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Aims and scope:

Changing Societies & Personalities is an international, peer-reviewed quarterly journal, published in English by the Ural Federal University. *CS&P* examines how rapid societallevel changes are reshaping individual-level beliefs, motivations and values – and how these individual-level changes in turn are reshaping societies. The interplay of personality traits and sociocultural factors in defining motivation, deliberation, action and reflection of individuals requires a combination of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Since an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand the causes and consequences of the contemporary world's changing socio-political institutions, moral values, and religious beliefs, the journal welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions from a wide range of perspectives in the context of value pluralism and social heterogeneity of (post)modern society.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to

- value implications of interactions between socio-political transformations and personal self-identity;
- changes in value orientations, materialist and post-materialist values;
- moral reasoning and behavior;
- variability and continuity in the election of styles of moral regime and/or religious identity;
- the moral bases of political preferences and their elimination;
- social exclusion and inclusion;
- post-secular religious individualism;
- tolerance and merely 'tolerating': their meanings, varieties and fundamental bases;
- ideologies of gender and age as variables in political, moral, religious and social change;
- educational strategies as training for specific social competences;
- social and existential security.

The journal publishes original research articles, forum discussions, review articles and book reviews.

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SPECIAL ISSUE: Higher Education in the BRICS and the Global South: A Driver for the Development?

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EDITORIAL

Editor's Note

The Global South is a research concept, which gained currency fast and which tends to replace previously wide-spread notions of the Third World and developing countries. The Global South today is analyzed from a variety of perspectives. It refers to geographical grouping of countries with emerging economic and growing political impact. On the one hand, countries included in the Global South are actively asserting themselves in the international arena, and, on the other hand, are troubled with many issues that significantly differ from those "developed" Global North faces. It is important to note that many of these issues stem from the colonial past of the countries of the Global South.

BRICS as the most advanced of the international organizations of the Global South begins to play increasingly important role in the development of higher education. The evidence for the positive impact it has is the BRICS Network University, the BRICS ministers of education's cooperation efforts, and the interest of the Global Academia in the new models of South-South university collaboration.

This special issue involves scholars and practitioners in discussing how higher education influences the situation in the Global South and whether it can spur its development. Should it focus, for example, on internal problems of the South, such as human development and struggle against poverty, or it must be oriented towards international standards of the research university? Should the governments invest in the excellence programmes to establish world-class universities, or should they create conditions for equal education opportunities and for enhancing inclusive nature of the higher education? Is higher education capable of boosting development in the countries with high unemployment and illiteracy rates?

In Maxim B. Khomyakov's paper*, BRICS and Global South: Towards Multilateral Educational Collaboration,* he notices that BRICS as an international grouping has always been an odd phenomenon. BRICS countries still have very different opinions on many issues; nevertheless, what they have in common is their vision for a new global order, in which education would play the most important role. The situation, however, is very complex, since education (especially, higher education) both has very important national tasks, and is an element of the nation's global performance. That is why higher education is

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mostly ridden with contradictions between its functions in developing imaginaries and its role in competition on the global educational market. In the article, he reflects upon the discussion of the contradiction between global orientation of the universities, and the necessity for them to play important role in domestic affairs through addressing local problems and developing valuable imaginaries. This tension among other things is expressed in contradiction between various global excellence projects, on the one hand, and horizontally structured university networks and associations, on the other. In addition, he analyzes the role of BRICS countries in the light of articulating the interests of Global South.

Dr. David Monyae in the paper *US, Russia, China and Africa in the Evolving Global Order* rises the complex issue of the post-World War II global order, which is in deep crisis now due to changing roles of such powers as USA, Russia, and China. Dr. Monyae's main concern is the African states, which are disregarded by this new order, and are "no longer seen to be of any importance, as they had been during the Cold War". However, as he mentions, there is an emerging "intra-west" competition over gaining favour with African countries, and developing countries can take advantage of this. In addition, Dr. Monyae stresses the importance for African scholars to study intensively the historical and present intentions of the foreign policy of the above-mentioned countries. He concludes that African states should not "pick sides" in global struggle for dominance, but follow their own agenda based on long-term goals and prospects seeking cooperation with these powers "only insofar as there can be an Africa-centred outcome".

In the paper *Higher Education, Development, and Inequality in Brazil and South Africa* Maria Lígia de Oliveira Barbosa, André Pires, and Tom Dwyer undertake the comprehensive analysis of the higher education in Brazil and South Africa taking into consideration both countries' controversial history of inequality, as well as the expansion of the role and scale of universities in last 25 years. The authors pose the question if the growth of the number of higher educational institutions and enrollments creates high quality or "world-class universities" in these countries; in answering this question, they provide deliberative report on the quality and problems of education there. Among other issues, they reflect upon the international ranking as popular method for evaluating educational institutions, which presently is under sharp debates all over the world. The authors conclude that in spite of important steps towards greater democratization of higher education in both countries, still it is not sufficiently inclusive, and remains relatively closed, particularly in courses that give access to more prestigious and well-paid careers.

Yuyun Li in the paper *Development of Cooperation in Higher Education in BRICS Countries* stresses the fact that the BRICS countries see the collaboration in higher education as being extremely important; at the same time, she strives to distinguish existing difficulties and problems in current cooperation such as the shortage of funds and the lack of publicity. She believes that five countries can learn from each other, and explore solutions in the area of education: "When higher education in one country accepts and adopts ideas, curriculum, languages, cultures, traditions and even talent training from other countries' education systems, the collaboration between education systems leads to amplified results and guaranteed intelligence, and forms the basis for long-term and stable cooperation". Li Yuyun suggests enhancing of multi-disciplinary and multi-form educational exchanges and cooperation projects with mutual participation, which creates an open and diverse partnership network in educational development.

The current issue of CS&P also contains two book reviews. The first one is of Victoria Smolkin's (2018) *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism*, presented by Andrey S. Menshikov. As it is argued in the review, Smolkin's book as a "panoramic study is a must-read for those who specialize in the Soviet history as well as for those who work in Religious Studies". The second review is of Jonathan Floyd's book (2017) *Is Political Philosophy Impossible? Thoughts and Behaviour in Normative Political Theory,* presented by Daniil I. Kokin. The reviewer makes some critical remarks on the book and concludes that generally it is an important contribution to the foundations of political philosophy.

Discussions on the topics raised in the current issue will be continued in the subsequent issues of our journal, and new themes will be introduces. We welcome suggestions for thematic issues, debate sections, book reviews and other formats from readers and prospective authors and invite you to send us your reflections and ideas!

For more information, please visit the journal web-site: https://changing-sp.com/

Elena A. Stepanova,
Editor-in-Chief

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ARTICLE

BRICS and Global South: Towards Multilateral Educational Collaboration[1]

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ABSTRACT
The article is devoted to the discussion of the educational policies of the BRICS countries in the context of rising Global South. The author argues that BRICS grouping is better understood not as a union of the countries based upon common identity or a set of the values, but as a group, which is held together by certain imaginaries. These imaginaries are a vision of alternative world order on the one hand and of the emerging Global South on the other hand. Education, then, pays a pivotal role in BRICS collaboration, because it helps to develop and to spread these imaginaries. The article analyses multilateral educational collaboration in BRICS in comparison with excellence programmes devoted to establishment of elite world-class universities and oriented at indicators of the main international academic rankings. The author argues that such projects as BRICS Network University are much more relevant to the tasks of South-South collaboration than the excellence programmes such as Russian 5/100 one. In conclusion, the author attracts readers' attention to the multiple modernities theories as possible rationale for BRICS cooperation or South-South collaboration in general.

KEYWORDS
South-South cooperation, multiple modernities theories, BRICS collaboration, BRICS Network University, education policies of the BRICS countries, excellence projects in higher education, Russian 5/100 project, Global South

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Introduction

BRICS as an international grouping has always been an odd phenomenon. Its first summit in Yekaterinburg has effectively been a result of the invitation of Brazil to a traditional meeting of Russia, India and China (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 10); its second summit would probably not take place if Brazilian President Lula had not invited the leaders to meet together for the second time in the Brazilian capital (Stuenkel, 2015, p. 34). Nothing seemed to unite these very different and distant countries except their resentment of the Bretton Woods institutions as well as of other elements of the global governance system. As President Lula has famously noted after G8 summit in France, to which India, Brazil and South Africa had been invited as mere observers: “We do not want to participate only to eat the dessert; we want to eat the main course, dessert and then coffee” (Kurtz, 2013).

BRICS countries, however, had (and still have) very different opinions on free trade, security, role of existing global governance institutions etc. India and China still dispute territorial issues, and Indian aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council has been successfully blocked by a fellow BRICS country. It is not surprising then, that some experts have quite persuasively argued that

> these countries have basically nothing in common whatsoever, except that they are called BRICS and they are quite important. However, in all other respects, their interests and values, political systems, and objectives are substantially diverse. Therefore, there’s no reason whatsoever to expect them to agree on anything substantive in the world, except that the existing dominating powers should cede some of their influence and power. That’s the one thing they have in common (Alessi, 2012).

This also explains the fact why BRICS gatherings were always looked upon quite skeptically by the overwhelming majority of the Western commentators.

Over time, however, BRICS managed to develop a number of international forums and a complex system of negotiation between the governments, which, following Joseph Nye, could be called “trans-governmental” (Nye, 2002, p. 106). Every year different ministers keep meeting to discuss new (and sometimes very innovative) forms of collaboration. What does drive them if not commonalities between the countries? Why for more than ten years does the BRICS grouping hold together and even manage to develop not only new forums, but also some new institutions (such as, for example, New Development Bank)? The answer seems to lie not in the present events, but in the horizon of the future, and not in what could be found in reality, but rather in what is imagined.

> The characteristic that made the BRICS countries identify with the concept and resulted in common action as a political and economic grouping was not a shared identity… Instead, it was the realization that they share a common vision for a new global order, and that by combining forces in a small but strategic group that binds Asia, Africa and Latin America together, they had a better chance of realizing that vision (De Coning et al., 2015, p. 1).

In other words, it is the vision, the imaginary, which really matters in the case of BRICS collaboration. Apparently, part of this imaginary is a vision of an alternative world order.

It is this vision which seems to have brought about so-called "BRICS plus" format or the idea of expansion BRICS collaboration to other Global South countries. This format, proposed by China and for the first time implemented at Xiamen summit of 2017, has matured under South African Presidency, who invited to Johannesburg summit of 2018 not only important African countries, but also the countries, representing various regional communities of the Global South, such as, for example, Argentina, Indonesia, Egypt, Jamaica and Turkey. BRICS engagement with Global South for promoting South-South cooperation seems to be another powerful imaginary, which holds BRICS countries together. Of course, whether BRICS grouping is able to become a voice of the Global South is still very unclear. What is obvious, however, is that the survival of BRICS very much depends upon its success in providing leadership to the emerging Global South.

Development of these basic imaginaries of the alternative world ordering and of the South-South cooperation can help us to explain the fact why various "softer" types of collaboration like, for example, people-to-people exchanges play increasingly great role in BRICS "inter-governmentality". Arguably, the most important of these collaborations is educational one.

Social imaginaries are always developed through scholarship (mostly in humanities and social sciences), and are installed via education. This is how the imaginary, "idea" or "theory" usually sizes the masses, and, by the same token, becomes a material force (Marx, 1970, p. 137). It is understandable, then, why South African Minister of Higher Education, Ms. Naledi Pandor in her opening speech at the third Annual BRICS Network University Conference highlighted importance of the BRICS NU platform for educational collaboration as "deeply entrenched within BRICS". She also emphasized its importance for Global South: "in fact a lot is expected from it, not only by the BRICS leaders and countries, but by the entire developing world". BRICS Network University "can foster new dynamics in South-South cooperation, while fostering intellectual bonds and exchanges among the BRICS academic community" (Pandor, 2018).

These considerations do explain importance of education in the context of BRICS and Global South. The situation, however, is very complex, since education both has very important national tasks, and is an element of the nation's global performance. International aspect applies, of course, mostly to the higher education. That is why it is higher education, which is mostly ridden with contradictions today: contradictions between national tasks and international performance or between its functions in developing imaginaries and its role in competition on the global educational market. These tensions are expressed among other things in the contradictions between domestically focused education and internationally oriented university research, or between university policy, oriented at supporting important publications in national language and the policy focused on international journals of high reputation.

These contradictions, being rather moderate in the developed Global North countries, naturally become extreme in Global South. The universities of established reputations do not have to compromise their missions for the sake of international advancement, but the situation of the "emerging universities" is rather different. Thus, any university of the developing world, which, following its mission, chooses to publish its research outputs in open access resources, available in national language, would seriously undermine its performance in World University rankings, and, thus, would weaken its position in global competition for the most talented (or just simply rich) international students.

This article is devoted to the discussion of one of these numerous contradictions between global orientation of the universities, and the necessity for them to play important role in domestic affairs through addressing local problems and developing valuable imaginaries. This tension among other things is expressed in contradiction between various global excellence projects on the one hand, and horizontally structured university networks and associations. The article will discuss this tension in terms of its relevance to the development of educational collaboration of the BRICS and Global South countries.

Does Global South Have a Place in Global Academic Revolution?

Higher education today is experiencing a period of most radical transformation, rapidly changing content and structure of education everywhere in the world. These changes are so drastic that some attentive observers have even coined the term academic revolution to describe what is happening in the sphere of higher education today. What is meant here are four main processes, which jointly determine radical changes in today's university environment. The processes in question are massification, commercialization, globalization and internationalization (Altbach et al., 2009).

These four processes, however, are not separate ones. They are so tightly interconnected and entwined that they seem to be the aspects of a single global transformation, of one general trend. On the one hand, the growing middle class in a number of the Global South countries is seeking access to tertiary education abroad, thus contributing to both internationalization and massification of the universities in the Global North. On the other hand, internationalization almost inevitably leads to a higher degree of commercialization, simply because it seems to be very difficult to persuade national taxpayers to support international students. As in any transnational corporation, in the university today nationally defined common good comes into conflict with internationally attracted resources and worldwide activity. Global presence, contributing to making world a global campus, as in the famous David Lodge's novel (*Small World: An Academic Romance*, 1984), thus, also transforms the university into transnational commercial enterprise. The four elements of the academic revolution, thus, do intertwine, contributing together to the worldwide process of radical transformation.

It follows that this transformation is neo-liberal in its essence (Khomyakov, 2016, p. 396). Namely, one of its obvious results is treating higher education not as an important public good, but rather as a product for international sale (Hazelkorn, 2011, p. 11; Rhoads et al., 2014; Dill & Soo 2005, p. 253). The logic of the public good has been substituted with the logic of the private commercial brand and the Humboldtian idea of individual development gave way to the educational services provided by the universities. The result is a phenomenon of educational capitalism, which threatens washing out non-commercial values (Sandel, 2012, p. 114). As commercial enterprises, the universities stop performing some of their important social functions, such as, for example, enhancing social equality through inclusive comprehensive education or providing moral education to the future citizens (Sandel, 2012, p. 203).

Internationalization is certainly one of the most prominent aspects of this global transformation. Explosive growth of the young population in such countries as Nigeria (median age 18.4 years), India (27.9), Ethiopia (17.9), Kenya (19.7), Philippines (23.5), Pakistan (23.8), Angola (15.9) and Nepal (24.1) make them potentially very attractive markets to recruit foreign students from. The shortage of the institutions of tertiary education combined with the gradual growth of the middle class leads to an increasing number of the young people from these countries seeking paid education abroad. It is very important to notice at this point that the academic neo-liberal revolution thus further reinforces the gap between the Global South and the Global North. The first is treated as a source of potential students, bringing money to the economies of Europe and North America. This growing gap certainly exhibits neo-colonial nature of the global educational market structure.

In the countries of Global North itself, the resulting commercialization of the universities is increasingly blurring boundaries between public and private education. Thus, in many public universities in the US, for example, only one fifth of the budget comes from different public sources (Altbach et al., 2009, p. 14). This fact does make us wonder in which sense education in the "developed world" still could be called public.

All these considerations mean that both internationalization and the academic revolution in general, not only bring with them putative or real openness, inclusiveness or equality. They also lead to the consolidation of the global educational market, to fierce competition among both universities and national educational systems, to the substitution of the nationally oriented approaches with transnational commercial education as well as to the gradual disappearance of the concept of education as a public good and, consequently to the aggravating struggle of the universities for the material and human resources both domestically and internationally. They also contribute to the ever-growing gap between South and North and, by the same token, to the condition of radical global inequality. In short, internationalization and globalization accompany processes of formation of the global educational capitalist system.

It is not surprising then, that formation of the global educational market led to the emergence of the new private business of academic rankings. The Big Academic Three, composed of Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU, also known as Shanghai Ranking), Times Higher Education ranking and Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) World Academic ranking seems to have monopolized this business globally. Ostensibly meant to provide a reliable guide in the global landscape of the higher education, the rankings in reality led to the aggravation of global inequality, to creation of new neo-colonial disciplinary practice as well as to the unprecedented pressure on both the national governments and universities. This pressure led, among other things to the inclination of the university leaders to use the results of the rankings in the strategic planning even if they believe that the picture provided by the rankings distorts the reality gravely. Thus, E. Hazelkorn (2011) noted that while the majority of the leaders of the higher education institutions (HEIs) believe that the university rankings favor old universities (89%), establish hierarchy of HEIs (82%), are open to distortion and inaccuracies (81%), at the same time they are also inclined to use the results of the rankings in setting goals for strategic planning (63%) and to consider them as providing important comparative information (73%). Only 40% of these leaders, however, believe that the rankings provide valid assessment of the higher education quality (Hazelkorn, 2011, p. 94).

The very logic of the world university rankings seems to imply favoring those institutions, which are already very powerful. Indeed, the concept of world-class university (WCU) as it has been developed by a number of scholars, is based upon understanding a WCU as an institution, which attracts talents and resources globally and is effectively led towards this aim by a team of good professionals (Salmi, 2009). This is clearly a circular way of defining world-class university, since, of course, only the universities of already existing high world reputation are able to attract talents and resources. In a way, this definition almost tautologically says to us that only those universities are world-class ones, which already have the reputation of those. In other words, World-Class University is one, which is recognized as such globally. This, in its turn, directly implies that it is almost a tautology that Harvard University, Cambridge, Yale and Oxford represent world-class universities.

This means that this vicious circle of the reputation in the rankings produces what Robert Merton has famously called a “Matthew effect” – the situation, when those who already have the reputation gain everything, and those without established reputation continue to loose the resources (Rigney, 2010; Safón, 2013, p. 230; Hazelkorn, 2011, pp. 19–20, 76). What rankings produce, then, is a greater inequality in reputation, and, therefore, in resources the universities are able to attract. Rankings, thus, are usually biased to old, established, large traditional universities.

Inequality, fostered by these reputational gaps is twofold. On the global scale, there is obvious inequality between the nations: rankings do favour British and American model of research university more than, say, socially responsible highly autonomous institutions of some continental European countries (Safón, 2013; Saisana & D’Hombres, 2008; Jeremic et al., 2011, p. 595; Altbach, 2006, p. 79; Mei Li et al., 2011).

At the domestic level, the schools of inherited reputation usually perform better in all main league tables. International rankings seem to favor traditionally leading schools of particular nation, such as, say, Moscow State University in Russia or Al-Farabi National Kazakh University in Kazakhstan. Their international reputation is very much inherited, while the other universities in the same country must build it sometimes from scratch. It certainly makes the task of building world-class universities even more formidable for the schools, which for the moment do not have the reputation of belonging to this rather elite club. After all, the majority of the rankings elevate institutions “with advanced reputation in both teaching and research, as historical bearers of state mission” (Pusser & Marginson, 2013, pp. 555–557).

Thus, domestically international rankings reinforce inequality between elite and mass higher education institutions, while globally they widen the gaps between perceived educational metropolises and deeply provincial "periphery". That is why B. Pusser and S. Marginson describe the project of the world academic rankings as "neo-imperial" and argue that "because the norms of ranking systems are mostly consistent with the world's strongest higher education institutions located in the United States, this disciplinary effect is especially invidious in nation-states outside the United States. Despite the global variations in resources, states of development, national histories, traditions, languages and cultures, institutions outside the United States are pressed into following the template of the globally dominant universities…" (Pusser & Marginson, 2013, p. 558). Thus, "…the state project being pursued here is not simply national but also neo-imperial, being most closely tailored to the interests of the nations traditionally dominant in the higher education sector: the Western nations and, above all, the English-speaking nations led by the United States and United Kingdom" (Pusser & Marginson, 2013, p. 559).

