EU and the other post-communist countries, the Eastern Orthodox countries were found higher in homo negativity than the Roman Catholic. A similar finding was reported by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), who used the WVS database. In comparison to the Protestant and Catholic religion, Eastern Orthodoxy increases social distance toward homosexuals, regardless of the level of modernization.

Exposure to a diversity of ideas and people that is typically associated with university education encourages people to be more open-minded and liberal (Inglehart, 1977). As economic prosperity increases through modernization, a change in citizens' value systems also occurs. According to Inglehart and his collaborators (Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003, 2004), a shift from materialist to post-materialist values, or self-expression values, takes

place when chances to satisfy material needs increase. Materialist values include the following: satisfying economic living conditions, security, national identity and the exclusion of outsiders. Post-materialist or self-expression values, in contrast, are characterized by the desire for self-fulfilment, an emphasis on freedom, participation and the tolerance of diversity (Inglehart, 2006). Inglehart interprets discrimination against homosexuals as one type of social exclusion. He shows that existential security tends to make all out-groups, including homosexuals, more acceptable.

Main results for Russia show that drug addicts and heavy drinkers are not desired as neighbours, their rejection has increased in the last two waves. Attitudinal studies in Russia have highlighted pervasive stigma directed toward both people with HIV and people who inject drugs (Balanova et al., 2006; Lioznov & Nikolaenko, 2011). Additionally, according to a Policy Briefing by WHO European Centre for Environment and Health (2006), there is considerable evidence which supports links between drinking and violent behavior. In the Russian Federation, alcohol consumption has been noted to be involved in the perpetration of violence generally as well as in specific types of violence.

Homosexuals are excluded by almost two thirds of Russian respondents since 1995, though a little less than they were in 1990. This is coherent with conclusions by Gulevich et al. (2016) who suggest that negative attitudes toward homosexuals include a perception of threat originating from homosexuals viewed as an active group. Individuals with high levels of prejudice see homosexuality as a deviation from a natural and moral norm that may threaten social morals, unless it is contained. Homosexuality is seen as a fashion, based on Western influence, which threatens Russian values. Homosexuals are perceived as a source of threat to individuals (as they are believed to be inclined to molest children and "convert" "normal" heterosexual adults to homosexual ways) and to the Russian society as a whole.

Summary of Main Results

The first main finding is that social exclusion of the same groups seems to be very stable across time and space, with very few changes between 1981 and 2010, and very few differences comparing seven geo-cultural world regions. Through principal component analysis it was found that apparently people all over the world, with very few exceptions, perceive two different types of social groups, those to which individuals belong regardless of their own personal decision (immigrants and foreign workers, different race, religion or language), and those who apparently have at least partially done something to belong to (drug addicts, heavy drinkers, people with AIDS and homosexuals). Results have been analyzed through seven geo-cultural regions in which the 59 countries have been distributed. Russia has been analyzed also separately. It has been found that social groups based on more individual choice are more excluded than those to which individuals belonged not because of their choice.

An index of total social exclusion has been constructed based on the number of social groups mentioned by respondents as undesired neighbours, ranging from 0 to 8 points. This total exclusion index has been disaggregated into two components, the personal exclusion index and the group exclusion index, each based on the exclusion

of four social groups respectively. All the indexes have been calculated for the total sample of 59 countries, the 7 geo-cultural regions and Russia. On the basis of these three indexes we have identified what categories of persons are more or less likely to be excluders. For that purpose different statistical tools have been used, mainly descriptive. Finally, an attempt to explain the main factors that lead to social exclusion has been implemented, mainly through correlation and regression analysis. Thus, it was confirmed that the four main explanatory variables: social position, information, post-materialist values and perception of security are negatively related to social exclusion because of existing theory and previous research. Other explanatory variables were added, measuring social, economic, political and religious attitudes and behaviours, which increased the power to explain social exclusion. But results show that social position, post-materialist values and some religious indicators seem to be the variables that contribute more to the explanation of social exclusion, though there are important specifications in these relationships in the different geo-cultural regions. Main findings are coherent with existing theory and research in this topic.

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ARTICLE

Revolution and Modernity[1]

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ABSTRACT
Revolution simultaneously legitimises and denies the coordinate centre of the political order of Modernity. It is difficult to describe the historical evolution from the early industrial, class-national forms of political organisation to late or global Modernity other than in terms of a *low-intensity revolution in the rate of social change*. On the other hand, this permanent modernisation is not revolutionary in the sense that the periodic splits of elites, colour revolutions, coups and national liberation movements do not in and of themselves make demands for fundamental change in the value-institutional core of the political order of Modernity. The potential for a new revolution can be consequent only on a repudiation of Modernity in favour of an alternative political project having a greater capability for universalisation and totalisation. If, in legitimising its liberal consensus and nation-state models as the dominant political format of their synthesis, capitalism is the value-institutional quintessence of the political order of Modernity, it is precisely in challenges to capitalism, the liberal consensus and nationalism that provide the most obvious means for crystallising revolutionary movements. From such a perspective, capitalism increasingly comes up against the global limits of its expansion, with class ideologies degenerating into a fragmented, technologically-intermediated populism, and nation-states experiencing increasing pressure from alternative political formats (city networks, multinational corporations, etc.) as they attempt to preserve the model of the social state. While various discourses and social groups profess to play the role of revolutionary utopias

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and subjects, in essence, their ability to present a totalising alternative to late Modernity remains an open question. A utopian systemic challenge to Modernity, connected with a morally more justified configuration and associated hierarchy of legitimate violence, is yet to emerge, whether from within Modernity or some source external to it. It is demonstrated that in the long term a serious (and possibly revolutionary) correction of the political order of modern societies will be capable of producing a rental transformation of capitalism and an expansion of the rent-class stratification mechanisms associated with precarisation, along with a reduction of social mobility trajectories and the prospects of active social groups.

KEYWORDS
revolution, violence, political order, legitimacy, modernity, late modernity, centre-periphery, global economics, political subject, consensus, rental society, precariat

The Political Project of Modernity as a Permanent Revolution?

Since all the ideological coordinates of the basic *liberal consensus* (Immanuel Wallerstein) are by definition reducible to it, revolution can be seen to form a sacred reference point in the political project of Modernity, a kind of event analogue of the Nativity of Christ in Christian chronology. In this constructed history, revolution appears freed from all references to divine prescriptions in the guise of the common will of the people regarding their common destiny. Therefore, as Ortega y Gasset aptly notes, "…referring to the uprisings of medieval peasants and burghers as the precursors of the revolutions of modern times testifies to a complete absence of historical intuition. Between them there is almost nothing in common. In rising up against his feudal masters, a medieval man was rebelling against the abuses of those masters. The revolutionary, conversely, does not rebel against abuses, but against the order of things" (Ortega y Gasset, 2016, p. 133). A revolution may create a heterarchy in which alternative sources of power are the condition for meaningful social changes but it is unable to maintain a stable political order associated with the daily regulation of the conflictual space of individual and collective freedom. As a result, "…the entire history of Modernity as the story of different societies faced with the 'absolute independence' of the individual can be represented as a series of successful and unsuccessful attempts to achieve and maintain public order" (Kapustin, 2010, p. 587).

Revolution is an initiating event for the political order of the New and Newest Times. However, it cannot provide final answers to the question of how the modern political order may be subsequently maintained. This order is one in which the initial principles of maximising both collective and individual autonomy entail endless contradictions and engender a mass of conflicts whose resolution can only be achieved with the institutional support of a *hierarchy* of values and interests in society.

A study of the history of the political order of Modernity reveals a constant revision and re-creation of social hierarchies along with associated compromises. As a metaphor, revolution refers to an instant transfiguration, transmutation, resurrection and a new life; it appears as a chiliastic dream of a collective and instantaneous transition to an earthly paradise, or, in later ideological forms, a rational plan for the realisation of a utopia. However, revolution never definitively establishes anything in the constant movement and renewal of generations, social groups, technological structures, and the dominant configurations of values and interests. Therefore, the revolution never reaches its final goals, which are ostensibly connected with a total change in relations between man, society and state. The stratification of revolutionary agents in the course of revolution leads to the attainment of the most radical goals being determined by terror, purges and mutual annihilation of the revolutionaries, who seek to monopolise the revolutionary ideology as the new basis of power. If the monopolistic claim of the revolutionary subject is successful, the new political order will become totalitarian; however, a compromise is more typically established between the outgoing and rising classes, with any social contradiction entailed by the former tending to be replaced by another inherent to the latter. In any case, the temporal unfolding of the revolution invariably involves the instrumental incorporation of the revolution by the revolutionary political subject into new structures of political hegemony. In their attempts to fix and routinise the achievements of the revolution, the subjects of revolution seize the coercive apparatus of the state; however, in so doing, the revolutionaries are themselves inevitably overtaken by the logic of the reproduction of the political order, transforming them into a new bureaucracy.

If the usual political order is based on the legitimisation of violence, then the revolution appears both as the foundation of Modernity and as an ineliminable challenge to it. The revolution confirms in practical terms the primary liberal thesis that the social order is not eternal but is the work of human hands. However, this is also why, being divided between finite and imperfect people, it cannot become finalised or its laws remain absolute and unchanged. For this, people would have to live forever, without the succession of generations or the movement of history. The revolution generates a modern political order, which offers alternative and morally more convincing grounds for violence than those operated by the estate-monarchical Ancien Régime. Exemplary, classical revolutions concerned the demolition of the Ancien Régime, which did not possess the internal conditions and mechanisms for reform in the course of growing systemic contradictions of the changing social structure and background in which Christian values were being eroded by new practices introduced by capitalism: “the policy of the medieval ‘petit bourgeois’ was to counterpose the privileges of the nobility with exactly the same privileges. City guilds and communes were famous for their narrow, suspicious and selfish spirit – even more so than feudal lords” (Ortega y Gasset, 2016, p. 138).

In other words, the revolution is inevitably rethought during the process of the institutionalisation of Modernity. From the initiating event, it is more confidently interpreted from the position of the new liberal consensus as political extremism, which threatens the modern political order. In this way, Modernity is simultaneously

constituted by a legitimisation and a denial of the revolution, which, in destroying the Ancien Régime, brought it into existence. Institutional Modernity, then, is wholly derived from the revolutionary event that engendered it. Revolution appears as the transcendental centre of Modernity, to which, however, it does not belong completely, and therefore eludes attempts at complete control. However, at the same time, the above-noted centre legitimises this order from a sacred-symbolic space in which everyday and routine legitimation procedures lose their power. Moreover, the question of a destructive/creative incursion or a return of this sacrosanct centre to the political order of Modernity always remains open. In connection with this, the political order of Modernism, as an epiphenomenon of the revolution, constantly strives to gain independence from it with the help of all kinds of institutions and procedures that aim to ensure its repeatability, its immutability and its self-identity outside of historical time.

With a more detailed examination of contemporary political ontology, it can be noted that the ineradicable contradiction between the modern political order and revolution is not necessarily fatal. It can be said that, following the establishment of the *revolution-event***,** Modernity represents the same revolution, but a low-intensity revolution, *unfolding across a long period of historical time*. This is the undulatory or wave-like revolution that continues after the big bang that caused it and is associated with the endless changes and reconfigurations of the value-institutional core of the emergent society. However, if the basic legitimacy of the political order of Modernity always refers to the revolution, to the fact that we continue to live within this unfolding historical event mediated by many years and generations, then an obvious question arises: in what can a revolutionary change consist here and now against the background the fact that modern society is based on the tradition of progress – *of constant improving changes* – as a social norm? Modern societies may no longer require total revolutions. More important is the search for subtler socio-cultural adjustments that determine the effectiveness of the progress of each particular society. In such a system of coordinates, the absolute can only consist in change itself as a value.

Modernity counterposes the new *morality of change* to the customary *morality of tradition*, while at the same time strongly defending itself against any other radical changes that could undermine the new world. According to the thought of Jean Baudrillard, Modernity "gives rise to a *crisis of values and* moral contradictions. Thus, as an idea in which a whole civilisation recognises itself, modernity assumes a regulatory cultural function and thereby surreptitiously rejoins tradition." (Baudrillard, 1985, p. 424). Here arises the image of Modernity as a *new tradition* of controlled changes in the turbulent social order. In such a context, the true revolution will consist in a total rejection of the political project of Modernity. Since it is only revolution that can become a new *absolute event* (Filippov, 2006, p. 108), superseding Modernity in favour of a totalised alternative, an event that rejuvenates the very system of modern ideological coordinates that is substantiated by the *liberal consensus*. In the meantime, in place of total rejection, it is possible to observe predominantly limited utopias caused by the internal contradictions of Modernity, which are, however,

unlikely to consist in its potential alternatives. These include, for example, the logic of postmodernism, acting as a method of intellectual self-criticism and self-correction of late Modernity (Martianov, 2012).

The only revolution became a possibility within the new linear timeframe of Modernity, in which there exists a utopian discourse concerning a possible alternative future capable of being realised in the space of collective freedom. This contradicts previous cyclical concepts of time, in which the future is predicated by the present, and the recurrence of historical cycles does not entail significant differences that would allow the past to be distinguished from the present and the future as fundamentally different states of society. At the political centre of the Ancien Régime was the pre-ordained *divine tradition*; this is essentially what was refuted by rationally utilitarian and liberal Modernity. All the subsequent revolutions *within* Modernity were naturally limited in character, since either comprising the victories of nations in the struggle for sovereignty and independence; or were presented as counter-revolutions in the form of partial kickbacks to the Ancien Régime; or they only led to a rotation of the elites and an upgrade of the existing version of Modernity in the given society. This is the case irrespective of whether we are discussing the version of *late Modernity*, ideas about *multiple modernities* or the alternative project of *Soviet Modernity*. In all cases, we are dealing with invariants within the self-referential system of Modernism, which draws its legitimacy from the original act of its creation. This even applies, for example, in the case of the USSR, when the rational interpretation of the revolution as a whole still fits into the logic of liberal consensus in terms of its radical socialist invariant.

Moreover, the currently observed *colour revolutions* taking place under the conditions of late Modernity do not assume an analogous level of system development of the alternative political project, being essentially a *discourse of cultural reconstruction*, whether involving the logic of optimisation, reform or correction of the liberal consensus and capitalist ontology, but never implying a direct repudiation of the latter. Therefore, neither the struggle for sovereignty and periodic collapse of empires nor political upheavals or transition to different version/model of Modernity can properly be referred to in terms of revolution, any more than the dozens of other cases of *political convulsion* taking place in specific modern societies. This is true even if the results of the latter, thanks to symbolic politics and the construction of another collective memory, become a palliative reference point in the chronology of the new political regime. *Thus, in fact, humanity has not yet experienced any new revolutions since the pulling down of the Ancien Régime. Significant transformations of individual societies were associated primarily with a global transition to Modernity and then to its late value-institutional versions.* Against this background, the historical transformation of the project of Modernity is yet to lead to its *revolutionary displacement* of the alternative political project, despite all the fundamental differences between *early-industrial, class and national* Modernity variants and its later versions taking the form of *second, global, radical, fluid* or *singular* Modernity.