Thus, the majority of the universities from the Global South countries lose in this competition independently of their active participation in the race. Those who abstain, lose from the very start; those who participate, find it impossible to compete with the established centres of academic power, and eventually lose anyway. The arrival of the new technologies resulting in the things like MOOCS (Massive Open Online Courses) does not really make this world more open and equal. In the condition of transnational educational capitalism, open courses lead to further exclusion and inequality. Thus, Zembylas and Vrasidas (2005) claimed that instead of helping to create a culturally neutral "global village", digital networks helped Western countries to colonize the world again, to increase their opportunities and to expand their reach. S. A. Rye (2014) demonstrated how seemingly "democratic" (meant to be inclusive, equality-based) Norwegian online courses, which involved both Norwegian and African students, produced in reality some new important inequalities and exclusions. African students, for example, had to deal with various cultural peculiarities, built in the very structure of the course, and, in result, were not always capable of demonstrating the same level of the performance as the students from Norway. Thus, with all their democratic potential and the millions of the on-line students taking courses in the best world-class universities, the MOOCs do not necessarily contribute to the narrowing the gap between Global North and Global South.

The growing gap between Global North and Global South makes the universities in the emerging economy countries seek an effective strategy for overcoming most serious differences. Arguably, there are two possible strategies here: the first one is an attempt to gain a proper share of the global educational market through active participation in the worldwide excellence race, while the second one is rather a quest for an alternative vision. In terms of the existing structure of academic power, the first one consists in active participation in educational neo-colonialism described above, while the second one tries to implement anti-colonial principles of a more or less radical nature. By the same token, the first one is about better integration to Global Academia, while the second one rather concerns creation of additional alternative networks and consortia. The best implementations of the first are various national excellence projects, whereas the second is the main focus of horizontal network programmes. Quite naturally, then, the integration strategy is totally in agreement with current neo-liberal transformation of global education; the networks, however, represent an ambitious attempt to find an alternative to the transnational educational capitalism. Finally, integration to the World Academia today means orientation at creation of the elite world-class university, but the horizontal networks focus primarily on peculiar problems of the Global South societies.

Many universities in the BRICS countries (especially in China and Russia with their extensive excellence projects such as "project 985" in China and 5-100 project in Russia) today seem to play both games simultaneously, thus trying not too consistently both to get their share of the neo-colonial pie and to find alternatives to the dominant power structure. This is very unsustainable situation, of course, because it does make one suspect masking neo-imperial fight for markets. In other words, it is still very unclear whether BRICS countries are able and willing to find an alternative for the existing power distribution or they are simply fighting for the bigger share of this power. In the context of neoliberal knowledge society discourse, education and science are directly connected to these power structures.

Now, it is too early to judge what in reality is going on in higher education systems of the BRICS countries and Global South in general. On the one hand, in their attempts to build World-Class Universities many of these countries tend to reproduce external Northern models and play old game of market competition in the global educational space. On the other hand, through forming horizontal university networks and enhancing South-South educational cooperation, BRICS countries do try to form an alternative vision of international education. The struggle between these two tendencies seems to reflect general contradiction of the BRICS policies between neo-colonial and inclusive models of the development. In any case, the future of the BRICS block seems to depend very much on which of these tendencies would finally win. In what follows I will briefly analyze these two opposite currents in educational development policies of the BRICS countries.

Excellence Projects: Paving the Way for the Transnational Education

The impact of the new transnational higher education upon national systems of higher education is especially strong in the countries, struggling for better representation in the global educational market. This struggle is most strongly intensified by the obsession with the academic rankings that can sometimes lead to compromising national goals and domestic traditions in higher education. There is, for instance, an example of Japan, whose government has recently recommended to the universities not to spend precious resources for humanities and social sciences and to close the relevant departments ("Japanese government asks universities to close social sciences and humanities faculties", 2015). Humanities are national in the essence, and they naturally lose their place in the new transnational order of higher education.

This bias is only very natural for the rankings, which tend to favour hard sciences over humanities. Humanities do not produce new technologies and are not considered to be useful for generating revenues (Amsler & Bolsmann, 2012, p. 287). Moreover, with their focus upon the development of national cultures, humanities' research output cannot be properly measured by international citation indexes. Finally, by both tradition and their nature, humanities are still very much books- rather than journals- oriented disciplines. This fact also adds to the difficulties of the "objective" measurement favoured by the world university rankings, since even world's top historians or philosophers very often have comparatively low h-index.

It does make sense, then, to agree with Rauhvargers (2013), who describes the rankings as (1) focusing on elite universities; (2) relatively neglectful of the arts, humanities and social sciences, and (3) reliant upon such poor indicators as, for example, faculty/students ratio in measuring teaching quality (Rauhvargers, 2013, pp. 17–19). Those who want to get quickly higher positions in the academic rankings, then, will have to support already rich universities, thus, contributing to further inequality growth as well as to sacrifice certain disciplines (especially those focused in human development, such as humanities) for the sake of the developing technology-oriented knowledge.

In other words, those who decide to participate actively in the global academic race must be ready to invest heavily in few elite institutions. For one thing, "a world-class university is a $1–1.5 b[illion]-a-year operation" (Hazelkorn, 2007, p. 1), and, for another, building new reputation is even more expensive than maintaining existing one. That is why among BRICS countries, since 1999 China has been spending in total about US$6 billion for the programmes devoted to the creation of the world-class universities (WCUs). Russia in 2012–2017 invested US$878.5 million in its well-known 5/100 Project, which supports enhancing "international competitiveness" of 21 best Russian institutions of higher education.

Despite some interesting results, the performance of the universities from the BRICS countries in the world academic rankings is still not too impressive. Even mainland China with all its huge investments has only seven universities in top 200 of the 2019 Times Higher Education (THE) ranking and seven universities in top 200 of the 2019 QS World University Ranking. Russia and South Africa had one university each in both rankings, India and Brazil are not represented in top 200 of THE. India has three universities, and Brazil – only one university in top 200 of the QS WUR. On the other hand, the UK is represented with 29 universities in top 200 of the both rankings. This is a good illustration of the huge gap in academic power and weight, which emerging economy countries are so desperately trying to bridge with their excellence projects.

In the end, then, it would appear that the main goal of the excellence initiatives is better integration into the world Academia rather than addressing most pressing domestic issues. In the Russian case, the project is openly oriented at enhancing performance of Russian universities on the global scale and has initially set the educational system an utterly unrealistic task to bring at least five universities to the top 100 of the world university rankings. In other cases the goals could be expressed in more subtle ways, but all of them invariably promote transnational technological education, which became a new educational normality of 21st century. Thus, internationalization becomes one of the most important goals of higher education development.

What is most important here is that in this quest for better integration to the world Academia the universities are compelled to change according to the external standards. Therefore, the negative impact of the rankings is far less “on institutions at the top of the global ranking tables that can determine their own identities” (Amsler & Bolsmann, 2012, p. 287). In the emerging countries, however, sometimes even elite national institutions have been “partly displaced” by the top global universities (Marginson, 2007, p. 11). In the countries, which aspire for better positioning of their higher education systems in the main league tables, the impact of the rankings can become disastrous.

The rankings, thus, become a powerful disciplinary tool because they define both external standards and the best performers, thus becoming an important instrument for the benchmarking (Hazelkorn, 2011, p. 42; Proulx, 2011). In the Russian case the main benchmarks for the best 5/100 universities are set based on the rankings. Thus, Higher School of Economics (Moscow), for example, chose London School of Economics and Political Science, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Humboldt University of Berlin, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and University of Warwick as its benchmarks (Programma HSE, 2013, pp. 6–7). Ural Federal University (Yekaterinburg), being a large technical school, focused on massive attracting foreign students from Asia, compared itself with Aalto University (Finland), Sungkyunkwan University and Yonsei University (both in South Korea), City University of Hong Kong and TsinHua University (both in China). Interestingly, for Ural Federal University the main elements to compare were current position and historical dynamics of these universities in THE and QS academic rankings (Programma UrFU, 2013, pp. 6–7).

Another obvious feature of the excellence programmes is their orientation at creating WCUs, peculiar elite schools with distinct mission and purposes. Through supporting elite schools, the governments further increase basic educational inequalities in their societies. Those schools, recruiting best students from the best high schools, are thus getting additional support from the public sources. Since the majority of the best high school’s alumni belong to upper middle class, the governments through the excellence initiatives indirectly subsidize those who by no means could be called the least advantaged members of the society. Excellence programmes, thus, are indirectly reinforcing social inequality.

It is not surprising, then, that the development programmes of the majority of the Russian university participants of 5/100 project do exhibit neo-liberal orientation at enhancing competitiveness or developing national economy (for example, Programma UrFU, 2013, p. 4). Integration to the Academia is defined not so much in terms of joining old good Republic of Letters, but rather as entering fierce competition for material and human resources. Internationalization, then, is used also as synonym for the market competitiveness (see also a powerful critique of the concept of international by Paesi, 2005).

The excellence projects have positive sides as well. They make the universities care about their reputation, set high standards and integrate research and education in global Academia. The projects stimulate researchers to publish in respected journals and motivate professors to create educational programmes able to attract good students. The rankings become an interesting benchmarking instrument and do provide university management with some useful metrics. Undoubtedly, "rankings are here to stay. Even if academics are aware that the results of rankings are biased … they also recognize that as impressive position in the rankings can be a key factor in securing additional resources…" (Rauhvargers, 2013, p. 25).

The quest for better integration to the market-driven world Academia, however, should not lead to forgetting the most pressing problems at home and to compromising their own missions by the university. The difficulty, thus, lies in finding a proper balance between orientation to the international standards and national or regional commitment of the higher education institution. It is not an easy task, however. In his welcome address to the participants of the 7th QS-APPLE conference held on 16–18 November 2011 in Manila, Fr. Rolando V. Dela Rosa, O. P. Rector of the University of Santo Thomas, noted that his university would probably become one of the world leading ones if the rankings took in consideration the number of saints produced by particular institution ("Which University Has More Saints?", 2011). The seemingly joking nature of this remark should not obscure the obvious fact that many Global South countries like Philippines would probably need those aspiring to be the saints more than those who prepare for the career of the office manager. In any case, neoliberal world-class universities glorified by the world academic rankings do not seriously embody domestic social role of the university, the role, which is certainly important both for the Global South countries in general, and for the BRICS countries in particular.

There is no any evidence, moreover, that putative own BRICS academic rankings would anyhow help the situation. On the one hand, there already exist some BRICS and "emerging economies" academic rankings being issued by both Times Higher Education and QS. These rankings, however, are almost identical to the world ones as far as the measurement and metrics are concerned. The only real difference seems to be artificial geographical limitations. On the other hand, even if BRICS does create its own new university ranking mechanism, it would inevitably keep the main drawbacks of the existing world academic rankings. The point is that the task of taking into account the needs of such different societies and educational systems with the aim of incorporating all of them into a unified ranking mechanism does not really make any sense. Any unified ranking would necessarily be too abstract, and, thus, would not take into consideration different needs of the BRICS societies. One of the important things in this respect is that what is needed for the majority of the BRICS countries is an inclusive quality education, which is very difficult to measure internationally and which, therefore, is not really measured at all by the main rankings focused instead upon universities research performance.

"Horizontal" University Networks: Addressing Common Problems

An answer to the misbalances of the obsession with the world academic rankings is given by the horizontal academic networks of the universities of the similar position and status, who share general approaches to the common problems of the similar societies. These networks could be seen as an emerging alternative model of the university collaboration and higher education development.

The still dominating model of the university interaction is the model of "vertical" collaboration of the North and South, in which Northern expertise and standards are exchanged for human (students) and material (funding) resources of the Southern nations. S. A. Rye (2014) discerns three main types of such collaboration for the development. The first one is providing free places for the Global South students at the universities of the Global North. It is, by the way, still the main practice of the "educational internationalization", employed by the Russian government. The second one is connected with establishing higher education institutions of high "international" (that is Northern) quality standards in the Global South countries (via either supporting local universities or through creating foreign campuses of the best universities). Finally, the third type of the vertical collaboration is online education, which provides the students with opportunities of international mobility without actual physical moving. Arguably, all these types of interactions involve certain transfer of the standards in direction of Global South and transfer of the resources in predominantly Northern direction. Even when these collaborations are supported by international donors, they do promote further expansion of the northern standards and culture.

That is why developing horizontal South-South university cooperation is both new and important, because it brings with itself a hope of overcoming dependence of the Southern universities from the values, standards and cultures of the Northern partners. In the overwhelming majority of the cases, however, this collaboration is still just a weak addition to the predominantly hierarchical development-driven North–South collaboration.

BRICS is no exception from this rule. Quite naturally, BRICS is a club, based rather upon pragmatic than normative consensus. The overall goals and immediate tasks of BRICS were always pragmatic: overcoming consequences of the global economic crisis, creating conditions for sustainable development, safeguarding security etc. That is why creation of a common educational area has never been a proper task of the BRICS interactions. As a result, collaboration in research and education among BRICS countries has never been very intensive. The number of co-publications between researchers of any pair of the five countries does not exceed 3% of the total number of publication of the particular BRICS nation (Khomyakov, 2016a, p. 19). The exchange of international students is intense only with China; the double degree programmes between universities of different BRICS countries are also very rare.

Speaking about the number of the international degree-seeking students from the BRICS countries in the best Russian universities, it differs greatly. In 2017 of 5498 students from the BRICS countries in 12 Russian universities – participants of the BRICS Network University, 5120 were from China, 191 from South Africa, 136 from India and only 39 were from Brazil.

In many respects, thus, educational collaboration of the BRICS countries is still very much in the plans rather than in reality. One of the possible reasons is the difference between the educational systems of the BRICS nations (with the exception of China and Russia), which simply cannot be meaningfully compared with each other. All these facts allowed Ph. G. Altbach and R. M. Basset to claim that the concept of the BRICS block "is actually of little relevance in understanding the complex higher education environment" (Altbach & Basset, 2014, p. 2).

It can also be argued, however, that if BRICS is to develop and to provide a real alternative vision of the world-making, it is bound to have something to tell to the world not only in terms of sheer pragmatism, but also in terms of the values. To become sustainable, BRICS (and, generally, other members of the Global South) should obtain a normative dimension. Arguably, any real value-framework, however, does require a common educational and research area as well as rich cultural interactions between countries. Thus, if the BRICS project is to be considered seriously as a viable alternative to the existing world-making model, it has to eventually include all these aspects. If BRICS countries are to become real leaders of the consolidated Global South, they should find their own way in education and research. Otherwise, BRICS club would not live up to its own promise and it will be more or less quickly substituted by another, more viable alternative.

The most successful attempt to build international common educational and research area we can find is in the Bologna process along with other important European initiatives, such as organizing Erasmus academic mobility programme or establishing European University Institute in Florence. On the one hand, when they try to create joint educational projects, BRICS experts must certainly learn from these experiences. But, on the other hand, the possibilities of borrowing are very limited due to the fact that the links between BRICS countries simply cannot be so tight and their interrelations so intense as they are between European member-states. BRICS club naturally does not aspire for establishing political unity or common market, and, thus, it cannot aim at developing intensely common educational and research area.

The normative framework for this collaboration is still to be developed, although I will briefly discuss some possible candidates for this role in the last section of this chapter. As for the general idea, the very concept of the Global Emerging South with inherent understanding of the horizontally structured collaboration could be seen as a basis for such collaboration. In such understanding, BRICS is not simply anti-globalist movement directed against the prevailing neo-liberal world-order, but is an important attempt to provide an alternative vision of development devoid of the remnants of imperialism and colonialism. The ideas of the Global South, development and interpretations of modernity are then crucial for such collaboration.

These ideas lie behind the most developed of the BRICS educational projects, the BRICS Network University (NU). The network consists of 56 universities from all five BRICS countries, jointly implementing Master and PhD programmes in the six priority areas of the BRICS studies: economics, water resources, IT, ecology, and energy. Being established by the MOU, signed by the Ministers of Education of the BRICS countries, the Network University involves complex horizontal coordination mechanism, based upon the principles of what has been announced as a new concept of the development. In other words, all efforts were taken to ensure equality and autonomy of the participants in the project, which should eventually become a basis for the sustainable university collaboration of the BRICS countries.

Unlike European University Institute, this BRICS initiative is a network without its own developed infrastructure that is without buildings, libraries and computers. Unlike Shanghai Cooperation Organization Network University (another network initiated by Russia), the BRICS NU does not imply existence of a permanent secretariat or rector's office. Unlike European Erasmus programme, it does not have, at least at the initial stage, any consolidated budget, so that each country is supposed to finance independently the participating universities.

The President of the BRICS NU is appointed on the annual basis by the current BRICS Chair country, whereas it is the International Governing Board (IGB), which collectively takes all strategic decisions. The Board consists of 15 permanent members, representing universities and ministries of education of all five countries. Following the rules of the other BRICS bodies, all decisions are taken on the consensus basis and do not imply a voting mechanism. On the national level, the activity of the BRICS NU is organized by certain National Coordinating Committees, composed by the representatives of the individual universities. Finally, all substantial issues are discussed at the six international thematic groups, organized in accordance with the six priority areas. Thus, the whole system of coordination is rather complex and consists of national and international, formal and substantial, ministerial and universities-related bodies. The complexity of the system inevitably makes the decision-making process sometimes very long and always quite difficult; there is, however, a shared understanding that only such a system really corresponds to the principles of equality and autonomy of the horizontal BRICS collaboration.

One of the most problematic and at the same time important issues in this context is of how the financial decisions are taken and through which mechanism the participating universities are supported. According to the MOU on the establishment of the BRICS NU, the financial matters are domestic responsibility of each BRICS country. Some of them (Brazil in 2015, South Africa in 2017) decided to allocate finance to individual institutions, Russia is going to support incoming students through the mechanism of the subsidized places at the participant universities (starting at least from 2019, when the network is supposed to generate the first exchange students mobility), while India considers supporting the BRICS NU activity through the University grant commission, which provides funding for all universities in the country. China has not decided on the mechanism at the time of writing, probably because it would need first to define clearly relations between the BRICS Network University on the one hand and China-financed project of the BRICS University League, on the other hand. The differences in funding procedures along with the absence of the consolidated budget do add difficulties to the project and reflect its complex nature.

Important aspects of the BRICS NU activity are Internet presence of the project and annual general gatherings (not to mention regular meetings of the individual international thematic groups). The face-to-face meetings of all participants are important for the success of the project. That is why the New Delhi Declaration of the BRICS Ministers of Education (2016) envisages holding annual BRICS NU conferences. Face-to-face interactions between researchers of the BRICS countries, situated far away from each other, are thus considered to be of high importance for the BRICS NU activity. They are especially significant because individual researchers and professors there still have better knowledge of the relevant activity in the US or Europe than in BRICS or other Global South countries. Since real interactions between individual professors and researchers are considered as the basis for the successful networking activity, BRICS NU envisages extensive face-to-face work.

As for the Internet presence, apart from the project web page (https://nu-brics.ru), several groups inside of the project are currently working upon on-line courses in the main BRICS NU priority areas. In total, international thematic groups for the moment are working on 22 joint master and PhD programmes. Of them 6 have already been opened for the students (4 in computer sciences and 2 in ecology and climate change), and other 18 are going to enroll the first students in 2018 and 2019. Namely, there will be opened 1 additional programme in computer sciences, 4 programmes in the BRICS studies, 4 programmes in economics, 4 programmes in energy, 1 programme in water resources and pollution treatment, and 2 additional programmes in ecology and climate change. It is clear that with, all these programmes in place, the BRICS NU will become the largest, the most comprehensive and certainly the most ambitious project as far as South–South cooperation in education is concerned. That is why today BRICS NU is justly treated as a flagship project of educational collaboration among emerging countries. However, difficulties with funding, uneven participation in the project and complex mechanism of the decision-making do make development of these programs a difficult and rather long process.

There is also another, quite different, initiative which is usually also mentioned in the context of educational collaboration of the BRICS nations. Namely, the BRICS University League, a voluntary university association, is regularly referred to by various BRICS Declarations and Statements. Being officially initiated by five Russian and five Chinese Universities in 2013, it is coordinated now by Beijing Normal University (China). Unlike the Network University, the League is rather slow in developing its activities. It still lacks a signed charter, a developed plan of the activities and a clear organizational structure. In a way, this organization is still to be established. The main difference of the League compared to the BRICS Network University project consists in its purely voluntary nature that is in its being formed independently from any official ministerial decision. The idea, thus, is that its activity would be complimentary to the work of the BRICS Network University.

Conclusion

As it has been argued in the previous sections, sustainable educational and research collaboration of the BRICS countries is impossible without a more comprehensive normative framework, justifying its ambitions. Namely, if the BRICS club is just another neo-imperial gathering of the countries trying to enhance their international standing and to get their share of the post-colonial market, it cannot be expected to provide a viable alternative to the existing world-order. In this case, collaboration of these countries will remain purely pragmatic, which, in the absence of the strong common interest, will inevitably tear the club apart. We have already witnessed such processes in the conflict between India and China over construction of a road in Bhutan; Brazilian u-turn after Dilma Rouseff's impeachment (and especially after recent election of Jair Bolsonaro) is another example of the looming dangers, which might threaten the very BRICS existence. After all, when established common institutions are absent, too much seems to depend upon the current political course and will of each of the BRICS countries.

It is not very clear, however, what the normative framework, which can help to overcome such problems, could be. After all, as it has been already noted, the BRICS countries are so different and are situated so far away from each other, that it would be difficult to locate the long-standing interests and features they have in common. One thing, however, is very clear from the very beginning: the BRICS club is sustainable only as a leader of a consolidated Global South. Even if it contains Russia with its Arctic regions, Northern ambitions and rich imperial past, the BRICS does make sense only as an articulation of the interests of Global South. The idea is that through BRICS the Global South will participate in the alternative global governance to a level they hitherto have not. Only in this case is participation of such small countries as South Africa justified: it takes part in BRICS projects as a leader of the whole African continent. Similarly, Brazil represents South America, Russia leads Central Asia, China represents Far East and South-East Asia, while India expresses interests of Southern Asia. Of course, one could ask if these countries are able to represent the regions they are supposed to lead, if they have necessary moral and material power and weather they are really credible and trustworthy. All these questions would not change, however, the fact that the only way for the BRICS to become sustainable is to inspire confidence and hope in the Global South as a whole.

The idea of Global South makes sense, however, if there is a possibility for alternative vision of the social development. In other words, consolidation of the Global South is possible if development or progress is not a straight way from one point to another. This means rejection of the modernization theory, at least in its classical post-Second World War version. The problem is that "theories of modernization in the 1960s understood the combination of autonomy and rational control as realized solely and definitively in the institutions that emerged in Europe and the US… As a result, modernization in newly developing countries was understood as an imitation of that which had occurred in more advanced countries" (Larrain, 2007, p. 41). Unlike theory of modernization as a single way to establishing a set of distinctly modern institutions, the new theory understands modernity as "experience and interpretation" of the modern condition. We are now talking, then, on plural modernities, rather than single modernization of different societies. Now, how is this understanding possible?

After Johann Arnason's and Peter Wagner's seminal works on modernity (Arnason, 1989; Wagner, 1994) it has become almost commonplace to refer to Cornelius Castoriadis's characterization of modernity as based upon a certain "double imaginary signification". Namely, the modern period, according to Castoriadis, "is best defined by the conflict, but also the mutual contamination and entanglement, of two imaginary significations: autonomy on the one hand, unlimited expansion of 'rational mastery', on the other. They ambiguously coexisted under the common roof of 'reason'" (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 37–38). Arnason thinks of these two principles, or, rather, "significations" as having divergent, mutually irreducible logics so that "the pursuit of the unlimited power over nature does not necessarily enhance the capacity of human society to question and reshape its own institutions, and a coherent vision of the autonomous society excludes an unquestioning commitment to the more or less rationalized phantasm of total mastery" (Arnason, 1989, p. 327). These logics, however, are not only divergent, but also "entangled", and both are present in modernity from its very outset (Carlenden, 2010, p. 57). In short, "modernity has two goals – to make man master and possessor of nature, and to make human freedom possible. The question that remains is whether these two are compatible with one another" (Gillespie, 2008, p. 42).

Importantly, these two pillars of modernity are not definite principles; they are rather significations, in other words, "multiform complexes of meaning that give rise to more determinate patterns and at the same time remain open to other interpretations" (Arnason, 1989, p. 334). The interpretations are given and the definite patters are formed, in their turn, in real historical situations by real people, and thus reflect complex interplay of different elements, including other imaginary significations, pre-modern traditions, popular sentiments or political considerations. The question of how these patterns are formulated against a particular socio-historical background is, then, one of the most important and interesting questions arising in the study of modernity. These patterns represent what could be called different trajectories of modernity.

Without going into further details of the plural modernity theory, it is worth emphasising that, being based on experiences and interpretations, particular modernity constellations or trajectories are formed by real people in real time and space and therefore do differ from place to place. This in its turn means that Global South is not an "underdeveloped" region in need of modernization according to the external northern standards; it is not less "modern" than "developed" countries of the Global North. However, it is alternatively modern.

The plural modernity theory thus opens up interpretative space for understanding Global South not simply as a competitor, but rather as an alternative to the Global North. In education, the patterns of North–South collaboration as well as the activities of various excellence programmes most closely correspond to the classical idea of educational modernization, whereas horizontal networks make sense as alternative ways of organizing international collaboration in education only in the framework of the plural modernity theory.

Rejection of the classical modernization idea has, however, some important consequences. One of them is abandoning traditional development concept, based upon aid and involving complex mechanisms of discipline and control. This development has always been a form of colonial education of the underdeveloped barbarians. Such approach is best expressed in the famous J. S. Mill's passage: "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and be justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty as a principle has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion" (Mill, 1977, p. 224). Such development projects are quite justly questioned and criticized my many post-development scholars (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997).

However, as rejection of modernization does not imply abandoning the concept of modernity altogether, pitfalls of the classical development concept should not lead us to the rejection of the development theory as such. Of course, in the framework of plural modernity theory, development could not be treated anymore as an effective transfer of good institutions from one place to another. As the experience of many former Soviet Union countries have recently demonstrated, such transfer in the majority of the cases is rather counter-productive. Thus, almost in all countries of the former Soviet Union, the deficiencies of the "transferred" institutions are obvious (for democracy, for example, see Rozin, 2017; Fish, 2005). Even if the exact causes of these deficiencies are not always completely clear, the efficiency of any institutional "transfer" is questionable. If one, however, recognizes each country's possibility to be modern in its own way, the sought-after development can only be in growing its own institutions, based upon particular constellation of modernity. In other words to be effective the development has to fit the trajectory of the society in question.

The new concept of the development as a basis for BRICS countries' interactions has been recently (2015) proposed by the scholars of BRICS Studies Centre in Fudan University (Shanghai). The concept implies "non-zero sum game" win-win development based upon principles of autonomy (independence), equality, inclusiveness and sustainability (green development) (Win-win Cooperation, 2015; Fan, 2016). Autonomy in this concept means independent choice of the development path, while equality "refers to… equal treatment of all economic actors internally and to equal participation international economic competition externally" (Fan, 2016, p. 5). Both autonomy and equality are notoriously absent in traditional development instrument, where BRICS countries together have only 13% of votes in World Bank and 14.29% in IMF, while the US alone, for example, has 15% and 16.6% of the votes respectively.

The inclusiveness means complimentary character of all instruments and channels of the development, so that BRICS New Development Bank, for example, does not substitute traditional instruments, but rather compliments their activity. In this sense, inclusiveness, according to Yongming Fan (2016), means inclusiveness both in cooperation and in competition, and guarantees against exclusivist approach of the Global South. Since in late modernity fast development almost always entails environmental issues, new concept of the development should be based upon the principle of the "harmonious coexistence between human beings and environment and between individuals and society in the progress of development" (Fan, 2016, p. 6). In a way, new concept of the development is still a general idea only. However, it has to be further developed if BRICS is really going to offer a valuable alternative to the existing structures of power, including academic ones.

Collaboration of the BRICS countries, thus, normatively makes sense if it is going to promote for all countries of the Global South a new concept of the development based upon plural understanding of modernity. This understanding of BRICS cooperation is rather thick, and, frankly speaking, is quite far from what this collaboration looks like today. However to make this cooperation sustainable BRICS must seriously think of becoming a real leader of the Global South, which, in its turn, is impossible without employing plural modernity theory and without elaborating a new concept of development.

However, this is impossible without creating a common educational area. Joint educational projects are capable of bringing normative dimension into the purely pragmatic BRICS bloc. Through various excellence projects, BRICS countries participate in the life of Global Academia and compete in educational market according to the rules set by the dominating academic powers. To make the development sustainable they have, however, to support the horizontal networks, which would both further elaborate and implement the principles of the new theory of the development and incorporate real experiences and interpretations of the modernity condition. The most successful of these networks for the moment is BRICS Network University, a unique and ambitious initiative of the BRICS ministries of education. The question is, however, to which extent BRICS is capable to become a speaker for the Global South as a whole, since without this it would turn into another pragmatic international organization, pursuing its own particular egoistic interests. What is also important is that education plays a pivotal role in all attempts to answer the questions above.

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ARTICLE

US, Russia, China and Africa in the Evolving Global Order

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ABSTRACT
The relations of US, Russia, China and the African continent have evolved since the end of the Second World War (WWII). While the US, Russia and China were not colonial powers in Africa, their interactions between and among themselves had little to do with Africa emerging from the bondage of colonialism. With the rise of the Cold War, Africa became a space of great interest to these countries as they compete for influence in different spheres big power politics. Throughout the Cold War, Africa's importance become significant as a source of vital resources and player within the institutions of global political and economic governance such as the United Nations. At the end of the Cold War in 1990s, the big took a different phase. The interactions of these countries with Africa declined drastically with expectation the US's humanitarian engagement. Russia and China withdrew support to Africa as they both abandoned an ideological driven and hegemonic foreign policy in Africa in the post-Cold War era. However, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia is gradually bringing back rivalries between and among the big, three powers in Africa. Previously viewed as an insignificant continent, Africa is increasingly occupying an important role as a critical partner in development, conflict resolution, peace and security.

KEYWORDS
Cold War, peace, security, humanitarian, hegemonic, development, conflict resolution, multilateral and governance

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Introduction

This paper examines the current global order in which Africa is widely seen to have been given a peripheral role, but which is also in a state of change, due to the resurgence of China and Russia and the intentional decline of the United States and the West at large.

It is divided into five sections. The first assesses the rise and decline of the US-dominated post-1945 world order. The second analyses Russia's post-1989 orientation, and its dealings with the West. The third examines China's opening up while retaining a Chinese self-understanding and its subsequent promulgation of a globalisation with Chinese characteristics. The fourth assesses Africa's position in the crumbling post-1989 world order through three lenses: (1) its peripheral stature in the international financial architecture, (2) its international political positioning after the 2008 global financial crisis which, ironically but typically, it did not help to create, but suffered the most from; and (3) its asymmetrical standing in the international legal and economic framework. The final section outlines the implications of the changing global order and offers policy prescriptions for Africa.

The Rise and Fall of the Post-War World Order

The post-World War II global order is in crisis, more deeply so than we are led to believe. This crisis has numerous causes, both political and economic. Currently under the captaincy of a US presidency, which seemingly has no singular policy direction, or any desire to continue leading the international community, this order appears to have reached the end of the road.

After World War II, the US held the moral high ground. It had acted decisively in defeating fascism, it could credibly characterise itself as a beacon of democracy; and as the country which, almost singlehandedly, had helped to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe (if only to isolate and contain the Soviet Union in the process) through the Marshall Plan, and the international trade framework under the auspices of the Bretton Woods institutions. It also played a leading role in fresh attempts to establish global peace and security, notably by financing and promoting the United Nations. It rallied around the UN agenda and, despite protestations by fringe budget wonks and anti-Soviet sections of US society, remained the organisation's biggest funder (Bennett, 1983, p. 45).

The US also sought to codify international free trade, notably in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This was based on the notion of "democratic peace", incorporating the idea that the market was a stabilising force. In this view, interlocking states into a cobweb of trade and investment could act as a deterrent against war, as it encourages them to discuss and resolve matters around the table rather than by means of conflict. But this thesis has arguably been unravelling in the face of globalisation. The decisive decade in this process was perhaps the 1970s; the decade of Richard Nixon and later of Margaret Thatcher who was elected as British prime minister after the fall of a troubled Labour government (which had failed to quell worker unrest and had even resorted to IMF financing in an attempt to end the “Winter of Discontent”).

This decade also saw the return of market fundamentalism and neoliberal conservatism that was wholly embraced by the Reagan administration in the 1980s, which deregulated the US economy, and rolled back the state. The World Bank issued the Berg Report, which argued that African countries should spend less on social goods and services, and should privatise their health institutions. (According to some analysts, this is why the Ebola virus, which could otherwise have been contained by effective public health institutions has become a regional epidemic.) Ronald Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, pushed for war with Saddam Hussein in a pretended coalition with smaller partners, some of which were cajoled into cooperating when the “Yemen precedent” (the threatening of removal of financial aid to small nations to ensure that they vote in favour of the US-favoured resolutions in the UNSC after the end of the Cold War) was allegedly set.

When in the 1990s, centre-left governments came to power under Tony Blair in Britain and Bill Clinton in the US, they fell into “Third Way” politics – the notion that conservatism could be swallowed up by the left, and extremism diluted by pragmatic strategies. But even this centrist agenda is crumbling. The greatest signifiers of its collapse are the outcome of the Brexit referendum, Hilary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential race, and the rise of nationalist sentiment in France, Germany and Spain. These are signposts of the western world overturning the world order it had established after World War II.

The Donald Trump administration’s “America first” policy is aiding in debilitating America’s influence in the current global order. Upon assuming office as the US president, Donald Trump withdrew the Washington from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, trade deal, which made up 40% of the global economy. One would argue that this move could give China (which is not part of the agreement) leverage in advancing its hegemonic ambitions in the global economy.

The 2018 US withdrawal from the United Nation Human Rights Council is an indication of waning America’s influence and the coming in of a multipolar world order. Washington argues that its decision to withdraw from the council was due to the failure by the council to implement changes it demanded as well as what America calls the “anti-Israel” bias. The other reason for Washington withdrawal being that the council consists of member states known for bad human rights records among which are China and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This move decentralizes the power in the organization given that America as the founding member had used the organization to insulate its leaders from indictment for war crimes in foreign countries under the guise of protection of human rights.

This world order was marked by a total disregard for Africa and Africans; they were no longer seen to be of any importance, as they had been during the Cold War. This cynical shift was perhaps demonstrated most clearly when the US and the rest of the western community failed to intervene in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. In the mineral-focused pragmatism of the Third Way, the Rwandan crisis did not require the same response as oil-rich Libya in 2011. Following the Cold War, African countries were only important if they had strategic minerals to offer, and not for much else.

In the meantime, in 1989, Francis Fukuyama had published his celebrated conception that, following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, together with its alternative world order, history had come to an end, bolstering the belief that western liberal democracy had proven itself to be the highest – in fact the only successful – form of social organisation, and should therefore be exported to the rest of the world. There was a sense of the West having conquered the rest of the world, and neoliberalism – now known as the Washington Consensus – was surrounded by triumphalism. But this celebration proved to be premature, for it ignored various factors, notably growing resentment in the former Soviet Union. In the prophetic words of David Lloyd George after the Treaty of Versailles:

> You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retributions on her conquerors (Mayer, 1971, p. 3367).

On Russia

Russia was essentially told not to worry about its defeat, and that what ought to have been a Russian Question – i.e., how best to create an environment in which Eastern European countries could be integrated into the broader global order while ensuring that Russia would become a fully-fledged member of key international organisations without fear of encroachment) was not deemed fit for discussion. It was obvious that, after a transitional period, Russia would become westernised (the folly of this notion ought to have been obvious, as various previous attempts to westernise Russia going as far back as the monarchical period, primarily under Peter the Great, ended in failure).

Foreign policy analyses on both sides of the Iron Curtain assumed that after the end of the Cold War, both the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact would lose their foundational mandates, and would be dissolved. While the Warsaw Pact died quietly, NATO lives on, with no dissolution in sight. On the contrary, after 1999 the organisation saw an expansion seemingly directed towards Russia; in that year alone, three countries – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – were incorporated, with the seeming goal of strengthening the buffer between western European and Russia. Russian protestations went unheard in the West. In 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and, crucially, the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia with which Russia shares its north eastern borders followed suit. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined, and the circle was nearly completed with the inclusion of Montenegro in June 2017.

In 2018, Colombia was incorporated into NATO, making it the first Latin American country to join the organization. This move comes with its own share of controversy given that there already had been a heavy US military presence in Colombia with the alleged mandate of curbing drug trafficking (Gomez, 2018). To some it may be interpreted as the US feeling threatened by Russia in the light of Moscow's growing influence and establishing multilateral organizations particularly with the developing countries in the form of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Before the expansion of NATO, the US President Trump had misgivings about the organization, calling it obsolete and expensive and contemplated withdrawing Washington from the alliance. The thoughts of the US criticism of NATO and threats of withdrawing from the organization would have been inconceivable in the past.

The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union represents another facet of the burgeoning multipolar world order. This grouping was envisaged by Russia as an alternative to the European Union and would be similar to the Commonwealth of Independent States (Shtraks, 2018). The headquarters of the Union would be in Moscow and its court in would be located in Minsk, Belarus.

These moves by NATO, which bring home Russia's fall from power and prowess, have in part facilitated the emergence of a strong man in the form of Vladimir Putin, under whose leadership Russia has been more assertive, projecting the image of a Russia that is economically strained but is still a formidable military power. It still has the largest nuclear stockpile in the world (7,000 warheads), and the fourth highest military budget in the world. The American agenda of running Russia down has therefore not been successful, and has in fact led to a great deal of Russian pushback, as seen in the Crimea in 2014, when the West could do nothing to Putin beyond sanctions and a suspension from the G8 – a testament to Russia's power even beyond the fall of the USSR. Alleged American attempts to undermine electoral support for Putin within Russia (with the decision in March 2012 by the former US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, to directly provide $50 million worth of assistance to Russian civil society cited as evidence of pernicious US interference in Russian elections), and mass protests have also been unsuccessful – liberal nationalists such as Alexey Navalny have been publicly disgraced as recipients of funds from foreign sponsors, and following the 2011–2012 mass protests in Moscow (Ramani, 2016), Putin's supporters launched their own counter-protests in Moscow to protest against what they perceived to be US meddling in Russian elections. Ironically therefore, perceived foreign meddling has helped Putin to consolidate his power to the point where his latest approval ratings have reached some 90%.

On China

The simultaneous regional military containment and conversion-from-within thinking in the western world is not limited to Russia. Indeed, its most ambitious incarnation is in relation to China. A far back as the 1970s, Richard Nixon had tried to exploit and harness the Sino-Soviet split by recruiting China as an ally against the Soviet Union, drawing it into the western-oriented international community, and socialising it in that context. Therefore, China was let into the United Nations

Security Council in 1971 and the US was even willing to cease its recognition of Taiwan as the One China. In 2001, harkening to the interdependency-peace thesis, China was let into the WTO on the assumption that opening up China economically would eventually it up politically – thus, through commerce, China would be roped in and turned into a western-style democracy instead of a threat. But this has not happened. As China has developed industrially and commercially to become the second-largest economy in the world, lifting about 700 million people out of poverty in the process, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has gained “performance legitimacy” to the extent that about 90% of Chinese society approves of the CCP. Further complicating issues is the fact that some 60% of Chinese society believe that China is already a democracy, and therefore see no need to change the one-party system; therefore, there is very little organic impetus for regime change.

For its part, China has neither been overrun by nor opposed to Western-style globalisation. In other words, China has embraced globalisation but not necessarily of the western kind – instead, it has sought a globalisation with Chinese characteristics, predicated on non-interference. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is an infrastructure project of gigantic proportions, which attempts to bring under its sway more than 70 countries, from Scandinavia to the South Pacific Islands to the ports of East Africa, in its land and maritime versions (Madhav, 2017). In a world of competing economic and trade alliances, OBOR has overtaken many others active in the world at large. By any measure, this is the biggest constellation of nations in the 21st century. Quite clearly, the US has failed to remodel China in its own image; instead, China has come out of its engagements with the West with a grand plan of its own and is renegotiating the post-1945 world order, something that has not been well-received in the West, with many touting and espousing what has essentially come to be known as the China Threat Theory.

Following China’s economic footprint in Africa is its nascent military profile in Africa. This could be the reason why some espouse it as the China Threat. This follows China’s establishment of its military base in Djibouti, a few miles away from the American military base. This move has been defended by the Chinese foreign Ministry as a move towards creating a peaceful environment for China’s overseas investments (Pant & Haidar, 2017). The establishment of the military base in Djibouti denotes China’s growing economic interests and prefaces Sino-Africa trade through the Indian Ocean which constitutes the Belt and Road Initiative (Fei, 2017).