In abandoning reliance on tradition, the value centre of the political order of Modernity acquires a multifaceted character, which becomes the subject of

permanent coordination and recognition by key social groups. Institutionally, it is constantly adjusted under the influence of parties, regions, ideologies, classes, states and endless co-ordination procedures: the activities of bodies of different branches of government, elections, referendums, public-political and trade union activities, mass communications, international interactions, etc. All these subjects of influence are in themselves ambivalent: they can support, change and/or destroy the basic liberal consensus that lies at the foundation of Modernity. Moreover, all these particular entities themselves claim ideological representation of the whole. Therefore, in modern nations, the centre is always divided and implicit, being the subject of constant discussion or bargaining. However, any danger, catastrophe or external threat leads to a mobilisation of society, during the course of which the value centre is manifested and consolidated.

The post-revolutionary stabilisation of a modern society is achieved by means of a consistent differentiation and empowerment of the subsystems of society in terms of the private conflicts that arise within them. Here, it is necessary to ensure that the latter are solved at the lower and middle levels, not generalising and not ultimately covering the entire social system (Luhmann, 2006). The paradox consists in the fact that the constant accumulation of internal contradictions never reaches a critical level. In every subsystem of society – politics, economics, law, art, etc. – special mechanisms for coordinating interests and facilitating partial, gradual changes that prevent revolutionary scenarios are being elaborated. On the basis of this modern political order, feudal political power was divided into autonomous spheres, in which private ownership, for the first time, became relatively independent of power (i.e. power ceased to be directly equivalent to ownership). As a result, politics as a *zero-sum game*, in which the winner takes all, became a means of permanently reconciling social interests within a pre-established time period (Ankersmit, 2002). Complicated procedures for instrumental, day-to-day legitimation of the political order of Modernity, e.g., elections, referendums, rotation of elites, reconciliation of class and/or civil interests, turn the revolution into a ritual political reference point. The possibility of revising the conditions of social consensus through the political participation of citizens and the rotation of elites significantly reduces the severity of conflicts and limits the possibilities for their totalisation. An important role in smoothing political contradictions is played by the division of Modernity into elective and functional bureaucratic elites, which allows the day-to-day, rational-functional goals of the state apparatus to be combined with the setting of strategic goals related to a reconciliation of the interests of the dominant social groups. The processes of systemic differentiation naturally lead to modern citizens being increasingly unwilling to place high hopes in the revolution under the conditions of a growing autonomy within private life and the structurally autonomous subsystems of modern society that limit the political sphere.

Nevertheless, the modern political order always contains the seeds of future revolution. Appeals to the revolution in the context of legitimising and rhetorical power (in the case of its opponents, critical and practical) reveals the utopian space of the political order of Modernity, proving that it is still capable of further improvement in public laboratories and unpredictable social experiments – and

therefore, in principle, a candidate for early abolishment in favour of an alternative project. Therefore, the revolutionary challenges – whether cultural, economic, political – simply cannot accumulate in a sufficient volume for their own *revolutionary resolution*. A flexible political order either eliminates the initial causes of social unrest or actively incorporates new social forces. If it fails in this, a general reconfiguration takes place, during which meaningful social groups achieve recognition and *places at the common table***,** thus establishing a new equilibrium.

From this perspective, if the revolution consists in a disruption of the state, then it is only natural if the political logic of the state and the revolution are embroiled in insoluble conflict. According to the latest theories of the revolutionary process, it is not so much the historical class struggle as an elementary crisis of legal competency or a default on obligations to the population on the part of the government that in most cases becomes the mechanism by which broad social movements and revolutions uncontrolled by the elites are launched (Goldstone, 2012; Skocpol, 1979). In the first instance, the triggering factors tend to be default, malfunction, disintegration and delegitimisation of the state (political order). The revolution appears in the form of the establishment of a total self-organisation of society in the transition to a new social equilibrium by means of collective practices and institutions. A space of collective freedom for the realisation of various political utopias arises together with a new state assembly. Here, an appeal to preservation of the political order (constitution, law, tradition) as a basic, unconditional value is directly comparable in terms of conferring political legitimacy with revolutionary calls for overthrowing this order. Moreover, values associated with maintaining order prevail in the eyes of citizens under conditions of stability and the competency of the state; that is, during the overwhelming majority of history, except in situations of crisis and the collapse of states. In this context, locking in the results of the revolution is always connected with compromises, with the collapse and/or betrayal of utopias in favour of reaction and various conservative kickbacks. Trade-off solutions, in principle, do not suit any of the social forces; however, they eventually allow them to be reconciled with them in exchange for ending the debilitating struggle between asserting a new utopia or maintaining the old order. Sooner or later the state is once again recognised as an indispensable public good and a kind *big brother*.

In the context of the interconnected world economy of late Modernity, substantial doubts concerning the possibility of a classical revolution at the scale of individual states are raised due to their growing global interdependence. National communities are increasingly becoming only private *moments* in the movement of more general background processes associated with an accumulation of the contradictions inherent in capitalism as well as demographic, technological and institutional transformations entailed by late-modern societies. In this situation, it makes little difference what kinds of social forces in a particular society invoke and uphold the mechanisms of social change, whether these be counter-elite, marginalised, precarious, working class, middle class, liberation movements, different minorities, etc.

From this perspective, a given state can be considered as merely an initial platform for the permanent *global revolution*. This key idea was carried by the political

thought of the left throughout the entire twentieth century. Actually, the problem is of a rather different nature, viz. whether it is possible to initiate a revolution under conditions when the elites and the majority of citizens are as close in terms of their human qualities, their initial rights, education, morals and opportunities as never before in history? Accordingly, the revolution, both as a concept and as an event, is increasingly seen in metaphorical terms. As such, it is subject to constant deferment, which becomes comparable to eternity. At the same time, mechanisms for procedural legitimisation of changes within the tradition of modernity are strengthened in the form of a permanent reconfiguration of the value-institutional core of late-modern society for the purposes of self-preservation and the prevention of constantly arising conflicts, challenges and threats.

The Crisis of Late-Modern Subjectivity: from Class-Consciousness to the Schizophrenic Subject

The spectre of the revolution, always hovering over the political order of Modernity, draws its strength from the fact that any citizen can potentially exercise his or her inalienable right as a member of a political society to represent his interests in his personal capacity, take actions and make attempts to change the political order. For the most part, this allows the hegemonic disciplinary mechanisms to be effectively ignored or bypassed along with the regulatory procedures of political representation designed to control the political energy of the masses, which, strictly speaking, also constitute the routine institutional framework of the political order of Modernity. Active citizens and social groups that represent themselves and do not need intermediaries or representatives thus comprise the revolutionary political core of Modernity. These are the Kantian adult citizens who dare to be guided by their own minds and to act without external permits and approvals, without power of attorney and without guarantors. This individual and collective political action, proceeding according to the logic of the revolutionary rupture with approved actions and procedures, perforce reveals the constructed and conventional nature of the political order that presented itself as monolithic and unchanging in its tautological discourse. Of course, on the part of the beneficiaries of a particular political order, uncontrolled political activity and/or mobilisation of the population by non-system actors is traditionally represented as *rioting teenagers*, *freaks*, *office plankton* or *fifth columnists*, i.e. as the actions of those who reject political maturity and/or expose their conscious or unconscious dependence on foreign interests. On the other hand, the logic of *street* democracy is structurally analogous to the logic of a given present government, when it is shown by new leaders of public opinion that the official representatives of the people, by acting in their own, particular – not popular – interests, have lost legitimacy. Thus, it is obvious that direct democracy cannot ensure the effective functioning of complex and geographically dispersed political communities of Modernity, in which representative mechanisms of expression and the harmonisation of collective interests predominate. However, the latent

mechanisms of direct democracy come to the fore in a situation in which a political order based on representation is faced by a revolutionary crisis (Bikbov, 2012).

The revolution assumes as its key feature the emergence of alternative sources of political order (heterarchy) as a result of the rise and subsequent fall of mass political subjectivity (Kapustin, 2015, p. 7). Alternative subjects are directly connected with the permanent threat of revolution in the course of expanding and intensifying conflicts already present in society. Therefore, the dominant elite seeks to discredit any non-systemic political subject by describing it with the help of a variety of marginal and peripheral non-norm codes, whereby other actors appear as terrorists, extremists, cynics, agents of influence, youth manipulated by such agents, as lacking the necessary competencies, etc. However, even when proclaiming the pathology or death of a revolutionary political subject, the state cannot stop the movement of history. The disciplinary logic of desubjectivisation and depersonalisation, as an attempt to build a total biopolitics of power, will only lead to a growth in the *accursed share of things* (Baudrillard), which attracts to itself all that is excluded from the discourse of power as an indispensable element of the antinomy of power. As a result, the emergence of a revolutionary situation, in which "the revolution can be understood not as a reversal of the top and bottom, when the subordinate group or 'lower classes' suddenly intercept power or become 'the elite', but as an uprising of those segments of the population who are convinced that they are bearers of the idea of the state or 'raison d'État'" (Hestanov, 2012, p. 58). *The current pessimism in assessing the possibility of a future revolution is closely connected with the problem of the disintegration of effective collective action, the political subject and the capacity of states themselves under the conditions of late Modernity* (Rossiya v poiskakh ..., 2016, pp. 78–104).

The paradoxical consequences of a state strategy that seeks to monopolise political subjectivity, thus creating new actors in the revolutionary logic of heterarchy (Martianov, 2009), coexist with a number of other processes leading to an overall weakening of political subjectivity in late-modern societies. Socio-political, economic and cultural forms are increasingly breaking away from the everyday experience of individuals. This gap between the individual and society, leading to an increasing inaccessibility and unknowability of the latter, is compensated by ideology and mythology, whose significance as a connecting link of individual preferences and collective prescriptions can only increase. As a result of the revolution, society came to accept experimental social practices and concepts that previously took place at its periphery and were the object of ridicule, its carriers ignored, suppressed or persecuted. However, in the situation of the reconfiguration of the social structure, these excessive, heretical, marginal and even criminal notions turn out to be in demand by a new political order (Lobovikov, 2015). The revolution realises the structural possibilities into which the society has already matured, but at the same time it continues to think of itself in terms of the relations and hierarchies of social interests and groups, whose configurations and relationships experience ever greater deformations. On the one hand, a stalemate situation arises when modernity fails to accumulate sufficient contradictions for the political order to be disturbed by revolution

despite the many individual conflicts by which the society may be permeated at local, national and global levels. On the other hand, when differentiation and complication occur in contemporary societies, the disintegration of public spaces makes it difficult to maintain the usual hierarchies and instead promotes revolutionary heterarchies. Simultaneously, alternative axiological grounds for the political order and common good arise and a search for new ways of assembling sociality and principles of stratification is set into motion. Small groups and groups with weak social ties begin to have more effective identities and cultural codes than blurred economic macro-classes deprived of their former political subjectivity. The natural result of these transformations is the spread of the schizophrenic type of social subject, which loses its ability to effectively organise its interests over the course of history.

The schizophrenic postmodern subject loses the ability to perceive time and think historically. Accordingly, it cannot deliver utopia, because it lacks desires or hopes that underpin collective action according to the utopian impulse (Jameson, 2004). The space of history is entirely obscured by the space of culture that simulates history. Accordingly, the actions of schizophrenic subjects (consumer class, creative class, middle class, etc.), taking place within a culturally coded space that cannot be taken for reality itself, turn out to be the actions of a predominantly symbolic order that do not – and cannot – lead to changes in the socio-political reality. As a result, they lose the ability to capture social changes in time or create revolutionary utopias oriented towards the future as an alternative to the present. However, from the standpoint of preserving the political order, the insensitivity of such a subject to the past or the future is interpreted positively, as a sign of its freedom in the present, despite occluding the entire chronological horizon of possibilities.

Summarising the interim result, we can say that *revolutions do not create the political, economic and cultural order of Modernity directly. Formulating more precisely, we can remark that revolutions create new individual and social subjects, which, by virtue of their extrinsic nature relative to the Ancien Régime, are able to create a different order. However, the formation and strengthening of the new political order will inevitably be associated with the transformation and extinction of revolutionary actors*. The ability to create utopias is the historical mission of a kind of political demiurge, who, by virtue of their extrinsicality to the old and new orders – their *intermediacy* – feel themselves to be all-powerful within that specific historical moment. But the revolution in its deployment instantly corrects and dismisses its creators, as, for example, the democratically- and republicanistically-inclined French aristocracy of the *second echelon*: “in the terror of 1793–94, the internal horror of the Jacobins was externally manifested: they saw their terrible mistake and wanted to correct it with the guillotine, but, no matter how many heads they chopped off, they still bowed their own to the strength of the ascending social stratum. Everyone bowed to that which overpowered the revolution and reaction, which flooded the old forms and filled them with itself, because it was the only active and modern majority; Sieyès was speaking more accurately than he knew when he said that the *Third Estate* was ‘everything’. The Third Estate – or commoners – were not born in the revolution, but were ready with their own traditions and customs, which were alien to

the *other tune* of the revolutionary idea. They were treated roughly by the aristocracy and kept in third place; liberated, they trampled the dead bodies of their liberators to introduce their own order" (Herzen, 1946, p. 410).

Accordingly, the ability of the political order of late Modernity to prevent revolution is straightforward, not least due to the rapid erosion of the former social classes of the demiurge. The extrinsic – whether to pre-Modernity or to Modernity – political subject disappeared; the present domineering subjects consist wholly within Modernity. And for as long as the unpredictable revolution fails to wrest some people from Modernity, they will lack a sufficiently strong collective subjectivity, since this only arises during a revolution. Until then, political utopias will not appear, because utopias do not precede revolutions, but are formulated during their process by new actors.

Undoubtedly, prior to the outbreak of a revolution, there are political *change discourses* as, for example, the work of Rousseau, Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists; however, these can serve only as preliminary material for revolutionary utopias. Nevertheless, the landmark "Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind" was only written by Nicolas de Condorcet at a time when the French Revolution was in full swing; in general, key modern ideologies took shape only as a result of subsequent reflection on the revolutionary transition to a new social state.

Thus, the prospect of a revolutionary alternative to Modernity is closely related to the possibilities for continuing the reproduction of ideologies and utopias that totalise social reality within the structures of group experience. Totalisation generates an image of society that is oriented towards the re-creation of its integrity. This is true even if the received *cognitive coordinates* of society are recognised by other interpreters as subjective, vulnerable and ideological. The creation of ideologies and utopias as a means of *cognitive mapping*, allows the subjectivity and identity of a particular social class to be recreated, including through the construction of its social coordinates relative to other classes. Conversely, the logic of preventing revolution is manifested in the form of attempts to remove conflict and class content from politics, replacing them with various palliatives in the form of *homo economicus*, metaphors of the *natural market* and various *theories of modernisation*. This tendency involves the introduction of universal standards into all areas of life, releasing them from historical traditions and cultural contexts.

However, a closer look proves that, on the one hand, the theory of modernisation and democratic/market transition, and, on the other hand, civilisational discourses on the insurmountability of cultural differences and *ruts of tradition*, are merely forced palliatives of class ideologies in the situation of the weakening and schizophrenisation of the established political subjects of Modernity. These discourses do not exist as a means to *understand* the particular societies in respect of which they are applied, but rather in order to make them more similar to *other societies acting as a target sample.* Or, alternatively, they serve to justify the unavoidable differences from the target societies, which by virtue of their *uniqueness* also *free themselves from an understanding* of their society from a comparative-historical perspective. Thus, the idea of Modernity presented in a neutral form as *modernisation*, i.e. the permanent achievement of an *increasingly modern state of affairs*, is analogous to an *endless*

cul-de-sac for a society entirely lacking in utopias that go beyond economic (*capitalism*) or cultural (*civilisation*) determinism.

However, if (a) capitalism in (b) legitimising its liberal consensus and nation-state as the dominant political format of their synthesis, comprises the value-institutional quintessence of the political order of Modernity, it is precisely in challenges to (a) capitalism and (b) the liberal consensus and nationalism that the most obvious means for crystallising revolutionary movements are presented. It seems that in late-modern societies, these challenges and the corresponding ideological/utopian formats under the conditions of stagnation are increasingly likely to be determined by economic means. The geographic and technological expansion of the capitalist world system during a particular historical period (*the Glorious Thirty* from 1945–1975) made it possible to smooth out internal class contradictions through extra-market regulation and compensation for the costs of capitalism in the form of the *welfare state* and an expanding *middle class*. However, under the conditions of suspended economic growth, robotisation and a decline in the status of *working people*, such stabilisers cease to compensate for the growing costs and non-economic challenges to capitalism associated with the growth of the unemployed and the precariat, as well as a decrease in the ability of states to perform protective functions for these sectors of citizens.

In his influential book One-Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse concluded that "underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus, their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not." (Marcuse, 1964, pp. 260–261). Over half a century after these words were written, social forces that are ostensibly trying to torpedo it in the name of these or those alternatives continue to mature within global Modernity. These social forces comprise a wide range of radical movements (fundamentalists, alternative globalists, anarchists, new Luddites, environmentalists, different minorities, etc.), usually constructing their ideological niches in the form of private utopias aimed at solving private challenges, problems and contradictions in modern society.

It seems that in the context of this process there will be an increasingly diverse *cultural determination* of group interests and collective actions as well as the value of the *social status* and *social capital* of its participants. However, the particular nature of the criticism of Modernity becomes the chief problem of the global revolutionary movement. Political ultra-projects do not permit the possibility of a total alternative to Modernity, to all intents and purposes replacing it with a discourse of justice, restoration of a balance of interests, or discourses related to the *repair of Modernity*, but ultimately only strengthen the political order that constantly incorporates those movements into the mainstream and periodically satisfies protest demands. This problem is not resolved by the efforts of leftist forces against the backdrop of global challenges to resuscitate familiar ideological coordinates and class struggle from the times of national-industrial Modernity (Kagarlitsky, 2017, p. 264–265). If

the lives of the majority are ipso facto significantly affected by the consequences of revolution, the field within such potential changes may take effect is becoming less and less directly related to politics. *Under the conditions of late Modernity, the revolutionary potential of social change is increasingly fuelled by the possible consequences of the implementation of non-political, private utopias*. This occurs, for example, when biomedical or technological progress replaces human workers in production processes, resulting in capability for work no longer comprising the basic usefulness resource of the majority of the population in the sense of providing automatic access to various benefits. Technological progress, a sharp increase in life expectancy (and consequently, in the number of disabled and old people), universal basic income, unlimited sources of energy and the management of biological mutations can have unexpected political consequences comparable to the class revolution in terms of transforming the political order and the principles of its stratification.

The New Revolution as the Problem of a Political Alternative to Late Modernity

Revolution feeds on utopia as the energy of the future. Thus, revolutions are caused by utopian discourses associated with social forces, whose constituents would like to expand their rights and opportunities by gaining control over their own destiny. However, under the conditions of late Modernity, the utopian dimension is experiencing increasing difficulties in comparison with those alternatives that make their appeal to the past and the present. The future, in common with the metanarratives associated with its justification, is increasingly being viewed as something vague, suspicious and unconvincing. As a result, it turns out that "a revolution in the usual sense is no longer possible, since there are no intentions for a break with the past and associated breakthrough into the future, dynamism is suspicious, and violence is unacceptable" (Puchkov, 2017).

The problem of the possibility of a new revolution is not only that the value of order/stability is almost always perceived to be more fundamental than the value of change. It consists in the search for an alternative that would be attractive to active social forces, which would lead to a conscious rejection of the liberal consensus of Modernity that, in one version or another, continues to dominate. Alternatives to this consensus at the present time are generally limited to partial utopias in which, instead of recognising and discussing real social and economic problems, conflicts and interests, a process of continuing mythologisation takes place. For example, this may be seen in the (conservative) form of reasoning based on the concept *spiritual bonds* or (liberal) calls for the redistribution of social hierarchies and resources in favour of some *minority* or other. Alternatively, it may be seen in the form of calls for the destruction of the social order, which often emanate from peripheral social forces or requirements that actually become ends in themselves under conditions vaguely referred to in terms of some *alternative future*. This leads not so much to an overcoming of Modernity as to various *kickbacks from Modernity*, conceded in favour of the archaising and strengthening of pre-modern and anti-modern values,

practices and institutions, especially in societies drifting from the centre of the capitalist world-economy towards its margins and periphery.

Here, the question of the global subject of the revolutionary changes of late Modernity and its moral advantages with respect to the hegemons also remains unclear. Negation of the political order results in a transcendence of the act of cultural disavowal or revolutionary breakdown itself. Despite the growing social base from which revolutionary demands are being issued, those ideological options for the liberation of human nature from the normative order of late Modernity not related to a return to the Ancien Régime are yet to acquire a systemic character. The ability of ultra-movements to organise systemic collective action in the context of a crisis of class subjectivity and a general decline in political subjectivity in the consumer society raises multiple questions. The repudiation of ideological meta-narratives, whether from class struggle – or even from the more blurred cultural hegemony – in favour of *agonistic democracy* (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 80–107), actually dissolves the political subject in cultural discourses, depriving him of the necessary initial political ontology. Here another question naturally arises concerning the social regulators of a possible post-modern society, since, in the field of mechanisms of cultural domination, late Modernity is permeated with an effective mixture and eclecticisation of its entire previous ideological heritage. It turns out that late capitalism is rather successful at commodifying and expanding into fields of non-economic regulators, such as morality, law, art and politics, which are potentially capable of producing alternative non-capitalist hierarchies and orders of social life.

Finally, in favour of the political order of late Modernity against the backdrop of weak alternatives, there is a strong practical argument: never before in history have such a large proportion of the population had such opportunities to exercise individual freedom as in the present. Consequently, contemporary revolutionaries lose the struggle for the interpretation of human nature and the generation of normative ideas concerning the desires and purposes of human existence (Jameson, 1983, pp. 1–14). Thus, it is becoming increasingly difficult for new utopias entering the field of political imagination to challenge the capitalist order underpinned by the developed *mass consumer culture* with a call for collective political action. Therefore, the growing stagnation of global capitalism paradoxically leads to demands for a disciplinary and regulatory strengthening of the political order of nation-states. This is due to the latter being seen as counterbalances to growing discontent with the transformation of the capitalist global economy associated with rising unemployment, a precarious labour market and the intensification of various forms of geographical and social inequality.

It can be observed that *the most significant threats to the political order of Modernity are generated for and by itself*: "Western Modernity – first the European manifestation, then the American – has for centuries maintained the conviction that it is nothing more than contemporaneity in action and that its goal is not the effective mobilisation of resources, but rather the replacement of traditions with reason." (Touraine, 2014, p. 99) Indeed, universal reason in politics proved impossible, disintegrating into its various conflicting and class-based variants. Against the backdrop of the crisis between economic classes and within instrumental reason, ideas concerning the guaranteeing

of commonality, universality, justice and progress on a new round of globalisation are once again returning to political nations; meanwhile, global Modernity is facing ever more insoluble challenges. As a result, a future revolution may ensue from the exhaustion of the communication and dialogue opportunities for key social actors: "a revolution begins with the negation of the other and ends with the disintegration or destruction of the negating actor; only chaos or absolute power can follow it" (Touraine, 2014, p. 112). The possibility of an active, including revolutionary, return of peoples to direct participation in their common history and collective destiny under the conditions of late Modernity remains an open and debatable political issue. However, when the mass apathy of a schizophrenic consumer subject is combined with endless modernisation as a mode of living under the conditions of Modernity, the revolutionary utopia disappears over the event horizon. A global crisis having the potential to envelop many modern societies and launch uncontrolled events seems extremely unlikely; its genesis from the contradictions of capitalism, which have already existed for 500 years, is also rather doubtful, although the corresponding forecasts are issued with enviable consistency (Wallerstein et al., 2013).

It is suggested that the possibility of a new revolution can be realised only on the basis of a putative repudiation of Modernity in favour of an alternative political project having a greater capability for universalisation and totalisation. If, in legitimising the liberal consensus and nation-state as the dominant political format of its synthesis, capitalism is the value-institutional quintessence of the political order of Modernity, it is precisely in challenges to capitalism, the liberal consensus and nationalism that provide the most obvious means for crystallising revolutionary movements. At present, despite postmodernist criticisms, the crisis of the market model of capitalism and mass democracies, the weakening of the social state and other challenges to the political order of late Modernity all relate to internal transformations or the archaisation of modern societies rather than any real alternative. Finally, the global scale of late Modernity also requires another scale to be achieved by its potential revolutionary subjects. If the modern revolution was initiated in key European polities, then revolution, as an alternative to late Modernity, presupposes a transnational rise in political subjectivity together with a corresponding coordination and institutionalisation that transcends territorial states. This presupposes the emergence of an effective counterbalance to the current global economy in the form of a future global policy, which, being subordinated to the interests of the leading national states, is still very much in its infancy. While various discourses and social groups profess to play the role of revolutionary utopias and subjects, in essence, their ability to present an alternative to Modernity remains an open question. Thus, a utopian systemic challenge to Modernity, connected with a morally more justified configuration and associated hierarchy of legitimate violence, is yet to emerge.

In the long term, a serious (and possibly revolutionary) negative correction of the political order of modern societies will be capable of producing a rental transformation of capitalism and an expansion of the rent-class stratification mechanisms associated with precarisation, along with a reduction in the social mobility trajectories and other prospects of active social groups. The present global exhaustion of the market-based

development model, which is oriented towards the infinite expansion of profit, reveals the contours of a future society without economic growth (Policy Challenges, 2015). Robotisation has in no way compensated for the costs of technological progress in terms of filling society with superfluous people, while simultaneously turning them into increasingly dangerous classes: the precarious, the unemployed and the various minorities concealed in public policy blind spots or openly ignored by the state (Ford, 2015). The discovery of resource limits applying to free, self-regulating markets leads to an increase in protectionism and nationalism, leading to the tendency to replace market competition mechanisms with the forceful redistribution of markets and resource chains. In an increasingly entrenched society without mass labour, mass taxpayers or profitable capital, the resource crisis affecting the social state model is exacerbated. The depletion of its resource base is accompanied by a growth in state-dependent social groupings. As a result, a rental political order is formed, in which market communications are replaced by hierarchical models of distributive exchanges, which are increasingly controlled by the state. Social stratification increasingly depends not on market-based class formation, but on the access of citizens and social groups to the distribution of rental resources as regulated by the state. These trends lead to the dominance of rent-seeking economic behaviour (Davydov & Fishman, 2015). Mass behaviour associated with the search for rents that have a guaranteed status is increasingly becoming a more profitable strategy than risky entrepreneurial activity or the desire to take advantageous positions within a shrinking and increasingly unreliable labour market.

Paradoxically, the most urgent challenge faced by existing mechanisms for coordinating collective interests is the archaisation or simulation of Modernity, in which neo-patristic, neo-patrimonial models of political order unite power, law and property. A potentially revolutionary situation arises when Modernity turns into a new non-modernity that is incapable of transforming itself or effectively responding to the constantly arising challenges and threats of the volatile contemporary society. This situation becomes especially clear at the periphery of global capitalism. Here, the beneficiaries of peripheral capitalism strive to preserve the established political order, in which the radicalisation of various contradictions is intensified by their nonsolubility. To this end, political elites may attempt to freeze *fluid contemporaneity* (Z. Bauman), something that is impossible by definition. Such rigid and non-modular institutional states can, as a rule, only be reversed by revolutionary means. Therefore, the likelihood of a revolution is higher on the periphery of the global system, where, as a consequence of a variety of subtle sociocultural configurations, contemporary societies lack the flexibility demonstrated by the countries of the centre.

Finally, in the course of its development, the revolution always goes beyond the framework of any previous theoretical justification. Collective praxis outpaces outdated social ontologies and categorical descriptive apparatuses in favour of *the imaginary establishment of society* (Cornelius Castoriadis), which is gradually overgrown with a new institutional framework and legitimating self-descriptions. Therefore, in order for revolution to take place, policy must necessarily take centre stage in public life at a time when political issues have become questions of life and death.

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ARTICLE

Effects of Modernization and Globalization on Values Change in the Arab World

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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that social transformation processes generate shifts in public opinion among the public. More specifically, increasing rates of modernization and globalization in the Arab world over the past half century have led to a moving away from religion, tradition, and ethnocentrism to embracing more secular, liberal, and egalitarian values. Ordinary citizens in today's Arab world are more tolerant towards non-Muslims, Americans, and other Westerners more than ever before. They support recognizing Israel as a state at a rate previously unprecedented in the region. Arabs are politically, socially, and culturally more liberal than they have been in the twentieth century. Evidence from the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer clearly convey this observable value change in the region. Underlying causes for this change are arguably due to macro, mezzo, and micro-level changes in peoples' lives resulting from increased modernization and globalization compared to earlier periods. This confirms earlier findings from Western Europe and North America which propose that social transformation processes yield predictable changes in values among mass publics.

KEYWORDS
modernization, globalization, public opinion, Arab world, survey research

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Introduction

There are many questions about the Arab world that have remained unanswered by political science (Campante & Chor, 2012; Hamarneh, Hollis, & Shiqāqī, 1997; Lynch, 2013; Ryan & Schwedler, 2004; Tessler & Jamal, 2006; Tessler, et al., 2012; Zogby, 2002; Bayat, 2013). Has there been an attitude shift from traditional to post-materialist issues in the Middle East as has been the case in North America or Western Europe? Are Arabs exceptionally more religious compared to other populations around the world? Do Arabs feel the same about Islam, its role in politics and society, and its meaning compared to half a century ago? Has modernization, globalization, urbanization, and westernization altered ordinary citizens' views on religion, economics, politics, and foreign affairs? Most importantly, have Arabs' perceptions of the Arab/Israeli conflict changed over time? This paper endeavors to answer this set of related questions and shed light on citizens' preference changes in an often-forgotten region in the empirical study of comparative politics: the Middle East.

The study of public opinion in the Arab world suffers from several limitations (Robbins & Tessler, 2012; Braizat, 2005; Tessler, 2011a; Nisbet & Meyers, 2011; Gause, 2011; Stoll, 2004). First, most analyses and narratives on the region lack empirical, verifiable, evidence (Telhami, 2006; Gause, 2011; Ciftci, 2012). Analysts and experts on the Middle East rely on sheer conjecture and speculation when describing, prescribing, or prognosing Arab world political development (Zogby, 2002; Robbins & Tessler, 2012). Second, public opinion in the Arab world is often cast as irrelevant by western political scientists, citing the lack of its coherent ideological structure, significance in determining political outcomes, and fluidity (Robins & Tessler, 2012; Tessler, 2011b; Nisbet & Meyers, 2011). Despite such charges, political science literature from the developing world has established robust links between political attitudes among citizens and electoral results, regime survival, and longevity (Ryan & Schwedler, 2004; Tessler, 2011b; Tessler & Jamal, 2006; Tessler et al., 2012; Robbins & Tessler, 2012). More recent dimensional analyses of political ideologies in Eastern Europe, China, India, and the Arab world have established that Arab political attitude structures exist and do not deviate significantly from their Western counterparts (Bayat, 2013; Marinov, 2012).