Beijing is fast growing as the leader of multilateral institutions. It is a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Regardless of the pre-existing international organizations, the SCO at its inception was focused on combating transnational issues such as terrorism. In 2004, the organization widened its scope to incorporate increases in trade and investment in its activities and this idea served to be the harbinger of the Belt and Road Initiative, with some commentators likening latter to the Marshall Plan despite the BRI’s larger financial clout (Grace, 2018; Shtraks, 2018).

On Africa and the Global Order

The "New World Order" and its Discontents

The end of the Cold War ushered in what US President George H. W. Bush called a "new world order" (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2011). Marked by American primacy in the international political economy for the past 25 years, it has seen the emergence of challenges (and opportunities) that are unique in character and have far-reaching implications for African development.

The increasing self-preservation by western countries ended any prospect that the Doha Round of the WTO would be beneficial to Africa and the developing world (represented in the negotiations by Brazil, China, India and South Africa) – and it was not, as agricultural tariffs were only removed for one product, bananas, imported to EU countries and the US from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Shah, 2013). Moreover, many western countries subsidise their agricultural sectors, in which Africa is meant to have a comparative advantage (Shah, 2013). This has inhibited the expansion of markets for African agricultural products; indeed, African producers find that they cannot compete against subsidised local producers in western markets (Gordon, 2009). Furthermore, European and American multinational corporations have also crowded out local producers in domestic African markets.

Through partnership agreements such the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which was signed in 2000, the European Union provides African countries with access to some of its markets while "asks for compliance with a given set of good governance norms and procedures" (Gokcekus & Suzuki, 2013). This has led to asymmetrical relations, as African countries clearly need these partnerships more than Europe needs concessions from African countries. This has given the EU the power to impose what it regards as better governance practices on African countries (Gokcekus & Suzuki, 2013). This asymmetry is also seen, and used, in the international legal framework, notably the International Criminal Court (ICC).

South Africa's apparent hesitation in June 2015 to arrest the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, despite the existence of an ICC warrant which it was obliged to observe, attests to the "high level of scepticism and outright lack of trust the court now has among African leaders and, to an extent, the general public" (Weller, 2015, p. 1). Bashir, who has refused several requests to visit the court to face the charges against him, has described the ICC as "a tool to terrorize countries that the West thinks are disobedient", and other African leaders have expressed similar sentiments. As the Ethiopian foreign minister, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, put it in at the 2013 African Union summit, "the court has transformed itself into a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans" (Weller, 2015, p. 1).

It is true that the ICC has so far prosecuted African individuals. Of the nine situations the court is officially investigating, all are in Africa. Furthermore, each of the 32 individuals indicted by the Court are African. This indicates a level of geopolitical bias, which even the Court's most ardent defenders must take into consideration. As one scholar puts it:

> The ICC operates in the context of a global governance structure characterised by a problematic multilateralism, the prevalence of Northern hegemony, and an implicit hierarchical moral and racial order that makes it acceptable for African leaders to be prosecuted but makes the indictment of American or British leaders inconceivable. In 2011, Amnesty International called for Tony Blair and George W. Bush to be tried by the ICC as war criminals for atrocities committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nobody believed for a second that these leaders would ever be brought to book (Niang, 2016).

The Spectacle of Crisis

Despite its relative lack of integration into the world's financial machinery, Africa was still unable to escape the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. This not only highlighted Africa's marginalisation, which then only accounted for less than 2% of global trade (Roux, 2014, p. 120), but also the dependency pathways of Africa's relations with the west. Peering into the trajectory of the Great Recession, as it has come to be called, with particular regards to Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, it becomes clear just how disastrous the aftershocks were and to what extent Africa's marginalisation was deepened because of them. The crisis, having ushered in a financial recession in the West, clamped down on the continent's already meagre incomes.

Tourism receipts and remittances all declined, in parallel with trade financing. Due to the rise in unemployment in core African states, remittances dropped by 5–8% in 2009 alone (African Development Bank, 2009), translating into a US$1 billion shortfall for Africa. Some African countries, notably Kenya, were disproportionally affected due to a differential number of family members in the west. In line with the Bretton Woods-imposed currency devaluations in states such as Malawi, Liberia, Uganda and Kenya, this contributed further to the foreign currency exchange shortages and further deteriorated already limited buying power of African countries. Poverty and marginalisation were further entrenched (African Development Bank, 2009).

Attempts to remedy the effects of the crisis were also telling, and characteristic of the state of Africa's dependency. Although some leaders, such as Malawi's then president Bingu wa Mutharika who declared Bretton Woods institutions to be "neo-colonial" yokes which had to be thrown off in favour of "home-grown policies", many countries (including Malawi itself) had no choice but to pander to the west in trying to dig themselves out of the crisis (African Leaders, 2011, p. 55; Ali, 2016). Each in their own way, African states made overtures to western countries and business communities, trying to market themselves as investor-friendly for western capital. South Africa looked to use the 2010 FIFA World Cup to expose itself to the world as a viable investment destination.

Concurrently, the president of Tanzania, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, took to Perth to address the Commonwealth Business Forum of Australia to make the case for his continent, stating that "what is required of us is to transform Africa's agriculture from its current state of being predominantly peasant, traditional, backward, less productive and subsistent to being modern, highly productive, and commercial" (African Leaders, 2011, p. 225). Africa, he declared, was responsible for its own plight because it had hitherto "pursued economic policies that lead to stagnation or even retardation of growth and development" (African Leaders, 2011, p. 226). In closing, he reassured the dignitaries that "our [African] governments and people are ready to play their part to play their part and work in partnership with friendly governments and representatives of the international private sector, such as the captains of industry and business gathered here this morning" (African Leaders, 2011, p. 227).

It is ironic that Africa was disproportionately affected by the Great Recession, considering that it had "never touched the complex financial derivatives that sparked the financial crisis" but not at all surprising. In fact, it is symptomatic of global capitalism, or put differently, how global capitalism was supposed to work. As the US Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon, John Connally, said to a gathering of foreign finance ministers, "it's our dollar, but your problem" (Panitch and Gindin, 2013, p. 144).

Harnessing Competing Global Orders

Axiomatically, and history's verdict on this is clear, the world order and its structures are not given and static; stability is merely a chimera. The world order is continually made and remade by problem-solving measures within the existing structural framework that are required to deal with emerging contradictions, and visualised through interactions and a lack of consensus between different actors. In our times, perhaps the greatest source of contradiction is the schism between US military dominance and Chinese economic pre-eminence.

But the changing nature of the world order does not explain away the fact that shifts in global economic and financial power create unfamiliar circumstances, and unfamiliar shifts create risks. In the 1960s and 1970s the rising powers, Europe and Japan, complained of destabilising economic impulses emanating from the US. This source of economic risks has been around for a long time, in other words, although it continues to mutate. But now, in addition, the US and other advanced economies must worry about the risk of adverse shocks arising out of events in China and other emerging markets.

It is because of this that Africa finds itself in a multipolar world; a world characterised by competing and layered global interests. The emerging global order, we should bear in mind, is unevenly hegemonic. Indeed, hegemonic power does not operate in a uniform manner across the globe. There is no denying, firstly, the often acrimonious differences among core power governments, and, in turn, the growing challenge from China and Russia.

Intra-west competition (borne of the rise in populism in some western states and continuity in others) over gaining favour with African countries is beginning to emerge. Recently, the EU has negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several African countries that provide some reciprocal tariff benefits, leading the US Congressional Research Service to plead with the US Congress to make AGOA even more favourable, as not doing so would "potentially place US firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to European firms in some markets" (Williams, 2015,

p. 2). Furthermore, the British, in exiting the EU, are in pursuit of trade deals and are eager to outdo their European counterparts. Especially in terms of agriculture, African countries can harness this to their advantage.

Indeed, funders competing for business with Africa, while reminiscent of the tug-of-war politics of the Cold War, can mean that African states are able to negotiate with greater ease. In the wake of Trump's victory and his "America First" stance, both the West and East are now more eager than ever to forge deals that outdo the other. Developing nations can take advantage of this, what Li Xing and Oscar Garcia Agustin (2014, p. 53) have called "interdependent hegemony". Incumbent upon Africa is the crafting of a policy framework that will not tie it to Washington, Beijing or Moscow. Despite the history of cooperation with and assistance to many African countries by both China and the former Soviet Union in shaking off the yoke of colonialism, and the people-to-people sympathies of Beijing and Moscow alike, Africa has to play a game in which it avoids its territory being a battleground for these giants.

It falls within the ambit of the African Union to understand the long-range game of all three powers and devise corresponding policy measures that are Africa-centred and advance Africa's position. Knowing these states' histories, self-perceptions and touchpoints will enhance Africa's ability to serve its own interests in interacting with them. Therefore, African scholars should study, with explicit foreign policy intentions, the contemporary foreign policy aims of a state which once viewed (and perhaps still views) itself as the "Middle Kingdom" (China) or the "third Rome" (Russia), while generating an African position on China's Five-Year Plans and Russia's Foreign Policy Concept as well as more nuanced but less pronounced/official foreign policy and world visions, while closely monitoring these countries' interactions with states in their vicinity (for example, those in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization of which China and Russia are members, along with a number of other Central Asian states and the nine-member Commonwealth of Independent States composed of former Soviet republics). This will help Africa to avoid one fait accompli after another.

At the same time, armed with its own self-generated understanding of China and Russia, Africa should engage with them on the basis of its own view of these states as opposed to Western-generated information; a process laden with conflict of interest which has produced such narratives as "China props up authoritarian regimes" and "China is neo-colonial" by an America and Europe, which itself deals with those authoritarian regimes, and has sometimes placed them in power in the first place as puppet regimes – the epitome of neo-colonialism.

As it stands, the world finds itself with a weakened America, a huge portion of whose elite population is bent on blaming Russia for adverse domestic electoral outcomes, and bent on reversing the greatest economic outcome of the post-War order: a powerful China with which the US has a trade deficit. The fundamentals that brought this situation about are crumbling politically in the sense that there is a dissolution of the moral high ground held and maintained by the US after World War II. Africa needs to observe these arguments closely; allegations of Russian espionage and outside influence have a direct impact for Africa. Firstly, issues such as diplomatic freezes, US-Russia sanctions and espionage are reminiscent of the

Cold War in which African states might find themselves caught in the middle. Indeed, leading up to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, with Vladimir Putin claiming that Joseph "Sepp" Blatter was removed as FIFA president as punishment for his selection of Russia to host the 2018 tournament, we are reminded once more of the reciprocal 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games boycotts by the US and the Soviet Union. Recently, these accusations of cyber influence have inspired the Zimbabwean government to prop up a Department of Cyber Security. Furthermore, Russia is an important ally from whose isolation it cannot benefit. Secondly, Russophobia merits some scepticism and weariness. If the US election was indeed influenced by a foreign entity, western democracy, is not as durable or impregnable as the US, among others, has claimed it to be. This is a further blow to America's international standing, further hastened by its own determination to shrink from global leadership.

The US is no longer in the business of nation-building. Proposed cuts to the UN budget which are bound to affect Africa directly, withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, as well a rise of explicit militarism under the banner of "America First" are symptoms of an America that has forfeited its role of global leadership. American militarism is particularly worrying from an African standpoint, since it points to a lack of long-term orientation in resolving the issue of terrorism in Africa and leaving a stronger continent with strong nations, not through the barrel of a gun but through social development and creating opportunities for youths who would otherwise be lured into joining terrorist groups. A more comprehensive approach needs to be adopted; terrorism is a security issue, but it is also an economic and a social issue, and cracking down on it is the stuff of nation-building, failing which a vicious terror-poverty-terror-poverty cycle is bolstered.

American militarism towards North Korea is another matter that merits close and concerted African observation. To begin with, North Korea is a Chinese ally, while America's foothold in the Asia-Pacific implicates South Korea, Japan and Taiwan and to some extent India – any potential conflict in this part of the world would have a direct impact on Africa as these are crucial trade partners, and the Asia-Pacific is a crucial trade route whose disruption, owing once more to the weak position Africa finds itself in, would serve only to choke Africa.

For its part, Russia needs to devise an African strategy of its own. Despite the advantage of history and established networks with African states which it assisted in the fight against colonialism (and an impressive total of 50,000 African students educated at Soviet universities and institutes by 1991). After the Cold War, the Russian presence on the continent abated. Under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin, the former Russian Federation looked towards the West, and retreated more rapidly from Africa; indeed after the fall of the Soviet Union, even Cuba seemed to play a bigger role in Africa. Faced with economic and political problems at home and its "near abroad", as detailed above, this was perhaps inevitable – indeed the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party leader and former vice-chair of the State Duma, Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky, blamed the economic turmoil in Russia in the 1990s on aid to Africa. Indeed, Africa seems virtually absent from Russian foreign policy documents, notably its 2008 Foreigh Policy Concept (http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116) and its Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020 (https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html).

More recently, Russia has drawn on new expertise in oil and gas exploration to forge ties with Algeria, and the two states alone control about 40% of the EU's natural gas supply. Other signs of a Russian resurgence in Africa include its participation in UN Security Council peacekeeping efforts (in the DRC, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan and South Sudan); its respect for international governance institutions in which Africa is invested, including the UN itself, from which the US is now divesting; state visits by Putin; the growing presence of Russian corporations in Africa; and Russia's involvement in BRICS.

Between 2000 and 2012, Africa-Russia trade increased tenfold, and according to the African Development Bank, Russian companies invested some $20 billion in Africa in 2013 in such far-flung sectors as energy production, mining and fisheries. Russia's investment in Africa is coordinated in large part by the increasingly active Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with African Countries (AFROCOM), which brings together ministries and other government agencies as well as companies large and small. Russia has also relieved African debt to the tune of $20 billion.

Also impressive is the fact that the Institute for African Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences now has 13 research units and has more than 100 academic staff members; this is matched by very few governments elsewhere in the world. While these are positive signs, they need to be greater supplemented, and Africa needs to act towards Russia in a coordinated way, aimed at identifying the most promising areas of economic cooperation.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

The implications of this analysis are as follows. Firstly, the global order that started in 1945 and was consolidated in 1989 is undergoing a fundamental transformation, among others due to America's loss of global moral stature, enhanced by Trump's apparent efforts to diminish global US leadership on climate change, state-building, and stable institutions. Secondly, while the US maintains its military supremacy, there are emerging states, which have not been entirely socialised by the US and West and are seeking to reassert themselves and reshape the world order in their own image. In addition, post-Brexit and in the wake of the crisis within the EU, a prospect lingers of West-West competition for access to Africa. Thirdly, Africa remains significantly unrepresented in the current global order, accounting for little in terms of commerce, and even less in terms of setting the agenda. Fourthly, the spectre of conflict, either through diplomatic freezing, military confrontation, or trade wars (and even alleged electoral interference and mutual regime undermining) among the US, China and Russia is has far-reaching implications for the African continent.

On the basis of this assessment, the following policy recommendations for Africa can be made:

1. Currently small and relatively powerless, and subject to potentially harmful outcomes should they attempt to deal with the US, Russia and China on their own.

African states have no other option but to cooperate and subsume their national interests in an overarching African agenda and framework.

2. Africa needs its own data. Currently, very few African countries have a sound grasp of demographic and other vital statistics. Besides boosting state capacity (through taxation and revenue collection), this is important for foreign policy-making, because it will reduce reliance on western governments and non-governmental organisations for key data, which has implications for security as well as development and continental coordination.

3. Africa is not obliged to "pick sides", and should in fact avoid a repeat of Cold War-style advocacy, as this could lead to a massive loss of opportunities. Each of those three powers has specific benefits to offer (in terms of security, foreign direct investment and support at the UN), and policy formation should be based on long-term African goals and prospects as opposed to only historical links. As discussed previously, the world order is in constant flux, and policy-making should keep pace. Furthermore, like China and Russia, Africa has its own interests, and should seek cooperation with these emerging powers only insofar as there can be an Africa-centred outcome.

4. The African Union (AU) should have an epistemic function that informs foreign policy-making. It is the AU's principal duty to gain a deep understanding of the long-range game of all three powers, and devise corresponding policy measures that are Africa-centred and advance Africa's position. African embassies in those three countries should have research units that build up in-depth understandings of their histories, policies, and long-range plans – not just as officially pronounced but also through unofficial but detectable means – and then coalesce these with one another and with the AU.

5. The AU should implement the 2014 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights) in order to enable the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to prosecute crimes under international law and transnational crimes. Indeed, "the recent prosecution of Hissène Habré at the Extraordinary African Chamber in Dakar for crimes of war is evidence that where there is political will, and adequate resources, the cause of justice can be advanced on the continent" (Niang, 2017).

6. Developments in countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia should be monitored, as this would reveal what collaboration with Russia and China really means in practice. Major lessons could be learnt in the process, as many of their proposals for Africa have been piloted in those countries. Central Asia has seen simultaneous Sino-Russian and US-China-Russian involvement in much the same way that Africa has seen and is beginning to see once again. Countries in those regions therefore offer the potential for case studies with uncanny parallels with and implications for Africa.

7. The emergence of the new world order would present a leverage to Africa insofar as the continent is already involved in partnership with the emerging leaders of the new world order in the shape of Russia and China. Africa enjoys partnership with

China through FOCAC. South Africa, the biggest economy in Africa also holds sway in being part of the BRICS coalition of the emerging countries of the Global South. To derive value from the growing Global South coalitions, African nations will have to fine-tune their policies in time to adjust in the nascent global order, which seemingly the developing countries are to have a substantial stake.

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ARTICLE

Higher Education, Development, and Inequality in Brazil and South Africa

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ABSTRACT

This article has the premise that South Africa and Brazil spaces share contextual and geopolitical characteristics with a history of great inequalities, racial and gender discrimination and these and other related factors serve as barriers constraining education. Considering the remarkable expansion of higher education systems in both countries on the last 25 years, and its uneven effects, some questions are raised as a challenge in this article. Does this growth in enrollments create high quality or "world-class universities" in these countries? Is it possible to find South African or Brazilian universities in the international rankings of institutional higher education? Has such expansion produced a full democratization of educational opportunities? Or, in other words, does any skilled and hardworking student, regardless of his/her social background, have equal chances of access to the best courses and universities? In order to try to answer these questions, we begin characterizing the expansion of higher education systems over the last two and a half decades in both countries. Regarding policies of access by poor students to higher education system, we taking in account and compare some initiatives in both countries, such as Reuni, Fies and Prouni in Brazil, and National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), in South Africa. Our analysis, following the tradition of sociological research, understands that the mode of operation of higher education

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institutions stands out as one of the key factors in the mechanisms and social conflicts that increase or reduce inequalities. Focusing on the basic distinction between public and private sector, for Brazil, and the persistence of distinction between historically black and white institutions, in South Africa, we try to show that both countries improved the access to higher education systems and managed to create some world-class institutions. Even so, social and gender inequalities persist and there are too few such institutions, especially in Brazil.

KEYWORDS
Brazil, South Africa, higher education, affirmative action, education inequalities

Introduction: Higher Education in Brazil and South Africa

For two and a half decades the Brazilian system of higher education (HES) has expanded and diversified. New courses and new school paths were offered as well as different types of diplomas. Brazil went from 1.3 million students in 1980 to 8 million in 2015. Hundreds of thousands from working and so-called "popular classes" entered the university. Public policies such as quotas or scholarships ensured a significant expansion of access to tertiary education. In South Africa, in 1993 – before the end of Apartheid – there were 473,000 students HE students enrolled, this grew to 683,000 in 1996 and reached 2,000,000 in 2016. South Africa also moved to "promote equity of access and fair chances for success to all who are seeking to realize their potential through higher education, while eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress for past inequalities" (White Paper, 1997, 1.14)

Does this growth in enrollments create high quality or "world-class universities" in these countries? Is it possible to find South African or Brazilian universities in the international rankings of institutional higher education? Has such expansion produced a full democratization of educational opportunities? Or, in other words, does any skilled and hardworking student, regardless of his/her social background, have equal chances of access to the best courses and universities? The last is the key question for the sociology of social inequality: does expansion "reduce inequality by providing more opportunities for persons from disadvantage strata, or magnify inequality by expanding opportunities disproportionately for those who are already privileged"? (Arum et al., 2007, p. 1) The production of quality rankings includes, at least in countries like the USA, measures of social, gender and racial inequalities but it is mainly associated with scientific research and learning (Goastellec, 2008).