This research presents many contributions to the study of public opinion in the Arab world. The first section provides an extensive listing of existing data sources on the attitudes of Arab citizens on political, social, economic, and cultural matters across different time periods and geographic locales. This resource provides details on the type, breadth, and usefulness of available data on testing potentially interesting questions concerning important outcomes in the region. Second, the paper provides a possible explanation for the observed attitude changes across the region in the past half century. This theoretical clarification relies on the fundamental hypothesis suggesting that social transformation processes such as modernization and globalization lead to changes in the composition of society where new groups rise and other groups lose ground, generating discernible shifts in public opinion.

Third, the paper provides evidence on the nature and type of attitude changes among citizens in the region by comparing ordinary citizens' preferences in a number of countries including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and other states where the data in two distinct periods is available.

Public Opinion Research in the Arab World

Current literature on public opinion trends toward politics has largely focused on industrialized western countries (Warwick, 2002; Kitschelt, 1992; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Bartolini & Mair, 2001). This may be due to the assumption that public opinion is only relevant in consolidated democracies (Robbins & Tessler, 2012; Nisbet & Meyers, 2011). However, a number of studies have shown the link between voters and political actors, and its ameliorating effect on democratic governance in the developing world (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Lindberg, 2006; Ryan & Schwedler, 2004). Although dictators and monarchs attempt to manipulate electoral races for their benefit, holding elections opens a channel of communication between candidates and voters (Gause, 2011; Levitsky & Way, 2002). Political parties and independent candidates run campaigns on a number of issues relevant to the role of government in the economy and international affairs, appealing to their respective constituencies (Malik & Awadallah, 2013).

The situation in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen is no different from other hybrid regimes (Robbins & Tessler, 2012; Ryan & Schwedler, 2002). Such countries have held regular, relatively free, elections where candidates and voters interacted in a competitive race to fill political offices (Bolleyer & Storm, 2010; Langohr, 2002; Marinov, 2012; Robbins & Tessler, 2012). This shows that ordinary citizens' political attitudes count in the political process in hybrid regimes (Bolleyer & Storm, 2010; Ryan & Schwedler, 2004). This study focuses on the political space in the Arab world, contributing to the larger literature on political space cross-nationally.

One of the most active areas of research in the Arab world concerns the attitudes and behavior of the so called "Arab Street" (Bayat, 2011; Acemoglu, Hassan, & Tahoun, 2017). This literature has generated empirical studies exploring the most important political factors defining the attitudes and behaviors of Arab citizens (Bayat, 2013; Robbins & Tessler, 2012; Tessler, 2011). On the one hand, the empirical investigation of the Arab political space is unsystematic (Ciftci, 2012; Harik, 1987). Usually, researchers limit their focus to one dimension or two arbitrarily and report support patterns of different structural groups in the population (Marinov, 2012; Robbins & Tessler, 2012). The research typically inspects citizens' attitudes toward particular dimensions (usually support for democracy, political Islam, and the Arab/Israeli conflict) while leaving out possible defining factors such as trust in political institutions and political leadership (Campante & Chor, 2012; Ciftci, 2012; Malik & Awadallah, 2013; Tessler, 2011). Despite this continuous effort, certainty of what concerns the Arab Street remains unclear. The empirical work is often limited to case studies and focuses on idiosyncratic relationships concerning particular countries.

On the other hand, the theoretical work is often too abstract and difficult to verify using available data. Establishing a more robust link between the empirical world and the theoretical one is needed in order to better understand what the Arab Street wants, and how this influences its behavior. Much of the theoretical research has been devoted to finding and explaining the single, most significant, political factor driving the organizational pattern of political attitudes in the Arab world (Bayat, 2013; Dabashi, 2012). This one-dimensional research usually focuses on political Islam or economic policies. It is hardly justifiable and largely dependent on historically rooted explanations. The lack of consensus and systematic investigation on the number, nature, and independence of defining political factors in the Arab world poses the problem of accumulating unchecked arguments such as that of ascribing a one-dimensional nature of the political space in the Arab world.

Despite the paucity in public opinion survey research over the past half century, the last decade has recorded a surge in the growing number of cross-national surveys in the Arab world. The numerous projects present new avenues for public opinion research in the Arab world. Prior to introducing such interesting enterprises, this section provides a brief background on survey research in the Arab world. A quick glimpse at the political science literature on the Arab world points to a dearth of public opinion studies prior to this burgeoning of studies. This phenomenon may be due to the long absence of systematic, nationally representative, samples of Arab countries (Tessler & Jamal, 2006). An ancillary factor is the nature of authoritarian regimes in the region has made it difficult to conduct reliable survey research regarding sensitive political matters. Nevertheless, some American and Arab social scientists have taken the lead in producing public opinion studies on the Arab world (Tessler, 2003). However, such absence of information has limited the potential contribution of the Arab world experience to just the theoretical and empirical development of the field of Comparative Politics (unlike in Eastern Europe and Latin America where it was possible to develop, test, and examine various types of hypotheses linking political attitudes to democratic transitions).

Early scholars of Arab politics noted the absence of public opinion research on the Arab world (Harik, 1987; Hudson, 1995). Unfortunately, such missing information has resulted in the proliferation of myths and stereotypes regarding Arab citizens (Tessler, 2003; Zogby & Foundation, 2002). A decade ago, a leading figure on public opinion research in the Middle East, remarked that “in the Arab world, there has been very little serious political attitude research until recently, which has made it difficult to challenge stereotypes about the Arab Street and the Arab mind” (Tessler, 2003, p. 23). Three years later, the founders of the Arab Barometer have argued that a number of factors have led to “emerging opportunities for political attitude research in the Arab world” (Tessler & Jamal, 2006, p. 17).

This changing climate comes from several different factors. First, social scientists, as well as area specialists, are employing more rigorous techniques to questions regarding the Arab world. Second, the relative modernizing and liberalizing policies undertaken by several Arab regimes made it possible to access and acquire reliable data on ordinary Arab citizens. Finally, the attacks of September 11 on the

U.S. sparked an interest in learning more about the attitudes of Arabs and Muslims across the globe, including the Arab world. This has led to the emergence of a number of cross-national survey projects investigating the attitudes, beliefs, and values of ordinary Arab citizens.

The World Values Survey (WVS) constitutes one of the most extensive survey instruments, investigating citizens' political attitudes toward government, democracy, and policy preferences in more than 50 countries in its sixth wave. The fourth and fifth waves of the survey included six Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. The survey questionnaire generally asks Arab respondents questions regarding numerous political factors such as the role of religion in the state. Further, it investigates attitudes toward emerging post-materialist political issues, including the role of women in politics and society, homosexual rights, and environmentalism since the WVS more generally solicits public opinion on issues more relevant to Western politics (Moreno, 1999). To make the instrument better suited for Arab countries, the principal investigators of the WVS consulted with regional experts to add more relevant items in the questionnaires administered in the Arab world (Tessler & Jamal, 2006).

Prompted by "the profound gap in understanding between the United States and the Arab world that had become so painfully apparent following September 11, 2001", the Arab Thought Foundation in collaboration with Zogby International launched a public opinion survey project in the Arab World (Zogby & Foundation, 2002). The project covered seven Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The survey instrument contains items investigating Arab citizens' attitudes, values, and beliefs regarding government and international affairs. The survey heavily focuses on Arab attitudes toward American foreign policy, culture, and the west in general (Lynch, 2013).

The Anwar Sadat Center at the University of Maryland directed by Professor Shibley Telhami in collaboration with Zogby International survey research enterprise has conducted annual Arab public opinion surveys since 2003. The project covers six countries in the Arab World and investigates attitudes regarding government international affairs, American foreign policy, identity, and media (Telhami, 2006). He notes that other surveys, including the Arab Barometer, are more comprehensive when covering political attitudes of ordinary Arab men and women on domestic affairs (including the economy, institutional performance, and trust in political institutions). In addition to the annual polls, the WorldPublicOpinion.org project through the Program on International Policy Attitudes has conducted several surveys across the Middle East between 2005–2015 at the University of Maryland. The information collected through such surveys were conducted with close collaboration of the staff working on the annual polls and producing similar information.

Other Arab surveys have been conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, who conducts regular public opinion surveys on the national and regional level Arab attitudes toward the US and the West in addition to general demographic surveys. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, stationed in Doha, Qatar, has launched the Public Opinion Index in the Arab World, attempting

to investigate Arab citizens' attitudes in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The Arab Opinion Index investigates ordinary Arab men and womens' attitudes toward a wide range of issues such as general life satisfaction, economic, social, personal and national security, and satisfaction. Moreover, they include questions regarding democracy, confidence on political institutions, and economic accountability. The center published a report documenting its findings for the 2011 wave. Unfortunately, the data is not available for public use and analysis.

The survey chosen for use in this research, the Arab Barometer, was selected because it is one of the most comprehensive survey research projects investigating the values, beliefs, and attitudes of ordinary Arab men and women in a number of countries throughout the Arab world. Initially, the project started with a cross-national and collaborative research effort in six Arab countries: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen (Tessler & Jamal, 2006). Soon, the project expanded, following its partnership with the Arab Reform Initiative, to include five more countries. The objective of the Arab Barometer is to "produce scientifically reliable data on the politically-relevant attitudes of ordinary citizens, to disseminate and apply survey findings in order to contribute to political reform, and to strengthen institutional capacity for public opinion research" (Tessler, 2011, p. 13; Tessler, Jamal, & Robbins, 2012). The survey instrument was developed in consultation with other regional democracy barometers, collectively known as the global barometer.

The Arab Barometer has conducted four waves in the Arab World. The first took place in 2006–2007 in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Kuwait, and Yemen. After the expansion the second wave of the Arab Barometer took place in 2010-11 in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. The third wave of the Arab Barometer took place between 2012 and 2014, surveying Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. The Fourth wave of the survey was conducted in seven Arab nations: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen between 2016 and 2017. In addition to the aforementioned surveys, the Pew Research Center and Gallup have conducted several polls across the Middle East and the Islamic world. Those surveys included several topics, including public opinions on international affairs, Islam and politics, and relations with the United States and the West.

Despite the burgeoning nature of public opinion research in the Middle East over the past two decades, many of the aforementioned surveys are difficult to obtain by analysts of Middle Eastern affairs given the arduous procedures put in place to obtaining the data from the original publishers. Further, all such available surveys on Middle Eastern affairs are cross-sectional, making it difficult on researchers to conduct analysis of value changes over time in the region. More importantly, public opinion research in the form of surveys in the Middle East is seldom available before the 1990s. This complicates the picture for anyone attempting to understand the underlying causes for public opinion change over the past half century in the region.

Public Opinion Change

Modernization theorists have suggested that economic development leads to systematic values change in societies (Aratz, 1988). This thesis stems from the realization that increased rates of education across all levels, rising levels of industrialization, urbanization and division of labor, as well as the dismantling of traditional gender roles generates tangible social, political, and cultural changes that lead to shifts in public opinion. This transformation of attitudes is culminated in moving away from absolutist, traditional, and patriarchal norms, ideals, and beliefs to more relative, tolerant, and egalitarian views of the self, society, political order, and culture. While this prescription is said to be probabilistic rather than deterministic, modernization theory still holds that improvements in income, education, institutionalization, technological advancement, empowerment of females, and greater levels of industrialization, urbanization and population densities are associated with predictable political and cultural changes across societies (Marsh, 2014; Bordoloi & Doss, 2017).

At the core of modernization theory lays its basic principle: the replacement of traditional values with a set of modern values due to significant changes in the economy and society at a given time and place. Lerner (1958), Weiner (1966), Tipps (1973), Arat (1988), Marsh (2014), and Bordoloi and Doss (2017) suggested that the lack of economic development, persistence of traditional cultural traits, existence of traditional institutions have led to the underdevelopment of many developing nations. Such perspectives viewed Western modes of capitalism as an inevitable way of achieving modernity; therefore, developing countries should reject their traditional systems and replace them with modern economic, social and cultural institutions if they desired to modernize. Increased economic, cultural, and military development, as it occurred in Western nations, was observed as the causal processes leading to modernization. This paradigm has undergone great criticism due to its victimization logic. It viewed underdeveloped countries as active agents that reject modern values and institutions, therefore suffering from underdevelopment (Marsh, 2014). Many social scientists have declared modernization as a moot model for cultural change since it neglects the significant influence of external forces such as colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalization, world hegemony and other forms of state international dominance (Weiner, 1966; Lerner, 1958). Many political scientists viewed underdevelopment as an outcome of hegemonic influence exercised by world powers limiting the economic development of the developing world. This rejectionist view of modernization believed that the only way leading to the fulfilment of economic development is the liberation of the developing world economies from the developed world restraints (Bordoloi & Doss, 2017).

Despite the great criticisms levelled against modernization theory, its central claim that economic development generates predictable cultural, social, and political values changes still enjoys theoretical and empirical popularity across the social and behavioral sciences (Marsh, 2014). Cross-national studies indicate that economic development pushes societal change in a relatively unified prescribed manner. Economic development is associated with increases in industrialization,

labor specialization, greater educational attainment and rising incomes. Such structural changes lead to predictable cultural shifts, more tolerant views towards out-groups, more favorable views for gender equality, more challenge to religion and authority, greater political activism and more literate citizenry (Aratz, 1988).

More recent understandings of modernization theory propose that the shift from industrialization into post-industrialization marked with the movement of occupations from factories into the service sector has influenced cultural values change (Marsh, 2014). This change from absolutist perceptions (concern for physical and spiritual survival, and emphasizes issues of religion, law, order, and economy) to post-materialist values (concern for the environment, diversity, gender equality, etc., while emphasizing individual autonomy, relative perceptions, and lifestyles) is associated with the movement from industrialization to post-industrialization (Bordoloi & Doss, 2017). Modern conceptions of modernization theory suggest that cultural changes due to economic development occur at two junctures. First, the move from agrarian to industrialized economies is associated with cultural shifts emphasizing issues of economic growth, law and order, and religion and state. Second, the replacement of industrial complexes with the service sector moves the emphasis toward a new set of cultural issues: individual expression, autonomy, lifestyles, environment, and gender equality (Aratz, 1988; Marsh, 2014).

The underlying mechanism by which modernization leads individuals to change their cultural values lies in the nature of the relationship between humans and their immediate environments (Tipps, 1973). In pre-industrial societies, individuals grapple with nature directly and have minimal control over natural forces. This leads them into emphasizing the role of the divine, God, and family, since they spend most of their time interacting or thinking about such elements. Once societies become industrialized, humans control of their environments and nature increases with technological advancement and rational choices. The relationship between them, God, nature, and the family dwindles due to an increase in their secular interpretation of their worlds and the relationships governing such interactions (Weiner, 1966). In post-industrial societies, humans have more control over nature and deal less with machinery and production. They spend more time communicating with each other, processing information, and becoming better at making decisions, using technology to improve their lives, and spending more time socializing in the workplace, as well as outside of the workplace. This makes humans value themselves, the quality of their lifestyles, their immediate environments, sustainability of their livelihoods, and the well-being of themselves and their loved ones increasingly. Individuals, therefore, move further away from materialist and spiritual perceptions and into self-driven concerns (Lerner, 1958).