For analysts of most diverse hues, the proper functioning of institutions of higher education – their economic, social, and scientific efficiency – has become an important element in the assertion of democratic principles and equality of opportunities in modern societies. This understanding seems to be present in Brazilian and South African societies even if diverse social groups have different expectations and demands for higher education. These groups have political strategies and ways to lobby the State and society to try to embed the models they think suitable for themselves and for all in the education system. However, the common perception that some level of democratization is necessary in higher education emerges through the multiplication of public and institutional policies for the inclusion of previously excluded social groups.

Numerous student assistance policies have been developed in Brazilian public universities to facilitate some kind of integration of previously excluded students (Heringer & Honorato, 2014, p. 323). Some initiatives created in private institutions – scholarship programs and internships – can be considered as evidence of this increasingly widespread democratizing impetus (Almeida Neto, 2015, p. 23). Several affirmative action policies have been developed in Brazil since the 1990s, with some success in the inclusion of afro-descendants and poor youth. More recently, REUNI (Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities Program) promoted a significant increase in the number of federal institutions of higher education and the increased the offer of student vacancies outside of the populated coastal areas. In a continental country such as Brazil, this program, despite its difficulties, greatly facilitates the access of young people with limited resources to go to good universities near their homes (Vargas, 2014). Similarly, the federal government's PROUNI (University for All Program) provided grants and scholarships for poor students to study in private universities (Santos, 2012). The federal government also invested heavily in vocational centers at the tertiary level. This aimed to increase the alternatives to university education, thus differing from the two aforementioned policies (Mont'Alvão, 2015).

In South Africa, policies try to interweave economic development, a greater equality of opportunities and the overcoming of past inequalities. The increase of enrollments in South Africa's higher education system did not begin in 1994, but it was already present during the apartheid period. In fact, as shown by Akoojee & Nkomo (2008), the demand for skilled people in apartheid times produced a dual higher education system in the country. In the one hand, a university for the white population, focused on scientific knowledge to foster the ruling class. On the other hand, a university for Indians and Coloreds, focused on training for the labor market. Even though a large mass of the population was denied access to higher education, "*economic imperatives under apartheid left some room for selected black people to access institutions of higher education*" (Akoojee & Nkomo, 2008, p. 389). Some authors (Patto, 2007) (Libâneo, 2012) have argued that a similar dual education system was built in Brazil, without such emphasis on racial and ethnic discrimination, but which stressed the separation between poor and rich students.

In the South Africa's transition from apartheid, when the need to redress past inequalities became a priority, a political agenda that increased access for black and colored groups to the higher education system was developed. As pointed out by Akoojee and Nkomo:

> Transformation requires that the ethos that prevailed at higher education institutions (HEIs) in the past needs to be replaced with a new democratic culture directed at actively undoing race-based separation. In this regard, the issue of access to higher education institutions remains the key mechanism by which to forge a new order (Akoojee & Nkomo, 2008, p. 390).

Several changes in the political framework post-1994, such as the South Africa Constitution in 1996, the 1997 Act and the publication of a White Paper, produced deep alterations throughout the Higher Education System (Badat, 2010). Jansen (2007) sumarizes five major changes in the higher education landscape. First, a programme of government mergers in order to reduce the number of post-high school public institutions (numbering 306 these were radically reduced to 72 institutions). Second, a "*spectacular growth in private higher education*" (Jansen, 2007, p. 164) strengthened this segment in political and economic terms. The emergence of new models of delivering higher education was the third major change. So, according to (Jansen, 2007, p. 164), "*it is no longer possible to clearly distinguish contact and distance education institutions in South Africa, as the former increasingly blurred the distinction in practice between these two forms of education delivery*". The fourth change has been a decline in humanities enrollments. The last change was related to the nature of academic workplace, represented by the growth of a new managerialism characterized by "*a growing emphasis on performance, measurement and accountability; the increasing ethos of competition; a changing language that recasts students as clients and departments as cost centres; the growing vulnerability of academic and administrative positions as 'outsourcing' and 'efficiencies' dominate the institutional strategy*" (Jansen, 2007, p. 164).

The shift in the core rules of higher education system produces some uneven effects. One was the expansion of students enrollments. In 25 years enrollment almost doubled, from 473,000 in 1993 to some 800,000 in 2008 (Badat, 2010). By 2016, 2 milion[1] students were enrolled in higher education, 78.3% of then in public institutions and 21.7% in private institutions (Statistics South Africa, 2017, p. 71). However, there are many discrepancies when taking into account ethnic and racial issues. In 2016, black and coloured people were expected to receive 1.7 years of schooling in higher education, whereas whites were expected to receive 7.5 years.

Since 1994, two kinds of policies of access for black students could be seen. First, "access as participation approach" (Akoojee & Nkomo, 2008, p. 390) when policies emphasize their increasing participation at universities that had previously denied them entry. Because of these efforts, Cloete and Bunting (2000) and Subotzky (2003) showed that the proportion of African students in White institutions increased, between 1993 and 2000, from 13% to 46%. Despite favorable enrollment growth numbers, there is evidence that this process did not guarantee success for the black students. A report quoted by Akoojee & Nkomo (2008, p. 390) indicated that at least 25 per cent of South Africa's higher

[1] See the methodological information bellow on statistics of higher education in South Africa.

education students fail to complete their studies. In addition, there is little black enrollment and success in high demand courses, such as science, engineering, and technology.

After 1999, "access with success" approach, which gives emphasis to guaranteeing success for these students was developed (Akoojee & Nkomo, 2008). In other words, these policies aim to provide proper conditions for black/poor students to successfully complete higher education. National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), created in 1999, is an example of this kind of policy. The main purpose of the program is to enable young people from poor households to obtain a higher education. NSFAS provides loan and bursaries for students "*access to, and success in, higher and further education and training*" (National Student Financial Aid Scheme, 2018). In some dimensions, NFAS is quite similar to FIES in Brazil. Both provide loans to student and it is expected that they will be repaid when the new graduates enter the labor market. But there are some important differences. First, the loans could be used not only for undergraduate courses but also in some selected postgraduate programs[2]. The second and most important difference is that up to 40% of the loan can be converted into a bursary in South Africa, based on academic performance. A student led protest movement that began in 2015 called #FeesMustFall, in response to an increase in fees at South African universities. As a result, the 2018 NSFAS[3] will no longer disburse loans to students, according to South African President Jacob Zuma's December 2017 statement. It will only provide bursaries (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2018) NSFAS became more similar to the Brazilian Prouni than to FIES. Up until 2017, allowances for books, food, private accommodation, transport, and the like are paid directly to students using a voucher system (Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2018). In this sense, NSFAS faces a challenge that invisible in Brazilian FIES or Prouni, which is to provide adequate conditions so as to allow people to complete their courses successfully. In 2014, loans and grants were disbursed to about 425,000 students, twice as many as in 2010 (Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2018). In 2016, the NSFAS fund intended to support 405,000 first generation students in higher education and to continue to support those already in the system. (Statistics South Africa, 2017, p. 55). However, as we shall see below, some discrepancies surround South Africa government data. Based on information from Department of Higher Education and Training, 225,950 students were supported by NSFSAS fund in 2016.

The numbers in Graph 1 show that, in a broader perspective, both programs have exhibited a tendency of increase over the past decade[4]. The size of both programs, regarding the total number of students, is quite similar as well. But, as noted before,

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[2] Architecture/Architectural Technology; Biokinetics/Biomedical Technology/Biotechnology; Postgraduate Certificate in Education; Postgraduate Diploma in Accounting and LLB (National Student Financial Aid Scheme, 2018).

[3] The authors would like to thank Pearl Whittle and Diane Parker of the Department of Higher Education and Training, and Gerrit Coetzee from Department of Basic Education, for the help in obtaining these statistics.

[4] The period from 2005 to 2016 was choose because Prouni was created in 2005.

Brazilian´s Prouni is one of a number of programs, which include FIES and REUNI, that intend to increase the enrollment of poor students in higher education. Besides, Prouni is focused only on private education institutions.

South Africa's NSFSA and the Brazilian Prouni have one other similarity, which is the goal to promote teaching as a qualified profession. Part of the funds of NSFSA, for example, are addressed the Funza Lushaka bursary programme launched in 2007, which intends to improve the attractiveness of teaching as a career choice for South African students. The bursary provides fixed values per Higher Education Institution which should cover: a) student tuition fees, including laboratory fees (where applicable); b) residence/accommodation fees including meals; c) annual grant for stationery and books (±R7,000 – R8,000); d) covers costs involved in teaching internships; and e) ±R 600 monthly stipend to cover basic living expenses. The Brazilian Prouni provides bursaries for any public sector teacher, from primary or secondary education, who has not a higher education degree. The range of undergraduate courses supported by program is limited to education, social sciences, history, biology, geography, mathematics, and physics. However, there is no requirement for a maximum per capita household income for the student to be eligible for PROUNI´s teacher bursaries.

Once again, South Africa's program for teaching focuses not only in access to high education level, but to promote allowances so that students can successfully complete their undergraduate courses, such a mechanism is absent in Brazil´s Prouni. The number of bursaries awarded in each program is very different. Between 2007 and 2017, the Funza Lushaka bursary programme awarded 120,511 bursaries, whereas Prouni for teaching awarded only 12,225 bursaries (from 2004 to 2014). Considering the differences between the number of enrollments in higher education system in Brazil and South Africa (see Graph 2), the relative importance of Funza Lushaka bursary programme is much higher than Prouni.



Graph 1. *Distribution for Prouni and NSFAS (Total Number of Students) between 2005 to 2016*



Graph 2. *Enrollment in Higher Education*

Sources: *INEP-MEC. Brazilian Census of Higher Education; STATS South Africa & Council on Higher Education.*

International Rankings

Beside the expansion and inclusive policies implemented in both countries, many forms of assessing university quality became an important subject especially as international rankings became a popular method for evaluating these institutions. Using diverse methodologies and criteria, there is still a lot of argument or debate about why and how to consider the rankings both for managing the institutions or choosing to enroll in one of them (Clarke, 2002). Most important, the debate highlighted the race in course to constitute "world-class universities" in each country and this is seen as an indicator of the development of a market for international higher education (Martins, 2015). The Times Higher Education ranking of universities in emerging countries for 2018 allows for some initial comparisons on this topic (Table 1).

Table 1. *Distribution for Brazilian and South African Universities by Selected International Rankings*

Emerging Economies Rank 2018	Emerging Economies Rank 2017	World University Rank 2018	University	Country/Region
9	4	171	University of Cape Town	South Africa
12	8	251–300	University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa
14	13	251–300	University of São Paulo	Brazil
33	28	401–500	University of Campinas	Brazil
38	42	351–400	Stellenbosch University	South Africa
=41	58	401–500	University of KwaZulu-Natal	South Africa
=61	55	601–800	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)	Brazil
66	74	601–800	University of Pretoria	South Africa
=92	=89	501–600	Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP)	Brazil
=92	=141	601–800	University of Johannesburg	South Africa
98	NR	601–800	Federal University of Itajubá	Brazil

Source: *https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/subject-ranking/education#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/scores (accessed June 25, 2018).*

The rankings eventually raise a lot of debates, especially as they favor English-language domination and institutions over others. Anyway, they can be read as indicators of the level of success of each country in creating institutions that could be defined as being "world-class universities".

Therefore, considering this framework of great enrollment increase together with several policies to open up access and facilitate the permanence of students in the higher education system one must ask to what extent Brazil and South Africa have managed to improve both international quality rankings positions and indicators of equality of educational opportunities?

Theoretical Approach

Societies build models for democratization of their educational systems, in ways that result from configurations of social forces, which in turn produce historical trajectories. In this article, we shall use parameters established by Coleman (1968) indicating that equality of educational opportunities means ensuring every citizen, regardless of his/her class, race or gender, can obtain entry into effectively accessible institutions, qualified learning and training in a common curricular framework. Therefore, equality of educational opportunities means that the school system – or, in our case, the higher education system – precludes social determinism, ensuring that all young people are capable of learning and that their performance reflects their efforts and intelligence and not their social origins. We consider a higher education system to be more democratic when it guarantees greater opportunities to the population – tending to equality. The conceptualization of phases of higher education systems elaborated by Martin Trow (2007) has also been used in studies of Latin America and Africa (Hornsby & Osman, 2014). A system's evolution is characterized by the proportion of students they would be able to enroll: elite systems are those where up to 15% of the correct age bracket are enrolled, and in a universal systems this figure is over 50%. We define a mass higher education system as one that enrolls from 16% to 50% of individuals in the age bracket appropriate for their entry into tertiary education.

The massification of a HE system can improve access of some groups such as cultural or ethnic minorities and women. However, massification is different to democratization. Not all social categories benefit in the same way from massification. Even with more students entering universities, the democratization of access also depends on the general structure of the education system. The higher education systems tend to develop a type of academic meritocracy that would build a hierarchy of skills. This is not only a social hierarchy itself, and strongly contributes to the reproduction of wider social hierarchies (Dubet, 2015, p. 258).

The theories of social closure developed by Weber (2013) and Parkin (1979) were systematically used to analyze various strategies for achieving and maintaining power and social status, especially by those who dominate the educational system (Karabel, 1984/2005). The theoretical and methodological improvement and refinement of this concept (Lareau, 2011; Van Zanten, 2015) identifies the complexity and subtlety of the social processes, which involve power struggles, in an area, which is supposed to be meritocratic and impartial. Precisely due to the assumption that the university would be the expression of modern forms of legal rational domination, the sustained presence of those linked to traditional forms of authority in these institutions leads us to revive the Weberian concept of patrimonialism (Lachmann, 2011; Charrad & Adams, 2011; Campante, 2003). Similar to the institutional matrix of scientific rationality in contemporary societies (Parsons, 1967), the university, and tertiary education as a whole, represent the apex of democratization given their use of merit-based ranking criteria. However, due to the persistence of, and increase of inequalities when access to higher education is expanding (Alon, 2009; Dubet et al., 2010) idealized approaches lack credibility. Weberian concepts related to forms of domination seem to offer more adequate explanations for the struggles and disputes over the meaning and value of higher education (Weber, 2013; Szelenyi, 2016). Through these concepts, it is possible to understand why teaching or scientific research are not just technical matters. They also constitute a more or less legitimate form of the exercise of power. From this perspective, academic activities produce forms of social hierarchies of skills. A tradition of sociological research perceives the higher education system as a set of formal institutions that participate in these struggles and are subject to pressures and social expectations, while not denying that they have a certain degree of autonomy (Coté & Furlong, 2016; Gripp & Barbosa, 2014). Furthermore, the specific functioning of these institutions is a key factor in increasing or reducing inequality in higher education.

The dispute over whether to include more students or to create world-class institutions will be analyzed in the perspective outlined above. Winners in these disputes would establish legal and institutional parameters that allow for different levels of system openness and/or high-quality institutions. While they are not mutually exclusive, the option or the preference for one of these models has impacts on the functioning and results of the higher education system.

As in other countries, and especially in the United States, Brazilian sociological research tried to analyze the key institutional features that organize the country's higher education system. The pioneering work undertaken at NUPP (Center for Research in Public Policy) at the University of São Paulo covered various topics such as scientific development, university autonomy and the academic profession[5]. These studies are the initial base of research into the Brazilian higher education system. Later on, other centers were set up and the Ministry of Education, through the INEP (National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anisio Teixeira), currently centralizes the collection and systematization of data and the evaluation of higher education. Highlighting the strength of the so-called academic drift in the Brazilian tertiary education system was one of the main results of NUPPs' research. Schwartzman (2011, p. 15) uses the term "academic drift" to describe the attempts of educational institutions to increase their status by imitating the most prestigious organizational models and areas of knowledge, this strategy reduces diversity. Its effects extend down to the lower levels of education with important consequences

[5] Most of these studies were published and can be found at http://nupps.usp.br/index.php/serie-qdocumentos-de-trabalho-nuppsq-1989–2005

for the structure of inequality in Brazil. There are indications that more than being a simple bias, academicism is the dominant feature of the Brazilian higher educational system (Prates & Barbosa, 2015). More recently this academicism came to be reinforced by national institutions being encouraged to seek to acquire the status of “world-class universities” (Martins, 2015). Perhaps this academic bias is simply a result of the Brazilian law that defines one single model of tertiary education, which is based on the large research universities.

Forms of social and political organization in Brazil tend to be traditionalist (Faoro, 1998; Schwartzman, 1988). Even during strong periods of economic growth, which marked Brazilian modernization, which included significant urbanization and industrialization. Our university system was created late and, with rare exceptions, without having modern scientific knowledge as its major reference (Barbosa, 2012). Little value is attached to education as the basis of occupational, professional, and social achievement (Barbosa, 1996; Almeida, 2007). Although there is evidence of a “civilizing” impact of the passage through the university Almeida (2007) shows that students emerge less racist, sexist, and discriminatory than their peers do. Lack of education is often mobilized to justify a person’s failure or poor realizations in the labor market. However, when people legitimize successful trajectories they rarely mention their educational achievements!

In South Africa, a new constitution was established in 1994 in the process of democratization subsequent to the overthrow of apartheid and its unique structure of social, economic and political inequalities. The new government focused on higher education, producing an array of institutional changes, which sought to enlarge and diversify access. Some studies and proposals for policies and institutional actions came from research centers at some universities (Johannesburg, for instance). However, the full organization of the educational system came after “the development of policy and legislative frameworks, [in] the second period of government (1999–2004) [that] saw an elaboration of policies which further enabled the government to get a grip on the levers of power in order to steer the system to not only to be able to deal and respond to global challenges, but also to be locally responsive and relevant” (Sehoole, 2011, p. 977). New legislation, always based on the values and principles of the emerging democracy, focused at increasing participation, improving responsiveness to social and economic needs, and seeking cooperative governance. (Sehoole, 2011, p. 978). The whole higher education system was restructured, public and private institutions were centrally regulated, and accreditation programs were developed. The previous fragmentation was overcome: the 1997 White Paper established a higher education branch at the Department of Education (that eventually gave birth to the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) and the Council on Higher Education (CHE)). Both institutions, using data from STATS SA (the statistics institute for South Africa, created in 1976), provide the best information on policies and results of higher education in the country.

The hypothesis that guides this study, based on the concepts proposed above, is that traditional and colonial forms of authority are a constituent part of the higher education system. This article tries to show that these patterns or institutional models seem to work as barriers to the effective democratization of educational opportunities. These barriers could act as obstacles even in a context of public policies directed towards social inclusion and to making very significant increases in enrollment in higher education.

To examine this hypothesis previous studies developed by the Brazilian research group (LAPES – Laboratory for Research on Higher Education) and by other researchers were used. Data from Brazilian Census of Higher Education 2013 and 2014 and data derived from ENADE 2014 (National Student Performance Exam) are all produced by INEP. This quantitative data permits some generalizations to be made. However, some case studies are also used in this article. For South Africa, we use data from STATS SA. The institution counts two million higher education students. Nevertheless, none of South African statistics includes Vocational Education and Training (VET), Medicine and courses in the area of Health, nor do they have information on private institutions in the data and tables on enrollments or graduation rates for Higher Education. Because of that, there are significant differences in the numbers that will be presented in the article. We chose to use only the available data on the public universities (traditional, comprehensive, or technological) as they were presented by The Council on Higher Education, which is considered the official source (along with STATS SA) in the country.

Socioeconomic and Historical Context

In Brazil and South Africa, as in many countries, there are quite substantial individual economic returns to schooling, which would be a normal outcome, considering the progress made in terms of modernization of social relations in both countries. However, the difference between the individual returns for different levels of education is changing and, ultimately, is making room for questions about the very legitimacy of education as a criterion for the distribution of socioeconomic positions. As shown in Menezes' studies (e.g. Menezes & Pecora, 2014), the balance in the returns for different levels of schooling is changing with a reduction in returns at the higher levels. This distinction also allows us to understand why access to higher education has become an important object of social demands.

The returns to education in South Africa are significant, being very unequally distributed among different racial groups. Higher education works as an important factor in reducing unemployment from about 40% among those with only primary school to about 6% for graduates (Mapadimeng, 2017).

The expansion of higher education in Brazil began very slowly during the military governments but gained momentum from the year 1990. As the data from INEP (2014) shows the growth rate in 1980–2000, was 96% and for the period 2000–2014 was 190%. Counting nearly 8 million enrollees in 2014 (see Graph 1), the gross rate (or participation) of Brazilian higher education coverage reaches a mere 34.2%. This is already a problematic indicator: considering only those aged between 18 and 24 (the ideal age cohort to attend higher education), the 2010 demographic census shows a participation (or net enrollment rate) of 13.94%. In other words, less than 14% of young people in this age group were enrolled in some kind of post-secondary education. In South Africa, the numbers appear somewhat similar to those in Brazil: just 12.1% of the population aged 25–64 had a higher education degree in 2016, according to STATS SA. According to the same institution, in 2016 the participation rate reached 18% in South Africa. In Trow's classification, both countries are midway through a transformation from an elitist to a mass system of higher education. Even considering their recent expansion.