Globalization

Many social scientists have argued that social transformation processes, such as globalization, lead to predictable shifts in cultural values. While less developed across the behavioral and social science literatures, globalization is said to bring about tangible changes in societies and to lead citizens to abandon, espouse, or

modify existing or new preferences (Inglehart & Welzel, 2004). Globalization gives rise to new forms of disparities, competition, and opposition. Citizens around the world perceive such realities in terms of either victories or losses depending on their economic, social, and cultural positions within their own environments. Globalization leads to the political articulation of such new forms of inequalities by formal political institutions such as parties, governments, or non-governmental actors. The evolution of citizens' perceptions is largely informed by the new realities caused by the increase of economic, social, and cultural integration (Hudson, 1995; Inglehart & Welzel, 2004).

Globalization hurts individuals and groups who are protected by nationalization and protectionist policies (Tipps, 1973; Gause 2011). The decrease of states' controls over segments of their economy, society, and culture poses imminent threats to the social status and security of those enjoying the benefits of the state control. In other words, the economic, social, and cultural viability of such groups are increasingly jeopardized as globalization increases (Gause, 2011). On the contrary, globalization creates opportunities for new individuals and groups whose lives are enriched due to the increase in market integrations, migration, and multiculturalism (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). To determine whether an individual or group is a winner or loser in globalization, the amount of exit options an individual or group possesses must be assessed. The more options available to an individual or group, the better chances they have of rendering themselves winners in the process. On the one hand, the more options one has the more socially mobile he or she becomes. Converting possessed economic, human, and social capital into resources allows the individual to mitigate the negative externalities brought by globalization and places the demarcation line between the winners and losers in the process (Marsh, 2014).

Globalization has led to structural changes in at least three discernable ways. First, globalization has resulted in an increase in economic deregulation which has led to the erosion of sheltered sectors of the economy. This change has initiated the emergence of a labor force cleavage between those advocating for lowering production costs by the slashing of employee benefits or outsourcing jobs and those who favor state-imposed protectionist economic securities that guarantee higher wages for workers in sheltered industries (Malik & Awadallah, 2013; Aratz, 1988). Second, globalization has resulted in a significant increase in human migration across countries. While many describe this movement by referencing only migration from the East to the West, recent developments across the world have led to massive waves of internal displacement within regions (such as the Middle East's refugee crises and the movement of large numbers of people within the Eastern hemisphere) (Lerner, 1958; Bayat, 2013; Acemoglu, Hassan, & Tahoun, 2017). Many individuals feel culturally threatened by the large influx of immigrants into their own communities. This has resulted in a new global cleavage between proponents of multiculturalism and advocates for assimilation (Stoll, 2004; Tipps, 1973; Kitschelt, 1997). Third, globalization leads to the formation of new political alliances, arrangements, and competitions. Many actors emerge as winners or losers depending on the amount of social status, prestige, resources, and leverage gained or lost due to such developments. Individuals are likely to develop, modify,

and abandon preferences on many issues due to globalization (Harik, 1987; Jackman, 1998; Stoll, 2004; Tessler, 2003).

Data and Methods

The data sources for this research come from the first and fourth waves of the Arab Barometer, as well as the fourth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. Notice that data included in the analysis only covers the nations that were surveyed in both waves in order to maximize the comparative scope of the research. The Arab Barometer waves included data on five Arab nations: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Palestine. Both waves were conducted by Arab researchers partnering with University of Michigan and Princeton University researchers in the United States. Note that the interviews were held face-to-face with respondents and in Arabic unless specified otherwise, as was the case of a few Algerian citizens who preferred French. Both waves were based on nationally representative samples prepared by the country's partners in the Arab Barometer project.

According to the methodological notes of the survey, the population of subjects included citizens of 18 years of age and above in all surveyed countries. This includes the entire population living in the surveyed countries, including urban and rural areas. Clearly, this population does not include any inaccessible subjects such as those hospitalized, imprisoned, or on active duty. The sampling design followed by the researchers was a stratified multi-stage cluster sampling technique for each country. Government or state was the most important stratifications so as to ensure geographic representation of populations living across each country. Individuals who conducted the face-to-face interviews undertook rigorous training and were tested before their release to the field in order to ensure higher response rates and reliable answers.

The World Values Surveys started to cover Arab nations in the fourth wave, 1999–2004, by surveying Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The most recently available wave of surveys, the sixth, included data on Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Iraq. More nations were included in the two surveys; however, since earlier rounds did not include such nations. As discussed previously, data from such included nations is not available for the 1970s or 80s, thus limiting the availability of a sufficient time difference for detecting significant changes in values. Notice that all items used in the analysis were the same for the two waves in each survey so as to reduce variability in responses and maximize the ability to generate comparable findings.

This study utilizes a variety of numerical and graphical descriptive statistics tools for describing political attitudes in the Arab world. Frequencies, Bar Graphs, Line Charts, measures of central tendency, and variation are utilized to better explore ordinary citizens' political attitudes in the region. Comparisons of similar items, from the first wave of the Arab Barometer to the items from the fourth wave of the survey, are presented to detect any discernable changes. The use of such techniques is informed by the overall exploratory research design objective for this analysis.

Results

The Arab world has become more globalized today than ever before. KOF Index of Globalization scores, a general metric of the extent to which nation-states are globalized, have steadily increased in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia over the past half century as indicated in figures 1 to 6. Between 1970 and 2014, the KOF scores have almost doubled in most Arab countries, indicating more economic, social, and political integration into the world. Arab nation-states have less economic restrictions on the flow of goods, services, and capital today compared to a few decades ago. They have increased their capabilities of collecting and sharing data on economic flows and have established many bodies to encourage, facilitate, and promote economic cooperation both regionally as well as internationally. Cultural and social data collection efforts have also significantly increased and improved, thereby allowing governments and interested stakeholders to better assess the degree of cultural proximity, as well as personal contact, across the region and with the rest of the world. All in all, the Arab world is more globalized than ever.



Figure 1. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Algeria*



Figure 2. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Egypt*



Figure 3. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Jordan*



Figure 4. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Lebanon*



Figure 5. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Morocco*



Figure 6. *KOF Index of Globalization scores for Tunisia*

The Arab world has also become more modernized than ever before. All Arab countries generate higher gross domestic products (GDPs) than they have previously been capable of in their short histories. While the contribution of agriculture to their economies is dwindling, the service sector has simultaneously been the single most productive sector of economic activity across many countries in the region. Figure 7 shows the GDP in current $US for a selection of Arab states (Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq). GDP across the region has increased significantly over the past half century. For instance, the GDP of Saudi Arabia arose almost three-fold between 2000 and 2014, rising from about $189 to $755 Billion. Similarly, Jordan's GDP rose from less than $10 Billion in 2000 to about $30 Billion in 2015. This increase in GDP is indicative of broader economic growth across the region, where more services, products, and business are being generated in such countries compared to a few decades ago.

Figure 8 represents the percentage of GDP derived from agricultural based value-added activity in the Arab world. Virtually, across all Arab states, the percentage of agriculture-based economic contribution to the total GDP has decreased in the past few decades. This indicates that governments and people across the Arab world are moving away from agriculture to industrial and service oriented economies. Figure 9 indicates the percentage of GDP derived from service-based economic activity in the Arab world. It demonstrates that Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia rely heavily on the service sector with more than 60%. While it has increased at a slower pace, however, it has been steady in contributing to the oil rich economies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf Cooperation Council member states.



Figure 7. *GDP in $US for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq*



Figure 8. *Percentage of GDP from agricultural based value-added activity in the Arab World*



Figure 9. *Percentage of GDP from service-based economic activity in the Arab World*

The Arab world has undergone major strides in fulfilling the promise of gender equality. While realizing the objective of gender equity has not been fully achieved and great barriers to accomplishing this noble normative state of affairs still exists, evidence points to a positive outlook for females today in the Arab world. In all Arab countries virtually all of the Gender Inequality Index scores have decreased over the past half century as indicated by Table 1. Further, female participation in the labor force across the Arab world is increasing at a steady pace. Conservative Gulf Cooperation Council states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are leading the way in the region by putting more females behind desks, in government posts, and decision making pathways throughout various industries. Females are also gaining university degrees at a faster rate than ever before across the region, subsequently becoming more active politically, socially, and culturally. Today, the Arab world has witnessed a qualitative change in gender equity, thus making noticeably positive strides toward gender egalitarianism.

Table 1

Gender Inequality Index Scores for Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia

Country	1995	2005	2015
Algeria	.680	.561	.429
Iraq	.658	.536	.525
Egypt	.665	.581	–
Morocco	.713	.580	.494
Saudi Arabia	–	.672	.257

Values Change in the Arab World

Religiosity

Table 2 represents agreement levels of Jordanian, Palestinian, Moroccan, Lebanese, and Algerian samples with the extent to which religious figures influence politics. Results indicate that, across the board, Arab citizens favor less religious interference with politics in the five nations. Noticeable drops in agreement regarding the influence of religious leaders are observed in Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, and Morocco. Lebanon seems to be stable with regard to its citizens' perceptions of religion and politics. Lebanese citizens favor less Islam and Christianity in their political arrangements favoring a more secular form of government.

Table 2

To what Extent do you Agree or Strongly Agree with the Following Statements?

Country	Year			
	2006		2016	
	Religious People Hold Public Office, %	Men of Religion Should Influence Politics, %	Religious People Hold Public Office, %	Men of Religion Should Influence Politics, %
Jordan	44	34	43	31
Palestine	59	45	45	40
Lebanon	12	13	16	15
Algeria	45	40	40	40
Morocco	66	41	39	23

Figure 10 displays the percentage of ordinary citizens in Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, and Palestine who self-identified with religion or ethnicity (Arab or Muslims for most respondents) in 2006 and 2016. Results indicate a significant decrease in identifying as an Arab or Muslim in the decade separating the two surveys. About 70% to 80% of Algerians, Jordanians, and Palestinians identified as Arab or Muslim in 2006, whereas only 30% to 45% of the same populations identified themselves with either a religion or ethnicity in 2016. By the same token, the Moroccan sample exhibited a steady decrease in identification with religion or ethnicity from about 60% to 30%. Lebanon seems to reflect a steady state where most of the population identify themselves as Lebanese as opposed to Muslim, Christian or Arab. All in all, self-identification with Islam and Arabism in the region decreased significantly over the past decade.



Figure 10. *Percentage who self-identified with religion or ethnicity in 2006*



Figure 11. *Percentage who self-identified with religion or ethnicity in 2016*

Trust

Table 3 displays ordinary Arab citizens trust levels in their courts and police services in 2006 and 2016. Trust in the courts has dramatically decreased in all five countries. For instance, in Lebanon 45% of respondents in 2006 reported no trust at all or not very much trust in courts while 91% of the country's sample reported the same answers in 2016. Lebanon, Algeria and Palestine witnessed a significant decrease in trust in police services in those nations while Jordan and Morocco scored a moderate rise of trust in police services in the past decade. Judging from this exclusionary look at Arab citizens' trust levels in their political institutions, one can

infer that, generally, Arab citizens have lower levels of trust in their institutions today compared to a decade ago.

Table 3

Percentages of No Trust at All and Not Very Much Trust in Courts and Police

Country	Year			
	2006		2016	
	Courts, %	Police, %	Courts, %	Police, %
Algeria	56	46	68	51
Lebanon	45	38	91	51
Jordan	17	9	46	5
Palestine	38	40	64	53
Morocco	58	50	56	31

Tolerance

Figure 12 displays Arab citizens' perceptions towards ordinary American citizens. Respondents were asked despite the negative consequences of American foreign policy in the region, do they believe that most Americans are good people. Results indicate that Arab citizens' image of American people improved significantly in the past decade. Large percentage increases in Jordan, Palestine, and Algeria have been observed since 2006, suggesting that more Arabs believe that most Americans are good people regardless of the country's active policy in the region. Lebanese citizens appear to have a stable view of Americans, a favorable outlook exhibited in the large percentage agreeing with the statement that "Americans are good people". Moroccans seem to have a favorable view towards Americans exhibited by the large percentage, over 60%, which indicates their favorable attitude toward Americans.



Figure 12. *Arab citizens' perceptions towards ordinary American citizens, 2006*



Figure 13. *Arab citizens' perceptions towards ordinary American citizens, 2016*

On Palestine, Arab citizens today seem to be favorable towards a two-state solution for the ongoing conflict more so now than in the past. The Arab Barometer asked Arab citizens whether Arab states should accept Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East in 2006, and opposition to the idea was high in all surveyed nations. Asked a similar question a decade later, Arabs seem to be less opposed to the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab World. Arabs seem to be in favor of more friendly relations toward Israel than ever before in history. Notice how Egyptians, Moroccans, and Palestinians are almost divided on whether a two-state solution is an appropriate end to the conflict today whereas none of the Arab polities seemed divided on this question in 2006. Further, the number of people in each surveyed country who hold more favorable views towards brokering peace with Israel through the acceptance of the Jewish state or by installing two states, Israel being one of them, increased across the board.



Figure 14. *Should Arab countries accept Israel, 2006*



Figure 15. *Should Arab countries accept Israel, 2016*

Discussion and Conclusions

This research investigated whether social transformation processes such as modernization and globalization generate value shifts among ordinary citizens in the Arab world. Survey research evidence form the World Values Surveys and the Arab Barometer clearly indicate a discernable change in Arabs' political, social, and cultural perceptions from more conservative worldviews to more liberal preference schedules. Arabs today are more liberal than they have ever been.

While this research established the observational narrative of values change, using various indicators, the underlying mechanisms linking social transformation

processes and values shift are still unclear. It has been argued here that the environment surrounding the current generations qualitatively differs from that existing during previous generations. Today the K-12 education system, working conditions, family relationships, and social interactions are not the same as those found in the Arab world during say the 1970s. Modernization and globalization have provided individuals with a higher selection of options, lifestyles, and choices at most levels and stages. Further, people have been exposed to idiosyncratic, eclectic, and peculiar styles, tastes, ways of doing things, and lifestyles in general thus making them more tolerant. People today are increasingly aware of ethnic, religious, and national differences more now than ever, creating an active sense of acceptance and toleration for many around the region.

Political scientists have conceptualized liberalism and conservatism, or Left versus Right, to refer to the struggle between challenging the status quo and openness to change (liberalism or Left) and supporting the status quo and resisting change (conservatism or Right). This means that challenging forces of power in society such as religion and traditional values and extending tolerance towards others (such as those who are foreign in cultural mores) represent attributes of liberalism. For the twentieth century, Islam, antagonism towards the West and Israel, and vehement pride in local traditions have defined societies in the Middle East and North Africa, making them indicators of conservative values since such forces have defined the political, cultural, and social arrangements of the region for centuries. The evidence purported by this study clearly establishes that Arabs are becoming less religious, more tolerant to foreigners (especially Western citizens), and are more prone to peace-making with Israel. Such shifts in attitudes lead one to conclude that Arabs are more liberal than they have ever been (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Choma et al., 2012; Jahn, 2011).

One of the noteworthy shifts in the public opinion of Arabs is their increased tolerance toward gender equity (Kostenko, Kuzmuchev, & Ponarin, 2016). While structural economic indicators of female participation in the workforce, female's attainment of higher education, and female political empowerment in the Arab World point to significant improvements, individual-level attitudes toward gender participation in social, political, and cultural avenues are supportive of the structural changes (Inglehart, 2017). Arabs are more likely to vote for a female candidate than they have ever been previously. They are also more likely to approve of a new female Chief Executive Officer for a public or private enterprise. Such changes clearly mark a departure from status quo traditions (where females belong in the household) to a more liberal understanding of the role women can play in society (where she can achieve the economic, social, and cultural benefits of socialization similar to men) (Metcalfe, 2008). This markedly underscores a shift in attitudes at the structural and individual levels, making the Arab World more liberal today.

This study carries many implications. First, it shatters current arguments supporting the suggestion that Arabs are more conservative than they have ever been before. Second, it opens new horizons for the systematic investigation of public opinion shifts in the region among researchers. Third, this research confirms earlier findings from different regions, thus supporting the claim that modernization leads to values changes among the mass public.

To establish a more robust link between social transformation processes and values changes, archival data or retrospective research can help identify a multitude of attitudes in the Arab world during different epochs across the past century. This data can assist in detecting the differences in values in a fashion comparable to existing research on Western Europe and North America. Notice that this research is limited in its ability to recover comparable data on a larger set of items to establish robust comparisons between attitudes across the region.

Future research should utilize exploratory and confirmatory statistical techniques that could generate the dimensionality of values systems in the Arab world at different temporal periods. This exercise allows researchers to detect the overall direction and magnitude of shifts in a more precise manner compared to simply identifying the shifts using many survey items as this research has done. Dimensional analysis can inform researchers about the type and structuration of value systems and whether such patterns have changed over time.

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ARTICLE

Interactivity as a Vector of the Socialization of Art

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ABSTRACT
The article presents research into the role of interactive practices in the development of contemporary art. By "interactive" is meant a creative work based on a two-way interaction with the viewer. Such a creative work is capable of responding to the recipient's actions as well as changing under their influence. Interactive work is process-based, variable and open to interpretations. The history of the establishment of interactive contemporary art practices, which may be traced back to the historical avant-garde, punctuated by such important stages for contemporary art as the performative and social turns, is considered alongside ruptured art conventions associated with their advent. It is assumed that the various possibilities for interactivity are correlated with different media types (old/new/post). Interactivity is considered in terms of an important socialization factor in the various modifications of interactive art, including participatory art, as well as collaborative and collective artistic practices.

KEYWORDS
installation, interactivity, interactive art, media, participatory art, performance

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Introduction

Accusations of dehumanisation roundly levelled against art of the modernist/avant-garde period during the first decades of the twentieth century nowadays look like an anachronism. No one can accuse contemporary art of autism, of a fixation on solving internal problems or ignoring the interests of the public. On the contrary, it actively demonstrates its interest in the viewer in every possible way. To this end, game- or show-related elements are actively used and creative work often presented in the format of an entertainment attraction. The interactive works of Carsten Höller, for example, may be seen to function in this way. His installation *Test Site* (2006, Tate Modern Gallery) is comprised of slides of dizzying heights and steepness, by which means visitors to the gallery could descend from its upper floors, bypassing the elevator. Or his *Double Carousel with Zöllner Stripes* (2011), consisting of two roundabouts, slowly revolving in opposite directions in a hall whose walls are decorated with optical Zöllner illusions depicted with black and white stripes. While such installations are the subject of mixed critical responses, at the same time, for obvious reasons, they prove very popular with the public. Simultaneously amusing and fascinating, they allow the art-viewing public to undergo a new, unique experience, one that is unlikely to be possible under any other circumstances. At the same time, these works are conceptually much deeper than they might at first glance seem. For example, the primary task Höller set himself was not to facilitate fairground rides, but rather to create a situation that overturns the usual forms of perception, establishing new conditions for the development of his audience's self-knowledge. An additionally attractive aspect to such works is connected to their site-specificity, i.e. the fact that they are created in the context of a particular exhibition area; as a consequence, the same project looks and feels a little different each time. Thus, according to Höller's current plans, a neurobiological project will be undertaken in Florence during the summer of 2018 involving a twenty-metre artificial hill twisted into a double helix of DNA.

Today, art must actively draw potential recipients into its orbit, provoking them to participate in unfamiliar activities and providing them with many new (often nontrivial) opportunities for self-expression. Viewers can become both a part of the creative work as well as its co-artists; they can feel themselves to form an integral part of large-scale art projects that last for years as well as members of the micro-society formed by such projects. Following the initiation of a wide variety of public projects, art then consists in the implementation of such projects with the direct participation of a loyal public.

The loyalty of mass aesthetic consciousness towards contemporary art today is located in the confluence of several intersecting lines of its development. These include where art appears as instigating the emancipation of a particular member of the public, group and/or society as a whole; as a factor in the formation of new social practices; or as a media laboratory (old/new/post-). No less important is the artist's repudiation of monologue in favour of dialogue with the public, which is supported by the interactivity of the creative work.

The interactivity of a work of art today consists in a routing into a mass aesthetic consciousness. Modern art actively deploys interactivity in installation, environmental, in various types of actionism and manifestations of digital/hybrid art.

Interactivity in Contemporary Art

Interactivity is one of the most effective tools for involving audiences in the field of art.

However, in the context of contemporary art, the concept of "interactivity" is characterised by ambiguity. Initially, interactivity was understood in the sense of interacting with someone using various technological devices. The appearance of "interactive art" as such, at around the turn of the 1980s and 90s, is associated with the emergence of the Internet and art projects that started to appear online. In this context, "interactive art" is a digital art form that interacts directly with the user or viewer. However, from the point of view of Lev Manovich, a researcher into "soft culture", such an interpretation of the concept of "interactive art" is tautological, since "the modern human-computer interface is interactive by definition. As soon as an object is presented on a computer screen, it automatically becomes interactive." (Manovich, 2017, p. 38).

Reflecting on the problem of producing an adequate description of post-digital culture, Manovich argues for the creation of a new conceptual system, which, in his opinion, can be borrowed from digital culture. From his point of view, they can be used both literally – in the case of computer-mediated communication – and metaphorically – with reference to pre-digital culture (Manovich, 2017, p. 39). In accordance with this logic, interactivity can be interpreted in this context as having an expansive-metaphorical sense. Thus, art can be defined in terms of the active interaction of the viewer with the work and the two-way communication that arises between them. This permits the use of this concept to describe the specific manifestations of both digital and non-digital art. Irrespective of whether it is old or new media that are used by the artist of the work, by "interactive" we refer to a creative work capable of responding to the recipient's action and changing under her influence. In what follows, the concept will be used precisely in this sense.

Interactivity generates a new type of artistic communication, characterised by a change in the role of the viewer in the process of perceiving a work of art. Here the role of the artist is to provide the viewer with a part of his or her functionality. As a consequence, instead of a passive contemplator, whose participation in the process of perception of a work of art had traditionally been limited to the mental sphere, the viewer becomes an active participant in the creative process, a co-artist, who, by his or her actions supplements the original artist's intention, giving the latter integrity and completeness.

At the same time, despite the proclaimed emancipation of the recipient, it would be a mistake to believe that the artist gives the audience member absolute freedom of action. His or her powers in this respect are by no means limitless. As a participant in the assembly of the work, the viewer turns out to be intrinsic to the work, although realising the schema of the initiator rather than his or her own intention. The actions

of the viewer in this situation can be compared to those of a character in a computer game: on the one hand, it seems that within the context of the creative work he is free and unrestricted to act at his own discretion. Nevertheless, this or that choice can be realised exactly within the limits envisioned by the game developer (or, in the situation with the creative work of art, its originating artist). By and large, it consists in an upgrade of the viewer's capabilities, rather than necessarily granting her rights commensurate with those of the artist. Nevertheless, it is the viewer who confers completeness on the interactive creative work. Félix González-Torres – the famous representative of the "art of complicity", some of whose installations the viewer could take away with her (for example, sweets, sheets of paper, etc.) – acknowledged that without its public, his work had no meaning. For him, it is precisely the public, who, in becoming part of the work, allows him to consider it to be complete.

Of course, in this case, the boundaries between the artist and the work, the viewer and the work, cannot be completely removed, but rather become maximally permeable. As a consequence, an interactive work is much more open to interpretation, its meanings less rigidly defined and more subject to variation. In general, works based on the principle of interactivity are characterised by processuality (for the creators of such works, the process is more important than the result), variability, lack of pre-specified meanings and openness to interpretations.

Among the reasons for the wide dissemination of interactive art, it is necessary to mention those purely artistic reasons connected with: the exploration of artistic boundaries by artists, the subsequent democratisation of the creative process as well as the replacement of direct representation with a presentational form that occurs within the framework of a performative turn and entails the active introduction of reality into the creative process. Another set of reasons concerns the development of media: artists were not slow to seize the novel opportunities that appeared in connection with new media. As a result, creativity was subject to a rapidly growing democratisation, ultimately depriving artists of their former monopoly.

From a sociocultural point of view, in a certain sense, interactivity, which has become widespread not only in art, but also in social relations, correlates with the new social phenomena described by Alvin Toffler. Among other reasons given for the popularity of the DIY (Do It Yourself) movement, which arose and became widespread during the 1950–60's, Toffler lists inflation in the cost of manual labour as a side-effect of the automation of production (Toffler, 1999, p. 441). In Toffler's account, this movement contributed to the growth of activity and initiatives across diverse social groups.

The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of a new social phenomenon – prosumerism. In embodying a shift from a passive consumer to an active producer for herself (Toffler, 1999, p. 441), the prosumer becomes the bearer of a new identity characterised by activity and initiative. Within the concept of prosumerism, Toffler connects the emergence of a multitude of diverse social groups with the common idea of helping people to solve their problems independently.

While generally critical of the penetration of new media into art, Claire Bishop nevertheless acknowledges that contemporary social relations are mediated not by

one-way media images (the principle position of Guy Debord's theory) but rather via an interactive screen. Today, art increasingly uses the same language as the Web 2.0 protocol, introduced in 2002: both speak of platforms, collaboration and the involvement of viewers and prosumers, who not only consume the information provided, but also participate in the creation of content (Bishop, 2015). According to researchers into contemporary digital culture (for example, Oksana Moroz), today's prosumer is primarily an active Internet user, creating and consuming content across different social networks. The contemporary prosumer is thus both a potential co-producer as well as a consumer of interactive art.

The Establishment of Interactive Practices in the Arts

Despite the view of researchers that experiments with the "viewer/creative work interface" only began to take place in the middle of the 20th century, examples of interactive art can be seen as having taken place much earlier.

The origins of interactivity, metaphorically interpreted as an active two-way interaction between the viewer and the creative work, date back to the last few decades of the 19th century, i.e. at the time of the rise of modernism. The consistent democratisation of the creative process, which began with the Paris Salons, inspired the scrapping of many historically established conventions in the field of art, including those relating to the sphere of artistic communication [Thierry de Duve]. The line of demarcation, which previously clearly delineated the roles (and functions) of the artist, the creative work and the recipient, disappears, resulting in their joint involvement in the creative process.

Strictly speaking, it is only the absence of bilateral involvement that prevents many of the earlier works of art, in the course of perception of which the viewer was forced to take certain actions, from being considered as interactive. For example, from the time of the Renaissance onwards, works created using the laws of linear perspective required the viewer to occupy a certain – central – position in front of the plane of the canvas. A similar interactive effect took place with respect to the anamorphosis that had spread in the art of the 16th and 17th centuries, in which a "hidden image" was created by the artist by distorting of the rules of perspective. In order to find anamorphosis in a picturesque work, the viewer had to make an effort to locate the single point in front of the work of art from which it would be possible to see this hidden image and thus obtain a complete picture of the artist's conception. One of the most famous examples of this kind is the painting *The Ambassadors* by Hans Holbein the Younger – only by observing the picture from a certain angle is the distorted object in the foreground transformed into an image of a skull.

In both cases, the works seem to induce the viewer to perform actions by bodily means, e.g. adjustment of vision, etc. However, due to the fact that this activity is one-sided, it does not change anything in the state of the work itself, which is unaltered regardless of whether the viewer achieves the desired result or not. Other examples of the same kind include the paintings of the Impressionists. In this connection it was asserted by Camille Pisarro that an adequate perception of a work of art requires

that the viewer and the work be separated by a distance equal to three diagonals of the work in question. Here again, contemplation of the work could change according to the viewer's level of mentation, but in no way influenced the work itself.

Elements of future interactive art practices, in particular, performance or interactive installation, would start to reveal themselves in the art of the historical avant-garde. Among works of this kind can also be included the optical-kinetic sculptures of Marcel Duchamp, consisting of discs painted by the artist and driven by electric motors, as well as the kinetic sculptures of Naum Gabo and the mobiles of Alexander Calder. Here, however, it would be an exaggeration to talk about the freedom of the viewer since the role played is not significant. It may be thought of in terms of a walk-on-part, a mechanical gesture by which means an art object is brought into motion, but in whose motivating gesture their function is exhausted.

At around the same time, numerous artistic events were taking place, which, in retrospect, can be seen as comprising a kind of proto-performance. Despite the fact that, chronologically, performance art only occurs for the first time during the 1960s, Rube Goldberg traces its origins in futuristic theatre, in which conceptual work involving the public became an indispensable component of artistic communication. For the Italian Futurists, any public appearance – whether in a cafe or a theatre, at a concert, etc. – necessarily involved a negative reaction on the part of the public. In his manifesto *The Pleasure of Being Booed*, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti lists a number of approaches to bringing the public into a state of extreme irritation, including ridiculous suggestions such as 'selling twice as many tickets for the performance as seats in the hall or "covering the seats with glue" (Goldberg, 2015, p. 20). Frequently, in order to provoke the public into a state of panic, Futurists used plants, who issued loud cries when wrenched from their seats in the midst of the performance.

As regards Russian Futurism, here too proto-performance elements could be seen accompanying futuristic poetry evenings, as well as lectures and debates about contemporary art, which were often accompanied by fights with the public and police arrests. Such phenomena also include Futurists walking along the streets of Moscow with painted faces and wearing extravagant costumes, often accentuated with bizarre accessories such as a red wooden spoon inserted into a buttonhole. In terms of the proto-performative attractions of Russian Futurism, one can also consider the performances of the Budetlyanin Theatre: *Vladimir Mayakovsky: A Tragedy* and the opera *Victory over the Sun*.

Boris Groys interprets this desire of artists to activate the public, to rouse it from its state of 'contemplative passivity', in the context of the utopian project of avant-garde art. For Groys, actions of this kind are conditioned by the desire to involve the broad masses in art practice and "turn the country of victorious communism into a single, total work of art, one in which the process of permanent dissolution of the individual in the collective takes place" (Groys, 2008).