Brazilian growth in enrollment was more intense in private institutions. While the public sector grew by 80.5% (1980–2000) and 120.7% (2000–2014), the rates for the private sector were 104.1% and 224.6% over the same periods. Of the two million post-secondary education students reported during 2016 in South Africa (including VET ones), 78.3% were enrolled at a public institution, whereas 21.7% attended private institutions. According to CHE, an average of 110–120 higher education private institutions operated in South Africa between 2002 and 2016. Considering the most recent data, there are 2,364 higher education institutions in Brazil, of which 87% are private ones. Private colleges cater to 75% of all undergraduates, most of whom attend for-profit institutions (55, 33% of all students) (Higher Education Census, 2015).

The next graph shows enrollment distribution per type of academic degree or track. This data makes clear the utmost preference for the bachelor's degree, which are responsible for approximately 67% of enrollments over the above-mentioned period. In the same period, enrollment in degrees to prepare for a teaching career seems to have undergone a slight decline, despite public policies to the contrary. At the same time, tertiary-level technological courses have had stronger growth, having multiplied their share in total enrollment six-fold. The courses that offer technological degrees and teachers' degrees were legalized only in 1996, with the new LDB (Law of Directives and Bases for Brazilian Education).



Graph 3. *The Preference for Graduate/Professional Degree, % enrollment*
Source: *INEP-MEC. Brazilian Census of Higher Education.*

The similarly stratified distribution of degrees in South Africa is presented in the next figure. Diplomas (Occupational certificate level 6) and certificates (Occupational certificate level 5), could be associated to Brazilian technological degrees and teaching licenses. They refer to tertiary education, situated above the occupations that demand the National Certificate (high school, level 4 in the National Qualifications Framework). The degrees are assigned two different Occupational Certificates: 360 credits for Advanced Diploma and Bachelor's constitute the Occupational Certificate level 7 (UG Degree in the Graph). In the Occupational Certificate level 8 three categories can be found: Bachelor's degree (480 credits (which is represented by the line entitled "Prof 1st" in Graph 4), some Postgraduate diplomas, and the Bachelor Honours Degree. (See the table with National Qualifications Framework in the annex.) The same way as happens in Brazil, bachelor's degrees are much more valued than other tertiary certificates and diplomas. As pointed out by the literature, this can be viewed as a way of diversifying the intake into higher education systems, as this tends to reduce inequality even in periods in which the system is expanding.

Because of the observed similarity, at this point it is important to compare the enrollment ratios for each field of study. This would permit us to have some indications on the more scientific or more traditional preferences in the definition of the parameters for higher education systems in both countries.

In Brazil, the enrollment ratio in the STEM (Sciences, Technology and Mathematics) varies from 17% to 23% over the period, and in the area of Education it reduced from 21% to 19%. In South Africa, the figures are similar for Education but in 2016 STEM reaches 30.27%, almost a third of all students.

There are 32 bachelors' degrees offered in South Africa. Unfortunately, we were unable to find statistical information available on the topic on CHE or STATS SA sites because their data refers only to public sector higher education. Also, differently from Brazil, enrollment in the health sciences area is not included. This introduces a problem for comparing the proportions of students in each area.

The common trait in the two cases is the high participation of business, education, and humanities areas. In the case of Brazil, even including enrollments in the health area, business is the area chosen by almost half of the students.



***Graph 4.** Certificates & Degrees in SA*

***Source:** CHE/Vital Stats (2016, 17 ff).*



Graph 5. *Enrollments by Area in Brazil*
Source: *Brazilian Census of Higher Education.*



Graph 6. *Enrollment by Area in South Africa*
Source: *CHE VitalStats – Public Higher Education 2016.*

The Brazilian System of Higher Education

The Brazilian system of higher education was developed late, even when compared to other Latin American countries or other BRICS countries. The first Brazilian university was created in 1920, the University of Brazil. The federal government joined three isolated colleges under the title of university in order to bestow the title of doctor *honoris causa* to the King of Belgium during his visit. It remained the model for many states/provinces from the 1920s to the 1950s. The University of São Paulo, created in 1934, was the first attempt to have an institution conceived to work as a higher education structure and not an aggregate of smaller colleges under a single administration. The BRICS countries show significant similarities in their economic development process: in all cases, we see the prevailing acute shortage of resources coupled with a close relationship between the higher education system and the political forces that control the State in each of these societies (Schwartzman, 2015). According to the same study, the five BRICS countries passed through a strong institutional diversification, implemented affirmative action policies of several kinds and their internationalization policies have not been very successful. The increase in enrollment occurred mainly in social sciences, humanities, and education.

Some features of the Brazilian system are noteworthy: by a constitutional requirement, public institutions do not charge for enrollment, they are totally free. This is a unique trait to Brazil, when compared to the other BRICS countries. Public institutions, especially the state-funded universities in São Paulo, tend to be evaluated more positively, both in internal classifications made by government agencies and in international rankings. However, even with a system of higher education that has bureaucratic, technical and social diversity, Brazilian law imposes a single model to be followed by all institutions. Through legislation, research universities with many graduate courses, a small college or a training center for industry should work under the classical model of universities proposed by Wilhelm von Humboldt (Schwartzman, 2014, p. 23). This legal demand obviously has impacts on the possible paths towards democratization of the higher education system. Each institution should be prepared to function as a "world class university". One can understand this definition of a single legal model for the whole system of higher education as a handicap. Although established by bureaucratic and legal rational parameters, this traditional model of university reduces the range of socially valued training options. The diversity and experimentation that has characterized tertiary education elsewhere, for example in the United States, Germany or South Africa, is excluded from the alternatives offered to Brazilians. The ideal university is prescribed as an advanced research institution, with high quality post-graduate programs. Undergraduate courses follow the model of bachelor formation; they invest strongly in theoretical knowledge and provide almost no practical training. This appears to be a restrictive model when one considers the demands of the labor market, the needs for teacher training and the expectations of young people seeking higher education. This legally defined model of a university highlights the strong academic bias that runs throughout the education system. So, instead of increasing qualification opportunities and certification alternatives, the legally defined higher education model, raises the bachelor's diploma to the position of "general equivalent" (Thévenot, 1983), the parameter for measuring of all qualities.

Therefore, this higher education system works in a specific legal framework that defines its bureaucratic rules and its institutional excellence models. There are three defined levels in the system: the lowest one is the "isolated college", a small institution with few courses. The next level is the "university center": "institutions of higher education, covering one or more areas of knowledge, characterized by the excellence of teaching offered, proven by the qualification of its faculty and by the academic working conditions offered to the school community. These "accredited university centers" have the autonomy to create, organize and extinguish, at their headquarters, courses and higher education programs" (Brazil, MEC, Decree nº 5.773/06). Finally, the term "university" defines the highest level and organizes the hierarchy of higher education institutions. "Universities are characterized by the indissociability of teaching, research and extension activities. They are multidisciplinary institutions for the training of professional staff at a high level, research, extension and the mastery and cultivation of human knowledge, which are characterized by: (I) – institutionalized intellectual production through the systematic study of the most relevant themes and problems, from the scientific and cultural viewpoints be they regional or national; (II) – one-third of the teaching staff, at least, with an academic master's or doctorate degree; and (III) – one third of the faculty on a full-time basis" (idem ibidem).

This conception of what a university should be is associated with the Humboldtian model whose core idea is a holistic combination of research and teaching. The model integrates the arts and sciences with research to achieve both comprehensive general learning and cultural knowledge. According to Anderson (2010), this kind of model shaped the research universities in the United States and all around the world. "The Humboldtian university can be seen as the characteristic form of the university idea until the growth of mass higher education in the late twentieth century" (Anderson, 2010). The adherence to this type of model is very problematic. The Humboldt model designs elite universities and, historically, could be opposed to the conception of mass higher education. In this way, the Brazilian higher education system suffers from a paradox: it has the ambition to reach large segments of the population offering a model theoretically aimed at teaching the elite.

This model of accreditation and hierarchy makes any institution, even those smaller or characteristically more vocationally-oriented, work as a "university under construction". All of them aim of being eventually recognized as a university which conducts both research and academic formation. Many of them become mere simulacra of a university. As is easy to imagine, the social distribution of the population throughout these different types of institutions is not random.

This same model is required for public and private institutions, for courses that offer bachelor's degrees, or teaching degrees, or even technology courses! However, it is not difficult to find, within this single legal model, several types of segmentation that end up producing enormous differences in institutional functioning and the quality of the services offered.

South African System of Higher Education

The University of the Cape of the Good Hope, created in 1873, was the first in South Africa. Established in the southern part of the country, it eventually became the University of South Africa (UNISA). With the universities of Stellenbosch and Cape Town, UNISA could be linked back to the settlement by white colonialists in the 17th century. The higher education system developed during most of the 20th century was marked by significant racial differences. Around the 1960's only 5,000 of the 62,000 university students in South Africa were non-white. According to Sehoole (2011), the racial disparity was followed by a gradual "racial opening up" and the figures changed. By 1980 there were 150,000 whites and 120,000 non-whites enrolled. In the first decade of this century, the majority (67%) of students in the 21 public universities are non-white.

The higher education system had a binary structure of traditional universities and technikons (institutions for technical higher education). The latter evolved from the old technical education institutes, favored mainly by the mining industry. To address the needs of this industry, training centers were established as apprenticeships. After some decades, with the inclusion of more abstract items in the curriculum, the centers became colleges. The Higher Education Act of 1923 declared some of them as higher education institutions. In 1970, the Ministry of Education recognized these technical institutions as constituent part of the higher education system, with equal status to the traditional universities. Only in 1993, the Technikons were authorized to award degrees as any other university. In 1994, the new democratic government "inherited a well-established higher education system made up of 21 universities and 15 technikons" (Sehoole, 2011, p. 974). All of them public institutions. In 2018, the private sector comprises roughly 10% of enrollments.

A Segmented System: Public or Private Institutions in Brazil, Black and White Universities in South Africa

The Brazilian private and public sectors are deeply differentiated (Sampaio, 2014), even in their institutional characteristics. Thus, among public institutions, there are federal, state and municipal entities, defined according to the legal responsibility for their management and financing. It is important to remember that in Brazil, public institutions have free tuition, with all costs covered by public funds. On the other hand, private institutions are distinguished by being either "for profit" or "not for profit". Among the latter, there are the so-called Community Institutions – often associated with religious groups – which sometimes attain very high levels of quality (Neves et al, 2008).

Private institutions receive 74% of students' enrollment in Brazilian HE. Some public policies and institutional actions were developed to assure the ability of enrolled poor students to remain studying in these universities. The costs for the best institutions and enrollment in courses leading to the most prestigious careers are very high: the average monthly fee for a medicine course in a private university is approximately R$7,000 (during 8 months of the year, approximately US$1,800 or 7 Brazilian minimum monthly wages) – an amount beyond the reach of most Brazilians who are also unable to succeed in the very competitive entrance exams for the public universities. The



Graph 7. *System Segmentation: Private and Public Institutions*

Source: *INEP-MEC. Brazilian Census of Higher Education 2014*
(Students include all enrollments: from first year to last year, Freshmen are first year students)

medical course fees start at R$4,500 per month and reach up to around R$13,500! And, this is just the cost of enrollment: it does not include the acquisition of books or research materials, transportation, and lodging. There are, for sure, less expensive courses, mainly in the area of Humanities (e.g. Philosophy, Sociology, Geography, Psychology etc.) or Education (which includes Pedagogy and all teaching degrees). The monthly fee in a Pedagogy course could be as low as R$270 when conducted by distance education. Anyway, for many fees are a big expense in a country where annual per capita income is US$15,700 (in 2015).

Policies for financing private higher education have been developed over recent years and are now very relevant, two major programs were established: PROUNI is a policy that offers full and partial scholarships for poor and/or black students through tax exemptions for private institutions; FIES is a student loan fund with reduced interest rates that must be repaid in the long term. The data demonstrate the importance of these mechanisms. In the period from 2010 to 2014, enrollments in the private sector grew by 17% (Table 2), while students benefiting from FIES increased by 750%. This explosive increase is associated to political strategies and suffered a significant setback in 2015 and 2016 due to cuts in government funding. But it remains one of the main instruments of access to private higher education in the country.

There are also social welfare policies for poor students even in the tuition free public universities. Students entering public universities through quotas or other affirmative action policies receive various types of economic aid. They are mostly fruit of policies developed within these institutions that aim at ensuring – with greater or lesser success – the permanence of these students.

In addition, the federal government's REUNI program aimed to expand the public system of higher education. According to data from the Ministry of Education, 14 new universities and 100 new campuses were created, thereby expanding the federal network. In this context, a significant expansion of enrollment in federal institutions occurred. In 2007, when REUNI was created, these institutions had 12.61% of enrollments in higher education. This proportion rose to 16.71% in 2014. In addition, the creation of evening courses, especially in the area of education, has increased the participation of less affluent and working students.

In Brazilian society, several studies that indicate an aversion to the private sector and an appreciation of the public sector (Almeida, 2007). Coupled with the fact that the best Brazilian universities are public, this evaluation flows on to all institutions in

Table 2. *Students with FIES and PROUNI*

	2010	2012	2014	Variation 2010–14, %
FIES	223,284	623,241	1,900,737	751.3
PROUNI	372,488	459,146	511,316	37.3
Total	595,772	1,082,387	2,412,053	304.9
Enrollment Private Sector	3,987,424	4,208,086	4,664,542	17.0

Source: *Corbucci et al (2016) using data from Microdados do Censo da Educação Superior, do Inep/MEC; Fies/Secretaria de Ensino Superior (Sesu)/MEC; Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação (FNDE)/MEC.*

the sector, regardless of their actual quality, and likewise diminishes the expectations held of their private sector counterparts. Yet, as shown above, the private sector is by far the most important for enrollments and their offer of courses is significantly larger: 10,240 in the public sector in 2014 versus 21,842 in the private sector.

The public and private sectors have been distinguished along several dimensions: in this section, we discuss some social characteristics that distinguish the students who attend the institutions in each of the sectors. First, the average age of students enrolled in higher education differs significantly. For public sector students, the average age (Brazilian Census of Higher Education, 2014) is 25.97 years (standard deviation 7.764), while in private institutions the age rises by nearly two years to 27.83 years (with an even higher standard deviation: 8.391). For 2013, the year that ENADE examined agronomy and social work students, in addition to all specialties in the health area, the age gap at graduation was three years. Going to HE at a later age is usually associated with a more modest social origin, or with entering courses of a more vocational nature (Connor et al., 2001, p. 106; Prates & Collares, 2015).

In Brazilian society, the preferences for the type of degree are fairly marked from the social point of view: Teaching degrees or technological courses have been "preferred" by the students from more modest social backgrounds. The data above confirm the studies that indicated this trend with a clear increase in demand for the less prestigious courses and degrees for students from less affluent social groups. As for the students of the educated middle classes, the choice falls mainly on the very prestigious courses and with a very high number of students competing for each place offered in the public institutions. These preferences for bachelor's degree are understandable. Having a bachelor diploma entitles a person to work in the public sector and to receive a premium wage.

In South Africa, the hopes of democratization of HE system subsequent to substantial changes in the legal and institutional framework did not materialize. Contrary to expectations, students left historically black universities (HBU) for the historically white ones (HWU) where they could find better infrastructure and teaching or more chances of funding for their studies. HWU also offered better opportunities in the job market. It was truly a mass migration phenomenon. The best institutions in the HE system sized the opportunities to better their positions, including investing in distance education. The Higher Education Act (1997), permitted private institutions, and they experienced huge and almost unregulated growth. There were no registration nor quality requirements. The crisis that emerged subsequently induced the consolidation of a policy and regulatory framework aimed at the constitution of a single coordinated system (Sehoole, 2011). In the case of Brazil, since the 19th century, the private sector has been strongly regulated by federal government, which has a great deal of control over Brazilian higher education system, including the public institutions.

Emerging from a more mature and organized governmental structure (in the period 1999–2004), policies were designed by South African professionals with the participation of the ministries responsible for the Economy and Education. The

Higher Education Act was amended in order to legally reorder the multifaceted and unorganized set of higher education institutions. The new single system of higher education implied a consolidation of the public sector from 36 to 21 institutions, the legal regulation of private providers that made their registration at the Department obligatory. One important measure was that the South African Qualifications Authority must assess all qualifications standards. Another dimension was the accreditation of programs, especially post-graduate ones. The assessment of MBA programs in 2003 indicated many problems, mainly among international providers and Technikons. This kind of problem, as noted by Sehoole (2011, p. 990), made South Africa a pioneer country in developing a comprehensive framework capable of dealing with the challenges of cross-border or transnational systems of education.

Discussion

The expansion of Brazilian higher education system effectively allowed some less affluent social groups access to tertiary level education. Given the previous low coverage levels, this was certainly an important step towards the system's greater democratization. The same could be said about South Africa post-apartheid, when African, Colored, and Indian students got more opportunities to enter the best universities.

However, considering the net coverage rate, around 14% and 18% respectively, it can be said that this expansion is still quite restrictive and less than inclusive, or at least not sufficiently inclusive to allow Brazil and South Africa to be ranked as relatively democratic HE systems. Statistically, enrollment remains, in both countries, very close to Throw's definition (1970) of an elite university system.

The problem that arises is similar to Alon's (2009): how to explain that in the context of expansion, in spite of public policies focused on the democratization of access and permanence, HE remains relatively closed, particularly in courses that give access to more prestigious and well-paid careers. Both in Brazil and South Africa, it seems that the theories of maximum maintained or effectively maintained inequality (MMI and EMI respectively) fit, as has been shown by many authors for the United States and Israel. Diversification and expansion did not keep pace with democratization. Even worse, it seems that diversification is a way of diverting more disadvantaged students from the more privileged professions or careers (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993).

For the Brazilian case, the data presented below indicate both some advances associated with the higher education system and some bottlenecks in opening educational opportunities for Afro-descendants (previously called "blacks") and for women. The proportion of Afro-descendants remains very low in the most prestigious careers and with better social status and economic returns. At the same time, women are now the majority of higher education students but enroll in courses that lead them into the lower paid occupations. The data on family income in Table 3 seem to indicate that higher paid professionals come from affluent families and those who earn less come from poorer families.

Table 3. *Data on Individuals with Full Tertiary Education – by Selected Courses*

Course	Year	Percentage in the population with higher education degrees, %	Percentage of Women, %	Percentage of Afro-Descendants, %	Hour wage (R$)	Percentage occupied, %	Average Family Income (R$)
Management	2000	15.74	41.20	11.73	19.07	83.77	948.73
	2010	18.64	49.97	22.90	18.91	87.56	1194.55
Law	2000	15.29	44.27	12.96	23.59	82.01	1093.77
	2010	11.44	49.56	19.53	30.19	84.33	1555.37
Education	2000	17.02	92.26	19.03	10.44	76.09	844.67
	2010	25.57	83.89	35.19	12.48	83.18	911.26
Nursing	2000	2.17	92.25	24.46	13.07	84.65	946,56
	2010	3.27	87.51	33.82	14.04	81.42	1089.22
Engineering	2000	10.54	15.08	10.29	25.70	89.33	991.98
	2010	6.70	17.23	17.83	32.46	88.89	1370.41
Medicine	2000	5.64	39.80	11.24	31.16	94.09	1236.06
	2010	2.41	46.68	14.96	43.51	92.90	1969.58

Data extracted from Martins and Machado 2015 (pages 11 and 12) using demographic census data from 2000 and 2010. Note 1: Values in Reais of 2010. Note 2: Per capita household income figures calculated excluding the individual's own income.

Table 4. *Graduate and Dropout Rates – 2014–2016*

Year	African		Colored		Indian		White	
	Graduated, %	Dropped out, %	Graduated, %	Dropped out, %	Graduated, %	Dropped out, %	Graduated, %	Dropped out, %
2014	42	29	39	34	40	28	51	26
2015	57	30	53	36	59	28	65	27
2016	63	37	60	40	66	34	70	30

Source: *CHE VitalStats – Public Higher Education 2016/ Cohort Study p. 73.*

It was not possible to find similar data for South Africa. However, the numbers on completion according to the race, presented in Table 4, show that Africans, Colored, and Indian students have lower rates of graduation than their White peers. Even 22 years after the end of apartheid, it seems that the non-white students still face some difficulties in their higher education trajectories.