In all cases in which interactivity is considered at this stage in the development of contemporary art, artists also examined the problem of the boundaries of art, gradually shaking them, pushing them aside, facilitating their removal and, thereby, increasing the democratisation of the creative process. However, in the full sense

of the word, interactivity only becomes possible when representational art makes the transition to the presentational form. In this situation, art no longer reflects reality, but becomes it. This process, which spans several decades, begins with the historical avant-garde: from abstract art, Suprematism, Dadaism, etc., in which figurative and narrative elements are progressively discarded. According to Peter Weibel, "the art of the 20th century developed the most radical art of reality, introducing real objects, real bodies, real movement, real actions, real people, real animals, real landscapes into the art system. This break with representation, this transition […] from picture to action, is also responsible for […] the new role of the audience in art." (Weibel, 2011, p. 278). The break with representation not only radically removed the problem of professionalism, but also provided opportunities for artistic self-expression to all comers.

Interactivity in the Context of Old/New Media

The specificities of artistic practices that involve interactivity as a means of creating/perceiving the work and thus influencing how it functions are directly correlated with the specific media features used by the artist in the creation of the work. Indeed, the degree of interactivity of the work depends largely on the choice of media.

Today, the available media are divided into old (pre-digital) and new (digital). Old media, in turn, are divided into non-technological and technological. When applied to art, old media includes traditional arts – painting, sculpture, drawing, etc. To the class of old technological/analogue media belong pre-digital photography and cinematography, whereas new technological media are those for the production and consumption of which a computer or handheld computing device is required. According to Lev Manovich, the criterion for distinguishing between types of media is simple: "If you want to understand whether there is something new in the media or not, just ask the question: Do you need a computer in order to perceive it? If so, then we are dealing with new media." (Manovich, 2017, p. 80). The principal novelty of new media relative to old media lies in their digitality.

The specifics of old non-technological media limited the possibilities for active interaction between the viewer and the work. Manovich explains this situation as follows: "The traditional understanding of a medium emphasises the physical properties of a certain material and its representational capabilities, that is, the relationship between sign and referent. Like all traditional aesthetics, this concept assumes a focus on the intent of the artist, as well as the content and form of the work, but not on the user." (Manovich, 2017, p. 40). Here, the lack of any reaction on the part of the second component of artistic communication (i.e. the creative work) detracts from the issue of interactivity.

Under the situation of non-technological media, the interaction of artists with their public took place (for the most part) in accordance with well-established procedures. Shared meanings consisted in the reaction of the public being included in the artist's intention, as a result of which the course of the proposed scenario could only vary to an extremely limited degree, and for which the media requirement was not very

significant. In the case of the already-mentioned example of the proto-performance, staged altercations, which broke out at different times and places than those envisaged by the originators of the action, were typically used to achieve this effect. The question then arose as to what possibilities existed for working with the public's emotions on a subtler level. At that time, the answer was most likely – not many. The speeches of the Dadaists in the Cabaret Voltaire and Dada Gallery were sustained in the same vein of scandal and outrageous behaviour as the proto-performances of the Surrealists. As a conceptually important means of representation for many artistic trends within modernism, especially the avant-garde, scandal becomes the primary means of promoting new artistic ideas. Implicitly, it was present in any work. Here, the use of interactive elements by artists had a very specific purpose – to attract attention to the new art at any cost, pre-empting opponents and attracting supporters.

The further development of interactive art is associated with the spread of technological media, used by artists both during the process of creating a work (as a new means of artistic expression), as well as for the purpose of subsequently documenting the process. The latter is due to the process-orientation of interactive art, which only exists in the here and now: in the absence of any documentation, it remains only in the memory of the participants. In this context, media such as photography and video have in many ways contributed to the spread of interactive art. Equally relevant is the fact that the appearance of photography deprived artists of their former monopoly on the production of images, forcing them to seek new ways of developing art.

The development of technological media in art began with their use as a means of artistic expressiveness. For example, when designing a scene in Erik Satie's ballet *Relâche* [*The Performance is Cancelled*], electric bulbs were used and the composer exited the stage in a car; during the intermission, René Clair's provocative – and, in full accordance with Dada's covenants, senseless – film *Entr'acte* was shown. In the theatrical performances of the Bauhaus (projection-light plays), as well as for *Pictures from an Exhibition*, staged in Dessau by Wassily Kandinsky to the music of Modest Mussorgsky, light projections were used as means of expression. The general interest in renewing the means of artistic expressiveness, connected with the approach to the latest achievements of science and technology, was reflected in another essay *Theatre, Circus, Variety* (1924) by another representative of the Bauhaus László Moholy-Nagy: "Nothing prevents us from using sophisticated TECHNIQUE: cinema, car, elevator, airplane, other mechanisms as well as optical instruments, reflecting instruments and so on." And further: "It's time to begin to engage in stage activities of a kind that will not allow the masses to remain mute spectators, that […] will allow them to merge with the action on the stage (Goldberg, 2015, pp. 145–146). Moholy-Nagy's dreams about the viewer's interaction with the work up to and including complete dissolution in it would only be realised several decades later, when art took a performative turn, resulting in a full validation of public participation in the creation of a work of art.

Art's repudiation of the principle of mimesis, its transformation from representation to presentation, makes the work inseparable from reality. According to Weibel, "this

transition from picture to action is responsible for the performative turn, and, for the new role of the audience in art […], we live in the age of the performative turn. All kinds of art, from music to sculpture, are highly dependent on the participation and performative acts of the public." (Weibel, 2011, pp. 279–280). Contemporary art not only works with real space (as often as not, as in the case of public art outside the "white cube"), but also time (this art is process-oriented), movement, objects, landscapes. It also works with people's bodies, whether using them as part of the work, as does Santiago Sierra, for example, whose installation heroes are without subjectivity, part of the installation, nothing more. Or, in becoming an active part of the work, the audience acquires subjectivity, primarily as a consequence of interactivity.

For a long time, it was the medium that was considered as the basis for the typologisation of art. However, during the last few decades of the 20th century, the situation changed. According to Manovich: "The previous criteria for distinguishing art, based on materials used, have lost their relevance. New art practices – installation, performance, happening, etc. – unpredictably and haphazardly incorporate various materials." (Manovic, 2017, p. 35).

In the performances and happenings of the 1950s and 1960s, interactivity becomes for the viewer a source of new, often nontrivial, absurd, far-from-everyday experiences. Thus, during one of the performances of the Japanese group Gutai, who typically work very aggressively with the public in the spirit of the Dadaists, viewers were invited to paint a large format canvas on which anyone could depict anything. Thus, a situation was created in which any of its participants could turn out to be equal to the artist. Such spontaneity and unpredictability also characterised the performance-festivals of the Fluxus international art movement (among whose participants included Yoko Ono, Joseph Beuys, Ben Vautier, Nam June Paik), in full accordance with the statement of George Maciunas, one of the founders of the movement: "Everything can become a work of art and everyone can create it." His concept of 'expanded art' could not but inspire the public, although, with regard to its direct participation in the events of Fluxus, it is fair to say that initially only the presence of the latter was required.

Much more detailed audience participation requirements were described in the performances of Allan Kaprow. In 1959, Kaprow carried out the performance entitled *18 Happenings in Six Parts*. Visitors were given programmes, which contained a set of instructions: a procedural script detailing the actions of certain groups of viewers. This was the first documented case of direct participation of the public as a component of the artistic work – in the programme, it was listed as part of the performing staff. And although the participation of the public was mainly limited to a transition from one zone of space to another, the absence of any barriers between it and the performers created a completely new situation.

During the 1960s, there was a return to collective ways of organising artistic activity, involving such forms as *performance* and *happening*: Fluxus, Situationist International, GRAV (Groupe de Recherche d'Art Visuel) took aesthetic approaches to levelling critiques against institutions of power, against the Society of the Spectacle, against consumerism. It is during these years that art goes beyond the white cube,

and, in so doing, establishes new formats by means of which the public may encounter works of art (Vali Exports, Peter Weibel, GRAV, etc.). The role of viewers in artistic communication is strengthened, although their actions remain at times destructive or hostile. Here, artistic communication can become more complicated since including such new components as: the *viewer-as-artist* (since in the first performances the artist often was his own performer); the *viewer-as-another-viewer; the viewer-as-work*.

Since the 1960s, performances have been characterised by an appeal to an ever-wider range of topics, including those that were formerly considered taboo in culture: among them politics, sex, violence, death, narcissism, and so on. At the same time, the public was liberated; on the one hand, becoming increasingly active; in other cases, also aggressive. Thus, Yoko Ono's 1964 performance *Cut Piece*, during which the audience was invited to cut off pieces from the artist's dress with a pair of scissors, made a dispiriting impression on critics – primarily, in terms of the willingness of some members of the public to perform actions bordering on violence. The subsequent performance by Marina Abramović entitled *Rhythm 0* had to be interrupted due to threats to the life of the artist, who invited the public to perform any actions on her using various items laid out on the table.

The art of the 1960s works enthusiastically with all media, including video, film, television – both as a means of documenting events and as a means of artistic expressiveness. However, with the advent of new digital technologies, their capabilities in this respect have become almost limitless. High technologies have now penetrated almost all spheres of human existence: they mediate labour, leisure, communication, as well as art in many of its manifestations.

For several decades, the experiments of artists with new technologies were transformed into that component of visual arts referred to today as 'digital art'. This art form has already undergone many name changes during its relatively short existence. It has been referred to, for example, in terms of computer-, multimedia-, cyberspace- (Paul, 2017, p. 7), etc. Whatever it is called, it is undeniable that new technologies are claimed by art, according to Claire Bishop, "at least at one stage of their production, distribution and consumption" (Bishop, 2015). Even in those cases where artists do not use new media directly in their work (which, as, Bishop observes, applies to almost the whole artistic mainstream), they are nevertheless forced to take into account new circumstances related to the digitalisation of reality.

Already in the 1960s, in order to realise their projects, artists were entering into collaborations with programmers, engineers, etc. Many adherents of high technology continue to believe that the future lies in a hybrid art that unites science, art, biotechnology and other elements.

Artists working with new media can place their projects directly on the network, where they are available for user input. For example, a user could participate in B. Seaman's project "Prokhodnye nabory/Tyanut' za ruchku na konchike yazyka (Passages Sets/One Pulls Pivots at the Tip of the Tongue)", creating a multimedia poem from words, images and media clips (Paul, 2017, p. 93). Artists can create installations or environments in which high technologies are used in one way or another: computers, interfaces, all kinds of sensors that react to human presence

or to some parameters of the human body or even the weather, e.g. wind speed, etc. In this sense, the viewer becomes part of the installation when, by her actions, she activates it. An example of this is A. Ballock's *Drawing Machine*, a work which hung on the wall and began to draw straight lines in response to the sounds of human presence (or some other human actions that were not announced in advance). The viewer can also consciously interact with an installation: using a gadget, she can change the patterns of projections and colours on three giant screens that represent Masato Tutsui's audio-visual installation *Functional Organics*.

Projects of this kind are typically not only interactive, but also kinaesthetic and immersive; that is, they totally immerse the recipient in an artificial environment created by the artist. Thus, Philip Beasley creates an interactive environment consisting in a kind of forest that affects all the sensory organs of the recipient as well as being sensitive to her touch (installation Hylozoic series: STOA).

Today we live in a post-media world, a situation in which no particular medium has priority; meanwhile, in art, any combination of them is allowed. Nevertheless, it is digital media that exerts the greatest influence on contemporary art. Just as the appearance of photography at one time deprived artists of their monopoly on creating images, which resulted in the performative turn in art, so the appearance of new media, according to Weibel, deprived artists of their monopoly on creativity. "The new 21st century art paradigm consists in a worldwide network, especially following the Web 2.0 revolution: now access to all media open is to everyone at any time […] With the arrival of the mass media network, the monopoly on distribution was also lost. Creativity is everywhere […] Everyone can be creative with the help of technology; however, in addition to this, she can also distribute products of her creativity with the help of technology" (Weibel, 2011, pp. 276–277). In this way, new media create a situation of extreme democratisation of creativity. Hence the increase in activity on the part of the public, who are waiting for the co-creatorship invitation from the artist. Hence also the corresponding proposal on the part of artists.

Researchers note the emergence of a kind of 'interactive dependency' in modern culture (Adashevskaya, 2011). The reasons for this dependency are quite understandable: interactive work not only entertains and empowers the viewer, provoking her to perform certain actions, but also gives her something more – new sensations and new experiences. On the one hand, this art undoubtedly arouses genuine interest among the public; on the other, it creates a situation of proximity to the market, for which it is often reproached by critics. In this respect, interactive art fits into the "experience economy", the business concept based on people's desire for a variety of impressions. The product here is the obtaining of a new experience, the possibility of experiencing interesting new emotions.

Interactive art in the Context of Social Practices

New media has turned the viewer into a user, whose ever-increasing activity over time produces the ability to go beyond the boundaries of the work, to form new social ties and on this basis create a micro-society.

The curator Mary Jane Jacob defines art as a kind of social practice. In her opinion, art always creates social interaction, regardless of whether it is a picture, conventional subjects, or multiple varieties of socially-engaged art (Jacob, 2013). Thus, in the context of interactive art, various types of the art of complicity become of interest.

During the 1990s, a period characterised by an unstable socio-political situation, social issues were to the fore in contemporary art. In a situation in which a dominant force in the political arena is absent, art acquires the ability to express itself more vividly. "When the dominant political narratives lose their legitimacy, the space is released for new ideas about the future. It is this sense of opportunity that determines the current proliferation of contemporary art practices associated with collective action and civic participation." (Kester, 2013, p. 48).

This circle of problems was updated in *Relational Aesthetics*, a collection of essays by Nicolas Bourriaud, which became one of the most discussed (and criticised) books devoted to contemporary art. At the centre of Bourriaud's attention is 'relational art', defined as art that takes as its theoretical foundation "the sphere of human relationships and its social context" (Bourriaud, 2016, p. 15). In other words, on the one hand, while the work of art does not cease to be objective and material, on the other, Bourriaud's primary attention is emphatically on the human relationships arising within the performance or other event proposed by the artist. Bourriaud's reflections were inspired by the works of artists who actively work with their public, including Philippe Parreno, Félix González-Torres, Carsten Höller, Rirkrit Tiravanija and Pierre Huyghe.

This kind of relational art takes the interactivity of the work to a new level. Previously, the artist either used viewers as extras, a means of setting the work into motion; or as part of the installation, simultaneously complementing and changing it with their actions. In either case, the viewer acted within the framework of the script created by the artist. Most of the performances of previous decades assumed either merely the presence of the viewer – where she acted as an entourage, or, in other words, was used as a medium – or permitted her a modicum of participation. Unlike most examples of this kind (for example, the events of Joseph Beuys and Bruce Nauman), the art of relationships creates a fundamentally different situation, since it gives the viewer a subjectivity, taking into account not only her body, but also experience, sensations, etc. In this sense, works of this kind are much more variative and open to (two-way) communication.

Bourriaud uses the potential of art to try to find exclusively peaceful means of overcoming the fragmentation of the consumer society and alienation inherent therein. In his opinion, one should not create new utopias or make plans for improving the world through revolutionary change (as, for example, the Situationists did). Rather, one should learn to live in the world as it is, making it better, friendlier and more harmonious through the establishment of new social ties, the emergence of which in other circumstances, outside art, would be difficult or impossible. The art of relationships should become a source of alternative forms of sociality, its projects oases of good will and mutual understanding. In the opinion of Bourriaud, this art

is "a pore, a notch in alienation everywhere" (Bourriaud, 2016, p. 96). Sometimes he understood the space of human relationships as is, on the one hand, inscribed in the global system; on the other hand, he admits "alternative [spaces], not accepted in this system of exchange opportunities" (Bourriaud, 2016, p. 18). Although Bourriaud objects to a definition of relational work in social terms, this can be seen as an attempt to organise fragmented reality into a positive social project.

Quite quickly, relational art becomes supplemented by the large number of practices associated with the general idea of establishing social ties through interactive artistic approaches. These include socially engaged art, dialogic art, the art of social practices, the art of experimental communities, the aesthetics of communication, etc. They are united by the absence of a border between art and life: actions take place in real time and space, requiring the simultaneous presence of both artist and public.

For the designation of art of this kind, art critic Claire Bishop uses the term "participatory art" or the art of participation. A consistent critic of Bourriaud, Bishop tries to reveal art in areas where there is a much more obvious social and ethical dimension, in connection with which the problem of the criteria to be used for evaluating such creative works from an aesthetic point of view remains unresolved. In striving to avoid the terminological uncertainty inherent in art of this kind, Bishop distinguishes between the concepts of "participation" and "interactivity". By interactivity is implied the work of the 1960s and 1970s, based on a one-to-one relationship between the viewer and a technological device or interface (for example, the viewer can click a button). For Bishop, "participation" implies that a work is created by several people, each of which also acts as a medium, a communicative means within this work (Bishop, 2010). In the digital age, such an idea of interactivity is already inherent. In the case of participative art, interaction is made more complicated, but never abrogated. Its structure becomes more complicated, in this case including not only the viewer and the work, but also the viewer and the artist, the viewer and other viewers.

In the case of collaborative and collective art practices, the structure of interaction becomes even more complex. These are large-scale projects that unite many artists with different social groups, who interact for long time periods often measured in years. As an example of how art creates micro-societies, united by common goals and values, art critic and art historian Grant Kester led the project *Park Fiction* in Hamburg (Kester, 2013, p. 47). Due to the efforts of artists and local residents, a river bank area intended for gentrification was not only defended against the city authorities but also turned into a fantasy public park. During the process of project implementation, alternative platforms for community communication (cafes, bars, schools, etc.) were created and local opinion leaders (musicians, priests, school principals, etc.) were invited. Naturally, the most active local residents took part in the discussion and implementation of the project. In this case, additional interactive structures were associated with the interaction not only of individual viewers, but also of individual social groups.

Critics of interactive art (and all its modifications) often doubt its ability to do anything to radically change society through such "baby steps"; clearly, it does not

constitute a magic wand for solving all social problems. Nevertheless, projects of this kind continue to be implemented and can be seen to contribute to positive social change. The success of the curator Charles Esche is explained by the combination of artistic imagination with the original realism of the task: at the base of such projects are "modest proposals", seeking to use existing objects, conditions and situations with the aim of their due transformation. Esche is convinced that collective creativity not only opens up new opportunities, but also becomes a "method of research and analysis of objective conditions" (Esche, 2005, p. 8). Another important factor is the increasing impossibility of experiencing collective creativity in other spheres of contemporary society, making its realisation even more attractive both for artists and for the public.

In this regard, the curator M. Lindt notes that in recent times, culture and art have become an effective force for provoking artistic activism. For her, collaboration is "a way to create a space that would allow us to escape the instrumentalising impact of the art market and state-funded art" (Lindt, 2013, p. 115).

Conclusion

Despite its clear role in determining the development of art since the time of the historical avant-garde, the importance of interactivity to the emergence of contemporary art has, in our opinion, been underestimated. It is no exaggeration to say that today's state of art is due, inter alia, to the interactivity that made the process of artistic communication bilateral and active, resulting in the emancipation of both individual audience members and society as a whole. If it hadn't been for interactivity, many of the former boundaries between art and reality, between the artist and recipient, would still remain in place. The active deployment of interactivity allows contemporary artists to not only entertain the public, but also involve them in the social projects initiated by the artists, thus contributing to the socialisation of art.

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BOOK REVIEW

Ronald Inglehart (2018). Cultural Evolution, People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Cambridge University Press

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In *Cultural Evolution, People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World*, Ronald Inglehart undertakes a comprehensive scholarly examination of his proposition that "high levels of economic and physical security led to pervasive intergenerational cultural changes that reshaped people's values and worldviews, bringing a shift from materialist to post-materialist values, which was part of an even broader shift from survival to self-expression values".

This book builds on the author's previous work concerning modernization as a multifaceted process of social change pivoting on value change, that is transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects. Inglehart's work builds on, but substantially revises, classical modernization theory as developed by Marx, Weber, Durkheim and many others, updating it to examine post-modern society and beyond, inquiring into the trajectory of the knowledge society and the Artificial Intelligence era.

In this book, Inglehart applies the principles of evolutionary theory to develop a new theoretical framework for modernization theory. Evolutionary theory and functionalism shaped modernization theory as early as in the 60s, emphasizing the ability to adapt to gradual, continuous change as the normal condition of stability, by attributing causal priority to immanent sources of changes, and by analyzing social change as a directional process. As the author suggests, "Evidence from around the world indicates that socioeconomic development tends to propel various societies in a roughly

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predictable direction, but these changes are probabilistic not deterministic. And cultural change is path dependent. The fact that a society was historically Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist even when one controls for the effects of socioeconomic development. Although the value systems of different countries are moving in the same direction under the impact of powerful modernizing forces, their value systems have not been converging, as simplistic models of cultural globalization suggest."

By revisiting the scientific concepts of evolutionary theory and blending them with modernization theory, the author succeeds in marking the categories that tell us more about the subject matter than any other categorical sets (Kaplan, 1973).

According to Inglehart, "The central claim of classic modernization theory is that economic and technological development tends to bring coherent and roughly predictable social and political changes. Evolutionary modernization theory agrees, but argues that these societal changes are largely driven by the fact that modernization brings value changes that are causing the people of economically advanced societies to have systematically different motivations, and consequently different behavior, from the people of less developed societies."

The book is structured in an introduction and ten thematic chapters. The introduction presents the approach and concepts of evolutionary modernization theory that are used in the work. The chapters address various social phenomena in an ambitious and comprehensive way. From the end of secularization, to the feminization of society and the rise of Trump and the xenophobic populist parties, the author covers a broad specter of social life.

The book analyzes a wide number of topics in comparative perspective covering over 100 countries, which permits a rich examination of both individual and cross-cultural levels. Additionally, Inglehart examines the data in a longitudinal perspective discriminating between enduring birth cohort effects and transient life-cycle effects. As the author points out "A large body of evidence, analyzed using three different approaches, (1) cohort analysis; (2) comparisons of rich and poor countries; (3) examination of actual trends observed over the past 40 years, all points to the conclusion that major cultural changes are occurring, and that they reflect a process of intergenerational change linked with rising levels of existential security."

Inglehart tests his main hypothesis in connection with various realms of society including economy, gender equality, sexual behavior, democracy, happiness, religion, individualism versus collectivism, among others. The author discusses the transformation of many aspects of human existence from individual personality to international relations.

The author provides deep insight into the factors that impact on values and behaviors in numerous countries, employing survey data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, from 1981 to 2014, with surveys in more than 100 countries that contain over 90 percent of the world's population, based on more than half a million personal interviews.

One of the most critical findings confirmed in this book is the evolution towards a globalized world that has increasing inequality within countries. According to the OECD, income inequality in OECD countries is at its highest level for the past half century.

In 2015, many countries adopted the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, among which, Goal 10 refers to reducing inequality within and among countries. However, the outlook seems pessimistic as many societies, according to Inglehart, "…are currently regressing toward the xenophobic authoritarian politics linked with insecurity. But, unlike the xenophobic authoritarianism that surged during the Great Depression, this does not result from objective scarcity. These societies possess abundant and growing resources, but they are increasingly misallocated from the standpoint of maximizing human well-being."

The future seems also uncertain as the inadequate regulation of financial sector and the deregulation of economy and financial markets are contributing to financial capitalism that is deepening inequality. The author comments that "Trump promised to make America great again. But Trump's policies of deregulating the financial sector, cutting medical coverage and reducing taxes on the very rich are the opposite of what is needed by the people who have been left behind. They will make America great for billionaires who pay no income tax".

Another main contribution emanating from this work is that it takes into account cognitions and emotions as sources of value changes. According to Inglehart "…experimental research indicates that human decisions are heavily influenced by unconscious biases or intuitions". In recent years, social scientists have underemphasized the role of emotions as mediators in human cognition, behaviors, and values. But recently, emotions are gaining momentum (Hochschild, 2016).

Inglehart's analysis based on evolutionary modernization theory has certain limitations, as the author points out. The first is that his analyses are largely confined to national territorial states, partly because he mainly uses the data of the World Values Survey, which carries, out representative national surveys. This could be taken to imply that the transformation of societies reflects internal processes of change, ignoring the role of interactions between societies. The author with his deep knowledge of the world history brilliantly solves this limitation. In any case, the tradition of books that use the national level for their analysis is long and rich (among others, see Merrit & Rokkan, 1966).

Second, the evolutionary modernization theory approach could be considered to be the product of an ethnocentric world-view in which the benchmark universally applied is that of the United States of America. However, in the present book, this limitation is overcome as fundamental values and structures associated with modernity and post-modernity are contested. On the other hand, there is evidence that changes tend to be produced in societies of the "social center" and then spread to societies of the "social periphery" (Galtung, 1976). Changes toward post-materialist values and, since 2000, a reversion toward materialist values have begun in the most developed countries (and specifically in the United States of America)

and within the most prestigious social positions. Furthermore, there is theoretical and empirical evidence of the complementary relations between Galtung's centre-periphery theory and Inglehart's theory of value change, based on Spanish and international data (Díez-Nicolás, 2013).

Third, long-term ecological viability as a fundamental human value should play an important role in the analysis of advanced industrial societies (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992). The author's concerns about inequality have important implications on the ecological viability of modern societies. Recent literature on the topic of ecological inequality focuses on inequality and green trade (Oosterveer, 2007), power and inequality related to environmental and informational flows (Mol, 2008), differential effects of stringent environmental policies and the unequal distribution of environmental risks (Smith, Sonnenfeld, & Pellow, 2006).

Fourth, one of the main conclusions of the book is the threat for stability posed by the unequal allocation of resources. The resources are considered in terms of economic scarcity. However, they should also be considered from the point of view of the scarcity of cultural resources, because the present environment of Mankind is more and more socio-cultural, not only natural. The debate should address the citizenship and the problem of the unequal distribution of resources in society. In this point, Inglehart leaves the door open to future research in the political realm as Insecurity today results not from inadequate resources but from growing inequality, which is ultimately a political question.

Fifth, the book seems to support the notion that tradition and modernity represents two mutually exclusive, functionally independent clusters, but Inglehart's evolutionary modernization theory does not treat all modern or post-modern societies as similar, recognizing different traditions. In his book, Inglehart suggests that "…the forces of modernization have impacted on large numbers of societies in enduring and comparable ways. Urbanization, industrialization, rising educational levels, occupational specialization and bureaucratization produce enduring changes in people's worldviews. They do not make all societies alike, but they do tend to make societies that have experienced them differ from societies that have not experienced them, in consistent ways."

With this book, Inglehart has established a powerful baseline for future research. Among the topics that deserve further analysis, we suggest the research on immigration and citizenship and the evolution of values in a context of financial capitalism because as the author warns "In recent decades, much of the population of high-income countries has experienced declining real income, declining job security and rising income inequality, bringing growing existential insecurity. This has happened in context with a massive influx of immigrants and refugees." Understanding the role played by immigrants is critical for societies in general and Western societies in particular as an important percentage of Western countries' citizens now is of immigrant origin and citizenship is bound up with the problem of unequal distribution of resources in society. Financial capitalism threatens to undermine the very foundations of our societies of individuals (Elias, 1987).

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APA (*American Psychological Association*) references are widely used in the social sciences, education, engineering and business. For detailed information, please see the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*, 6th edition, http://www.apastyle.org/ and http://blog.apastyle.org/

In the text:	
Placement	References are cited in the text by the author's surname, the publication date of the work cited, and a page number if necessary. Full details are given in the reference list. Place them at the appropriate point in the text. If they appear within parenthetical material, put the year within commas: (see Table 3 of National Institute of Mental Health, 2012, for more details)
Within the same Parentheses	Order alphabetically and then by year for repeated authors, with in-press citations last. Separate references by different authors with a semi-colon.
Repeat mentions in the same paragraph	If name and year are in parentheses, include the year in subsequent citations.
With a quotation	This is the text, and Smith (2012) says "quoted text" (p. 1), which supports my argument. This is the text, and this is supported by "quoted text" (Smith, 2012, p. 1). This is a displayed quotation. (Smith, 2012, p. 1)
Page number	(Smith, 2012, p. 6)
One author	Smith (2012) or (Smith, 2012)
Two authors	Smith and Jones (2012) or (Smith & Jones, 2012)
Three to five authors	At first mention: Smith, Jones, Khan, Patel, and Chen (2012) or (Smith, Jones, Khan, Patel, & Chen, 2012) At subsequent mentions: Smith et al. (2012) or (Smith et al., 2012) In cases where two or more references would shorten to the same form, retain all three names.
Six or more authors	Smith et al. (2012) (Smith et al., 2012)
Authors with same surname	G. Smith (2012) and F. Smith (2008) G. Smith (2012) and F. Smith (2012)

No author	Cite first few words of title (in quotation marks or italics depending on journal style for that type of work), plus the year: (“Study Finds”, 2007) If anonymous, put (Anonymous, 2012).
Groups of authors that would shorten to the same form	Cite the surnames of the first author and as many others as necessary to distinguish the two references, followed by comma and et al.
Organization as author	The name of an organization can be spelled out each time it appears in the text or you can spell it out only the first time and abbreviate it after that. The guiding rule is that the reader should be able to find it in the reference list easily. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH, 2012) or (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2012) University of Oxford (2012) or (University of Oxford, 2012)
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Act	*Mental Health Systems Act*, 41 U.S.C. § 9403 (1988).
Audio and visual media	Taupin, B. (1975). Someone saved my life tonight [Recorded by Elton John]. On Captain fantastic and the brown dirt cowboy [CD]. London: Big Pig Music Limited. Author, A. (Producer). (2009, December 2). *Title of Podcast* [Audio podcast]. Retrieved from *Name website*: https://www.w3.org Producer, P. P. (Producer), & Director, D. D. (Director). (Date of publication). *Title of Motion Picture* [Motion picture]. Country of origin: Studio or distributor. Smith, A. (Writer), & Miller, R. (Director). (1989). Title of episode [Television series episode]. In A. Green (Executive Producer), Series. New York, NY: WNET.

	Miller, R. (Producer). (1989). The mind [Television series]. New York, NY: WNET.
Database	Author, A. A., Author, B. B., & Author, A. A. (2002). A study of enjoyment of peas. *Journal Title*, 8(3). Retrieved February 20, 2003, from the PsycARTICLES database.
Dataset	Author. (2011). *National Statistics Office Monthly Means and other Derived Variables* [Data set]. Retrieved March 6, 2011, from *Name website*: https://www.w3.org If the dataset is updated regularly, use the year of retrieval in the reference, and using the retrieval date is also recommended.
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