Our analysis, following the tradition of sociological research, understands that the mode of operation of higher education institutions stands out as one of the key factors in the mechanisms and social disputes that increase or reduce inequalities. Focusing on the basic distinction between public and private sector, we try to show some of the effects of this segmentation and, maybe, of academic drift in Brazil. More than a bias, academicism seems to be a dominant feature of the higher education system either because of the legal definition that imposes a single model, or because of the rules and practices of diverse social agents. This is shown not only in the ways of teaching and in the definition of the subject contents, but also in the adoption of a perspective that devalues nearly all practical, technical, and even scientific knowledge. Probably the strongest indication of the academic bias is the generalized preference for bachelor's degrees.

The private sector of higher education has more students and courses and, in a slightly different manner to the public sector, it invests heavily in technological courses. This may indicate a lesser impact of academic bias in this sector. Data on graduates shows that, overall, the higher education system remains a very elitist area, but that there are slight openings in the private sector.

In South Africa, after the end of apartheid, many Africans moved to the historical white (and better) universities, trying to get more privileged positions in the job market (Sehoole, 2011). This made it more difficult to implement policies to improve the quality of the historically black universities, and even more so to develop world-class universities among them. The best universities in South Africa are still those traditional institutions, which are historically white.

The South African system of higher education is more accessible to those groups of disadvantaged students, but as in the case of Brazil, these students seem to be diverted into the less privileged careers, such as technological courses or in the area of education. Women are the majority of students, except in the STEM area. However, the data does not permit us to see if their participation is also translated into better positions in society and job market.

Both Brazil and South Africa have invested in improving the equality of opportunities and the quality of higher education. The Times Higher Education rank for emergent countries showed that South Africa can be considered more successful than most others in its policies to create world-class universities. Even so, in both countries the quest for excellence seems to be much more related to the emphasis given by administrators to bureaucratic procedures than to academic investments (Martins, 2015; Govender, 2018).

Although the data is incomplete, there are some indications that, measured by the rates of completion presented by CHE, South Africa is ahead of Brazil in opening up its higher education system. Again, after institutional and curriculum transformation, policies for social and economic priorities at the higher education level, social inequality and structural contradictions are reproduced within existing power relations with the strong contribution of the higher education system.

The two countries appear to be very comparable with respect to the difficulties faced in opening and democratizing their higher education systems. Gender and racial inequalities still permeate trajectories and achievements in both systems. In Brazil and South Africa, the investments in scientific formation (and in the STEM area), that would improve participation in knowledge society, are precarious and most students are enrolled in business and the humanities.

Even considering the problems with the statistical sources, South Africa seems to be a little ahead of Brazil both in opening up and improving the quality of its HE system. One hypothesis to explain the small differences between two countries which otherwise appear to be so similar would be the academic bias, so strong in the case of Brazil, having a much less significant role in South Africa. The development of a more modern HE system, one that is democratic and scientific, becomes difficult when the existing system is very strongly influenced by traditional and patrimonial values. Science and modernity do not go well together with tradition and patrimonialism.

Annex

National Qualifications Framework

LEVEL		SUB-FRAMEWORK AND QUALIFICATION TYPES		
10	HEQSF	Doctoral Degree Doctoral Degree (Professional)		
9	HEQSF	Master's Degree Master's Degree (Professional)		
8	HEQSF	Bachelor Honours Degree Postgraduate Diploma Bachelor's Degree (480 credits)	Occupational Certificate (Level 8)	OQSF
7	HEQSF	Bachelor's Degree (360 credits) Advanced Diploma	Occupational Certificate (Level 7)	OQSF
6	HEQSF	Diploma Advanced Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 6)	OQSF
5	HEQSF	Higher Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 5)	OQSF
4	GENFETQSF	National Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 4)	OQSF
3	GENFETQSF	Intermediate Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 3)	OQSF
2	GENFETQSF	Elementary Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 2)	OQSF
1	GENFETQSF	General Certificate	Occupational Certificate (Level 1)	OQSF

Taken from Government Gazette Volume 578, Number 36721, Pretoria, 2 August 2013 and adapted for the Register. The GENETQSF can be found on Page 23 of Gazette. Qualification types beyond level 6 on the OQSF have not been determined pending further advice.

Source: Department of Higher Education and Training

Source: *https://wenr.wes.org/2017/05/education-south-africa (accessed June 25, 2018).*

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ARTICLE

Development of Cooperation in Higher Education in BRICS Countries

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ABSTRACT
As an important component of BRICS cooperation, collaboration in higher education plays a key role in the development and mutual collaboration of the five countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze current cooperation in higher education of BRICS countries. The article selects BRICS Network University, BRICS Universities League and BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University as case studies, to compare and summarize the achievements and the existing problems of these three BRICS higher education projects. The paper discovers that the BRICS education cooperation has great significance to the development of the five countries, and also promotes education in Global South. However, cooperation in higher education is still in its nascent stage and certain aspects need to be improved. At the end, the article gives several suggestions on how to promote and strengthen the cooperation in the future.

KEYWORDS
Higher education, cooperation, development, BRICS, Global South

Introduction

The BRICS countries are the most dynamic emerging economies in the world, with a total population of more than 3 billion. Nowadays, the influence of BRICS in the global political, economic, cultural and diplomatic fields is constantly increasing. As collaboration has continued to deepen among BRICS countries and the cooperation in economic and cultural exchanges have risen to a new historical height, this has brought about unprecedented opportunities for the further development of cooperation in higher education.

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With the annual BRICS Education Ministers' Meeting, it can be seen that the BRICS countries attach great importance to collaboration in higher education. The cooperation within BRICS has attained certain achievements. Two official cooperation mechanisms, the BRICS Network University and BRICS Universities League, have been established and there are also bilateral and multilateral education cooperation projects, such as the BRICS Summer Program in Fudan University. These are remarkable results and these projects play a positive role in improving BRICS cooperation. In addition, with economic globalization, emerging economies have become more tightly connected than ever before. Given that BRICS countries are influential developing countries, education cooperation within BRICS would play a significant role in promoting higher education development in the Global South.

The purpose of this article is to study the collaboration in higher education of BRICS countries, to find the existing difficulties and problems in current cooperation. Thus, to give several suggestions in deepen BRICS's cooperation in higher education field. In order to demonstrate this argument, this paper is divided into four sections. The first section presents the importance of the collaboration in BRICS. While benefitting higher education development and cultivation of talents in each country, such collaboration can also promote educational cooperation in Global South. The second section demonstrates an overview of the present collaboration projects and has selected the BRICS Network University, the BRICS Universities League and the BRICS Summer Program as examples. The third section seeks to compare and analyze the achievements and the difficulties in the cooperation at present. Lastly, several suggestions will be given on how to improve and promote collaboration in higher education in the future.

The Importance of the Collaboration in Higher Education in BRICS

In the context of globalization, cooperation in education plays a special function of promoting cultural exchange, economic development and information exchange. Since 2009, when the first BRICS Leaders' Summit put forward the aim "Strengthen Educational Cooperation", collaboration in the field of education has been one of the key priorities in BRICS cooperation. The educational collaboration between the five countries will not only provide high-quality talents for the development of countries, but also have a positive impact on the development in higher education in the Global South.

Promote Educational Development in BRICS Countries

Since the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, the five countries have always adhered to the spirit of "cooperation, development, and mutual benefit". The collaboration in higher education in BRICS could promote positive educational development in these countries.

At present, educational development in the BRICS countries can be characterized by its "large scale" and "fast development". The BRICS countries have encountered common challenges in promoting educational equity, increasing education opportunities and improving the quality of education. Through the platform built by the BRICS Education Cooperation, the five countries can learn from each other and explore solutions in these areas. In addition, the BRICS countries have complementary aspects in the field of education, and the development of education in each country could be promoted through cooperation and exchange among the five countries. When higher education in one country accepts and adopts ideas, curriculum, languages, cultures, traditions and even talent training from other countries' education systems, the collaboration between education systems leads to amplified results and guaranteed intelligence, and forms the basis for long-term and stable cooperation. Through practical cooperation, the BRICS countries will strengthen the relations between the universities, share their experiences in development of first-class disciplines and cooperation in scientific research, as well as jointly explore new ideas in university reforms, share new experiences, promote the development of education within the BRICS countries, and work together to promote world-class universities construction.

Cultivate Talents for the Cooperation between BRICS Countries

The BRICS Education Cooperation Mechanism offers a communication platform to encourage more outstanding youths and scholars to pay more attention to and participate in the development of BRICS cooperation. Cooperation in higher education has successfully cultivated many outstanding talents for the BRICS countries.

Regardless of whether it is in the field of cultural exchange and economic development, or in technological innovation and emerging technology, the future of BRICS cooperation will be conducted mainly by the younger generation, who should explore new ideas, new methods and new solutions for BRICS countries. Under the impetus of the BRICS Education Ministers' Meeting, the five countries have continuously promoted joint research and training of talents, as well as increased the number of teachers and students involved in academic exchange programs. The international platform of BRICS cooperation has allowed students from the five countries to gain broadened perspectives, increased knowledge as well as enhanced competence in global communication. This has in turn produced high-quality compound talents for the economic development and technological innovation of the BRICS countries.

In addition, the cooperation of BRICS in education produces impacts beyond just the field of education. The BRICS countries are geographically far apart, spanning Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. The BRICS countries have also had very different historical development paths, as well as tremendous differences in languages and cultures. As the Chinese saying goes, "The key to sound relations between states lies in the affinity between their people, which largely stems from mutual understanding". Through the exchanges and cooperation in higher education, youths in the five countries will gain greater understanding of the culture and context of each country's development, and thus truly enhance the affinity between the people from different BRICS countries.

It can be said that the BRICS higher education cooperation is not only an important part of the BRICS cooperation but also reflects the achievements of the cooperation. Therefore, enhancing cooperation in higher education is conducive to deepening the cooperation of BRICS in other fields.

Boost Development of Education in Global South

As the representatives of emerging economies and developing countries, the rise of BRICS has become a new development force in the world. Among the BRICS members, China, South Africa, India, and Brazil are all major countries of the Global South, and Russia also promotes international cooperation in accordance to the principles of South-South cooperation. It can be said that cooperation between Global South and BRICS countries are all based on the prospect of common development of developing countries, with the goal of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. BRICS higher education cooperation also opens up new paths and provides new ideas for education development in the Global South.

In the field of education, the Global South countries and BRICS countries now face many common difficulties and problems such as ensuring equality in opportunities for higher education, eliminating gender inequality, caring for vulnerable groups and improving the quality of education. BRICS higher education cooperation is in line with the UNESCO Education 2030 Action Framework. Under this framework, efforts are made to promote the sustainable development of education, actively contribute the “BRICS Solution” to the world, enhance the influence and increase the benefit of BRICS higher education cooperation, create an open and diverse partnership network in educational development, increase accessibility for more developing countries to take the “fast train” and “free ride” of BRICS education development, and lead and promote the development of quality fair education around the world.

Present International Cooperation in Higher Education in BRICS

With the positive response and support of the BRICS Education Ministers’ meeting, the five countries constantly work together to promote pragmatic cooperation and have already signed a series of declarations for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This chapter provides a brief overview of the present cooperation projects in the five countries. Among them, all five countries have jointly participated in the BRICS Network University and BRICS Universities League, and these two projects are recognized and supported by the Ministers of Education of each country. In addition, the BRICS Summer Program is an exchange program for college students from BRICS countries, funded by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and organized by Fudan University.

BRICS Network University

The BRICS Network University is a major mechanism for multilateral cooperation in higher education in the BRICS countries. It is led by Russia and the secretariat is located in Ural Federal University. The mechanism was established for joint research and training of highly qualified professionals in universities in the BRICS countries, thereby making higher education play its increasingly important role in national strategic decision-making and the development of emerging economies. The thematic priorities of the BRICS Network University include Energy, Computer Science and Information Security, BRICS studies, Ecology, Climate Change, Water Resources and Pollution Treatment, and Economics.

At present, there are 55 universities in the BRICS countries participating in the BRICS Network University project, with 11 universities from each country. Other than top universities from the five countries – for example, Lomonosov Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State University in Russia, Fudan University and Zhejiang University in China, University of the Witwatersrand and University of Cape Town in South Africa, the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, and the University of Delhi in India – there are also specialized colleges with corresponding dominant disciplines accepted by the Network, including Indian Institutes of Technology, Hohai University (for hydraulic engineering), Durban University of Technology, and ITMO University, etc.

BRICS Universities League

The BRICS University League was first proposed by the Center of BRICS Studies of Fudan University when it was established in March 2012. The aim of the League is to become a platform for academic and expert cooperation, comparative research, and international educational projects, so as to provide intellectual support for BRICS cooperation and develop a new way of university internationalization. After the idea was put forward, it was immediately supported by the Russian National Research University Higher School of Economics, and the two sides set up a working group to promote its establishment.

On October 18, 2015, the BRICS University League was established in Beijing Normal University, China, and the Beijing Consensus was declared. According to the Beijing Consensus, members of the BRICS University League will work together to build a platform for collaborative research and academic exchanges, strive to enhance global knowledge innovation, improve people's living standards, and consolidate and enhance the influence of BRICS in global intellectual competition. The League will also pay attention to the all-rounded development of young students and cultivate innovative talents with an international vision. The League advocates a balanced and sustainable development model to achieve the harmony between economic development and environmental protection, and urges BRICS countries to choose a development strategy that suits their national circumstances.

At the same time, under the cooperation mechanism of the BRICS University League, the five countries will strengthen the cooperation in personnel training, carry out inter-university teacher exchanges and student exchanges, mutual recognition of credits and mutual degree conferring among BRICS countries, and implement the training of talents for undergraduate, master, doctor and postdoctoral students. Secondly, they will strengthen research cooperation, conduct bilateral or multilateral scientific research cooperation, set up joint laboratories and bases, jointly carry out scientific innovation research, establish bilateral or multilateral research think tanks, and jointly tackle major issues concerning BRICS cooperation, provide policy consultation for the economic and social development of all countries. Thirdly, they will also strengthen cooperation on quality assurance of higher education and explore the joint development of the high education quality assurance system in BRICS countries. These three aspects serve as the core aims and objectives for cooperation.

BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University

The BRICS Summer School Program is the first program in BRICS education cooperation and has the largest substantial progress. The summer school focuses on communication and integration, aiming to create a platform for consensus and friendship among young students from the BRICS countries. The program aims to facilitate mutual exchanges and consolidate BRICS cooperation, promote the understanding and interest of the younger generation in China's social culture, political and economic development, as well as in BRICS collaboration and the change in global governance.

The Summer School was first established in 2014 and has since been successfully held for five years. Every year during July and August, the summer school gathers both undergraduate and graduate students from top universities of BRICS countries for a one-month study in Fudan University, one of the most prestigious universities in China. The BRICS Summer School enrolls 28 students every year from both partner and nonpartner schools of Fudan University, amongst which 20 students are eligible for full scholarships. Depending on the registration status, the number of scholarships are equally divided among the four countries.

Since its establishment in 2014, a total of 145 outstanding students have participated in the BRICS Summer School Program. Figure 1 illustrates that among the 145 students, there have been 56 Brazilian students, 34 Russian students, 18 Indian students, and 37 South African students. This year's program was the first time that two additional Chinese students were allowed to enroll in the program. Most of the students were undergraduate and postgraduates students, with a small number of doctoral student and young researchers.

The Summer Course consists of two modules: "Global Governance and Cooperation among BRICS" and "China's Politics and Diplomacy". The Summer School also organizes other BRICS-related activities and events, such as participation



Figure 1. *2014–2018 The Number of the Student from Each Country*

Source: *Center for BRICS Studies of Fudan University.*

in the BRICS Annual Meeting, visit to the New Development Bank and simulation of the BRICS Summit. Other than regular lectures, the program also includes several cultural excursions within and around Shanghai, so as to let students get in touch with the Chinese traditional culture. To guarantee the quality of teaching, all lectures are Englishtaught and are delivered by prestigious scholars from China, the United States, Brazil, South Africa, and other countries and regions. Many of the lecturers are senior researchers in BRICS studies, and the program has also invited famous diplomats and entrepreneurs to give the lecture for the students.

The Achievements and Difficulties in the Cooperation in Higher Education

Through an overview of the three case studies above, this section compares and analyzes the achievements of the current cooperation projects. This section will also summarize the difficulties and problems encountered in the concrete implementation of the cooperation projects.

Achievements in the BRICS Education Cooperation

Driven by the BRICS Network University, the BRICS Network University Conference has been successfully held for three years. In 2016, at Ural Federal University, Russia, representatives held their first plenary meeting. During the meeting, the official logo and slogan of the Network University were adopted and the International Governing Board (IGB) draft regulations and other regulations were discussed. In 2017 and 2018, the annual meeting of the BRICS Network University was held in Zhengzhou, Henan, China and Cape Town, South Africa. The two meetings focused on topics such as centered on “Pragmatic Cooperation and International Education”, “Sustainable Development Strategy of Network University”, “Formulate and Consolidate BRICS Education Agenda”, etc.

Achievements have also been made in the implementation of cooperation projects. One of the key priority areas of the BRICS Network University is international joint education, especially the promotion of student exchanges and joint training in the field of superior disciplines. In the context of the BRICS Network University, Ural Federal University and the North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power (NCWU) have established a Sino-Russian cooperative school – Ural Institute of NCWU by, approved by the Ministry of Education of China. In line with the unique advantages and features of these two universities, four majors were set up: Water Supply and Drainage Science and Engineering, Energy and Power Engineering, Geomatics Engineering, and Architecture. The two universities plan to recruit 60 new students in 2018. Students who meet the graduation requirements of the two universities can obtain their Bachelor’s Degree from NCWU as well as the degree certificates in related majors of Ural Federal University.

The BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University, as a successful example of recent cooperation, has also successfully forged closer educational bonds among the young people of five countries. So far, the program had gained media attention and has earned praises from the officials of Consulate-Generals of BRICS countries.

The BRICS Summer Program has enhanced the interests and ignited enthusiasm of the young generation to find out more about China. Many students reflected that the one-month program had broadened their horizons and that they had gained more insights and perspectives in BRICS Studies. After participating in the summer program, some of the students have decided to further their studies in China and have gone on to apply for the Master's Degree courses. Furthermore, with the experience from the summer school, some students have contributed their own efforts to promote the cooperation of the BRICS countries. For example, three Brazilian students from the 2016 BRICS Summer Program organized the "China and Brazil: Challenges in 2017 Forum" at Peking University in 2017, which helped to promote the communication between the Chinese and Brazilian organizations and enterprises. Another student from South Africa was selected as the youth representative to coordinate BRICS affairs between China and South Africa.

In contrast, although the BRICS University League has been mentioned many times in the Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers and has gathered 55 top universities from five countries, there has been a lack of substantive progress and concrete cooperation projects. There is a lack of interaction and communication between member universities and the League. For now, the League has not played a significant role in promoting higher education in the BRICS countries.

Difficulties in the Current Educational Cooperation

Through the above review, it can be seen that the cooperation between the BRICS countries in the field of higher education area has attained certain achievements. However, at the same time, it has also showed that there are several aspects that need to be improved in the present cooperation.

Lack of Multilateral Cooperation

At present, the BRICS Network University focuses on cooperation in Energy, Computer Science and Information Security, BRICS studies, Ecology, Climate Change, Water Resources and Pollution Treatment, and Economics. Most of the member universities within the network are known for Science and Engineering disciplines. With regards to the BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University, according to the curriculum, the courses are mainly about "Global Governance and BRICS cooperation" and "China's Politics and Diplomacy", showing an emphasis on International Relations.

According to the Center for BRICS Studies of Fudan University, on the basis of the data statistics of the professional background of the 145 students participated in former years, from 2014 to 2018, more than 50% of the students were International Relations majors. This was followed by Law (18%) and Economics (14%) respectively. There were very few students studying History, Management, and Asian Studies. From the above data, the current cooperation in higher education of BRICS is principally in International Relations, Economics Management, and Science and Technology. However, there are few exchange and cooperation programs in Agriculture, Technical Skills and Humanities.



Figure 2. *2017–2018 Students' Professional Background*

Source: *Center for BRICS Studies of Fudan University.*

Shortage of Cooperation Funds

Compared with the students from developed countries, the economic conditions of students in BRICS countries are generally worse. When youths are participating in the exchange programs or activities between BRICS countries, a large cost may be incurred due to high cost of tuition, airfare, accommodation, and other fees.

Take the BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University as an example. At present, this project is mainly supported by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission. However, the program funding is only sufficient to support the expenses for the one-month operation of the summer school, and the scholarships for some, but not all, of the students. There were some cases where the student gave up on participating in the summer school because they did not manage to get the scholarship. Thus, it can be seen that in the absence of subsidies or scholarships, the high economic cost of these educational programs may reduce the enthusiasm of interested students, hence depriving those interested in BRICS development of such education opportunities.

Lack of Publicity

The BRICS Network University established its official website (https://nu-brics.ru) in 2016. Relevant information and documents, such as on the BRICS Network University, such as the university charter, organizational structure, list of member universities, as well as BRICS News and BRICS Announcements, which focus on BRICS education development, the Annual Conference of the Network University and the priority areas of the Network University's cooperation is available on this website.

The BRICS Summer Program of Fudan University is mainly promoted through the Internet and the recommendations of former program students and professors from partner schools. Every year during the application period, details on Admissions are publicized on the BRICS Information Sharing & Exchanging Platform and Facebook[1] page of the Fudan BRICS Program. However, despite Facebook being one of the most popular social networking sites among youths, the Fudan BRICS Facebook page only

[1] Facebook® and its logo are trademarks of Facebook, Inc., registered in the United States and other countries

has about 60 followers (https://www.facebook.com/fudanbricsprogram/). In addition, most of the reports of the BRICS Summer School are from Chinese media. News coverage of this program in other BRICS media is relatively low.

Until now, the BRICS Universities League has yet to establish an official website. It is extremely urgent and necessary to create a platform for promoting and sharing useful information.

To sum up, it can be seen that the above three BRICS cooperation programs have different levels of publicity. In general, the publicity of BRICS education cooperation is insufficient and must be further strengthened in the future. In addition to the construction and improvement of the official homepage, traditional media and social networks are also important ways to expand publicity.

Suggestions on Strengthening Collaborations in Higher Education in BRICS and Global South

At present, the BRICS countries have attained a series of remarkable achievements in higher education cooperation. In order to improve the diversified educational cooperation mechanism, this paper gives the following suggestions for the future development of BRICS higher education cooperation.

Enhance Multilateral, Multi-Disciplinary and Multi-Format Cooperation

Under the BRICS cooperation mechanism, the five countries actively carry out multi-disciplinary and multi-form educational exchanges and cooperation projects with mutual participation and jointly promoted the development of education. The cooperation between the BRICS countries has deepened into the development of all fields of the five countries, and higher education provides the intellectual guarantee for the cooperation. In addition to focusing on educational cooperation at the annual Meeting of BRICS Education Ministers, other ministerial conferences such as the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture, the BRICS Science, Technology & Innovation Ministerial Meeting and the Meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers have also mentioned talent-training issue in relevant areas. Therefore, the BRICS countries can broaden the scope of cooperation in education, not only in the fields of International Relations, Economic Management, Scientific and Technological Innovation, but also promote the cultivation and exchange of talents in Agriculture, Technical Skills and Industry. In terms of the format of cooperation, other than the original exchange programs, summer school and short-term exchange programs, BRICS countries can also promote sister relations in universities with specific professional fields and similar talent training goals, carry out joint education, co-build international laboratories and cooperation centers, and promote distance education.

Strengthen Government Support for Higher Education Cooperation

First, increase scholarships for BRICS students and funding support for BRICS education cooperation projects. As mentioned before, the economic conditions of students from the BRICS countries are generally poorer, and many students are unable to participate in exchange programs because of the expensive fees. In this regard, the five countries can increase the number of scholarships types for students from the BRICS countries and increase the number of beneficiaries for each of these scholarships to allow more outstanding young people who are interested in the development of the BRICS to participate in the exchange projects. In addition, for other educational cooperation projects that are in progress, financial support can be enhanced to expand the influence of cooperation.

Second, in terms of policies, cooperation in the field of education quality certification and evaluation and academic credit certification standards can be promoted. At present, the BRICS countries have carried out many multilateral and bilateral educational exchange programs. However, the five countries have different education systems, and there are certain gaps in the regulations of education quality. Therefore, the development of education cooperation in BRICS countries should focus on improving the education policies of the five countries, strengthening and expanding cooperation in the field of education quality and certification, and accomplishing the system of mutual recognition of academic degrees and exchange of credits.

Deepen Cooperation in Higher Education with Global South

In the field of education, the Global South countries and BRICS countries now face many common difficulties and problems such as ensuring equality in higher education opportunities, eliminating gender inequality, caring for vulnerable groups and improving the quality of education. BRICS higher education cooperation is in line with the UNESCO Education 2030 Action Framework. Under this framework, efforts are made to promote the sustainable development of education, actively contribute the "BRICS Solution" to the world, enhance the influence and increase the benefit of BRICS higher education cooperation, create an open and diverse partnership network in educational development, increase accessibility for more developing countries to take the "fast train" and "free ride" of BRICS education development, and lead and promote the development of quality fair education around the world. By analyzing the current cooperation situation of BRICS education and summarizing the solutions and cooperation proposals on the same challenges, the valuable practical experience from BRICS cooperation could then be applied to the development of higher education in the Global South.

As influential developing countries in each of their respective continents, the BRICS countries have similarities in global and regional competition. Therefore, the higher educational cooperation of BRICS plays a leading role in the education development of emerging countries. It is suggested that in the future, the development of higher education in the Global South can be promoted by the BRICS' educational cooperation. In the first place, the countries of BRICS and Global South should establish an international synergetic mechanism, and maintain close contact with international organizations, such as UNESCO, to support the development of educational cooperation among these counties. This would utilize international forces to promote and deepen exchanges of higher education between the countries and to form a collaborative mechanism. Secondly, BRICS countries should expand the scope of the BRICS higher education cooperation to promote the development of education in the Global South. Under the "BRIC+" initiative, educational cooperation projects could also involve universities from the Global South, while concurrently intensifying contact with top universities to improve the quality of the projects. By analyzing the current cooperation situation of BRICS education and summarizing the solutions and cooperation proposals on the same challenges, the valuable practical experiences could be applied to the development of higher education in the Global South.

Conclusions

Based on the summary of the above report and the 3 case studies on existing BRICS education cooperation, we can arrive at the following conclusions:

It is clear that there are long-term benefits for strengthening BRICS cooperation in education. Not only is education cooperation an important sector for BRICS cooperation, it also reflects the results that BRICS countries have achieved in cooperation. Under the concept of win-win cooperation, strengthening education cooperation will promote both interactions between teachers and students of BRICS countries, as well as the exchange of education ideology. This will promote development of education in each of the five BRICS countries and also aid in the cultivation of talents who are well versed in BRICS issues. Furthermore, as compared to developed countries, BRICS countries and countries in the Global South share many common challenges in education development. As the representative of emerging countries, education cooperation among BRICS countries will also promote educational development in the Global South and provide valuable experiences for other developing countries.

Significant education cooperation between BRICS countries has already been achieved currently due to the support from the BRICS Education Ministers' Meeting. However, there are still many challenges faced in cooperation. In the case of the BRICS Network University, BRICS Universities League and BRICS summer school, which were mentioned in the report, while these 3 modes of cooperation each have achieved varying results in BRICS cooperation, they are still plagued by the problems of lack of multidisciplinary and multilateral exchanges, lack of sufficient financial support and weak publicity. These are thus areas that ought to be addressed and improve in future BRICS cooperation. Therefore, the BRICS counties should deepen cooperation in higher education from various aspects and at the same time, it is also important to increase the collaboration with countries of Global South.

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BOOK REVIEW

Victoria Smolkin (2018). A Sacred Space Is Never Empty. A History of Soviet Atheism. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press[1]

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Since the turn of the century, a reappraisal of secularization thesis in social sciences of religion resulted in a growing body of research on diversity of secularism, or rather secularisms. In recent years, we have seen an expanding interest in atheism, or again rather atheisms. Atheism traditionally understood as either an ideological stance in the Enlightenment or militant repression of religion in the Soviet Union is now studied as a spiritual phenomenon and as historical experience. Victoria Smolkin book – the monumental exposition of the history of Soviet atheism – analyzes it in its complexity and multidimensionality tracing its development from an ideological precept of Marxism-Leninism to the state policy of expunging Russian Orthodoxy from the Soviet public life, to social science methodology in the study of religion, to philosophical inquiry into the nature of spirituality and moral commitment.

Smolkin generally structures the argument around the "three sets of oppositions: the political opposition between the party's commitment to ideological purity and state's pursuit of effective governance; the ideological opposition between religion, superstition, and backwardness and science, reason, and progress; and the spiritual opposition between emptiness and indifference and fullness and conviction" (p. 5). As she supposes, these sets of oppositions could be usefully reformulated into three questions that puzzled the Soviet authorities in their efforts to deal with religion: "What kind of state Soviet Communism should produce" (p. 5); "What kind of society Soviet Communism should produce" (p. 5); and "What kind of person Soviet Communism should produce" (p. 5).

Although the ideological view on religion hardly changed in the course of Soviet history, atheism had to be "reimagined in fundamental ways" (p. 3), which reflected the Soviet government's self-reinvention and reinterpretation of its goals. Thus, these oppositions and questions, in fact, conform to the stages of

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Soviet history. The respective problems the Soviet government faced in achieving these purposes on each of these stages also varied and required different approaches and tools, which Smolkin consequently observes.

She shows that in the early Soviet period, Bolshevik leaders regarded the Russian Orthodox Church as a fundamentally counterrevolutionary force. Therefore, despite the initial promise of secularization and certain support for religious minorities, Bolsheviks launched a devastating attack on the Russian Orthodox Church in order to eliminate its economic and political potential. Apart from confiscations and evictions, militant atheism was unleashed on religious believers and clergy through state sponsored propaganda. After 1929, legislation was enacted, religions were practically forced out of the public space with "prohibition of performing any form of charity or social work, as well as religious education" (p. 239). Since Stalin's sudden change of policy in 1943, all who survived the purges of the 1920–30s were co-opted to serve – willingly or not – to the goals of the Soviet government at home and abroad. Religious organizations were effectively controlled by the state apparatus, although the veneer of separation of the state and church was put in place. Antireligious propaganda was practically hushed.

After the denunciation of Stalin's personality cult, in order to legitimize his leadership, Khrushchev tried to revive revolutionary ideals and with them the hope of a society freed from religion. Thus, Smolkin stresses, religion was "reconstituted as an ideological problem" (p. 239) rather than as a political threat. Khrushchev invested heavily in mass education and propaganda "to inculcate a scientific materialist worldview" (p. 15), which was supposed to eradicate the ideological grasp of religion over presumably still ignorant, backward and politically inconsistent people. The alien and corrupting influence of religious beliefs and practices was construed as one of the causes which hindered further progress of Soviet society on its way to Communism. Scientific atheism was, therefore, to replace militant atheism of the early Soviet period.

Scientific atheism relied on enlightenment of the masses and investigation into the factors that could explain the persistence of religion in Soviet society. At the same time, the state did not hesitate to resume its repression by closing religious spaces, disbanding religious communities and enforcing legal and financial restrictions on religious institutions and clergy. Yet, the campaigns had limited success. As Smolkin rightly indicates, "for Soviet atheists, the lesson of Khrushchev's antireligious campaign was that many Soviet people had little trouble reconciling science and religion, or (un) belief with (religious) practice. Many continued to rely on religion for moral norms, traditions, and rites of passage. Religion, then, continued to shape communities, families, and individuals" (p. 240). Thus, the challenge of intractable religious beliefs and practices along with the developing academic study of religions forced the Soviet ideologues to reconsider their very understanding of the nature of religion and to rethink their strategy of eliminating religion.

In their struggle against religion, imagined as a bunch of false beliefs and superstitions, on which venal clergy feeds and which barely survive in the new world of Socialism, the atheists and antireligious campaigners encountered religion that was lived. And, in Smolkin's words, "the problem with lived religion was precisely that it was a world distinct, if not apart, from religious dogma and institutions. Rather than being confined to specific spaces and texts (which could be regulated and disciplined by church and state authorities), lived religion was domesticated, dispersed, and therefore often beyond the party's reach" (p. 163). Therefore, the new strategy of the struggle against religion should aim at substituting Soviet rituals and emotional experiences for religious practices. Instead of simply repressing or repudiating religion, the atheists should engage in promoting the "socialist way of life" (p. 198). Smolkin summarizes another stage of atheism's re-invention: "Finding themselves in the unexpected role of spiritual caretakers, Soviet atheists shifted their attention inward, to the interior worlds of ordinary Soviet people" (p. 240).

But, Smolkin continues, the challenge of persisting religions was more dangerous, Marxist laws of historical development postulated the gradual disappearance of religion in a society on its way to Communism. The continued presence of religion could upon reflection lead to the conclusion that the Soviet society was not actually on its way to Communism. Thus, as Smolkin underlines, religion at first regarded as a political threat, and then as an ideological opponent, has now become an existential challenge. Moreover, the advances in the empirical study of religion as it existed in the Soviet Union uncovered a phenomenon which shocked the Soviet authorities and ideologues: "For Soviet atheists, the fact of indifference came to be more unsettling than the fact of the continued existence of religion...Whereas believers could be engaged and converted, those who were indifferent had no interest in the questions at the heart of religion or atheism. They were disengaged from religious or ideological truth claims, and were unconcerned if their actions did not accord with their convictions, since they lacked firm convictions" (p. 240).

According to Smolkin, in late Soviet period the true nature of Soviet atheism was revealed. It did not seek merely the disappearance of religion, it aspired to effect the conversion to the Communist values. Because indifference was primarily widespread among Soviet youth, the future of the Soviet system was endangered. The struggle of the Soviet regime with religion's political, ideological and spiritual authority exposed atheism's inability to offer a positive program of its own for existential problems people had to face. By demolishing the sacred in the public space and failing to fill the cleared space with new values, adequate for a modernizing society, which just discovered the pleasures of individualization and consumerism, atheism contributed to the emergence and growth of indifference, which Soviet social scientists diagnosed in the late Soviet period. In the 1980s, however, Soviet people turned "to alternative spiritual, ideological, and even political commitments" (p. 241), which "again made religion into a political problem" (p. 241). Smolkin concludes: if earlier religion could be described as a survival and – subject to the laws of historical development – destined to disappear, the spiritual revival under Brezhnev, glasnost that opened mass media for religious voices and the official celebration of the Orthodoxy's millennium in 1988 "disrupted the internal logic of the Soviet Communism" (p. 244).

Smolkin's book is a panoramic study, which describes stages of the Soviet atheism's development and its specific features in the context of raise and fall of the Soviet state. Her book is a must-read for those who specialize in the Soviet history, as well as for those who work in Religious Studies.

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BOOK REVIEW

Jonathan Floyd (2017). Is Political Philosophy Impossible? Thoughts and Behavior in Normative Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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Jonathan Floyd holds a position of Senior lecturer in Political theory at the University of Bristol. In 2011, he co-edited (in collaboration with Marc Stears) a book *Political Philosophy versus History*. In this book, Floyd first proposed his original approach called normative behaviorism. The reviewed book in its turn is his first monograph and the most comprehensive statement of the approach. It is worth attention and careful reading for two reasons. First, it considers the deepest question of the discipline. Second, it is an exemplary work in analytic political philosophy. In this review, I will try to summarize main ideas presented in the book and explain, why, despite all its merits, it did not make a breakthrough in the field.

The main purpose of the book is to introduce a new way of doing political philosophy. Thus, Floyd claims that it is about (and of) political philosophy, particularly its deepest foundational principles. In the first part, *Symptom*, the author argues that debates in contemporary political philosophy are rationally interminable. He explains it by the fact that the discipline must be understood in terms of organizing question (OQ) – how should we live? Examining contemporary political philosophers' works and ideas, Floyd realizes that they "have failed to provide a *convincing* and *meaningful* answer to this question" (p. 98). Besides this, Floyd distinguishes two more questions: foundational question (Why should we live that way and not another?) and guiding question (Is it possible to provide a convincing and meaningful answer to OQ?). He comes to the ambiguous conclusion that political philosophy is impossible to do and impossible to avoid doing. It is impossible to do because we cannot provide a decisive answer to the OQ. It is impossible to avoid doing just because people anyway live within certain political system based on the existing principles and answers. This is what Floyd calls the impossibility thesis. It is the first of his main ideas presented in the book.

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The part *Diagnosis* is devoted to the idea of mentalism, the second main idea of the book. In his effort to find the cause of political philosophy's interminability, Floyd states that it is mentalist paradigm. It means that "political philosophers attempt to discover and then apply whatever set of normative political principles is already implicitly expressed within our existing normative thought" (p. 100). The author argues that it is the dominant method of political philosophy. Surprisingly, the author claims that these normative principles derived from our vision of how the world should be are inconsistent and thus impossible. Thus, Floyd identifies six mentalist techniques. It brings him to the conclusion that there are no comprehensive normative positions in contemporary political philosophy.

The third and the most important idea, normative behaviorism, is developed in the third part *Cure*. Floyd claims that this is a new model of political philosophy that is able to give a convincing and meaningful answer to OQ and solve the dilemma of interminability. The author claims that the idea of normative behaviorism holds "hat rather than trying to convert patterns in human thought into convincing and meaningful political principles, we should try to do the same with patterns in human behavior" (p. 3). This approach focuses mostly on two phenomena: crime and insurrection. Thus, the most suitable political system is the one that produces less of this behavior. And the best developed so far, according to normative behaviorism, is social liberal democracy.

As was already noted, this is an exemplary book of analytic political philosophy. It is comprehensible and easy to read. Moreover, the way of developing ideas in this book is like doctor's activity, where Floyd assesses the symptoms, determines a diagnosis and recommends a cure for ailing political philosophy. It is worth mentioning that this cure is elaborated by Floyd himself. These steps are reflected in the book structure. The author uses simple language and employs clear structure without any intrigue or sophisticated tricks. Moreover, Floyd often tries to keep in touch with a reader by asking, explaining and clarifying his arguments.

In spite of its merits, Floyd's book did not make a breakthrough within the discipline. Moreover, it raises more questions than it succeeds in answering. The problem arises already at the starting point. Why exactly this question defines the essence of political philosophy? Isn't it more suitable for ethics? The organizing question of political philosophy Floyd proposes seems both too broad and too specific. It seems too broad because political philosophy is unable to tell people how they should live in general. It touches only upon political aspect of their existence. It seems too specific because political philosophy tries to answer a number of other questions, which are not related to human way of life.

The size of the book is traditional for the discipline, but makes the reader to wonder why a large part of it is given to reiterations and re-phrasings of what was already said. I believe the argument could be more concise. Even Floyd himself in the introduction points out that one can skip some parts depending on the reasons one reads it for.

Finally, does normative behaviorism really solve the problem? Fighting against pluralism of universalist approaches, Floyd comes to the same dead-end: Floyd repudiates the existing approaches while the only one deemed correct is his own. This conclusion seems yet another variant of existing criticisms of preceding political thought, it emphasizing particular aspects such as political realism and diagnostic practice. But leaves these aspects insufficiently justified, for one could ask if all people behave in the same way? Although trying to change rules of the game by reinventing the ground for establishing political principles, Floyd arrives to the homely widespread conclusion: the best way of living is social liberal democracy. This seems highly ideological.

Regardless of these observations, this book is an important contribution to the discipline because there are too few works that examine the foundations of political philosophy. It is relevant to the current debates as well, for political philosophers today are mostly concerned with methodological issues of the field. It also encourages us to look at the current political situation and study political behavior, which is to be oriented to the current state of affairs. However, this book needs a professional reader with a serious background and critical attitude. If one needs another argument for social liberal democracy as the best political system one can live in, one can try to struggle through this reading.

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Reports	
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Working paper	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Working Paper No. 123). Location: Publisher. Author, A. A. (2012). Title of work (Working Paper No. 123). Retrieved from *Name website*: https://www.w3.org
Discussion paper	Author, A. A. (2012). *Title of work* (Discussion Paper No. 123). Location: Publisher. Author, A. A. (2012). Title of work (Discussion Paper No. 123). Retrieved from *Name website*: https://www.w3.org
Personal communication	Personal communication includes letters, emails, memos, messages from discussion groups and electronic bulletin boards, personal interviews. Cite these only in the text. Include references for archived material only.
Other reference types	
Patent	Cho, S. T. (2005). U.S. Patent No. 6,980,855. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Map	London Mapping Co. (Cartographer). (1960). Street map. [Map]. Retrieved from http://www.londonmapping.co.uk/maps/xxxxx.pdf
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Computer program	Rightsholder, A. A. (2010). *Title of Program* (Version number) [Description of form]. Location: Name of producer. Name of software (Version Number) [Computer software]. Location: Publisher. If the program can be downloaded or ordered from a website, give this information in place of the publication information.

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